

The Political and Economic Geography of Southern Secession
Online Appendix

Table 1. District-level Electoral Returns and Sources

State	Vote Description	Date of Election	Source
AL	Elections for delegates to the convention	Dec. 24, 1860	Denman (1933)
GA	Elections for delegates to the convention	Jan. 2, 1861	Johnson (1972)
LA	Elections for delegates to the convention	Jan. 7, 1861	Dew (1970)
VA	Referendum of whether a convention decision to secede requires voter ratification	Feb. 4, 1861	<i>Journal of the Acts and Proceedings of a General Convention of the State of Virginia, Doc. IX</i> (Richmond: Wyatt M. Elliot, 1861)
TN	Referendum on whether the state should call a secession convention	Feb. 9, 1861	Tennessee State Library and Archives – Record Group #87
NC	Referendum on whether the state should call a secession convention	Feb. 28, 1861	State Archives of North Carolina. Election Returns on Constitutional Questions, 1861

Table 2. Convention Roll-Call Votes Description

Alabama	
Vote Description	yeas/nays
1. Convention President (p. 5)	53/45
2. State troops transferred to FL to seize Federal forts (p. 27)	53/45
3. Minority Report offering Southern Convention to redress grievances (p. 40)	54/48
4. Ordinance shall not go into effect until the 4th day of March, 1861, and not then unless the same shall have been ratified and confirmed by a direct vote of the people (p. 41)	54/44
5. Report of the majority and the Ordinance of Secession, as amended (p. 44)	61/39
Georgia	
Vote Description	yeas/nays
1. Nisbet Rs: It is the right and duty of GA to secede from the Union and form a Southern Confederacy (p. 20)	166/130
2. Hill Motion: replace secession ordinance with Johnson Resolution-Cooperation resolution of Southern Convention and other demands (p. 32)	164/133
3. Ordinance of Secession (p. 35)	208/89
Louisiana	
Vote Description	yeas/nays
1. Rozier Rs: Cooperation resolution-Southern Convention and other demands (p. 15)	106/27
2. Fuqua Rs: If North tries to coerce any state that seceded back into the Union, then LA will defend the seceded states (p. 16)	73/47
3. Bienvenu Rs: Choice of Convention does not take effect until ratified by the voters (p. 17)	84/43
4. Ordinance of Secession (p. 18)	113/17
Arkansas	
Vote Description	yeas/nays
1. Hanly Amdt: Amdt to another resolution in which secession would take effect upon voter ratification (p. 8)	35/39
2. Vote to postpone Yell Amdt: Vote to indefinitely postpone a vote on the following proposal: dissolve the Union in the Convention and then submit it to the people for ratification, and ordinance only goes into effect if ratified by the people (p. 82)	33/36
Virginia	
Vote Description	yeas/nays
1. Convention President (p. 7-8)	54/70
2. Amdt on Secession (p. 136)	54/73
3. Harvie Amdt: Ordinance resuming the powers delegated by Virginia to the Federal Government (p. 136)	45/88

Table 3. District-level Variables and Sources


Variable	Description	Source
Relative Representation Index (<i>RRI</i>)	Representation of individuals in the conventions and in the state legislatures. See text for details.	Created by authors using the US Census, state constitutions, and statutes on apportionment (various years).
Slave Share	Number of slaves in a district as a proportion of total population.	US Census (various years.)
Slaveholders Share	Number of slaveholders in the district as a proportion of the electorate (AWM population - AWMFB population)	US Census (1860)
Slaveholding Inequality	Gini coefficient of slave ownership. We aggregate the slaveholdings categories of the Census into: i) 1 to 9, ii) 10 to 19, iii) 20 to 49, iv) 50 to 99, v) 100 to 499, vi) 500 or more slaves, and use the median value in each to estimate the total number of slaves correspondingly.	US Census (1860)
Planters Share	Number of AWM in the district owning 20 or more slaves, as a proportion of the electorate.	US Census (1860)
Population Density	District population over size (in sq.mi.).	Atlas of Historical County Boundaries, Newberry Library (various years).
Historical Transportation	Length of steamboat-navigated rivers and and railroads (normalized by area) in 1860	Atack (2015)
Land Inequality	Gini coefficient of land ownership. We aggregate the farm acreage categories of the Census into : i) 3 to 9, ii) 10 to 19, iii) 20 to 49, iv) 50 to 99, v) 100 to 499, vi) 500-999, and vii) more than 1000 acres, and use the median acreage in each to estimate the total number of farms correspondingly.	US Census (1860)
Delegates Slaveholdings	Number of slaves owned by delegates to the conventions of AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, VA.	US Census slave schedules in 1860 as provided by Ancestry.com.
Delegate Characteristics	Birth place, age, occupation, and real and personal property of delegates to the conventions of AR, FL, GA and LA, as collected by Wooster.	Wooster (1951, 1954, 1956, 1958)
Political Competition, 1860	Effective Number of parties in the 1860 Presidential Election.	Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (2006)

Table 4. Dates and Basic Demographics

Date of Secession	State	Confederate					
		Slaves/ Total Population	AWM population (%)	Pre- Convention Referendum	Seceded in Pre-April 15 Convention	Seceded in Post-April 15 Convention	Post- Convention Referendum
Dec. 20, 1860	SC	57.2	5.3	No	Yes		No
Jan. 9, 1861	MS	55.2	6.5	No	Yes		No
Jan. 10, 1861	FL	44	1.5	No	Yes		No
Jan. 11, 1861	AL	45.1	9.3	No	Yes		No
Jan. 19, 1861	GA	43.7	10.4	No	Yes		No
Jan. 26, 1861	LA	46.9	7.7	No	Yes		No
February 6, 1861 - Confederate States of America formed							
Feb. 23, 1861	TX	30.2	8.3	No	Yes		Yes
April 15, 1861 - Lincoln s call for troops to put down rebellion							
April, 17, 1861	VA	30.8	19.2	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
May 6, 1861	AR	25.5	5.8	Yes	No	Yes	No
May 7, 1861	TN*	24.8	14.8	Yes		No	Yes
May 20, 1861	NC	33.4	11.2	Yes		Yes	No


*State seceded in the General Assembly.

Figure 1. Participation Election of Convention Delegates (AL, GA and LA)




Notes: Each bar represents the average district-level votes in the elections for convention delegates as a share of 1860 presidential turnout (weighted by the latter). “Sec” and “Coop” is the vote received by secessionist, and cooperationist candidates, respectively. “Abst” is the average abstention (benchmark is the 1860 presidential turnout). Middle panel only takes the sample of districts in which the highest vote was obtained by a secessionist candidate(s). Right panel are districts in which cooperationist candidates obtained the highest vote. See Online Appendix Table 2 for sources.

Figure 2
 Change in Participation and Local Competitiveness (Additional Controls)




Notes: Partial regression plots with the residuals of the change in voter participation between i) the elections for convention delegates in AL, GA and LA (figure A), or, ii) the secession referenda in NC, TN and VA (figure B), and the 1860 presidential election, against the residuals of district competitiveness measured as $1 - \text{abs}(\text{district-level margin of victory})$. In each model we control for the number of slaveholders (divided by AWM population), \ln total population, and the effective number of parties (ENP) index in the 1860 presidential election. Both models include a full set of state fixed effects and allow for arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the district-level. Plots produced in Stata with the added-variable plot command (avplot).

Figure 3
 Change in Participation and District Competitiveness (Excluding Outliers)




Notes: Partial regression plots with the residuals of the change in voter participation between i) the elections for convention delegates in AL, GA and LA (figure A), or, ii) the secession referenda in NC, TN and VA (figure B), and the 1860 presidential election, against the residuals of district competitiveness measured as $1 - \text{abs}(\text{district-level margin of victory})$. In each model we control for the number of slaveholders (divided by AWM population), (\ln) total population, and the effective number of parties (ENP) index in the 1860 presidential election. Both models include a full set of state fixed effects and allow for arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the district-level. Plots produced in Stata with the added-variable plot command (avplot). Outliers are defined as observations with a Cook distance higher than $4/N$, where N is the sample size ($N=238$ in A and $N=296$ in B).

Figure 4
 Convention and State Legislative Relative Representation Index (RRI)




Notes: The y-axis show the convention relative representation index (RRI) defined as $d(ij)/v(ij)/d(j)/v(j)$, where $d(i)$ and $d(j)$ are the delegates of county i in state j . $d(j)$ is the size of the convention in state j . Similarly, $v(ij)$ and $v(i)$ represent the voters of county i and $v(j)$ the total voters of state j . In the x-axis we depict the same measure but using the number of state senators and house representatives in each state. Specifically, state legislative RRI is the mean RRI across the two legislative chambers in each state.

Figure 5
Convention Representation and Slaveholders Incidence




Notes: Partial regression leverage plots with the predicted convention (\ln) *RRI* against the predicted slaveholding population divided by the district's electorate (defined as the AWM population minus the adult white male foreign-born population). Each dot represents a single district. Model partials out the effect of total population in 1860, (\ln) mean value of farms per acre, (\ln) population density (total population/district area), land Gini, (\ln) per capita manufacturing output in 1860, and includes a full set of state fixed effects. Estimated standard error allows for arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the district-level.

Figure 6
Convention Representation and Slaveholders Incidence



Notes: Partial regression leverage plots with the predicted convention (ln) *RRI* against the predicted slaveholding population divided by the district's electorate (defined as the AWM population minus the adult white male foreign-born population). Each dot represents a single district. Planters defined as slaveholders holding 20 or more slaves according to the 1860 Census. Model partials out the effect of total population in 1860, (ln) mean value of farms per acre and (ln) population density (total population/district area), and includes a full set of state fixed effects. Estimated standard error allows for arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the district-level.

Figure 8
 Convention Representation and Slaveholders Incidence (by state)



Notes: Partial regression leverage plots with the predicted convention (\ln) RRI against the predicted slaveholding population divided by the district's electorate (defined as the AWM population minus the adult white male foreign-born population). Each dot represents a single district. Each model partials out the effect of total population in 1860, (\ln) mean value of farms per acre, and (\ln) population density (total population/district area). Estimated standard errors allows for arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the district-level.

Table 5
Slavery and Support for Secession, Lower South Conventions (excluding final secession resolution)

	AL				GA				LA			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Slaveholders Share	1.766*** (0.184)	1.873*** (0.357)			0.583*** (0.166)	0.601*** (0.217)			0.747*** (0.258)	0.893** (0.381)		
Pro-secession district			0.956*** (0.025)	0.932*** (0.040)			0.812*** (0.033)	0.754*** (0.043)			0.581*** (0.055)	0.468*** (0.089)
Motion Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes								
County Controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Delegate Slaveholdings	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Delegates (clusters)	100	100	97	97	296	291	294	289	128	125	129	125
Roll Call Votes	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3
Observations	396	396	384	384	590	580	586	576	374	365	377	365
R^2	0.331	0.518	0.918	0.924	0.040	0.288	0.667	0.705	0.085	0.329	0.365	0.411

Robust standard errors clustered at the delegate level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Dependent variable in all columns is the delegate-level likelihood of a pro-secession vote in the different conventions. County controls include: (ln) total district population, population density, land inequity measured by a Gini index, farm land value (per acre), and the extension of railroads and steamboat-navigated rivers. Delegate slaveholdings refers to the (ln+1) number of slaves owned by each delegate according to the 1860 Slave Schedule, US Census. All models include a full set of motion fixed effects. See Data Appendix for detailed description of the motions used and sources.

Table 6
Slavery and Support for Secession, Lower South Conventions (additional controls)

	AL				GA				LA			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Slaveholders Share	1.851*** (0.345)	1.779*** (0.355)			0.651*** (0.209)	0.525** (0.234)			0.843** (0.369)	0.964** (0.470)		
Pro-secession district			0.907*** (0.039)	0.901*** (0.041)			0.673*** (0.041)	0.644*** (0.045)			0.434*** (0.075)	0.512*** (0.068)
Motion Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
County Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Delegate Slaveholdings	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Delegate Controls	no	na	no	na	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Delegates (clusters)	100	94	97	91	292	237	290	235	125	87	125	87
Roll Call Votes	5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4
Observations	496	466	481	451	871	707	865	701	489	340	489	340
R^2	0.499	0.495	0.881	0.876	0.279	0.287	0.612	0.596	0.307	0.358	0.384	0.457

Robust standard errors clustered at the delegate level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Dependent variable in all columns is the delegate-level likelihood of a pro-secession vote in the different conventions. County controls include: (ln) total district population, population density, land inequity measured by a Gini index, farm land value (per acre), the extension of railroads and steamboat-navigated rivers, and the value of manufactures in 1860. Delegate slaveholdings refers to the (ln+1) number of slaves owned by each delegate according to the 1860 Slave Schedule, US Census. Delegate controls includes age and occupation dummies. All models include a full set of motion fixed effects. See Data Appendix for detailed description of the motions used and sources.

Table 7
Slavery and Support for Secession, Upper South Conventions

	AR			VA		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Slaveholders Share	2.731*** (0.343)	3.037*** (0.385)	2.541*** (0.454)	1.420*** (0.117)	1.221*** (0.151)	1.350*** (0.160)
Motion Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
County Controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Delegate Slaveholdings	no	no	yes	no	no	yes
Delegate Controls	no	no	yes	no	no	na
Delegates (clusters)	74	73	59	143	143	139
Roll Call Votes	2	2	2	3	3	3
Observations	148	146	118	358	358	348
R^2	0.332	0.493	0.693	0.332	0.397	0.399

Robust standard errors clustered at the delegate level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Dependent variable in all columns is the delegate-level likelihood of a pro-secession vote in the different conventions. County controls include: (ln) total district population, population density, land inequity measured by a Gini index, farm land value (per acre), the extension of railroads and steamboat-navigated rivers, and the value of manufactures in 1860. Delegate slaveholdings refers to the (ln+1) number of slaves owned by each delegate according to the 1860 Slave Schedule, US Census. Delegate controls includes age and occupation dummies. All models include a full set of motion fixed effects. See Data Appendix for detailed description of the motions used and sources.