Political dynasties in defense of democracy: The Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act

ONLINE APPENDIX

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# Appendix A: Description of the data

#### Table A1: List of dynastic parliamentarians

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Parliamentarian in 1940** | **Pro-democratic dynasty** | **Dynasty Founder** | **Political regime** | **Function** | **Party** |
| Bernard d'Aillières  | no | Augustin, Henry Caillard d'Aillières | July Monarchy | Deputy (1837-1839) | Ministerial majority |
| André Albert  | yes | François Albert | Third Republic | Senator (1920-1927) Deputy (1928-1933) | Radical Party |
| Gaston Allemane  | yes | Jean Allemane | Third Republic | Took part in the Commune (1871)Deputy (1901-1902 /1906-1910) | Republican - Socialist |
| Hubert d'Andlau de Hombourg  | no | Frédéric-Antoine-Marc d'Andlau | Monarchy | Noble at the General Estate of 1789 | Royalist |
| Joseph Antier  | no | Abbé Antier  | Absolute monarchy | Reactionary Abbot during the French Revolution | Monarchist  |
| Paul Antier  | no | Abbé Antier  | Absolute monarchy | Reactionary Abbot during the French Revolution | Monarchist  |
| Étienne d'Audiffret-Pasquier  | no | Etienne-Denis Pasquier | Restoration July Monarchy | President of the deputies assembly (1816-1817)President of the Chamber of Pairs (1830-1848) | Monarchist  |
| Léonide Babaud-Lacroze  | yes | Antoine Babaud-Lacroze | Third Republic | Deputy (1890-1919) | Republican |
| Paul Bachelet  | yes | Henri Bachelet | Third Republic | Senator (1920-1930) | Republican Union |
| Emerand Bardoul  | no | Julien-Marie Bardoul | Third Republic | Mayor of Marsac-sur DonConseiller général of Guéméné Penfao | Republican Federation |
| Jacques Bardoux  | yes | Agénor Bardoux | Third Republic | Deputy (1876-1881) Senator (1882-1897) | Republican |
| Léon Baréty  | yes | Alexandre Baréty | Third Republic | Conseiller général Mayor of Puget Théniers  | Republican |
| Étienne Baron  | yes | Jean Baron  | Third Republic | Mayor of Lauzerte (1896-1904)Conseiller général (1892-1904) | Republican  |
| Comte Jean de Beaumont  | no | Marc-Antoine de Beaumont | Restoration | Pair of France (1814-1830) | Monarchist  |
| Adrien Bels  | yes | Gabriel Lamothe-Pradelle | Third Republic | Deputy (1885-1888) | Republican |
| Paul Bénazet  | no | Louis Marie Joseph Bénazet | Restoration  | General of the EmpireMayor of Dunkirk(1826-1846) | Monarchist  |
| Louis de Blois  | no | Eugène Caillaux | Third Republic | Deputy (1871-1876)Senator (1876-1882) | Monarchist  |
| Jean Boivin-Champeaux  | yes | Paul Boivin-Champeaux | Third Republic | Senator (1907-1925) | Democratic Left |
| François Boux de Casson  | no | Charles de Casson | Absolute monarchy | Local Lord  | Monarchist  |
| André Breton  | yes | Jules-Louis Breton | Third Republic | Deputy (1898-1921)Senator (1921-1930) | Socialist |
| Auguste Brunet  | yes | Louis Brunet | Third Republic | Deputy (1893-1905)Senator(1905) | Republican  |
| Louis Buyat  | yes | Etienne Buyat | Third Repubic  | Deputy (1876-1887) | Republican |
| Joseph Caillaux  | no | Alexandre Eugène Caillaux | Third Republic | Deputy (1871-1876)Senator (1876-1882) | Monarchist  |
| Stanislas de Castellane  | no | Boniface de Castellane | Restoration | Pair of France (1815-1837) | Monarchist  |
| Jean Chaulin-Servinière  | yes | Lucien Chaulin-Servinière | Third Republic | Deputy (1889-1898) | Progressist Republican |
| Alphonse Chautemps  | yes | Emile Chautemps | Third Republic | Deputy (1889-1905)Senator (1905-1918) | Radical Socialist |
| Camille Chautemps  | yes | Emile Chautemps | Third Republic | Deputy (1889-1905)Senator (1905-1918) | Radical Socialist |
| Emery Compayré  | no | Etienne Compayré | Revolution | Legislative body (1798-1803) | Bonapartist |
| Joseph Coucoureux  | yes | Lucien Coucoureux | Third Republic | Conseiller général (1875-1907) | Republican |
| Charles Delesalle  | no | Charles Delesalle | Third Republic | Mayor of Lille (1904-1919) | No political affiliation (Right conservatism) |
| Roger Delthil  | yes | Camille Delthil | Third Republic | Mayor of Moissac (1894-1895)Senator (1902) | Republican |
| René Delzangles  | no | Pierre Delzangles | Third Republic | Mayor of Villefranque | No political affiliation |
| Jean Deschanel  | yes | Emile Deschanel | Third Republic | Deputy (1876-1881)Senator (1881-1904) | Moderate Republican |
| Charles Desjardins  | yes | Jules Desjardins | Third Republic | Deputy (1893-1914) | Moderate Republican |
| Louis de Diesbach de Belleroche  | no | Eugène de Belleroche de Diesbach | Third Republic | Deputy (1871-1876) | Bonapartist |
| Pierre Dignac  | no | Eugène Dignac | July Monarchy | Mayor of Gujan-Mestras | Monarchist  |
| Jacques Duboys-Fresney  | yes | Etienne Duboys-Fresney | July Monarchy | Deputy (1842-1846 / 1871-1876) | Republican |
| Pierre Duchesne-Fournet  | yes | Paul Duchesne-Fournet | Third Republic | Deputy (1881-1885)Senator (1894-1906) | Republican |
| Pierre Dupuy  | yes | Jean Dupuy | Third Republic | Senator (1891-1919) | Republican |
| Henri Elby  | yes | Jules Elby | Third Republic | Senator (1923-1933) | Republican Union |
| Pierre Even  | yes | Jacques Even | Third Republic | Deputy (1881-1885) | Republican Left |
| André Fallières  | yes | Armand Fallières | Third Repubic  | Deputy (1876-1889) | Republican Left |
| Roger Farjon  | yes | Pierre Farjon  | Third Republic | Deputy (1906-1910) | Republican |
| Camille Ferrand  | yes | Emile Labussière | Third Republic | Deputy (1893-1906) | Socialist |
| Pierre-Étienne Flandin  | yes | Hippolyte Ribière | Third Republic | Senator (1876-1885) | Republican Left |
| Achille-Armand Fould  | no | Achille Marcus Fould | Second Empire | Minister of State (1852-1860) | Bonapartist |
| François du Fretay  | no | René Monjaret de Kerjégu | Absolute monarchy | Concellor of the KingMayor of Moncontour | Monarchist  |
| Félix Gadaud  | yes | Antoine Gadaud | Third Republic | Deputy (1885-1889)Senator (1891-1897) | Republican Union |
| André Goirand  | yes | Léopold Goirand | Third Republic | Deputy (1887-1898)Senator (1906-1920 | Republican |
| Georges de Grandmaison Charles  | no | Comte Lobau | Restoration | Deputy (1828-1833) | Monarchist  |
| Robert de Grandmaison  | no | Comte Lobau | Restoration | Deputy (1828-1833) | Monarchist  |
| Edmond Hannotin  | no | Maurice Sabatier | Third Republic | Mayor of Viry-Chatillon | Conservatism |
| André Join-Lambert  | no | Arthur Join-Lambert | Third Republic | Conseiller général of Brionne | Monarchist  |
| Marquis Jacques de Juigné  | no | Jacques Leclerc de Juigné | Absolute monarchy | Representing nobility at the General Estate of 1789 | Monarchist  |
| Edgar de Kergariou  | no | Joseph de Kergariou | Restoration | Deputy (1820-1827) | Monarchist  |
| Guy La Chambre  | no | Charles-Emile La Chambre | Third Republic | Deputy (1876-1878 / 1889-1893) | Monarchist |
| Marquis Henri de La Ferronnays  | no | Pierre Léon de la Ferronnays | Restoration  | Pair of France | Monarchist  |
| Lucien Lamoureux  | yes | Etienne Lamoureux | Third Republic | Deputy (1910-1914) | Republican radical socialist |
| Fernand Lavergne  | yes | Bernard Lavergne | Second Empire | Deputy (1849-1851 / 1876-1889)Senator (1889-1900) | Montagne / Republican |
| Edmond Leblanc  | no | Edmond Lucien Leblanc | Third Republic | Deputy (1884-1889) | Conservative Union |
| Jean Le Cour Grandmaison  | no | Adolphe le Cour Grandmaison | Second Republic | Deputy (1849) | Bonapartist |
| Edmond Lefebvre du Prey  | no | François-Joseph Lefebvre-Cayet | Directory | Member of the "Conseil des Anciens" (1800-1811) | Monarchist  |
| Victor Lourties  | yes | Victor Lourties | Third Republic | Senator (1888-1920) | Republican left |
| Émile Malon  | no | Pascal Malon | Third Republic | Mayor of Saint-Georges de Rouellé | No political affiliation |
| Augustin Michel  | yes | Adrien Michel | Third Republic  | Deputy (1902-1906) | Republican moderate |
| Eugène Milliès-Lacroix  | yes | Raphaël Milliès-Lacroix | Third Republic | Senator (1897-1933) | Republican |
| Joseph Monsservin  | yes | Emile Monsservin | Third Republic | Senator (1892-1911) | Republican |
| Hubert de Montaigu  | no | François de Wendel | Restoration | Deputy (1815-1825) | Monarchist  |
| Geoffroy de Montalembert  | no | Marc René de Montalembert | Restoration | Pair of France (1819-1830) | Monarchist  |
| Jean Montigny  | no | Jean-Joseph de Verneilh-Puyraseau | Restoration | Deputy (1817-1824 / 1827-1830) | Monarchist  |
| Louis Nachon  | no | Missing Name | Third Republic | Mayor of Conliège (1891-1921) | No political affiliation |
| Henri de Pavin de Lafarge  | no | Joseph Pavin de Lafarge | Third Republic | Mayor of Viviers (1897-1935) | Republican Federation |
| François Piétri  | no | Francois Piétri | French Revolution | Deputy at the Constituting Assembly | Moderate group |
| Étienne Pinault  | yes | Eugène Pinault | Third Republic | Deputy (1876-1889)Senator (1901-1913) | Republican Union |
| Jean-Pierre Plichon  | no | Ignace Plichon | July Monarchy | Deputy (1846-1848 / 1857-1888) | Monarchist  |
| François Reille-Soult-Dalmatie  | no | Jean-de Dieu Soult | July Monarchy | Chief of government (1832-1834 / 1839-1847) | Monarchist  |
| René Rollin  | yes | Henri Rollin  | Third Republic | Deputy (1932-1933) | Republican Radical Socialist |
| Guillaume des Rotours  | no | Eugène des Rotours | Second Empire | Deputy (1868-1889) | Bonapartist |
| Georges Roulleaux-Dugage  | no | Henri Roulleaux Dugage | Second Empire | Deputy (1852-1870) | Bonapartist |
| Édouard Roussel  | yes | Edouard Roussel | Third Republic  | Conseiller général (1898-1910) | Republican |
| Henri Salengro  | yes | Roger Salengro | Third Republic | Deputy (1928-1936) | Socialist |
| Albert Sarraut  | yes | Omer Sarraut | Third Repubic  | Mayor of Carcassone (1887) | Radical |
| Paul Saurin  | no | Paul Saurin | Third Republic | Senator (1927-1933) | Independant |
| Émile Taudière  | no | Jacques-Paul Taudière | Third Republic | Deputy (1889-1893) | Conservatism |
| René Thorp  | yes | Antoine Dubost | Third Republic | Deputy (1880-1897)Senator (1897-1921) | Radical |
| Pierre Sérandour | yes | Pierre Marie Sérandour | Third Republic | Deputy (1924-1928) | Republican left |
| Marcel-François Astier  | yes | Francois Astier | Third Republic  | Deputy (1909-1910) | Radical Socialist |
| Laurent Bonnevay  | yes | Jacques Bonnevay | Third Republic | Conseiller général du Rhônes | Republican |
| Georges Bruguier  | yes | Victorien Bruguier | Third Republic | Municipal council of Nice (1888-"") | Republican |
| Pierre de Chambrun  | no | Joseph Aldebert de Chambrun | Second Empire | Deputy (1857-1871) | Bonapartist |
| Maurice Delom-Sorbé  | yes | Joseph Delom-Sorbé | Third Republic | Deputy (1914-1921) | Republican Left |
| Marx Dormoy  | yes | Jean Dormoy | Third Republic | Mayor of Montlucon (1892-1898) | Socialist |
| Amédée Guy  | yes | Jules Guy | Third Republic | Mayor of Bonneville (1900-1904) | Republican |
| Jean Hennessy  | no | Jacques Hennessy | Restoration | Deputy(1824-1842) | Monarchist  |
| François Labrousse  | yes | Philippe Labrousse | Third Republic | Deputy (1884-1893)Senator (1894-1910) | Radical left |
| Albert Le Bail  | yes | Roland le Bail  | Restoration | Mayor of Plozévet (1837-1840) | Anti-Monarchist Republican |
| Alfred Margaine  | yes | Henri Margaine | Third Republic  | Deputy (1871-1888)Senator (1888-1893) | Republican Left |
| Robert Mauger  | yes | Pierre Mauger-Violleau | Third Republic | Deputy (1924) | Republican Socialist |
| Léonel de Moustier  | no | Clément Edouard, de Moustier | July Monarchy | Deputy (1824-1827) | Monarchist  |
| Léon Roche  | no | Marie-Léon Roche | Third Republic | Mayor of Oradour-sur-Vayre | No political affiliation |
| Isidore Thivrier  | yes | Christophe Thivrier | Third Republic | Deputy (1889-1895) | Republican |
| Théodore Steeg | yes | Jules Steeg | Third Republic  | Deputy (1881-1889) | Republican Union |
| Paul Bastid | yes | Paul Devès | Third Republic | Deputy (1876-1885) | Republican Left |
| Michel Tony-Révillon | yes | Tony Révillon | Third Republic | Deputy (1881-1893) | Socialist |
| Robert Lassalle  | yes | Gustave Lassalle | Third Republic | Conseiller général of Soustons (1901-1913) | Republican |
| Jean Bouhey | yes | Jean-Baptiste Bouhey-Allex | Third Republic | Deputy (1902-1913) | Socialist |
| François de Wendel | no | François de Wendel | Restoration | Deputy (1815-1825) | Monarchist  |
| Jean Chiappe  | no | Ange Chiappe | Convention  |  Deputy (1792-1797) | Moderate - Conservatism |
| Bernard de Coral | no | Jules Labat | Second Empire | Deputy(1869-1893) | Moderate Conservatism |
| Paul Cuttoli | yes | Jules Cuttoli | Third Republic | Deputy (1928-1936) | Republican radical |
| Ernest Daraignez | no | Joseph Daraignez | Third Republic | Mayor of Hagetmau (1904-1908) | No political affiliation |
| Armand Dupuis | no | Charles Dupuis | Third Republic | Mayor and Conseiller général | No political affiliation |
| Paul Faure | yes | M. Faure | Third Republic | Conseiller général de Dordogne | Republican |
| Michel Geistdoerfer | yes | Michel Geistdoerfer | Third Republic | Municipal Council of Dinan | Republican |
| François Charles d'Harcourt | no | Francois Gabriel d'Harcourt | July Monarchy | Deputy (1827-1837) | Monarchist  |
| James Hennessy | no | Jacques Hennessy | Restoration | Deputy(1824-1842) | Monarchist  |
| Paul Vasseux | no | Name missing | Second Empire | Mayor of Golancourt | No political affiliation |
| Georges Denis  | no | Jean-Henri Merle d'Aubigné | First Empire (Germany) | Chaplain to Wilhem the first | Monarchist - Evangelist |
| Jean Neyret  | no | Blaise Neyret | Third Republic | Deputy (1914-1924) | Republican Federation |
| Jacques Poitou-Duplessy  | no | Roger Poitou-Duplessy | Third Republic | Deputy(1910-1914) | Catholic of Liberal Action |
| François de Saint-Just  | no | Victor de Saint-Just d'Autingues | Third Republic | Deputy (1924-1933) | Republican Federation |
| Charles Saint-Venant  | yes | Charles Saint-Venant | Third Republic | Deputy (1919-1926) | Socialist |
| Paul Giacobbi  | yes | Marius Giacobbi | Third Republic | Deputy (1914-1919)Senator (1903-1912) | Radical |
| Paul Reynaud | yes | Hippolyte Gassier | Third Republic | Deputy (1876-1885)Senator (1930-1907) | Republican |
| Maurice Cabart-Danneville | yes | Jean-Baptiste De Beauvais | French Revolution | Representing clergy at the General Estates of 1789 | Reformist |
| Amaury de la Grange | no | Prosper de Lagrange | Second Empire | Deputy (1852-1857) | Bonapartist |

#### Table A2: The origin of dynasties

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Pro-Democratic dynasty | Other dynasty |
|  |  | Numbers | Percentage | Numbers | Percentage |
| Ancien régime | < 1789 |  |  | 4 | 6.78% |
| 1789 Revolution and Constitutional Monarchy | 1789-1792 | 1 | 1.52% | 3 | 5.08% |
| First Republic | 1792-1795 |  |  | 1 | 1.69% |
| Directory  | 1795-1799 |  |  | 2 | 3.39% |
| Consulate and First Empire | 1799-1815# |  |  |  |  |
| Restoration | 1814-1830 | 1 | 1.52% | 14 | 23.73% |
| July Monarchy | 1830-1848 | 1 | 1.52% | 6 | 10.17% |
| Second Republic | 1848-1852 |  |  | 1 | 1.69% |
| Second Empire | 1852-1870 | 1 | 1.52% | 7 | 11.86% |
| Third Republic | 1870-1940 | 62 | 93.94% | 21 | 35.59% |
| Total |  | 66 | 100% | 59 | 100% |

# In fact 1814 with a short-lived return in 1815 (the Hundred days episode).

In the instances when an ancestor held several mandates, we code the beginning of the dynasty with the first mandate. Etienne Denis Pasquier held a political mandate both during the Restoration and the July Monarchy, we consider the dynasty began during the Restoration. In one instance, Georges Denis and his ancestor, Jean Henri Merle d’Aubigné, the dynasty began outside France. This case is therefore not included in our table.

#### Table A3: Variables definition

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Description** | **Source** |
| **Dependent variables** |
| Pro-democratic dynastic | 1 if family member is or has been a Mayor, a *Conseiller général* or a national representative in a party of a Republican origin | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Other dynastic | 1 if family member is or has been a Mayor, a Conseiller général or a national representative but is not consider pro-democratic | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Study Years | Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| **Control variables** |
| Freemason | 1 if Freemason (0 otherwise) | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| Study Years | Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Conseil Général | Time as a *Conseiller Général* (in years) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Age | Age of the representative | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| ***Constituency:*** |
| Mean No-votes per *département* | For each *département* the proportion of representatives opposing to the reform (excluding the vote of the observation) | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| Mean Abst per *département* | For each *département* the proportion of representatives abstaining (excluding the vote of the observation) | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| ***Constituency specific*** |
| Mean No-votes per party-département | Proportion of “No” votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and the same *département* | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| Mean Abst per party-*département* | Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and the same *département* | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| Mean No-votes per party if senator | Proportion of “No” votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and belonging to the *Sénat* (if the representative is a *Sénateur,* 0 otherwise) | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| Mean Abst per party-if Senator | Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and belonging to the *Sénat* (if the representative is a *Sénateur,* 0 otherwise) | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| ***Parliamentary group*** |
| Mean No-votes per parliamentary group | Proportion of «No» votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same parliamentary group | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| Mean Abst per parliamentary group | Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same parliamentary group | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| ***Personal*** |
| Occupied | 1 if the *département* of the representative is occupied (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website /  |
| Crossed | 1 if the *département* of the representative is crossed by the demarcation line (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Journalist | 1 if the representative is or has been a journalist (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Doc | 1 if the representative has or has had a medical profession (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Civil\_servant | 1 if the representative is or has been a civil\_servant (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Law | 1 if the representative has a law degree (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Low | 1 if the representative is a farmer or a worker (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Age | Age of the representative (in years) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Study years | Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| ***Mandate*** |
| Min | Time as a *Ministre* or a *Secrétaire d'Etat* (in years) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Conseil Général | Time as a *Conseiller Général* (in years) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Mayor | 1 if the representative is or has been a Mayor (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| National Mandate | Time as a *Député* or as a *Sénateur* | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| ***Social Status*** |
| Freemason | 1 if Freemason (0 otherwise) | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| Synd | 1 if the representative is or has occupied a position in a union (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Jewish | 1 if the representative declared being Jewish or he was victim of antisemetic attacks during parliamentary debates (0 otherwise) | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| WWI\_veteran | 1 if the representative served during WWI (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Legion | 1 if the representative has a *Légion d'honneur* (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| War\_Medal | 1 if the representative has a *Croix de guerre* (0 otherwise) | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| ***Party*** |
| Left | 1 if the representative belongs to a leftist party (0 otherwise). We follow the definition of parties adopted by Ermakoff (2008, p. 86-87). | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| Center | 1 if the representative belongs to a centrist party (0 otherwise). We follow the definition of parties adopted by Ermakoff (2008, p. 86-87). | Parliamentarians’ biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website |
| ***Occupation*** |
| Occupied | 1 if the representative is from an occupied *département* (0 otherwise) |  |
| Crossed | 1 if the representative is from an occupied *département* (0 otherwise) |  |
| ***Political behavior*** |
| Total opposition | Percentage of times a representative opposed to its parliamentary group's vote (if more than 66 percent of a parliamentary group voted along the same line) | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| Abstention | Number of times a representative abstained during the 5 previous votes dealing with checks and balances during the 1936-1940 legislature. | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| Scoreno | Number of times the representative voted against checks and balance dismantlement during the past five votes on this issue | *Journal Officiel de la République Française* |
| Length Bio | Length of the Biography in Joly’s dictionary | *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français (1889-1940)* |
| Dynasty with syndicalism | = 1 if the founder of the dynasty was active in a union | *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français (1889-1940) and Wikipédia page of some parliamentarians* |

#### Table A4: List of parties

|  |
| --- |
| *Leftwing parties* |
| Union populaire française, Section Française de l'internationale ouvrière |
| *Center parties* |
| Union socialiste républicaine, Gauche indépendante, Gauche radicale |
| *Rightwing parties* |
| Alliance démocratique, Indépendants d'action populaire, Républicains indépendants et d’action sociale, Indépendants républicains, Fédération républicaine, Gauche démocratique, Union Républicaine, Union démocratique républicaine, Parti républicain, Parti agraire et paysan français, Non inscrits |

Based on parliamentarians’ biographies and Ermakoff (2006, p. 86-87).

#### Table A5: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians versus Other dynastic parliamentarians

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (A5.1) | (A5.2) | (A5.3) | (A5.4) | (A5.5) | (A5.6) |
|  | Pro-democratic dynastic | Non-dynastic | Other dynastic |  (A5.2)-(A5.1)Non-dynastic – Pro-democratic dynastic | (A5.3)-(A5.1)Other dynastic – Pro-democratic dynastic  | (A5.2)-(A5.3)Non-dynastic – Other dynastic  |
| Age | 56.53 | 56.55 | 55.85 | 0.02 | -0.68 | 0.70 |
|  | (1.46) | (0.42) | (1.63) | (1.46) | (2.19) | (1.54) |
| In *Senate* | 0.5 | 0.34 | 0.4 | -0.16\*\*\* | -0.10 | 0.06 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.06) |
| Medical Profession | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.067 | -0.02 | -0.05 | 0.039 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) |
| Civil Servant | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.08 | -0.04 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.01) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.03) |
| Mean opposition in  | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.04 |
| *Département* | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Mean abstention in  | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.02 | -0.01 |
| *Département* | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Center | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.13 | -0.01 | -0.09 | -0.09 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.06) |

Standard deviation in brackets. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# Appendix B: Robustness checks

## B.1 The role of abstention

Our baseline specification contrasts explicit opposition to and approval of the enabling act. One may, however, view abstention could as an intermediate form of opposition to the act. To take this possibility into account, we estimate an ordered logit model where the dependent variable is a trichotomous variable coding the decision to cast a “Yes” vote, abstain, or cast a “No” vote, and the main explanatory variables are the two dummy variables coding pro-democratic and other dynasties. The results of that regression are reported in the first column of Table B3. In this regression, the pro-democratic dynasty dummy exhibits a positive coefficient statistically significant at the one percent level while the coefficient of the other dynasty dummy is statistically insignificant, confirming our baseline results. In the same vein, we estimate a multinomial logit model. This model simultaneously estimates the factors affecting the probability of abstaining and of opposing the act. These estimations reach results similar to baseline results: Pro-democratic dynasties do not influence abstention but opposition to the reform. We also now observe that other dynasties had a lower probability of abstaining in the vote but not to vote against the act.

#### Table B1: Taking abstention into account

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (B1.1) | (B1.2) | (B1.3) |
|  | Ordered logit | Multinomial Logit | Multinomial Logit |
| Dependent variable | Opposition (=0 if Votei=Yes / =1 if Votei=Abstention / =2 if Votei=No) | Votei =Abstention | Votei =No |
| Pro-democratic dynasty | 0.938\*\*\* | -1.090 | 1.061\*\*\* |
|  | (3.112) | (-0.866) | (2.878) |
| Other dynasty | 0.350 | -16.13\*\*\* | 0.766 |
|  | (0.480) | (-32.36) | (0.977) |
| Constant |  | -5.935\*\*\* | -6.120\*\*\* |
|  |  | (-2.672) | (-4.898) |
| Constant cut1 | 5.169\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (5.481) |  |  |
| Constant cut2 | 5.487\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (6.025) |  |  |
| Baseline controls | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Political orientation | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| *Départements* means | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 669 |
| Log-likelihood | -273.7 | -248.9 | -248.9 |

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

## B.2 Selection into the vote

Baseline estimates assess the effect of belonging to a pro-democratic dynasty on opposing the act. If dynastic membership also determined selection into the vote, our estimates could be biased. To investigate this issue, we first use the universe of French parliamentarians in 1940 as sample and then estimate a sequential logit model taking as dependent variables first the probability of being in Vichy then the probability of casting a “No” vote. The results of the estimation of the sequential logit model are reported in Table B2.a.

#### Table B2.a: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians, being in Vichy, and opposition to the 1940 enabling act: Sequential logit estimates

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (B2.1) | (B2.2) | (B2.3) | (B2.4) | (B2.5) | (B2.6) |
|  | Sequential logit | Sequential logit | Logit  | OLS | Logit | OLS |
| Dependent variable | Cast a vote | Opposition | Cast a vote | Cast a vote | Cast a vote and oppose | Cast a vote and oppose |
| Pro-democratic Dynasties | 0.466\* | 1.079\*\*\* | 0.520\* | 0.0528 | 1.163\*\*\* | 0.119\*\*\* |
|  | (1.838) | (2.811) | (1.803) | (1.527) | (3.057) | (2.976) |
| Other Dynasties | 0.333 | 0.808 | 0.123 | 0.0249 | 0.739 | 0.0691 |
|  | (0.774) | (1.025) | (0.306) | (0.475) | (0.980) | (1.442) |
| In *Senate* | -0.0216 | 0.684 | -0.355 | -0.0439 | 0.542 | 0.0334 |
|  | (-0.0673) | (1.120) | (-1.076) | (-1.259) | (1.143) | (0.823) |
| Age | -0.0179\* | 0.0194 | -0.0426\*\*\* | -0.00586\*\*\* | 0.0148 | 0.00143 |
|  | (-1.780) | (1.056) | (-3.253) | (-6.104) | (0.878) | (1.338) |
| Jewish | -1.099\*\*\* | 0.262 | 0.697 | 0.0360 | 0.0270 | -0.0249 |
|  | (-2.683) | (0.574) | (0.677) | (0.425) | (0.0592) | (-0.580) |
| Freemason | -0.338 | 0.998\* | 0.338 | 0.0577 | 0.673 | 0.0786\*\* |
|  | (-1.000) | (1.949) | (0.946) | (1.476) | (1.500) | (2.482) |
| Years of study | 0.0477 | 0.0477 | 0.133\*\*\* | 0.0162\*\*\* | 0.0500 | 0.00294 |
|  | (1.438) | (0.488) | (3.749) | (3.733) | (0.621) | (0.617) |
| Occupation : Journalist  | -0.408\* | -0.405 | 0.0573 | 0.0239 | -0.602 | -0.0272 |
|  | (-1.797) | (-0.807) | (0.232) | (0.813) | (-1.197) | (-0.836) |
| Law-related | -0.341 | 0.493 | -0.410 | -0.0403 | 0.299 | 0.00504 |
|  | (-1.220) | (0.916) | (-1.067) | (-1.215) | (0.627) | (0.201) |
| Medical profession | -0.155 | 0.977\* | -0.459 | -0.0712\*\* | 0.772 | 0.0417 |
|  | (-0.678) | (1.739) | (-1.554) | (-2.096) | (1.423) | (0.878) |
| Civil Servant | -0.355 | -1.027\* | -0.340 | -0.0338 | -1.181\*\*\* | -0.0512\*\*\* |
|  | (-0.960) | (-1.938) | (-0.750) | (-0.508) | (-2.634) | (-3.054) |
| Low-skilled | -0.342\* | 0.385 | -0.319 | -0.0387 | 0.411 | 0.0266 |
|  | (-1.791) | (1.218) | (-1.329) | (-0.999) | (1.416) | (1.217) |
| Occupied territory | -1.214\*\*\* | -0.236 | -1.324\*\*\* | -0.342\*\*\* | -0.643\* | 0.0475\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.632) | (-0.774) | (-4.788) | (-4.161) | (-1.825) | (2.819) |
| Crossed by the demarcation line | -0.470 | 0.0714 | -0.0888 | 0.0768 | -0.0927 | -0.0129 |
|  | (-1.153) | (0.249) | (-0.151) | (1.052) | (-0.374) | (-0.396) |
| WWI veteran | 0.320 | 0.288 | 0.292 | 0.0519 | 0.368\* | 0.0370\*\*\* |
|  | (1.193) | (1.416) | (1.213) | (1.632) | (1.953) | (2.854) |
| Constant | 3.143\*\*\* | -6.084\*\*\* | 4.825\*\*\* | 1.286\*\*\* | -5.605\*\*\* | -0.0522 |
|  | (5.051) | (-4.907) | (5.264) | (15.74) | (-5.239) | (-0.380) |
| Political orientation | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| *Départements* means | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  |
| *Départements* FE |  |  |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |
| Observations | 847 | 847 | 847 | 847 | 847 | 847 |
| R-squared |  |  |  | 0.267 |  | 0.297 |
| Pseudo-R² | . | . | 0.133 | . | 0.220 | . |

Sequential logit estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means or department fixed effects.

When estimating the probability of casting a no ballot on the whole population of parliamentarians (Columns B2.a.5 and B2.a.6), we still observe that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians have a 11.9 percentage points higher likelihood to oppose the act than their non-dynastic peers. Table B2.b shows that dynasts were not more likely than other parliamentarians to choose alternative ways to protest against the enabling act.

#### Table B2.b: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (B.2.b.1) | (B.2.b.2) | (B.2.b.3) | (B.2.b.4) | (B.2.b.5) |
| Dependent variable  | Prisoners | London | Massilia | Absent (Excused) | Absent (All) |
| Pro-democratic dynasties | -0.000468 | -0.00326 | -0.0104 | 0.0111 | -0.0538 |
|  | (-0.0458) | (-1.138) | (-0.466) | (0.650) | (-1.549) |
| Other Dynasties | -0.0154 | -0.00270 | -0.0166 | 0.0173 | -0.0268 |
|  | (-1.439) | (-0.824) | (-1.051) | (1.066) | (-0.496) |
| Constant | -0.213 | -0.0161 | 0.0629 | -0.0422 | -0.320\*\*\* |
|  | (-1.340) | (-1.144) | (0.726) | (-0.947) | (-3.618) |
| Political orientation | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Baseline control | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| *Département* FE | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Observations | 847 | 847 | 847 | 847 | 847 |
| R-squared | 0.276 | 0.127 | 0.220 | 0.136 | 0.263 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

## B.3 Logit estimates

#### Table B3: Pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians and opposition to the 1940 enabling act: Logit estimates

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (B3.1) | (B3.2) | (B3.3) | (B3.4) | (B3.5) | (B3.6) |
|  | Logit | Logit | Logit | Logit | Logit | Logit |
| Dependent variable | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No |
| Dynastic | 0.301\* |  | 0.995\*\* |  | 1.522\*\* |  |
|  | (1.832) |  | (2.403) |  | (2.405) |  |
| Pro-democratic Dynastic |  | 0.728\*\*\* |  | 1.079\*\*\* |  | 1.719\*\* |
|  |  | (3.478) |  | (2.811) |  | (2.217) |
| Other Dynasty |  | -0.414 |  | 0.808 |  | 1.164 |
|  |  | (-0.926) |  | (1.025) |  | (1.329) |
| Constant | -2.050\*\*\* | -2.050\*\*\* | -6.121\*\*\* | -6.084\*\*\* | -19.91\*\*\* | -19.88\*\*\* |
|  | (-7.077) | (-7.077) | (-4.886) | (-4.907) | (-7.757) | (-7.962) |
| Political orientation |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| *Départements* means |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |
| *Départements* FE |  |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Baseline controls |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 349 | 349 |
| Pseudo | 0.00194 | 0.00989 | 0.227 | 0.227 | 0.349 | 0.350 |
| Marginal effect – Dynasty | 0.03 |  | 0.08 |  | 0.17 |  |
| Marginal effect – Pro Dem Dyn |  | 0.08 |  | 0.09 |  | 0.19 |
| Marginal effect – Other Dyn |  | -0.04 |  | 0.07 |  | 0.13 |

Logit estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Marginal effects are computed from the reference value of the variable. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means or department fixed effects.

## B.4 Alternative clustering of standard errors

#### Table B4 Clustering at the département-level

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (B5.1.1) | (B5.1.2) | (B5.1.3) | (B5.1.4) |
| Dependent variable Votei = No |  |  |  |  |
| Dynasty | 0.0341 |  | 0.125\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.875) |  | (2.875) |  |
| Pro-democratic dynasties |  | 0.0964\* |  | 0.151\*\* |
|  |  | (1.693) |  | (2.612) |
| Other Dynasties |  | -0.0357 |  | 0.0946 |
|  |  | (-0.786) |  | (1.658) |
| Constant | 0.114\*\*\* | 0.114\*\*\* | -0.104 | -0.0972 |
|  | (5.787) | (5.782) | (-0.916) | (-0.858) |
| Political orientation |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Baseline control |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| *Département* FE |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 |
| R-squared | 0.001 | 0.008 | 0.333 | 0.334 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

#### Figure B1: Wild-Bootstrap – Graphical representation

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Without control variables | With the full set of control variables |
|  |  |

On the left panel are the results of the Wild-Bootstrap using 999 replications in a specification without control (akin to the specification presented in Column 2.2, Table 2). On the right panel are the results of the Wild-Bootstrap using 999 replications in a specification with full control variables (akin to the specification presented in Column 2.4, Table 2)

## B.5 Rebalancing of covariates using Propensity Score Matching

The baseline model controls for individual characteristics in a linear fashion. To complement this approach, we estimate a series of propensity score matching models using baseline controls to balance the “treated” and “non-treated” samples. We therefore compare pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians with other parliamentarians whose observable characteristics are similar.

Propensity score matching proceeds in two steps. In the first one, using the set of baseline controls, it assigns a score to each parliamentarian. This represents their probability of being a member of a pro-democratic dynasty according to observables. In the second step, parliamentarians from the treated group, i.e. those belonging to a pro-democratic dynasty, are matched with the parliamentarians from the control group –those who do not belong to a pro-democratic dynasty– with the closest score. The difference in the outcome variable between the two groups is comparable to an average treatment effect on the treated. The results of propensity score estimations are reported in Table B5. Results also confirm that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians behaved differently from other parliamentarians in the vote of the enabling act.

#### Table B5: Propensity Score Matching

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (B5.1) | (B5.2) | (B5.3) | (B5.4) | (B5.5) |
|  | Matching  | Matching  | Matching  | Matching  | Matching  |
| Number of match(es) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Dependent variable | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No |
|  |  |
|  | Panel A / Comparison group: Non-dynastic + Other dynastic parliamentarians |
| Democratic dynasty | 0.105\*\* | 0.105\*\* | 0.111\*\* | 0.101\*\* | 0.0982\*\* |
|  | (2.038) | (2.068) | (2.448) | (2.310) | (2.355) |
|  |  |
|  | Panel B / Comparison group: Non-dynastic parliamentarians |
| Democratic dynasty | 0.0877\*\* | 0.114\*\*\* | 0.117\*\*\* | 0.127\*\*\* | 0.105\*\*\* |
|  | (2.229) | (3.408) | (4.542) | (5.016) | (4.976) |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 |

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Matching on political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means. Standard errors take into account that the propensity score is estimated. Abadie-Imbens standard errors are presented in parentheses.

## B.6 Alternative coding of the Dynasty variable

This section uses an alternative coding of the dynastic variable. The variable is equal to zero if a parliamentarian is not a dynast, to 1 if he comes from a dynasty not qualified as a pro-democratic dynasty, and 2 for pro-democratic dynasts.

#### Table B.6: Alternative coding of the Dynasty variable

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (B6.1) | (B6.2) |
| Dependent variable Votei = No |  |  |
| Dynasty  | 0.0347\*\* | 0.0783\*\*\* |
| (alternative definition) | (2.386) | (3.045) |
| Constant | 0.111\*\*\* | -0.0945 |
|  | (3.754) | (-0.684) |
| Political orientation |  | 🗸 |
| Baseline control |  | 🗸 |
| *Département* FE |  | 🗸 |
| Observations | 669 | 669 |
| R-squared | 0.004 | 0.334 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects means.

## B.7 Considering different definitions of the veteran variable

Our database features 397 parliamentarians who were active during World War One. To assess whether they fought directly under Philippe Pétain we went back to their individual military records. A large number of these have been digitized but the files are not complete.[[1]](#footnote-2) The relatively limited number of parliamentarians renders this approach feasible. It allows making sure that a parliamentarian was fighting when Pétain was at the helm and not for example, in a hospital recovering from an injury. It also takes the fact that some soldiers regularly changed unit into account.

The military record of Auguste Polimann illustrates these points. His military record shows he began the war at the 8ème bataillon de chasseurs in November 1914, was transferred to the 45ème régiment d’infanterie on April 21st, 1915, then to the 62ème régiment d’infanterie on May 1st, 1915, followed by the 137ème régiment d’infanterie on June 15th, 1915, that he was made prisoner on June 13th, 1916 and remained in captivity until the end of the war. On the basis of his record, we can then see if any of the unit in which he was active was commanded by Pétain.

We exclude the following units because they did not have a direct fighting role: parliamentarians involved in units of support (auxiliaires) and transport (escadrons du train) or medical units. We code soldiers involved in the air force as separate, as Pétain strongly supported the creation and development of these units.

We managed to track the records of 247 parliamentarians. We took a conservative approach when there was a doubt regarding identity. The cases of André Daher and Raymond Susset may be used to illustrate the search process. There is no André Daher in the database listing the records of French soldiers’ but there is an André Dahen. The date of birth of both is similar (1st February 1891), the place of birth too (Marseilles), the father of both has Paul as first name and Dahen is listed as a law student; Daher would later on hold a law decree. Daher’s biography mentions his involvement in the infantry and later on his work with armored vehicles, like the document from Dahen. In such a case we consider that there was an encoding mistake in 1911 and therefore consider the two persons as being one. By contrast, consider the case of Ismael Pascal Susset who was born on the same date and in the same municipality as Raymond Susset (Magné, 5 June 1895). Neither Ismael or Pascal are mentioned in Raymond Susset’s biographical notice. Ismael Pascal may therefore have been Raymond’s twin and we exclude the observation from the sample. If either Ismael or Pascal had been a second or third name, then we would have considered a match.

In case of doubt, we looked at biographical notices. We also used these to complement the database when military records were unavailable. When the mention was vague (e.g. “fought gallantly in the artillery”), nothing was encoded. It was only when the name of the unit and the exact dates of service were mentioned in the biography that we added the parliamentarian’s details. This approach allowed increasing the number of covered parliamentarians by 49 units.

We then code dummy variables capturing when the veterans fought under Pétain’s command. We consider four periods[[2]](#footnote-3): The first covers the beginning of the war, from August to October 1914, when Pétain was in charge of the 6ème division d’infanterie. The second ranges from October 1914 to June 1915 when he was commanding the 33ème corps d’armée. The third runs from June 1915 to May 1916 when the 2ème Armée was under his command. For this period, we distinguish the soldiers who were there between February and May 1916 to specifically identify those involved in the Battle of Verdun. We code no specific Pétain variable after that battle, as Pétain’s responsibilities had grown to such an extent that almost all soldiers fell directly or indirectly under his command. We then add those dummy variables coding these episodes to the set of explanatory variables in the baseline estimation.

We could document the military activities of 74.56% of parliamentarians listed as veterans in their biographies. There is therefore attrition in the data, with which we deal in several ways. First, we simply consider veterans whose military record we could not find as missing observations. Second, we code them as not having fought under Pétain’s command. Third, we conversely code them as having fought under Pétain’s command.

#### Table B7: Controlling for service under Pétain’s command during World War I

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Dependent variable | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No |
|  | Panel A: If not found in the Archives=Missing |
| Pro-democratic dynasties | 0.152\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* | 0.138\*\*\* | 0.141\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* | 0.138\*\*\* | 0.142\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* |
|  | (3.720) | (3.738) | (3.571) | (3.625) | (3.694) | (3.847) | (3.866) | (3.740) | (3.797) | (3.835) |
| Other dynasties | 0.151\* | 0.151\* | 0.145\* | 0.148\* | 0.152\* | 0.150\* | 0.150\* | 0.143\* | 0.146\* | 0.151\* |
|  | (1.979) | (1.977) | (2.028) | (2.070) | (2.025) | (1.945) | (1.944) | (1.972) | (2.007) | (1.977) |
| February-April 1916 | 0.101 |  |  |  |  | 0.0843 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (1.235) |  |  |  |  | (1.001) |  |  |  |  |
| June 1915 -May 1916 |  | 0.0926 |  |  | 0.0893 |  | 0.0769 |  |  | 0.0707 |
|  |  | (1.319) |  |  | (1.244) |  | (1.055) |  |  | (0.945) |
| October 1914 – June 1915 |  |  | -0.0179 |  | -0.0103 |  |  | -0.0391 |  | -0.0271 |
|  |  |  | (-0.186) |  | (-0.103) |  |  | (-0.388) |  | (-0.261) |
| August 1914 – October 1914 |  |  |  | -0.0492 | -0.0507 |  |  |  | -0.0683 | -0.0658 |
|  |  |  |  | (-0.706) | (-0.738) |  |  |  | (-0.925) | (-0.887) |
| WWI veteran |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0249 | 0.0247 | 0.0378\*\* | 0.0371\*\* | 0.0287 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.596) | (1.551) | (2.377) | (2.382) | (1.673) |
| Constant | -0.109 | -0.108 | -0.123 | -0.122 | -0.114 | -0.118 | -0.117 | -0.138 | -0.135 | -0.127 |
|  | (-0.548) | (-0.542) | (-0.619) | (-0.613) | (-0.565) | (-0.627) | (-0.621) | (-0.744) | (-0.722) | (-0.668) |
| Observations | 574 | 574 | 579 | 578 | 572 | 574 | 574 | 579 | 578 | 572 |
| R-squared | 0.355 | 0.355 | 0.355 | 0.355 | 0.357 | 0.356 | 0.356 | 0.357 | 0.358 | 0.359 |
|  | Panel B: If not found in the Archives=0 |
| Pro-democratic dynasties | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* | 0.154\*\*\* | 0.156\*\*\* | 0.154\*\*\* | 0.153\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.153\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* |
|  | (3.307) | (3.298) | (3.309) | (3.330) | (3.296) | (3.352) | (3.344) | (3.388) | (3.418) | (3.349) |
| Other dynasties | 0.0995 | 0.100 | 0.0988 | 0.0980 | 0.0991 | 0.0954 | 0.0958 | 0.0944 | 0.0936 | 0.0945 |
|  | (1.507) | (1.514) | (1.512) | (1.500) | (1.498) | (1.394) | (1.396) | (1.388) | (1.375) | (1.372) |
| February-April 1916 | 0.0894 |  |  |  |  | 0.0629 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (1.288) |  |  |  |  | (0.867) |  |  |  |  |
| June 1915 -May 1916 |  | 0.0818 |  |  | 0.0819 |  | 0.0573 |  |  | 0.0565 |
|  |  | (1.316) |  |  | (1.321) |  | (0.874) |  |  | (0.861) |
| October 1914 – June 1915 |  |  | -0.0386 |  | -0.0400 |  |  | -0.0586 |  | -0.0590 |
|  |  |  | (-0.434) |  | (-0.441) |  |  | (-0.614) |  | (-0.609) |
| August 1914 – October 1914 |  |  |  | -0.113 | -0.115 |  |  |  | -0.134\* | -0.135\* |
|  |  |  |  | (-1.630) | (-1.655) |  |  |  | (-1.842) | (-1.830) |
| WWI veteran |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0419\*\* | 0.0418\*\* | 0.0466\*\* | 0.0466\*\* | 0.0436\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (2.160) | (2.130) | (2.406) | (2.453) | (2.077) |
| Constant | -0.0762 | -0.0757 | -0.0811 | -0.0783 | -0.0779 | -0.0940 | -0.0936 | -0.101 | -0.0972 | -0.0977 |
|  | (-0.495) | (-0.491) | (-0.531) | (-0.505) | (-0.510) | (-0.678) | (-0.674) | (-0.739) | (-0.694) | (-0.718) |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 |
| R-squared | 0.332 | 0.332 | 0.330 | 0.331 | 0.332 | 0.335 | 0.335 | 0.334 | 0.335 | 0.336 |
|  | Panel C: If not found in the Archives=1 |
| Pro-democratic dynasties | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* |
|  | (3.283) | (3.283) | (3.311) | (3.303) | (3.227) | (3.346) | (3.346) | (3.384) | (3.373) | (3.289) |
| Other dynasties | 0.0943 | 0.0947 | 0.0966 | 0.0972 | 0.0945 | 0.0928 | 0.0931 | 0.0942 | 0.0944 | 0.0929 |
|  | (1.368) | (1.378) | (1.430) | (1.444) | (1.380) | (1.332) | (1.339) | (1.373) | (1.378) | (1.342) |
| February-April 1916 | 0.0619\*\* |  |  |  |  | 0.0431\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (2.408) |  |  |  |  | (1.775) |  |  |  |  |
| June 1915 -May 1916 |  | 0.0621\*\* |  |  | 0.112\*\* |  | 0.0437\* |  |  | 0.0956\* |
|  |  | (2.493) |  |  | (2.195) |  | (1.832) |  |  | (1.796) |
| October 1914 – June 1915 |  |  | 0.0378 |  | -0.0260 |  |  | 0.0123 |  | -0.0332 |
|  |  |  | (1.407) |  | (-0.424) |  |  | (0.527) |  | (-0.560) |
| August 1914 – October 1914 |  |  |  | 0.0388 | -0.0391 |  |  |  | 0.0138 | -0.0368 |
|  |  |  |  | (1.401) | (-0.619) |  |  |  | (0.565) | (-0.581) |
| WWI veteran |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0306\* | 0.0300\* | 0.0421\*\* | 0.0417\*\* | 0.0320\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.830) | (1.763) | (2.687) | (2.647) | (1.963) |
| Constant | -0.0737 | -0.0731 | -0.0765 | -0.0792 | -0.0696 | -0.0876 | -0.0869 | -0.0950 | -0.0958 | -0.0844 |
|  | (-0.486) | (-0.481) | (-0.499) | (-0.520) | (-0.460) | (-0.618) | (-0.612) | (-0.671) | (-0.679) | (-0.599) |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 |
| R-squared | 0.334 | 0.334 | 0.332 | 0.332 | 0.336 | 0.336 | 0.336 | 0.334 | 0.334 | 0.337 |
| Political orientation | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Baseline controls | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| *Département* FE | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

# Appendix C: Extensions – What are the transmission channels?

## C.1 Expectations regarding the war

Democratic dynastic parliamentarians might have behaved differently from their peers because they had different expectations about how the war would affect them. Although expectations are unobservable, we indirectly test this hypothesis by looking at whether pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians had a different trajectory during the war. In particular, we test whether they had a specific probability to be a mayor under the Vichy regime or participate in its institutions. Conversely, we also test whether they had a higher likelihood to be arrested by the regime or killed during the war. Table C1 estimates the baseline model on four new dependent variables: a dummy variable equal to one if a parliamentarian was a mayor under the Vichy regime, a dummy variable set to one if he participated in its institutions, either as Conseiller National or as Conseiller Départemental, as recorded by Wieviorka (2001), a dummy set to one if he was arrested by the regime, and a dummy variable equal to one if he died during World War II.

In Table C1, none of the pro-democratic dynasty dummy turns statistically significant. We interpret these results as evidence that expectations about the evolution of the war and of the regime did not affect pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians in a systematic way different from other parliamentarians. Being a pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian was not associated with the probability to be a mayor, participate in the regime, be arrested by the regime, or to die, suggesting that pro-democratic parliamentarians did not benefit from specific networks affecting their relationship with the regime or protecting them from death. This finding runs against the possibility that specific expectations about their trajectories during the war drove their vote on the enabling act.

#### Table C1: Pro-democratic dynasties during the war

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (C1.1) | (C1.2) | (C1.3) | (C1.4) | (C1.5) | (C1.6) | (C1.7) | (C1.8) | (C1.9) | (C1.10) |
| Dep. Variable :  | Mayor under Vichy | Mayor under Vichy | Mayor under Vichy | Mayor under Vichy | Participated in Vichy Institutions | Participated in Vichy Institutions | Arrested by Vichy | Arrested by Vichy | Died during WWII | Died during WWII |
| Pro-democratic dynasty | -0.00281 | 0.00360 | -0.0169 | -0.0291 | 0.0454 | 0.0303 | 0.0235 | 0.0205 | -0.0114 | 0.0138 |
|  | (-0.0615) | (0.0519) | (-0.159) | (-0.236) | (0.531) | (0.429) | (0.617) | (0.518) | (-0.203) | (0.264) |
| Other Dynasty | 0.0766 | 0.00762 | 0.0412 | -0.185\*\* | 0.118\*\* | 0.0231 | -0.00535 | 0.0267 | -0.0125 | -0.00180 |
|  | (1.276) | (0.178) | (0.490) | (-2.132) | (2.436) | (0.407) | (-0.147) | (0.656) | (-0.228) | (-0.0284) |
| Constant | 0.178\*\*\* | 0.336 | 0.303\*\*\* | 0.607 | 0.235\*\*\* | 0.373 | 0.0642\*\*\* | 0.354\*\* | 0.169\*\*\* | -0.337 |
|  | (8.468) | (1.363) | (8.353) | (1.676) | (5.598) | (1.491) | (5.741) | (2.073) | (6.818) | (-0.741) |
| Political orientation |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |
| Baseline control |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |
| *Département* FE |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |  | 🗸 |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 331 | 331 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 |
| R-squared | 0.003 | 0.229 | 0.001 | 0.365 | 0.006 | 0.24 | 0.001 | 0.199 | 0.000 | 0.183 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to politicians that have been mayors before the Vichy regime. Pro-Democratic Parties is a dummy variable equal to one if a parliamentarian belongs to a party that would qualify as “democratic” according to our definition of pro-democratic dynasties. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

## C.2 Individual experience and prominence in the parliament

The dynastic advantage may have materialized as additional individual prestige, political experience, or parliamentary prominence, which pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians may have leveraged to oppose the act. To determine whether additional individual prestige drove the results, we create a dummy variable capturing whether a parliamentarian had received the War Medal or the *Légion d’Honneur*. We measure political experience by the length of his biography in the *Dictionnaire des députés et sénateurs français* (1889-1940). We also measure experience by the time spent as of July 1940 respectively in a ministerial cabinet, with a national mandate, as a local representative (“Conseiller général”). Finally, we create a dummy variable capturing whether the parliamentarian was also a mayor.

The results of the regressions including those variables are reported in Table C2. The variable distinguishing holders of a War Medal is the only one significant (at the five-percent level). This result is in line with the previous finding that war veterans were more likely to oppose the act. Hence, parliamentarians recognized as war heroes had a higher propensity to oppose the act. However, and more to the point, the magnitude and significance of the pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarian dummy remain in line with baseline estimates.

Those variables measure prestige and experience, but political capital specific to the work of a parliamentarian may have mattered more on July 10, 1940. We therefore also look at experience and prominence inside parliament. Specifically, we measure the number of commissions on which each parliamentarian had sat as of July 1940. We also define a dummy variable set to one if the parliamentarian had held a special position, namely if he had been chairman, vice-chairman, or secretary of one of the two chambers. We also code the number of interventions of each parliamentarian from 1936 to 1940 and the reactions of his peers. We therefore create a variable measuring the number of times a parliamentarian was applauded and another measuring the number of times he was booed.[[3]](#footnote-4) We refine those measures by distinguishing applause and boos from left- and right-wingers. Results are reported in Table C3.

#### Table C2: Controlling for individual prestige and political experience

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (C2.1) | (C2.2) | (C2.3) | (C2.4) | (C2.5) | (C2.6) |
|  | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| Dependent variable | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No |
| Democratic Dynasties | 0.154\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.153\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* |
|  | (3.534) | (3.504) | (3.565) | (3.441) | (3.485) | (3.673) |
| Other Dynasties | 0.0843 | 0.0925 | 0.0967 | 0.0951 | 0.0849 | 0.0748 |
|  | (1.253) | (1.430) | (1.450) | (1.406) | (1.325) | (1.196) |
| War Medal | 0.0652\* |  |  |  |  | 0.0668\*\* |
|  | (2.030) |  |  |  |  | (2.081) |
| *Légion d’Honneur* | 0.0275 |  |  |  |  | 0.0254 |
|  | (1.259) |  |  |  |  | (1.201) |
| Length Biography |  | 1.22e-05 |  |  |  | 3.02e-05 |
|  |  | (0.342) |  |  |  | (0.791) |
| Length Ministerial cabinet |  |  | -0.00919 |  |  | -0.0155\* |
|  |  |  | (-0.871) |  |  | (-2.056) |
| Length national mandates |  |  |  | -0.000120 |  | -0.000282 |
|  |  |  |  | (-0.103) |  | (-0.208) |
| Mayor |  |  |  |  | 0.0400 | 0.0398 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (1.342) | (1.321) |
| Length – *conseiller general* |  |  |  |  | 0.000900 | 0.000787 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.694) | (0.532) |
| Constant | -0.0632 | -0.0884 | -0.112 | -0.1000 | -0.112 | -0.0900 |
|  | (-0.473) | (-0.666) | (-0.791) | (-0.708) | (-0.800) | (-0.661) |
| Baseline Controls | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Political orientation | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Départments FE | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 |
| R-squared | 0.340 | 0.334 | 0.335 | 0.334 | 0.338 | 0.345 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

Among the measures capturing political capital in the parliament, only the number of interventions in the parliament is significant, at the five percent level, when controlling for all the variables measuring experience in the parliament. The coefficient is negative suggesting that parliamentarians active in the parliament were less likely to oppose the enabling act. Yet, in all the regressions reported in table C3, the coefficient of the pro-democratic dynastic dummy remains significant, and its magnitude remains the same. This again suggests that experience or prominence did not drive the vote of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians on the enabling act.

#### Table C3: Controlling for individual political capital in the Parliament

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (C3.1) | (C3.2) | (C3.3) | (C3.4) | (C3.5) | (C3.6) | (C3.7) | (C3.8) | (C3.9) |
|  | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| Dependent variable | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No | Votei =No |
| Democratic Dynasties | 0.149\*\*\* | 0.153\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* | 0.149\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.152\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.152\*\* |
|  | (3.256) | (3.269) | (3.445) | (3.115) | (3.358) | (3.371) | (3.261) | (3.343) | (2.765) |
| Other Dynasties | 0.0948 | 0.0947 | 0.0952 | 0.0925 | 0.0944 | 0.0938 | 0.0972 | 0.0948 | 0.0948 |
|  | (1.399) | (1.394) | (1.411) | (1.354) | (1.388) | (1.385) | (1.422) | (1.402) | (1.376) |
| # commissions | 0.00700 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00660 |
|  | (0.740) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.697) |
| Special role (=1) |  | -0.0162 |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.00971 |
|  |  | (-0.365) |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-0.214) |
| # interventions (1936-1940) |  |  | -0.00876 |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0191\*\* |
|  |  |  | (-0.764) |  |  |  |  |  | (-2.142) |
| # applause Left (1936-1940) |  |  |  | 0.0356\* |  |  |  |  | 0.0251 |
|  |  |  |  | (1.894) |  |  |  |  | (0.704) |
| # applause Right (1936-1940) |  |  |  |  | -0.00510 |  |  |  | -0.00882 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (-0.832) |  |  |  | (-0.585) |
| # applause - chamber (1936-1940) |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0224 |  |  | 0.0140 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.470) |  |  | (0.743) |
| # boos from the right (1936-1940) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0395 |  | 0.0210 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.535) |  | (0.625) |
| # boos from the left (1936-1940) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.00186 | 0.00506 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (-0.267) | (0.396) |
| Constant | -0.108 | -0.101 | -0.110 | -0.0623 | -0.0959 | -0.0673 | -0.0833 | -0.0968 | -0.0850 |
|  | (-0.820) | (-0.727) | (-0.832) | (-0.473) | (-0.685) | (-0.496) | (-0.623) | (-0.688) | (-0.739) |
| Baseline controls | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Political orientation | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| *Département* FE | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 |
| R-squared | 0.335 | 0.334 | 0.335 | 0.343 | 0.334 | 0.338 | 0.341 | 0.334 | 0.349 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

## C.3 When do pro-democratic dynasties matter?

Our baseline results show that pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians were more likely to oppose the enabling act. One may wonder whether pro-democratic parliamentarians stood out in other circumstances, in particular in votes affecting checks and balances. The answer to that question is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, pro-democratic dynastic status may result in a greater sensitivity to any shift in the balance of power away from the parliament. On the other hand, the stronger preference of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians for democracy may pertain to the democratic nature of the regime rather than to the balance of power within a democracy. Moreover, it may also be that the specificity of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians had no reason to materialize in other votes, in the absence of pressure to conform, and when political parties were more organized. To address these questions, we consider five votes that took place during the pre-war period (1937-1940) and affected checks and balances. In those votes, the parliament was asked to grant a delegation of powers to the government. Although the votes did not question the republican nature of the regime, they increased the power of the executive. The question of checks and balances was explicitly mentioned in the parliamentary debates, as the quotes reported in Table C4 show. The votes therefore provide information about the behavior of parliamentarians in instances that tilted the balance of power in favor of the government without jeopardizing the republic.

#### Table C4: Democratic culture – Votes to measure taste for checks and balances

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Date / Cabinet | Vote on power delegation | Parliamentary debate |
| 19/03/1939Daladier | The government is allowed to take any necessary measures to defend the Homeland by decree. | M. Fleurot: “What honors and weakens a democracy is debate; the free examination of law projects by the deliberative assemblies” Journal officiel – Sénat 19/03/1939 M. Bachelet: “The powers you will provide the government with will allow it to take measures of the same kind as a dictator’s” Journal officiel – Sénat 19/03/1939 |
| 30/11/1939Daladier |  “In case of emergency, the government is allowed to take any measures guaranteeing the defense of the Nation after deliberation by the ministers’ cabinet” | M. Rotinat “The commission does not agree on renouncing the parliament’s right to control law projects, which is the mere principle of democracy.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 30/11/1939 |
| 04/10/1938Daladier | Grant the government with the necessary powers to “improve the economic and financial situation of the country” | M. Philip: “Be sure that we will not reform our democracy if we do not show the respect we owe each-other to discuss law projects » Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 04/10/1938M. Grésa: “Full-powers, decrees, here is a dangerous path for our democracy.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 04/10/1938 |
| 06/04/1938Blum | Grant the government with the necessary powers to face its financial liabilities, especially for its defense expenses. | M. Reynaud: “In the present situation, we abuse the concept of popular will” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 06/04/1938“We have no right to accept this imperative mandate” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 06/04/1938 |
| 19/06/1937Blum | Grant the government with the necessary powers to “improve the economic and financial situation of the country” | M. Piétri: “Every dictatorship took advantage of the legitimacy of the blank check. It contradicts the necessary critic which is the law of true democracies.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 19/06/1937M. André Albert: “I thought and still think that the politics of power delegation might weaken the republican principle itself.” Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 19/06/1937  |

We extract three types of information from the five votes. First, we count the number of times that each parliamentarian opposed the extension of government powers. Second, we count the number of times he abstained from voting. We interpret those variables as measuring the parliamentarian’s opposition to a reduction of checks and balances, hence his opposition to a threat to democracy. The third piece of information we extract from the votes is the number of times that the parliamentarian voted against his party’s line. As parties may have taken different stances, this variable measures the parliamentarian’s independence.

Table C5a reports the results of a series of regressions taking in turn the three variables describing the behavior of each parliamentarian in the votes on special powers as dependent variables. We alternatively estimate the effect of dynasties on those different scores of opposition to delegations of power without any control (Columns C5a.1 to C5a.3) and when adding the whole set of controls (Columns C5a.4 to C5a.6).

#### Table C5.a: Dynasties in previous votes on power delegation

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (C5a.1) | (C5a.2) | (C5a.3) | (C5a.4) | (C5a.5) | (C5a.6) |
|  | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| Dependent variable | # Against C&B | # Abstained | % of votes opposed to party line | # Against C&B | # Abstained | % of votes opposed to party line |
| Pro-democratic Dynasties | 0.115 | 0.0254 | -0.0882 | 0.00609 | 0.0304 | -0.00783 |
|  | (0.676) | (1.044) | (-0.632) | (0.0371) | (1.197) | (-0.0719) |
| Other Dynasties | -0.0909 | 0.00297 | 0.232 | 0.0720 | 0.0209 | 0.0278 |
|  | (-0.504) | (0.137) | (1.145) | (0.548) | (1.108) | (0.248) |
| Constant | 0.797\*\*\* | 0.0320\*\* | 1.474\*\*\* | 2.098\*\* | -0.0108 | 1.732\*\*\* |
|  | (9.494) | (2.181) | (7.508) | (2.394) | (-0.213) | (3.036) |
| Baseline controls |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Political orientation |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| *Départements* FE |  |  |  | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Observations | 669 | 667 | 669 | 669 | 667 | 669 |
| R-squared | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.006 | 0.271 | 0.246 | 0.400 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

In Columns C5a.1 and C5a.4, the dependent variable is the number of times a parliamentarian opposed granting special powers to the government. In Columns C5a.2 and C5a.5, the dependent variable is the number of times a parliamentarian abstained in these votes. The dynastic dummies turn significant in none of the regressions reported in Table C5a. Finally, Columns C5a.3 and C5a.6 take as dependent variable, the proportion of the votes for which a parliamentarian opposed the party line. [[4]](#footnote-5) Again, in those regressions neither the pro-democratic nor the other dynasty dummies exhibit a statistically significant coefficient.

Overall, those regressions show that the specific opposition of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians to a change in the balance of power did not materialize before the vote on the enabling act. Moreover, dynastic status did not prompt parliamentarians to be more independent from their parties in the votes preceding the enabling act. Until that vote, pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians followed their parties’ line. It is only when democracy was at stake, political parties disorganized, and the pressure to conform high, that the votes of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians differed in a systematic way.

We also tested whether the pattern of behavior of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians in previous votes predicted their vote on the enabling act, we supplement our baseline regressions with a series of regressions controlling for each variable coding parliamentarians’ votes in previous voting. The idea here is to test whether there were types of parliamentarians that could be indirectly captured by the pro-democratic dynastic dummy. The results of these regressions are reported in Table C5b.

#### Table C5b: When do pro-democratic dynasties appear? Controlling for previous votes on power delegation

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (C5b.1) | (C5b.2) | (C5b.3) | (C5b.4) |
|  | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| Dependent variable | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No |
| Pro-democratic dynasties | 0.148\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.151\*\*\* |
|  | (3.710) | (3.294) | (3.385) | (3.753) |
| Other Dynasties | 0.0906 | 0.0923 | 0.0957 | 0.0883 |
|  | (1.352) | (1.360) | (1.428) | (1.335) |
| # Against C&B | 0.249\*\*\* |  |  | 0.226\*\* |
|  | (3.055) |  |  | (2.101) |
| # Abstained |  | 0.0320\*\*\* |  | 0.0412\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.771) |  | (3.006) |
| % of votes opposed to party line |  |  | -0.0121 | 0.00407 |
|  |  |  | (-0.686) | (0.165) |
| Constant | -0.103 | -0.164 | -0.0785 | -0.199 |
|  | (-0.748) | (-1.147) | (-0.532) | (-1.221) |
| Baseline controls | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Political orientation | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| *Départements* FE | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Observations | 667 | 669 | 669 | 667 |
| R-squared | 0.345 | 0.341 | 0.335 | 0.354 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

Column C5b.1 controls for the number of votes against the delegation of additional powers to the government, in addition to the baseline dynasty dummies. The coefficient of the number of votes against the delegation of powers is statistically significant at the five (Column C5b.4) or the one-percent level (Column C5b.1). When the number of times a parliamentarian abstained is controlled for, as in Column C5b.2, the coefficient is also statistically significant at the one percent level and positive. The result is also robust to jointly controlling for the three variables capturing parliamentarians’ behavior in previous votes, shown in Column C5b.4. Therefore, parliamentarians who abstained more often from voting on the delegation of powers to the government were also more likely to oppose the enabling act. The findings of both regressions suggest the existence of a type of parliamentarian systematically opposing reforms reducing checks and balances.

When we control for the number of times a parliamentarian voted against the party line, in Column C5b.3, the coefficient of that variable is not statistically significant at usual levels. This finding implies that parliamentarians who had been more independent from their party in previous votes displayed no specific behavior in the vote on the enabling act.

However, the key result of Table C5b concerns dynastic parliamentarians. Throughout the table, the coefficient of the pro-democratic dynastic variable remains positive and statistically significant at the five percent level in all the regressions, regardless of the set of control variables. In addition, the magnitude of the pro-democratic dynastic dummy is similar to its value in baseline results. In line with baseline results too, the coefficient of the other dynasty variable is also statistically insignificant at accepted levels.

The upshot of the Table C5b is therefore that, while some parliamentarians indeed displayed a higher propensity to oppose the extension of government power, they did not drive the effect of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians in the vote for the enabling act.

## C.6 Dynasty characteristics

Pro-democratic and other dynasties may face different constraints or leverage different skills or assets to emerge. As a result, the two types of dynasties may differ in their capacity to continuously have an active member, which may in turn have affected their behavior during the vote on the enabling act. To test that possibility, we first compared pro-democratic and other dynastic parliamentarians in terms tenure in parliament, having a father who was a politician, and having a living member of the dynasty at the time of the vote on the enabling act. The results are reported in Table C6.a. We could find no difference between the two types of dynastic parliamentarians.

#### Table C6.a: The continuity of pro-democratic and other dynasties

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Variable* | *Pro-democratic**Dynasties* | *Other**Dynasties* | *Difference**(p-value)* |
| Tenure in Parliament | 14.32 | 14.07 | 0.93 |
|  | (1.94) | (2.28) |  |
| Father politician | 0.86 | 0.74 | 0.12 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.06) |  |
| Member of the dynasty alive | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.25 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.06) |  |
| Pro-Democratic dynasties | 0.77 | 0 | 0.00\*\*\* |
| (Founding fathers – IIIrd Republic) | (0.06) |  |  |
| Pro-Democratic dynasties | 0.23 | 0 | 0.00\*\*\* |
| (others) | (0.06) |  |  |
| New dynasty | 0.79 | 0.37 | 0.00\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.07) |  |

Sample means. Standard errors in parentheses.

We have so far pooled all pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians. Yet, even pro-democratic dynasties are heterogeneous. Some were created by active opponents to Napoleon III, others by parliamentarians who had simply joined a democratic party. Some dynastic parliamentarians still had a living elected ancestor while others were the only living parliamentarian of the dynasty. In Table C6.b, we investigate whether differences between pro-democratic dynasties drove the specific voting behavior of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians.

#### Table C6.b: Dynastic monitoring and the effect of pro-democratic dynasties

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (C6.b.1) | (C6.b.2) | (C6.b.3) |
| Dependent variable Votei = No |  |  |  |
| Pro-Democratic Dynasties  |  | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.156\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.691) | (4.517) |
| Dynasties with one member alive | 0.0709 | 0.0109 | 0.0576 |
|  | (0.749) | (0.114) | (0.581) |
| Pro-Democratic Dynasties with one member alive |  |  | -0.108 |
|  |  |  | (-0.476) |
| Other dynasties | 0.0615 | 0.0926 | 0.0851 |
|  | (0.911) | (1.306) | (1.119) |
| Constant | -0.105 | -0.0970 | -0.0990 |
|  | (-0.737) | (-0.691) | (-0.703) |
| Political orientation |  |  |  |
| Baseline control |  |  |  |
| *Département* FE |  |  |  |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 669 |
| R-squared | 0.322 | 0.334 | 0.335 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

The monitoring exercised by the family on pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians may be more influential if one of their forebears was still alive. We therefore construct a dummy variable capturing whether a parliamentarian had an elected forebear still living at the time of the vote. We first include that variable as a single variable of interest. The results of the regression, reported in Column C6b.1, show that its coefficient is statistically insignificant. It remains statistically insignificant when the two baseline variables capturing dynastic status are included. Moreover, the pro-democratic dynastic variable exhibits a positive coefficient statistically significant at the one percent level. Its magnitude remains similar to its baseline estimates. The interaction of the pro-democratic dynasty variable with the dummy variable capturing whether a parliamentarian’s forebear was still alive at the time of the vote is also insignificant. The behavior of pro-democratic dynastic parliamentarians was thus not driven by the monitoring or pressure of surviving members of the dynasty.

The negative sign of the interaction of the pro-democratic dynasty variable with dynasties’ tenure in parliament in Column 4.6 of Table 4 is a striking result. To fully interpret it, Figure C3.c below presents the marginal effect on the probability to oppose the enabling act of being a pro-democratic dynast at different levels of dynastic tenure in parliament. Tenure in parliament is defined as the number of years spent in parliament by members of the dynasty to which a 1940 parliamentarian belongs. The graph plots the marginal effect resulting from the estimation.

#### Figure C1: Dynasties’ tenure in parliament and the effect of pro-democratic dynasties



## C.7 Dynasties and pro-democratic parties – Not controlling for political orientation

#### Table C.7: Political parties, dynasties, and opposition to the enabling act

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (C7.1) | (C7.2) | (C7.3) | (C7.4) | (C7.5) | (C7.6) | (C7.7) |
| Dependent variable: | Votei=No | Votei=No40 | Democratic Partyi | Democratic Partyi | Votei=No | Votei=No | Votei=No40 |
| Dynasty | 0.129\*\* |  | 0.0245 |  |  | 0.154\*\* |  |
|  | (2.777) |  | (0.522) |  |  | (2.178) |  |
| Pro-democratic Dynasties |  | 0.148\*\*\* |  | 0.116\* |  |  | 0.115\* |
|  |  | (3.411) |  | (1.993) |  |  | (1.983) |
| Other Dynasties |  | 0.106 |  | -0.0817 |  |  | 0.0568 |
|  |  | (1.659) |  | (-0.938) |  |  | (0.890) |
| Pro-democratic party |  |  |  |  | 0.169\*\*\* | 0.179\*\*\* | 0.162\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.795) | (4.562) | (4.325) |
| Dynasty × Pro-democratic party |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0746 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (-1.072) |  |
| Pro Democratic Dynasty × Pro-democratic party |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0137 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.199) |
| Constant | -0.0763 | -0.0751 | 0.492 | 0.509 | -0.0505 | -0.0639 | -0.0424 |
|  | (-0.396) | (-0.388) | (1.629) | (1.678) | (-0.271) | (-0.348) | (-0.230) |
| Marginal effect of the relevant dynastic variable in a pro-democratic party |  |  |  |  |  | 0.08\*(0.05) | 0.13\*\*\*(0.00) |
| Party FE | 🗸 | 🗸 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Baseline control | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Départements FE | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 | 🗸 |
| Political orientation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 | 669 |
| R-squared | 0.251 | 0.251 | 0.163 | 0.171 | 0.142 | 0.150 | 0.149 |

OLS estimates. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 Standard errors are clustered at the party level. Pro-Democratic Parties is a dummy variable equal to one if a parliamentarian belongs to a party that would qualify as “democratic” according to our definition of pro-democratic dynasties. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, Jewish (=1), Freemason (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), département crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and department fixed effects.

1. Some files are referred to but not accessible. For example, in one case the id number of soldiers are digitized for the numbers between 1 and 500 and 1000 and 1500 but no the numbers in between. In another instance a specific website could not be accessed because of maintenance issues etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. See Vergez-Chaignon (2014, pp. 110-111). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. The parliamentary minutes published in the Journal de la République Francaise record whether a parliamentarian was applauded or booed when he spoke in the debate. We normalized boos/applause inside each chamber and inside the group of former ministers. An example: for senators, the measure is equal to the number of boos/rounds of applause minus the mean umber of boos/applause in the senate divided by the standard deviation of the number of boos/applause in the senate. The same operation applies to deputies and ministers. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. A party line exists if 66 percent or more of a party’s parliamentarian voted for (against) a delegation of power. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)