

## Appendix

Attitudes and Action in International Refugee Policy: Evidence from Australia.  
Jill Sheppard and Jana von Stein. *International Organization*.

### I. Results

**Table 1a. Average Treatment Effects, Policy Approval**

	Model 1	Model 2
International Law	-.452** [-.616, -.287]	-.352** [-.502, -.201]
Moral	-.264** [-.427, -.100]	-.230** [-.380, -.081]
Reputational	-.156 [-.318, .005]	-.129 [-.276, .018]
Education		-.169** [-.238, -.101]
Income		.008 [-.001, .017]
Age		.084** [.030, .139]
Ethnic Distance		.249** [.203, .295]
Female		-.120* [-.228, -.013]
Party: Labor		-.881** [-1.024, -.737]
Party: Greens		-1.408** [-1.624, -1.191]
Party: Other/ Independent		-.353** [-.537, -.169]
Party: Don't know/ Won't vote		-.724** [-.878, -.570]
Constant	2.702** [2.588, 2.816]	3.071** [2.761, 3.382]
Observations	2052	2008
R <sup>2</sup>	.015	.207
F Statistic	10.179**	43.290**

\*\* $p < .01$ . \*  $p < .05$ . OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.

0 = Strongly disapprove, 1 = Disapprove, 2 = Neither/nor, 3 = Approve, 4 = Strongly approve.

**Table 2a. Wald Tests, Equality of Coefficients in Table 1a**

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame
Intl Law		.028	< .001		.121	.004
Moral	.028		.203	.121		.186
Reputational	< .001	.203		.004	.186	

**Table 3a. Power Analysis: Policy Approval**

	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame
Control	.999 ( <i>N</i> = 1024)	.989 ( <i>N</i> = 1041)	.720 ( <i>N</i> = 1061)
Intl Law Frame		.840 ( <i>N</i> =991)	.996 ( <i>N</i> = 1011)
Moral Frame	.840 ( <i>N</i> =991)		.403 ( <i>N</i> = 1028)
Reputational Frame	.996 ( <i>N</i> = 1011)	.403 ( <i>N</i> = 1028)	

$\alpha = .05$

**Table 4a. Factor Analysis**

Factor	Loading	Uniqueness
Petition	.475	.775
Protest	.547	.700
Donate	.515	.735
Cronbach's $\alpha$		.550

**Table 5a. Average Treatment Effects, Policy Action**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>
International Law	.040 [-.045, .125]	-.003 [-.084, .078]
Moral	.032 [-.053, .116]	.014 [-.067, .095]
Reputational	-.059 [-.142, .025]	-.084* [-.163, -.004]
Education		.070** [.033, .108]
Income		-.002 [-.007, .003]
Age		-.077** [-.106, -.047]
Ethnic Distance		-.041** [-.066, -.016]
Female		-.015 [-.073, .043]
Party: Labor		.289** [.212, .366]
Party: Greens		.596** [.479, .713]
Party: Other/ Independent		.003 [-.096, .103]
Party: Don't know/ Won't vote		.059 [-.024, .142]
Constant	-.002 [-.061, .056]	-.014 [-.181, .154]
Observations	2,052	2,008
R <sup>2</sup>	.003	.117
F Statistic	2.133	21.998**

\*\* $p < .01$ . \*  $p < .05$ . OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.  
Dependent variable is derived through factor analysis (see Table 4a).

**Table 6a. Wald Tests, Equality of Coefficients in Table 5a**

	<b>Model 1</b>			<b>Model 2</b>		
	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame
Intl Law		.852	.024		.693	.052
Moral	.852		.037	.693		.018
Reputational	.024	.037		.052	.018	

**Table 7a. Power Analysis: Policy Action**

	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame
Control	.098 (N = 1024)	.081 (N = 1041)	.159 (N = 1061)
Intl Law Frame		.052 (N=991)	.348 (N = 1011)
Moral Frame	.052 (N=991)		.306 (N = 1028)
Reputational Frame	.348 (N = 1011)	.306 (N = 1028)	

$\alpha = .05$ . Dependent variable is derived through factor analysis (see Table 4a)

**Table 8a. Mediation Analysis**

	Intl Law vs. Control	Moral vs. Control	Reputational vs. Control	Intl Law vs. Moral	Intl Law vs. Reputational	Moral vs. Intl Law	Moral vs. Reputational	Reputational vs. Intl Law	Reputational vs. Moral
ACME†	.110** [.070, .150]	.073* [.027, .120]	.037* [.003, .070]	.049* [.006, .100]	.066** [.029, .110]	-.049* [-.100, -.006]	.028 [-.021, .070]	-.066** [-.110, -.029]	-.028 [-.070, .021]
Average Direct Effect	-.070 [-.154, .010]	-.041 [-.110, .030]	-.096* [-.170, .030]	-.041 [-.119, .040]	.033 [-.044, .110]	.041 [-.040, .119]	.063 [-.006, .140]	-.033 [-.110, .044]	-.063 [-.006, .140]
Total Effect	.040 [-.048, .130]	.032 [-.053, .120]	-.059 [-.137, .020]	.008 [-.076, .110]	.099* [.013, .180]	-.008 [-.110, .076]	.091* [.012, .170]	-.099* [-.180, -.013]	-.091* [-.170, -.012]
Proportion Mediated	2.740 [-20.5, 24.0]	2.284 [-18.0, 25.1]	-.639 [-6.23, 4.81]	5.914 [-10.5, 15.9]	.669* [.259, 2.53]	5.914 [-10.5, 15.9]	.303 [-.285, 1.06]	.669* [.259, 2.53]	.303 [-.285, 1.06]
Obs.	1041	1041	1061	991	1011	991	1028	1011	1028

*\*\*p<.01. \* p<.05. Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.  
Dependent variable is derived through factor analysis (see Table 4a).*

**Table 9a. Power Analysis: Mediation**

	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame
Control	.124 (N = 1024)	.121 (N = 1041)	.113 (N = 1061)
Intl Law Frame		.130 (N=991)	.122 (N = 1011)
Moral Frame	.130 (N=991)		.118 (N = 1028)
Reputational Frame	.122 (N = 1011)	.118 (N = 1028)	

$\alpha = .05$

## II. Text Analysis

We identified 1784 articles between July 2015 and July 2018, based on our key search parameters: (1) 'boat' and (2) 'refugee' and/or 'asylum.' Pre-processing was fairly limited because we are chiefly interested in identifying the presence of terms we have identified as being associated with legal, moral, and reputational arguments – rather than conducting a far-reaching analysis of the corpus. We used Quanteda; pre-processing included stemming and removal of URLs and stopwords. We also dropped some expressions that might obfuscate interpretation. For instance, we dropped any instance of 'convention' that did not pertain to the refugee convention, e.g., 'conventional,' 'convention centre,' 'annual convention,' 'ALP convention,' 'party convention,' and 'climate change convention.' Similarly, we dropped any reference to reputation that was not about Australia's reputation (e.g., "Peter Dutton has a reputation as a hard-nosed politician").

Below, we provide some examples from the corpus. Our goal is simply to show some of the common international legal, moral, and international reputational formulations that exist:

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"The UN Refugee Convention says countries shall not punish people for seeking Asylum and should never return refugees to their country of origin. We signed that convention."<sup>1</sup>

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"The government claims that the bill is consistent with international law. We strongly disagree. The bill would illegally punish refugees for entering Australia by boat" in violation of "Article 31 (1) of the Refugee Convention [and] would also violate Australia's human rights obligation to protect families and children."<sup>2</sup>

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"My statute says I must speak out if particular acts are contrary to Australia's obligations under international law."<sup>3</sup>

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"For any Christian, be they priest, brother or lay, the duty of care to children is far greater than any obligation under secular law. It is a sacred moral duty."<sup>4</sup>

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"What a pity our leaders have propagated hysteria over boat arrivals, instead of leading us towards a culture of compassion where the odd boat arrivals are accepted and dealt with humanely within our moral obligation as global citizens."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> David Isaacs and Alanna Maycock. "Australia is Hurting Children to Make a Point." *The Sydney Morning Herald*, December 13, 2017.

<sup>2</sup> Ben Saul and Jane McAdam. "Turnbull Disregards the Law with Cruel Refugee Ban." *The Sydney Morning Herald*. November 10, 2016.

<sup>3</sup> Michael Gordon. "The Cat Among the Pigeons." *The Age*, June 17, 2017.

<sup>4</sup> Mark Porter. "A Sacred Duty." *The Newcastle Herald*. February 10, 2017.

<sup>5</sup> Lainie Anderson. Out of Sight, Out of Mind – the Shame of Our Nation." *The Advertiser*. May 8, 2016.

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“The treatment in recent years by Coalition and Labor governments of people seeking asylum has, *The Age* has consistently argued, been shameful. It is a blot on a nation that prides itself on fairness, decency and opportunity, a nation that has long been enriched economically and socially by immigration, by cultural diversity. We have also argued our governments' policies are not only morally dubious by being harsh to the point of inhumane, they also contravene international law. Australia is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which enshrines the legal right of people fleeing persecution.”<sup>6</sup>

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“We understand it's part of Immigration Minister Peter Dutton's job to sell the government's troubling treatment of asylum seekers in offshore processing centres on Manus Island and Nauru. That means making no admissions or concessions about inhumane practices that have drawn widespread international condemnation and blackened Australia's reputation.”<sup>7</sup>

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“We are the generation that will inherit the damage done to our national character, reputation and most significantly the harm done to the mental health and wellbeing of those who have sought our help and protection.”<sup>8</sup>

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The policies have “a deep and abiding impact on the nation's international reputation, which matters.”<sup>9</sup>

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To create Figure 1 (main article), we identified specific terms that align with international legal, moral, or reputational arguments. In most cases, it was evident to which of the three frames a specific term applied, but when it was not, we read the article for context and categorized it accordingly. For instance, the term ‘obligation’ appears in reference to IL in some cases, and in relation to moral codes in others. We hand-coded these. The table below displays the terms we included in each frame.

<b>Terms Included in Each Frame</b>		
<b>International Law</b>	<b>Moral</b>	<b>Reputational</b>
convention	compassion	embarrass/ed/ing
international law	duty of care	global citizen
international legal	decent/cy	international pariah
legal duty	ethic/ethics/ethical	international standing
legal obligation	moral/ly	global standing
legal responsibility	moral duty	national character
ratify/ratified/ratification	moral obligation	reputation
treaty	moral responsibility	

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<sup>6</sup> The Editors. “Film Shows Why Asylum Policy Must be Changed.” *The Age*, May 9, 2016.

<sup>7</sup> The Editor. “Secrecy the Only Winner in Manus Court Settlement.” *Sydney Morning Herald*. June 16, 2017.

<sup>8</sup> Aquinas College Class of 2016. One in, All in. *Gold Coast Bulletin*, December 6, 2016.

<sup>9</sup> Claire Higgins. “Australia is Bankrupting its Global Standing, and it’s all for just \$200 a Fortnight.” *The Sydney Morning Herald*, August 29, 2017.

### III. Sample

We worked with Ipsos Australia<sup>10</sup>, spending 10 days in the field in July/August 2018. The sample size was largely determined by Australia's population (24.6 million people), margin of error parameters, and the project's budget. We determined that with approximately 500 respondents per group, we could achieve a margin of error of about 4.5% with a 95% confidence level. Ipsos uses quotas on region, gender, and age to ensure that the sample broadly represents the Australia population. The basic demographics from the survey are generally consistent with what we observe in the general Australian population (Australian Election Study 2019). The table below provides comparisons.

The main area of potential concern is education – our survey population underrepresents individuals with the US equivalent of a trade school or community college diploma, and overrepresents those with a high school diploma or less, or a Bachelor's degree or higher. We gauge whether this is a problem by reconducting the analyses and weighting the observations by education level as observed in the AES data. The results are highly similar to those obtained without weighting and do not alter any of our findings. Those results are not included in the interest of space, but they are available upon request.

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<sup>10</sup> [www.ipsos.com/en-au](http://www.ipsos.com/en-au). The survey is registered at [osf.io/a46qx](https://osf.io/a46qx) (EGAP registration 20190716AA), with ANU IRB number Protocol 2018/395.

**Comparison of Cumulative Percentages in Australian  
Population (Australian Election Study [AES]) and Experiment**

	<b>Demographic</b>	<b>AES 2019</b>	<b>Experiment</b>
<i>Age</i>	18 to 34	25.9	28.3
	35 to 49	30.4	27.5
	50 to 64	23.2	25
	65+	20.5	19.2
<i>Gender</i>	Male	49.8	51.3
	Female	48.2	48.7
	Other/Skipped	1.9	0.0
<i>Income</i>	<\$20,000	10.3	4.6
	\$20,000-\$39,999	13.7	20.3
	\$40,000-\$59,999	14.2	16.4
	\$60,000-\$79,999	8.1	11.9
	\$80,000-\$99,999	11.0	10.4
	\$100,000-\$124,999	18.7	15.7
	\$150,000-\$199,999	9.6	5.0
	\$200,000+	6.3	4.3
	Other/skipped	8.0	11.3
	<i>Education</i>	High school or less	22.3
Other tertiary qualification		49.3	32.2
BA or higher		25.2	35.4
Other/skipped		3.21	2.13
<i>Birthplace</i>	Australia	74.7	78.5
	UK	5.5	6
	NZ	1.2	2.3
	Other	18.6	13.2
<i>Region</i>	New South Wales	32	34.8
	Victoria	26.1	25.7
	Queensland	19.8	19.1
	South Australia	7.1	6.9
	Western Australia	10.3	9.3
	Tasmania	2.9	2.4
	Northern Territory	0.6	0.5
	Australian Cap Territory	1.3	1.4

### III. Balance Tests

We assess balance across various demographic, attitudinal/identity-based, and geographic factors. We present the data visually. P-values from likelihood ratio tests for the equality of joint distributions are available upon request. Figure 1a looks at the balance across gender and age group. The balance across gender generally looks good, with the differences never achieving statistical significance. Balance is generally good across age group, but the 35-49 age group is overrepresented in the IL group as compared to the moral ( $p < .05$ ), and the 50-64 age group is



underrepresented in the IL group as compared to the control ( $p < .05$ ). This is potentially a threat to inference because older individuals are more supportive of Australia’s boat arrivals policy.<sup>11</sup>






Figure 2a explores balance across education level. Here, we find one area of imbalance: more people with a university degree (BA or higher) are more heavily assigned to the moral treatment as

<sup>11</sup> Among the control group and for each treatment group, older individuals favor existing policy significantly more strongly ( $p < .01$ ).

compared to the control. This is potentially a threat to inference because educated people are more critical of existing policy.<sup>12</sup> Balance across all other comparisons is good.

Next, we look at balance across the income distribution. Figure 3a demonstrates that there is very little imbalance for this covariate.




Next, we turn to two attitudinal/identity factors that might also affect peoples’ views on refugees. The first is ethnic identity. To gauge ‘ethnic distance,’ we asked respondents how they would feel if a close relative married someone of an ethnicity different to their own.<sup>13</sup> Figure 4a reveals some areas of concern. First, the IL group contains more ethnically inclusive individuals ( $p < .01$  compared to the control and  $p < .05$  compared to the reputation group). Second, the control group contains more people who are neutral on the ethnic distance question ( $p < .05$  or smaller in all three comparisons). Finally, the reputational group has more ethnically distant individuals,

<sup>12</sup> Among the control group and across each treatment, people with a BA or higher are significantly more critical of Australia’s boat arrivals policy ( $p < .01$ ).

<sup>13</sup> It is not common practice in Australian surveys to ask about race or ethnicity. In the survey, we used the term ‘ethnicity,’ as it is somewhat more prevalent.

particularly compared to the control ( $p < .05$ ). This imbalance creates a potential threat to inference because ethnically-distant individuals support existing policy more strongly.<sup>14</sup>




Next, we look at the distribution of voting intention across treatment group. Although Australia’s boat arrivals policy has general bipartisan consensus in Parliament, the right-leaning Liberals and Nationals, who currently form a coalition government, are particularly well-known for their tough stance. In contrast, Green Party MPs are outspoken in their criticism of the policy. Among voters, Greens/Labor supporters tend to oppose the policy, whereas Coalition supporters are more favorable.<sup>15</sup>

Figure 5a shows two areas of potential concern. First, Greens supporters are underrepresented in the moral group; this difference is statistically significant ( $p = .031$ ) in comparison to the IL frame. Second, there is a noticeable under-assignment of Liberal Party supporters to the IL frame.

<sup>14</sup> Across each treatment as well as the control, more ethnically-distant individuals are significantly more opposed to existing policy ( $p < .001$ ). See also Huynh and Neyland 2020.

<sup>15</sup> Carson et al. 2016.

These differences are statistically significant or very close to standard thresholds in comparison to all three other groups. This imbalance potentially poses a potential threat to inference because support for existing policy is strongly related to political party preference.<sup>16</sup>



#### IV. Robustness Checks

##### a. Discussion

Other than the models with covariates displayed in Tables 1a and 5a above (discussed in the main text), we conducted one other series of robustness checks. We which analyzed petition, protest, and donation separately rather than as a factor. The results are largely consistent with those discussed in the main text, with one potential exception: the IL and moral groups are somewhat more strongly inclined to sign a petition as compared to the control ( $p = .067$  and  $.080$ ,

<sup>16</sup> Among the control group and each treatment, those who intended to vote for the Liberal-National coalition in the next Federal election are significantly more supportive of policy as compared to all other groups ( $p < .001$ ). Those who intended to vote for the Greens are more critical of existing policy as compared to Labor voters ( $p < .05$ ), too.

respectively), but that is not the case for attending a protest or donating. This suggests that the IL and moral frames are better able to induce low-cost action than high(er) cost action in comparison to the control.

As in the analysis with a factor as the dependent variable (Model 2 of Table 5a), including covariates in the model renders these differences indistinguishable from zero for the IL frame ( $p = .432$ ) and more marginally significant for the moral frame ( $p = .165$ ). Those who receive the reputational frame are also significantly less likely to say they would donate when covariates are included, but otherwise the results do not change notably for petition and protest. Therefore, one's conclusions about whether frames affect willingness to sign a petition (and about whether reputational frames affect willingness to donate) depend somewhat on one's views on rebalancing. If one does not think rebalancing is appropriate, IL and moral framing do drive up willingness to take this low-cost form of action. If one thinks covariates should be included, treatment does not affect any form of mobilization as compared to the control condition.

The frame comparisons are largely the same whether analyzed as one factor or as three separate models (petition, protest, donate), although the differences between frames are sometimes smaller in the separate models – the baseline probability of expressing interest in taking any single action is low.

We also conducted mediation analysis for each outcome separately (Tables 13a to 18a below). Not surprisingly (given the results discussed above), the differences are more pronounced for petition and more muted for protesting or donating. Inducing willingness to take these costlier types of action is much harder across the board. One could go into some detail on the differences between petition and protest/donate theoretically, but this does not fundamentally alter the findings discussed in the main article.

**b. Tables**

**Table 10a. Average Treatment Effects, Policy Action**

	<i>Petition</i>		<i>Protest</i>		<i>Donate</i>	
	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 6</b>
International Law	.152 [-.010, .314]	.069 [-.103, .241]	.090 [-.123, .302]	-.003 [-.231, .225]	-.055 [-.259, .148]	-.131 [-.347, .085]
Moral	.144 [-.017, .304]	.121 [-.050, .291]	-.001 [-.217, .215]	-.058 [-.289, .174]	.009 [-.190, .207]	-.011 [-.220, .199]
Reputational	-.074 [-.237, .089]	-.135 [-.308, .039]	-.087 [-.307, .132]	-.166 [-.401, .070]	-.154 [-.359, .051]	-.245* [-.463, -.026]
Education		.122** [.043, .201]		.111* [.004, .217]		.187** [.087, .287]
Income		-.010 [-.020, .0004]		-.001 [-.015, .013]		-.001 [-.014, .012]
Age		-.124** [-.187, -.061]		-.160** [-.248, -.073]		-.201** [-.283, -.119]
Ethnic Distance		-.182** [-.237, -.127]		-.069 [-.142, .005]		.028 [-.037, .093]
Female		.077 [-.047, .201]		-.186* [-.354, -.019]		.011 [-.145, .167]
Party: Labor		.678** [.509, .847]		.649** [.412, .886]		.311** [.099, .523]
Party: Greens		1.219** [.976, 1.461]		.833** [.534, 1.132]		.684** [.412, .956]
Party: Other/ Independent		.180 [-.046, .407]		-.076 [-.450, .298]		-.146 [-.467, .174]
Party: Don't know/ Won't vote		.239* [.053, .425]		.138 [-.138, .414]		.082 [-.152, .317]
Constant	-.461** [-.577, -.345]	-.593** [-.953, -.233]	-1.356** [-1.506, -1.206]	-1.386** [-1.870, -.902]	-1.188** [-1.327, -1.050]	-1.334** [-1.782, -.886]
Observations	2052	2008	2052	2008	2052	2008
Log Likelihood	-1227.550**	-1078.820**	-608.659	-537.366	-701.727	-631.322

\*\* $p < .01$ . \*  $p < .05$ . Probit coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.

**Table 11a. Wald Tests, Equality of Coefficients in Table 10a**

	<b>Model 1</b>			<b>Model 2</b>		
	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame
International Law		.921	.007		.557	.023
Moral	.921		.009	.557		.004
Reputational	.007	.009		.023	.004	
	<b>Model 3</b>			<b>Model 4</b>		
International Law		.409	.114		.646	.178
Moral	.409		.449	.646		.378
Reputational	.114	.449		.178	.378	
	<b>Model 5</b>			<b>Model 6</b>		
International Law		.542	.362		.281	.329
Moral	.542		.124	.281		.038
Reputational	.362	.124		.329	.038	

**Table 12a. Power Analysis: Policy Action**

	<b><i>Petition</i></b>			<b><i>Protest</i></b>			<b><i>Donate</i></b>		
	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame
Control	.133 (N = 1024)	.125 (N = 1041)	.067 (N = 1061)	.057 (N = 1024)	.050 (N = 1041)	.056 (N = 1061)	.053 (N = 1024)	.051 (N = 1041)	.073 (N = 1061)
Intl Law Frame		.050 (N=991)	.227 (N = 1011)		.057 (N=991)	.703 (N = 1011)		.054 (N=991)	.059 (N = 1011)
Moral Frame	.050 (N=991)		.217 (N = 1028)	.057 (N=991)		.055 (N = 1028)	.054 (N=991)		.076 (N = 1028)
Reputational Frame	.227 (N = 1011)	.217 (N = 1028)		.057 (N = 1011)	.055 (N = 1028)		.059 (N = 1011)		

**Table 13a. Mediation Analysis: Petition**

	Intl Law vs. Control	Moral vs. Control	Reputational vs. Control	Intl Law vs. Moral	Intl Law vs. Reputational	Moral vs. Intl Law	Moral vs. Reputational	Reputational vs. Intl Law	Reputational vs. Moral
ACME <sup>†</sup>	.073** [.046, .100]	.044** [.018, .070]	.023** [.001, .050]	.033** [.003, .060]	.048** [.019, .080]	-.033** [-.060, -.003]	.018 [-.010, .050]	.048** [.019, .080]	-.018 [-.050, .010]
Average Direct Effect	-.036 [-.087, .010]	-.008 [-.055, .040]	-.053 [-.103, .010]	-.036 [-.089, .010]	.020* [-.032, .070]	.036 [-.010, .089]	.051* [.001, .100]	.020* [-.032, .070]	-.051* [-.100, -.001]
Total Effect	.036 [-.022, .090]	.036 [-.017, .090]	-.030 [-.079, .020]	-.003 [-.058, .060]	.069* [.006, .130]	.003 [-.060, .058]	.068* [.011, .120]	.069* [.006, .130]	-.068* [-.130, -.006]
Proportion Mediated	2.003 [-11.4, 15.0]	1.209 [-6.2, 13.0]	-.763 [-.109, .807]	-13.228 [-13.7, 17.1]	.703* [.298, 2.28]	-13.228 [-13.7, 17.1]	.261* [.272, .880]	.703* [.298, 2.28]	.261* [.272, .880]
Obs	1024	1041	1061	991	1011	991	1028	1011	1028

\*\* $p < .01$ . \* $p < .05$ . Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. <sup>†</sup>Average causal mediation effect.

**Table 14a. Power Analysis: Mediation (Petition)**

	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame
Control	>.999 ( $N = 1024$ )	.894 ( $N = 1041$ )	.503 ( $N = 1061$ )
Intl Law Frame		.564 ( $N = 991$ )	.929 ( $N = 1011$ )
Moral Frame	.564 ( $N = 991$ )		.250 ( $N = 1028$ )
Reputational Frame	.929 ( $N = 1011$ )	.250 ( $N = 1028$ )	

$\alpha = .05$



**Table 15a. Mediation Analysis: Protest**

	Intl Law vs. Control	Moral vs. Control	Reputational vs. Control	Intl Law vs. Moral	Intl Law vs. Reputational	Moral vs. Intl Law	Moral vs. Reputational	Reputational vs. Intl Law	Reputational vs. Moral
ACME <sup>†</sup>	.024** [.014, .040]	.016** [.007, .030]	.008* [.000, .020]	.010* [.006, .020]	.014* [.006, .020]	-.010* [-.020, -.006]	.006 [-.003, .020]	-.014* [-.020, .006]	-.006 [-.020, .003]
Average Direct Effect	-.011 [-.048, .020]	-.021 [-.053, .010]	-.022 [-.052, .010]	.008 [-.026, .040]	.013 [-.021, .040]	.008 [-.026, .040]	.009 [-.025, .040]	-.013 [-.040, .021]	-.009 [-.040, .025]
Total Effect	.014 [-.025, .050]	-.005 [-.035, .030]	-.014 [-.044, .020]	.018 [-.018, .050]	.028 [-.006, .060]	.018 [-.018, .050]	.009 [-.025, .040]	-.028 [-.060, .006]	-.009 [-.040, .025]
Proportion Mediated	1.747 [-27.2, 13.9]	-2.824 [-13.8, 14.1]	-.587 [-7.7, 5.63]	.575 [-4.5, 7.2]	.519 [-4.80, .134]	.575 [-4.5, 7.2]	.661 [-4.1, 4.5]	.519 [-4.80, .134]	.661 [-4.1, 4.5]
Obs	1024	1041	1061	991	1011	991	1028	1011	1028

*\*\*p<.01. \* p<.05. Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.*

**Table 16a. Power Analysis: Mediation (Protest)**

	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame
Control	> .999 (N = 1024)	.895 (N = 1041)	.504 (N = 1061)
Intl Law Frame		.565 (N=991)	.930 (N = 1011)
Moral Frame	.565 (N=991)		.250 (N = 1028)
Reputational Frame	.930 (N = 1011)	.250 (N = 1028)	

$\alpha = .05$

**Table 17a. Mediation Analysis: Donate**

	Intl Law vs. Control	Moral vs. Control	Reputational vs. Control	Intl Law vs. Moral	Intl Law vs. Reputational	Moral vs. Intl Law	Moral vs. Reputational	Reputational vs. Intl Law	Reputational vs. Moral
ACME <sup>†</sup>	.023** [.013, .030]	.016** [.005, .030]	.008* [.000, .020]	.010* [.001, .020]	.013** [.005, .020]	-.010* [-.020, .001]	.006 [-.003, .010]	-.013** [-.005, -.020]	-.006 [-.010, .003]
Average Direct Effect	-.035 [-.073, .000]	-.019 [-.057, .020]	-.035 [-.070, .001]	-.020 [-.062, .020]	.003 [-.033, .040]	.021 [-.020, .062]	.020 [-.018, .060]	-.003 [-.040, .033]	-.020 [-.060, .018]
Total Effect	-.012 [-.051, .020]	-.003 [-.042, .030]	-.027 [-.062, .010]	-.010 [-.050, .030]	.016 [-.021, .060]	.010 [-.030, .050]	.026 [-.013, .060]	-.016 [-.060, .021]	-.026 [-.060, .013]
Proportion Mediated	-1.679 [-21.2, 16.3]	-6.040 [-10.8, 12.4]	-.283 [-2.4, 2.2]	-.995 [-9.9, 9.2]	.793 [-6.3, 7.7]	-.995 [-9.9, 9.2]	.229 [-.97, 1.67]	.793 [-6.3, 7.7]	.229 [-.97, 1.67]
Obs	1024	1041	1061	991	1011	991	1028	1011	1028

\*\* $p < .01$ . \*  $p < .05$ . Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.

**Table 18a. Power Analysis: Donate**

	Intl Law Frame	Moral Frame	Reputational Frame
Control	>.999 ( $N = 1024$ )	.895 ( $N = 1041$ )	.503 ( $N = 1061$ )
Intl Law Frame		.565 ( $N=991$ )	.930 ( $N = 1011$ )
Moral Frame	.565 ( $N=991$ )		.250 ( $N = 1028$ )
Reputational Frame	.930 ( $N = 1011$ )	.250 ( $N = 1028$ )	

$\alpha = .05$

## V. Survey

The survey proceeded in six steps:

- (a) All respondents: obtain consent.
- (b) All respondents: demographic questions, a voting intention question, and an ethnic distance question.
- (c) All respondents: receive basic information about existing policy.
- (d) All respondents: receive basic information on the government's justification for existing policy.
- (e) Respondents are randomly divided into four groups: control, international law, moral, and international reputation. The control group receives no vignette. Each of the three treatment groups receive a vignette that emphasizes a particular set of considerations (international law, moral factors, or international reputation).

We had concerns about potential word-ordering effects. Therefore, for each treatment group, half of respondents receive (d) first and (e) second, and the other half receive (e) first and (d) second.<sup>17</sup> For the control group, there is no 'before' or 'after' since there is no vignette.

- (f) All respondents: post-treatment questions about policy approval and policy action.

### Full Survey Instrument

#### a. [Obtain consent]

*To begin with, the following demographic questions are simply for classification purposes – to ensure that we speak to a broad cross section of the Australian population.*

#### **b1.** *In which of the following areas do you live? (Select one)*

- 1. Sydney
- 2. Rural NSW
- 3. Melbourne
- 4. Rural Victoria
- 5. Brisbane
- 6. Rural Queensland
- 7. Adelaide
- 8. Rural South Australia
- 9. Perth
- 10. Rural Western Australia
- 11. ACT
- 12. Northern Territory
- 13. Hobart
- 14. Rural Tasmania

#### **b2.** *And which of these would best describe the area in which you live? (Select one)*

- 1. Within a capital city
- 2. Within a major Regional city
- 3. Within a rural town or its surrounds
- 4. More than 5km from the nearest town

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<sup>17</sup> Post-survey comparison of these subgroups revealed no significant differences in responses, so we analyzed them together.

**b3.** Please tell us which age group you belong to: (Select one)

1. Under 18 **[TERMINATE]**
2. 18 to 34
3. 35 to 49
4. 50 to 64
5. 65 years or older

**b4.** Are you... (Select one)

1. Male
2. Female
3. Other

**b5.** What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed? (Select one)

1. Higher degree or post graduate diploma
2. Bachelor degree
3. Undergraduate diploma
4. Associate diploma
5. Skilled vocational
6. Basic vocational
7. Completed highest level of school
8. Did not complete highest level of school
99. Prefer not to say

**b6.** For socio-demographic classification, which of the following best describes your **annual household income** before taxes?

*This includes the combined income of all those living in your household, considering income from all sources (e.g. from employment, pensions, state benefits, investments or other sources) (Select one)*  
[income brackets suppressed to conserve space]

**b7.** In what country were you born? (Select one)

[country list suppressed to conserve space]

**b8.** At the next Federal election, who would you be most likely to vote for? (Select one)

**[1 → 4 RANDOMIZED]**

1. Labor party
2. Liberal party
3. The Nationals
4. The Greens
96. Other/Independent
97. Don't know
99. I don't intend to vote

**b9.** How do you feel about the following statement? "I would feel uncomfortable if a close relative of mine married someone of an ethnicity different from my own." (Select one)

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree

*What comes next is information that we would like to you read with your full attention. You will subsequently be asked questions that relate to this content, therefore please consider this carefully.*

**c. Policy explanation** (all respondents):

*Under Australian law, anyone who arrives in Australia by boat without a visa is not allowed to enter the country. Instead, they are sent to an offshore processing and detention facility. Even if they're later found eligible for refugee status, they will never be allowed to settle in Australia.*

**d. Government justification** (all respondents):

*The government of Australia states that this policy is necessary to protect our borders and to deter people from making the dangerous passage to this country.*

**e. Treatments:** respondents randomly divided into four groups:

(1) **Control:** no additional information.

(2) **International law treatment:**

*Critics of this policy argue that it breaches international agreements that Australia is a party to. They say it violates the Refugee Convention, which legally obligates countries to protect refugees regardless of how they arrive. They argue that the detention facilities violate a core treaty on standards of humane treatment, and breach a children's rights treaty requiring children to be protected and not imprisoned.*

(3) **Moral treatment:**

*Critics of this policy argue that it breaches standards of human dignity. They say it violates a moral obligation Australia has to protect refugees regardless of how they arrive. They argue that the detention facilities violate ethical standards of humane treatment, and breach the principle that children should be protected and not imprisoned.*

(4) **Reputational treatment:**

*Critics of this policy argue that it harms Australia's international reputation. They say it violates an obligation that all countries have, to protect refugees regardless of how they arrive. They argue that the detention facilities violate internationally accepted standards of humane treatment, and breach the international principle that children should be protected and not imprisoned.*

For each treatment group in (e) above, half of respondents receive (d) first and (e) second, and the other half receive (e) first and (d) second. For the control group, there is no 'before' or 'after' since there is no vignette.

**[NEW SCREEN; ALL RESPONDENTS]:**

**f1.** *Do you approve or disapprove of Australia's current policy regarding people who arrive here by boat? (Select one)*

1. Strongly approve
2. Approve
3. Neither approve nor disapprove
4. Disapprove
5. Strongly disapprove

**f2.** *Would you participate in any of the following activities? (Select all that apply)*

**[RANDOMIZE 1-3]**

1. Sign a petition urging the government to change its policies toward people who arrive by boat
  2. Attend a protest urging the government to change its policies toward people who arrive by boat
  3. Donate money to an organisation working to change government policies toward people who arrive by boat
99. None of the above