*Analysis Appendix: Additional Results*

 This Appendix presents results omitted from the main paper due to page-length constraints.

 Appendix 1 tabulates results for variations on Table 2 and Table 3 of the article. The first four tables break the sample into urban and rural counties at the median; vary the definition of a “close” election; omit local government variables; and present the suppressed regression coefficients for Table 2 and 3.

 Appendix 2 reports elasticities of CAP spending using a vector of variables analogous to Price Fishback, Shawn Kantor, and John Wallis (2003), which the text uses to draw out some similarities and differences between the two programs.

 Appendix 3 reports a multivariate analysis of voting on enactment of the EOA in the House and Senate.

 Appendix 4 reports the turnout and Democratic vote share estimates graphed in Figure 4.

# *Appendix 1: Alternative Specifications of Models Underlying Table 2 and Table 3*

Appendix Table 1

COUNTY-LEVEL CORRELATES OF CAP SPENDING, BY URBAN STATUS

*A. Urban Counties Only*

|  |
| --- |
|  *Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968* |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| *Poverty Variables* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Population share in HH with incomes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ≤ $3K | 37.01\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 37.16\*\* |  |  |
|  | (13.04) |  |  |  |  | (15.28) |  |  |
| ≤ $1K |  | 108.97\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 113.92\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (38.92) |  |  |  |  | (43.12) |  |
| ≤ $2K |  |  | 53.67\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 53.71\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (16.10) |  |  |  |  | (17.68) |
| Share nonwhite |  |  |  | 23.60\* |  | 22.03 | 12.05 | 16.62 |
|  |  |  |  | (13.02) |  | (15.63) | (12.64) | (13.75) |
| *Political Variables*  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  1,000/Population |  |  |  |  | –16.83 | –19.48 | –12.90 | –16.67 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (20.19) | (21.92) | (21.35) | (21.25) |
| For 1964 Presidential election: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Change in share for Democrat, |  |  |  |  | 36.72\* | 47.50\*\* | 49.46\*\* | 48.04\*\* |
|  1960–1964 |  |  |  |  | (20.89) | (22.95) | (24.11) | (23.64) |
| Share for Democrat |  |  |  |  | –1.33 | 0.61 | 0.38 | 0.21 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (23.94) | (22.26) | (22.98) | (22.74) |
| 1= Democratic won |  |  |  |  | 2.18 | 1.10 | 1.06 | 1.14 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (5.24) | (4.90) | (4.94) | (4.93) |
| 1= Election close (+/–10 points) |  |  |  |  | –1.01 | –1.31 | –1.07 | –1.09 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.67) | (2.51) | (2.65) | (2.58) |
| 1= Presidential election close |  |  |  |  | 1.64 | 2.47 | 2.50 | 2.42 |
|  x 1=Democrat won |  |  |  |  | (4.65) | (4.33) | (4.44) | (4.41) |
| *89th Congress House Representative(s)* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | 2.18 | 1.92 | 2.02 | 2.05 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.22) | (2.07) | (2.12) | (2.10) |
| 1= Major committee member/ |  |  |  |  | 0.93 | 0.88 | 0.95 | 0.95 |
|  leader |  |  |  |  | (1.74) | (1.72) | (1.73) | (1.73) |
| 1= Major committee member |  |  |  |  | –2.92 | –2.88 | –2.91 | –3.02 |
|  x 1=Democrat |  |  |  |  | (3.30) | (3.13) | (3.19) | (3.18) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ |  |  |  |  | –2.21 | –1.31 | –1.08 | –1.20 |
|  leader |  |  |  |  | (1.67) | (1.61) | (1.63) | (1.58) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ |  |  |  |  | 1.23 | 1.50 | 2.37 | 1.70 |
|  leader x 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | (3.59) | (3.58) | (3.64) | (3.60) |
| Observations |  1,545 |  1,545 |  1,545 |  1,545  |  1,545 |  1,545 |  1,545 |  1,545 |
| *R*-squared | 0.089 | 0.075 | 0.079 | 0.077 | 0.074 | 0.078 | 0.085 | 0.088 |
| *Partial R-squared* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Poverty variables  | 0.002 | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.003 |  | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Political variables |  |  |  |  | 0.007 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.008 |

*B. Rural Counties Only*

|  |
| --- |
|  *Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968* |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| *Poverty Variables* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Population share in HH with incomes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ≤ $3K | 76.60\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 55.68\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (17.32) |  |  |  |  | (15.95) |  |  |
| ≤ $1K |  | 136.29\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 69.87\*\* |  |
|  |  | (38.27) |  |  |  |  | (29.19) |  |
| ≤ $2K |  |  | 105.03\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 59.20\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (25.11) |  |  |  |  | (17.93) |
| Share nonwhite |  |  |  | 98.25\*\*\* |  | 98.31\*\*\* | 98.30\*\*\* | 94.60\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (25.54) |  | (25.82) | (25.64) | (25.34) |
| *Political Variables*  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  1,000/Population |  |  |  |  | 9.27 | 12.28\* | 7.96 | 8.29 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (7.26) | (6.93) | (6.46) | (6.42) |
| For 1964 Presidential election: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Change in share for Democrat, |  |  |  |  | 12.99 | 45.91\*\*\* | 44.72\*\*\* | 44.30\*\*\* |
|  1960–1964 |  |  |  |  | (11.57) | (17.14) | (16.90) | (17.03) |
| Share for Democrat |  |  |  |  | 47.35\*\* | 41.22\*\* | 41.42\*\* | 41.38\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (19.84) | (18.51) | (18.51) | (18.51) |
| 1= Democratic won |  |  |  |  | –8.12 | –3.81 | –3.86 | –3.71 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (5.55) | (5.20) | (5.21) | (5.21) |
| 1= Election close (+/–10 points) |  |  |  | –7.30\*\* | –2.82 | –2.92 | –2.79 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (3.25) | (3.01) | (3.00) | (3.00) |
| 1= Presidential election close |  |  |  |  | 6.25 | 1.25 | 1.40 | 1.21 |
|  x 1= Democrat won |  |  |  |  | (5.09) | (4.78) | (4.78) | (4.79) |
|  *89th Congress House Representative(s)* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | –8.08\* | –9.29\*\* | –9.27\*\* | –9.02\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.70) | (4.59) | (4.59) | (4.58) |
| 1= Major committee member/ |  |  |  |  | –8.54 | –4.50 | –4.68 | –4.28 |
|  leader |  |  |  |  | (6.50) | (5.94) | (5.85) | (5.90) |
| 1= Major committee member |  |  |  |  | 13.46\* | 13.94\*\* | 13.57\*\* | 13.27\* |
|  x 1=Democrat |  |  |  |  | (7.24) | (6.93) | (6.81) | (6.88) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ |  |  |  |  | 5.75 | 3.77 | 2.95 | 3.38 |
|  leader |  |  |  |  | (6.87) | (5.40) | (5.67) | (5.59) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ |  |  |  |  | –9.58 | –10.09 | –8.53 | –9.44 |
|  leader x 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | (7.91) | (6.72) | (6.93) | (6.90) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations |  1,546 |  1,546 |  1,546 |  1,546 |  1,546 |  1,546 |  1,546 |  1,546 |
| *R*-squared | 0.242 | 0.244 | 0.250 | 0.275 | 0.238 | 0.301 | 0.298 | 0.300 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Partial R-squared* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Poverty variables  | 0.013 | 0.020 | 0.021 | 0.035 |  | 0.054 | 0.047 | 0.048 |
|  Political variables |  |  |  |  | 0.014 | 0.021 | 0.019 | 0.019 |

*C. Farming Counties Only*

|  |
| --- |
|  *Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968* |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |  (6) | (7) |  (8) |
| *Poverty Variables* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Population share in HH with incomes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ≤ $3K | 60.83\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 35.58\* |  |  |
|  | (22.64) |  |  |  |  | (21.07) |  |  |
| ≤ $1K |  | 105.53\*\* |  |  |  |  | 21.02 |  |
|  |  | (45.47) |  |  |  |  | (34.11) |  |
| ≤ $2K |  |  | 84.81\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 26.77 |
|  |  |  | (31.07) |  |  |  |  | (21.64) |
| Share nonwhite |  |  |  | 113.58\*\*\* |  | 117.85\*\*\* |  121.15\*\*\* | 117.83\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (34.17) |  | (33.96) |  (34.27) | (33.76) |
| *Political Variables*  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  1,000/Population |  |  |  |  | 12.38 | 12.87 |  9.42 | 9.68 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (8.80) | (8.53) |  (7.56) | (7.61) |
| For 1964 Presidential election: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Change in share for Democrat, |  |  |  |  | 22.67 | 48.45\*\* | 48.91\*\* | 48.08\*\* |
|  1960–1964 |  |  |  |  | (17.52) | (21.72) | (21.67) | (21.73) |
| Share for Democrat |  |  |  |  | 21.04 | 27.59 | 26.24 | 26.99 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (20.09) | (20.74) | (20.74) | (20.73) |
| 1= Democratic won |  |  |  |  | –1.47 | –0.36 | –0.54 | –0.46 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (5.31) | (5.21) | (5.21) | (5.21) |
| 1= Election Close (+/–10 points) |  |  |  | –3.96 | –1.20 | –1.56 | –1.38 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.94) | (2.82) | (2.80) | (2.81) |
| 1= Presidential election close |  |  |  |  | –0.25 | –2.32 | –1.90 | –2.12 |
|  x 1= Democrat won |  |  |  |  | (4.75) | (4.69) | (4.68) | (4.68) |
| *89th Congress House Representative(s)* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | –3.03 | –6.09 | –6.11 | –5.97 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.79) | (4.92) | (4.91) | (4.87) |
| 1= Major committee member/ |  |  |  |  | –3.42 | –1.84 | –2.16 | –1.94 |
|  leader |  |  |  |  | (5.40) | (5.01) | (4.95) | (4.98) |
| 1= Major committee member |  |  |  |  | 5.52 | 8.18 | 8.36 | 8.11 |
|  x 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | (6.77) | (6.69) | (6.62) | (6.63) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ |  |  |  |  | –0.24 | –1.05 | –1.48 | –1.32 |
|  leader |  |  |  |  | (4.43) | (4.12) | (4.25) | (4.21) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ |  |  |  |  | –5.81 | –6.12 | –5.40 | –5.63 |
|  leader x 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | (6.29) | (6.13) | (6.20) | (6.19) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations |  1,545 |  1,545 |  1,545 |  1,545 | 1,545 |  1,545 |  1,545 |  1,545 |
| *R*-squared | 0.050 | 0.051 | 0.054 | 0.086 | 0.050 | 0.101 | 0.099 | 0.100 |
| *Partial R-squared* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Poverty variables  | 0.005 | 0.006 | 0.009 | 0.024 |  | 0.030 | 0.026 | 0.026 |
|  Political variables |  |  |  |  | 0.004 | 0.010 | 0.009 | 0.009 |

*D. Industrial Counties Only*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  *Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968* |

 |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |  (6) |  (7) |  (8) |
| *Poverty Variables* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Population share in HH with incomes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ≤ $3K | 89.39\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 66.21\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (19.83) |  |  |  |  | (14.88) |  |  |
| ≤ $1K |  | 244.17\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 189.24\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  (82.46) |  |  |  |  | (62.26) |  |
| ≤ $2K |  |  | 115.35\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 81.79\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (28.98) |  |  |  |  | (18.77) |
| Share nonwhite |  |  |  | 68.61\*\* |  | 63.60\*\* | 54.54\*\* | 59.56\* |
|  |  |  |  | (30.91) |  | (32.01) | (26.80) | (31.18) |
| *Political Variables*  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  1,000/Population |  |  |  |  | 6.16 | 9.88\*\* | 8.41 | 6.88 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (5.39) | (4.88) | (5.30) | (4.99) |
| For 1964 Presidential election: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Change in share for Democrat, |  |  |  | 24.51\*\* | 55.12\*\*\* | 51.54\*\*\* | 53.38\*\*\* |
|  1960–1964 |  |  |  |  | (11.07) | (19.83) | (19.62) | (19.79) |
| Share for Democrat |  |  |  |  | 57.44\*\*\* | 50.06\*\*\* | 48.54\*\*\* | 50.21\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (18.07) | (17.00) | (17.42) | (17.13) |
| 1= Democratic won |  |  |  |  | –11.71\*\* | –10.45\*\* | –9.43\*\* | –10.08\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (4.80) | (4.57) | (4.65) | (4.58) |
| 1= Election close (+/–10 points) |  |  |  | –9.25\*\*\* | –8.20\*\* | –7.24\*\* | –7.92\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (3.42) | (3.24) | (3.18) | (3.25) |
| 1= Presidential election close |  |  |  | 18.33\*\*\* | 16.85\*\*\* | 15.70\*\*\* | 16.68\*\*\* |
|  x 1= Democrat won |  |  |  |  | (6.37) | (6.03) | (5.65) | (6.00) |
| *89th Congress House Representative(s)* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | –0.39 | –0.70 | –0.12 | –0.41 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.64) | (2.46) | (2.56) | (2.48) |
| 1= Major committee member/ |  |  |  |  | –3.43 | –2.87 | –2.51 | –2.73 |
|  leader |  |  |  |  | (2.70) | (2.43) | (2.44) | (2.44) |
| 1= Major committee member |  |  |  |  | –0.26 | 0.47 | –0.06 | 0.20 |
|  x 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | (3.71) | (3.40) | (3.49) | (3.41) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ |  |  |  |  | 1.26 | 2.44 | 2.32 | 2.09 |
|  leader |  |  |  |  | (2.35) | (2.38) | (2.26) | (2.30) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ |  |  |  |  | 0.34 | –0.68 | 1.59 | 0.13 |
|  leader x 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | (4.05) | (4.23) | (4.24) | (4.18) |
| Observations | 1,546 | 1,546 | 1,546 | 1,546 | 1,546 |  1,546 |  1,546 |  1,546 |
| *R*-squared | 0.079 | 0.103 | 0.086 | 0.088 | 0.065 | 0.131 | 0.145 | 0.132 |
| *Partial R-squared* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Poverty variables  | 0.022 | 0.046 | 0.031 | 0.020 |  | 0.039 | 0.046 | 0.038 |
|  Political variables |  |  |  |  | 0.028 | 0.032 | 0.029 | 0.030 |

*Notes*: Urban counties are defined as those with an urban share of population in 1960 above the median (31.3 percent) and rural counties are defined as those at or below the urban share median. Farming counties are those above the median share of population living on farms in 1960 (20.4 percent) and industrial counties are those at or below the farming median. See Table 2 notes for information on specification and sources.

Appendix Table 2

COUNTY–LEVEL CORRELATES OF CAP SPENDING, 1965–1968, USING

ALTERNATIVE CUTOFFS FOR “CLOSE” ELECTION

|  |
| --- |
|  *Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968* |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| *Closeness cutoff* | +/– 3% | +/– 5% | +/– 7% | +/– 15% |
| *Poverty variables* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Population share in HH with incomes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ≤ $3K |  | 49.53\*\*\* |  | 48.89\*\*\* |  | 48.71\*\*\* |  | 49.36\*\*\* |
|  |  | (11.65) |  | (11.62) |  | (11.63) |  | (11.65) |
| Share nonwhite |  | 85.58\*\*\* |  | 85.78\*\*\* |  | 86.15\*\*\* |  | 85.56\*\*\* |
|  |  | (21.59) |  | (21.67) |  | (21.67) |  | (21.80) |
| *Political Variables*  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  1,000/Population | 7.81 | 9.99\* | 7.82 | 9.94\* | 7.67 | 9.82\* | 7.75 | 9.99\* |
|  | (5.95) | (5.66) | (5.87) | (5.61) | (5.87) | (5.62) | (5.93) | (5.68) |
| For 1964 Presidential election: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Change in share for Democrat, | 26.35\*\* | 56.09\*\*\* | 27.06\*\* | 56.53\*\*\* | 27.39\*\*\* | 57.10\*\*\* | 26.53\*\* | 55.34\*\*\* |
|  1960–1964 | (10.57) | (14.92) | (10.55) | (14.90) | (10.46) | (14.88) | (10.47) | (14.61) |
| Share for Democrat | 28.91\*\* | 30.37\*\*\* | 29.60\*\* | 32.02\*\* | 28.71\*\* | 34.90\*\* | 14.21 | 21.80 |
|  | (11.96) | (11.67) | (13.42) | (13.13) | (14.25) | (14.10) | (17.13) | (17.03) |
| 1= Democratic won | –3.65 | –3.48 | –5.15 | –4.99 | –5.70 | –6.79 | 0.23 | –0.72 |
|  | (2.69) | (2.61) | (3.53) | (3.44) | (4.27) | (4.24) | (6.83) | (6.73) |
| 1= election close  | –4.70\*\* | –3.07\* | –6.15\*\*\* | –4.41\*\* | –6.24\*\*\* | –4.98\*\* | –3.41 | –1.03 |
|  | (1.92) | (1.84) | (2.14) | (2.02) | (2.30) | (2.31) | (3.31) | (3.33) |
| 1= Presidential election close | 8.35\* | 6.97 | 7.71\*\* | 6.77\* | 6.88\* | 7.40\*\* | 0.75 | 0.53 |
|  x 1= Democrat won | (4.61) | (4.33) | (3.71) | (3.58) | (3.64) | (3.68) | (5.16) | (5.09) |
| *89th Congress House Representative(s)* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1= Democrat | –0.97 | –2.33 | –1.08 | –2.40 | –1.02 | –2.31 | –1.09 | –2.37 |
|  | (2.51) | (2.43) | (2.52) | (2.44) | (2.51) | (2.43) | (2.50) | (2.42) |
| 1= Major committee member/ | –3.58 | –2.24 | –3.66 | –2.29 | –3.63 | –2.22 | –3.68 | –2.23 |
|  leader | (3.07) | (2.81) | (3.08) | (2.82) | (3.08) | (2.82) | (3.09) | (2.82) |
| 1= Major committee member | 2.90 | 3.98 | 3.09 | 4.13 | 3.04 | 4.06 | 2.99 | 4.02 |
|  x 1=Democrat | (3.83) | (3.65) | (3.83) | (3.65) | (3.83) | (3.65) | (3.81) | (3.64) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ | 1.67 | 2.25 | 1.77 | 2.30 | 1.69 | 2.10 | 1.91 | 2.42 |
|  leader | (2.32) | (2.20) | (2.33) | (2.21) | (2.33) | (2.20) | (2.33) | (2.22) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ | –2.53 | –3.37 | –2.73 | –3.51 | –2.76 | –3.42 | –3.03 | –3.71 |
|  leader x 1= Democrat | (3.33) | (3.28) | (3.33) | (3.28) | (3.32) | (3.28) | (3.34) | (3.30) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |
| *R*-squared | 0.008 | 0.090 | 0.008 | 0.090 | 0.008 | 0.090 | 0.008 | 0.089 |

*Notes*: “Close elections” are defined using margins of +/– 3 percentage points from the pivotal vote (columns 1 and 2), +/– 5 (3 and 4), +/– 7 (5 and 6), and +/– 15 (7 and 8). Specifications are otherwise identical to columns 5 and 6 of Table 2. See Table 2 notes for information on specification and sources.

Appendix Table 3

COUNTY-LEVEL CORRELATES OF CAP SPENDING, 1965–1968,

OMITTING LOCAL GOVERNMENT VARIABLES

|  |
| --- |
|  *Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita, 1965–1968* |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| *Poverty variables* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Population share in HH with incomes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ≤ $3K |  83.09\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 59.62\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (16.44) |  |  |  |  | (12.99) |  |  |
| ≤ $1K |  | 156.98\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 90.68\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (38.81) |  |  |  |  | (27.42) |  |
| ≤ $2K |  |  | 103.63\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 62.06\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (21.60) |  |  |  |  | (14.46) |
| Share nonwhite |  |  |  | 87.77\*\*\* |  | 85.13\*\*\* | 82.82\*\*\* | 81.68\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (21.77) |  | (21.74) | (20.70) | (21.40) |
|  *Political Variables*  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1,000/Population |  |  |  |  | –1.28 | 5.59 | 0.87 | 0.98 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (3.80) | (4.36) | (3.73) | (3.90) |
| For 1964 Presidential election: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Change in share for Democrat, |  |  |  |  | 23.63\*\* | 54.98\*\*\* | 52.36\*\*\* | 53.00\*\*\* |
|  1960–1964 |  |  |  |  | (10.30) | (14.86) | (14.65) | (14.77) |
| Share for Democrat |  |  |  |  | 34.45\*\* | 35.43\*\*\* | 37.74\*\*\* | 36.31\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (14.16) | (13.64) | (13.90) | (13.76) |
| 1= Democratic won |  |  |  |  | –5.56 | –5.25 | –5.58 | –5.34 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (3.62) | (3.51) | (3.54) | (3.52) |
| 1= Election close (+/–10 points) |  |  |  |  | –6.75\*\*\* | –4.69\*\* | –4.92\*\* | –4.70\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.20) | (2.04) | (2.05) | (2.04) |
| 1= Presidential election close |  |  |  |  | 7.32\*\* | 6.37\* | 6.75\* | 6.52\* |
|  x 1=Democrat won |  |  |  |  | (3.70) | (3.57) | (3.57) | (3.59) |
| *89th Congress House Representative(s)* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | –1.52 | –2.66 | –2.67 | –2.50 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (2.51) | (2.41) | (2.42) | (2.40) |
| 1= Major committee member/ |  |  |  |  | –4.42 | –2.66 | –2.65 | –2.54 |
|  leader |  |  |  |  | (3.22) | (2.88) | (2.86) | (2.87) |
| 1= Major committee member |  |  |  |  | 3.41 | 4.24 | 4.07 | 3.93 |
|  x 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | (3.85) | (3.64) | (3.62) | (3.61) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ |  |  |  |  | 0.38 | 1.35 | 0.49 | 0.82 |
|  leader |  |  |  |  | (2.29) | (2.10) | (2.10) | (2.10) |
| 1= Major committee chair/ |  |  |  |  | –2.15 | –2.95 | –1.52 | –2.23 |
|  leader x 1= Democrat |  |  |  |  | (3.29) | (3.23) | (3.17) | (3.21) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations |  3,091 | 3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 | 3,091 | 3,091 |
| *R*-squared |  0.085 | 0.041 | 0.043 | 0.045 | 0.061 | 0.027 | 0.084 | 0.082 |

*Notes*: Local government variables are omitted from the set of suppressed controls. Specifications are otherwise identical to columns 1 to 8 of Table 2. See Table 2 notes for information on specification and sources.

Appendix Table 4

COUNTY-LEVEL CORRELATES OF CAP SPENDING, 1965–1968,

REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS SUPPRESSED IN TABLES 2 AND 3

1. *Regression Coefficients Suppressed in Table 2*

|  |
| --- |
|  *Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures per Capita* |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  *1960 Census Variables (Share of Population)* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| < 5 years old | 202.51\* | 166.90 | 165.85 | –62.14 | 286.32\*\* | –74.53 | –78.69 | –79.09 |
|  | (116.67) | (105.92) | (111.61) | (87.66) | (130.33) | (90.41) | (90.40) | (90.76) |
| > 64 years old | –98.72\*\* | –84.22\* | –97.31\*\* | –158.71\*\*\* | –32.17 | –219.18\*\*\* | –200.42\*\*\* | –208.12\*\*\* |
|  | (50.15) | (47.23) | (49.51) | (52.35) | (46.94) | (54.49) | (52.45) | (53.35) |
| Urban | 1.64 | –0.72 | 0.03 | –1.25 | –1.80 | 2.66 | 0.36 | 0.70 |
|  | (3.99) | (4.15) | (4.11) | (4.11) | (4.38) | (3.88) | (3.94) | (3.97) |
| Rural nonfarm | –41.17\*\*\* | –39.91\*\*\* | –43.36\*\*\* | –17.56\*\*\* | –17.94\*\* | –25.62\*\*\* | –22.40\*\*\* | –24.14\*\*\* |
|  | (9.79) | (10.34) | (10.38) | (6.72) | (7.39) | (7.68) | (7.80) | (7.64) |
| Income ≥ $10,000 | 15.03 | –2.88 | 11.07 | –40.31\*\*\* | –37.28\*\* | 6.98 | –12.86 | –5.94 |
|  | (17.62) | (16.11) | (16.64) | (15.16) | (15.36) | (17.58) | (15.62) | (16.09) |
|  *Census of Government (1962) Local Government Finance* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Direct total expenditures  | –0.01 | –0.00 | –0.00 | –0.01 | –0.01 | –0.01 | –0.01 | –0.01 |
|  per capita | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Total tax revenue per capita | –0.05 | –0.07\* | –0.06 | –0.09\*\* | –0.11\*\* | –0.07 | –0.08\* | –0.07\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Welfare expenditures  | 0.31\*\* | 0.36\*\* | 0.31\*\* | 0.35\*\* | 0.35\*\* | 0.30\*\* | 0.34\*\* | 0.32\*\* |
|  per capita | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.14) |
|  *Miscellaneous Social Factors* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sharecroppers / total operators | 1.44 | –7.33 | –7.15 | –33.89\*\* | 17.16\* | –20.87\* | –24.12\* | –23.95\* |
|  1930 (Southern paternalism) | (7.93) | (9.51) | (8.83) | (14.18) | (8.76) | (12.56) | (13.00) | (12.80) |
| Collins-Margo riot intensity | 35.00\*\*\* | 35.27\*\*\* | 31.22\*\* | 10.32 | 60.53\*\*\* | –2.57 | 1.75 | 0.04 |
|  Index, 1964–1968 | (13.44) | (11.97) | (12.15) | (11.01) | (19.25) | (13.31) | (12.99) | (13.28) |
| Vietnam deaths 1960–1970 / | 4.05 | 4.81 | 4.56 | 6.89 | 4.35 | 6.16 | 6.40 | 6.24 |
|  Males aged 8–20 in 1960 | (4.85) | (4.83) | (4.83) | (4.70) | (4.95) | (4.73) | (4.77) | (4.76) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations |  3,091 |  3,091 | 3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |  3,091 |
| *R*-squared | 0.045 | 0.050 | 0.050 | 0.070 | 0.038 | 0.090 | 0.089 | 0.089 |

*B.* *Regression Coefficients Suppressed in Table 3*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  (1) | (2) | (3) |  (4) |  (5) |  (6) |  (7) |  (8) |
|  | *Dependent Variable: Real Federal CAP Expenditures Per Capita* |
| *1960 Census Variables (Share of Population)* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| < 5 years old | –13.83 | –20.99 | –34.97 | –78.06 | 44.99 | –131.19 | –125.54 | –135.66 |
|  | (106.04) | (104.18) | (106.03) | (118.80) | (100.97) |  (127.23) | (126.90) | (127.73) |
| > 64 years old | –72.47 | –58.67 | –69.99 | –89.12 | –43.87 | –143.94\*\* | –125.91\*\* | –134.58\*\* |
|  | (55.86) | (52.54) | (53.81) | (57.94) | (46.63) | (61.62) | (59.42) | (60.40) |
| Urban | 12.76\*\*\* | 11.12\*\* | 11.61\*\* | 10.75\*\* | 10.50\* | 12.23\*\* | 10.71\* | 10.94\* |
|  | (4.94) | (5.16) | (5.10) | (5.20) | (5.73) | (5.43) | (5.67) | (5.64) |
| Rural nonfarm | –15.93\*\* | –15.62\* | –18.08\*\* | –5.65 | –3.78 | –11.58 | –10.66 | –12.97 |
|  | (8.10) | (8.32) | (8.58) | (7.25) | (7.46) | (8.38) | (8.36) | (8.63) |
| Income ≥ $10,000 | 11.49 | –11.90 | 1.65 | –37.97 | –43.45 | 5.61 | –16.98 | –5.64 |
|  | (32.53) | (28.29) | (30.46) | (26.15) | (28.79) | (36.22) | (31.14) | (32.74) |
| *Census of Government (1962) Local Government Finance* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Direct total expenditures  | –0.05 | –0.05 | –0.05 | –0.05 | –0.05 | –0.05 | –0.05 | –0.05 |
|  per capita | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Total tax revenue per capita | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Welfare expenditures  | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.28 | 0.41 | 0.29 | 0.24 | 0.27 | 0.24 |
|  per capita | (0.31) | (0.31) | (0.31) | (0.31) | (0.32) | (0.32) | (0.32) | (0.32) |
| *Miscellaneous Social Factors* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Sharecroppers / total  operators 1930 | 7.39 | 5.05 | 4.81 | 0.68 | 15.29\* | 5.73 | 4.38 | 4.13 |
|  (Southern paternalism) | (7.56) | (8.01) | (7.70) | (9.08) | (9.06) | (9.53) | (9.72) | (9.58) |
|  Collins-Margo riot intensity | 6.63 | 2.24 | –0.30 | –28.07 | 8.79 | –39.56 | –40.62 | –41.56 |
|  Index, 1964–1968 | (59.89) | (59.37) | (58.93) | (63.11) | (61.69) | (61.78) | (61.00) | (60.98) |
|  Vietnam deaths 1960–1970  / Males aged 8–20 in 1960 | 7.41(5.44) | 7.49(5.46) | 7.45(5.50) | 9.16\*(5.32) | 7.69(5.59) | 8.27(5.60) | 8.30(5.57) | 8.13(5.62) |
| Observations |  1,414 |  1,414 |  1,414 |  1,414 |  1,414 |  1,414 |  1,414 |  1,414 |
| *R*-squared | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.017 | 0.016 | 0.018 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.028 |

*Notes*: Specifications are identical to the specifications reported in columns 1 to 8 of Table 2 (panel A) and Table 3 (panel B). Estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3 are suppressed here for brevity. See Table 2 and 3 notes for information on specification and sources.

# *Appendix 2: Comparison of the New Deal with the War on Poverty*

 This article’s political economy of the EOA can also be compared to research on the political economy of the New Deal.[[1]](#footnote-1) Like the New Deal literature, we find that EOA spending was influenced by need and by presidential politics. Unlike the New Deal, we do not find evidence that the OEO attempted to allocate grants to areas with powerful congressmen. This is consistent with historical accounts of the lack of influence by local elites and Congress, or, perhaps, with Lee J. Alston and Joseph P. Ferrie’s (1999) hypothesis that some powerful Congressmen did not want EOA spending in their districts.

 In his seminal analysis of reelection-seeking behavior of the Roosevelt administration, Gavin Wright (1974) constructs a measure of “political productivity” for each state that captured its electoral votes per capita and proximity to the 50 percent vote threshold to create a measure of expected electoral votes for FDR per New Deal dollar spent per capita.[[2]](#footnote-2) His state-level analysis finds that New Deal spending is correlated with his measure of political productivity and that spending increased Democratic share in 1936 and 1938 elections, but not in the 1940 election. In contrast, he reports that federal work-relief job allocation predicts vote share in all three elections. Wallis (1987) adds annual data on state unemployment rates to the analysis and finds that Wright overstates the importance of politics relative to economic conditions. The series of articles that followed have investigated these findings further. Wallis (1998) found his own results were driven by a single outlier, Nevada, which had extremely high electoral votes per capita (over triple the second-highest state’s) and which was represented the powerful Senator, Key Pittman, throughout the New Deal. Robert K. Fleck (2001) argues that John Wallis (1998) should control using land area rather than 1/population.

 Because it is difficult to disentangle these competing hypotheses with state-level data,
a new literature examines the correlates of New Deal spending at the county-level. Fleck (1999) shows higher voter turnout increased spending under the Federal Emergency Relief Administration in Southern counties. Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis (2003) extend this analysis to all counties. Their baseline specification is

$$SpendingPerCap\_{i}=\frac{α\_{0}}{Pop\_{i}}+ β\_{0}+ \sum\_{i}^{n}β\_{k}X\_{ik}+ \sum\_{s=1}^{48}β\_{s}b\_{si}+ ε\_{i}$$

where *SpendingPerCap* is per capita New Deal spending from 1933–1939 in county *i*, *Pop* is county population, $β\_{0}$ is a constant (baseline spending per person), $α\_{0}$ is also a constant (baseline spending per county), $X\_{ik}$ is one of *k* controls at the county or state level, *b* is
a state-fixed effect. Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis exploit the greater number of observations available in a county-level analysis to include a variety of measures of political productivity and both 1/population and square mileage/population terms, encompassing both approaches of the state-level analysis.

 To examine the robustness of our findings to Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis’s (2003) county-level model, our Appendix Table 5 replicates their elasticities (column 1) and then uses the same specification for our dependent variable of interest: real, cumulative CAP spending from 1965 to 1968 (column 2). Their regressors are changed to be the closest available analogues in more recent data. In particular, we add land area and some additional economic and political variables from the 1960 Census and 1962 and 1967 County Data Books (Haines 2005). Instead of tax returns, which were mandated for a much larger share of the population following the Second World War, we use share of households earning more than $10,000 to measure high-income households.[[3]](#footnote-3) In addition, we use share of population with less than four years of education in lieu of literacy rate. Average tenure of congressional representatives for a county is measured by averaging the number of Congresses served by all representatives of a county for representatives serving at the time of the August 1964 vote on the EOA, using the Congressional data from ICPSR and Carroll McKibbin (1997).

 Consistent with our preferred specification and with Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis’s analysis, high per capita CAP spending is associated with measures of poverty (unemployment rate) and with presidential politics (mean Democratic vote over recent elections, Democratic swing from 1960 to 1964). As in our main table, the inverse of population and inverse of population density are not statistically significant predictors of CAP spending. Interestingly, we find a negative (though not statistically significant) relationship between a Representative’s tenure and total CAP funding, where Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis (2003) find a positive relationship. Consistent with the Alston and Ferrie hypothesis, this seems to be driven by lower funding in the South, where Representatives generally had served longer. (The median county in the South had an average tenure of 6 terms across its Representatives; the North, Midwest, and West all had medians of 3 terms.) Column 3 adds variables for rioting, Vietnam mobilization, and Southern paternalism, which do not meaningfully change the estimates.

 These estimates confirm the robustness of our primary findings: that the OEO directed funds toward poorer areas, as well as those most valuable for presidential politics, while actually spending *less* in congressional districts held by powerful Southern congressmen, consistent with Alston and Ferrie’s hypothesis. Overall, however, politics mattered far less for CAP spending relative to New Deal spending. Together, the political variables directly analogous to Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis’s have a partial *R*2 of just 0.014 for the Community Action Program, compared to 0.206 for the New Deal.

Appendix Table 5

COMPARISION OF TOTAL FEDERAL GRANTS PER CAPITA BY COUNTY, NEW DEAL AND COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | *Fishback, Kantor,**and Wallis* | *Community Action* *Program, 1965–1968* |
|  |  |  (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| *Relief and Recovery* |  |  |  |  |
|  | Growth retail sales per cap. | 0.001 | 0.311\* | 0.311\* | 0.351\* |
|  | Unemployment rate | 0.058\* | 1.117\* | 1.106\* | 1.142\* |
|  | % Farm failures(a)  | –0.021\* | –0.127 | –0.117 | –0.136 |
| *Redistribution and Reform* |  |  |  |  |
|  | Tax returns / % High income(b) | –0.06\* | 0.0621 | 0.419\* | 0.484\* |
|  | Retail sales per capita | 0.12\* | –0.585\* | –0.588\* | –0.809\* |
|  | % Black | 0.02 | 0.109 | 0.0238 | 0.116 |
|  | % Illiterate / % Low education(c) | –0.027 | 0.388\* | 0.00170 | 0.240 |
|  | Average farm size | 0.303\* | 0.0513\* | 0.0610\* | 0.0650\* |
| *Political Variables* |  |  |  |  |
|  | 9-cycle Dem. pres. vote mean | 0.14\* | 0.610 | 0.845\* |  |
|  | Presidential election swing | 0.226\* | 0.0534\* | 0.0569\* |  |
|  | 10-cycle Dem. pres. vote std. dev.  | 0.016 | –0.0565 | 0.0758 |  |
|  | Pres. votes per population | 0.58\* | –1.725\* | –2.118\* |  |
|  | Avg. tenure in House(d) | 0.009 | –0.0158 | –0.009 |  |
| *Structural Variables* |  |  |  |  |
|  | Inverse population | 0.024\* | 0.0904 | 0.0764 | –0.00215 |
|  | Square miles per capita | 0.067\* | –0.0507 | –0.0449 | –0.0427 |
|  | % Population urban | –0.004 | 0.114 | 0.245\* | 0.286\* |
|  | % Land on farms | –0.278\* | 0.386\* | 0.358\* | 0.374\* |
| *Additional Controls* |  |  |  |  |
|  | % Families <= $3K Income, 1960 |  |  | 0.0904 | 0.0764 |
|  | Sharecroppers, 1930 |  |  | –0.0507 | –0.0449 |
|  | Vietnam deaths, 1960–1970 p.c. |  |  | 0.114 | 0.245\* |
|  | Riot intensity index |  |  | 0.386\* | 0.358\* |
| *1964 Presidential Election Variables* |  |  |  |  |
|  | Dem Swing from previous election |  |  |  | 0.175\* |
|  | Democratic vote share |  |  |  | 0.128\* |
|  | Win county (0/1) |  |  |  | –0.177 |
|  | Close election (< 10% margin) |  |  |  | –0.0665 |
|  | Win \* close |  |  |  | 0.0540 |
|  | State-fixed effects |  Yes |  Yes |  Yes |  Yes |
|  | Committee indicators |  Yes |  Yes |  Yes |  Yes |
|  | *R*-squared | 0.426 | 0.107 | 0.114 | 0.108 |
|  | Observations |  3,060 |  3,067 |  3,067 |  3,067 |
|  | Partial *R*-squared |  |  |  |  |
|  |  *All variables except state-fixed effects*  | 0.367 | 0.040 | 0.051 | 0.047 |
|  |  *Political variables* | 0.206 | 0.011 | 0.014 | 0.005 |

Appendix Table 5 — continued

*Notes*: Elasticities for New Deal spending taken from the working paper version of Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis (2003), Table 4, “Elasticities of relief, recovery, and reform variables: Total Grants.” An asterisk (“\*”) denotes an elasticity that is significant at the 10 percent level in a two-tailed test. Congressional standing committees varied over time; our set of committee effects comprises indicator variables equal to 1 if the district was represented in the 88th Congress by a representative on one of the following committees: Appropriations, Agriculture, Banking, Education and Labor, Judiciary, Foreign Commerce, Merchant Marine, Public Works, Rules, and Ways and Means. Fishback, Kantor and Wallace use: Agriculture, Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Exports, Flood Control, Irrigation Control, Labor, Labor, Public Buildings, Public Lands, Rivers and Harbors, Roads, Ways and Means. Independent variables for OEO spending are the contemporary equivalents of the New Deal variables, with some subsitutions: (a) Because farm failures are not presented at the county level in the 1963 census of agriculture, we use negative of the percent change in number of farms from 1958 to 1963; (b) Instead of tax returns per capita, we use 1960 share of population in households with income above $10,000 from the Putnam file; the filing cutoff for an income tax return in 1932, $5,000, equals $8,663 in 1960 dollars; (c) Instead of percent illiterate, we use 1960 share of population with less than four years of education. (d) We measure tenure in the House using the number of Congresses served as of the 88th Congress, for representatives as of the vote on the EOA. Partial *R*-squared is calculated by taking the sum of the partial *R*-squareds for variables of interest from the Stata ado-file *pcorr2*.

# *Appendix 3: Roll Call Voting Analysis of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964*

 Footnote 5 describes patterns of roll call voting on the Economic Opportunity Act; this Appendix provides more detail on the roll call voting analysis. For a set of votes on the Economic Opportunity Act, we estimate a linear probability model

$$Y\_{i}=α+P\_{i}^{'}γ+X\_{i}^{'}β+\sum\_{p=0}^{1}\sum\_{j}^{}(D\_{i}=p)\*R\_{j}(i)\*δ\_{pj}+ε\_{i}$$

where $Y\_{i}$ is equal to 1 for a yea vote and 0 for a no vote on a particular roll call (including paired and announced votes), and missing if members voted present or did not vote (ICPSR 2010). $P\_{i}^{'}$ is a column vector of political controls from election outcomes, including Democratic vote share and a close election dummy. In the House, Democratic vote share and the close election dummy are calculated with respect to the 1962 election to that House seat; since only one-third of Senate seats are up for election in a given cycle, Democratic vote share and close election dummy in the Senate regressions are for the
1960 Presidential election (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 2006). $X\_{i}^{}$is a column vector of socioeconomic controls including black, urban, and farm shares of the population and the median income taken from census estimates for congressional districts (Adler undated; Census 1963); $δ\_{pj}$ is a coefficient on a vector of interacted dummies for membership *p* in the Democratic party ($D\_{i}$) and a district in each of *j* census regions ($R\_{j}$). The residual is denoted $ε\_{i}$ and $α$ is a constant. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.

 The results are reported in Appendix Table 6 (next page). In both chambers, the most important determinant of a positive vote for the Economic Opportunity Act is partisan identity: Southern Democrats were less likely to vote for the EOA than Democrats of any other region, but much more likely to vote for passage than Northeastern Republicans (who were themselves more favorable than any other regional block in the GOP). In addition to partisan and regional patterns, legislators from states or districts with high shares of black population were less likely to vote for the bill, though this effect seems to be driven by the inclusion of Southern legislators (columns 2–3 and 6–7). House members were significantly more likely to vote for EOA passage if unemployment in their districts was high.

 Appendix Table 6

 MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION OF AFFIRMATIVE VOTE ON EOA

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | *Senate Vote For EOA Passage**July 23, 1964* | *House Vote for EOA Passage**August 8, 1964* |
|  |  |  (1) | (2) | (3) |  (4) | (5) |  (6) |  (7)  | (8) |
|  |  |  |  |
|   Democrat | 0.654\*\*\* | 0.672\*\*\* | 0.795\*\*\* |  | 0.887\*\*\* | 0.875\*\*\* | 0.765\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.0964) | (0.118) | (0.208) |  | (0.0515) | (0.0440) | (0.115) |  |
| *Electoral Outcomes* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Democratic vote  | –2.079\* | –1.718 | 0.982 | –2.134\*\* | –0.536\*\*\* | –0.286 | –0.518\* | –0.480\*\* |
|  |  share | (1.077) | (1.299) | (2.676) | (1.056) | (0.194) | (0.174) | (0.283) | (0.189) |
|  | Close election | 0.0652 | 0.0605 | 0.0623 | 0.00981 | –0.0209 | 0.00443 | –0.137 | –0.0408 |
|  |  | (0.0911) | (0.107) | (0.202) | (0.0863) | (0.0352) | (0.0342) | (0.118) | (0.0356) |
|  | JFK Win 1960 | 0.193 | 0.0895 | 0.186 | 0.232\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.130) | (0.168) | (0.319) | (0.115) |  |  |  |  |
| *Region Dummies* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Midwest | –0.421\*\*\* | –0.507\*\* |  |  | –0.177\*\*\* | –0.180\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.152) | (0.194) |  |  | (0.0434) | (0.0387) |  |  |
|  | South | –0.268\* |  |  |  | –0.163\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.148) |  |  |  | (0.0654) |  |  |  |
|  | West | –0.357\*\* | –0.328\*\* |  |  | –0.195\*\*\* | –0.166\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.142) | (0.141) |  |  | (0.0410) | (0.0397) |  |  |
| *Regions by Party* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Democrat \* Northeast |  |  |  | 0.205 |  |  |  | 0.691\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.194) |  |  |  | (0.0817) |
|  | Democrat \* Midwest |  |  |  | 0.0762 |  |  |  | 0.704\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.178) |  |  |  | (0.0784) |
|  | Democrat \* South |  |  |  | 0.227 |  |  |  | 0.557\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.186) |  |  |  | (0.105) |
|  | Democrat \* West |  |  |  | 0.114 |  |  |  | 0.666\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.160) |  |  |  | (0.0793) |
|  | Not Dem. \* Midwest |  |  |  | –0.899\*\*\* |  |  |  | –0.344\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.157) |  |  |  | (0.0710) |
|  | Not Dem. \* South |  |  |  | –0.494\*\* |  |  |  | –0.141 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.207) |  |  |  | (0.116) |
|  | Not Dem. \* West |  |  |  | –0.623\*\*\* |  |  |  | –0.376\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.221) |  |  |  | (0.0763) |

 Appendix Table 6 — continued

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | *Senate Vote For EOA Passage**July 23, 1964* | *House Vote for EOA Passage**August 8, 1964* |
|  |  |  (1) | (2) | (3) |  (4) | (5) |  (6) |  (7)  | (8) |
|  |  |  |  |
| *Demographic Controls* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Black pop. | –1.753\*\*\* | 1.311 | –3.665\*\*\* | –1.975\*\*\* | –0.495\*\* | –0.152 | –0.592 | –0.498\*\* |
|  |  | (0.528) | (2.526) | (1.020) | (0.490) | (0.202) | (0.151) | (0.367) | (0.201) |
|  | Urban pop. | 0.429 | 0.219 | 0.310 | 0.588 | 0.231\* | 0.151 | 0.0502 | 0.293\*\* |
|  |  | (0.610) | (0.946) | (1.156) | (0.487) | (0.124) | (0.107) | (0.280) | (0.131) |
|  | Rural farm pop. | 0.662 | 0.809 | 3.049 | 1.248 | 0.348 | 0.0234 | 1.005 | 0.444 |
|  |  | (1.013) | (1.303) | (2.685) | (0.865) | (0.386) | (0.321) | (0.766) | (0.383) |
|  | Unemployment  | 21.57 | 13.73 | –9.954 | 18.56 | 12.64\*\*\* | 4.429 | 32.96\*\*\* | 10.40\*\*\* |
|  |  | (14.17) | (17.66) | (41.71) | (12.90) | (2.866) | (2.723) | (8.611) | (2.706) |
|  | Median Income | –0.00246 | 0.00488 | 0.0315 | 0.0214 | 0.0142 | –0.00745 | 0.107 | –0.00206 |
|  |  | (0.0683) | (0.0796) | (0.171) | (0.0709) | (0.0302) | (0.0303) | (0.0695) | (0.0300) |
|  | Constant | –1.753\*\*\* | 1.311 | –3.665\*\*\* | –1.975\*\*\* | –0.495\*\* | –0.152 | –0.592 | –0.498\*\* |
|  |  | (0.528) | (2.526) | (1.020) | (0.490) | (0.202) | (0.151) | (0.367) | (0.201) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Observations | 99 | 67 | 32 | 99 | 422 | 292 | 130 |  422 |
|  | *R*–squared | 0.541 | 0.639 | 0.410 | 0.602 | 0.594 | 0.776 | 0.245 | 0.617 |
|  | Region | All | Non-South | South | All | All | Non-South | South |  All |

\*\*\* *p* < 0.01.

\*\* *p* < 0.05.

\* *p* < 0.1.

*Notes*: Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level.

*Sources*: Demographic data from Adler (undated) and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1963); Voting data from ICPSR (2010).

# *Appendix 4: Estimated Relationships Between Election Outcomes and Demographics over Time*

 Appendix Table 7

 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OUTCOMES BY DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLE

AND YEAR

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | *Turnout* | *Democratic Vote Share* |
|  | Year Dummy | All | Non-South | South | All | Non-South | South |
| *Share of population with income ≤ $3,000 x*  | 1950 | 10.516\*\*\* | 9.138\* | 13.762\*\*\* | –2.261 | 15.675\*\*\* | –20.779\*\*\* |
|  | (3.386) | (4.960) | (4.560) | (3.886) | (4.247) | (7.458) |
| 1952 | 0.437 | 2.992 | –3.791 | –3.652 | 11.604\*\* | –24.060\*\*\* |
|  | (3.225) | (4.813) | (3.862) | (3.870) | (4.751) | (6.075) |
| 1954 | 10.565\*\*\* | 10.225\*\* | 13.371\*\*\* | –6.196 | 14.792\*\*\* | –26.986\*\* |
|  | (3.181) | (4.165) | (5.046) | (5.881) | (5.086) | (11.442) |
| 1956 | 8.753\*\*\* | 10.870\*\*\* | 5.730 | –4.632 | 8.145 | –21.447\*\*\* |
|  | (3.136) | (4.192) | (4.792) | (4.268) | (5.786) | (6.111) |
| 1958 | 8.876\*\*\* | 11.199\*\*\* | 10.284\*\* | –6.903\*\* | –1.402 | –10.696\* |
|  | (2.966) | (3.981) | (4.730) | (3.348) | (4.227) | (6.094) |
| 1962 | 11.423\*\*\* | 14.924\*\*\* | 11.437\*\* | –1.624 | 0.028 | –6.742 |
|  | (2.954) | (3.641) | (5.184) | (3.818) | (3.663) | (7.734) |
| 1964 | 2.774 | 5.288 | 0.572 | 6.562 | –3.335 | 21.215\*\* |
|  | (3.009) | (3.471) | (5.367) | (5.093) | (4.649) | (10.236) |
| 1966 | 14.613\*\*\* | 22.430\*\*\* | 7.954 | 11.290\*\* | 1.445 | 26.282\*\*\* |
|  | (3.398) | (4.525) | (5.482) | (4.863) | (5.093) | (9.186) |
| 1968 | 5.964\* | 7.065 | 4.025 | 3.498 | –0.105 | 9.932 |
|  | (3.312) | (4.442) | (5.380) | (5.485) | (5.785) | (10.417) |
| 1970 | 3.354 | 3.602 | 5.704 | –1.702 | –12.780\*\* | 17.085 |
|  | (3.587) | (5.181) | (5.334) | (6.287) | (6.010) | (12.543) |
| 1972 | –5.237 | –8.941 | 7.327 | –2.742 | –1.172 | –7.879 |
|  | (5.508) | (9.439) | (5.276) | (6.422) | (6.597) | (13.079) |
| *Share nonwhite x* | 1950 | 2.784 | –1.728 | 4.573\* | –6.401\*\* | –6.709 | –3.272 |
|  | (2.126) | (5.099) | (2.431) | (3.164) | (4.204) | (4.517) |
| 1952 | –0.195 | 2.770 | 0.314 | 2.049 | –8.727\*\* | 7.352\*\* |
|  | (1.715) | (3.684) | (2.018) | (2.952) | (4.002) | (3.728) |
| 1954 | 1.200 | 7.407\*\*\* | 0.437 | 3.348 | –4.930 | 11.896\*\* |
|  | (1.910) | (2.872) | (2.640) | (3.523) | (4.499) | (4.962) |
| 1956 | 1.354 | –1.944 | 2.333 | –4.496 | –4.677 | 0.392 |
|  | (1.760) | (2.436) | (2.417) | (2.799) | (4.595) | (3.613) |
| 1958 | 11.259\*\*\* | 5.189 | 12.683\*\*\* | –5.981\*\* | –6.009\* | –4.739 |
|  | (2.000) | (3.490) | (2.813) | (2.914) | (3.419) | (4.179) |
| 1962 | 0.184 | –5.034 | 1.942 | 4.092 | –1.541 | 7.153 |
|  | (1.980) | (3.209) | (2.808) | (3.341) | (2.624) | (4.911) |
| 1964 | 8.721\*\*\* | 12.481\*\*\* | 9.156\*\*\* | –7.105 | 10.373\*\*\* | –16.237\*\* |
|  | (2.138) | (3.238) | (2.941) | (4.847) | (3.552) | (6.926) |
| 1966 | 14.703\*\*\* | –4.044 | 19.971\*\*\* | –15.216\*\*\* | 5.458 | –22.718\*\*\* |
|  | (2.428) | (4.894) | (2.888) | (4.374) | (4.236) | (6.074) |
| 1968 | 20.088\*\*\* | 5.936 | 24.326\*\*\* | –9.245\*\* | 3.443 | –12.120\*\* |
|  | (2.359) | (3.919) | (3.082) | (3.973) | (4.716) | (5.354) |
| 1970 | 22.017\*\*\* | 6.438 | 25.789\*\*\* | –8.505\* | 8.590 | –9.737 |
|  | (2.711) | (6.973) | (2.871) | (4.711) | (5.385) | (6.595) |
| 1972 | 22.150\*\*\* | 4.615 | 23.553\*\*\* | 0.739 | 21.951\*\*\* | –1.410 |
|  | (3.377) | (10.033) | (3.201) | (5.190) | (6.518) | (7.179) |

 Appendix Table 7 — continued

\*\*\* *p* < 0.01.

\*\* *p* < 0.05.

\* *p* < 0.1.

*Notes*: Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level. Regression specification is described in equation 3 of the main text. 1960 is the comparison election and is dropped. Omitted controls include interactions of election year dummies interacted with the set of suppressed control variables tabulated in Appendix Table 4 and with state dummies.

*Sources*: Estimates of voter turnout from Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (2006). Other sources are described in the note to Table 2.

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1. See Table 2 of Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis (2003) for a thorough overview of the literature and Fleck (2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Wright assumes the cost of buying one vote is the same everywhere, so the formula is Index = Electoral votes \* (probability of winning with 1 percent votes “bought” – probability of winning with no spending) / number of votes needed to buy 1 percent of electorate. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The $5,000 filing requirement on the 1932 income tax return equals $8,663 in 1960 dollars, making $10,000 household income the closest equivalent income level in the available data. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)