
This book could not have been timed better. At the end of the 1990s the political debate on German immigration policy intensified as the red–green coalition headed by Gerhard Schroeder pushed for official acknowledgement of Germany as an immigration country, and for the possibility of actively recruiting immigrants from outside the European Union for economic and demographic reasons. Klaus Bade, director of the Institute for Migration and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) at the University of Osnabrück and for many years the leading and most prolific German migration historian, was involved as adviser to the government. Judging from the manifold and very positive reviews that have appeared in the major German newspapers and magazines, his latest book played an important role in this discussion.

This is not to say that Europa in Bewegung (Europe in Movement) is merely a political pamphlet, in which history is used as ammunition to prepare the public for a new migration policy. It is a well-written and thoroughly documented overview of Europe’s migration history in the past two centuries. In contrast to many studies that use “Europe” in the title and then concentrate on one or just a few western European countries, this book is a serious effort to include the southern and eastern parts of the continent, especially where the twentieth century is concerned. Moreover, Bade has systematically drawn from the relevant social-scientific literature, thus adding the often dramatic changes in migration streams and regimes during the last decades of the twentieth century to complement the historical picture.

The stress is clearly on migration and the way the movement of people within and towards Europe has been viewed by states and their subjects. In the second part of the book in particular, much attention is paid to the interplay between migration and politics, both at national and European level. This also explains the choice of 1914, 1945 and 1990 (the collapse of the Iron Curtain) as major turning points. In this sense Bade’s book differs from the path-breaking study by Leslie Page Moch (Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650, published in 1992), which includes the early modern period and focuses much more on migrants and on the relationship between the history of migration and general socioeconomic developments (demography, family formation, protoindustry, industrialization, urbanization, etc.). Although Bade, who often refers to Moch’s study, also pays attention to these linkages, he is clearly more interested in state policies and the lessons that can be drawn from the past.

The difference between Europa in Bewegung and Moving Europeans is less obvious in the first part of the book (chapters 1 and 2), which deals extensively with the long nineteenth century (1789–1914). Bade also stresses the importance of the changing character of the labour market for our understanding of migration. To illustrate the point that migration is not a recent phenomenon but a structural element in Europe’s history, he often uses examples, like the Germans from Hesse in Paris or the Poles in the Ruhr area. These excursions are instructive and make the book easy to read. Using Klessman’s classic study on the Ruhr Poles and Noiriel’s book on Longwy, he also paints a colourful picture of Europe’s “Wild West” in many rapidly expanding European industrial towns, which
attracted masses of foreigners. In doing so he offers a useful counterweight to the still powerful association of migration and immigration in the nineteenth century with the United States. Although there are no references to a number of relevant recent studies (Pooley and Turnbull’s *Migration and Mobility in Britain*, Rosenthal’s *Les sentiers invisibles*, Feldman on immigration and poor relief in *Mouvement Social* (1999), and Strikwerda’s work on Belgian workers in the north of France and migration regimes in *IRSH* (1999)), in general Bade has read widely.

In the first part of the book Bade does not restrict himself to migration within and towards Europe, but also deals with the massive emigration to the New World, starting with the indentured migrants and the redemptioner system in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, Bade puts his expertise as a former colonial historian to good use in considering the extent of colonial migration and the long-term consequences of empire building (both formal and informal) by European states for the migration streams from these areas in the twentieth century. Interesting in view of the experiences of later welfare states is the link he makes between the often forced export of paupers and children from Great Britain to the settler colonies (especially Australia) and the concerns in nineteenth-century Britain about poverty and criminality. This important theme is also addressed for Germany, when Bade describes Bismarck’s attempts to regulate and monitor labour migration from the 1880s onwards. However, Bade’s interpretation is somewhat traditional, in the sense that he points only to the ethnonational elements (the threat Polish labour migrants would pose to the national state). Although these were clearly haunting the minds of many German politicians, this concern conceals the more structural link between the early development of Germany’s welfare system and the need to control migration. Thus Dutch migrants who flocked to the booming Ruhr area after 1870 also increasingly required documents proving their nationality, to ensure they could be sent back if they became destitute.

As in Moch’s study, the First World War is treated as a watershed, first of all because of the massive movements of refugees – during and immediately after – created not only by war and devastation (*Menschen über Grenzen* [people above borders]), but also as a consequence of the collapse of empires (the Ottoman Empire, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and the creation of 11,000 kilometres of new state borders (*Grenzen über Menschen* [borders above people]). Even more fundamental was the onset of state intervention in recruiting migrants for the labour market and in restricting, or at least controlling, the immigration of foreigners to their territories. The period between the wars is treated somewhat unevenly, especially when compared with the long nineteenth century: much more attention is paid to refugees and political causes, while relatively few pages are devoted to labour migration. Bade has chosen to deal only with the massive labour migration to France and the waning of this phenomenon to Germany. Bade thereby ignores the considerable increase in immigration to the Netherlands (Germans), Switzerland and Belgium; the same is true for the interesting question to what extent labour migration under the new migration regime was effectively regulated by states.

The fourth chapter of the book, on migration during the Cold War, systematically lists all the major migrations, the changes in state policies that occurred as western Europe’s welfare-state system unfolded, and the often racially loaded reactions of the indigenous population. Although well-written, the first part, which reviews displaced persons, colonial migrants, guest workers, and refugees, offers little new. More interesting is the author’s comparison between the French and German integration models. Instead of
treating the reader to a tame story of *ius soli* versus *ius sanguinis* models, Bade shows that the practice is much less straightforward. Though Turks may find it difficult to acquire German nationality, they are more systematically integrated into the welfare system and the labour market than in France, where it is relatively easy for foreigners to become formally French but where no effort has been made to prevent social segregation and ghetto-building. Also useful is his typology of the selective streams of asylum seekers, which makes clear that for a thorough understanding it is not enough to consider only the attraction of a specific state; geopolitical, historical (e.g. colonial links) and social (through networks) factors are also relevant.

The last part (1989–2000) is loaded with numbers to illustrate the diverse migration movements after the fall of the Iron Curtain. More interesting is Bade’s focus on the fundamental changes in the migration regime, bringing eastern Europe into the picture, not so much as a push region (apart from the German *Aussiedler*, Jews, and Romanian gypsies), but much more as transit regions for migrants from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Here the author makes no secret of his aversion to populist and racist anti-immigration politics. Based on his extensive knowledge of recent migrations, both legal and illegal, he shows the many contradictory and inhuman aspects that are at the basis of Fortress Europe.

*Europa in Bewegung* will remain a valuable and comprehensive overview for a long time. It would have benefited, however, if the author had avoided the overly familiar more often (especially for the period 1914–1990) and considered long-term analyses of certain trends and developments at greater length (for example, the relationship between migration and poor relief, labour markets, or gender). Apart from gender, these themes are dealt with, but in an isolated and dispersed fashion. A more thematic approach, with structured chronological comparisons – like in the recent book by Nancy Foner (*From Ellis Island to JFK*) – could have yielded even more than the already rich tale that lies before us now.

Leo Lucassen


One might have thought the history of the working class and its organizations had already been thoroughly researched. Though immense, the flood of publications shows striking lacunas. The lack of studies on Christian labour unions, for example, becomes obvious especially when compared with the numerous studies on the history of the mainstream socialist workers’ movement. Christian labour unions are perceived as little more than a side issue – one that can safely be neglected – and they are generally relegated to the footnotes of history. This does no justice to their real significance, which is measurable less in quantity than in quality. Furthermore, historical research, which so often seems to think only in terms of the nation-state, has paid little attention to the international union movement. In his study of the international Christian union movement Patrick Pasture, a distinguished expert on the European Christian workers’ and labour movement, aims to make up for these deficits. His project is ambitious. It covers the period from the beginnings of Social Catholicism in Europe in the mid-nineteenth century to the
International of the Poor" in the 1970s. Pasture provides not only a history of the organization and its programme, but also a synthesis of the national Christian union movements and an analysis of their globalization in the light of the political and socio-economic upheavals of the twentieth century. There is a comparatively wide range of sources available for his project. The archives of the IFCTU (International Federation of Christian Trade Unions), founded in 1920, are complete for the years after 1926. For earlier years there are many published and secondary sources.

Pasture’s unbiased analyses make his study particularly convincing. He points out the strengths and weaknesses of the Christian union movement. In doing so he succeeds in refuting a number of common prejudices against a supposedly reactionary and clerical union movement which were articulated by contemporary opponents of the movement and, thus, found their way into its historiography. Pasture interprets the history of Christian labour unions, whose complexity and variety are immediately evident in comparison with the socialist union movement, as the search for a third path between liberalism and socialism/communism. In the 1920s the movement distinctly distanced itself from fascism. In terms of numbers, the Christian international union movement was always relatively insignificant. However, it did have an influence on international organizations: for this reason, it was later appointed consultative organ to the United Nations. Also, its isolation within the international workers’ and union movement was not of its own choosing. Even if Pasture does not want to present a comparison between Christian and socialist organizations, his view through the glasses of the David of the international union movement throws a characteristic light on its Goliath.

First, the author reconstructs the origins of the movement, which are rooted in nineteenth-century Social Catholicism. The movement drew on idealized medieval models of society to answer social questions. Soon, however, the working class had emancipated itself from retrogressive models. In contrast to what common prejudices supposed, the Christian labour unions were organized as independent bodies led by laymen, supported by the lower clergy but confronted by rejection and indifference by the higher clergy. The ties to Christian Democracy were far less tangible than the ties between independent unions and socialist parties. Antisocialism was a reaction to the anticlericalism of the independent unions. Pasture rebuts the common interpretation that the existence of Christian unions weakened the workers’ movement. On the contrary: they were able to reach workers with a religious and national outlook who would not have organized outside Christian unions, and, thus, in fact they helped to strengthen the workers’ movement.

However, their marked national outlook proved to be problematic for an international amalgamation of Christian workers’ organizations. The beginnings of institutionalized international cooperation date back to 1908, with the foundation of an International Office. World War I poisoned the atmosphere, particularly between Germany on the one hand and France and Belgium on the other. It was not until 1920 that it was possible to found the IFCTU. With three million members it was a comparatively small organization, with its geographic centre in continental Europe. Unlike their socialist counterparts, the Christian unions lacked a theoretical superstructure. The demands of context and programme were subject to change and were often adjusted to reflect the social and political realities of the time. Contradictions and ambiguities were predetermined. At first, the religious outlook served to unify, although there were also conflicts between Protestant, Catholic and interdenominational organizations. For example, Pasture
interprets the initial clear disapproval of women’s labour as a spiritual bond within the movement. It served as proof that the unions pursued not only material interests but also valued the protection of the family. The economic crisis of the 1930s was interpreted not only in economic but also in political and moral terms. Due particularly to the influence of its leader Serrarens, the IFCTU was straightforward and courageous in its disapproval of fascism. The individual national organizations varied between conformity (Austria) and ambiguity (Germany). The idea of a national community, the corporatism and anti-Semitism of the fascist movements quite appealed to some Christian national workers. Like their Social Democratic counterparts, the Christian unions were unable to contribute much to rebutting fascism in Europe.

After the war, there was no opportunity for independent Christian workers’ unions to be founded, since calls for a unified union predominated. In Germany the emergence of National Socialism was blamed on the division into specialized unions. Even the European Christian democracies and the bishops declined to support any new endeavour, since they feared a split within the workers’ movement would help the communists. Nevertheless, the IFCTU re-emerged because Christian unionists felt marginalized in a unified organization. In the following years, the international Christian union movement changed fundamentally in context and organization. It revised its colonial outlook on countries outside Europe. As it became less and less important in Europe, the IFCTU spread to Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where it began to represent the low-income countries. Islamic and Hindu organizations were admitted, marking the beginning of a gradual déconfessionalisation. In 1968 the IFCTU was renamed the World Confederation of Labour (WCL).

With his history of the international Christian union movement, Patrick Pasture has presented a work of reference extensive in context and containing a wealth of lucid analyses from which future researchers can only gain.

Claudia Hiepel


At the turn of the century, long before leading the Bolshevik takeover of the Russian Empire in 1917, the young Lenin referred to the Russian Empire as “the prison house of nations”. Lenin’s remark was a response to the growing nationalist opposition that was then spreading throughout the Empire. In the following years, however, Lenin’s statement proved to be more than a mere political observation. To rally all the Empire’s minorities under their banner, the Bolsheviks even called for the right of national self-determination and the right of total secession. The February Revolution of 1917, which was followed by the Bolshevik revolt in October of the same year, provided a golden opportunity for national minorities all over the Empire to call for the right of national self-determination as a prelude, ultimately, to securing independence. For the Bolsheviks, this was a call to practice what they had been preaching for years in the lobbies of European socialist conventions.

Jeremy Smith’s study of the nationalities question in the early years of the Bolshevik
takeover, which is based on the author’s doctoral thesis, seeks to provide an integrated picture of how the Bolsheviks responded to the nationalities question in a society that, more than anything, was characterized by a host of ethnic groups and nationalities. His book comprises eight chapters and a conclusion. In his introductory chapter, Smith provides a short summary of the Sovietization of the borderland. In the following four chapters he examines the efforts of the Bolsheviks to pursue their national policy, establishing the first multinational socialist state in the vast land they inherited from the Tsarist Empire. The final two chapters deal with the crises that the implementation of this policy caused for the Soviet regime.

In chapter 2, which is devoted to the Marxists’ and Bolsheviks’ theoretical perceptions of the national question, Smith begins with a brief review of the stances of the socialist internationals on minority rights in pre-World-War-I Europe and compares and contrasts the attitude of the Bolsheviks towards the nationalities question before and after 1917. Before 1917 the Bolsheviks embraced the right of all the Empire’s national minorities to self-determination, while by 1918 Stalin was stating publicly that self-determination was “outmoded and ‘should be subordinated to the principles of socialism’ ” (p. 22). By raising the problem of “backwardness”, Stalin, as Commissar for Nationality Affairs in the new Soviet regime, was arguing that “these peoples [the national minorities in Russia] were mistrustful of the Russians, and were deeply influenced by religion. The immediate task of Soviet power, then, was to improve their economic condition, to provide educational facilities, to attract as far as possible the local intelligentsia and to conduct socialist propaganda in the local languages” (p. 23). Territorial autonomy with a constitutional status, together with ethnic consolidation, education, linguistic and cultural development, became the general policy of the Bolsheviks in promoting the non-Russian subjects of the ousted Tsarist Empire to the “higher stage” of socialism (p. 28).

In chapter 3, the author prudently examines the process of implementing the territorial autonomy based on the first constitution of Bolshevik Russia, which was adopted at the Fifth All Russian Congress on 10 July 1918. Securing the territorial integrity of the land inherited from the old Tsarist Empire and combating interethnic violence were the major short-term considerations in offering national territorial autonomy. The national-territorial model opted for by Stalin was adopted by the new regime. The main long-term principle of this policy was to provide national minorities with a basis for national development and identification, and to give them the means for the cultural and economic development necessary for socialism, and a medium through which they could assert their loyalty to the Soviet state (p. 65). Consequently, a series of new autonomous Soviet socialist republics and regions were established, along with the Peoples’ Commissariat for Nationality Affairs and the Muslim Commissariat. The commissariats were largely involved in disseminating propaganda and overseeing cultural and educational matters. They also had responsibility for economic reforms specific to national groups (p. 41).

In chapter 4, Jeremy Smith deals with the building of nationhood borders and state structures. The nation-building process aimed at establishing territorial borders, which were viewed as essential to nationhood. Consequently, the Bolsheviks adopted a peculiar type of ethnofederalist administrative structure in which the titular nationality in each territory would be able to flourish. While they attempted to link a single constructed titular nation to its own state, to achieve social homogeneity and political cohesion they denied the smaller ethnic minorities in each republic rights equal to those of the titular nation. Moreover, in some cases economic and political criteria were also regarded as
parameters in this new demarcation policy. As a result, border disputes between various nationalities were exacerbated by conflicts between the “economic principle” and the “national-territorial principle” (p. 69).

In the face of these difficulties, the Bolsheviks opted for national development, fostering economic development and promoting the national proletariat as a necessary step towards accomplishing their ideal national political development. In the short term, Moscow’s main priority was to recruit native cadres to the Communist Party and Soviet apparatus, to promote national culture and class-consciousness while supporting the principle of Soviet power. Smith examines this policy in the fifth and sixth chapters of his book. He describes Moscow’s attempts to educate the influx of young affiliates and to appeal to the veteran native revolutionaries, some of whom had a long history of political involvement in the nationalist movement. In 1921 the Communist University of Labourers of the East was founded in Moscow, and within two years it had opened branches across Russia. By 1924, more than 50 per cent of the students attending the Communist University were non-Russian communists. Using previously unpublished studies, Smith gives a comprehensive and inclusive account of Moscow’s educational campaign (pp. 136–143).

In addition to educating young communists, by launching a new campaign to nurture “cultural autonomy” Moscow endeavoured to recruit non-Russian political activists with their non-nationalist yearnings. In their cultural autonomy policy, the chief aim of the Bolsheviks was to create national languages for each autonomous entity throughout the Soviet Union. Each republic was to have its own national language, based on a particular spoken dialect, both as its written and literary language. Russian would be the sole lingua franca, welding the entire “Soviet nation” together.

Although Smith devotes part of his study (pp. 145–171) to this campaign and presents some interesting statistics on educational reform and the linguistic policy of the Soviet regime, one should realize that the linguistic campaign of the Soviets began as late as 1923 and lasted for almost a decade, a period well beyond that covered in Smith’s study.

The accommodation of the Bolsheviks’ nationalities policy throughout the vast territory of the Soviet Union was anything but simple. In chapters 7 and 8 of his study Smith deals with the crisis in the nationalities policy that accompanied the formation of the Soviet Union. In addition to enduring divergences and frictions within the Communist Party, there was anti-Soviet resistance and interethnic conflict in the peripheries; these impeded the Bolsheviks’ ethnofederalist approach to state building. In the Caucasus, where there were difficulties in demarcating the region, the attempt by the Bolsheviks to form a Transcaucasian Federation comprising Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan was resisted by the Georgian authorities. Furthermore, their short-term mandate of recruiting and cooperating with non-Russian political activists with known nationalist yearnings led to a greater distrust than was originally anticipated. In 1923, following the Twelfth Communist Party Congress, it was “revealed” that some national communists were pursuing “an independent political line in the sphere of the national question in opposition to the Comintern and Soviet power” (p. 230). The new antinational-communist movement, which was soon branded with the name of the Tatar revolutionary Sultan Galiev, turned out to be the first strike by the Bolsheviks in their long campaign against those non-Russian intellectuals who had been politically active before 1917. Although Smith acknowledges the Sultangalievshchina as a “crisis” in the national policy in the early years of Bolshevik rule, nevertheless his brief assessment of the episode does not significantly add to previous scholarly works on this subject, such as Alexandre A. Bennigsen and

In conclusion, *The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917–1923* is well-written and a thoroughly researched work, based in part on original materials. It certainly adds to our understanding of Bolshevik policy on the national question. Smith’s study would have been more comprehensive if, in addition to giving us Moscow’s interpretation of this episode, it could have incorporated non-Russian archive material, especially when dealing with the acceptance of and resistance to Bolshevik policy in the peripheries of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this deficiency by no means undermines the overall authenticity and originality of Smith’s study. Indeed, this book can be highly recommended for students of Soviet history and those who seek a better understanding of the complexities that burdened the Bolsheviks in establishing the first ever socialist state.

*Touraj Atabaki*


The history of the Russian Orthodox Church and the development of religious policy in the Soviet Union was one those forgotten topics to which historians and theologians only really started to pay serious attention after the collapse of the Soviet system. The opening of the archives in the early 1990s challenged the work of earlier authors who had conducted their studies by using either public Soviet sources or emigrant/samizdat sources. These “pre-archival” authors usually saw the Bolshevik party as an ideological monolith and a bloody juggernaut, which was diabolically and systematically rooting religion out from Soviet society. The majority of historians either did not want to deal with religion, or believed the official explanations concerning the progressive tendencies of Soviet religious policy. As a rule, the lack of primary sources led to inaccurate and fantastical conclusions.

Another problem with earlier “pre-archival” studies was the difficulty in seeing the effects of the changing political situation in the religious political sphere. Authors merely drew simplistic conclusions based on labels such as “moderate” or “hawkish”, without deeper political analysis or the use of sources originating with the Communist Party itself.

The picture we get from the archives is more complex and nuanced than the horror stories of the Cold-War era. According to the archives, Soviet religious policy was mostly dependent upon the general political objectives of the party leadership. For example, during the Civil War in Russia, 1918–1921, the new regime limited its policy to legislating church–state relations. Terror and violence were mostly sporadic and directed against those who were considered politically active opponents of the Bolsheviks. This does not rule out the fact that terror and bloodshed were the cornerstones of the Soviet system from the very beginning. However, the sudden turns in the power struggle and the general political objectives primarily dictated the way the Soviet state dealt with its religious adversaries.

“*Godless Communists*: Atheism and Society in Soviet Russia, 1917–1932” is an excellent work of research based on archival and public sources. The author is a specialist in the social and political history of Russia and has published books on themes such as women in Russia, and human tradition in modern Russia. The prime goal of “*Godless Communists*” is
to shed light on the ordinary people who were under attack from the communist regime. The book focuses on how the majority integrated atheism with communism and conducted silent “sabotage” against the rulers, who were desperately trying to create a new man and a new society. The response of these ordinary people was a strange kind of accommodation to the realities of daily life. Similar strategies for survival have been dealt with in, for example, Sheila Fitzpatrick’s Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization (New York, 1994). Husband clarifies this strategy in matters of religion. His clear and diligent analysis of the ways in which the masses fought their cultural “fight” is a very valuable addition to scholarship in this field.

Husband shows how the campaigns to eradicate religion – promoting a new atheist society with its new celebrations and new “scientific” worldview – failed to root out religion. The atheist mission was too overwhelming and too gross to be accomplished. Here the communist regime was not only fighting against religion but against everything “old”. The result of this Sisyphean struggle was, as Husband aptly puts it, a *dvoeverie* – a synthesis of old and new. People accepted the change, but did not fully embrace the new society and its values. The result was not “Homo Sovieticus” but a “Homunculus Sovieticus”.

Husband provides us with a dispassionate account of this cultural evolution and fills an important gap in these studies, which have in the past suffered from a polarization of different views. The forte of this study is the combination of archival and public sources. It would be absurd to minimize the value of this work on the grounds that the author has utilized archival sources. This hostile mentality towards the archival material seems to be common among those scholars who did their work during the Cold-War period. For example, Professor Dimitry Pospielovsky has accused Husband of relying too much on archives. According to him “[...] access to archives alone will not guarantee reliability of the information obtained. Many of the documents’ authors were Soviet officials guided by ulterior motives in writing reports to their bosses”.

I deeply sympathise with the generation that conducted its research without access to the archives. They have often done an enormous amount of work. It would, however, simply be unwise not to utilize this new flow of information. In short, what on earth would we use if not archives! The authenticity of the Soviet archives is beyond doubt. These documents were intended only for very select party circles, and even if these papers include expressions of ideological doublethink or “incorrect” information, it does not diminish their historical value. The other option would be for scholars to go back to “pre-archival” times – reading *Pravda* with a magnifying glass.

*Arto Luukkanen*


The collapse of the communist system in the USSR in the early 1990s enabled Russian and international scholars to gain access to hitherto restricted Soviet archives and those of the

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international communist movement (Comintern). This resulted in the publication of many books offering a fresh look at various aspects of Soviet politics, including Bolshevik policy toward China in the 1920s and 1930s. Alexander Pantsov is one of the most able scholars to have taken advantage of these new research opportunities, by exploiting masses of previously inaccessible Russian archival sources. They serve as the main basis for Pantsov’s study, which focuses on the following key questions. To what degree was the Comintern, under first Lenin’s and then Stalin’s influence, responsible for the defeat of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1927? Could Trotsky have radically changed the situation had his ideas been accepted by the Comintern Executive in time? What considerations guided these three Soviet Communist Party leaders in formulating their China policy, and how were these received in China? How did Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky differ in their assessment of the strategic and tactical role of the communists in China? And what was the fate of the Chinese Trotskyists in the Soviet Union after 1927?

In the course of his research the author has divided the Bolshevik concepts of the Chinese revolution into three periods. During the first, from early 1919 to the autumn of 1922, Trotskyism predominated, i.e. there was a profound belief in radical internationalism and in an imminent proletarian world revolution. During the second period, from the end of 1922 until 1925, Trotskyism was enfeebled by the renewed authority of orthodox Leninist theory. Lenin acknowledged the nationalist and anti-imperialist character of the Chinese revolution and urged the CCP to support the national bourgeoisie of their country. He finally succeeded in convincing the Chinese communists that they should establish a united front with the Kuomintang, which, of course, was a manoeuvre aimed at helping unsophisticated communist activists to temporarily use their potential foes for their own purposes.

The third period, 1925 to 1927, was characterized by Stalin’s assumption of leadership and saw the replacement of the Leninist with the Stalinist doctrine of the Chinese revolution. According to Pantsov, Stalin himself seemed convinced he was simply developing Lenin’s line, but actually he revised it. Stalin believed that the Kuomintang was a multiclass party, and he urged the Chinese communists to make the Kuomintang as Leftist as possible by changing it into a workers’ and peasants’ party. However, in reality it was impossible for the communists to communize the Kuomintang without risking the break-up of the united front. As a result of Stalin’s orders, the CCP was condemned to constant retreat. It lost its independence and was trapped in a cul-de-sac that ended in 1927 in a disastrous defeat against Chiang Kai-shek and his allies.

This book is most helpful and can be recommended to all scholars interested in the different opinions and manifold arguments of the leading Soviet politicians in Moscow involved in the controversial debate on China between 1919 and 1927. Based on new archival sources, Pantsov quotes in detail from a host of declarations, resolutions, manifestations, letters, and articles deriving from the Moscow leadership. His strength lies in presenting theories, ideas, doctrines, theses, concepts, views, and proposals. Unfortunately, this presentation of ideological positions is not sufficiently linked to the empirical

1. To give just one example, the Russian Institute of Far Eastern Studies and the German Free University of Berlin have embarked on a joint research project which has so far (1994–2001) resulted in the publication of four volumes of documents (edited by M.L. Titarenko and Mechthild Leutner) on the Comintern and China in the period 1920–1937, in both Russian and German.
reality of the situation in China. Given the concrete restraints of day-to-day politics, the reader may not be wholly convinced of Pantsov’s method of strictly dividing the positions of Trotsky, Lenin and Stalin, who to some extent were confronted with the need to react pragmatically to certain developments in China and Russia.

Did the events of 1927 really constitute a complete “defeat” and disaster for the CCP? One objection to this view might be that the communist movement had remarkable success in terms of membership and organization during the United-Front period between 1925 and 1927. Pantsov, however, refers to it as a heavy defeat, and he places the blame entirely on Stalin, whose line is described as “irrational”, “leftist, even extreme leftist”, “bureaucratic by nature, based almost wholly on armchair calculations”. Thus, according to the author’s somewhat deterministic argumentation, Stalin’s policy was doomed to failure. Generally, this book presents much in the way of “analysis with hindsight”: leftist and rightist, realistic and unrealistic, right and wrong, sectarian, extremist, and bureaucratic; these are constant categories of judgement.

Finally, Pantsov also dismisses the views of the opposition surrounding Trotsky, Radek and Zinoviev in 1926–1927 as contradictory and “even more senseless than that of Stalin”. But would Lenin, confronted with power struggles at home and with the complex situation in China at that time, really have adopted a fundamentally different policy towards China? The answer is of course speculative, since concepts of politics and their implementation under difficult and changing conditions are obviously quite different things.

Tim Trampedach


The journals of Georgi Dimitroff, General Secretary of the Comintern from 1935 to 1943, are now available in a two-volume set, in which the first volume contains his writings and the second consists of commentaries on the source material. The layout of the book and presentation of the material is impressive, as is the consumer-friendly price; both substantiate the claim made by the editor, B. Bayerlein, that this publication “aims to reach more than simply an academic public while at the same time refusing to abandon the standards of scholarly succinctness and methodology”. However, what he means by this is only that the books represents a “compromise between a source book that adheres to the stringent rules of a critical scholarly work and a book conceived for the broader public” (1, p. 711). The publication is based “on the handwritten and typed transcripts” of documents that have been “partially corrected by Bulgarian scholars”. The original material is collected in “twelve journals and on nine individual pages”, each in the language of the corresponding place of residency (German, Russian, and Bulgarian) and are stored in the Central Därzhaven Archive in Sofia, Bulgaria. The difficulties that arose in this German edition, in part because Dimitroff was fluent neither in German nor Russian and used letters from both the Roman and the Cyrillic alphabets when writing Russian, have been noted by the editors responsible (1, pp. 709–712) and are also marked throughout the text.
Whereas the 1997 Bulgarian edition includes every available entry of the journals – except for the period between 1 February 1935 and 19 August 1936 for which no entries could be found and where several pages had apparently been removed – either in translation or in the original Bulgarian language, the German edition concludes with the entry from 12 June 1943, which starts with the heading: “Meeting of the Commission to Eliminate the Affairs of the Comintern”.

The table of contents of the Tagebücher-volume 1 follows the chronological order of the entries starting in 1935. The first section (1, pp. 7–89) covers the months of imprisonment in various prisons in Germany, the trial over the Reichstag fire, and the continuation of incarceration despite acquittal. It ends on 27 February 1934 with the deportation of the new Soviet citizen Dimitroff to Moscow and his arrival there: “At 7 o’clock – ‘home’”.

The second volume, Kommentare und Materialien, consists of two introductory essays followed by a comprehensive chronology of events (Chronik: 2, pp. 25–223) that appears to seek to incorporate the occurrences in the Soviet Union and in the international communist movement into a “synopsis of world politics”, or, in other words, to demonstrate the “simultaneity of the incompatible” (Die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen). That on 16 January 1933, “sentence was passed [… in the trial of 32 communist and trade union leaders in Meerut (India)” and on the same day the “Council for Labour and Defence […] in the USSR [passed] a resolution on ‘The self-sufficiency of workers regarding agricultural products’” (2, p. 25) can be perceived as an illustration of incompatible events occurring simultaneously – or can it? The reader is aware of the efforts not only to document noteworthy events, but especially to thwart any possible criticism of “intracommunism” and “Eurocentrism” by recording geographically and politically remote events that are, however, irrelevant for Dimitroff’s journals. This leaves one with the impression that the chronology was largely put together arbitrarily, all the more so since relevant dates often lack additional information that would make them more comprehensible or would satisfy the reader’s aroused curiosity. Many of these entries read like media headlines, leaving the reader puzzled. For example, what is the meaning of the “resolution of the PB [Politburo] on the question of the CK [Central Committee] of the CP (B) Bylorussia [Communist Party of Bylorussia]” recorded on 9 February 1933 (2, p. 27)? In light of the obvious effort that went into the collection of the data, it is regrettable that this and much more information about the years to follow have nothing to do with Dimitroff’s journals. The first important event of 1933 in this connection occurs on 30 January: “Hitler is named Reich Chancellor. […] The EKKI is thoroughly surprised by the fascist overthrow [?! – U.L.-A.] in Germany” (2, p. 26). For 27 February 1933, I would have added that Marinus van der Lubbe was arrested near the burning Reichstag and deleted the announcement of the opening of a preliminary investigation of him for 7 March. One last note: Hitler’s official title was Führer and Reichs Chancellor, not “Reichsführer” (2, p. 41, 2 August 1934).

The annotations added to Dimitroff’s notes (Anmerkungen: 2, pp. 224–294) referring to people, organizations, events, or topics are classified in volume 1 under the page number where they are each found, not under the date of the journal entry. It is good that research literature and memoirs are cited now and again, although the latter is cited quite frequently, which I consider to be superfluous. Yet, on the whole, the annotations are limited to essential information and the research involved in this annotative compilation deserves praise.

The selected bibliography included for the Dimitroff journals (Auswahlbibliographie:
2, pp. 295–365) is divided into seven categories ranging from the “works of Dimitroff” to “encyclopedias and reference books”. Unfortunately there are many examples of sloppiness to be found here. Some references are incomplete or incorrect, i.e. the _Schlussrede vor Gericht_ (2, p. 302). In the annotation in volume 1, p. 480, on the _Aufruf_ _Fitin_, it is noted that the document is “published in: Part 2, pp. 187–190”. Part 2 of what, please? According to the annotations, a number of documents are published in _Komintern i Vtoraja Mirovaja Vojna_, whereby only volume 1 or 2 and the page numbers are given. However, the above-mentioned publication is listed under the name of the editor (Lebedeva, etc.) in category 4.1.

Following the biographical dates (_Lebensstationen Georgi Dimitroffs_, 2, pp. 366–379) and a genealogy tree, come the short biographies of every person mentioned in the first volume (2, pp. 382–680). Historians and others will be eager to use these. The list of the pseudonyms mentioned in the journals (2, pp. 760–763) is actually unnecessary because the pseudonyms, together with the references to the real names of these individuals, are listed in the regular index of names. However, it would have been advantageous to list after each pseudonym the page numbers on which it was used, thereby enabling us to easily discover on which occasions, for example, Maurice Thorez was called “Stern” and on which he was referred to as just “Maurice” or “Jean” (“Jean” is not listed as a pseudonym of “Thorez”; is this just an oversight or is this pseudonym being confused with Franz Dahlem?). That Togliatti’s Comintern pseudonym was “Ercoli” should be familiar to those well acquainted with the material, less known perhaps is that he also had the code name of “Alfredo”.

What could also be criticized with regard to the publication as a whole is that the reader must constantly page back and forth between the chronology of events, the annotations, and the short biographies of volume 2 in order to obtain additional information on certain dates and journal entries in volume 1. Instead, the _Tagebücher_ could have followed the example set by Marcel Cachin’s edition of _Carnets_, in which the annotations and short biographies are footnoted directly in the entries.¹

The last entry by Dimitroff on 12 June 1943 is a very personal one: “Visited Mitja’s grave this morning with Rosi” (1, p. 708). His son Mitja, born in 1936, became ill with diphtheria on 21 March 1943. After that, not a day went by without Dimitroff mentioning the state of his health, and after Mitja’s death on 3 April, not a day without recording painful thoughts and memories, usually combined with a visit to the grave. Who was this man Georgi Dimitroff?

In the journals we catch glimpses of the two faces of Dimitroff. His private face is a simple one, that of any “common” person. He loves his mother, his siblings, and his wives and mistresses; and they return his love. He suffers during the years of illness of his first wife, who dies while he is imprisoned in Germany, and cherishes her memory even throughout his second marriage. He is proud of his son and nearly falls apart when he dies. Years later he adopts two children. He is a sociable person, is concerned with the health of

¹. Marcel Cachin, _Carnets 1906–1947_, sous la direction de Denis Peschanski; see especially Tome 3, 1921–1933. Édition établie et annotée par Serge Wolikow et Jacques Girault (Paris, 1998); when comparing the content with Tome 4, _Carnets 1937–1947_ (Paris, 1997) it became apparent that Dimitroff often summarized a number of meetings etc. under one (concluding) date. See, e.g., his notes dated 7 February 1937, and Cachin’s entries for the dates 21 January, 3 February, 5 February, and 6 February 1937.
his fellow comrades, both women and men, almost more than he is with his own, and
records the course of their illnesses in his notes.

The other face is that of the functionary, the apparatchik. Loyal, self-sacrificing, callous,
cold, efficient, obedient, stubborn, courageous, critical, adversarial, and eventually even
subversive. The journals allow a great deal of room for interpretation. Depending on the
political viewpoint, these interpretations broaden through substantiation or nuance the
picture we have derived to date of Dimitroff from his works, his correspondence, and
secondary literature.

The biographical dates outline in staccato how Dimitroff, born in June 1882 in a
Bulgarian village as the eighth child of a “wagon-driver” and a “woman agricultural
worker”, ended up in the workers’ movement: from his start by joining the union as a
fifteen-year-old and becoming a member of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Workers’
Party at the age of twenty, where within a year he switches to the left-wing faction, to his
activity in organizing strikes and uprisings even abroad that lands him in jail and
penitentiary and earns him the death sentence in absentia, finally to his rise in the
international communist movement. This begins with his election to the executive office
of the Red International of Labour Unions in 1922 and is followed by his election to be a
candidate of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1924. Starting in
1929, he acts as secretary of both the executive committee of the Balkan Communist
Federation in Vienna as well as of the western European office of the EKKI in Berlin,
where his chief residence is. He leads a life of continuous travel. As Dr Rudolf Steiner, he is
arrested on 9 March 1933 in Berlin as a suspect in connection with the Reichstag fire.

Two occurrences foreshadow later political developments. First, in 1926, Dimitroff
proves to be a follower of Stalin when he argues in favour of “exposing the Trotskyite-
Zinovievite traitors” (2, p. 371). Second, in 1932, he broadens his contacts beyond those of
his fellow communists to include (left-wing) bourgeois personalities in western Europe
through his activity in an amnesty campaign for sentenced communists and in the world
congress against the imperialist war held in Amsterdam (2, p. 373).

As General Secretary of the “World Party of the Proletariat” on the shoulders of the
CPSU, elected in 1935 at the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern as designated by
Stalin, Dimitroff shared the responsibility for the “exposure” of all types and “centres” of
“Trotskyites”, who usually were sentenced to death, if not sent to the Gulag, as a result.
But Dimitroff also intervened on behalf of people arrested. In 1935/1936, Dimitroff helped
significantly to conceive a new policy of the Comintern toward social democracy under
the motto of creating a “united front” and a broad “popular front against war and fascism”.
In the years that followed, he used this same motto while replacing this strategy of
cooperation with strictly tactical manoeuvres that adapted to the events of the time, the
(supposed) requirements within the ever-changing constellations, and the irrational will of
Stalin.

This is the jumping-off point for Wolfgang Engler in his commentary “Einheitsfront als
Ideologie. Kommentar zu den Tägebüchern von Georgi Dimitroff” (United Front as
philosophy student in the GDR, Engler is searching his soul for answers to tormenting
questions more than he is offering us a commentary. The question he poses to himself and
to former faculty members and fellow students – and to Dimitroff – is “how was it
possible” that Dimitroff went along with almost everything that came “from above”, that
he recorded the purges and Stalin’s atrocious pronouncements and orders without a word?
I tend here to agree with Bayerlein, who writes in his essay, “Dimitroffs Tagebücher – Innenansichten aus dem Stab der ‘Weltrevolution’” (Dimitroff’s Journals – A view from within the staff of the “World Revolution”, 2, pp. 7–18), about the ambivalence evident in the journals. They were “memory aids” for his work and a type of insurance. Should the not unlikely case arise that he too would get caught up in the grinder of terror, these journals “were witness to his unconditional obedience” (2, p. 18).

Proof of the accuracy of Bayerlein’s hypothesis are the short, tight-lipped notes Dimitroff made in an apparently calculated, protocol-like fashion on the events surrounding the trial against “Kam[enev], Zin[oviev], and others” between 19 August 1936, the first of his journal entries since 31 January 1935, and the end of August. Just as revealing is the wording quoted by Engler of the minutes of an order Stalin gave to Dimitroff in a private conversation on 11 November 1937: “Münzenberg is a Trotskyite. When he comes here, we will arrest him immediately. – Do something to entice him to come here.” Engler criticizes: “Again, no comment” (2, p. 21). Yet why should Dimitroff make any comment at this point? This is the most extensive of the total of four references in which Willi Münzenberg, the organizer of many “suprapartisan” actions of the Comintern, is even mentioned. In this regard, the truly interesting aspect is noting all the things Dimitroff did not entrust to his journals.

What more do we learn from the Tagebücher about the 1930s and the period between the Second World War and the self-imposed dissolution of the Comintern than we already know from other sources and research literature? We learn that Dimitroff closely followed what was going on in the world while he was imprisoned in Nazi-Germany and wrote almost ceaselessly with his bound hands about the prison conditions, his health and wellbeing, his activities and what he read in the newspapers, as well as political and personal letters, protests, and petitions. We experience nearly first-hand how he worked intensely to help organize the worldwide mobilization of the masses, the counter-trial to the Reichstag fire trial, and his own trial defence.² We gain some insight into the “daily life” of the Comintern and CPSU clans (Bayerlein refers to these as “castes”) around Stalin beyond that of their illnesses and other personal misfortunes; we learn that evenings they went to the Bolshoi together or to one of the dachas and that a great deal of alcohol was always being consumed.

Bayerlein lists with occasionally apodictic commentary a wide range of new insights that the Tagebücher offer and that would have to lead to a modification if not a total revision of the existing historiography in a series of fields. He sees this as a chance to accurately interpret the World-War-II period for the very first time. Yet to do this, the journals would have to extend to at least May 1945. It would also be necessary to study the material from archives that were never accessible or have again closed their doors in Moscow and elsewhere. From an objective standpoint, we can discern that Stalin’s image as a stern but fair-minded “father of mankind” and an intellectual leader cherished by a good many people is ruined completely – something not deliberately intended by Dimitroff, unlike

Trotsky, although his image of Stalin is indeed very close to that of Trotsky’s, as Bayerlein emphasizes. Certainly Dimitroff harboured no desire to do anything that might expose himself as an “antifascist hero” who ultimately failed.

Despite several points of criticism regarding “craftsmanship”, this publication should be praised in general. It is a valuable and essential contribution to the advancement of research, indeed to understanding the worldwide spectrum of ideological and political thought and debate in the decade between 1933 and 1943. Long after the Soviet empire, the Comintern and its sections, and the postwar eastern bloc have left the political stage, they cast long shadows throughout the world today. Will there arise a new controversy over history, another Historikerstreit, as Bayerlein believes? I am sceptical, although the ambivalence of the Tagebücher could open the door to such controversy.

Ursula Langkau-Alex

**Browning, Christopher R.** Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [etc.] 2000. xii, 185 pp. £30.00; $49.95. (Paper: £11.95; $15.95.)

In the spring of 1999, Christopher R. Browning held a lecture at Cambridge University in which he summarized the recent historical research on the mass murder of European Jews. This lecture has now been published as a book. In it, Browning not only surveys the research of the last few years, he adds his own new studies and uses this review as an opportunity to reconsider the results of his earlier work – an extensive undertaking that Browning manages with admirable clarity.

The clarity of Browning’s book is attributable largely to his focus on “three issues at the forefront of current Holocaust scholarship: (1) decision and policy making at the heart of the Nazi regime, out of which emerged the so-called Final Solution – the systematic attempt to murder every last Jew, man, woman, and child, within the German grasp; (2) the pragmatic and temporary use of Jewish labour, which was potentially in conflict with but also clearly subordinate to the regime’s ideological commitment to total destruction, and the resulting impact on the victims whose lives were thus briefly spared; and (3) the attitudes, motivations, and adaptations of the ‘ordinary’ Germans who implemented Nazi policy at the local level” (p. x). These issues create the three central sections that make up Browning’s book. In each of these sections, he dedicates two chapters to examining the issue presented.

In the first two chapters, Browning deals with the questions of when and where the National Socialist apparatus made the decision to murder all Jews living within the German sphere of influence. According to Browning, the issue has to be considered within the narrow context of the existing plans for deportation. The increasingly radical and brutal proposals for a forced resettlement of entire ethnic groups in eastern Europe were linked with the plans to deport the Jewish population from the German empire and the annexed areas. That the deportation to remote regions would be fatal for many of the deported was something the planners always counted on and desired. In the last few years, much more has become known about each of these plans, their development, and the reasons why they were then discarded. Browning traces the course of this planning phase from the deportation plans in the district of Lublin to the plans that existed for a short time following the victory over France to deport people to the French colony of Madagascar,
and finally to the plans for a deportation to territory of the Soviet Union. Browning refers to the research done by Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, and agrees with Götz Aly’s interpretation that as early as December 1940 the National Socialist leadership began to consider the deportation of 5.8 million European Jews to the territory of the Soviet Union.

Like most Holocaust historians, Browning argues that German policy became even more radical and brutal following the attack on the Soviet Union. This policy finally culminated in the systematic mass murder of the Jews of Europe. In very recent historical research it has been discussed intensely whether Hitler ever made the ultimate decision in favour of genocide at some point in this process. In 1997, Christian Gerlach argued in a highly acclaimed essay that on the basis of new source material it could be proved that Hitler did indeed make an ultimate decision in December 1941 to kill all the Jews living within the German sphere of influence. This decision, says Gerlach, was made because the United States had entered the war. Unlike Gerlach, Browning stands by his earlier thesis that the decision was probably made in October 1941. Like Gerlach, he still relies on the interpretation of notes and on statements made years later by those involved. However, Browning’s line of argument appears more plausible overall than Gerlach’s. It is highly possible that the planning for the mass murder was started as early as the autumn of 1941. Whether or not a dateable ultimate decision was ever really made, as both Gerlach and Browning assume, remains controversial. In his recently published book Der ungeschriebene Befehl (2001), Peter Longerich points out again that an insufficient number of meaningful sources exist to support the thesis of either Gerlach or Browning; instead Longerich continues to assume that a process of decision-making and radicalization was underway in which turning points occurred during the autumn and month of December 1941, but that this process had not yet reached its culmination by December 1941.

In the third and fourth chapters of his book, Browning deals extensively with the topic of the use of Jewish labour on behalf of German business interests. Browning argues that the deployment of Jewish labour was always subordinate to the other goals of National Socialist policy toward Jews. Between 1939 and 1941, the German administration of Jewish ghettos had a great deal of influence in exploiting Jewish labour. In the large ghettos of Lodz and Warsaw, the ghetto administration depended on the systematic use of Jewish labour to organize the basic provisioning of the interned population with food. This situation changed dramatically in the autumn of 1941. Even though the labour shortage in the Third Reich was being combated more energetically by the deployment of the Polish to work as forced labourers, there was but little opportunity to replace the transferred Polish workers with interned Jews. Himmler intervened personally again and again between July 1942 and November 1943 to accelerate the murder of even labouring Jews. Not until November 1943 did Himmler’s deadly campaign wane. Yet shortly before, 42,000 Jewish workers were murdered in the district of Lublin in only two days.

Very few of the labouring Polish Jews were still alive after November 1943. Browning names three camp compounds in which they continued to be forced to work: the camps run by the SS in the Auschwitz compound and in Płaszów near Krakow, the ghetto Lodz, and a group of camps in Starachowice in the district of Radom. The labour camps in Starachowice, the focus of Browning’s fourth chapter, were untypical in many respects. They eluded the systematic liquidation experienced in other labour camps during the course of 1943, they were not included in the far more deadly complex of the SS concentration camps, and workers from the camps were shipped on 28 July 1944 to Birkenau without undergoing a selection immediately upon disembarking the trains there.
This has lead to the fact that many more testimonies exist from survivors of these camps than of others. Browning evaluates these testimonies with the necessary caution, repeatedly emphasizes the untypical character of the camps at Starachowice, and still comes to several important findings, particularly regarding the issue of the corruptibility of the German camp commanders and the guards, as well as the hidden economy within the camps.

In dealing with the camps in Starachowice, the issue is again raised concerning the degree of flexibility and influence that local authorities had, be it with regards to ghettoization, the exploitation of the interned labour force, or the ordering of mass murder. Browning addresses this issue extensively in the fifth chapter. The conclusion drawn from the three case studies presented here is clear: local initiatives that were conducted in anticipation of regime policy, even though they were not explicitly and officially ordered, were in many cases approved after the fact, such as the unauthorized massacres perpetrated by police battalions. At least for a while, local initiatives to deploy Jewish labour in Brest were also tolerated even though these went against the overall goals of extermination policy. However, such autonomous action was tolerated only for a limited period and never questioned the basic overriding policy aims. Initiatives or omissions that contradicted basic policy were not tolerated in the least. In this context, Browning offers us the example of the Gebietskommissar Kempf (regional commissioner) from Kovel, who failed to ghettoize the Jews of Kovel in September 1941 as ordered. Later, he was denounced, convicted, and executed. Browning’s assumption that the commissioner’s “grave disloyalty” (p. 142) was the determining factor in his conviction appears to be based on a misunderstanding. Browning translates the serious charge of “schwere Untreue” to “grave disloyalty”. More accurate, and closer to the legal usage of the term, would appear to me to be “embezzlement”. It is far from a minor matter to determine whether the regional commissioner Kempf was sentenced to death because he was found guilty of failing to follow orders or of embezzlement. In the war-crimes trials after the war, those accused repeatedly defended their actions by claiming that a failure to follow the orders to murder the Jews was punishable by death. Yet it was Browning himself who contributed significantly toward exposing this persistent legend as a myth in his book *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York, 1992).

The case studies that Browning presents in the sixth chapter show that the results of his study on the Reserve Police Battalion 101 can be generalized in many respects. In other units there were also individuals who refused to participate in murderous raids, without suffering any repercussions themselves. In his case studies, Browning again examines in depth the question of the attitudes, motives, and possible choices of the “common” German perpetrator, which leads him to reconfirm many of the findings he presented in 1992: “A core of eager and committed officers and men, accompanied by an even larger block of men who complied with the policies of the regime more out of situational and organizational rather than ideological factors was sufficient. Unfortunately, the presence of a minority of men who sought not to participate in the regime’s racial killing had no measurable effect whatsoever.” (p. 169) Only with regard to the group of committed murderers in each of the units has Browning partially modified his conclusions. This group was smaller that he originally believed it to be, but its impact should not be underestimated in any way. “On the local level, they formed a crucial nucleus for the killing process in the same way as eager and ambitious initiators at the middle echelons and Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich at the top” (p. 175).
Browning’s book is an important contribution to the most recent research on the Holocaust. The focus of the presentation, the extensive amount of source material, and the comprehensive reception of research literature make it one of the most important recent publications in this field of research. Readers who are becoming acquainted with this research area are offered here a very readable introduction.

Tobias Mulot


Let me get straight to the point: this book is not exactly a balanced synthesis, and its title suggests a wider significance than it actually has. Moreover, it requires from the reader considerable knowledge of postwar French political and intellectual history as well as of Catholic intransigence. Anyone without this cultural background will be dazzled by the many names and figures. Notwithstanding these – and other – constraints, anyone interested in the mentalities of Catholic intellectuals in postwar France will find here some subtle and clear analyses of a fascinating phenomenon.

*Catholiques et communistes* deals with Christian Progressivism, a current within French Catholicism which from around 1943 to 1957 embraced communism (hence Christian progressistes). This book concentrates particularly on the period between the Decree of the Holy Office (1 July 1949) forbidding Catholics to advocate communism or to adhere to communist parties – without concretely condemning anyone – and the papal condemnation of the Christian progressiste periodical *La Quinzaine* in February 1955. The crisis of Christian Progressivism includes the condemnation of Jeunesse de l’Église in 1953, the ending of the experience of the worker-priests in 1954, and the silencing of numerous theologians, among whom the renowned Dominican Fathers Marie-Dominique Chenu and Yves Congar in 1954.

Most of the book consists of an analysis of the bimonthly *La Quinzaine*. It also contains a discussion of Christian progressistes active in Paris’s thirteenth arrondissement, an illuminating history of the representation and memory of Félicité de Lamennais among anti-progressistes and Christian progressistes, and a study of Father Augustin-Jean Maydieu, director of another Catholic periodical in the realm of leftist Catholicism, *La Vie intellectuelle*. However, as Tranvouez admits, Father Maydieu cannot be considered a Christian progressiste, since Maydieu opposed communism. On the other hand, important advocates of the alliance between Catholicism and communism, such as Father Maurice Montuclard, the Union des Chrétiens Progressistes (UCP), and the Mouvement Populaire des Familles (MPF), which transformed itself into the Mouvement de Libération du Peuple (MLP), are not treated as such; indeed, the latter is scarcely mentioned. In fact *Catholiques et communistes* is more a compilation of articles (admittedly sometimes substantially revised), mainly dedicated to *La Quinzaine*, to which a few other chapters are added. The logic of their selection and arrangement does not seem to have been well-considered, and obvious overlaps – a late definition of the term Christian Progressivism on p. 330, for example – remain.

The term progressisme chrétien is particularly difficult to define. It was a label applied by its adversaries. The proponents of progressisme chrétien considered themselves as both
communist and Christian (mostly Catholic), i.e. as belonging to the Church. Limited to communist Christians, the movement is more narrow and particular than left Catholicism, as shown in a recent collection of essays edited by Gerd-Rainer Horn and Emmanuel Gerard, in which Tranvouez presents a larger overview.¹ At least three quite different strands can be distinguished within Christian Progressiveness: political, such as the Union des Chrétiens Progressistes, theological, best represented by the Jeunesse de l’Église of Father Montuclard, and apostolic. The latter is embodied by the worker-priests, and by the Mission de France and the Mission de Paris (which also include laics).

The author is at his best when assessing the subtle networks and relations among some Christian progressistes (around the omnipresent Madame Sauvageot, born Ella Thuillier, the successful publisher of the Dominican press Les Éditions du Cerf and the driving force and backer behind La Quinzaine), but once he ventures from these circles he appears to lose this sense of nuance. So the communist world is remarkably absent in this book. The nature of the involvement of the Christian progressistes and their relations with communist organizations are not developed. As a result it remains unclear if, or to what extent, these people violated the official papal ban on communism other than by expressing communist sympathies in their publications. When reactions towards communism – which were in any case restricted to Stalinism – and the persecution of the Catholic Church are considered, it is only from the perspective of what that meant for these Christian progressistes in their relations with the Church. Tranvouez concentrates almost exclusively on the inner motivations and tribulations of the Christian progressistes (who, incidentally, were hardly Protestants, and intellectuals rather than workers) in their relations with the Catholic Church.

As noted earlier, the main subject of Tranvouez’s book is La Quinzaine. In its editorial committee, authors and readership this periodical reflected the different factions within Christian Progressivism. For some La Quinzaine was a continuation of the prewar periodicals La Sept (1934–1937) and especially Temps Présent (1937–1940/1944–1947); Tranvouez dedicates some very effective and well-written pages to the question of continuity and discontinuity, as well as to the exact nature and stance of Temps Présent before and after the war, particularly its stance towards fascism. However, La Quinzaine never achieved the same scope and circulation: although its dissemination was undoubtedly much greater, it had scarcely more than 6,000 subscribers, of whom a disproportionate number were intellectuals and clerics. Itself a product of the Cold War, La Quinzaine rejected the division between a communist East and a “free”, capitalist West, and expressed much sympathy with the viewpoints of the Soviet Union and the European people’s republics, while being highly critical of the USA and its presumed imperialist capitalism.

Throughout the book, the author argues that Christian Progressivism can only properly be understood as part of the missionary movement that had animated French Catholicism since the publication, in 1943, of Henri Godin and Yvan Daniel’s La France, pays de mission? In that sense, and given its antecedents in interwar neo-Thomism and personalism, Christian Progressivism was undoubtedly rooted in Catholic intransigent-ism, which rejects both liberalism and socialism and which Tranvouez apparently believes

was common to all other strands of Catholicism and in particular to Social Catholicism, a view not everybody will subscribe to: one might argue, for example, about whether it applies to postwar Christian Democracy and trade unionism. Whatever the case, Christian Progressivism came to transcend this intransigentism. While Social Catholicism opposed Christianity to the modern world and therefore aimed at Christianizing society, Christian progressistes on the contrary took the secularized environment as their starting point. They saw no conflict between their faith and the modern world (see, for example, pp. 209 ff., 248). From this perspective they did not want to build a New World under the guidance of the Church; they put their hopes in the militant workers’ movement. Recognizing the primary role of labour, they sought to be present, as Christians (hence they remain heirs of integralist or intransigent Christianity), at labour’s service. That is why they engaged fully in the (secularist) world of labour – the essence of the worker-priests – and why they shared the communist struggle. Worker-priests, for example, affiliated massively to the CGT, not the CFTC. As Father Montuclard, the most radical of the Christian progressistes Dominicans, concluded, this perspective implies that the Church renounces its spirit of conquest, that it even (temporarily perhaps) abandons its role of witness, to limit itself to being present in this new world (p. 133). Why that apparently also meant (although some doubts and differences of opinion are mentioned) almost total submission to Stalinism, by some of the most brilliant minds of their generation – individuals moreover with a profound theological education and a developed sense of social justice – remains a mystery.

Nevertheless, Christian progressistes continued to feel part of the Church, and it was that which secured their fate. The ecclesiastical hierarchy did not share their analyses, however much Christian progressistes hoped and believed they would. Tranvouez gives a case in point in the representation and (mis)use by La Quinzaine of the story of St Remi, who in order to convert Clovis “passed to the barbarians” (especially pp. 167–169). In a famous speech Mgr Chappoulie, Bishop of Anger, had explained that “passing to the barbarians” meant that the Church had to adapt in order to subsequently guide the barbarians to the Mother Church. However, La Quinzaine used this speech to argue that “passing to the barbarians” anno 1953 meant “to recognize that it is the workers’ movement [and not the church, P.P.] that puts its imprint on our time, to accept [...] the leading role of the labour movement, to put oneself firmly at its service” (quoted p. 168). However, the radical association with communism in the eyes of the Vatican condemned Christian Progressivism: evangelization was not to be sacrificed to the Marxist revolution.

Patrick Pasture

**Book Reviews**


Stjepan Radić, the founder of the Croatian Peasant Party and its leader until his assassination in 1928, was a controversial figure in his own time and remains controversial. To many, certainly the critics and even some admirers, he was often inconsistent and seemed to relish contrariness for its own sake. To others, especially advocates of the new Yugoslavia after the First World War, he was a separatist blinded by Croat nationalism and a peasantist so devoted to rural traditions that he turned his back on modernization.
Mark Biondich has gone to the sources in order to sort out the disparate threads of Radić’s thought and political activities, and, in so doing, he has revealed a pattern of ideas and actions possessing a symmetry of their own. He finds a remarkable commitment by Radić throughout his long career to three fundamental principles: Croat state right: the insistence that Croatia had a distinct historical and political development and must be independent; peasant right: the demand that the independent Croatian state represent the interests of the peasant majority and assure it of political participation and economic security; and Christian ethics: the conviction that neither an independent Croatia nor a peasant state could come into being and prosper, if they were divorced from strong religious foundations.

Radic’s strongest commitment, as Biondich makes clear, was to the Croatian peasants. They lay at the heart of all his thoughts and actions, and he was determined to make them the primary force in Croatian political life, a goal that struck him as only natural, inasmuch as they formed the great majority of the population and all other classes ultimately depended on their labor. He felt perfectly justified in identifying the peasants with the nation because the other classes – the indigenous bourgeoisie, the urban working class, and the intellectuals – were far smaller. For him, the great anomaly in Croatian political life was the predominance of the intellectuals (lawyers, teachers, civil servants) and the almost total exclusion of the peasantry. Biondich makes his efforts to shift the balance of power in favor of the peasants the central theme of his book. He is, on the whole, sympathetic to Radić but he recognizes his shortcomings, too. For example, he shows how, on the one hand, Radić prided himself on being a realist in politics, but how, on the other hand, he could be sentimental, idealizing the peasant and remaining forever emotionally attached to the village. Biondich also shows convincingly that Radić’s peasantism was infused with intense national feeling and that he knew the achievement of an independent Croatia would depend on his ability to persuade the peasants that the new state he envisioned would be theirs. He and his brother Antun founded the Croatian Peasant Party in 1904 to mobilize them and make them political beings, labors which Biondich describes in depth.

Perhaps the fundamental problem Radić had to resolve was the relationship between Croats and Serbs. Here, too, Biondich’s sympathies lie with Radić as he explains both the underlying consistency of his ideas and his frequent changes of tactics. At the heart of Radić’s thinking was his recognition that Croats and Serbs were ethnically and culturally one nation. Yet, he pointed out that they had undergone different historical experiences, the Croats attached to the Habsburgs and the Serbs under the Ottomans, facts, he insisted, that could not be ignored. Biondich shows how Radić’s thought about political organization evolved from an autonomous Croatia within a federalized Habsburg monarchy to self-determination at the end of the First World War. Radić made clear in all of this that an independent Croatia remained his ultimate goal. He thus rejected union with Serbia, particularly in the new Yugoslavia, which he thought would merely serve as a vehicle for Serb domination. Yet Biondich points out Radić’s keen grasp of reality by explaining why he abandoned his boycott of Yugoslavia and why he decided to work within the new political framework. Biondich rejects the criticism of Radić by contemporaries and, later on, scholars, who thought he should have gone to Belgrade in the early 1920s in order to help fashion a country more in keeping with his own peasantist and democratic principles. Such opinions, Biondich argues, simply ignore the hard facts of political life in Yugoslavia of the time.

The Radić who emerges from these pages is a man of singular accomplishments. First
among them, in Biondich’s view, was the creation of a national mass movement among the Croats. He made the Croat peasant a force in Croatian (and, eventually, Yugoslav) politics for the first time, by combating the traditional passivity and sense of social inferiority of the peasants and by including them in the activities of the Croatian Peasant Party at all levels. But even in this labor of love Radić has his faults. Biondich singles out Radić’s obvious violation of his own strong commitment to democratic principles by running the Croatian Peasant Party in the late 1920s in an autocratic manner and by ignoring local peasant leaders.

In this first monograph about Radić published in English, Biondich has drawn a full-length portrait of a complex man. It is an intellectual as well as a political biography, for it not only chronicles Radić’s activities, but also defines the ideological and cultural context in which he placed himself. Biondich’s work should also give impetus to the comparative study of southeastern Europe, for Radić belongs in the company of Alexander Stamboliski in Bulgaria and Ion Mihalache and Virgil Madgearu in Romania.

Keith Hitchins

Reaction of John Markoff and Gilbert Shapiro to Fred E. Schrader’s review of Revolutionary Demands

In *IRSH*, 46 (2001), pp. 91–93, Fred E. Schrader reviewed Gilbert Shapiro and John Markoff, *Revolutionary Demands. A Content Analysis of the Cahiers de Doléances of 1789* (Stanford, CA, 1998). The authors of *Revolutionary Demands* have asked for an opportunity to respond to Schrader’s review. Their comments are followed by a reply from Fred E. Schrader.

We hesitate to enter into debate with a reviewer who writes: “this research programme, and the courage, the skills and the historiographical advances it represents, deserves our respect”. But Fred Schrader’s review of our *Revolutionary Demands: A Content Analysis of the Cahiers de Doléances of 1789* raises issues of general importance about the practice of historical social science on which we have profound differences.

In *Revolutionary Demands* we describe the way in which we analysed the grievance lists produced in thousands of assemblies at the beginning of the French Revolution, present evidence on the successes and failures of that analysis as measured by several criteria, and exemplify the ways the data set can be brought to bear on a variety of issues in the study of the Revolution. One very important consideration in the use of any data and analysis method is the struggle to understand their limitations, which we went to considerable pains to indicate. There were aspects of the documents we did not code: we focused on “grievances”, broadly understood, and omitted the arguments raised in their support, except when the arguments included additional grievances. Schrader asserts, *a priori*, that the arguments are more important than the grievances. But, before we’ve studied, classified, counted, catalogued, and meditated upon both arguments and grievances, how could we possibly know that? Our suspicion is that what people collectively demand at a moment of unparalleled social crisis, high hopes and great fears, is of enormous importance. But we welcome anyone who wishes to do a similarly systematic study of argument or of anything else within the *cahiers* to marshal that body of data and show
what can thereby be explained that our studies cannot. We would be delighted to ponder how to join such new evidence with ours and to modify or reject our current conclusions; but only when the evidence comes in, not in acquiescence to some academic fashion of the moment.

Because grievances can be complex structures, our code sometimes failed to capture them fully, particularly in their relationships with one another. Some texts are ambiguous. In other cases, grievances were qualified. Some actions demanded were alternatives to other courses of action, or were somehow conditional. These complications are in no way unique to our research enterprise; on the contrary, they must be faced by anybody seeking to code or, indeed, even to read the cahiers or any other complex documents. It is largely for this reason that we developed a two-step procedure. The first step is the coding, performed, not surprisingly, by coders; the second step is retrieval or scaling, performed later by analysts. The coders’ task is to translate, not analyse, the grievances from French into the artificial language of the code. In doing so, they not only indicate the subject of the grievance, and the action demanded by the assembly; they also record the ambiguities, conditions, alternatives, and so forth they find attached to the grievance. In the second step, analysts armed with the appropriate computer programs can include or exclude such qualified grievances according to their objectives and best judgment. In addition, the recording of qualifying remarks permits us to measure the extent of threats to the validity of the coding posed by the complexity of the document, to know empirically the importance of these considerations rather than make guesses about them. Moreover, we facilitate a return to the original text – every code carries an indication of where to find the original grievance – so that a user can go off and read that text and look for what our codes omit. One of the studies in the book in fact uses our code essentially as an index to find discussions of the King, whose rhetoric is then examined.

Analysts interested in the frequency with which some group, such as the parishes, discuss a subject, such as the salt tax, may well decide to include all qualified demands. After all, when a demand is qualified it is, nevertheless, a demand about the subject. On the other hand, those studying only demands for the abolition of the salt tax, might reasonably decide to exclude some or all of the qualified demands. The studies reported in Part 4 of our book reflect such analytical procedures. We regard this as an important innovation in the methodology of content analysis, but Schrader criticizes us as if no such qualifications were recorded by the coder, and as if there were no second step of analysis, claiming that such complexities are “stripped away by the coders”.

We call attention to these features of our procedures that are unappreciated or overlooked by Schrader in order to raise the more general question of how to deal with the inadequacy of analytic categories to fully capture all the interesting complexities of social reality. Schrader, drawing on the evidence on that subject that we provided, calls attention to the shortfall of our categories to pronounce failure. Our view is that this is neither enough nor helpful. We attempt to measure the degree and the nature of such failure, and to provide tools for reducing it.

In this review, moreover, there is an implicit perfectionism that we must reject. We are urged to accept that if important aspects of reality are omitted, a research enterprise is thereby deeply tainted: if we omit aspects of discourse, or material other than grievances, we must be producing results of no value at all. We submit that all research omits, all decisions to study something are decisions not to study something else, and on Schrader’s principles there could be no research whatsoever. That our research does not
discover everything worth knowing in no way implies that it discovers nothing worth knowing.

Finally, we want to comment on Schrader’s general reservations about projects like ours, in which one risks starting with the wrong questions, in which “results are never exactly what you expected”. We see these as virtues, not vices. When we set out to count what the French asked for at the start of this world-historical upheaval, we did not anticipate some of what we found. So much the better. And, we suggest, it is precisely a flexible code like ours, lacunae and all, that permits researchers to ask new questions of the data, without, as Schrader fears, “having to start all over again”.

Gilbert Shapiro and John Markoff

Reply by Fred E. Schrader

Criticism of a review only makes sense if the review represents an academic mistrial. This is definitively not the case here. Inaccurate, this criticism is also accompanied by an elegant gesture of seigniorial dismissiveness.

The reviewer explicitly stressed the historiographical progress achieved by the work of Markoff and Shapiro. There was no mention of or allusion to “failure”. But this did not, of course, exclude the introduction of aspects, questions and perspectives from different and complementary approaches to social history. After twenty years of insignificant archive and database research using the cahiers and similar documents from the ancien régime to the Revolution, and in line with the conclusions of other historians and sociologists, the reviewer merely humbly reminded readers of the historical importance of and the historiographical challenge presented by those “complex structures” and “ambiguous texts” which “our code sometimes failed to capture”, as the authors themselves admit in their criticism.

This is miles away from any a priori assertion, and even further from any “acquiescence to some academic fashion of the moment” – a remarkably undistinguished remark made by distinguished scholars – or from “implicit perfectionism”, as Markoff and Shapiro allege. “Profound differences” exist only in their imagination. It is evident, too, that there are no “general reservations about projects like ours”, as the reviewer clearly expressed his passion for this kind of research, to which he (and other colleagues) aim to contribute materially. Trial and error are just part of the job. There is absolutely no “fear” of starting all over again (why should there be?). On the contrary, such trial and error remain (fortunately) a quite reasonable habit of innovative research.

The polemical tones introduced by Markoff and Shapiro are of no scholarly use. The subject is serious and interesting enough to deserve professional discussion and debate, including a simple transatlantic look at the bibliographies and lists of work in progress offered by the relevant associations for research into the eighteenth century and the French Revolution. And it is up to the academic community to wonder and reflect on why Markoff and Shapiro absolutely insist on criticizing a sincerely positive review of their work.

Fred E. Schrader