**Reacting to the Olive Branch:**

**Hawks, Doves, and Public Support for Cooperation**

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# Appendix A: Research Process

Our research note presents results from two pre-registered survey experiments.[[1]](#footnote-1) To maximize expositional clarity and brevity, results from these experiments are reported in the opposite order of how the experiments were conducted. We describe here how the research unfolded and the logic for presenting results in a different order.

We preregistered and fielded the U.S.-Weak study in April 2021. Upon analyzing the data, we found support for the doves’ international advantage thesis (H1) in the costly gesture treatment, but not the low-cost gesture one. We were puzzled because this finding runs counter to theoretical logic and intuition.[[2]](#footnote-2) The puzzle was deepened by the fact that, as H1a predicts, respondents perceived foreign doves to be significantly more sincere than foreign hawks and, as H2a predicts, the gap in perceptions of sincerity was significantly larger for the low-cost gesture condition than the costly gesture one. While there was a significant gap in perceptions of sincerity, we found that perceptions of sincerity did not affect willingness to reciprocate in the low-cost gesture treatment but perceptions of sincerity were a strong predictor of willingness to reciprocate in the costly gesture treatment.

In light of these findings, we considered the possibility that we had chosen a scenario where cooperation was so uniformly undesirable in the low-cost gesture treatment that we induced a so-called “floor effect”. Indeed, support for reciprocation was substantially lower in the low-cost gesture treatment— 18% compared to 44% in the costly gesture treatment. We concluded that the likely cause of the reticence to cooperate in the low-cost scenario was the fact that, even with the conciliatory gesture, Russia kept its power advantage in the Arctic—Russia would have eight bases compared to the U.S.’s seven. Under these conditions, American respondents may be so overwhelmingly unwilling to reciprocate the Russian gesture that other aspects of the scenario, such as the foreign leader’s type, do not matter. Moreover, this issue could have influenced our findings about how gesture strength moderates dovishness: in the costly gesture treatment, the gesture would flip the balance of power, meaning that dovishness could (counter to our prediction) matter more*,* not less.

To examine whether this design choice had introduced a “floor effect”, we preregistered and fielded a second study (referred to as U.S.-Strong study in the manuscript) in May 2021. This study was designed to test the same hypotheses as the first study using an experimental scenario in which the U.S. starts off as the more powerful party in the Arctic and maintains its power advantage relative to Russia irrespective of Russia’s gesture. Otherwise, the two scenarios were nearly identical.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Our May PAP amendment specified how we would treat conclusions of this second study: “If we still do not find support for the dove’s advantage in the weak gesture condition in our revised experimental scenario, this would suggest that the dove’s advantage is weak and inconsistent (reinforcing the conclusion we draw from our original experiment). If we do find support for the dove’s advantage in the weak gesture treatment, this would suggest that the dove’s advantage depends not only on the size of the signal but also the distribution of power, and that a dovish foreign leader only has a peacemaking advantage when cooperation is already relatively attractive.”[[4]](#footnote-4) As we report in our research note, in the second study (referred to as U.S.-Strong study in the manuscript), we found support for the doves’ international advantage thesis both when Russia made a low-cost and a costly gesture. Combining findings from both studies, we concluded that the doves’ advantage emerges only when cooperation would not leave the U.S. in a position of weakness.[[5]](#footnote-5)

When writing up our findings, we found that describing our studies and conclusions in chronological order would not only require a lot of space (since we would have to narrate our thinking) but could also be confusing to readers. We instead opted to present the studies in the order that best clarified the substantive conclusions that readers would likely care about the most.

# Appendix B: External Validity

## B-1: Are Leaders of U.S. Rival States Ever Doves, and Do Voters Perceive Them As Such?

Our experiment finds that, holding constant the conciliatory gesture of a foreign rival, domestic audiences are more likely to want to reciprocate if the foreign leader is a dove rather than a hawk. One might wonder whether these results shed light on real-world dynamics for two related reasons. First, perhaps rival states are never led by doves: given the potential for hostility in rivalry relationships, foreign rivals may select for hawkish leaders (e.g. Colaresi 2004; Snyder 1989). Second, even if doves do sometimes attain office in rival countries, domestic audiences may not view them as doves— cognitive biases might make it difficult to see the leader of a hostile state as someone who seeks cooperation and compromise. If either foreign rivals do not have dovish leaders or dovish leaders of rival states are systematically seen as hawks, then the external validity of our experiment would be in question, since there would be no such thing as a dovish leader of a rival state (in the eyes of the public).

### Are the Leaders of U.S. Rival States Ever Dovish?

To address these possibilities, we first checked whether rival states of the United States—the focus of our study—were ever led by doves. Given the threat presented by superior U.S. military capabilities, U.S. rivals may be especially likely to select for hawkish leaders. We relied on a new measure of leader hawkishness/dovishness developed by Carter and Smith (2020).[[6]](#footnote-6) The idea behind their measure is to assess hawkishness/dovishness based on various background characteristics at the time the leader takes office, i.e. before any conflict behavior has been observed. Of the 10 leaders in power in the USSR/Russia between 1945-2004, four fell on the dovish side of the hawk-dove spectrum; of the six Chinese leaders between 1945-2004, one was a dove; of the four Iranian leaders between 1979-2004, two were on the dovish end of the spectrum; and of the two North Korean leaders between 1945-2004, one scored as more dovish. So, while there are more hawks among the leaders of these rival states, at times each of these rival states was led by a dove.

### Do U.S. Voters Perceive Foreign Doves as Doves? The Case of Gorbachev

The next question is whether, if a foreign leader of a rival state is a dove, domestic audiences correctly perceive this leader as a dove. Domestic audiences may discount evidence of a dovish disposition because that would not fit with the image of the rival country and/or because domestic elites might conceal information about the other side’s dovishness from the public. Examining this possibility requires us to research perceptions of individual foreign doves. As a plausibility probe, we therefore explored how Americans perceived, and the U.S. media and elites presented, an important foreign dove, namely Mikhail Gorbachev early in this tenure, *before* the rapprochement bore fruit (i.e. before the December 1987 INF Treaty). Gorbachev is an appropriate choice for a mini case study, given our experimental focus on U.S.-Russia relations and because Gorbachev is considered a dove based on the Carter and Smith measure.

Before taking over as General Secretary in March 1985, Gorbachev had served as the Soviet Union’s No. 2. In this role, he had presented himself as someone willing to reform the Soviet Union domestically and to seek greater cooperation with the West. At a widely reported speech at the British House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in December 1984, Gorbachev called for a “radical reduction” in nuclear and conventional arms. He stated that “The Soviet Union does not encroach upon the security of any country, East or West. We want to live in peace with all countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different sociopolitical systems.”[[7]](#footnote-7) During his visit, he also met Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who famously declared “I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together.” Thatcher’s comments and Gorbachev’s expressed desire for stricter arms control were widely reported in the U.S. press (e.g. Knobel 1991, 82).

Gorbachev’s elevation to the top Soviet position in March 1985 also received significant attention in the U.S. media, with commentators characterizing the transition as “from one generation to another, new era”, “the old guard out, the new guard in”, and “a new post-war Soviet generation (Knobel 1991, 104).” A White House official commented that “there’s some underlying feeling here that he [Gorbachev] is more likely […] to put together over time a regime inclined to constructive relations with the U.S.”[[8]](#footnote-8) Experts and opinion writers in the major news outlets, however, were mixed in their assessment of the potential for positive change.[[9]](#footnote-9)

As a result of the media coverage Gorbachev received, both he and his more dovish positions were already well-known shortly after he took office. In an ABC News/Washington Post poll from March 1985, the month Gorbachev took power, 70% of respondents said that they had heard or read about him.[[10]](#footnote-10) Initial polls also showed that the U.S. public was favorably inclined toward Gorbachev. Already in March, a Louis Harris & Associates poll showed 63% of respondents agreeing that Gorbachev is “likely to ease tensions between the U.S. and Russia.”[[11]](#footnote-11) The same survey also found 53% of respondents agreeing that Gorbachev “can be more trusted than other Russian leaders.” In May 1985, a USA Today poll showed that 72% of respondents evaluated Gorbachev succeeding Chernenko as either “very” or “somewhat” positive.[[12]](#footnote-12) An NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll in November 1985 showed that the majority of respondents (55%) thought that Gorbachev “may be easier for the United States to get along with” compared to previous Soviet leaders.[[13]](#footnote-13) The same month an ABC News/Washington Post poll showed that 56% of respondents believed Gorbachev “wants to make progress in arms control.”[[14]](#footnote-14) Also in November 1985, a CBS/New York Times poll found that 47% of respondents thought of Gorbachev “as different from previous Soviet leaders.”[[15]](#footnote-15) In fact, “the positive press coverage given to Gorbachev in his earliest days as General Secretary […] was seen by the White House as an indicator of the public’s positive view of the new Soviet leader (Knobel 1991, 25).” Gorbachev became popular enough to lead the Reagan administraion to try to “neutralize” his popularity (Knobel 1991, abstract).[[16]](#footnote-16)

Opinion polls were not uniformly positive, however. For example, a Newsweek/Gallup poll from November 1985 showed respondents almosy equally split on whether Gorbachev was “more interested in peace” (39%) or “interested about the same” (37%) compared to previous leaders.[[17]](#footnote-17) A March 1985 poll also showed that the majority of respondents expected the relationship between the US and the USSR to stay the same.[[18]](#footnote-18) Apart from wording and sample differences between these polls and those previously reported, part of the explanation may be that all of these polls reflect respondent attitudes at a time when Gorbachev had yet to make his more high-profile statements and actions that identified him as a dove. His rhetoric and gestures became stronger, i.e. more clearly dovish, over time. A month after taking office, in April 1985, he declared a one-sided freeze on intermediate range ballistic missiles deployments and in July 1985 he followed up with a moratorium on nuclear testing.[[19]](#footnote-19) In November 1985, he held his first joint summit with President Reagan in Geneva. At the 27th Party Congress in February1986, Gorbachev first publicly proposed “perestroika” and “glasnost,” indicating plans for substantial change in the Soviet Union itself. In October that year, at the Reykjavik summit, Gorbachev made generous concessions on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces, although the summit did not produce an agreement because of U.S. reluctance to give up the SDI project. Eventually, however, in December 1987, his efforts led to the first tangible mutual agreement with the U.S., the INF treaty.

In his first few years in office, Gorbachev’s statements and gestures reinforced the public’s perception of him. The New York Times summarized a poll from November 1987, i.e. before the INF agreement was concluded: “The unremitting campaign by the Soviet leader to portray himself and his country as the champions of warmer, more open relations with the United States has persuaded two-thirds of the public that he is unlike his predecessors in the Kremlin. That effort may have made him more popular here than any leader in Moscow since World War II, when Stalin, a key wartime ally, was portrayed in the American press as a cozy ‘Uncle Joe.'”[[20]](#footnote-20)

It is noteworthy that, while already quite early on Gorbachev was able to establish a positive reputation for himself, views of the Soviet Union did not move in tandem. Several scholars of public opinion at the time point to a split between the favorable views of Gorbachev and the relatively unchanging and more skeptical views of the Soviet Union (e.g. Hassner 1988, 96-97; Hinckley 1989, 245; Russett 1990/1991, 536). Knobel (1991, 345) writes: “Almost paradoxically, Americans seemed to like Gorbachev but distrust ‘the Soviets’.” This split between opinion about Gorbachev and the Soviet Union suggests that the public can and does make a difference between leaders and the states they represent. Overall, the evidence for the Gorbachev case suggests that it is possible for leaders of even a highly distrusted rival to distinguigh themselves from their predecessors and to be viewed as a someone with dovish leanings who can help ease tensions.

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## B-2: Real-World Examples of Dove Successes and Hawk Failures of Rapprochement

### Successful Rapprochement Efforts by Doves:

* In 2014, President Obama, widely viewed as a dove based on his early statements and actions, initiated the normalization of relations with Cuba by agreeing to a long-awaited prisoner swap.
* In the 1970s, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, a dove according to the Carter and Smith (2020) data, pursued the so-called “Ostpolitik” which led to the normalization of relations with Eastern Europe.
* In the 1980s, South Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung, also a dove according to Carter and Smith’s (2020) measure, decided to engage North Korea as part of what became known as the “Sunshine Policy.” The détente between the two countries ended in the mid-2000s as a result of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests. In recent years, President Moon Jae-in, often viewed as a dove because of his rhetoric and because he served as an aide to Kim Dae-jung, has sought to revive the “Sunshine Policy.”
* In addition to examples from democracies, there are also cases of dovish leaders of non-democratic states who delivered the olive branch. A high-profile example is certainly Gorbachev, whom we discuss at length in Appendix B-1. Another example is Iran’s Rouhani who immediately upon assuming office expressed a clear willingness to cooperate with the U.S., launched a public relations campaign involving op-eds, interviews, and tweets, to convey this desire, and was successful at bringing about negotiations with the U.S. which ultimately led to the Iran Nuclear Deal.

### Failed Rapprochement by Hawks:

* While the peace overtures that Iran’s President Rouhani, a dove, made upon assuming office were well-received by the U.S. and led to quick-paced negotiations on the JCPOA, an earlier outreach by Rouhani’s predecessor, President Ahmadinejad had failed. Known for combative speeches at the UN General Assembly, including verbal attacks on the U.S. and Israel, his denial of the Holocaust, and violently squashing the 2009 protests, President Ahmadinejad was widely perceived as a hawk. Ahmadinejad congratulated President Obama on his 2008 election and, in 2010, he wrote a lengthy letter proposing that the U.S. cooperate with Iran. The White House responded coldly: “We have no plans to respond to the letter because there was nothing to respond to.”[[21]](#footnote-21) A prior letter by President Ahmadinejad to President Bush in 2006 had also failed to produce an opening.
* Soviet leader Brezhnev’s early 1981 overtures to improve relations with the U.S. failed to persuade President Reagan. Brezhnev is coded as a hawk in the Carter and Smith (2020) data and, despite having been one of the architects of the détente, the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan likely reinforced his hawkish reputation. White House Press Secretary Brady noted that President Reagan viewed Brezhnev’s offer to hold a summit with interest, but that it could be a “ploy.”[[22]](#footnote-22) In an interview, President Reagan articulated preconditions for a summit meeting, demanding more costly signals from Brezhnev, and hedged that he would need to talk to U.S. allies first (Fisher 1997, 481-482). The summit never happened.
* Cuban President Fidel Castro’s 1964 attempt to improve relations with the U.S. also failed. Castro is of course commonly viewed as a hawk and is coded as such by Carter and Smith (2020). In a New York Times interview, Castro offered to halt aid to revolutionary movements in Latin America. He also admitted that both Cuba and the U.S. were to be blamed for the conflict and that Americans who had been expropriated by Cuba had a legitimate claim to compensation.[[23]](#footnote-23) His overture was quickly rebuffed. Administration officials thought “Dr. Castro's statements [were] designed to give an appearance of reasonableness and conciliation to his regime.” They did not “believe that Dr. Castro would willingly abandon the subversive campaigns unless it was overwhelmingly in his interest to do so.”[[24]](#footnote-24) As in the Brezhnev case, the U.S. was skeptical of the sincerity of the overture and demanded that Castro back up his words with acts.
* A particularly consequential failure of rapprochement efforts occurred between China and India in 1959-1960, before their 1963 war. At the time, China was led by Mao Tse-Tung, undoubtedly a hawk and identified as such by Carter and Smith (2020). Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, told India’s Prime Minister that China wanted to resolve the border problems peacefully and, while unwilling to officially acknowledge the McMahon Line, would not cross it. Nehru rejected an agreement on these terms, because he believed that this would open India up to additional demands by China. He believed that the Chinese leadership was “duplicitous” and “could not be trusted” (Raghavan 2006, 3889-3890).

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# Appendix C: Supporting Tables for Main Analyses

This appendix presents full tables for the analyses shown in the manuscript: the main results, the sincerity mediator, gesture strength, and perceptions of sincerity at different levels of gesture strength. The dependent variable is “reciprocate.”

## Table C-1: Effect of Foreign Dove on Support for Reciprocation, Low-Cost Gesture

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|  | U.S.-Strong, no controls | U.S.-Strong, w/ controls | U.S.-Weak, no controls | U.S.-Weak, w/ controls |
| *Foreign Dove* | *15.74\*\*\** | *14.96\*\*\** | *2.886* | *2.822* |
|  | *(2.924)* | *(2.823)* | *(2.228)* | *(2.319)* |
| U.S. Hawk |  | 2.097 |  | -1.624 |
|  |  | (2.821) |  | (2.315) |
| U.S. Democrat |  | -3.252 |  | -2.007 |
|  |  | (2.846) |  | (2.319) |
| Political Ideology |  | -15.54\*\* |  | -3.236 |
|  |  | (6.663) |  | (5.056) |
| Party ID |  | 0.575 |  | -3.947 |
|  |  | (5.030) |  | (3.984) |
| Male |  | 12.92\*\*\* |  | 3.699 |
|  |  | (2.895) |  | (2.414) |
| Age |  | 0.0801 |  | -0.0162 |
|  |  | (0.0921) |  | (0.0757) |
| White |  | 1.697 |  | 1.050 |
|  |  | (3.499) |  | (2.819) |
| Education |  | 9.381\* |  | -2.648 |
|  |  | (4.907) |  | (4.252) |
| Political Interest |  | 7.750 |  | -2.114 |
|  |  | (5.111) |  | (4.048) |
| Participation |  | -13.82\* |  | -15.15\*\* |
|  |  | (7.927) |  | (6.302) |
| Religiosity |  | -15.32\*\*\* |  | -0.252 |
|  |  | (3.931) |  | (3.236) |
| Internationalism |  | -11.81\*\* |  | 0.516 |
|  |  | (4.898) |  | (4.120) |
| Hawkishness |  | -38.00\*\*\* |  | -22.40\*\*\* |
|  |  | (6.963) |  | (5.678) |
| Trust in Foreign States |  | -3.633 |  | 0.894 |
|  |  | (3.725) |  | (2.922) |
| Constant | 29.95\*\*\* | 57.12\*\*\* | 17.01\*\*\* | 37.61\*\*\* |
|  | (2.018) | (7.372) | (1.545) | (5.987) |
| Observations | 1,071 | 1,046 | 1,212 | 1,138 |
| R-squared | 0.026 | 0.136 | 0.001 | 0.033 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table C-2: Sincerity Mediator in the U.S.-Strong Study, Low-Cost Gesture, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Sincerity, no controls | Model 2:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Sincerity, w/ controls | Model 3:  Effect of Sincerity on Reciprocate, w/controls |
| *Foreign Dove* | *30.77\*\*\** | *31.39\*\*\** | *9.923\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.905)* | *(2.909)* | *(2.939)* |
| U.S. Hawk |  | 4.626 | 1.355 |
|  |  | (2.907) | (2.787) |
| U.S. Democrat |  | 0.565 | -3.342 |
|  |  | (2.932) | (2.808) |
| Political Ideology |  | 1.665 | -15.80\*\* |
|  |  | (6.865) | (6.575) |
| Party ID |  | -6.658 | 1.643 |
|  |  | (5.182) | (4.967) |
| Male |  | 8.443\*\*\* | 11.57\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.983) | (2.868) |
| Age |  | -0.139 | 0.102 |
|  |  | (0.0949) | (0.0910) |
| White |  | -3.383 | 2.240 |
|  |  | (3.606) | (3.454) |
| Education |  | 5.012 | 8.577\* |
|  |  | (5.056) | (4.844) |
| Political Interest |  | 11.62\*\* | 5.886 |
|  |  | (5.265) | (5.055) |
| Participation |  | 0.787 | -13.94\* |
|  |  | (8.168) | (7.822) |
| Religiosity |  | -2.036 | -14.99\*\*\* |
|  |  | (4.051) | (3.880) |
| Internationalism |  | 1.611 | -12.07\*\* |
|  |  | (5.047) | (4.834) |
| Hawkishness |  | 2.199 | -38.35\*\*\* |
|  |  | (7.174) | (6.871) |
| Trust in Foreign States |  | 7.593\*\* | -4.851 |
|  |  | (3.838) | (3.682) |
| Sincerity |  |  | 0.160\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0298) |
| Constant | 39.04\*\*\* | 30.77\*\*\* | 52.18\*\*\* |
|  | (2.005) | (7.595) | (7.331) |
| Observations | 1,071 | 1,046 | 1,046 |
| R-squared | 0.095 | 0.130 | 0.159 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## 

## Table C-3: Sincerity Mediator in the U.S.-Weak Study, Low-Cost Gesture, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Sincerity, no controls | Model 2:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Sincerity, w/ controls | Model 3:  Effect of Sincerity on Reciprocate, w/controls |
| *Foreign Dove* | *30.68\*\*\** | *31.33\*\*\** | *1.409* |
|  | *(2.737)* | *(2.765)* | *(2.446)* |
| U.S. Hawk |  | 4.248 | -1.815 |
|  |  | (2.760) | (2.315) |
| U.S. Democrat |  | -2.539 | -1.893 |
|  |  | (2.765) | (2.317) |
| Political Ideology |  | 3.451 | -3.391 |
|  |  | (6.028) | (5.051) |
| Party ID |  | -0.621 | -3.919 |
|  |  | (4.751) | (3.981) |
| Male |  | 9.163\*\*\* | 3.286 |
|  |  | (2.879) | (2.423) |
| Age |  | -0.0681 | -0.0132 |
|  |  | (0.0903) | (0.0757) |
| White |  | 0.660 | 1.021 |
|  |  | (3.361) | (2.816) |
| Education |  | 2.337 | -2.753 |
|  |  | (5.069) | (4.248) |
| Political Interest |  | 16.30\*\*\* | -2.849 |
|  |  | (4.827) | (4.065) |
| Participation |  | -13.38\* | -14.55\*\* |
|  |  | (7.514) | (6.304) |
| Religiosity |  | 5.906 | -0.518 |
|  |  | (3.859) | (3.237) |
| Internationalism |  | 8.910\* | 0.115 |
|  |  | (4.912) | (4.122) |
| Hawkishness |  | -10.35 | -21.93\*\*\* |
|  |  | (6.770) | (5.678) |
| Trust in Foreign States |  | 9.584\*\*\* | 0.462 |
|  |  | (3.484) | (2.929) |
| Sincerity |  |  | 0.0451\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0250) |
| Constant | 36.72\*\*\* | 18.88\*\*\* | 36.76\*\*\* |
|  | (1.898) | (7.138) | (6.000) |
| Observations | 1,212 | 1,138 | 1,138 |
| R-squared | 0.094 | 0.148 | 0.036 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Mediation Analysis: Sincerity Mediator**

We carried out a mediation analysis using the procedures developed by Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2011). The table below shows that sincerity was a significant mediator for the effect of foreign doves in the U.S.-Strong study but not the U.S.-Weak study (in both cases, focusing on the low-cost gesture as described in the PAP).

## Table C-4: Summary of Mediation Analysis for Sincerity Mediator

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | U.S.-Strong Study, Low-Cost Gesture | U.S.-Weak Study, Low-Cost Gesture |
| Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) | 5.0  (3.1­ – 7.2) | 1.4  (-.07 ­– 3.0) |
| Direct Effect (through other causal pathways) | 10.0  (4.1 – 15.7) | 1.5  (-3.5 ­– 6.2) |
| Total Effect | 15.0  (9.3 ­– ­20.4) | 2.8  (-1.9 – 7.3) |

Note: cells show mean, followed by 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

## Table C-5: Gesture Strength and the Effect of Foreign Dove, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1: | Model 2: | Model 3: | Model 4: |
|  | U.S.-Strong, no controls | U.S.-Strong, w/ controls | U.S.-Weak,  no controls | U.S.-Weak,  w/ controls |
| *Foreign Dove X Low-Cost* | *45.69\*\*\** | *64.83\*\*\** | *19.90\*\*\** | *36.52\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.154)* | *(5.473)* | *(1.839)* | *(5.014)* |
| *Foreign Dove X Costly* | *50.53\*\*\** | *69.56\*\*\** | *46.77\*\*\** | *66.27\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.048)* | *(5.452)* | *(1.831)* | *(5.033)* |
| *Foreign Hawk X Low-Cost* | *29.95\*\*\** | *49.98\*\*\** | *17.01\*\*\** | *33.47\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.053)* | *(5.395)* | *(1.771)* | *(4.999)* |
| *Foreign Hawk X Costly* | *38.84\*\*\** | *57.78\*\*\** | *40.75\*\*\** | *59.27\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.072)* | *(5.418)* | *(1.830)* | *(5.021)* |
| U.S. Hawk |  | 1.299 |  | -3.355\* |
|  |  | (2.005) |  | (1.872) |
| U.S. Democrat |  | -1.592 |  | 0.677 |
|  |  | (2.008) |  | (1.872) |
| Political Ideology |  | -13.92\*\*\* |  | -7.181\* |
|  |  | (4.581) |  | (4.113) |
| Party ID |  | -1.199 |  | 3.525 |
|  |  | (3.471) |  | (3.168) |
| Male |  | 9.647\*\*\* |  | 4.747\*\* |
|  |  | (2.070) |  | (1.942) |
| Age |  | 0.206\*\*\* |  | 0.139\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0660) |  | (0.0621) |
| White |  | 1.166 |  | -2.008 |
|  |  | (2.553) |  | (2.299) |
| Education |  | 12.34\*\*\* |  | -1.566 |
|  |  | (3.552) |  | (3.384) |
| Political Interest |  | 8.772\*\* |  | 4.732 |
|  |  | (3.559) |  | (3.267) |
| Participation |  | -17.45\*\*\* |  | -11.49\*\* |
|  |  | (5.613) |  | (5.184) |
| Religiosity |  | -16.64\*\*\* |  | -4.636\* |
|  |  | (2.824) |  | (2.678) |
| Internationalism |  | -13.14\*\*\* |  | -5.818\* |
|  |  | (3.494) |  | (3.308) |
| Hawkishness |  | -34.74\*\*\* |  | -28.26\*\*\* |
|  |  | (4.928) |  | (4.537) |
| Trust in Foreign States |  | -1.541 |  | 3.269 |
|  |  | (2.613) |  | (2.375) |
| Observations | 2,186 | 2,135 | 2,389 | 2,219 |
| R-squared | 0.427 | 0.490 | 0.363 | 0.408 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Quantities of interest* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Dove Adv w/ Costly Gesture | 11.69\*\*\*  (2.9) | 11.78\*\*\*  (2.81) | 6.02\*\*  (2.59) | 7.00\*\*\*  (2.68) |
| Dove Adv w/ Low-Cost Gesture | 15.74\*\*\*  (2.98) | 14.85\*\*\*  (2.86) | 2.89  (2.55) | 3.05  (2.61) |
| Difference in Dove Adv | -04.05  (4.16) | -3.07  (4.01) | 3.14  (3.64) | 3.95  (3.74) |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table C-6: Differences in Perceptions of Sincerity of Foreign Hawks and Doves Across Different Gesture Strengths, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  U.S.-Strong,  no controls | Model 2:  U.S.-Strong,  w/ controls | Model 3:  U.S.-Weak,  no controls | Model 4:  U.S.-Weak,  w/ controls |
| *Foreign Dove X Low-Cost* | 69.80\*\*\* | 60.97\*\*\* | 67.41\*\*\* | 53.44\*\*\* |
|  | (2.100) | (5.517) | (1.990) | (5.310) |
| *Foreign Dove X Costly* | 71.99\*\*\* | 62.54\*\*\* | 66.84\*\*\* | 55.59\*\*\* |
|  | (1.997) | (5.495) | (1.982) | (5.330) |
| *Foreign Hawk X Low-Cost* | 39.04\*\*\* | 29.55\*\*\* | 36.72\*\*\* | 22.17\*\*\* |
|  | (2.002) | (5.438) | (1.916) | (5.294) |
| *Foreign Hawk X Costly* | 44.28\*\*\* | 34.89\*\*\* | 45.84\*\*\* | 33.20\*\*\* |
|  | (2.020) | (5.461) | (1.980) | (5.318) |
| U.S. Hawk |  | 2.410 |  | -0.0902 |
|  |  | (2.021) |  | (1.983) |
| U.S. Democrat |  | 0.914 |  | -1.285 |
|  |  | (2.024) |  | (1.982) |
| Political Ideology |  | -0.891 |  | 1.155 |
|  |  | (4.618) |  | (4.356) |
| Party ID |  | -8.337\*\* |  | -2.645 |
|  |  | (3.499) |  | (3.355) |
| Male |  | 7.831\*\*\* |  | 7.567\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.087) |  | (2.057) |
| Age |  | -0.0664 |  | 0.0187 |
|  |  | (0.0665) |  | (0.0658) |
| White |  | 0.757 |  | 2.678 |
|  |  | (2.574) |  | (2.435) |
| Education |  | 3.630 |  | -1.402 |
|  |  | (3.580) |  | (3.585) |
| Political Interest |  | 7.783\*\* |  | 16.60\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.587) |  | (3.460) |
| Participation |  | 2.720 |  | -2.974 |
|  |  | (5.658) |  | (5.490) |
| Religiosity |  | -0.156 |  | 1.526 |
|  |  | (2.847) |  | (2.836) |
| Internationalism |  | 1.085 |  | 8.157\*\* |
|  |  | (3.522) |  | (3.504) |
| Hawkishness |  | 0.636 |  | -11.43\*\* |
|  |  | (4.968) |  | (4.805) |
| Trust in Foreign States |  | 12.48\*\*\* |  | 9.705\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.634) |  | (2.515) |
| Observations | 2,186 | 2,135 | 2,389 | 2,219 |
| R-squared | 0.599 | 0.623 | 0.572 | 0.628 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Quantities of interest* |  |  |  |  |
| Dove Adv w/ Costly Gesture | 27.70\*\*\*  (2.84) | 27.65\*\*\*  (2.83) | 21.00\*\*\*  (2.80) | 22.39\*\*\*  (2.84) |
| Dove Adv w/ Low-Cost Gesture | 30.77\*\*\*  (2.90) | 31.42\*\*\*  (2.89) | 30.68\*\*\*  (2.76) | 31.26\*\*\*  (2.77) |
| Difference in Dove Adv | -3.06  (4.06) | -3.77  (4.04) | -9.69\*\*  (3.93) | -8.88\*\*  (3.96) |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table C-7: Effect of Perceptions of Sincerity on Support for Reciprocation, Costly Gesture

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  U.S.-Strong,  w/ controls | Model 2:  U.S.-Weak,  w/ controls |
| *Sincerity* | *0.229\*\*\** | *0.217\*\*\** |
|  | *(0.0301)* | *(0.0311)* |
| Foreign Dove | 5.372\* | 2.876 |
|  | (2.914) | (2.972) |
| U.S. Hawk | 0.243 | -3.584 |
|  | (2.792) | (2.900) |
| U.S. Democrat | -0.498 | 3.642 |
|  | (2.785) | (2.890) |
| Political Ideology | -12.43\*\* | -10.92\* |
|  | (6.214) | (6.404) |
| Party ID | 0.0782 | 12.45\*\* |
|  | (4.716) | (4.826) |
| Male | 5.123\* | 5.118\* |
|  | (2.906) | (2.996) |
| Age | 0.329\*\*\* | 0.284\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0924) | (0.0978) |
| White | -0.622 | -5.998\* |
|  | (3.652) | (3.595) |
| Education | 14.17\*\*\* | 1.821 |
|  | (5.058) | (5.149) |
| Political Interest | 8.614\* | 8.127 |
|  | (4.861) | (5.076) |
| Participation | -20.86\*\*\* | -9.551 |
|  | (7.826) | (8.199) |
| Religiosity | -18.39\*\*\* | -9.267\*\* |
|  | (3.967) | (4.249) |
| Internationalism | -14.59\*\*\* | -14.80\*\*\* |
|  | (4.893) | (5.099) |
| Hawkishness | -30.39\*\*\* | -31.80\*\*\* |
|  | (6.826) | (6.964) |
| Trust in Foreign States | -3.027 | 3.876 |
|  | (3.638) | (3.718) |
| Constant | 43.04\*\*\* | 46.26\*\*\* |
|  | (7.319) | (7.578) |
| Observations | 1,089 | 1,081 |
| R-squared | 0.168 | 0.117 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# Appendix D: Supplemental Analyses

This appendix presents supplemental analyses, including results using the alternative dependent variable (i.e., number of bases); results when we include only subjects who passed at least 85 percent of the post-treatment attention checks; and analyses by subgroups. (The analysis by subgroups is not in our PAP. We include it here based on a reviewer request.)

## Table D-1: Effect of Foreign Dove on Number of Bases, Low-Cost Gesture

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  U.S.-Strong, no controls | Model 2: U.S.-Strong, w/ controls | Model 3:  U.S.-Weak, no controls | Model 4:  U.S.-Weak, w/ controls |
| *Foreign Dove* | *-0.370\*\** | *-0.378\*\** | *-0.002* | *-0.143* |
|  | *(0.179)* | *(0.169)* | *(0.161)* | *(0.141)* |
| U.S. Hawk |  | -0.263 |  | 0.0783 |
|  |  | (0.169) |  | (0.141) |
| U.S. Democrat |  | 0.273 |  | -0.224 |
|  |  | (0.171) |  | (0.141) |
| Political Ideology |  | 0.398 |  | 0.102 |
|  |  | (0.399) |  | (0.307) |
| Party ID |  | 0.0189 |  | -0.158 |
|  |  | (0.301) |  | (0.242) |
| Male |  | -0.182 |  | 0.247\* |
|  |  | (0.174) |  | (0.147) |
| Age |  | -0.0115\*\* |  | -0.0240\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.00552) |  | (0.00460) |
| White |  | -0.0840 |  | 0.291\* |
|  |  | (0.210) |  | (0.171) |
| Education |  | -0.319 |  | 0.436\* |
|  |  | (0.294) |  | (0.258) |
| Political Interest |  | -0.179 |  | 0.327 |
|  |  | (0.306) |  | (0.246) |
| Participation |  | 1.584\*\*\* |  | 1.349\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.475) |  | (0.383) |
| Religiosity |  | 0.933\*\*\* |  | 0.555\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.236) |  | (0.196) |
| Internationalism |  | 1.188\*\*\* |  | 0.556\*\* |
|  |  | (0.294) |  | (0.250) |
| Hawkishness |  | 2.508\*\*\* |  | 1.875\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.417) |  | (0.345) |
| Trust in Foreign States |  | 0.665\*\*\* |  | -0.146 |
|  |  | (0.223) |  | (0.177) |
| Constant | 8.991\*\*\* | 6.769\*\*\* | 7.110\*\*\* | 5.987\*\*\* |
|  | (0.123) | (0.442) | (0.112) | (0.363) |
| Observations | 1,071 | 1,046 | 1,212 | 1,138 |
| R-squared | 0.004 | 0.125 | 0.000 | 0.111 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table D-2: Gesture Strength and the Effect of Foreign Dove, Number of Bases DV

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  U.S.-Strong, no controls | Model 2:  U.S.-Strong, w/ controls | Model 3:  U.S.-Weak, no controls | Model 4:  U.S.-Weak: w/ controls |
| *Foreign Dove X Low-Cost* | 8.622\*\*\* | 6.483\*\*\* | 7.108\*\*\* | 6.041\*\*\* |
|  | (0.153) | (0.381) | (0.132) | (0.324) |
| *Foreign Dove X Costly* | 7.246\*\*\* | 5.154\*\*\* | 5.316\*\*\* | 4.247\*\*\* |
|  | (0.145) | (0.379) | (0.132) | (0.325) |
| *Foreign Hawk X Low-Cost* | 8.991\*\*\* | 6.853\*\*\* | 7.110\*\*\* | 6.183\*\*\* |
|  | (0.146) | (0.375) | (0.127) | (0.323) |
| *Foreign Hawk X Costly* | 7.949\*\*\* | 5.832\*\*\* | 5.728\*\*\* | 4.821\*\*\* |
|  | (0.147) | (0.377) | (0.132) | (0.324) |
| U.S. Hawk |  | -0.0117 |  | 0.175 |
|  |  | (0.140) |  | (0.121) |
| U.S. Democrat |  | 0.111 |  | -0.295\*\* |
|  |  | (0.140) |  | (0.121) |
| Political Ideology |  | 0.308 |  | 0.419 |
|  |  | (0.319) |  | (0.266) |
| Party ID |  | 0.125 |  | -0.528\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.242) |  | (0.205) |
| Male |  | -0.126 |  | 0.127 |
|  |  | (0.144) |  | (0.125) |
| Age |  | -0.0229\*\*\* |  | -0.0277\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.00459) |  | (0.00401) |
| White |  | 0.161 |  | 0.457\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.178) |  | (0.148) |
| Education |  | -0.765\*\*\* |  | 0.403\* |
|  |  | (0.247) |  | (0.219) |
| Political Interest |  | -0.330 |  | -0.114 |
|  |  | (0.248) |  | (0.211) |
| Participation |  | 1.740\*\*\* |  | 1.026\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.391) |  | (0.335) |
| Religiosity |  | 1.364\*\*\* |  | 0.846\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.197) |  | (0.173) |
| Internationalism |  | 1.366\*\*\* |  | 0.708\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.243) |  | (0.214) |
| Hawkishness |  | 2.822\*\*\* |  | 1.877\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.343) |  | (0.293) |
| Trust in Foreign States |  | 0.575\*\*\* |  | -0.162 |
|  |  | (0.182) |  | (0.153) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,186 | 2,135 | 2,389 | 2,219 |
| R-squared | 0.850 | 0.871 | 0.800 | 0.849 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Quantities of Interest* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Dove Adv w/ Costly Gesture | -0.703\*\*\*  (0.206) | -0.678\*\*\*  (0.195) | -0.412\*\*  (0.186) | -0.574\*\*\*  (0.173) |
| Dove Adv w/ Low Cost Gesture | -0.370\*  (0.211) | -0.371\*  (0.199) | 0.002  (0.184) | -0.142  (0.169) |
| Difference in Dove Adv | -0.333  (0.296) | -0.307  (0.279) | -0.410  (0.262) | -0.432\*  (0.242) |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table D-3: Effect of Foreign Dove on Support for Reciprocation, Low-Cost Gesture, Passed 85% Post-Treatment Attention Checks

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  U.S.-Strong, no controls | Model 2:  U.S.-Strong, w/ controls | Model 3:  U.S.-Weak: no controls | Model 4:  U.S.-Weak, w/ controls |
| *Foreign Dove* | *15.97\*\*\** | *15.47\*\*\** | *3.311* | *2.466* |
|  | *(3.274)* | *(3.105)* | *(2.517)* | *(2.530)* |
| U.S. Hawk |  | 2.986 |  | -0.380 |
|  |  | (3.119) |  | (2.521) |
| U.S. Democrat |  | -1.329 |  | -3.896 |
|  |  | (3.126) |  | (2.531) |
| Political Ideology |  | -20.14\*\* |  | -5.297 |
|  |  | (8.122) |  | (6.076) |
| Party ID |  | 2.332 |  | -3.719 |
|  |  | (6.024) |  | (4.639) |
| Male |  | 16.93\*\*\* |  | 7.473\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.197) |  | (2.605) |
| Age |  | -0.0429 |  | -0.0619 |
|  |  | (0.100) |  | (0.0818) |
| White |  | 3.358 |  | 0.980 |
|  |  | (3.917) |  | (3.142) |
| Education |  | 8.227 |  | -0.760 |
|  |  | (5.417) |  | (4.660) |
| Political Interest |  | 6.688 |  | -2.227 |
|  |  | (5.683) |  | (4.413) |
| Participation |  | -6.127 |  | -7.186 |
|  |  | (8.670) |  | (7.012) |
| Religiosity |  | -11.14\*\* |  | 3.034 |
|  |  | (4.368) |  | (3.495) |
| Internationalism |  | -6.420 |  | -0.943 |
|  |  | (5.389) |  | (4.475) |
| Hawkishness |  | -40.80\*\*\* |  | -24.10\*\*\* |
|  |  | (7.920) |  | (6.363) |
| Trust in Foreign States |  | 3.942 |  | 4.934 |
|  |  | (4.350) |  | (3.332) |
| Constant | 33.92\*\*\* | 58.71\*\*\* | 16.96\*\*\* | 36.46\*\*\* |
|  | (2.278) | (8.251) | (1.714) | (6.502) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 886 | 879 | 957 | 942 |
| R-squared | 0.026 | 0.151 | 0.002 | 0.047 |

Note: Includes only the subsample of respondents who passed 85% of post-treatment attention checks in addition to the pre-treatment attention checks. OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table D-4: Gesture Strength and the Effect of Foreign Dove, Reciprocate DV, Passed 85% Post-Treatment Attention Checks

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1: U.S.-Strong, no controls | Model 2:  U.S.-Strong, w/ controls | Model 3:  U.S.-Weak, no controls | Model 4:  U.S.-Weak, w/ controls |
| *Foreign Dove X Low-Cost* | *49.88\*\*\** | *68.77\*\*\** | *20.27\*\*\** | *34.98\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.377)* | *(6.106)* | *(2.115)* | *(5.544)* |
| *Foreign Dove X Costly* | *55.81\*\*\** | *74.49\*\*\** | *55.24\*\*\** | *72.37\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.264)* | *(6.076)* | *(2.083)* | *(5.559)* |
| *Foreign Hawk X Low-Cost* | *33.92\*\*\** | *53.29\*\*\** | *16.96\*\*\** | *32.66\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.303)* | *(6.047)* | *(1.968)* | *(5.469)* |
| *Foreign Hawk X Costly* | *44.70\*\*\** | *62.48\*\*\** | *46.42\*\*\** | *62.25\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.363)* | *(6.104)* | *(2.076)* | *(5.536)* |
| U.S. Hawk |  | 1.685 |  | -4.129\*\* |
|  |  | (2.212) |  | (2.040) |
| U.S. Democrat |  | -1.277 |  | -0.695 |
|  |  | (2.210) |  | (2.037) |
| Political Ideology |  | -19.50\*\*\* |  | -8.997\* |
|  |  | (5.733) |  | (4.959) |
| Party ID |  | 0.780 |  | 4.951 |
|  |  | (4.225) |  | (3.739) |
| Male |  | 14.51\*\*\* |  | 8.721\*\*\* |
|  |  | (2.296) |  | (2.105) |
| Age |  | 0.0932 |  | 0.0448 |
|  |  | (0.0720) |  | (0.0672) |
| White |  | 3.802 |  | -1.676 |
|  |  | (2.894) |  | (2.548) |
| Education |  | 10.42\*\*\* |  | 0.897 |
|  |  | (3.947) |  | (3.712) |
| Political Interest |  | 4.908 |  | 4.913 |
|  |  | (3.984) |  | (3.560) |
| Participation |  | -11.56\* |  | -2.693 |
|  |  | (6.136) |  | (5.784) |
| Religiosity |  | -10.78\*\*\* |  | -1.466 |
|  |  | (3.150) |  | (2.903) |
| Internationalism |  | -9.064\*\* |  | -4.739 |
|  |  | (3.857) |  | (3.598) |
| Hawkishness |  | -38.14\*\*\* |  | -31.54\*\*\* |
|  |  | (5.550) |  | (5.081) |
| Trust in Foreign States |  | 7.913\*\* |  | 8.015\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3.075) |  | (2.735) |
| Observations | 1,793 | 1,777 | 1,876 | 1,842 |
| R-squared | 0.476 | 0.539 | 0.423 | 0.458 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Quantities of Interest* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Dove Adv w/ Costly Gesture | 11.11\*\*\*  (3.27) | 12.01\*\*\*  (3.12) | 8.82\*\*\*  (2.94) | 10.12\*\*\*  (2.91) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Dove Adv w/ Low-Cost Gesture | 15.97\*\*\*  (3.31) | 15.48\*\*\*  (3.14) | 3.31  (2.89) | 2.32  (2.86) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Difference in Dove Adv | -4.85  (4.65) | -3.48  (4.43) | 5.51  (4.12) | 7.80\*  (4.08) |

Note: Includes only the subsample of respondents who passed 85% of post-treatment attention checks in addition to the pre-treatment attention checks. OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table D-5: Effect of Foreign Dove, Low-Cost Gesture, by Party

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | U.S.-Strong | | | U.S.-Weak | | |
|  | Republicans | Democrats | Independent/  Other | Republicans | Democrats | Independent/  Other |
| *Foreign Dove* | *10.51\*\** | *20.35\*\*\** | *13.88\*\** | *-0.359* | *4.104* | *3.528* |
| *(5.271)* | *(4.485)* | *(5.553)* | *(3.863)* | *(3.477)* | *(4.279)* |
| Constant | 25.16\*\*\* | 29.88\*\*\* | 34.78\*\*\* | 13.87\*\*\* | 18.04\*\*\* | 18.41\*\*\* |
|  | (3.627) | (3.087) | (3.857) | (2.623) | (2.515) | (2.824) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 302 | 458 | 311 | 321 | 535 | 356 |
| R-squared | 0.013 | 0.043 | 0.020 | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.002 |

Note: OLS Regression without controls. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. The difference in treatment effect across parties was not statistically significant at the <.05 level. Party coded using the *pid5* variable, with “independent,” “other party,” and “no preference” in the “Independent/Other” category. Recoding partisanship to include those who lean toward a party as members of that party produces the same results.

## Table D-6: Effect of Foreign Dove, Low-Cost Gesture, by Level of International Trust

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | U.S.-Strong | | U.S.-Weak | |
|  | Low-Trust | High-Trust | Low-Trust | High-Trust |
| *Foreign Dove* | *15.18\*\*\** | *17.82\*\*\** | *4.877\** | *-3.974* |
| *(3.302)* | *(6.327)* | *(2.505)* | *(4.828)* |
| Constant | 29.98\*\*\* | 29.84\*\*\* | 15.31\*\*\* | 23.02\*\*\* |
|  | (2.287) | (4.306) | (1.719) | (3.461) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 840 | 231 | 926 | 286 |
| R-squared | 0.025 | 0.033 | 0.004 | 0.002 |

Note: OLS Regression without controls. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. The differences in treatment effect across levels of trust were not statistically significant at the <.05 level. We coded level of trust using the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that the U.S. can trust other nations, or that the U.S. should be very careful in dealing with other nations?” We coded subjects as high-trust if they answered “the U.S. can trust other nations” and low-trust if they answered “the U.S. should be very careful in dealing with other nations.”

## Table D-7: Effect of Foreign Dove, Low-Cost Gesture, by Level of Hawkishness

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | U.S.-Strong | | U.S.-Weak | |
|  | Low-Hawkishness | High-Hawkishness | Low-Hawkishness | High-Hawkishness |
| *Foreign Dove* | *18.92\*\*\** | *12.51\*\*\** | *0.960* | *4.964\** |
| *(4.426)* | *(3.733)* | *(3.416)* | *(2.878)* |
| Constant | 38.82\*\*\* | 22.55\*\*\* | 21.22\*\*\* | 12.89\*\*\* |
|  | (3.078) | (2.558) | (2.340) | (2.019) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 494 | 577 | 586 | 626 |
| R-squared | 0.036 | 0.019 | 0.000 | 0.005 |

Note: OLS Regression without controls. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. The differences in treatment effect across levels of hawkishness were not statistically significant at the <.05 level. We coded subjects as “High-hawkishness” if they scored higher than the median score (across both studies) on our hawkishness index, and as “low-hawkishness” otherwise.

# Appendix E: Additional Hypotheses in the Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP)

Our PAP formulated three additional sets of hypotheses that we mention only briefly in our research note given the word limit.[[25]](#footnote-25) We lay out the logic behind these hypotheses, the research design to test them, and our results here.

1. Exploitation Mechanism

Theory: In addition to the “sincerity mechanism”, we also tested a competing mechanism that could lead respondents to prefer to reciprocate a foreign dove’s overture over a hawk’s. Voters in the target state might be more likely to approve of reciprocating foreign doves’ rapprochement efforts not because they see a greater chance for lasting peace, but because they view doves as easily exploitable and would like to take advantage of them. Voters could reason that initially reciprocating a foreign dove’s overture might provide an opportunity to improve the home country’s position relative to the international rival. If opportunistic motives are at play, we would not be able to conclude that doves have an international advantage at peace—doves’ initial gestures might be reciprocated at a higher rate but rapprochement would be less likely to succeed in the longer run.

*M1b (Exploitation 1): Voters are more likely to favor reneging on cooperation with the foreign country at a later point if the foreign leader is a dove rather than a hawk.*

We further hypothesized that, if the “exploitation mechanism” is driving greater willingness to reciprocate the foreign dove’s gesture, then the preference for the dove should be greater when the foreign state engages in a costlier, more exploitable gesture than a low-cost one that exposes it to less risk.

*H3: As the strength of the gesture increases, the dove’s advantage grows.*

*M3a (Exploitation 2): As the strength of the foreign leader’s gesture increases, voters are more likely to favor reneging on cooperation with the foreign country at a later point if the foreign leader is a dove rather than a hawk.*

Research Design: To assess M1b, we adopted a two-step process. We first measured whether subjects strongly/somewhat agreed that the U.S. should exploit the foreign dove by cooperating in the short term but reneging in the long term (“President Richards should temporarily close some U.S. bases in the Arctic, but re-open them and send additional forces once Russia has finished reducing its own forces in the Arctic.”). If subjects did not show this pattern, this would rule out exploitation as an explanation for the dove’s advantage. However, in case we did find support for this mechanism, we asked a second question: whether respondents strongly/somewhat agree that the U.S. can trick Russia into weakening its military position*.* (“The U.S. can trick Russian President Stepanov into weakening Russia's position in the Arctic.”) If subjects supported reneging on cooperation with doves, *and* agreed Russia could be tricked at a higher rate when the foreign leader was a dove, this would bolster the idea that voters approve of (short-term) cooperation with doves because they see them as exploitable.

Findings: We found no support for this alternative mechanism in either study. In neither study was *dovish foreign leader* a statistically significant predictor of agreement with “temporarily close.” This was true for both the low-cost and costly gesture conditions in each study. At this point, we considered *M1b* falsified. For completeness, we also examined whether receiving the foreign dove treatment made respondents more likely to agree with “trick.” We found no statistically significant relationship between *dovish foreign leader* and the belief that Russia could be tricked in either the low-cost or costly gesture treatment condition in either study. As the manuscript discusses, we also did not find support for H3. Finally, we did not find support for M3a.

## Table E-A-1: Temporarily Close Mediator in the U.S.-Strong Study, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Temporarily Close, Low-Cost Gesture | Model 2:  Effect of Temporarily Close on Reciprocate, Low-Cost Gesture | Model 3:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Temporarily Close, Costly Gesture | Model 4:  Effect of Temporarily Close on Reciprocate, Costly Gesture |
| *Temporarily Close* |  | *-0.146\*\*\** |  | *-0.180\*\*\** |
|  |  | *(0.0354)* |  | *(0.0337)* |
| *Foreign Dove* | *-1.390* | *14.76\*\*\** | *-1.744* | *11.44\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.464)* | *(2.802)* | *(2.561)* | *(2.829)* |
| U.S. Hawk | 1.000 | 2.243 | 2.372 | 0.700 |
|  | (2.463) | (2.800) | (2.562) | (2.830) |
| U.S. Democrat | -1.017 | -3.400 | 3.515 | 0.558 |
|  | (2.484) | (2.824) | (2.555) | (2.824) |
| Political Ideology | -0.938 | -15.67\*\* | -7.429 | -14.67\*\* |
|  | (5.816) | (6.612) | (5.701) | (6.301) |
| Party ID | -4.741 | -0.119 | -5.378 | -3.220 |
|  | (4.390) | (4.994) | (4.318) | (4.772) |
| Male | 3.998 | 13.51\*\*\* | 1.363 | 6.996\*\* |
|  | (2.527) | (2.877) | (2.659) | (2.937) |
| Age | -0.579\*\*\* | -0.00469 | -0.426\*\*\* | 0.254\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0804) | (0.0937) | (0.0848) | (0.0948) |
| White | -6.838\*\* | 0.696 | -0.316 | 0.525 |
|  | (3.055) | (3.481) | (3.348) | (3.698) |
| Education | -7.110\* | 8.340\* | -5.549 | 13.77\*\*\* |
|  | (4.283) | (4.876) | (4.641) | (5.129) |
| Political Interest | 6.350 | 8.680\* | -2.067 | 9.274\* |
|  | (4.461) | (5.076) | (4.459) | (4.924) |
| Participation | 20.87\*\*\* | -10.76 | 19.14\*\*\* | -16.10\*\* |
|  | (6.919) | (7.901) | (7.180) | (7.955) |
| Religiosity | 12.77\*\*\* | -13.44\*\*\* | 17.08\*\*\* | -14.87\*\*\* |
|  | (3.432) | (3.927) | (3.640) | (4.060) |
| Internationalism | 11.37\*\*\* | -10.14\*\* | 24.81\*\*\* | -9.946\*\* |
|  | (4.276) | (4.877) | (4.490) | (5.028) |
| Hawkishness | 13.43\*\* | -36.03\*\*\* | 12.49\*\* | -28.29\*\*\* |
|  | (6.078) | (6.926) | (6.264) | (6.929) |
| Trust in Foreign States | 15.67\*\*\* | -1.339 | 9.417\*\*\* | 2.553 |
|  | (3.251) | (3.738) | (3.306) | (3.664) |
| Constant | 30.20\*\*\* | 61.54\*\*\* | 20.89\*\*\* | 54.22\*\*\* |
|  | (6.434) | (7.392) | (6.656) | (7.384) |
| Observations | 1,046 | 1,046 | 1,089 | 1,089 |
| R-squared | 0.165 | 0.150 | 0.145 | 0.146 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table E-A-2: Temporarily Close Mediator in the U.S.-Weak Study, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Temporarily Close, Low-Cost Gesture | Model 2:  Effect of Temporarily Close on Reciprocate, Low-Cost Gesture | Model 3:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Temporarily Close, Costly Gesture | Model 4:  Effect of Temporarily Close on Reciprocate, Costly Gesture |
| *Temporarily Close* |  | *-0.0429* |  | *-0.254\*\*\** |
|  |  | *(0.0294)* |  | *(0.0339)* |
| *Foreign Dove* | *-1.073* | *2.776* | *1.014* | *8.056\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.354)* | *(2.318)* | *(2.601)* | *(2.878)* |
| U.S. Hawk | 3.467 | -1.475 | 2.061 | -4.108 |
|  | (2.350) | (2.316) | (2.609) | (2.888) |
| U.S. Democrat | -5.405\*\* | -2.239 | -2.246 | 3.029 |
|  | (2.354) | (2.323) | (2.604) | (2.882) |
| Political Ideology | -6.737 | -3.524 | 12.86\*\* | -8.207 |
|  | (5.133) | (5.057) | (5.769) | (6.397) |
| Party ID | -7.263\* | -4.258 | -19.68\*\*\* | 6.326 |
|  | (4.045) | (3.988) | (4.345) | (4.854) |
| Male | 10.84\*\*\* | 4.164\* | 3.188 | 7.234\*\* |
|  | (2.451) | (2.434) | (2.694) | (2.982) |
| Age | -0.533\*\*\* | -0.0391 | -0.315\*\*\* | 0.232\*\* |
|  | (0.0769) | (0.0773) | (0.0881) | (0.0980) |
| White | 4.457 | 1.241 | 3.099 | -4.164 |
|  | (2.862) | (2.820) | (3.236) | (3.582) |
| Education | -2.670 | -2.762 | 9.822\*\* | 3.122 |
|  | (4.316) | (4.250) | (4.636) | (5.140) |
| Political Interest | -1.083 | -2.161 | -4.373 | 10.74\*\* |
|  | (4.110) | (4.046) | (4.548) | (5.033) |
| Participation | 17.44\*\*\* | -14.40\*\* | 20.03\*\*\* | -2.061 |
|  | (6.398) | (6.319) | (7.379) | (8.192) |
| Religiosity | 18.41\*\*\* | 0.537 | 10.68\*\*\* | -7.376\* |
|  | (3.286) | (3.280) | (3.826) | (4.249) |
| Internationalism | 20.82\*\*\* | 1.408 | 20.21\*\*\* | -7.766 |
|  | (4.183) | (4.163) | (4.587) | (5.121) |
| Hawkishness | 16.95\*\*\* | -21.67\*\*\* | 14.31\*\* | -30.64\*\*\* |
|  | (5.764) | (5.697) | (6.266) | (6.949) |
| Trust in Foreign States | 5.025\* | 1.109 | 6.457\* | 7.650\*\* |
|  | (2.966) | (2.924) | (3.338) | (3.700) |
| Constant | 15.85\*\*\* | 38.29\*\*\* | 7.571 | 55.86\*\*\* |
|  | (6.078) | (6.002) | (6.754) | (7.477) |
| Observations | 1,138 | 1,138 | 1,081 | 1,081 |
| R-squared | 0.180 | 0.035 | 0.114 | 0.123 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table E-A-3: Trick Mediator in the U.S.-Strong Study, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Trick, Low-Cost Gesture | Model 2:  Effect of Trick on Reciprocate, Low-Cost Gesture | Model 3:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Trick, Costly Gesture | Model 4:  Effect of Trick on Reciprocate, Costly Gesture |
| *Trick* |  | *-0.0397* |  | *-0.0611\** |
|  |  | *(0.0317)* |  | *(0.0314)* |
| *Foreign Dove* | *1.824* | *15.03\*\*\** | *5.088\** | *12.07\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.770)* | *(2.823)* | *(2.780)* | *(2.865)* |
| U.S. Hawk | -0.868 | 2.062 | 7.370\*\*\* | 0.724 |
|  | (2.769) | (2.821) | (2.781) | (2.871) |
| U.S. Democrat | 0.462 | -3.233 | 0.320 | -0.0542 |
|  | (2.793) | (2.845) | (2.774) | (2.854) |
| Political Ideology | -5.079 | -15.74\*\* | -6.696 | -13.74\*\* |
|  | (6.538) | (6.663) | (6.189) | (6.371) |
| Party ID | -6.145 | 0.331 | 9.080\* | -1.697 |
|  | (4.936) | (5.032) | (4.688) | (4.832) |
| Male | 4.578 | 13.10\*\*\* | 0.493 | 6.781\*\* |
|  | (2.841) | (2.898) | (2.886) | (2.970) |
| Age | -0.728\*\*\* | 0.0512 | -0.525\*\*\* | 0.299\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0904) | (0.0950) | (0.0921) | (0.0962) |
| White | -0.964 | 1.659 | 2.598 | 0.740 |
|  | (3.434) | (3.499) | (3.635) | (3.741) |
| Education | -8.503\* | 9.044\* | 3.178 | 14.96\*\*\* |
|  | (4.815) | (4.913) | (5.038) | (5.185) |
| Political Interest | 6.475 | 8.007 | 12.62\*\*\* | 10.42\*\* |
|  | (5.015) | (5.113) | (4.840) | (4.995) |
| Participation | 14.61\* | -13.24\* | 14.13\* | -18.68\*\* |
|  | (7.779) | (7.939) | (7.794) | (8.031) |
| Religiosity | 9.567\*\* | -14.94\*\*\* | 1.006 | -17.88\*\*\* |
|  | (3.858) | (3.942) | (3.951) | (4.065) |
| Internationalism | 12.19\*\* | -11.32\*\* | 9.724\*\* | -13.81\*\*\* |
|  | (4.807) | (4.912) | (4.873) | (5.024) |
| Hawkishness | 18.07\*\*\* | -37.28\*\*\* | 5.525 | -30.19\*\*\* |
|  | (6.833) | (6.985) | (6.799) | (6.998) |
| Trust in Foreign States | 2.775 | -3.523 | 7.924\*\* | 1.344 |
|  | (3.655) | (3.725) | (3.588) | (3.700) |
| Constant | 45.48\*\*\* | 58.92\*\*\* | 25.31\*\*\* | 52.01\*\*\* |
|  | (7.234) | (7.510) | (7.225) | (7.476) |
| Observations | 1,046 | 1,046 | 1,089 | 1,089 |
| R-squared | 0.117 | 0.137 | 0.080 | 0.126 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table E-A-4: Trick Mediator in the U.S.-Weak Study, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Trick, Low-Cost Gesture | Model 2:  Effect of Trick on Reciprocate, Low-Cost Gesture | Model 3:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Trick, Costly Gesture | Model 4:  Effect of Trick on Reciprocate, Costly Gesture |
| *Trick* |  | *-0.0387* |  | *-0.0442* |
|  |  | *(0.0275)* |  | *(0.0337)* |
| *Foreign Dove* | *2.440* | *2.916* | *3.524* | *7.953\*\*\** |
|  | *(2.520)* | *(2.319)* | *(2.682)* | *(2.953)* |
| U.S. Hawk | 2.923 | -1.511 | -2.416 | -4.739 |
|  | (2.515) | (2.315) | (2.691) | (2.961) |
| U.S. Democrat | -3.962 | -2.160 | -4.668\* | 3.394 |
|  | (2.520) | (2.320) | (2.685) | (2.958) |
| Political Ideology | 5.418 | -3.026 | -1.017 | -11.52\* |
|  | (5.494) | (5.056) | (5.949) | (6.544) |
| Party ID | -8.655\*\* | -4.282 | -1.759 | 11.25\*\* |
|  | (4.330) | (3.990) | (4.481) | (4.929) |
| Male | 10.26\*\*\* | 4.096\* | 6.930\*\* | 6.730\*\* |
|  | (2.624) | (2.430) | (2.778) | (3.064) |
| Age | -0.681\*\*\* | -0.0426 | -0.712\*\*\* | 0.281\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0823) | (0.0780) | (0.0908) | (0.103) |
| White | 5.531\* | 1.264 | 10.49\*\*\* | -4.488 |
|  | (3.063) | (2.822) | (3.337) | (3.688) |
| Education | 0.0397 | -2.646 | 1.369 | 0.684 |
|  | (4.620) | (4.250) | (4.781) | (5.259) |
| Political Interest | 9.626\*\* | -1.742 | 12.48\*\*\* | 12.40\*\* |
|  | (4.399) | (4.055) | (4.690) | (5.176) |
| Participation | 21.35\*\*\* | -14.33\*\* | 11.20 | -6.661 |
|  | (6.848) | (6.326) | (7.609) | (8.379) |
| Religiosity | 10.94\*\*\* | 0.171 | 4.125 | -9.911\*\* |
|  | (3.517) | (3.249) | (3.946) | (4.343) |
| Internationalism | 19.81\*\*\* | 1.282 | 18.01\*\*\* | -12.11\*\* |
|  | (4.477) | (4.154) | (4.730) | (5.239) |
| Hawkishness | 7.860 | -22.10\*\*\* | 18.48\*\*\* | -33.47\*\*\* |
|  | (6.170) | (5.679) | (6.461) | (7.135) |
| Trust in Foreign States | -4.216 | 0.731 | -0.196 | 5.999 |
|  | (3.175) | (2.923) | (3.442) | (3.787) |
| Constant | 21.98\*\*\* | 38.46\*\*\* | 23.26\*\*\* | 54.96\*\*\* |
|  | (6.506) | (6.015) | (6.965) | (7.702) |
| Observations | 1,138 | 1,138 | 1,081 | 1,081 |
| R-squared | 0.152 | 0.035 | 0.129 | 0.078 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

1. Fear Mechanism

Theory: Because there may be countervailing effects associated with foreign leader type, for logical completeness, we examined a third mediator that could give hawks, not doves, a rapprochement advantage. Hawks are perceived to favor military options and thus voters might worry that spurning a foreign hawk’s peaceful gesture carries a significant risk of retaliation. In contrast, rejecting a conciliatory gesture by a foreign dove may be seen as a way to push the dove to make additional concessions with little risk of escalation.

*M1c (Fear): Voters are more likely to believe that non-reciprocation of a gesture will lead to punishment if the foreign state’s leader is a hawk rather than a dove.*

Research Design: To assess this hypothesis, we examined whether respondents who received the *dovish foreign leader* treatment were less likely to say that they strongly/somewhat agreed with the statement that “If the U.S. does not cooperate with Russia now, Russia will find a way to punish the U.S.” We further examined whether fear of punishment predicted willingness to reciprocate the Russian leader’s gesture.

Findings: In the U.S.-Strong study, in line with *M1c*, we found that respondents who had received the *foreign dove* treatment were less likely to fear punishment for nonreciprocation than those who had been told that the foreign leader was a hawk (p<.01). In the low-cost gesture treatment condition, the gap between doves and hawks was -15pts and in the costly gesture condition it was -8pts. However, fear of punishment was not a statically significant predictor of support for reciprocation in either gesture strength condition. Thus, M1c was falsified. Likewise, in the U.S.-Weak study, respondents who were told the Russian leader was a dove were less likely—between 6-7pts— to fear retaliation for nonreciprocation than those who were told the Russian leader was a hawk. The difference was significant at the 95 percent level in the low-cost gesture condition, but only significant at the 90 percent level in the costly gesture condition. Furthermore, fear of punishment was not a significant predictor of support for reciprocation when the Russian gesture was low-cost, but was significantly correlated with support for reciprocation (p<.05) when the Russian gesture was costly. Overall, the findings on the fear mechanism were inconsistent and weak.

## Table E-B-1: Fear of Punishment Mediator in the U.S.-Strong Study, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Fear,  Low-Cost Gesture | | Model 2:  Effect of Fear on Reciprocate, Low-Cost Gesture | Model 3:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Fear, Costly Gesture | | | Model 4:  Effect of Fear on Reciprocate, Costly Gesture |
| *Fear of Punishment* | |  | *0.0442* | |  | *0.0227* | | |
|  | |  | *(0.0289)* | |  | *(0.0288)* | | |
| *Foreign Dove* | | *-14.55\*\*\** | *15.60\*\*\** | | *-8.408\*\*\** | *11.95\*\*\** | | |
|  | | *(3.038)* | *(2.852)* | | *(3.037)* | *(2.875)* | | |
| U.S. Hawk | | 1.176 | 2.045 | | 2.173 | 0.224 | | |
|  | | (3.037) | (2.820) | | (3.038) | (2.867) | | |
| U.S. Democrat | | 3.387 | -3.401 | | 1.093 | -0.0986 | | |
|  | | (3.063) | (2.846) | | (3.030) | (2.858) | | |
| Political Ideology | | -5.954 | -15.27\*\* | | 1.019 | -13.36\*\* | | |
|  | | (7.171) | (6.661) | | (6.760) | (6.377) | | |
| Party ID | | 2.185 | 0.478 | | 0.548 | -2.265 | | |
|  | | (5.413) | (5.027) | | (5.120) | (4.830) | | |
| Male | | -8.141\*\*\* | 13.28\*\*\* | | -4.231 | 6.847\*\* | | |
|  | | (3.116) | (2.903) | | (3.153) | (2.977) | | |
| Age | | -0.0814 | 0.0837 | | -0.0235 | 0.331\*\*\* | | |
|  | | (0.0992) | (0.0921) | | (0.101) | (0.0949) | | |
| White | | -8.560\*\* | 2.076 | | 2.955 | 0.515 | | |
|  | | (3.766) | (3.506) | | (3.970) | (3.746) | | |
| Education | | -4.171 | 9.566\* | | -1.314 | 14.79\*\*\* | | |
|  | | (5.281) | (4.905) | | (5.503) | (5.191) | | |
| Political Interest | | 12.04\*\* | 7.218 | | 4.844 | 9.536\* | | |
|  | | (5.500) | (5.119) | | (5.286) | (4.989) | | |
| Participation | | 21.19\*\* | -14.75\* | | -5.723 | -19.42\*\* | | |
|  | | (8.532) | (7.946) | | (8.513) | (8.033) | | |
| Religiosity | | 4.078 | -15.50\*\*\* | | 5.479 | -18.07\*\*\* | | |
|  | | (4.231) | (3.931) | | (4.315) | (4.074) | | |
| Internationalism | | 4.871 | -12.02\*\* | | 10.45\*\* | -14.65\*\*\* | | |
|  | | (5.272) | (4.897) | | (5.323) | (5.031) | | |
| Hawkishness | | -10.82 | -37.52\*\*\* | | -13.41\* | -30.23\*\*\* | | |
|  | | (7.494) | (6.966) | | (7.426) | (7.016) | | |
| Trust in Foreign States | | 1.615 | -3.704 | | 7.811\*\* | 0.683 | | |
|  | | (4.009) | (3.723) | | (3.919) | (3.704) | | |
| Constant | | 61.73\*\*\* | 54.38\*\*\* | | 45.76\*\*\* | 49.43\*\*\* | | |
|  | | (7.933) | (7.580) | | (7.892) | (7.560) | | |
| Observations | | 1,046 | 1,046 | | 1,089 | 1,089 | | |
| R-squared | | 0.058 | 0.138 | | 0.023 | 0.123 | | |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Table E-B-2: Fear of Punishment Mediator in the U.S.-Weak Study, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Fear, Low-Cost Gesture | | Model 2:  Effect of Fear on Reciprocate, Low-Cost Gesture | | Model 3:  Effect of Foreign Dove on Fear, Costly Gesture | | Model 4:  Effect of Fear on Reciprocate, Costly Gesture | |
| *Fear of Punishment* | |  | | *0.0287* | |  | | *0.0698\*\** | |
|  | |  | | *(0.0234)* | |  | | *(0.0296)* | |
| *Foreign Dove* | | *-6.641\*\** | | *3.013* | | *-5.917\** | | *8.211\*\*\** | |
|  | | *(2.957)* | | *(2.324)* | | *(3.050)* | | *(2.951)* | |
| U.S. Hawk | | -3.958 | | -1.510 | | 2.682 | | -4.819 | |
|  | | (2.952) | | (2.316) | | (3.059) | | (2.955) | |
| U.S. Democrat | | -4.686 | | -1.873 | | -0.163 | | 3.612 | |
|  | | (2.957) | | (2.321) | | (3.053) | | (2.948) | |
| Political Ideology | | -5.149 | | -3.088 | | -0.190 | | -11.47\* | |
|  | | (6.447) | | (5.056) | | (6.764) | | (6.532) | |
| Party ID | | -0.226 | | -3.941 | | -2.261 | | 11.49\*\* | |
|  | | (5.081) | | (3.984) | | (5.095) | | (4.921) | |
| Male | | 2.098 | | 3.639 | | -3.070 | | 6.638\*\* | |
|  | | (3.079) | | (2.414) | | (3.158) | | (3.051) | |
| Age | | -0.251\*\*\* | | -0.00903 | | 0.0321 | | 0.310\*\*\* | |
|  | | (0.0965) | | (0.0759) | | (0.103) | | (0.0997) | |
| White | | -3.507 | | 1.151 | | 2.320 | | -5.114 | |
|  | | (3.595) | | (2.819) | | (3.794) | | (3.665) | |
| Education | | -4.197 | | -2.527 | | -0.585 | | 0.665 | |
|  | | (5.422) | | (4.252) | | (5.436) | | (5.249) | |
| Political Interest | | 5.506 | | -2.273 | | 1.605 | | 11.74\*\* | |
|  | | (5.163) | | (4.050) | | (5.332) | | (5.149) | |
| Participation | | 15.55\* | | -15.60\*\* | | 15.05\* | | -8.206 | |
|  | | (8.036) | | (6.311) | | (8.652) | | (8.367) | |
| Religiosity | | 1.668 | | -0.300 | | 10.30\*\* | | -10.81\*\* | |
|  | | (4.127) | | (3.236) | | (4.487) | | (4.343) | |
| Internationalism | | 4.996 | | 0.373 | | 3.054 | | -13.12\*\* | |
|  | | (5.254) | | (4.121) | | (5.379) | | (5.195) | |
| Hawkishness | | 2.116 | | -22.46\*\*\* | | -2.165 | | -34.13\*\*\* | |
|  | | (7.240) | | (5.677) | | (7.347) | | (7.095) | |
| Trust in Foreign States | | 0.613 | | 0.876 | | 5.324 | | 5.636 | |
|  | | (3.726) | | (2.921) | | (3.914) | | (3.783) | |
| Constant | | 62.08\*\*\* | | 35.83\*\*\* | | 41.97\*\*\* | | 51.00\*\*\* | |
|  | | (7.635) | | (6.159) | | (7.920) | | (7.748) | |
| Observations | | 1,138 | | 1,138 | | 1,081 | | 1,081 | |
| R-squared | | 0.029 | | 0.035 | | 0.019 | | 0.082 | |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

1. Moderator: Threat Perceptions

Theory: Building on the logic of the sincerity mechanism, we proposed that individuals’ perceptions of the threat posed by the foreign country should moderate the effect of foreign leader type on approval for reciprocation. Those most concerned with the threat posed by the rival should worry most about the rival’s sincerity. These individuals should thus be more likely to be swayed by a foreign dove than a hawk.

*H4 (Threat): The dove’s advantage is larger among subjects who initially perceive the foreign country to be more threatening.*

Research Design: We assessed whether the dove’s advantage (the gap between support for reciprocating a dove’s gesture relative to a hawk’s gesture) was larger among subjects who initially (pretreatment) perceived Russia as an “enemy” or as “unfriendly” than those who perceived Russia as “friendly” or an “ally” or who had “no opinion.”

Findings: We did not find support for H4 in either study. The effect of a dovish leader was the same, statistically speaking, whether or not a subject saw Russia as a friend or an enemy.

## Table E-C-1: Threat Moderator, Low-Cost and Costly Gestures Pooled, Reciprocate DV

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1:  U.S.-Strong | Model 2:  U.S-Weak |
| *Foreign Hawk X Friend* | *53.82\*\*\** | *45.07\*\*\** |
|  | *(5.398)* | *(5.268)* |
| *Foreign Dove X Friend* | *64.93\*\*\** | *49.91\*\*\** |
|  | *(5.379)* | *(5.187)* |
| *Foreign Hawk X Enemy* | *56.87\*\*\** | *47.90\*\*\** |
|  | *(5.524)* | *(5.324)* |
| *Foreign Dove X Enemy* | *72.73\*\*\** | *53.76\*\*\** |
|  | *(5.661)* | *(5.414)* |
| U.S. Hawk | 1.474 | -3.264\* |
|  | (2.006) | (1.963) |
| U.S. Democrat | -1.353 | -0.103 |
|  | (2.011) | (1.962) |
| Political Ideology | -13.79\*\*\* | -7.570\* |
|  | (4.583) | (4.316) |
| Party ID | -0.467 | 4.028 |
|  | (3.485) | (3.324) |
| Male | 9.540\*\*\* | 4.642\*\* |
|  | (2.072) | (2.037) |
| Age | 0.158\*\* | 0.118\* |
|  | (0.0684) | (0.0664) |
| White | 1.662 | -1.399 |
|  | (2.555) | (2.409) |
| Education | 12.16\*\*\* | -2.558 |
|  | (3.556) | (3.550) |
| Political Interest | 7.272\*\* | 2.756 |
|  | (3.590) | (3.465) |
| Participation | -17.90\*\*\* | -12.81\*\* |
|  | (5.615) | (5.436) |
| Religiosity | -16.21\*\*\* | -3.111 |
|  | (2.840) | (2.837) |
| Internationalism | -12.67\*\*\* | -4.792 |
|  | (3.505) | (3.471) |
| Hawkishness | -34.50\*\*\* | -26.97\*\*\* |
|  | (4.931) | (4.759) |
| Trust in Foreign States | -0.701 | 3.230 |
|  | (2.626) | (2.498) |
| Observations | 2,135 | 2,219 |
| R-squared | 0.489 | 0.349 |
|  |  |  |
| *Quantities of Interest* |  |  |
| Dove’s Adv When Enemy | 15.86\*\*\*  (0.027) | 5.86\*\*  (2.64) |
| Dove’s Adv When Friend | 8.06\*\*\*  (2.93) | 2.01  (2.86) |
| Difference | 4.76  (4.03) | 1.01  (3.94) |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# Appendix F: Elites

As we discuss in the manuscript, we wanted to consider how elites might respond to gestures by foreign leaders who are either hawks or doves. Although we did not anticipate these analyses in our PAP, we believe it to be worthwhile to gain a better sense of whether policymakers are likely to share the mass public’s preference for reciprocating a foreign dove’s gesture over an identical gesture by a foreign hawk. Ultimately, policymakers are the ones who decide whether to respond favorably or unfavorably to a conciliatory gesture by a foreign adversary. We carried out two sets of analyses to gain insight on this question. First, we interacted five elitelike traits with our *foreign dove* experimental treatment (justified below). Second, we ran our analyses of the effect of *foreign dove* on the willingness to reciprocate on subsets of individuals who most closely resemble political elites, using a variety of definitions of political elites. Below we describe the research design and results in more detail.

For the *interaction analyses*, we interacted the following five elitelike traits with our treatments of interest. The first four are drawn directly from Kertzer (2020). The last one, high political interest, is logically important and also mentioned on p. 31 of the supplemental materials for Kertzer (2020).

* Male: individuals who identified as male.
* High Income: individuals whose income was above the median income in the combined samples.
* Highly Educated: individuals with a college degree.
* Prime Age: individuals between 40 and 65 years of age.
* High Political Interest: individuals who say they follow what's going on in government and public affairs some or most of the time.

For the *subset analyses*, we created six elitelike subsets based on different combinations of demographic and attitudinal traits that characterize policymaking elites. The number of subjects in each subset in each study are displayed in the tables below; some are very small.

* Elite 1: Male & High Income & High Educated & Prime Age
* Elite 2: High Income & Highly Educated & Prime Age
* Elite 3: High Income & Highly Educate & Prime Age & High Political Interest
* Elite 4: Highly Educated & Prime Age & High Political Interest
* Elite 5: Highly Educated & High Political Interest
* Elite 6: High Political Interest

Below we present findings from our analyses of our core hypothesis (H1 Dove’s Advantage) for those with elitelike traits. Table E-1 shows results for the interaction term approach. For the U.S.-Strong study, we find little evidence that those with elitelike characteristics respond differently to foreign hawks or doves than the mass public. Male respondents and those with college education appear to be marginally more likely to prefer to reciprocate a foreign dove’s gesture over a hawk’s, but these coefficients are only significant at the 90 percent level in the model without controls and become not significant once we include controls. In both specifications in the U.S.-Weak study, male respondents appear to be less likely to prefer foreign doves over hawks. Recall that in our analysis of the full sample we found that there is no dove’s advantage when the foreign country undertakes a low-cost gesture and the U.S. remains in a disadvantaged position. Thus, our conclusions here are unchanged. In neither study is there evidence that the results would be systematically different for elites.

Next, we examined the effect of *foreign dove* on the willingness to reciprocate the foreign gesture in each of the six elitelike subsamples defined above. Table F-2 and F-3 focus on the U.S.-Strong Study and provide results for each of the six subsamples without and with controls respectively. Tables F-4 and F-5 do the same for the U.S.-Weak Study. As can be seen in Tables F-2 and F-3, we consistently find a substantial and statistically significant dove’s advantage irrespective of the operationalization of elites. If anything, the dove’s advantage is larger in most of these elite subsamples than in our sample as a whole. Tables F-4 and F-5 consistently show no effect of *foreign dove* on willingness to reciprocate. This is in line with our results from the full sample. We thus conclude that there is no reason to believe that, in an experiment, elites would respond to a foreign dove’s or hawk’s overture substantially different than the mass public.

We also carried out similar analyses for M1a (Sincerity), H2 (Gesture Strength), and the three analyses on the Exploitation Mechanism, the Fear Mechanism, and the Threat Moderator. We found results largely consistent with those obtained from the analysis we report for the whole sample. There is little indication that our conclusions would change if we fielded this experiment on an elite sample. For space reasons, we do not report the full set of results here but they are available upon request.

## Table F-1: Effect of Foreign Dove on Support for Reciprocation, Low-Cost Gesture, Elite Interactions

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | U.S.-Strong  no controls | U.S.-Strong,  w/ controls | U.S.-Weak  no controls | U.S.-Weak,  w/ controls |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Foreign Dove | 10.73 | 13.14\* | 9.276 | 9.801\* |
|  | (7.205) | (6.976) | (5.650) | (5.774) |
| U.S. Hawk |  | 1.232 |  | -1.743 |
|  |  | (2.814) |  | (2.312) |
| U.S. Democrat |  | -3.758 |  | -1.465 |
|  |  | (2.823) |  | (2.311) |
| *Foreign Dove X Male* | *10.66\** | *7.735* | *-9.833\*\** | *-10.06\*\** |
|  | *(5.980)* | *(5.804)* | *(4.539)* | *(4.711)* |
| *Foreign Dove X High Income* | *-3.284* | *-1.761* | *-1.989* | *-2.065* |
|  | *(6.343)* | *(6.148)* | *(4.710)* | *(4.874)* |
| *Foreign Dove X High Education* | *11.22\** | *7.023* | *-2.669* | *-2.133* |
|  | *(6.415)* | *(6.226)* | *(4.750)* | *(4.909)* |
| *Foreign Dove X Prime Age* | *-4.981* | *-2.604* | *-1.155* | *-0.448* |
|  | *(5.871)* | *(5.686)* | *(4.505)* | *(4.655)* |
| *Foreign Dove X High Political Interest* | *-1.689* | *-3.423* | *1.780* | *0.205* |
| *(7.151)* | *(6.939)* | *(5.400)* | *(5.524)* |
| Male | 7.311\* | 8.975\*\* | 7.051\*\* | 8.021\*\* |
|  | (4.146) | (4.030) | (3.140) | (3.289) |
| High Income | 1.178 | 1.825 | 0.468 | 0.845 |
|  | (4.376) | (4.274) | (3.252) | (3.392) |
| High Education | -0.0511 | 1.809 | 0.698 | 1.333 |
|  | (4.429) | (4.350) | (3.278) | (3.423) |
| Prime Age | 5.369 | 6.408 | 2.105 | 2.932 |
|  | (4.046) | (3.964) | (3.126) | (3.266) |
| High Political Interest | 2.313 | 6.423 | -4.852 | -1.893 |
|  | (4.966) | (4.851) | (3.757) | (3.931) |
| Political Ideology |  | -13.70\*\* |  | -3.778 |
|  |  | (6.583) |  | (5.047) |
| Party ID |  | 0.160 |  | -4.690 |
|  |  | (5.011) |  | (3.991) |
| White |  | 3.668 |  | 0.535 |
|  |  | (3.400) |  | (2.679) |
| Participation |  | -11.31 |  | -16.14\*\*\* |
|  |  | (7.804) |  | (6.222) |
| Religiosity |  | -13.15\*\*\* |  | -0.596 |
|  |  | (3.883) |  | (3.247) |
| Internationalism |  | -10.74\*\* |  | 1.932 |
|  |  | (4.834) |  | (4.117) |
| Hawkishness |  | -39.94\*\*\* |  | -18.64\*\*\* |
|  |  | (6.830) |  | (5.592) |
| Trust in Foreign States |  | -3.610 |  | 0.263 |
|  |  | (3.641) |  | (2.885) |
| Constant | 21.74\*\*\* | 60.94\*\*\* | 15.81\*\*\* | 29.42\*\*\* |
|  | (5.099) | (7.271) | (3.869) | (5.653) |
| Observations | 1,071 | 1,069 | 1,212 | 1,161 |
| R-squared | 0.057 | 0.137 | 0.009 | 0.034 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Standard errors in parentheses

## Table F-2: Analysis of Foreign Dove on Support for Reciprocation in Elite Subsets,

## U.S.-Strong Study, Low-Cost Gesture, No Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Elite 1 | Elite 2 | Elite 3 | Elite 4 | Elite 5 | Elite 6 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Foreign Dove* | *32.47\*\*\** | *20.60\*\** | *19.03\*\** | *22.55\*\*\** | *24.96\*\*\** | *16.27\*\*\** |
|  | *(10.08)* | *(8.515)* | *(9.235)* | *(7.649)* | *(4.836)* | *(3.329)* |
| Constant | 28.89\*\*\* | 32.26\*\*\* | 34\*\*\* | 32\*\*\* | 30.21\*\*\* | 30.68\*\*\* |
|  | (7.089) | (6.201) | (6.966) | (5.620) | (3.467) | (2.288) |
| Observations | 89 | 132 | 116 | 163 | 395 | 834 |
| R-squared | 0.107 | 0.043 | 0.036 | 0.051 | 0.064 | 0.028 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Standard errors in parentheses

## Table F-3: Analysis of Foreign Dove on Support for Reciprocation in Elite Subsets,

## U.S.-Strong Study, Low-Cost Gesture, With Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Elite 1 | Elite 2 | Elite 3 | Elite 4 | Elite 5 | Elite 6 |
| *Foreign Dove* | *30.17\*\*\** | *21.14\*\** | *19.96\*\** | *22.75\*\*\** | *22.33\*\*\** | *15.35\*\*\** |
|  | *(10.16)* | *(8.544)* | *(9.131)* | *(7.454)* | *(4.791)* | *(3.223)* |
| Political Ideology | -20.04 | -19.24 | -37.76\* | -36.42\*\* | -12.22 | -18.07\*\* |
|  | (22.74) | (19.61) | (21.23) | (17.95) | (10.68) | (7.362) |
| Party ID | 17.08 | 13.56 | 32.28\* | 29.20\*\* | 6.236 | 3.482 |
|  | (18.08) | (15.61) | (17.72) | (14.57) | (8.448) | (5.662) |
| White | 2.564 | 4.657 | 3.758 | 2.337 | 5.778 | 7.679\* |
|  | (14.38) | (11.58) | (12.54) | (9.572) | (6.271) | (4.013) |
| Participation | 4.723 | -0.577 | 3.732 | 13.74 | -3.178 | -9.057 |
|  | (24.81) | (20.06) | (20.83) | (17.93) | (10.90) | (8.105) |
| Religiosity | -14.31 | -17.28 | -16.18 | -20.76\*\* | -20.86\*\*\* | -14.42\*\*\* |
|  | (13.73) | (12.03) | (12.90) | (10.37) | (6.724) | (4.472) |
| Internationalism | -22.76 | -15.97 | -4.735 | -10.61 | -2.059 | -4.390 |
|  | (17.57) | (15.75) | (16.56) | (12.79) | (8.306) | (5.432) |
| Hawkishness | -50.80\* | -43.86\* | -55.06\*\* | -41.35\*\* | -33.00\*\*\* | -35.66\*\*\* |
|  | (26.54) | (23.88) | (25.65) | (19.67) | (12.08) | (7.870) |
| Trust in Foreign States | -16.38 | -7.002 | -4.431 | -10.43 | -4.135 | -4.883 |
|  | (12.47) | (10.89) | (11.25) | (9.076) | (5.678) | (4.075) |
| Constant | 87.11\*\*\* | 79.93\*\*\* | 81.38\*\*\* | 78.97\*\*\* | 65.37\*\*\* | 67.35\*\*\* |
|  | (26.07) | (19.78) | (20.90) | (15.90) | (10.20) | (6.875) |
| Observations | 89 | 132 | 116 | 163 | 393 | 832 |
| R-squared | 0.205 | 0.117 | 0.139 | 0.167 | 0.133 | 0.106 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Standard errors in parentheses

## Table F-4: Analysis of Foreign Dove on Support for Reciprocation in Elite Subsets,

## U.S.-Weak Study, Low-Cost Gesture, No Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Elite 1 | Elite 2 | Elite 3 | Elite 4 | Elite 5 | Elite 6 |
| *Foreign Dove* | *-4.797* | *-6.162* | *-6.824* | *-5.474* | *1.740* | *2.669* |
|  | *(7.951)* | *(5.206)* | *(5.763)* | *(5.233)* | *(3.332)* | *(2.505)* |
| Constant | 21.82\*\*\* | 17.53\*\*\* | 18.82\*\*\* | 21.01\*\*\* | 16.18\*\*\* | 16.25\*\*\* |
|  | (5.397) | (3.591) | (3.946) | (3.564) | (2.281) | (1.736) |
| Observations | 102 | 185 | 160 | 222 | 512 | 924 |
| R-squared | 0.004 | 0.008 | 0.009 | 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.001 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Standard errors in parentheses

## Table F-5: Analysis of Foreign Dove on Support for Reciprocation in Elite Subsets,

## U.S.-Weak Study, Low-Cost Gesture, With Controls

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Elite 1 | Elite 2 | Elite 3 | Elite 4 | Elite 5 | Elite 6 |
| *Foreign Dove* | *-6.048* | *-6.909* | *-8.160* | *-6.651* | *1.127* | *1.990* |
|  | *(8.519)* | *(5.621)* | *(6.208)* | *(5.741)* | *(3.610)* | *(2.611)* |
| Political Ideology | -12.64 | -3.052 | 2.568 | -1.615 | -3.163 | -0.716 |
|  | (15.46) | (12.03) | (12.70) | (11.98) | (6.950) | (5.510) |
| Party ID | -14.66 | -12.36 | -17.02\* | -14.80 | -10.49\* | -7.004 |
|  | (12.69) | (9.170) | (10.12) | (9.346) | (5.777) | (4.331) |
| White | 15.40 | 0.192 | -5.517 | -2.358 | -1.168 | -0.625 |
|  | (12.44) | (7.378) | (9.186) | (7.278) | (4.546) | (3.120) |
| Participation | -34.32\* | -20.08\* | -29.72\*\* | -25.44\*\* | -22.30\*\*\* | -14.09\*\* |
|  | (17.58) | (12.01) | (12.66) | (12.42) | (7.991) | (6.403) |
| Religiosity | 5.275 | 5.524 | 5.193 | 6.448 | 4.014 | -3.294 |
|  | (12.52) | (7.992) | (8.746) | (8.335) | (5.261) | (3.716) |
| Internationalism | -22.82 | -12.01 | -8.209 | -9.307 | -4.277 | 1.215 |
|  | (16.70) | (11.08) | (12.34) | (10.57) | (6.545) | (4.595) |
| Hawkishness | -25.17 | -18.98 | -30.04\* | -22.77 | -18.89\*\* | -16.19\*\* |
|  | (21.26) | (14.64) | (16.32) | (14.87) | (8.795) | (6.320) |
| Trust in Foreign States | -12.78 | -7.936 | -11.67\* | -5.187 | -2.665 | 1.185 |
|  | (10.02) | (6.558) | (7.035) | (6.636) | (4.076) | (3.230) |
| Constant | 60.69\*\*\* | 46.04\*\*\* | 59.74\*\*\* | 52.19\*\*\* | 39.40\*\*\* | 33.29\*\*\* |
|  | (18.83) | (11.64) | (13.69) | (11.04) | (7.262) | (5.332) |
| Observations | 95 | 170 | 145 | 200 | 463 | 875 |
| R-squared | 0.139 | 0.068 | 0.108 | 0.069 | 0.042 | 0.028 |

Note: OLS Regression. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Standard errors in parentheses

# Appendix G: Survey Flows and Questionnaires

## U.S.-Strong Study:

EmbeddedData

ridValue will be set from Panel or URL.

ageValue will be set from Panel or URL.

genderValue will be set from Panel or URL.

hhiValue will be set from Panel or URL.

ethnicityValue will be set from Panel or URL.

Q\_TerminateFlagValue will be set from Panel or URL.

newUserValue will be set from Panel or URL.

hispanicValue will be set from Panel or URL.

educationValue will be set from Panel or URL.

political\_partyValue will be set from Panel or URL.

regionValue will be set from Panel or URL.

zipValue will be set from Panel or URL.

flast = Stepanov

ffirst = Alexei

lastname = Richards

Q\_TotalDurationValue will be set from Panel or URL.

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

EmbeddedData

party = Republican Party

party\_s = Republican

party\_adj = Republican

EmbeddedData

party = Democratic Party

party\_s = Democrat

party\_adj = Democratic

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

EmbeddedData

hawk1 = military power

hawk\_t = hawk

EmbeddedData

hawk1 = diplomacy and peaceful negotiation

hawk\_t = dove

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

EmbeddedData

hawkf1 = favoring military solutions over diplomatic ones

hawkf2 = He has often said that military force is essential to protecting Russian national security. He has frequently declared that he will use force when necessary. He is known for saying that “the only way to achieve peace is to be ready for war.”

hawkf\_t = hawk

hawkfs = favoring military solutions over diplomatic ones

EmbeddedData

hawkf1 = favoring diplomatic solutions over military ones

hawkf2 = He has often said that military force is not the answer to protecting Russian national security. He has frequently declared that he believes in diplomacy and negotiations and will use military force only as a last resort. He is known for saying that “the only way to achieve peace is to act peacefully.”

hawkf\_t = dove

hawkfs = favoring diplomatic solutions over military ones

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

EmbeddedData

rapf1 = He declares that Russia is closing 1 of its 7 military bases in the Arctic and that he is willing to consider closing additional Russian bases in the area.

rapf\_s = closing 1 of the 7 Russian military bases in the Arctic

rapf\_t = cheap

EmbeddedData

rapf1 = He declares that Russia is closing 5 of its 7 military bases in the Arctic and that he is willing to consider closing additional Russian bases in the area.

rapf\_t = strong

rapf\_s = closing 5 of the 7 Russian military bases in the Arctic

Standard: IRB Consent (1 Question)

Standard: NoBack (2 Questions)

Branch: New Branch

If

If Consent to Participate in [redacted for anonymity]... No Is Selected

EndSurvey: Advanced

Block: Hawk/Dove/Intl and Pretreatment attention checks (13 Questions)

Branch: New Branch

If

If Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with eac... 3 + 3 = 7 - Disagree somewhat Is Selected

Or Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with eac... 3 + 3 = 7 - Disagree strongly Is Selected

EmbeddedData

attn1 = pass

Branch: New Branch

If

If Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with eac... Please click the "neither agree nor disagree" response - Neither agree nor disagree Is Selected

EmbeddedData

attn2 = pass

Branch: New Branch

If

If Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with eac... The year 1910 came before the year 1920 - Agree strongly Is Selected

Or Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with eac... The year 1910 came before the year 1920 - Agree somewhat Is Selected

EmbeddedData

attn3 = pass

Branch: New Branch

If

If attn1 Is Not Equal to pass

Or attn2 Is Not Equal to pass

Or attn3 Is Not Equal to pass

EndSurvey: Advanced

Standard: Scenario (25 Questions)

Standard: Mediators (6 Questions)

Block: Beliefs and Demographic Info (15 Questions)

EndSurvey: Advanced

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Page Break |  |

**Questionnaire text for the U.S.-Strong Survey:**

*Note: we omit invisible timers from the questionnaire for brevity.*

irb [REDACTED TO MAINTAIN ANONYMITY]  
  
You must be **at least 18 years old** and **eligible to vote in the United States**to participate.  
   
 **Are you eligible for this survey, and do you agree to participate?**

* Yes (1)
* No (2)

Page Break

intro2 While you are taking the survey, please do not use the back button on your browser.

Page Break

ideo7 **In general, do you think of yourself as . . .**

* Extremely liberal (1)
* Liberal (2)
* Slightly liberal (3)
* Moderate, middle of the road (4)
* Slightly conservative (5)
* Conservative (6)
* Extremely conservative (7)

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| Page Break |

pid\_1 **Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...**

* Republican (1)
* Democrat (2)
* Independent (3)
* Another party, please specify (4) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
* No preference (5)

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| Page Break |

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...  = Republican

Or Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...  = Democrat

pid\_2 **Would you call yourself a ...**

* Strong ${pid\_1/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} (1)
* Not very strong ${pid\_1/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} (2)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...  != Republican

And Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...  != Democrat

pid\_3 **Do you think of yourself as closer to the . . .**

* Republican Party (1)
* Democratic Party (2)
* Neither party (3)

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| Page Break |

hawk7 **Some people think that U.S. military force should never be used under any circumstances. They are at “1” on the scale below. Other people think there are many situations in which U.S. military force should be used to deal with problems. They are at “7” on the scale below. And, of course, other people have opinions in between.**  
**Where would you put yourself on this scale?**

* 1 -- U.S. military force should never be used under any circumstances (1)
* 2 (2)
* 3 (3)
* 4 (4)
* 5 (5)
* 6 (6)
* 7 -- U.S. military force should be used in many situations (7)

trust **Generally speaking, would you say that the U.S. can trust other nations, or that the U.S. should be very careful in dealing with other nations?**

* The U.S. can trust other nations (1)
* The U.S. should be very careful in dealing with other nations (2)

|  |
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| Page Break |

enemy **Please say whether you consider Russia an ally of the United States, friendly, but not an ally, unfriendly, or an enemy of the United States.**

* Ally (1)
* Friendly, but not an ally (2)
* Unfriendly (3)
* Enemy (4)
* No opinion (5)

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| Page Break |

attn **Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement.**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Agree strongly (1) | Agree somewhat (2) | Neither agree nor disagree (3) | Disagree somewhat (4) | Disagree strongly (5) |
| 3 + 3 = 7 (attn\_1) |  |  |  |  |  |
| In the United States, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others. (ethn) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Please click the "neither agree nor disagree" response (attn\_2) |  |  |  |  |  |
| The use of military force only makes problems worse. (hawk5) |  |  |  |  |  |
| The U.S. needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world. (intl) |  |  |  |  |  |
| The year 1910 came before the year 1920 (attn\_3) |  |  |  |  |  |

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| Page Break |

preface We are going to describe a situation the U.S. could face in the future, in the year 2027, involving Russia. Some parts of the description may seem important to you; other parts may seem unimportant.  **Do you agree to read the details very carefully, and then give your most thoughtful answers?**

* Yes (1)
* No (2)

|  |
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| Page Break |

scen1 **Here is some background about the U.S. in 2027:**   
  In 2027, the U.S. president is John ${e://Field/lastname}, a ${e://Field/party\_s}.   
   
 President ${e://Field/lastname} is known for his emphasis on ${e://Field/hawk1}.  
   
 Before continuing, we need to make sure you read this information carefully.

mck\_party **Is President ${e://Field/lastname} a Republican or a Democrat**?

* A Republican (1)
* A Democrat (2)
* An Independent (3)
* Not sure (4)

mck\_hawk\_us **Which of the following best describes President ${e://Field/lastname}'s reputation?**

* He has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawk1} (1)
* He has a reputation for being talkative (2)
* He has a reputation for being a science fiction nerd (3)
* Not sure (4)

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| Page Break |

scen4 **Now, here is some background about Russia in 2027:**     
In 2027, Russia remains a non-democracy. The Russian president, ${e://Field/ffirst} ${e://Field/flast}, took office in 2025.   
  
 President ${e://Field/flast} has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawkf1}. ${e://Field/hawkf2}  
   
 Before continuing, we need to make sure you read this information carefully.

mck\_hawk\_rus **Which of the following best describes President ${e://Field/flast}'s reputation?**

* He has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawkfs} (1)
* He has a reputation for being a foodie (2)
* He has a reputation for liking opera (3)
* Not sure (4)

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| Page Break |

scen2 **Here is some background about the international situation in 2027:**  
   
 A major security concern for the U.S. is its very tense relationship with Russia. The U.S. and Russia disagree strongly over many important foreign policy issues.  
     
 The Arctic is a key site of competition between the U.S. and Russia. In 2027, 40% of all trade is shipped through Arctic waters. The area also contains massive oil and gas reserves. Because of the location of the Arctic between Alaska and Russia, the Pentagon has called the Arctic “the first line of defense.” U.S. officials have repeatedly warned about Russian ambitions in the Arctic.

Before continuing, we need to make sure you read this information carefully.

mck\_tense **In 2027, how tense is the relationship between the U.S. and Russia?**

* Very tense (1)
* Not very tense (2)
* Not sure (3)

mck\_scen2 **Please select the option that best describes the situation. In 2027...**

* The Arctic is a key site of competition between the U.S. and Russia. U.S. officials have called the Arctic "the first line of defense." (1)
* The U.S. and Russia will play against one another at the World Cup (2)
* All trade between the U.S. and Russia will occur via air (3)
* Russia had a major earthquake (4)

|  |
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| Page Break |

scen3 **Here is some more background about the international situation in 2027:**  
   
 In 2027, the U.S. military is overall about 30% stronger than the Russian military. Likewise, in the Arctic itself, the U.S. is about 30% stronger than Russia.   
   
 Both Russia and the U.S. have a major military presence in the Arctic region in 2027: Russia has 7 military bases in the Arctic.  The U.S. has 9 military bases in the Arctic. Both countries keep troops, icebreakers, aircraft, missiles, and nuclear-armed submarines on their bases.  Before continuing, we need to make sure you read this information carefully.

mck\_arc3 **Please select the option that best describes the situation. In 2027....**

* The U.S. is stronger than Russia, both overall and in the Arctic (1)
* The U.S. and Russia played in a ping-pong tournament (2)
* Russia gave the U.S. a commemorative plaque (3)
* Russia held a folk-dancing competition (4)

mck\_arc2 **Please select the option that best describes the situation. In 2027....**

* Both the U.S. and Russia have a major military presence in the Arctic (1)
* Russia has 7 military bases in the Arctic (2)
* The U.S. has 9 military bases in the Arctic (3)
* All of the above (4)

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| Page Break |

scen5   
**Here is some additional background:**   
  
 In 2027, Russian President ${e://Field/flast} makes a speech about foreign policy. He announces that he hopes to find common ground with the U.S. on the Arctic as well as on other disputed issues.   
    
${e://Field/rapf1}  
  
 Before continuing, we need to make sure you read this information carefully.

mck\_rap **The Russian President announced that he is...**

* ${e://Field/rapf\_s} (1)
* writing a novel (2)
* traveling to Tajikistan (3)
* building a new art museum (4)

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| Page Break |

dv1 **Here is a summary of the situation, for your reference:** The year is 2027. Relations between the U.S. and Russia are very tense. The two countries disagree about many issues, including the Arctic. Russia has 7 military bases in the Arctic, and the U.S. has 9. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawkf1}. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} announces that he is ${e://Field/rapf\_s}. **U.S. President Richards is considering whether to pursue a more cooperative or conflictual policy toward Russia. He is deciding what to do about U.S. bases in the Arctic. We want your view both on whether the U.S. should close any of its bases and on how many it should close.**  
  
 **Which of the following comes closest to your view? President Richards should...**

* Build additional U.S. bases in the Arctic (0)
* Keep the same number of U.S. bases in the Arctic (1)
* Reduce the number of U.S. bases in the Arctic (2)

Display This Question:

If Here is a summary of the situation, for your reference: The year is 2027. Relations between the U... = Build additional U.S. bases in the Arctic

build **In your opinion, how many additional U.S. military bases should President Richards build in the Arctic, beyond the 9 it already has?**

* 1 (1)
* 2 (2)
* 3 (3)
* 4 (4)
* 5 (5)
* 6 (6)
* 7 (7)
* 8 (8)
* 9+ (9)

Display This Question:

If Here is a summary of the situation, for your reference: The year is 2027. Relations between the U... = Reduce the number of U.S. bases in the Arctic

close **In your opinion, how many of the 9 U.S. military bases should President Richards close in the Arctic?**

* 1 (1)
* 2 (2)
* 3 (3)
* 4 (4)
* 5 (5)
* 6 (6)
* 7 (7)
* 8 (8)
* 9 (9)

Page Break

dv2 **Here is another summary of the situation, for your reference:** The year is 2027. Relations between the U.S. and Russia are very tense. The two countries disagree about many issues, including the Arctic. Russia has 7 military bases in the Arctic, and the U.S. has 9. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawkf1}. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} announces that he is ${e://Field/rapf\_s}.

**Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?**   
  President Richards should temporarily close some U.S. bases in the Arctic, but re-open them and send additional forces once Russia has finished reducing its own forces in the Arctic.

* Agree strongly (1)
* Agree somewhat (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Disagree somewhat (4)
* Disagree strongly (5)

|  |
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| Page Break |

scen5 **Here is a final summary of the situation, for your reference:** The year is 2027. Relations between the U.S. and Russia are very tense. The two countries disagree about many issues, including the Arctic. Russia has 7 military bases in the Arctic, and the U.S. has 9. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawkf1}. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} announces that he is ${e://Field/rapf\_s}.

**Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.**

sincere1 **Russian President ${e://Field/flast} wants peace with the U.S.**

* Strongly agree (1)
* Somewhat agree (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Somewhat disagree (4)
* Strongly disagree (5)

|  |
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| Page Break |

exploitation **The U.S. can trick Russian President ${e://Field/flast} into weakening Russia's position in the Arctic.**

* Strongly agree (1)
* Somewhat agree (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Somewhat disagree (4)
* Strongly disagree (5)

punish **If the U.S. does not cooperate with Russia now, Russia will find a way to punish the U.S.**

* Strongly agree (1)
* Somewhat agree (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Somewhat disagree (4)
* Strongly disagree (5)

parity **The U.S. must at all times maintain at least as many Arctic military bases as Russia.**

* Strongly agree (1)
* Somewhat agree (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Somewhat disagree (4)
* Strongly disagree (5)

|  |
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| Page Break |

newsint   
Finally, we would like to ask a few questions about you.  
  
**Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not.**  
     
 **Others aren't that interested.**

**Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs...?**

* Most of the time (1)
* Some of the time (2)
* Only now and then (3)
* Hardly at all (4)
* Don't know (5)

voted18 **Did you vote in the congressional election in November 2018?**

* No (1)
* I usually vote, but did not in 2018 (2)
* I am not sure (3)
* Yes. I definitely voted. (4)

voted20 **Did you vote in the presidential election in November 2020?**

* No (1)
* I usually vote, but did not in 2020 (2)
* I am not sure (3)
* Yes. I definitely voted. (4)

|  |
| --- |
| Page Break |
|  |

particip **During the past year did you ... (Please check all that apply)**

* Attend local political meetings (such as school board or city council) (1)
* Put up a political sign (such as a lawn sign or a bumper sticker) (2)
* Work for a candidate or campaign (3)
* Donate money to a candidate, campaign, or political organization (4)
* Donate blood (5)
* None of these (6)

education-mw **What is the highest level of school you have completed?**

* Did not graduate from high school (1)
* High school graduate (2)
* Some college, but no degree (yet) (3)
* 2-year college degree (4)
* 4-year college degree (5)
* Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc) (6)

race-mw **Which of the following best describes your race (mark all that apply)?**

* White (1)
* Black or African American (2)
* Asian (3)
* American Indian or Alaska Native (4)
* Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (5)
* Some other race (6)

|  |
| --- |
| Page Break |

relig\_impt **How important is religion in your life?**

* Very important (1)
* Somewhat important (2)
* Not too important (3)
* Not at all important (4)

relig\_born **Would you describe yourself as a "born-again" or evangelical Christian?**

* Yes (1)
* No (2)

age-mw **Please enter your age on your most recent birthday.**

▼ 18 (18) ... 100 (100)

gender-mw **What is your gender?**

* Male (1)
* Female (2)
* Non-binary (3)
* Other / prefer not to say (4)

|  |
| --- |
| Page Break |

comments **Thank you for your time. Do you have any comments about this survey?**

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

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concl After you have finished typing comments, click the button below to complete the survey and save your answers.

## U.S.-Weak Study:

EmbeddedData

ridValue will be set from Panel or URL.

ageValue will be set from Panel or URL.

genderValue will be set from Panel or URL.

hhiValue will be set from Panel or URL.

ethnicityValue will be set from Panel or URL.

Q\_TerminateFlagValue will be set from Panel or URL.

newUserValue will be set from Panel or URL.

hispanicValue will be set from Panel or URL.

educationValue will be set from Panel or URL.

political\_partyValue will be set from Panel or URL.

regionValue will be set from Panel or URL.

zipValue will be set from Panel or URL.

flast = Stepanov

ffirst = Alexei

lastname = Richards

Q\_TotalDurationValue will be set from Panel or URL.

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

EmbeddedData

party = Republican Party

party\_s = Republican

party\_adj = Republican

EmbeddedData

party = Democratic Party

party\_s = Democrat

party\_adj = Democratic

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

EmbeddedData

hawk1 = military power

hawk\_t = hawk

EmbeddedData

hawk1 = diplomacy and peaceful negotiation

hawk\_t = dove

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

EmbeddedData

hawkf1 = favoring military solutions over diplomatic ones

hawkf2 = He has often said that military force is essential to protecting Russian national security. He has frequently declared that he will use force when necessary. He is known for saying that “the only way to achieve peace is to be ready for war.”

hawkf\_t = hawk

hawkfs = favoring military solutions over diplomatic ones

EmbeddedData

hawkf1 = favoring diplomatic solutions over military ones

hawkf2 = He has often said that military force is not the answer to protecting Russian national security. He has frequently declared that he believes in diplomacy and negotiations and will use military force only as a last resort. He is known for saying that “the only way to achieve peace is to act peacefully.”

hawkf\_t = dove

hawkfs = favoring diplomatic solutions over military ones

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

EmbeddedData

rapf1 = He declares that Russia is closing 1 of its 9 military bases in the Artic and that he is willing to consider closing additional Russian bases in the area.

rapf\_s = closing 1 of the 9 Russian military bases in the Arctic

rapf\_t = cheap

EmbeddedData

rapf1 = He declares that Russia is closing 7 of its 9 military bases in the Arctic and that he is willing to consider closing additional Russian bases in the area.

rapf\_t = strong

rapf\_s = closing 7 of the 9 Russian military bases in the Arctic

Standard: IRB Consent (1 Question)

Standard: NoBack (2 Questions)

Branch: New Branch

If

If Consent to Participate in [redacted for anonymity] Is Selected

EndSurvey: Advanced

Block: Hawk/Dove/Intl and Pretreatment attention checks (13 Questions)

Branch: New Branch

If

If Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with eac... 3 + 3 = 7 - Disagree somewhat Is Selected

Or Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with eac... 3 + 3 = 7 - Disagree strongly Is Selected

EmbeddedData

attn1 = pass

Branch: New Branch

If

If Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with eac... Please click the "neither agree nor disagree" response - Neither agree nor disagree Is Selected

EmbeddedData

attn2 = pass

Branch: New Branch

If

If Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with eac... The year 1910 came before the year 1920 - Agree strongly Is Selected

Or Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with eac... The year 1910 came before the year 1920 - Agree somewhat Is Selected

EmbeddedData

attn3 = pass

Branch: New Branch

If

If attn1 Is Not Equal to pass

Or attn2 Is Not Equal to pass

Or attn3 Is Not Equal to pass

EndSurvey: Advanced

Standard: Scenario (25 Questions)

Standard: Mediators (5 Questions)

Block: Beliefs and Demographic Info (15 Questions)

EndSurvey: Advanced

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Page Break |  |

**Questionnaire for the U.S. Weak Study:**

*Note: we omit invisible timers from the questionnaire for brevity.*

irb [REDACTED TO MAINTAIN ANONYMITY]  
  
You must be **at least 18 years old** and **eligible to vote in the United States**to participate.  
   
 **Are you eligible for this survey, and do you agree to participate?**

* Yes (1)
* No (2)

Page Break

intro2 While you are taking the survey, please do not use the back button on your browser.  
  
Page Break

ideo7 **In general, do you think of yourself as . . .**

* Extremely liberal (1)
* Liberal (2)
* Slightly liberal (3)
* Moderate, middle of the road (4)
* Slightly conservative (5)
* Conservative (6)
* Extremely conservative (7)

Page Break

pid\_1 **Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...**

* Republican (1)
* Democrat (2)
* Independent (3)
* Another party, please specify (4) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

No preference (5)

Page Break

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...  = Republican

Or Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...  = Democrat

pid\_2 **Would you call yourself a ...**

* Strong ${pid\_1/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} (1)
* Not very strong ${pid\_1/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} (2)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...  != Republican

And Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...  != Democrat

pid\_3 **Do you think of yourself as closer to the . . .**

* Republican Party (1)

Democratic Party (2)

Neither party (3)

hawk7 **Some people think that U.S. military force should never be used under any circumstances. They are at “1” on the scale below. Other people think there are many situations in which U.S. military force should be used to deal with problems. They are at “7” on the scale below. And, of course, other people have opinions in between.**  
**Where would you put yourself on this scale?**

* 1 -- U.S. military force should never be used under any circumstances (1)
* 2 (2)
* 3 (3)
* 4 (4)
* 5 (5)
* 6 (6)
* 7 -- U.S. military force should be used in many situations (7)

trust **Generally speaking, would you say that the U.S. can trust other nations, or that the U.S. should be very careful in dealing with other nations?**

* The U.S. can trust other nations (1)
* The U.S. should be very careful in dealing with other nations (2)

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| Page Break |  |

enemy **Please say whether you consider Russia an ally of the United States, friendly, but not an ally, unfriendly, or an enemy of the United States.**

* Ally (1)
* Friendly, but not an ally (2)
* Unfriendly (3)
* Enemy (4)
* No opinion (5)

Page Break

attn **Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement.**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Agree strongly (1) | Agree somewhat (2) | Neither agree nor disagree (3) | Disagree somewhat (4) | Disagree strongly (5) |
| 3 + 3 = 7 (attn\_1) |  |  |  |  |  |
| In the United States, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others. (ethn) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Please click the "neither agree nor disagree" response (attn\_2) |  |  |  |  |  |
| The use of military force only makes problems worse. (hawk5) |  |  |  |  |  |
| The U.S. needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world. (intl) |  |  |  |  |  |
| The year 1910 came before the year 1920 (attn\_3) |  |  |  |  |  |

Page Break

preface We are going to describe a situation the U.S. could face in the future, in the year 2027, involving Russia. Some parts of the description may seem important to you; other parts may seem unimportant.  **Do you agree to read the details very carefully, and then give your most thoughtful answers?**

* Yes (1)
* No (2)

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| Page Break |  |

scen1 **Here is some background about the U.S. in 2027:**   
  In 2027, the U.S. president is John ${e://Field/lastname}, a ${e://Field/party\_s}.   
   
 President ${e://Field/lastname} is known for his emphasis on ${e://Field/hawk1}.  
   
 Before continuing, we need to make sure you read this information carefully.

mck\_party **Is President ${e://Field/lastname} a Republican or a Democrat**?

* A Republican (1)
* A Democrat (2)
* An Independent (3)
* Not sure (4)

mck\_hawk\_us **Which of the following best describes President ${e://Field/lastname}'s reputation?**

* He has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawk1} (1)
* He has a reputation for being talkative (2)
* He has a reputation for being a science fiction nerd (3)
* Not sure (4)

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| Page Break |

scen4 **Now, here is some background about Russia in 2027:**     
In 2027, Russia remains a non-democracy. The Russian president, ${e://Field/ffirst} ${e://Field/flast}, took office in 2025.   
  
 President ${e://Field/flast} has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawkf1}. ${e://Field/hawkf2}  
   
 Before continuing, we need to make sure you read this information carefully.

mck\_hawk\_rus **Which of the following best describes President ${e://Field/flast}'s reputation?**

* He has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawkfs} (1)
* He has a reputation for being a foodie (2)
* He has a reputation for liking opera (3)
* Not sure (4)

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| Page Break |

scen2 **Here is some background about the international situation in 2027:**  
   
 A major security concern for the U.S. is its very tense relationship with Russia. The U.S. and Russia disagree strongly over many important foreign policy issues.  
     
 The Arctic is a key site of competition between the U.S. and Russia. In 2027, 40% of all trade is shipped through Arctic waters. The area also contains massive oil and gas reserves. Because of the location of the Arctic between Alaska and Russia, the Pentagon has called the Arctic “the first line of defense.” U.S. officials have repeatedly warned about Russian ambitions in the Arctic.  
   
 Before continuing, we need to make sure you read this information carefully.

mck\_tense **In 2027, how tense is the relationship between the U.S. and Russia?**

* Very tense (1)
* Not very tense (2)
* Not sure (3)

mck\_scen2 **Please select the option that best describes the situation. In 2027...**

* The Arctic is a key site of competition between the U.S. and Russia. U.S. officials have called the Arctic "the first line of defense." (1)
* The U.S. and Russia will play against one another at the World Cup (2)
* All trade between the U.S. and Russia will occur via air (3)
* Russia had a major earthquake (4)

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scen3 **Here is some more background about the international situation in 2027:**  
   
 In 2027, the U.S. military is overall about 30% stronger than the Russian military. However, in the Arctic itself, Russia is about 30% stronger than the U.S.   
   
 Both Russia and the U.S. have a major military presence in the Arctic region in 2027: Russia has 9 military bases in the Arctic.  The U.S. has 7 military bases in the Arctic. Both countries keep troops, icebreakers, aircraft, missiles, and nuclear-armed submarines on their bases.  Before continuing, we need to make sure you read this information carefully.

mck\_arc3 **Please select the option that best describes the situation. In 2027....**

* The U.S. is stronger than Russia overall, but Russia is stronger in the Arctic (1)
* The U.S. and Russia played in a ping-pong tournament (2)
* Russia gave the U.S. a commemorative plaque (3)
* Russia held a folk-dancing competition (4)

mck\_arc2 **Please select the option that best describes the situation. In 2027....**

* Both the U.S. and Russia have a major military presence in the Arctic (1)
* Russia has 9 military bases in the Arctic (2)
* The U.S. has 7 military bases in the Arctic (3)
* All of the above (4)

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scen5   
**Here is some additional background:**   
  
 In 2027, Russian President ${e://Field/flast} makes a speech about foreign policy. He announces that he hopes to find common ground with the U.S. on the Arctic as well as on other disputed issues.   
    
${e://Field/rapf1}  
   
 Before continuing, we need to make sure you read this information carefully.

mck\_rap **The Russian President announced that he is...**

* ${e://Field/rapf\_s} (1)
* writing a novel (2)
* traveling to Tajikistan (3)
* building a new art museum (4)

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| Page Break |

dv1 **Here is a summary of the situation, for your reference:** The year is 2027. Relations between the U.S. and Russia are very tense. The two countries disagree about many issues, including the Arctic. Russia has 9 military bases in the Arctic, and the U.S. has 7. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawkf1}. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} announces that he is ${e://Field/rapf\_s}. **U.S. President Richards is considering whether to pursue a more cooperative or conflictual policy toward Russia. He is deciding what to do about U.S. bases in the Arctic.  Which of the following comes closest to your view? President Richards should...**

* Build additional U.S. bases in the Arctic (0)
* Keep the same number of U.S. bases in the Arctic (1)
* Reduce the number of U.S. bases in the Arctic (2)

Display This Question:

If Here is a summary of the situation, for your reference: The year is 2027. Relations between the U... = Build additional U.S. bases in the Arctic

build **In your opinion, how many additional U.S. military bases should President Richards build in the Arctic, beyond the 7 it already has?**

* 1 (1)
* 2 (2)
* 3 (3)
* 4 (4)
* 5 (5)
* 6 (6)
* 7+ (7)

Display This Question:

If Here is a summary of the situation, for your reference: The year is 2027. Relations between the U... = Reduce the number of U.S. bases in the Arctic

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close **In your opinion, how many of the 7 U.S. military bases should President Richards close in the Arctic?**

* 1 (1)
* 2 (2)
* 3 (3)
* 4 (4)
* 5 (5)
* 6 (6)
* 7 (7)

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| Page Break |

dv2 **Here is another summary of the situation, for your reference:** The year is 2027. Relations between the U.S. and Russia are very tense. The two countries disagree about many issues, including the Arctic. Russia has 9 military bases in the Arctic, and the U.S. has 7. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawkf1}. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} announces that he is ${e://Field/rapf\_s}.   
 **Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?**   
  President Richards should temporarily close some U.S. bases in the Arctic, but re-open them and send additional forces once Russia has finished reducing its own forces in the Arctic.

* Agree strongly (1)
* Agree somewhat (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Disagree somewhat (4)
* Disagree strongly (5)

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| Page Break |

scen5 **Here is a final summary of the situation, for your reference:** The year is 2027. Relations between the U.S. and Russia are very tense. The two countries disagree about many issues, including the Arctic. Russia has 9 military bases in the Arctic, and the U.S. has 7. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} has a reputation for ${e://Field/hawkf1}. Russian President ${e://Field/flast} announces that he is ${e://Field/rapf\_s}.   
 **Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.**

sincere1 **Russian President ${e://Field/flast} wants peace with the U.S.**

* Strongly agree (1)
* Somewhat agree (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Somewhat disagree (4)
* Strongly disagree (5)

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| Page Break |

exploitation **The U.S. can trick Russian President ${e://Field/flast} into weakening Russia's position in the Arctic.**

* Strongly agree (1)
* Somewhat agree (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Somewhat disagree (4)
* Strongly disagree (5)

punish **If the U.S. does not cooperate with Russia now, Russia will find a way to punish the U.S.**

* Strongly agree (1)
* Somewhat agree (2)
* Neither agree nor disagree (3)
* Somewhat disagree (4)
* Strongly disagree (5)

Page Break

newsint   
Finally, we would like to ask a few questions about you.  
  
**Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not.**  
     
 **Others aren't that interested.**   
     
 **Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs...?**

* Most of the time (1)
* Some of the time (2)
* Only now and then (3)
* Hardly at all (4)
* Don't know (5)

voted18 **Did you vote in the congressional election in November 2018?**

* No (1)
* I usually vote, but did not in 2018 (2)
* I am not sure (3)
* Yes. I definitely voted. (4)

voted20 **Did you vote in the presidential election in November 2020?**

* No (1)
* I usually vote, but did not in 2020 (2)
* I am not sure (3)
* Yes. I definitely voted. (4)

Page Break

particip **During the past year did you ... (Please check all that apply)**

* Attend local political meetings (such as school board or city council) (1)
* Put up a political sign (such as a lawn sign or a bumper sticker) (2)
* Work for a candidate or campaign (3)
* Donate money to a candidate, campaign, or political organization (4)
* Donate blood (5)
* None of these (6)

education-mw **What is the highest level of school you have completed?**

* Did not graduate from high school (1)
* High school graduate (2)
* Some college, but no degree (yet) (3)
* 2-year college degree (4)
* 4-year college degree (5)
* Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc) (6)

race-mw **Which of the following best describes your race (mark all that apply)?**

* White (1)
* Black or African American (2)
* Asian (3)
* American Indian or Alaska Native (4)
* Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (5)
* Some other race (6)

Page Break

relig\_impt **How important is religion in your life?**

* Very important (1)
* Somewhat important (2)
* Not too important (3)
* Not at all important (4)

relig\_born **Would you describe yourself as a "born-again" or evangelical Christian?**

* Yes (1)
* No (2)

age-mw **Please enter your age on your most recent birthday.**

▼ 18 (18) ... 100 (100)

gender-mw **What is your gender?**

* Male (1)
* Female (2)
* Non-binary (3)
* Other / prefer not to say (4)

Page Break

comments **Thank you for your time. Do you have any comments about this survey?**

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

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concl After you have finished typing comments, click the button below to complete the survey and save your answers.

1. OSF, Registration DOI [10.17605/OSF.IO/W2H7K](https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/W2H7K) and [10.17605/OSF.IO/CRV57](https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/CRV57). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. We also considered, given the relatively complicated scenario, whether the non-finding for the low-cost gesture could have been due to inattentiveness. We believe not. We prescreened our subjects for attentiveness, excluding subjects who did not pass three simple attention checks. Moreover, we included posttreatment attention checks to assess whether subjects were comprehending the scenario. We found that 89% of subjects in the U.S.-Weak study correctly identified the Russian leader as either a hawk or a dove, and 79% of subjects passed at least seven out of eight (85%) of the posttreatment attention checks. Moreover, even if we excluded respondents with a less than 85% passage rate on the post-treatment checks, the estimates are nearly identical. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. There are two additional small differences. First, we realized that our DV in the April study might have led respondents to make assumptions about the number of bases a U.S. president may close based on what they read the Russian president did. Such a perceived linkage might exert undue influence on whether respondents supported reciprocation. To de-link these considerations in our follow-up study we told respondents that “We want your view both on whether the U.S. should close any of its bases and on how many it should close.” Second, in the May study, we asked respondents whether they (dis)agree with the following statement: “The U.S. must at all times maintain at least as many Arctic military bases as Russia.” The goal was to assess the extent to which respondents care about the balance of power between the U.S. and the adversary. If balance of power affects willingness to reciprocate, we should find that respondents care strongly about the U.S. not falling behind Russia. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. In the PAP, we referred to the low-cost gesture as “weak” and the costly gesture as “strong”. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. We also found that 76% of respondents said that they either strongly or somewhat agreed that the U.S. should not fall behind Russia in terms of military strength in the Arctic. This reaffirmed our idea that reciprocating the low-cost Russian gesture in our first study was very unattractive for respondents because it would lead the U.S. to remain militarily inferior. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Specifically, we rely on Carter and Smith’s M2 measure, which incorporates conflict-risk-related background factors as well as information on political orientation and psychological characteristics of leaders. Carter and Smith conclude that this measure performs better than the three alternative measures at predicting conflict onset. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. https://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/19/world/excerpts-from-speech-by-gorbachev.html [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. https://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/12/world/in-us-cautious-hopes-for-better-relations.html?searchResultPosition=18 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. For example, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/12/world/succession-moscow-what-specialists-are-saying-experts-soviet-differ-much-impact.html [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. ABC News/Washington Post. ABC News/Washington Post Poll: National Poll, March, 1985, Question 66. USABCWP.186.R23. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1985. Web. Nov-17-2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Louis Harris & Associates (1985). Louis Harris & Associates Poll: March 1985, Question 9 [USHARRIS.040885.R09]. Louis Harris & Associates. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. USA Today. USA Today Poll: May 1985, Question 90. USGBUSA.859052.Q30D. Gordon S. Black Corporation. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1985. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. NBC News/Wall Street Journal. NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll: November 1985, Question 5. USNBCWSJ.120385.R05. NBC News/Wall Street Journal. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1985. Web. May-01-1986. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. ABC News/Washington Post. ABC News/Washington Post Poll: National Poll, November, 1985, Question 25. USABCWP.209.R18. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1985. Web. Nov-17-2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. CBS News/New York Times. CBS News/New York Times Poll # 1985-NOV: National Survey, November 1985, Question 34. USCBSNYT.NOV85.R26. CBS News/New York Times. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1985. Web. Apr-26-2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Notably, Gorbachev also received a positive reception from the domestic publics in other U.S. allies. For example, already in a December 1985 poll of Japanese Hokkaido residents, i.e. those located geographically closest to the USSR, about 30% of respondents viewed “held high hopes” for Gorbachev. “Analysts of the poll were struck by how large this figure was (Rozman 2014, 101). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Newsweek Magazine. Gallup/Newsweek Poll # 1985-85263: Pre-Summit Poll, Question 6. USGALNEW.85263.R06. Gallup Organization. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1985. Web. Jun-07-2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. ABC News/Washington Post. ABC News/Washington Post Poll: National Poll, March, 1985, Question 67. USABCWP.186.R24. Chilton Research Services. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1985. Web. Nov-17-2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. <https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/08/world/gorbachev-ready-for-reagan-talks-freezes-missiles.html>; https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/08/19/gorbachev-extends-test-moratorium/df95a8e3-bf09-4db8-9f50-8a46a4e209a7/ [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. <https://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/04/world/gorbachev-a-hit-with-the-american-public.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/17/AR2010041701842.html [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/02/23/President-Reagan-views-Soviet-leader-Leonid-Brezhnevs-call-for/5957351752400/ [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. https://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/08/archives/castros-overture.html [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. https://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/07/archives/us-aides-rebuff-castro-on-peace-talk-overture.html [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. We laid out these expectations in the PAP associated with the U.S.-Weak study; the PAP for the U.S.-Strong study refers back to the PAP for the U.S.-Weak study. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)