Journal of American Studies, **33** (1999), 3, 393–415. Printed in the United Kingdom

Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War

LIPING BU

The United States after World War II experienced symbiotically the fear of the Soviet threat and the belief in its own system as the ultimate choice for the world. In the confrontation with the Soviet Union, cultural relations programs began to be organized and designed in accordance with national security interest. George F. Kennan, the architect of US containment policy, urged: "let us by all means have the maximum cultural exchange."[1] The mission of cultural contact, according to Kennan, was "combatting the negative impressions about this country [USA] that mark so much of world opinion."[2] The US government made new cultural policies in terms of Cold War political concerns and relied extensively on private resources for the implementation of cultural diplomacy via educational exchange. It mobilized the American society for the achievement of "total diplomacy" with political rhetoric, legislative measures, and financial support. Private institutions, which pioneered and dominated US cultural interactions with other nations before the war, now began to play a new but supportive role for the state. Because of their expertise and their unique roles in a democratic society, American philanthropies, professional organizations, and universities became indispensable in delivering the multitude of exchange programs.

Educational exchange programs covered a wide range of cultural, economic, and military education activities. The term "educational exchange" became so inclusive that some scholars regarded it as a synonym for cultural relations in postwar America.[3] In the competition

Liping Bu is an Assistant Professor, in the Department of History, Alma College, Alma, Michigan 48801, USA.

[1] George F. Kennan, "International Exchange in the Arts," in *Perspectives USA*, **16** (1956), 8. [2] Ibid., 11.

[3] "Educational exchange" was long regarded as synonym for cultural relations. According to Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan, it was first formally used in the

with the Soviet propaganda, "educational exchange" became an important instrument to project favorable images of the United States symbolized by its abundance of material wealth, consumer culture, technological know-how, individual freedom, and political democracy. A unilateral approach to exporting American culture, values, and technology was increasingly emphasized. Hence "exchange" became a misnomer, although "mutual understanding" remained the watchword. As technical assistance, economic aid, and military defense were integrated with educational exchanges, they promoted American products, technology, and ways of life. The public and private sectors worked together to build American cultural power in the world, although differences and tension remained among major players.

Educational exchange as a form of cultural diplomacy has not received adequate attention in scholarly research.[4] This study explores several significant parallels developed from the mid-1940s throughout the 1950s. It focuses on the American state and several key social institutions such as philanthropic foundations, professional organizations, and universities as the primary objects of examination. The article does not only document the development of educational exchange for Cold War foreign policy purposes, but also outlines the important administrative implications and policy tensions that emerged. The following sections will concentrate on the discussion of four interrelated areas: (1) new government policy of cultural relations, (2) utilization of private resources, (3) universities and exchange programs, and (4) conflicting views and goals. The examination demonstrates how culture played a unique role in the contention for international power politics and how such contention reshaped the relationship of the American state and society.

NEW GOVERNMENT CULTURAL POLICY

International cultural involvement characterized one of the key features of US leadership in the postwar world. First of all, the US government sponsored the formation of the United Nations and eagerly sought the

---

Information and Educational Act of 1948 (the Smith–Mundt Act). It included all elements of cultural relations activities. See Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 19 n. 21.

[4] The role of culture in international relations is gaining more scholarly attention recently. Akira Iriye offered a conceptual discussion of the relations between culture and power in his book, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

membership of Unesco, which was a sharp contrast to its attitude toward the League of Nations and world intellectual co-operation after World War I. Such an effort indicated the US government's attempt to exert leadership in international educational and intellectual co-operation in a post-war world, as Frank Ninkovich pointed out.[5] Moreover, Congress passed legislations such as the Fulbright Act (1946) and the Smith–Mundt Act (1948) to commit the country to worldwide educational and cultural exchanges. The legislative mandate fundamentally changed the tradition of US government cultural policy. Before World War II, the US government basically left international cultural and educational activity to private efforts. Private institutions such as the Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies and religious organizations were the major forces sponsoring educational exchange. In the 1930s, the government began to sponsor limited cultural exchange activities with Latin America, as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy," to counteract European cultural expansion in the Western Hemisphere. The exchange programs with Latin America eventually became a prelude to the government's total involvement in worldwide cultural exchange after 1945.[6]

In addition, American economic aid and technical assistance to the war-devastated Europe and the "underdeveloped" Third World brought new meanings to educational exchange. The Marshall Plan, which created large-scale overseas operations in technical assistance and economic aid, and Truman's Point Four, which emphasized the sharing of American technology with underdeveloped nations, boosted a plethora of exchanges that relied extensively on university resources.[7] Technical assistance,

[5] Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[6] For information on Inter-American cultural activities, see J. Manuel Espinosa, *The Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936–1948* (Washington, D.C.: State Department, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, History Studies, US Government Printing Office, 1976); Francis J. Colligan, "Twenty Years After: Two Decades of Government-Sponsored Cultural Relations," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, **39** (July 1958), 112–20.

[7] In his inaugural address of January 1949, President Harry S Truman spoke of four courses of action in international relations by the United States – support of the United Nations, programs for world economic recovery, strengthening of freedom-loving nations against the dangers of communist aggression, and lastly, "Point Four," a "bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of under-developed areas" ("Inaugural Address of the President," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, **20** [January 1949], 125.) Different interpretations of Point Four were presented in various books such as I. F. Stone, *The Truman Era 1945–1952* (Boston: Little Brown, 1972), 71–74; Ernest R. May,

economic aid, and mutual military defense were interrelated programs designed to serve the goals of national security in the Cold War. Whether a military alliance or a student/scholar exchange, they were all considered as fulfillment of American leadership of the free world against the communist world. Truman's Point Four became a unifying factor in what was then emphasized as a policy of "total diplomacy."[8]

The role of American presidents in the cultural exchanges and political propaganda was exemplified not only by Harry S Truman but also by Dwight D. Eisenhower. President Eisenhower was particularly interested in cultural exchange. During his 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower made clear: "I firmly believe that educational exchange programs are an important step toward world peace… It is my personal hope that this activity… will continue to expand in the coming years."[9] President Eisenhower was instrumental in the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA), which separated information (overt propaganda) from the educational exchange under the supervision of the State Department. He also helped establish the People-to-People program for friendly contact between different nations. One scholar pointed out: "Presidential leadership played a key role in both the scope and effectiveness of propaganda and cultural efforts in the Cold War."[10]

Exchange programs brought hundreds of thousands of technical and industrial trainees as well as traditional foreign students/scholars to the United States from Europe and the "underdeveloped" countries of Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, as the United States reached the needs of the masses of the underprivileged. American specialists and professors were also sent abroad to assist, and pass on their expertise to, those in the aided countries. The exchangees or foreign students, as the foreigners on those programs were called, were encouraged to learn about American values and democratic ideals while Americans abroad were encouraged to spread American concepts and ways of life. Government

---

Anxiety and Affluence: 1945–1965 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), 223; J. B. Bingham, *Shirt-sleeve Diplomacy: Point Four in Action* (New York: J. Day Co., 1954); and Edward S. Mason, *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

[8] *Report of the Conference on International Educational Exchanges*, Congress Hotel, Chicago, Ill., 22–25 Mar. 1950 (New York: National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, 1950).

[9] Dwight D. Eisenhower to Kenneth Holand (president of IIE), October 16, 1952. Fulbright Papers, BCN 1:20, University of Arkansas.

[10] Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), xii.

departments and agencies, such as the State, Justice, Labor, Defense, Health, Education and Welfare, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, the Mutual Security Agency, and the Technical Cooperation Administration, were all involved in exchange programs.[11] Private institutions such as universities, philanthropic foundations, religious organizations, corporations, and civic groups were also mobilized and utilized for that purpose.

With the government taking the lead in promoting educational and cultural exchanges, the programs began to be broadly integrated with political goals and foreign policy deliberations. Philip Coombs, former Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs, pointed out that educational exchange had become "an irrevocable component of American foreign policy" after World War II. It constituted the "fourth dimension" of foreign relations – *cultural*, interwoven with the more traditional aspects, namely, political, economic, and military. Coombs characterized educational and cultural relations as "the human side" of foreign policy, as they focused on people, their ideas and values, their understanding and attitudes, and their skills and knowledge.[12] The State Department officials urged that all cultural relations programs should not be "a miscellany of goodwill activities" (as were conducted in pre-World War II time by private institutions) but be designed "to support United States foreign policy in its long range sense and to serve as an arm of that policy."[13] Senator J. William Fulbright made a similar argument when he introduced his bill: exchange should be made "to confirm to American foreign policy and promote better relations between the respective governments."[14] Assistant Secretary of State William Benton contended in 1945 that foreign relations had ceased to be government to government contacts and that "peoples of the world are exercising an ever larger influence upon decisions of foreign policy."[15] In the eyes of government policy-makers, "it became vital to the national security to understand the minds of people in other societies and to have American aspirations and problems understood by others."[16] Educational exchange served as a means to achieve this goal. However, educators often challenged the use

[11] Stewart E. Fraser, ed., *Government Policy and International Education* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 100.

[12] Philip H. Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 6–7, 17.

[13] William Benton, "The Role of International Information Service in Conduct of Foreign Relations," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, **13** (July–December 1945), 589–93.

[14] Charles Thomson and Walter H. C. Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), 61.

[15] Benton, 589–93.

[16] Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program*, 9.

of exchange for political propaganda. Contention for different goals existed among those involved in exchange, which will be discussed later.

UTILIZATION OF PRIVATE RESOURCES

The US government made full use of private resources to implement the exchange programs. In an effort to enlist the co-operation of American universities, the State Department, through the Institute of International Education (IIE), sponsored three national conferences of university administrators and foreign student advisers between 1946 and 1948. The State Department and the IIE also sent letters to university leaders, emphasizing the importance of educational exchange in serving national interest. Universities and colleges were expected to help generate "a greater and freer international flow of students" and meet the needs of the students. But the pressure of admitting more foreign students to campuses that were already congested with returned GIs led to confusion and frustration. Some university administrators complained: "It's like asking to put three in a bed when we already have four!"[17]

Adequate counseling and assistance to the exchanges were crucial for effective delivery of the exchange programs. The government was concerned with the implementation of the programs because the experiences of the students "will have great influence on the future of the world." George Allen, Assistant Secretary of State, pointed out: "Most of these students will return to positions of responsible leadership in their own countries and the impressions of the United States which they take back are considered ... more significant than the technical knowledge and skills which they acquire."[18] As part of the government's initiatives to strengthen exchange services, the government suggested the restructuring of private organizations in the field of educational exchange for specialization and avoidance of duplication. The IIE and the YMCA-affiliated Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students (CFRFS), the two pioneering organizations in US educational exchange services, responded to the government's call with structural changes and program adaptation.[19]

The IIE, established in 1919, was the first US professional institution devoted to the promotion and operation of educational exchange

[17] *Report of Conference of College and University Administrators and Foreign Student Advisers*, Chicago, 29 Apr.–1 May 1946 (New York, IIE, 1946), 91.

[18] IIE news release 4 May 1948, box 10, file 9, NAFSA Records, University of Arkansas.

[19] For the history of IIE, see Stephen Mark Halpern, "The Institute of International Education: A History," (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1969).

activities. Early in the 1930s, Secretary of State Cordell Hull had drawn on the IIE's expertise for the development of cultural exchanges with Latin America under President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy." IIE director Stephen Duggan, who labored his whole life for international educational exchange, chaired an Advisory Committee for the State Department. The Committee recommended the strategy of entrusting government projects to private administration for those advantages: (1) it could possibly retain the goodwill that had been developed by America's private institution, and (2) it would arouse less suspicion of the political purposes behind government action.[20] In the post-1945 years, the State Department selected the IIE as the major contractor to administer government-sponsored exchange programs. The IIE virtually became an operating agency for the State Department in exchange activities. This special working relationship with the government made the IIE a leading player in the field of exchanges for both the public and private sectors.

The CFRFS was founded in 1911 under the auspices of the YMCA originally to provide personal assistance to foreign students who encountered racial discrimination and social alienation in America. This organization dominated the social, intellectual, and spiritual life of foreign students in America before World War II through close working relations with various national organizations of foreign students. In the new era of educational exchange, the CFRFS redefined its role by emphasizing port-of-entry service and community programs as the focus of its work, but continued to regard as its unique responsibility the strengthening of exchangees' religious life. However, CFRFS leaders disagreed on how much the CFRFS should be involved in individuals' religious choices. CFRFS officials believed that the first impression often had an indelible effect on a person's later experience and that the port-of-entry service was crucial to the newcomer's first impression of America. With the cooperation of the YMCA, YWCA, and churches, thousands of CFRFS associates met the students at ports of entry and helped them with their luggage and travel to their final destinations. The service became quite popular among foreign students/trainees in the 1950s. The community programs provided foreign students opportunities to participate in local projects and visit business companies.

There were high demands for orienting foreign students/trainees in the local communities and advising and counseling them on individual

[20] IIE Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the Director (New York: IIE, 1 Oct. 1944), 10–11.

campuses. In order to meet the challenge, a new organization for foreign student service – the National Association for Foreign Student Advisers (later changed to the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, known as NAFSA) – was established in 1948, to "marshall the interest and resources of all institutions, organizations, and individuals concerned with student exchange programs."[21] The State Department encouraged NAFSA "to assist the educational institutions and agencies of the United States to develop an expanding international cultural relations program, particularly through student exchanges."[22] NAFSA represented colleges and universities, organizations and individuals engaged in foreign student education. It served as a liaison with the government to co-ordinate the work of foreign students/international education between the government, private agencies, and universities. One of its major contributions was the professionalization of foreign student advisers and the promotion of the office of foreign student/international education on campuses.[23]

By the early 1950s, a clear division of labor had emerged among the three major organizations in handling exchange programs at the national level. The IIE concentrated on administering exchange programs for the government (mostly Fulbright programs and exchanges sponsored by various government departments and agencies) and for private institutions such as the Ford Foundation, universities, and corporations. NAFSA focused on foreign student affairs, especially foreign student advising and visa and immigration issues; and the CFRFS concentrated on port-of-entry service and community programs to provide personal help to foreign students/trainees in their social and spiritual lives and professional experiences through community programs.

Despite these efforts, the increased exchange activities and the influx of foreign students rapidly outgrew national facilities and services. It was clear that exchange would not be adequately implemented to serve its objectives unless national services were expanded and strengthened. Financial support was a major issue for the strengthening of exchange programs, but Congress appropriated no money for this purpose. Fortunately, the Ford Foundation stepped into the field of educational exchange with an enormous endowment in 1950. After the reorganization in 1949, the Ford Foundation redefined its areas of interest and regarded

[21] "Brief Summary of Accomplishments of NAFSA during the First Year to June 1, 1949," 1, NAFSA records.

[22] IIE news release, 4 May 1948, box 10, file 9, NAFSA Records.

[23] For NAFSA, see Liping Bu, "Foreign Students and the Emergence of Modern International Education in the United States, 1910–1970," (Ph.D. diss., Carnegie Mellon University, 1995), Ch. 7.

educational exchange as complement to other programs in the effort to achieve a peaceful and democratic world (defined very much in Cold War perspectives).[24] The State Department lost no time in explaining to the Ford Foundation the vital importance of strengthening national institutional capability for the effective operation of educational exchange. The State Department conveyed the urgent financial need for the strengthening of exchange operation and wished that the Ford Foundation would provide support for that purpose.[25]

To the officials of the Ford Foundation, exchanges were primarily a means for world peace and "accordingly, the Foundation's exchange program will be planned and conducted in the light of the ends the Foundation seeks to further through it."[26] President of the Ford Foundation, H. Rowan Gaither, repeatedly stressed in his 1951 report to the board of trustees that exchange programs were an important means "of strengthening the free world and of promoting international understanding." The Ford Foundation followed this policy guideline throughout the 1950s.[27]

In regard to the strengthening of exchange services, the Ford Foundation officials agreed with the State Department that "special administrative facilities and procedures had to be developed to handle the wide variety of problems that these different exchanges created."[28] After consultation with representatives of the IIE and the State Department, the Ford Foundation decided to focus the exchange-strengthening efforts on three national organizations most crucial for the operation of exchange:

[24] The Ford Foundation defined five areas of interest: Area I – peace, Area II – democracy, Area III – the advancement of economic well-being, Area IV – education, and Area V – knowledge of human behavior (*The Ford Foundation Annual Report for 1951*). The objectives of Area I were to achieve a peaceful and democratic world. Specific programs under Area I included Overseas Development, Overseas Training and Research, International Affairs, and the Exchange of Persons. All the programs were supposed "to foster international understanding, maintain world peace, and combat communist threats to the western world by strengthening politically and economically the position of the free world, particularly the uncommitted developing countries" ("Scope and Content Note," The Office of the President Papers of H. Rowan Gaither, Ford Foundation Archives).

[25] Memo to Chester Davis, from William C. Johnstone, 27 Feb. 1951, 4–5. Ford Foundation Archives, PA51–29.

[26] Memo to Carl Spaeth, from Dyke Brown, "The Foundation's Exchange of Persons Program and the Institute of International Education," 6 Mar. 1952, 2. Ford Foundation Archives, Report 003325.

[27] For details of the Ford Foundation exchange programs and policy, and its role in educational exchange in general, see Bu, Ch. 6.

[28] Chester Davis, "Exchange of Persons," Apr. 1953, 5. Ford Foundation Archives, Report 010590.

the IIE, the NAFSA, and the CFRFS. These national organizations, rather than individual universities, were believed to be in a position to have the widest possible impact on the operations of educational exchange.

From 1951 to 1956, the Ford Foundation provided the IIE, the NAFSA, and the CFRFS with more than two million dollars of financial support to strengthen their general operation and program services. Evidence showed that 52 percent ($1,910,000) of IIE's general budget for non-contract operation came from the Ford Foundation, whereas 80 percent of NAFSA's total budget was Ford Foundation grants, which was about $118,2300. The CFRFS received relatively a small amount of $77,430 from the Ford Foundation, which contributed 12 percent of its budget.[29] The Ford Foundation continued to finance these organizations into the 1960s. Such support not only relieved the government of financial responsibility to exchange programs, but also significantly shaped the institutional growth of the IIE and the NAFSA and the national bureaucratic structure of exchange administration.

In the meantime, the Ford Foundation was conducting its own "exchange of persons programs." The IIE was designated as the operating agent for the Ford Foundation, in charge of reviewing and administering exchange projects submitted to or initiated by the Foundation. Ford Foundation officials consulted with the IIE and the State Department in determining the scope and content of their exchange programs.[30] William Johnstone, Jr., Director of State Department Educational Exchange Office, pointed out that the priority categories of exchange persons should be "developed on the principle of the interest of the United States in the global struggle in which we are now engaged." He emphasized that, in view of the Soviet tactic of propaganda via cultural activities, fine arts and other cultural activities should be of first priority of US exchange programs. This was because "many people in foreign countries believe that the United States is devoid of culture," although they highly admired America's advanced technology.[31] Consequently, the Ford Foundation's programs were shaped by the government's foreign policy objectives and

[29] International Programs, International Training and Research, "Grant Summary; Appropriation for Exchange Strengthening," 1956, 2; Docket, "Background Materials Regarding Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign Students," Trustee Meeting, 18–19 June 1956. Ford Foundation Archives, PA54–63.

[30] The Ford Foundation to the IIE, "Relationships and Procedures Governing Ford Foundation Exchange-of-Persons Activities," 27 Feb. 1951, 9. Ford Foundation Archives, PA51–29.

[31] Letter to Chester Davis, from William C. Johnstone, Jr., 27 July 1951. Ford Foundation Archives, PA51–29.

had to be screened by the State Department. In handling the Ford Foundation's programs, the IIE would send the State Department basic information concerning each project and the State Department would indicate the special interest it had if any. "When a project is regarded favourably and of high priority, the Department will return to IIE a *definite comment*; in the case of a project on which the Department takes no definite stand, the Department will indicate '*no comment*.'"[32]

Given the fact that the IIE was a major contractor for government exchange programs, it could easily integrate the Ford Foundation's programs into the state-sponsored exchanges. The programs conducted by the Ford Foundation also had a unique advantage in worldwide exchange movement, for leaders with politically sensitive background usually preferred to come on private grants. The Ford Foundation, as a private institution, was able to play a role the government could not in offering grants to this type of person. The Ford Foundation was concerned with "the democratic evolution of countries that were critical to world peace" and targeted exchanges at groups and individuals "who could exercise the greatest influence on the formation of opinions and attitudes in their countries."[33] Thousands of selected foreign journalists, scientists, businessmen, artists, agricultural specialists, and religious leaders were brought to the United States via the Ford Foundation's programs.

The State Department, the Ford Foundation, and the IIE formed a trio that dominated the entire range of exchanges as each of them exerted exceptional weight in their given domains – political leadership, financial resources, and service expertise. When the IE was acting as the administrative agency for both the State Department and the Ford Foundation, the State Department made clear that "IIE must be willing to accept direction and advice from the State Department," as "our officers overseas supply information vital to the successfully handling of foreign visitors in the U. S." The IIE was expected to "never operate a competing program" and must "consider that one of its primary tasks from a public relations point of view is to hold and obtain greater support for the State Department's exchange program." Officials of the State Department's Exchange of Persons Division believed that "unless the staff of the

[32] Memo to Chester Davis, from Kenneth Holland, "General Procedures for Review of Projects in International Exchange of Persons for the Ford Foundation," 5 Nov. 1951, 2. Ford Foundation Archives, PA51–29.

[33] The Ford Foundation to the IIE, "Relationships and Procedures." Ford Foundation Archives, PA51–29.

Institute [IIE] and the Board of Directors consider that they are engaged in a joint operation with the State Department, the program will not be effective."[34] In other words, the State Department cast the IIE in the role "of a private organization acting in effect as [an] agent for and on behalf of the State Department." Some IIE staff and members of the board of directors "very sincerely, desire to see the Institute remain free of too close connections with the State Department."[35]

The working relations between the IIE and the State Department in regard to the Ford Foundation-related exchange projects did not go as smoothly as expected. After a year of performance, complaints came from both the IIE and the State Department. The exchange program officers of the State Department criticized the IIE for not giving them sufficient information on projects for adequate consideration. They felt that in all cases they must be given adequate time if they were asked to review projects and that their opinions be held confidential.[36] Likewise, the IIE questioned whether the State Department faithfully followed the review procedures that were agreed upon by the Ford Foundation, the IIE, and the State Department. The State Department wished "to be considered as the major government channel and the sole source for government information on exchange projects," but the IIE doubted "that on the projects reviewed … by [the] State [Department] all government quarters had been checked." The IIE also "feels that [the] State [Department] has not cooperated in making available background information on its exchange planning." The IIE complained "that in reviewing projects [the] State [Department] bases its judgment entirely upon its own limited objectives in relation to the *Campaign of Truth*, and that its comments, therefore, cannot necessarily serve as a final judgment on a Foundation-oriented project."[37]

The State Department, however, felt that the "present procedures were somewhat inhibiting in terms of their submission of program suggestions directly to the Foundation." Consequently, the Ford Foundation took great responsibility to check "directly with the State Department on Foundation-initiated projects … and on all other projects where it seemed to be necessary."[38] In the meantime, the Ford Foundation began to re-examine its policy on exchange programs and procedures. Some officials

[34] Memo to Chester Davis, from William C. Johnstone, 27 Feb. 1951. Ford Foundation Archives, PA51–29.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Memo to Chester Davis, from Bernard Gladieux, "State Department Comments on Present Review Procedures," 18 Jan. 1952. Ford Foundation Archives, PA51–29.

[37] Memo to Bernard Gladieux, from Melvin Fox, "IIE Exchange Persons Activities." 6 Mar. 1952, 4. Ford Foundation Archives, PA51–29.

[38] Ibid., 5.

doubted whether it was realistic to "continue to delegate major responsibility for initiation and development of program and project review and supervision to any 'outside' agency." They even questioned, "Is it sound for IIE – an operating agency – to be in the position of approving and supervising *all* Foundation sponsored projects of other private operating agencies?" In the end, the Ford Foundation concluded that it "will be responsible for developing the scope and content of its own exchange-of-persons program," while the "IIE will be recognized as the primary agency, but not necessarily the exclusive instrumentality, of the Foundation."[39]

UNIVERSITIES AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

Government programs of economic aid and technical assistance inevitably had to rely on American universities for delivery. The International Cooperation Administration (ICA, formerly the Foreign Operations Administration) and the International Educational Exchange Service (IES) of the State Department carried out large-scale technical and defense training programs, which were contracted to universities as educational exchange. Universities trained foreign exchanges and sent faculty members abroad as technical specialists. Exchange programs brought to the United States hundreds of thousands of students, scholars, technical trainees, short-term visitors, and military personnel from all over the world, and some from former enemy countries like Germany and Japan for re-education. In the five years immediately after the war, foreign student population in the United States skyrocketed from 7,000 in 1945 to 30,000 in 1950.[40] There was a correlation between foreign aid and foreign student enrollment at American universities. The top thirty-three universities with the highest foreign student enrollment (42 percent of total foreign student population) were also most heavily involved in ICA university contracts for foreign aid.[41]

In 1956, the ICA spent $136 million on training and exchange programs. Foreign technical trainees were usually older than traditional students. Many of them lacked English language proficiency and tended to be isolated from campus activity and community life. These students

[39] The Ford Foundation to the IIE, "Relationships and Procedures," 3–9. Ford Foundation Archives, PA51–29.

[40] *Education for One World* (New York: Institute of International Education, 1952), 12.

[41] "Third Report of the ICA Inter-Agency Working Group on University Relationships, Apr 14. 1960, NAFSA Association files, box 14, NAFSA Records.

apparently could not receive effective training unless university services be improved to help them with language and other skills to better adjust to American system. The ICA and the IES officials worked with national organizations such as the IIE and NAFSA to strengthen campus services for exchange persons. Special instruction and curricula were created for the trainees along with counseling services. Increasing numbers of foreign student advisers were appointed and trained to handle foreign student affairs on campuses. In addition, offices to co-ordinate international exchange and training activities were gradually established at universities.[42]

In the 1950s under the auspices of public and private agencies, universities also conducted studies "to test the impact of our system upon these visitors" and to assess the effectiveness of exchange programs in meeting the stated objectives. The studies focused on the impact of American professional training on foreign students and the change of their views of the United States. Findings indicated that, although institutions tended to evaluate the programs worthwhile and effective in creating friendship for the United States, exchange students were more critical. They complained about American isolationist sentiment, racial prejudices, and their own limited contact with American people.[43]

Educational exchange programs expanded on American campuses not only with the push of external forces but also with newly inspired internal interest. Educators began to take initiatives to create educational exchanges. For instance, their efforts resulted in the educational exchange with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. In 1957, a group of scholars of the Comparative Education Society, 'eager to promote international understanding through comparative studies of education and to thaw the Cold War at governmental and local levels," spearheaded non-governmental educational exchange with the Soviet Union.[44] Moreover, the Inter-University Committee representing thirty-five leading American universities, which enjoyed financial support from foundations, the government, and university funds, also dealt directly

[42] "Report on the First & Second Meetings of the Working Group on University Relationships, June 24–July 1, 1959," NAFSA Association files, box 14, NAFSA Records.

[43] Studies were sponsored by various public and private organizations such as the US. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange and Fund for Adult Education, and by major philanthropies such as the Rockefeller, the Ford, and the Carnegie.

[44] The Comparative Education Society was founded in the fall of 1956. It became the Comparative and International Education Society (CIES) in September 1969 when international education was added to the Society. (Introduction to "CIES Archives: A Selection from the Records," Kent State University Libraries.)

with the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education for exchanges of scholars and students.[45] Private efforts eventually led to the signing of government agreements on cultural exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. The US–USSR educational exchange also opened up doors for exchange with Eastern European countries.[46]

To some extent, the educators' action corresponded with President Eisenhower's call for "a voluntary effort in people-to-people partnership" to expand what the government was doing. The president called for more sympathetic understanding among peoples of the world and suggested in 1956 that US educational leaders should establish "institutions of modern techniques and sciences" in the less developed areas of the world.[47] He even invited a group of foreign students to his office to observe "Foreign Student Day."[48] A People-to-People Program was thus launched under the President's initiative and fellowships were made to exchanges.

When the newly independent nations emphasized education in their nation-building, both the United States and the Soviet Unions eagerly offered them educational resources and political ideologies. In the late 1950s, IIE vice president, Albert Sims, traveled to Southeast Asia and reported: "Southeast Asia in general was exposed to a great abundance of scholarship offerings, mostly from Red China and the Soviet Union, where one could practically write his own ticket."[49] As a counter-attraction to communist educational exchange, the ICA offered seven thousand student scholarships for secondary and higher education exchanges. Accordingly, the IIE set up more programs in Taiwan and Hongkong to strengthen US influence in the Far East, and American universities were called upon to play a creative role in helping the government meet the challenge. In this context, exchanges were stressed as vital arteries of the international activity for American academic community.

This did not mean, however, that everything was working out well on American campuses. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, financial crises of

[45] Those universities included the University of California, California Institute of Technology, Case Institute of Technology, University of Chicago, University of Colorado, Columbia University, Cornell University, Harvard University, University of Illinois, Indiana University, Iowa State University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, Notre Dame University, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, Stanford University, Syracuse University, University of Washington, University of Wisconsin, and Yale University.

[46] Fulbright Papers, second accession, series 2, BCN 14; 6, University of Arkansas.

[47] NAFSA Newsletter, Aug. 1956, 4.

[48] NAFSA Newsletter, Apr. 1958, 20.

[49] "Minutes of Meeting of the NAFSA–IIE Liaison Committee, Mar 17–18, 1958," 1–2, NAFSA Association files, box 11, NAFSA Records.

foreign students (including those who came by themselves) caused an overwhelming problem for university administrators. Universities had to dig deep into local resources for solutions because little government money was available for that purpose. On the national level, there was a general pattern of tightening up government provisions for foreign student education while exchange programs continued to expand. Congress was more interested in propaganda than educational goals of the programs. Rhetorically, the government promoted exchange, but financially it was reluctant to provide support. Educators noticed that the exchange program was still operated at the same financial level as before the Smith–Mundt Act.[50] They urged the government to take more financial responsibility in exchange programs, alas, to little avail.

CONFLICTING VIEWS AND GOALS

Despite the co-operation of the public and private sectors, there were conflicting views of the goals of exchange and differences of policy objectives. The government's principal interest in educational exchange was to achieve short-term political objectives whereas educators were more interested in the long-term educational goals. The immediate political objectives of the Cold War shaped government exchange programs. The government weighed each undertaking of exchange in terms of political impact and foreign policy purposes. The Cold War intensified after the outbreak of the Korean War. The National Security Council included international information and educational exchange among the "United States programs for national defense" to be integrated with the military and economic programs.[51] The government launched a "Campaign of Truth" in 1950, urging "the intensified use of radio and films, a significant increase in the numbers of foreign students to the United States, and support of the United Nations … to stimulate and guide the efforts of multitudes of individual citizens in furtherance of the national information and educational programs." It also demanded that "the international propagation of the democratic creed be made an instrument of supreme national policy."[52]

[50] *Special Report: The National Association of Foreign Student Advisers Annual Meeting*, 28–30 Mar. 1949, Wade Park Manor, Cleveland, Ohio.

[51] *Sixth Semiannual Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information*, 1952, 2, House document. No. 526, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session.

[52] Thomson and Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 78–80. A bi-partisan resolution calling for a "worldwide Marshal Plan in the field of ideas was sponsored

Private institutions were not fully informed of the goals of government programs when they were urged to do what the government wanted. Educators were often confused over government policies on exchanges and complained about the lack of coherence in the goals of government programs. The Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange also pointed out that there was a lack of agreement on the objectives of cultural exchange. It listed four different interpretations of the purpose of exchange programs: (1) to transplant American methods and techniques to other countries, to "Americanize" them; (2) to acquaint other nations with the accomplishments of the United States in fine arts and scholarship to impress them with our cultural achievements; (3) to help other countries meet their problems of education to be guided mainly by local needs; and (4) to implement a special form of the information program of the State Department.[53] When the government emphasized political propaganda (part of the "Campaign of Truth" in the 1950s) in the name of combating the "aggression of Communism," it provoked a negative reaction among American educators and other interested groups in the private sector. Educators favored long-term cultural exchanges and a minimum of overt propaganda. They criticized the government for making educational and cultural exchanges politically patronizing. In their minds, the primary objective of exchange should be educational and not propaganda. They recommended that educational and cultural exchanges be honest, calm, intellectually mature, and directed toward raising appreciation of the fundamental attitudes and values of different peoples.[54]

Educators even attempted to separate political propaganda from educational activities. For instance, in 1947 when the Smith–Mundt Act was fervently debated, an educational group, led by Ben M. Cherrington of the University of Denver and George Zook of the American Council on Education, condemned the "mixing" of information and cultural activities. They recommended complete organizational and administrative separation of the two programs. Incidentally, Cherrington had served as

---

by twelve Senators based on a proposal by Assistant Secretary of State Edward Barrett in March, 1950. In April, President Truman underlined the essence of the proposal in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, urging a worldwide "Campaign of Truth."

[53] *Third Semiannual Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange Activities*, House document, No. 556, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, 6.

[54] Thomson and Laves, *Cultural Relations*, 96; *Education for One World* (1953/1954), 17.

the first chief of the Division of Cultural Relations of the State Department in 1938–40 when the US government embarked on educational exchange with Latin America. To the educators, information (overt propaganda) was for "international power politics," an instrument "to implement diplomatic policies of the Department of State," whereas educational and cultural exchanges were "nonpolitical" for the mutual benefit of exchange countries. They argued that American tradition favored the divorce of educational activities from the federal government. The government's role, especially that of the State Department, "should be to stimulate, facilitate, and coordinate" educational exchange. In addition, educators worried that, if cultural activities were not separated from political propaganda, citizens of other nations might see them as new forms of American cultural imperialism. Many educational associations and organizations that had long been involved in educational exchange, such as the American Council of Learned Societies, the American Council on Education, the Association of American Colleges, the National Educational Association, and the Institute of International Education, fully supported the demand for such separation.[55]

The YMCA-affiliated Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students also protested against the integration of information and educational exchange for political purposes. Some church leaders and YMCA leaders resented the government for exerting excessive administrative control of educational exchanges. They said that the program of cultural relations was misused to support the government's political goals when pressure was put on preparing special textbooks for use in Europe and on training teams of American teachers to re-educate Europe.[56] When Oliver Caldwell of the State Department's Division of Exchange of Persons told leaders of various Christian organizations that the US government wished to create friendships "not through mass exchange of people but by the right kind of exchange" for foreign policy objectives, some Christian leaders responded that they "have not seen fit to cooperate in this program."[57]

[55] Ben M. Cherrington, "Ten Years After," *Association of American Colleges Bulletin*, **34** (Dec. 1948), 507–20.

[56] Mary Thompson, ed., *Unofficial Ambassadors: The Story of International Student Service* (New York: International Student Service, 1982), 77.

[57] "Report of the Bronxville Consultation Conference, June 14–15, 1944," *The Unofficial Ambassadors* (annual report of the Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students, 1944), 11; "Summary of the Sessions of Consultative Conference, Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students, Bethlehem, PA, Oct. 8–9, 1946," 3–4, "Everett Stowe Folder," CFRFS box 3, YMCA Archives.

The IIE also protested in 1946 when student exchanges were recommended to be used to "implement" United States foreign policy.[58] Laurence Duggan, who succeeded his father Stephen Duggan as director of the IIE in late 1946, wrote Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, expressing IIE's concerns that student exchange programs would be used for political propaganda purposes.[59] Laurence Duggan emphasized that student fellowships "must not be a means whereby our government hopes to influence foreign students in the United States in favor of particular policies and programs."[60] He reiterated IIE's traditional philosophy of promoting international understanding through educational exchanges. However, he acknowledged that there was nothing wrong in hoping that foreign students might develop appreciation, sympathy and even active support for certain American foreign policy objectives.

How effective was the attempt to separate educational programs from political propaganda? Not very. Some scholars noted that, with the Cold War dominating international relations, "educational exchange was massively overshadowed by the information program and reduced, administratively, to a 'media service' thereof. Information received the major share of the budget and the bulk of attention."[61] None the less, educators' protest did make some impact on the government in that the Smith–Mundt Act mandated two separate advisory commissions to the Secretary of State – one for information, the other for educational exchange. This mandate led to the establishment of two divisions – even though nominal to some extent – in the State Department; the Division of Libraries and Institutes for information exchange and the Division of International Exchange of Persons for educational exchange.

Tensions between political goals and educational objectives were not the only conflict. Differences existed within Congress. Some Congressmen

[58] The State Department appointed Howland Sargeant, a lawyer with a background in educational administration to investigate IIE's administration of student exchanges in September 1946. After interviews with many concerned persons, Sargeant came up with a 35-page report officially known as "The United States Program for the Exchange of Students and Industrial Trainees." Sargeant recommended the use of student exchange for implementing foreign policy objectives. For details of the report, see Halpern, "Institute of International Education," 185–90.

[59] Before coming to the IIE, Laurence Duggan was Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations with Latin America of the State Department. He died unexpectedly in 1948. Kenneth Holland, formerly Assistant Director of the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs of the State Department, became president of the IIE in 1950 and served in that capacity in the 1950s–60s.

[60] Halpern, 192.

[61] Thomson and Laves, *Cultural Relations*, 72.

had serious doubts about the value of educational exchanges to US national security interest. When the Smith–Mundt Act was introduced, proposing worldwide cultural and educational exchange activity, it encountered strong opposition in Congress. Opponents argued that exchange of students and teachers would let down immigration bars and open American schools to communists and agitators. Proponents argued that we needed to counteract "the bitter Soviet propaganda attacks on the United States."[62] The bill did not get passed until after a joint Senate–House investigation committee presented a report stressing the dangers of Soviet propaganda. It took members of Congress to twenty-two European countries to investigate the information and educational exchange programs before they came up with the report to support the Smith–Mundt bill. As a result, the Smith–Mundt Act "carefully and deliberately determined that a program of educational exchange shall become an essential part of the conduct of this nation's foreign affairs."[63]

The debate over educational exchange was also complicated by McCarthyism. Paranoid with the fear of Communism in and out of the United States, Senator Joseph McCarthy was strongly against cultural exchange. He accused the Fulbright Program of bringing communists and foreign spies into the United States by sponsoring exchange professors, teachers, and students. McCarthy also alleged that the overseas libraries of United States Information Service were full of books by communists.[64] Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, by showing his ardent anti-communist colors, "ordered books authored by 'Communists, fellow travelers, et cetera' to be removed from the libraries of American overseas information centers."[65] Bureaucrats gave the broadest interpretation of "et cetera" and tossed out any books considered to be too liberal/leftist, many of which were by well-known journalists and scholars who were not communists at all. Although McCarthy and Fulbright held opposite positions in regard to educational exchange, they both were fighting Communism. Only their approaches were different. McCarthy represented the tradition of isolationism, reinforced by his paranoia of communist subversion in the country; whereas Fulbright represented the tradition of

[62] Ibid., 66.

[63] *First Semiannual Report of United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange* (February 1949), 4.

[64] *Time-Herald*, Washington, D.C., 30 Oct. 1953, Fulbright Papers, second accession, State Department, series 2, educational and cultural exchange, box 14–b.

[65] Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Relations, A History since 1895* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1995), 333.

internationalism, confident in the final triumph of American Democracy over Communism.

The dubious attitude of Congress toward educational exchange was also reflected in the constant governmental budget cut for exchange programs throughout the 1950s.[66] Although the reduction of funding was often attributed to John J. Rooney, chairman of House Subcommittee on Appropriations, and some of his colleagues who saw little importance of exchange to American foreign policy, it demonstrated the general attitude of Congress towards educational exchange. Congress made frequent budget cuts for the program despite the fact that Congressional leaders of both parties, such as Walter Judd, Homer E. Capehart, Karl E. Mundt, Edward J. Thye, and Vice President Richard Nixon (many of them were ardent cold warriors), spoke against the cuts.[67] Whether a dove or a hawk, they came to support the program when they saw the usefulness of exchange in fighting the Cold War. One scholar summarized, "politicians vied with one another to demonstrate their devotion to the cause of the 'Free World.'"[68]

The State Department under Secretary John Foster Dulles did not fight for the increase of funding for educational exchange. Instead, it even recommended Congress for reduced exchange budget. For instance, in 1956 when the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange recommended $31 million to extend exchange program, the State Department requested Congress for only $20 million. Senator Fullbright was furious with the State Department when the budget for Information Program and the International Cooperation Administration went up by $50 million and the budget for educational exchange went down significantly. Fulbright told Dulles that the State Department was placing emphasis in the wrong place.[69] The fact is Dulles was not interested in supporting educational exchange. When McCarthy attacked exchange programs, Dulles did not take action to defend the program. Dulles even

[66] In 1953, the House voted to reduce the requested $15 million to $9 million for 1954 educational exchanges. Again in 1954 the House cut exchange budget from 22 million down to 12 million. In the 1950s, private money was a major source for exchange programs, which increased from $12 million to $20 from 1952 to 1958 (J. Manuel Espinosa, *Landmarks in the History of the Cultural Relations Programs of the Department of State, 1938–1976*, 6).

[67] Congressional Record, vol. 101, 14 Apr. 1955, 4460–4499. The Department of State, "Effects of House Cut: International Education Exchange for 1956," 16 Apr. 1955, Fulbright Papers, BCN 90:13. Thomson and Laves, *Cultural Relations*, 118–19.

[68] Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), vii.

[69] Fulbright to Foster Dulles, 12 Jan. 1956, Fulbright Papers, BCN 84:27.

wanted the whole International Information and Educational Program to be removed from the Department of State. J. L. Morrill, chairman of the US Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, complained about the "uninterested and reluctant or even hostile State Department" and doubted if the location of the exchange program in the State Department could make it successful.[70]

The above discussion shows that the government's involvement in educational exchange greatly increased the political implications of cultural activity and the role of educational programs in international power struggle. As Melvin Fox, the Ford Foundation's exchange programs officer mentioned, "government program exercises a controlling influence over the exchange field and in a sense determines its character as well as its size and scope."[71] The Cold War created an environment where cultural expansion contributed to the "empire-building" when military actions could not be used directly because of mutual fear of total destruction. Educational exchange facilitated the cultural dominance of the United States, which included the sale of ideas, values, ideologies, technologies, commerce, military defense, and ways of life – anything that boosted its favorable image and power.

In the Cold War, educational exchange shifted from mutual to unilateral purposes when the government emphasized political objectives of the exchange program. Educational exchange for *educational* purposes hardly ever gained support of the government. Nevertheless, educational exchange at American universities expanded significantly during the Cold War when the government relied heavily on university resources to implement exchange activities. The facilities and knowledge reservoir of American universities were indispensable for the delivery of the exchange programs sponsored by either the government or private sources. Although the federal government funded international exchange and international studies on major campuses for national security purposes via National Defense Education Act, Fulbright Scholarships, and State Department funds, philanthropic foundations provided significant shares of financial support, too. The guideline of government policy was "even if the government had the necessary resources it would still be desirable that private groups do the bulk of the work in this field."[72]

[70] J. L. Morrill to Fulbright, 12 May 1953, Fulbright Papers, BCN 90:4.

[71] "Report on Exchange of Persons Activities of the Ford Foundation," Melvin Fox, Jan. 1953, 6. Ford Foundation Archives, Report 001567.

[72] The US Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, "Report to Congress," 9 Dec. 1949. (See Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program*, 34–36.)

How was the Cold War educational exchange different from pre-war educational outreach primarily sponsored by Christian missionaries and philanthropies? Obviously there was inherent continuity of cultural expansionism and the mission of manifest destiny.[73] But the Cold War, for the first time, put the United States under the direct threat of another power equally capable of total destruction. With the assumption of Soviet danger to American systems and ways of life, the American state seemed to justify itself to utilize the expertise and resources of private institutions for political purposes and national security interest. The concern of national security helped forge the co-operative efforts of the private and public sectors in building American power and influences in the world. The government's role in worldwide exchanges greatly impacted private institutions. Some non-governmental institutions assumed more than the role of links between the public and private sectors and functioned virtually as an extension of the government apparatus. International educational and cultural activities would have little legitimacy to receive Congress's support unless they were put in political service. Although the mobilization of private resources aimed at achieving the goal of "total diplomacy," different goals of exchanges and conflicting views of policy objectives were expressed by various major players in the field. These differences indicated tensions within the public–private co-operative relationship and the complexity of policy-making.

[73] Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).