### *Online Appendix*

*Do Black Politicians Matter? Evidence from Reconstruction*

Trevon D. Logan

1. **Considering Other Potential Instruments**

Free blacks may not be the only instrumental variable available, and it is useful to consider other IVs and what they would identify. First, one may think of environmental factors such as crop suitability as IVs for black officeholders under the assumption that crop suitability is related to long-standing political institutions which have their roots in agricultural productivity. The key problem with such an IV would be the fact that environmental factors are obviously related to slavery, the extent of slavery due to differences in slave labor requirements for specific crops, slave productivity, and agri- cultural land values ([Fogel and Engerman](#_bookmark70), [1974](#_bookmark70)). This would violate the exclusion restriction, and environmental factors would therefore not be exogenous to political institutions as they would be related to the tax base via farm values and the extent of slaveholding.

Second, one could think of Confederate losses during the Civil War as an IV for black officeholders under the logic that areas with more Confederate deaths would have fewer whites able to serve in political positions. Another part of the logic of such an IV is that the losses would have occurred before Reconstruction and would be unrelated to local conditions given troop movement and the locations of battles during the Civil War. Unfortunately, the extent of troop losses in the Confederacy is unknown and highly suspect.[[1]](#footnote-1) This could lead to the numbers of losses being correlated with Scalawags, Southern whites who were Republican during Reconstruction and derided as deserters during the Civil War, or other factors which would be related to postbellum outcomes. Another complication is that Confederate deaths are correlated with voting during Reconstruction ([Larsen](#_bookmark85), [2015](#_bookmark85)), which violates the exclusion restriction as they may be related to political preferences. At a more basic level, there is no evidence that there was a dearth of leaders that was related to Confederate losses during the war.[[2]](#footnote-2) The first reconstructed governments, established during Presidential Reconstruction, were completely white and staffed with former Confederates and other white sympathizers. There is no evidence that Confederate losses left such a gap in leadership that it would lead to black leaders in their absence. Indeed, after Reconstruction ended the governments quickly dispatched with black leaders and replaced them with no evidence that there was a dearth of whites willing to serve ([Franklin](#_bookmark73), [1961](#_bookmark73); [Foner](#_bookmark72), [2014](#_bookmark72)).[[3]](#footnote-3)

Third, one could think that rather than the number of free blacks, the *fraction* of the black population which was free would be a ideal instrument. The problems with such an IV are numerous. At a minimum, the chief issue is that the number of slaves is contained in the denominator. Enslaved and free blacks are weakly correlated, with a correlation of 0.1065.[[4]](#footnote-4) The number of slaves would be related to agricultural productivity and land values ([Fogel and Engerman](#_bookmark70), [1974](#_bookmark70)). Also, slavery and slaveholding played a critical role in political beliefs surrounding the Civil War ([Calomiris and](#_bookmark55) [Pritchett](#_bookmark55), [2016](#_bookmark55)), but there is little evidence that free blacks were related to contemporaneous political attitudes. There is also some evidence that slaveholding is related to persistent preferences for distribution ([Acharya et al.](#_bookmark39), [2016](#_bookmark39)).[[5]](#footnote-5) An additional problem is the identifying assumption of the IV–it supposes that black officeholders are related to their disproportion in the overall black population, as opposed to their number. For example, this assumption supposes that a location with 100 free blacks would have fewer black officeholders if there were 1,000 slaves in the area as opposed to 500.[[6]](#footnote-6) This is a curious assumption, as it supposes that there are a fixed number of positions for black officeholders that are more likely to be filled by free blacks where they are in larger proportion. There is no narrative evidence that this was the case. In fact, when testing the proportion free IV the first stage relationship is particularly weak– black politicians are not related to the relative size of the black population, but were related to the number of free blacks.[[7]](#footnote-7) Given that the difference between the free black and proportion of black free is driven by slaves, the results confirm that slaveholding is a weak instrument.[[8]](#footnote-8)

# Additional Specifications

In [Table A1](#_bookmark144) I show several checks of the main specification in [Table 5](#_bookmark121). First, Panel A shows results which use the percent of blacks who were free in 1860 as the instrument for black officeholders. While the share of the black population free in 1860 has intuitive appeal, the denominator’s inclusion of the slave population makes it difficult to argue that it would satisfy the exclusion restriction. As the results show, the percent of blacks free is a weak instrument. The F-statistic on the excluded instrument is below 5, falling well below conventional measures for instrument strength. This is consistent with the argument earlier that slaves (and any function which contains slaves) will be a poor instrument and slaves would be correlated with electoral preferences for redistribution.

Panels B and C consider the sensitivity of the results with respect to population. The dependent variable is in per capita terms but other variables in the main specification are not and population enters linearly in the existing models. This may lead to a biased estimate of the effects to the extent that black official would be located in more populous places, for which dichotomous urban indicators would be a poor control. Also, population enters in different ways on the right- and left-hand side of the regression. To see if population drives the results Panel B first excludes it from the specification. The results show that the exclusion of population does not alter the results. Panel C presents estimates where all covariates are placed in per capita terms, obviating the need to include total population by itself and now having a specification which is consistently in per capita terms.[[9]](#footnote-9) The results are similar to the main specification, where the IV estimate for black politicians is roughly twice the OLS estimate. The results confirm that the estimates are not confounded by population nor driven by their inclusion nor exclusion.[[10]](#footnote-10)

In [Table A2](#_bookmark145) addition specifications are included to decompose the effect geographically as well as to control for antebellum factors which could be related to political preferences. In Panel A of [Table A6](#_bookmark149) the specification is replicated geographically. Rather than focusing on branch of government these results show the effects of all black politicians who served in local offices as opposed to federal or state positions. As with the results for legislative officials, the results here confirm that those serving at a local level had a large impact on local tax revenues. In Panels B and C of [Table A2](#_bookmark145) I include measures of the extent of slaveholding to the extent that slavery may be related to persistent preferences for redistribution ([Acharya et al.](#_bookmark39), [2016](#_bookmark39)), or the potential for federal expenditures on Freedmen to substitute away from local expenditures. It should be noted that since the slave population was correlated with land values the inclusion of slaves may be an over-control in the specification. Panel B uses includes the number of slaves in 1860 and Panel C the share of slaves as a fraction of the total population in 1860. In both cases the inclusion of slaves does not alter the main result of the effect of black politicians on per capita taxes, nor does the inclusion of slaveholding weaken the free black IV in the first stage. In unreported results, the inclusion of slaves and the fraction of the population enslaved do not alter the results for 1880 taxes nor for the change in taxes from 1870 to 1880.[[11]](#footnote-11)

Further estimates of the effect of taxes and the existence of black politicians is presented in [Table A3](#_bookmark146). In [Table A3](#_bookmark146), the change in the number of farms is replicated for farms by size. Overall, the results show that taxes had little effect on the change in the number of farms. While there is a decrease in the number of farms 100-500 acres, the effect is relatively modest. When including the indicator for black politicians, the effect is similar, but the presence of black politicians is correlated with an increase of farms between 3 and 9 acres, which would be consistent with yeoman farming. At the same time, it is related to a decrease in farms between 10 and 20 acres, which is also yeoman farming. Given this inconclusive evidence it is difficult to assert that black politicians had an impact on changes in farms.[[12]](#footnote-12)

The educational results presented earlier can be reformulated in a two-stage regression where the first stage is county taxes as a function of black officials (or free blacks). This allows for a more intuitive interpretation of the marginal effect by focusing on the variation in taxes driven by black politicians. [Table A4](#_bookmark147) shows the results for the educational outcomes in [Table 9](#_bookmark125) where black officials (Panel A) and free blacks (Panel B) are used in a first stage to predict 1870 county taxes. The results for black officials show that the effect of taxes, predicted by the number of black officials, are substantially greater than the OLS estimates. In proportional terms, the effect of taxes is much larger for blacks than whites, which is consistent with the predicted taxes (via black officials) having a larger proportional effect on black educational outcomes.

Finally, [Table A5](#_bookmark148) shows the reduced form estimates of the relationship between the number of free blacks in 1860 and per capita county taxes in 1870, replicating the regression results of [Table 3](#_bookmark119), omitting black officials, and including free blacks in 1860.[[13]](#footnote-13) The results confirm that free blacks in 1860 are positively related to per capita county taxes in 1870.

In [Figure A1](#_bookmark142) the distribution of free blacks in 1860 is shown. As discussed in the text, the number of free blacks is greater in the Old South as opposed to the New South, but within each state there is significant variation. Less than one fifth of the counties in the South had no free blacks in 1860.[[14]](#footnote-14) A check of whether using 1870 for tax revenue is a valid for identification of black officeholders is required. Black officeholders were elected after 1870, and if a majority entered office after 1870 the effect they could have on public finance would be uncertain. In [Figure A2](#_bookmark143) I show the year of entry for black officeholders. More than two thirds of black officeholders began their offices before 1870. (It is important to note that officeholders beginning during 1870 could still have an effect on 1870 taxes.) Including those officials with uncertain start dates (some are listed only by the decade they began service) increases this even further.

## B.1 Heterogeneous Effects

Even allowing for the different mechanisms that can be used to increase county tax revenue, it should still hold that the basics of tax policy be consistent with the separation of powers. Judicial officials, for example, should be unrelated to tax receipts– during Reconstruction there is little evidence that judicial decisions were related to either tax policy or public goods expenditures ([Foner](#_bookmark72), [2014](#_bookmark72); [Franklin](#_bookmark73), [1961](#_bookmark73); [Du Bois](#_bookmark53), [1935](#_bookmark53)). Similarly, executive offices were not related to tax revenue during Congressional Reconstruction. Tax policy was related to local officials with *legislative* authority, which included tax policy and collection. At the time, poll taxes and property taxes were two of the most important sources of local tax revenue, and the tax rates were set by those in legislative positions ([Foner](#_bookmark71), [1996](#_bookmark71); [Sylla](#_bookmark108), [1986](#_bookmark108)).[[15]](#footnote-15)

As a check to ensure that the effect works through a channel related administratively to public

finance, I decompose the officials into branch of government and replicate Column 4 of [Table 5](#_bookmark121) for each branch of government. The results are shown in [Table A6](#_bookmark149) and reveal two facts. First, the instrument of free blacks is weak for both judicial and executive officials. In both instances the F- statistic from the first stage relationship fails all conventional levels of significance. For legislative officials, however, the instrument is particularly strong. Second, the effect by branch shows that executive and judicial officials have statistically insignificant effects on per capita county taxes. This is evidence that the effect of black politicians on public finance is not driven by a spurious relationship to officeholders who would have a tenuous impact on tax revenues. In both instances the IV estimates are not statistically different from zero. For legislative officials, however, the effect is more than 35% larger than the IV estimates in [Table 5](#_bookmark121). These results confirm that the effects of black politicians are concentrated in those with taxing authority, which is consistent with the effect of politicians working through the legislative process.[[16]](#footnote-16)

# Description of Branch of Service Rubric

Regarding the encoding of a politician’s branch, certain qualitative assessments had to be made in order to create a discrete variable representing which aspect of government in which the politician

participated. A value of “Legislative” was given if the politician himself or the governmental entity with which he was associated with was tasked with drafting laws and/or setting rates and policies with respect to revenue. This would include such titles as a state house representative, clerk for the state house, or tax assessor. A value of “Executive” was given if the politician himself or the governmental entity with which he was associated was primarily focused on carrying out or enforcing laws or making decisions on what to adopt into law. This includes such titles as alderman, county commissioner, postman, or a clerk for an entity primarily tasked with these duties. A value of “Judicial” was given if the politician himself or the governmental entity with which he was associated was tasked with the interpretation of the law or establishing penalties for criminals in courts of law. This includes titles such as magistrate, justice of the peace or a clerk for any court of law.




Figure A1: Number of Free Blacks by County, 1860.

500

450

400

350

300

Number of Officials

250

200

150

100

50

0

Year of Entry Into Office

Figure A2: Number of Black Politicians by Year of Entry to Office. Source: Foner (1996)

Table A1: Additional Specification Checks

Panel A: Percent of Blacks free in 1860 as IV

OLS First Stage IV

Dependent Variable: 1870 County Taxes Black Officials 1870 County Taxes

Per Capita Per County Per Capita

Officials Per County 0.0925\*\*\* 0.578\*

(0.0133) (0.327)

Percent of Blacks Free 1860 1.982\*

(1.084)

F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument 3.34

Panel B: Total Population Removed

OLS First Stage IV

Dependent Variable: 1870 County Taxes Black Officials 1870 County Taxes

Per Capita Per County Per Capita Black Officials Per County 0.0997\*\*\* 0.2056\*\*\*

(0.0132) (0.0787)

Free Blacks 1860 0.00118\*\*\*

(0.00024)

F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument 24.24

Panel C: All Covariates Per Capita, Total Population Removed

OLS First Stage IV

Dependent Variable: 1870 County Taxes Black Officials 1870 County Taxes

Per Capita Per County Per Capita Black Officials Per County 0.0949\*\*\* 0.1735\*\*\*

(0.00979) (0.0209)

Free Blacks 1860 0.00317\*\*\*

(0.000206)

F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument 237.79

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: N=825 in all regressions. All regressions include Republican vote share in 1868 Presidential Election, total value of farms, Logan-Parman Segregation, percent black, manufacturing wages,

value of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, urban county, county wealth and state fixed effects. Panel A includes total population in 1870. Panel C uses all variables which are not indices or proportions in per capita formulation.

Table A2: Specification Checks for Local Politicians and Inclusion of Antebellum Factors

Panel A: Local Politicians

OLS First Stage IV

Dependent Variable: 1870 County Taxes Local Black Officials 1870 County Taxes

Per Capita Per County Per Capita Local Officials Per County 0.141\*\*\* 0.291\*\*\*

(0.0225) (0.110)

Percent of Blacks Free 1860 0.000837\*\*\* (0.000140)

F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument 35.57

Panel B: Number of Slaves in 1860 Included

OLS First Stage IV

Dependent Variable: 1870 County Taxes Black Officials 1870 County Taxes

Per Capita Per County Per Capita Black Officials Per County 0.1094\*\*\* 0.1562\*\*

(0.0132) (0.0661)

Free Blacks 1860 0.00134\*\*\*

(0.00024)

F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument 32.52

Panel C: Slaves as Share of Total Population Included

OLS First Stage IV

Dependent Variable: 1870 County Taxes Black Officials 1870 County Taxes

Per Capita Per County Per Capita Black Officials Per County 0.0948\*\*\* 0.1833\*\*

(0.0133) (0.0873)

Free Blacks 1860 0.00106\*\*\*

(0.000243)

F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument 19.24

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: N=825 in all regressions. All regressions include Republican vote share in 1868 Presidential Election, total value of farms, Logan-Parman Segregation, percent black, manufacturing wages, value of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, urban county, county wealth and state fixed effects.

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Table A3: County Taxes and Changes in Number of Farms by Farm Size, 1870-1880

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Change in Number of Farms by Acreage, 1870 to 1880 | | | | | | | | |
| Panel A: | 0-2 | 3-9 | 10-19 | 20-49 | 50-99 | 100-499 | 500-999 | 1000 + |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| 1870 County Per Capita Taxes | 0.676 | 0.527 | 4.276 | -4.469 | -1.463 | -13.62\*\* | -1.344\* | -0.524 |
|  | (0.456) | (2.215) | (3.759) | (6.672) | (2.935) | (5.334) | (0.718) | (0.419) |
| R-Squared | 0.046 | 0.129 | 0.112 | 0.323 | 0.457 | 0.688 | 0.5 | 0.472 |
| State Fixed Effects | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Local Economic Conditions | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| County Wealth | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Republican Vote Share | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Change in Number of Farms by Acreage, 1870 to 1880 | | | | | | | | |
| Panel B: | 0-2 | 3-9 | 10-19 | 20-49 | 50-99 | 100-499 | 500-999 | 1000 + |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| 1870 County Per Capita Taxes | 0.657 | 0.357 | 4.493 | -4.315 | -1.569 | -13.60\*\* | -1.347\* | -0.526 |
|  | (0.456) | (2.209) | (3.756) | (6.679) | (2.936) | (5.341) | (0.719) | (0.420) |
| Black Officials? | 1.735 | 15.93\*\* | -20.35\* | -14.48 | 9.951 | -2.329 | 0.309 | 0.223 |
|  | (1.467) | (7.111) | (12.09) | (21.50) | (9.450) | (17.19) | (2.314) | (1.350) |
| R-Squared | 0.048 | 0.136 | 0.115 | 0.323 | 0.458 | 0.688 | 0.5 | 0.472 |
| State Fixed Effects | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Local Economic Conditions | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| County Wealth | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Republican Vote Share | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

N= 974. Regressions include total value of farms in 1870, the Logan-Parman segregation measure, percent black, total population, Column 2 and 4:manufacturing wages, value of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, urban county, and county wealth. Column 3 and 7: county wealth in 1870. Column 4 and 8: Republican Vote Share in 1868.

All regressions include state fixed effects.

Table A4: Two-Stage Estimates of Educational Outcomes as a Function of County Taxes

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|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Panel A: Black Officials as First Stage Predictor of Taxes  Enrollment | Black  Cannot Write Cannot Write Age > 10 Age >15 | 1900  Age >20 Literacy | Enrollment | White  Cannot Write Cannot Write Age > 10 Age >15 | 1900  Age >20 Literacy |
| 1870 County Per Capita Taxes 365.59\*\*\* | -138.79\*\*\* 15.55 | 0.0932\*\*\* | 391.18\*\*\* | -175.25\*\*\* -127.74\*\*\* | 0.0351\*\* |
| (50.766) | (24.887) (18.300) | (0.0205) | (92.837) | (35.575) (25.822) | (0.0133) |
| F Statistic on Excluded Predictor |  |  | 56.0 |  |  |
| Coefficient on Black Officials (First Stage) |  |  | 0.09886\*\*\*  (0.0132) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Panel B: Free Blacks as First  Stage Predictor of Taxes | Black | 1900 |  | White | 1900 |
| Enrollment | Cannot Write Cannot Write  Age > 10 Age >15 | Age >20  Literacy | Enrollment | Cannot Write Cannot Write  Age > 10 Age >15 | Age >20  Literacy |
| 1870 County Per Capita Taxes 320.16\*\* | -112.97\* -127.79\* | -0.044 | 461.53\* | -176.935\* -87.387 | -0.0352 |
| (126.28) | (64.294) (63.852) | (0.0553) | (267.815) | (99.106) (62.365) | (0.0368) |
| F Statistic on Excluded Predictor |  |  | 6.859 |  |  |
| Coefficient on Free Blacks (First Stage) |  |  | 0.000244\*\*  (0.0000931) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Panel C: OLS Estimates  1870 County Per Capita Taxes 42.20\*\*\* | -39.66\*\*\* -19.22\*\*\* | 0.0201\*\*\* | 156.6\*\*\* | -2.854 0.428 | -8.68e-05 |
| (6.603) | (5.454) (4.618) | (0.00470) | (22.69) | (6.983) (4.985) | (0.00322) |

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

N= 974. Regressions include total value of farms in 1870, the Logan-Parman segregation measure, percent black, total population, manufacturing wages, value of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, urban county, county wealth, and state fixed effects

Table A5: Reduced Form Estimates

Dependent Variable : 1870 County Taxes per Capita

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Free Blacks in 1860 0.000541\*\*\* | 0.000383\*\*\* | 0.000244\*\*\* | 0.000244\*\*\* |
| (7.84e-05) | (9.11e-05) | (9.31e-05) | (9.31e-05) |
| Total Value of Farms 1870 7.18e-08\*\*\* | 6.55e-08\*\*\* | 5.99e-08\*\*\* | 6.04e-08\*\*\* |
| (1.95e-08) | (2.10e-08) | (2.07e-08) | (2.08e-08) |
| Segregation Measure 0.0499 | 0.303 | 0.284 | 0.281 |
| (0.326) | (0.366) | (0.360) | (0.360) |
| Percent Black 0.669\*\*\* | 1.101\*\*\* | 0.954\*\*\* | 0.961\*\*\* |
| (0.211) | (0.262) | (0.259) | (0.260) |
| Total Population -3.11e-06 | 3.34e-05\*\*\* | -2.34e-05\* | -2.26e-05\* |
| (3.26e-06) | (8.27e-06) | (1.31e-05) | (1.34e-05) |
| Manufacturing Wages | -1.34e-06\*\*\* | -2.06e-06\*\*\* | -2.06e-06\*\*\* |
|  | (2.66e-07) | (2.92e-07) | (2.92e-07) |
| Value of Manufacturing Output | 2.18e-07\*\*\* | 3.04e-07\*\*\* | 3.04e-07\*\*\* |
|  | (7.20e-08) | (7.25e-08) | (7.26e-08) |
| Number Illiterate | -9.42e-05\*\*\* | -1.62e-05 | -1.72e-05 |
|  | (2.46e-05) | (2.80e-05) | (2.82e-05) |
| Rail Access? | 0.0437 | 0.0680 | 0.0689 |
|  | (0.0862) | (0.0849) | (0.0850) |
| Water Access? | 0.120 | 0.114 | 0.115 |
|  | (0.0829) | (0.0818) | (0.0820) |
| Urban? | 0.212 | 0.292 | 0.292 |
|  | (0.184) | (0.181) | (0.181) |
| County Wealth |  | 6.40e-08\*\*\* | 6.34e-08\*\*\* |
|  |  | (1.16e-08) | (1.18e-08) |
| Republican Vote Share 1868 President |  |  | 0.0832 |
|  |  |  | (0.259) |
| R-Squared 0.421 | 0.477 | 0.496 | 0.496 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 N= 825. All Regressions include state fixed effects.

Table A6: Effects of Politicians by Branch of Government

Panel A: Judicial Officials

Dependent Variable: OLS -- 1870 County First Stage Officials IV -- 1870 County

Taxes Per Capita Per County Taxes Per Capita Judicial Officials Per County 0.0659 3.494

(0.0608) (3.005)

Free Blacks 1860 6.77e-05

(5.39e-05)

F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument 1.578

Panel B: Executive Officials

Dependent Variable: OLS -- 1870 County First Stage Officials IV -- 1870 County

Taxes Per Capita Per County Taxes Per Capita Executive Officials Per County 0.123\*\*\* 1.006

(0.0233) (0.638)

Free Blacks 1860 0.000235\*

(0.000139)

F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument 2.883

Panel C: Legislative Officials

Dependent Variable: OLS -- 1870 County First Stage Officials IV -- 1870 County

Taxes Per Capita Per County Taxes Per Capita Legislative Officials Per County 0.139\*\*\* 0.283\*\*\*

(0.0232) (0.109)

Free Blacks 1860 0.000837\*\*\*

(0.000135)

F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument 38.204

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Note: N=825 in all regressions. Regressions include Republican vote share in 1868 Presidential Election, total value of farms, Logan- Parman Segregation, Total population, percent black, manufacturing wages, value of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, urban county, county wealth, state fixed effects.

1. See [Larsen](#_bookmark85) ([2015](#_bookmark85)), for example, who estimates death rates for seven confederate states. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [Larsen](#_bookmark85) ([2015](#_bookmark85)) argues that Confederate death rates were negatively related to lynching. [Cook et al.](#_bookmark62) ([2016](#_bookmark62)), however, find no evidence that lynching was related to the presence of black politicians during Reconstruction. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. This is not an issue of the quality of the leadership, but whether there were unfilled positions. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See above for more on the correlation of free blacks with other variables. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. If this is the case then slaves should be included in the specification. The inclusion of slaves in the specification could also be required if, for example, federal expenditures on Freedmen were substitutes for local expenditures. See[Table A2](#_bookmark145), which shows that the inclusion of slaves does not alter the results. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Note that since the regression controls for population and population shares such an IV is conditioned on these factors. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See [Table A1](#_bookmark144) for the results of the specification. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Another concern is the interpretation of the first stage. The fraction of blacks free is two variables, which alters the critical value of the F statistic. Even using the inappropriate value of the F statistic critical value, the IV fails all conventional weak instrument tests (see [Table A1](#_bookmark144)). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. In particular, wealth, manufacturing wages, manufacturing output, literacy, and farm value are measured per capita. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. When total population is included in the per capital estimate the F-statistic on the excluded instrument is 134.3–*βF irst* = 0.00265, t = 11.59– and the estimated difference *βOLS* = 0.094 versus *βIV* = 0.213. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For the effect of 1880 taxes, the results with slaves were *βOLS* = 0.0349 versus *βIV* = -0.0915. For the fraction slave the results were *βOLS* = 0.0277 versus *βIV* = -0.1402. For the effect of tax changes 1870 to 1880 taxes, the results with slaves were *βOLS* = -0.0143 versus *βIV* = -0.0523. For the fraction slave the results were *βOLS* = -0.0129 versus *βIV* = -0.0714. A one standard deviation increase in the number of black officials reduces 1880 taxes by 0.495 or 0.759 standard deviations, and decreases the change in taxes by 0.63 or 0.87 standard deviations, respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Taxes are unrelated to changes in the amount of unimproved land per county, but taxes are positively correlated changes in the amount of unimproved land per farm, which implies that more land was placed out of cultivation. Black politicians are correlated with a decrease in the amount if unimproved land per farm, but the effect is quite modest– less than 10 acres per county– and may simply reflect spacing of households in plots more distant over time. As with the results of tax size, this evidence is inconclusive, at best, of an effect of black politicians on land and land use changes. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. In specifications that contained slaves in 1860 and the percent of the population enslaved the coefficient on free blacks in 1860 was 0.000210 and 0.000194, respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. As a technical matter, the relatively high variation in the number of free blacks per county makes it difficult to visually show the range of distribution within as opposed to between states, especially for states in the Old South. Another option would be to show the distribution of free blacks relative to the state mean, but this approach is analogous to visually presenting the regression estimates with state fixed effects included. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See the Appendix Section on the description of the branch of government rubric. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The specification where the effect is estimated over legislative officials and free black adult men are used as the IV yields *βOLS* = 0.139 (0.0232 standard error, t=5.99) versus *βIV* = 0.3069 (0.112 standard error, t=2.74). The first stage relationship is *βF irst* = 0.00425 (standard error 0.000694, t=6.13, F-statistic 37.58). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)