Self-Determination Movements (SDM) Dataset

Coding Notes

Global Data on SDMs (1945-2012)
(Notes on Start and End Dates & Separatist Violence)

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AFGHANISTAN

Hazaras

Summary: The Hazaras are a small ethnic group of mixed Turkic and Mongol descent, primarily living in the central highlands of Afghanistan between the Pashtun and Tajik regions. Though the Hazaras made up 67% of the Afghan population in the 19th century, massacres and loss of political autonomy in 1893 decreased the Hazara population drastically due to deaths and refugee flight to the Turkestan region. Today, the Hazaras make up about 9% of the total Afghan population and are concentrated primarily in Hazarastan and secondarily in Badakhstan, both of which are mountainous regions that remain isolated from the urban population. The Hazaras are a minority not only in size but also in religion and language, as they are primarily Shi'i Muslims who speak a dialect of Farsi called Hazaragi. Due to more than a century of discrimination and repression, the Hazaras have evolved from a group of people that included landed gentry as well as peasants to today’s unskilled laborers living in poverty. Persecution historically came largely from the Sunni population even though a minority of Hazaras follow the Sunni sect, and today the Hazaras and victims of repression by the Pashtun elite in Afghanistan. Political, social, and religious repression have only increased with the Taliban’s rise to power due to the Hazaras’ religious beliefs and physical features (National Geographic: 2). When the Taliban was overthrown and Hamid Karzai became president, the Hazaras were afforded more opportunity in Afghanistan although they remain the clear lower caste in Afghan society. According to Minorities at Risk, past and recent goals include political participation and economic development. Besides these, the Hazaras also aim to increase self-determination by lobbying for more religious and cultural autonomy. According to Minority Rights Group International, “[t]he Hazaras have voiced their dissent to the policies of overt discrimination against them since the 1970s though a united political party of the Hazara opposition movement Hizb-e Wahdat (Party of Unity) was only established in 1988.” Minahan, on the other hand, contends that the Hazara self-determination movement began in the 1960s: “Economic deprivation and religious persecution stimulated the political mobilization of the Hazaras in the 1960s and 1970s, in a movement that concentrated on gaining political autonomy within the Afghan kingdom” (Minahan 2002: 728-729). In the late 1970s, the Hazaras were able to liberate Hazarastan and in the 1980s, won autonomy from the Afghan government. Hizb-e Wahdat was then involved in a war to overthrow the Taliban from the late 1980s until early 2000s, and today maintains one seat in the Afghan parliament. Non-zero protest scores in Minorities at Risk from 2002 until 2006 indicate that the Hazaras have been active in fighting for more autonomy in Afghanistan. Based on this information, the Hazaras are coded as having been active from 1960 and as ongoing as of 2012. Sources differ on the Hazaras’ involvement in armed conflict. The 5-year MAR rebellion score is 7 from 1980-1989. The MAR coding is contradictory, however, as the annual rebellion score (that is available from 1985) is 0 from 1985-1989. The annual rebellion score again crosses our threshold of two in 1992: it is 5 in 1992-1994. Furthermore, it is 7 from 1996-1998 and 6 from 1999-2001. In sum, MAR suggests a LVIOLSD from 1980-2001 except for 1990-1991 and 1995 (whereby 1985-1989 is ambiguous). EPR, on the other hand, codes the Hazaras as involved in armed conflict from 1989-2001. In order to avoid bogus de-escalations, we code LVIOLSD from 1980-2001. It is not clear from the MAR notes whether this was violence over SD, however. MAR simply states that the Hazara aligned with the United Front (or Northern Alliance) after the take-over of the primarily Pashtun Taliban in 1996 and full-scale civil war erupted. Yet (see Uzbeks under Afghanistan), “There is nevertheless evidence that self-determination was an issue in the conflict: from 1996-2001 the primary demand of the Northern Alliance, of which the Uzbeks were members, was the creation of a central government with political representation for all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups in a more federalized structure, with provincial areas having more control over their own affairs.” According to UCDP/PRIO the conflict was over government. Thus we apply an ambiguous code.
Sources:

Tajiks

Summary: Since 1979 is the first year for which we were able to find reports of Tajik separatist activity, we peg the start date of this movement at 1979. The HVIOLSD coding for 1979-92 and 1996-2001 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). We code no self-determination activity for 1993-95 because the Tajiks, as represented by the Jam’iyat-i-Islam party and under the guidance of Burhanuddin Rabbani, gained control of the country's government in 1992 and remained in control of the central government until Rabbani was overthrown in 1996 by the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. We code the HVIOLSD phases of the movement as “ambiguous” because of Fearon and Laitin's classification of the civil war as a “center insurgency,” which indicates that there were issues besides self-determination relevant to the conflict. Specifically, from 1996-2001 the primary demand of the Northern Alliance, of which the Tajiks were the dominant members, was the creation of a central government with political representation for all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups in a more federalized structure, with provincial areas having more control over their own affairs. So while the Northern Alliance was seeking control of the central government, it was also aiming to structure the state in a way that would provide for a greater degree of ethnic political autonomy. MAR denotes non-zero protest scores in 2003 and 2004, but no self-determination activity was found. This coincides with Marshall & Gurr (2003) who see the conflict as contained. The end of the movement is thus coded as 2001.
Note: we found no evidence for nonviolent activity before the two periods of activity (1979 onwards/1996 onwards). The first claim emerged in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The invasion took place in late December, so any violence must have occurred almost immediately, assuming Marshall & Gurr and Doyle & Sambanis are right that the Tajiks were engaged in separatist armed conflict in this year. Similarly, regarding the second period the available evidence suggests violence emerged immediately and was a result of turning tables in the ongoing civil war; effectively, the former rebels (the Taliban) became the goverment and the former (Tajik-dominated) government the rebels (see DS 2006 coding notes).
Uzbeks

Summary: Minorities at Risk reports that Uzbeks political organizations first made demands for widespread political autonomy in the early 1990s, hence we code 1990 as the start date. The Uzbeks’ MAR rebellion score is 7 from 1990-1992, 0 in 1993, 5 in 1994 and again 0 in 1995. We also found reports of low-level activity in Keesing’s: Keesing’s reports violence in 1992 and 1994: according to Keesing’s, in 1992 several hundred people were killed in clashes between Uzbek militiamen and government forces and in 1994, at least 44 people were killed by the Uzbek militiamen and 700 Uzbeks were allegedly killed by the government. Based on this, we code 1990-1992 and 1994 as LVIOLSD. 1993 and 1995 are coded with NVIOLSD. Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006), we code 1996-2001 HVIOLSD. As there appear to have been mixed motives to these clashes (control of the central government was also an issue), we coded the LVIOLSD phases as “ambiguous.” We also code the HVIOLSD period as “ambiguous” following Fearon and Laitin’s classification of the conflict as a “center insurgency.” There is nevertheless evidence that self-determination was an issue in the conflict: from 1996-2001 the primary demand of the Northern Alliance, of which the Uzbeks were members, was the creation of a central government with political representation for all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups in a more federalized structure, with provincial areas having more control over their own affairs. After the end of the war against the Taliban in 2001, the Uzbek organization Jumbish-I-Milli led by General Dostam became a political party that does not fight for self-determination. Jumbish-I-Milli does call for “reviving the original cultures an traditions of people living in Afghanistan,” but does not distinguish Uzbek identity. However, there is evidence that the Jumbish-I-Milli retains its regional emphasis. According to MAR, the group aims for greater control over Uzbek areas, a federalist structure with autonomy for the northern provinces, and equal status for Uzbek culture. MAR gives non-zero protest scores from 2004-2006, with a rebellion score of “3” in 2004 indicating LVIOLSD (again coded as “ambiguous” due to mixed motives). We thus code NVIOLSD from 2002-2003, LVIOLSD in 2004, and then NVIOLSD from 2005 onward. The movement is ongoing.

Note: it is not clear whether there was a period of nonviolence before violence emerged. MAR is the only source to suggest violence in the first year, 1990, and MAR's coding notes do not explain the code. For lack of better evidence, we code the movement as violent from the start, but it should be noted that this is ambiguous. Several other sources suggest violence emerged only later. Marshall & Gurr (2003), for example, report separatist violence starting only in 1996. DPR does the same. The SDM coding notes cite case evidence from Keesing’s that violence occurred in 1992, but there’s no report of earlier violence.
Sources:


ALBANIA

Epirote Greeks

Summary: The principle Greek self-determination movement in Albania, the Democratic Union of the Greek Ethnic Minority in Albania (OMONOIA), was formed in 1990. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990. We find only one report of separatist violence: in April 1994 militants of the Omonia party killed two soldiers in an attack on an army post. Since there were fewer than 25 deaths, we do not consider this violence to be LVIOLSD, hence the movement’s NVIOLSD classification. MAR provides non-zero protest scores for 1990-2004, and OMONOIA has remained active in politics as of 2012. The movement is thus coded as NVIOLSD and ongoing.

Sources:
ALGERIA

Berbers (Kabyles)

Summary: In 1963 the Berber-dominated Socialist Forces Front (FFS) split off from the National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria’s dominant political party both during the revolution and for most of the country’s history. The FFS has consistently called for official status for Tamazight (the Berber language); a secular, pluralist polity; greater autonomy for Berber-dominated regions and more Berber input in central policy decisions. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1963. The FFS was a key player in the post-independence strife, but as the violence was predominantly over control of the central government, we do not code a civil war over self-determination. Riots involving demands for language and cultural autonomy occurred in April 1980 and 32 persons; both Berbers and members of the security forces were reported to have been killed. We therefore code 1980 as LVIOLSD. This marks a switch in the movement’s tactics. In light of non-zero MAR protest scores for 1960-65 and 1980-99 and no reports of separatist violence at any time, with the exception of the 1980 riots (i.e. only relevant non-zero MAR anti-government score is a ‘1’ for 1965-69), we coded the following years as NVIOLSD: 1963-1979 and 1981-2000. In 2001, Agence France Presse reported rioting that killed between 56-100 people (AFP 6/25/2001) and thus 2001 is coded as LVIOLSD. 2002 onward is coded as NVIOLSD as the movement continued but no violence was found. While some sources (e.g. Minahan 1996: 51-53) consider the Tuaregs in Algeria to form a separate self-determination movement, we consider them to be part of the Berber ethnic group since they do not appear to have campaigned for self-determination apart from the Berbers.

Sources:
ANGOLA

Bakongo

Summary: The Cabindans are a subgroup of the Bakongo, but these two groups form separate self-determination movements. While the Cabindans are seeking greater autonomy/independence from Angola just for Cabinda, the Bakongo people advocate an independent Bakongo federation including Cabinda. The main organization associated with the Bakongo movement is the Movimento para Auto-Determinaçao de Bakongo (MAKO). In 1994, a subgroup of MAKO split off to found the Kimvuka Kia Lukuku Lua Kongo (KIMVUKA). Both MAKO and KIMVUKA were based in the United Kingdom. In 1998, the leader of KIMVUKA founded the Angola Bakongo Community (CANGOBAK), which aims to fight for “the self-determination of the Bakongo people in Angola and in the “Kongo” territory...”. Since MAKO was founded in 1990, we peg the start date of the movement at 1990. The Bakongo’s MAR rebellion score is 6 in 1998 and 7 from 1999-2001 due to their involvement in the war over Cabinda (the rebellion score is 8 in 2002 but this is a typo (the scale goes only to 7) and it should be 0, see the MAR group notes). Furthermore, EPR codes the Bakongos as involved in the civil war over Cabinda in 1991, 1994, 1997 and in 2002. Based on this, we code LVIOLS in 1991, 1994, and 1997-2002. We found no evidence of self-determination claims beyond 2002. This could be because Bakongo groups dissolved and are now fighting under the Cabindan rebel group FLEC (Minority Rights Group International). Thus, we code an end to the movement in 2012 following the 10-years rule.

Sources:
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com] [March 25, 2002].
Cabindans

Summary: The separatist struggle in Cabinda began in 1961 with the formation of three nationalist groups, which advocated separate independence for the enclave and merged in 1963 to form the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) (Minahan 2002: 350). Self-determination activity continued in subsequent years and carried over into independent Angola. In February 1975 the new Angolan government entered into negotiations with the Cabindan separatists, but rejected their demands (which included independence). In August Cabindan leaders declared independence (Minahan 2002: 351). We code the movement from 1975, the year of Angola’s independence, but note prior activity. In line with the above narrative, 1961 is used as start date. Note: it is not entirely clear to what extent the FLEC participated in the Angolan independence war (1961-1974). UCDP does not list the FLEC as a participant. In the coding notes, UCDP notes that the FLEC was militarily insignificant, and was not even included in the independence negotiations. Thus, it appears that the FLEC was not involved in separatist violence above the LVIOLSD threshold before 1975, and for this reason we note prior non-violent activity. We code 1975-79 as LVIOLSD following a MAR anti-government rebellion score of 4 for 1975-79. 1980-88, we code as NVIOLSD following a MAR anti-government rebellion score of 1 for 1980-89. In February 1985 a cease-fire agreement was signed and talks began, but no formal resolution was reached, and in late 1988 FLEC existed in little more than name only. A rebellion resurfaced in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Marshall & Gurr (2003: 61) indicate 1991 as the start date of LVIOLSD and so do UCDP/PRIO and MAR (the MAR rebellion score is below three in 1989-1990 and four in 1991-1993). In agreement with this, news reports archived in Lexis Nexis indicate that clashes between government forces and FLEC killed at least 44 persons in 1991. However, news reports also indicate that in 1990 13 persons were killed in clashes between the government and FLEC, while that in 1989, 57 persons were killed in clashes between FLEC and Angola’s armed forces. We therefore peg the start date of the LVIOLSD at 1989 and code it ongoing to 1993. The death toll in 1990 is below our threshold for LVIOLSD, but we retain the LVIOLSD because of potential reporting problems and because violence is likely to have escalated in the period leading to the onset of civil war in 1994. Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006) we code 1994-1999 as HVIOLOSD. The MAR rebellion score is 4 in 2000-2001, 6 in 2002-2003, 4 in 2004-2005 and 5 in 2006. The UCDP Battle Deaths v. 5 dataset estimates over 25 deaths in 2002, 2004, 2007, and 2009. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict from 1991-2006. We found no deaths in 2008, but UCDP reports difficulties with finding complete information. Thus 2000-2009 is coded with LVIOLSD. After 2009 the conflict appears to have de-escalated. 2010-2012 is coded with NVIOLSD. The movement is ongoing.

Sources:


International Crisis Group. “CrisisWatch Database.”.  

Keesing’s Record of World Events.  
http://www.keesings.com [February 24, 2002].

Lexis Nexis.  


Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (2013). UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v. 5.0. 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_battle-related_deaths_dataset/ [June 28, 2014].

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Berbudans

Summary: Antigua and Barbuda gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1981 and at that time representatives from Barbuda declared that they wished to create a separate sovereign state for their island. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1981. The Barbuda Independence Movement (BIM) was formed in 1987 to campaign for island self-government and in the parliamentary elections of 1999 and 2009, the separatist Barbuda People’s Movement retained its lone seat. Given such reports of separatist activity, the movement is coded as active from 1981 onward. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Note: Antigua and Barbuda’s population is less than 500,000. Movements in countries with a population of less than 500,000 are not included in the random draw.
**ARGENTINA**

**Indigenous Peoples**

*Summary:* The Argentina Indigenous Peoples refers to between 16-20 tribes living in northern Argentina. These tribes range in size but all have a population of less than 50,000. According to Minorities at Risk, these tribes include the Collas, Chiriguanoos, Tobas, Mapudungun, Guaranies, Wichis, Mapuches, and Selk’namgon, and the Tehuelches. The indigenous peoples tend to be religious, and practice a combination of traditional cultural religions and Christianity due to a history of evangelism in indigenous areas. These native tribes are not well integrated into Argentinian society, and those who have sought employment in urban areas continue to live in the outskirts of the country. Those who do not travel to urban areas live in extreme isolation in rural areas where several groups continue to practice their hunter-gatherer or nomadic traditions. As a result, the indigenous tribes maintain their own languages and religions, and generally know very little Spanish. The Argentinian government has been complicit in seizing indigenous lands, despite having passed laws preventing such actions. For example, the Forest Peoples Programme notes, “[e]xcessive police actions in February and March 2007, which include using tear gas, shooting rubber bullets and beating indigenous women, children, and men, resulted in the displacement of 22 families, the burning and destruction of 15 houses, and the damage and theft of other structures and personal belongings” (Forest Peoples Programme 12/1/2009). Similar forced evictions occurred on September 17, 2009, and October 12, 2009. Amnesty International has reported extensively on the treatment towards indigenous peoples, noting that they “have been treated like second class citizens, subjected to violence, intimidation and discrimination with their human rights ignored” (Amnesty International 8/9/2013). In particular, Amnesty International reports that indigenous tribes are not consulted on developmental projects that take place on indigenous lands and exploit resources on which the indigenous peoples depend. From the 1970s, the indigenous peoples of Argentina have fought for land rights as well as formal recognition of their language and the freedom to name their children using indigenous languages. The Mapuche tribe has been active in fighting for autonomy so that they might unite with Mapuche people living in Chile. Several organizations exist to advance the aims of the indigenous peoples. These include the Coordinating Commission of Indigenous Institutions (CCIIRA) formed in 1970, which later became the Indigenous Association of Argentina (AIRA), as well as the Indigenous Federation of Chaco, the Indigenous Federation of Tucuman, and the Indigenous Federation of Neuquina. Based on the establishment of CCIIRA in 1970, we code the start of a self-determination movement in 1970. The movement remains ongoing, as indicated by non-zero protest scores in the Minorities at Risk dataset as well as subsequent reports of land rights movements such as by the Forest Peoples Programme and Amnesty International. Though there were deaths resulting from forced displacement and subsequent protests, deaths do not reach the 25 deaths per year threshold and thus the entire movement is coded NVIOLSD. Note: see Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 185) for a short overview of the claims and status of Mapuches in Argentina.

*Sources:*


AUSTRALIA

Aborigines

Summary: Marshall & Gurr (2003: 64) indicate that the Aborigines have been seeking self-determination since at least 1945. As we have been unable to find specific information on Aborigine political organizations, for this version of the dataset we follow this start date for the movement. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1945-49 and 1960-2006 indicate that the movement has been ongoing. We find no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:

Christmas Islanders

Summary: The January 5, 2000, edition of The Straits Times reports that Christmas Islanders have been fighting the Australian government for two decades to gain more autonomy, namely “to make laws that are theirs, have a parliament or general assembly that matters, to control their own lives, to raise their own revenue.” Such provisions would be “no more or no less than the status enjoyed by every other Australian state, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory” and “even Australia’s other two island territories, Norfolk and Cocos Islands, enjoy a level of self-government denied to Christmas Islanders.” This suggests movement activity from 1980 onwards; hence 1980 is coded as start date. Note: Christmas Islanders attained Australian citizenship only in 1981 (Green 2006: 116). Due to this, we consider the movement an anti-colonial movement prior to 1981. Accordingly, we code the movement from 1981 onwards, but note prior non-violent activity. In 1994 and 1999, Christmas Islanders organized referendums on increased autonomy. We could not, however, detect subsequent activity. We therefore code an end to the movement in 2009 in accordance with the ten years of inactivity rule. We find no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:

New Englanders

Summary: New England is a region near Brisbane in New South Wales, Australia. The claim for the separation of New England from New South Wales had emerged under colonial rule, but separatist activity only really took off with Australia’s independence. The claim for separation from New South Wales was considered by two Royal Commissions, one set up following the First World War and the second in the aftermath of the Great Depression. While the first ruled against separation, the second ruled in favor. However, the separation was not implemented, and the movement died down. The movement resurfaced after the Second World War. According to Ulrich Ellis (1966), Campaign Director of the New England New State Movement: “[t]he modern New England Movement was launched in 1948 at a conference convened by the Armidale City Council and the Dumaresh Shire…The conference decided that decentralization of government was the first essential step and, accordingly, the New England New State Movement was inaugurated early in 1949” (Ellis 2007: 17).” Thus, we peg the start date to 1948, the first year the modern New England movement was active. In 1953, an unofficial referendum on separation from New South Wales garnered significant support. In 1967, an official referendum was finally held, but this time the claim was narrowly defeated. Separatist activity appears to have died down following the loss. Following our ten-year rule we code an end to the movement in 1977. In recent years the movement has reappeared on the scene, but separatist activity appears too limited to warrant re-inclusion. We find no reports of separatist violence, and thus we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Norfolk Islanders

Summary: Norfolk Island has been part of the Commonwealth of Australia since 1914. It had never been placed on the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories and is governed under article 122 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. Using the powers granted to Parliament under article 122, the Norfolk Island were granted significant self-government through the establishment of the Norfolk Island Legislative Assembly (Norfolk Island Act 1979). According to Angelo (2002: 99) “Norfolk Island has argued vigorously and persistently for greater autonomy.” This is confirmed by Sorens (2012: 75) who lists the Norfolk Islanders as an independence movement. The earliest evidence of this claim are the Submissions of the Norfolk Island Government to the Distribution of Powers Advisory Committee of the Australian Constitutional Commission in 1986 and the Submission of the Norfolk Island Government to the Inquiry into Australia’s Relations with the Pacific. In these documents it is demanded that “the future of the Island’s relationship with Australia should involve a greater degree of self-government” (paragraph 4) and that the “dominant feature of the relationship has been the tension between local autonomy and mainland control” (paragraph 8). The Norfolk Island Government further demanded that the Norfolk Island should no longer be regarded as “part of” the Commonwealth, but as a
dependency of the Commonwealth (paragraph 13) and that the island seeks recognition of the individual status by constitutional guarantee (paragraph 17). 1986 is coded as start date. The demand for increased self-determination was substantiated in 1996 when, according to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 208), the Norfolk Islanders wrote a letter to the British PM, John Major, claiming that the island was never formally handed over to Australia and that they were therefore still British. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000) argue that the main grievance was the movement towards severing ties with the British monarchy in Australia. This was resolved by a 1999 referendum in Australia that came out in favor of retaining the monarchy. We code the movement as ongoing given the opposition against recent plans by the Australian government to revoke autonomy (BBC 2015) and the continuing existence of a hard-core minority that still advocates independence, among which also the Chief Minister (NZ Herald 2013). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Torres Strait Islanders

Summary: Torres Strait Islanders first called for independence in 1976 when James Akee formed the Torres United Party. “It called publically for the first time for a separate and independent “Free Nation of Torres Strait” where the Islanders would control the Strait’s resources and future and facilitate the return of Islander diaspora” (Shnukal 2001). In 1981 calls for independence were rejected by the High Court of Australia. In 1988, a Torres Strait Islanders Congress voted for the secession of the island not just from Queensland (to which it is sub-ordinated), but from Australia (Elks 2011). In subsequent years the mood appears to have softened, and most Torres Strait Islanders, including the leader of the secessionist movement, George Mye, “want to become a separate territory of Australia – similar to the Northern Territory – with their own parliament and full regional control of island affairs, including the provision of health and education.” Mr. Mye’s “vie on the ideal model for regional autonomoy has softened. The fervor remains. “To secede from Australia is a no-no,” he said. “What we want, what we need, to look after the Torres Strait’s future is autonomy for the region, but we should be Australians for all time. “We’re not seceding from Australia, but Queensland, yes” (Elks 2011). Less radical claims have also been raised, such as the attainment of a status similar to the Christmas or Norfolk Islands, which would mean substantial autonomy within Queensland. In 1994, the Torres Strait Regional Authority was created as an autonomous regional assembly, but “true autonomy has not been achieved” (Elks 2011). We find no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.
Sources:


Western Australians

Summary: While the movement had already flared up in 1933, we found little indication for any sustained self-determination efforts until 1974, which we peg as the start date. In 1974, mining millionaire Lang Hancock announced that he and his partner were financially backing four secessionist candidates for the Senate election on the Westralian Secessionist Party ticket (unsuccessful candidates). Though there is later discussion of Western Australian secession by individuals, the Westralian Secessionist Party and the organized Westralian Secessionist Movement do not appear in news reports after the late 1970s. However, in 1993 the Western Australia Secession was formed, which at its peak had about 3,000 members. Due to a lack of popular support, the organization became defunct in 2011, but there continues to be more limited separatist activity. Thus, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. We find no reports of separatist violence, and thus we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**AUSTRIA**

**Vorarlbergers**

*Summary:* In 1979, an autonomist organization, Pro-Vorarlberg, published an appeal in which it demanded special status for Vorarlberg within the Austrian republic. This “led to an initiative by the provincial diet to conduct negotiations… on financial and fiscal autonomy, and increased control of local education, commerce, forestry, agriculture, and communications” (Minahan 2002: 2016). We peg the start date to 1979, since this is the first evidence of self-determination activity. The initiative was approved by a provincial referendum on June 23, 1980; it was then opposed by the Austrian government (Minahan 2002: 2016). Pro-Vorarlberg was politically active on a smaller scale in the 1980s. However, according to Bussjäger (2006) the movement died down after the failed reform of the federation in 1994. We do not find evidence for separatist activity after this, and following our ten-year rule we code an end to the movement in 2004. No violence has been found, hence a NVIOLSD coding for the whole movement.

*Sources:*


AZERBAIJAN

Armenians

Summary: The National Unification Party (NUP) was formed in Yerevan in 1966. The NUP called for an independent Armenia which would include Western Armenia, Nakhichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenians in Azerbaijan began to make irredentist demands in 1987 when dissidents known as the Karabakh Committee organized a petition drive to voice that demand. On February 28, 1988, the Karabakh Soviet of People's Deputies passed a resolution supporting the transfer of Karabakh to Armenian control. A million Armenians marched in Yerevan in support of the transfer of territorial control and Gorbachev promised action on the issue. This initial activity was still under the roof of the Soviet Union (see Armenians under Russia). However, the Armenian movement in Azerbaijan remained active when the USSR dissolved in 1991. In late 1991, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh established an unrecognized de-facto state. Thus, we code the movement as active since 1991, though we note that the movement was both active and violent prior to Azerbaijan’s independence. The HVIOLSD coding for 1991-94 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). In 1994 a cease-fire was reached. Yet according to MAR, the truce has been violated occasionally: “The cease-fire agreement that theoretically terminated the Azeri-Armenian war was by no means a peace treaty, for tensions and rhetoric remain high on both sides, and the truce has been a number of times, with border incidents and other isolated skirmishes still an occasional feature in the region, resulting in deaths for both Azeris and Armenians.” The MAR rebellion score is 7 in 1995, 3 in 1996, again 7 in 1997, thus 1995-1997 are coded as LVIOLSD. Marshall & Gurr (2003: 57) report that open hostilities ceded in 1997. MAR continues to code a rebellion score of three until 2003, but this appears due to Nagorno-Karabakh's de-facto independent status. No source suggests a violence code in 2004 (in particular, the MAR rebellion score is only one), thus 1998-2004 is coded NVIOLSD. The UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset v. 5 reports a best estimate of 26 deaths in 2005, hence the LVIOLSD code in 2005. In 2006-2009 casualty estimates we found are too low to code LVIOLSD, thus the NVIOLSD code. There was an escalation of violence in 2008, but just below the LVIOLSD threshold: in 2008, up to 16 soldiers were killed (Kavkaz Center 2008). The CrisisWatch Database reports over 25 deaths in 2010. No source reports violence in 2011. The UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset v. 5 reports a best estimate of 25 in 2012. Thus 2010 and 2012 are coded as LVIOLSD and 2011 as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**Kurds**

*Summary:* In the early 1990s there was some contention for an autonomous Kurdish Republic in Azerbaijan. “Following the defeat of the Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh by the Armenians, the Kurdish Liberation Movement declared the re-establishment of the Kurdish Autonomous Region, in early 1992” (McDowall 2004: 493; also see Müller 2000: 70). With high certainty, the Kurdish contention was instigated by Armenia. The declared aim of the Kurdish activists was the re-establishment of ‘Red Kurdistan’, an allegedly autonomous area that had existed between 1923-1930. Müller (2000) convincingly argues that ‘Red Kurdistan’ never had autonomous status. The Kurdish contention was shortlived. Already in May 1992, Armenian forces drove a corridor through the proclaimed Republic in order to connect Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. The local Kurds were expelled. Several sources (e.g. World Statesmen) report that the self-proclaimed republic was thereby dissolved. We found no further evidence of separatist activity. In 1993 Armenian forces occupied the rest of the proclaimed republic. We code the movement as active in a single year, 1992. We did not find any reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [March 23, 2002].


**Lezgins**

Summary: Movement activity for the Lezgins in Azerbaijan is coded as of 1991. However, the Lezgin national movement (Sadval) was founded already in 1990 (this is coded under Russia). Thus we note nonviolent activity prior to 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Lezgins began to protest what they consider an arbitrary boundary resulting from the Soviet Union’s collapse. Since the division of territories, the Lezgins have been unable to continue their traditional lifestyles. The Lezgins are herders who have spent centuries grazing their flock on Dagestani land and remaining on the Azerbaijani land during the winter. Grazing activity has decreased drastically as a result of the new international boundary. Similarly, burial grounds are located in Azerbaijan, and water-sharing traditions between the Lezghis have ended as a result of the formal split. In 1993, more than 10,000 protested near the Azeri-Dagestani border to demand the unification of the Lezgin people (Ormrod 1997: 135). The main organization associated with the movement, Sadval, has promoted an independent Lezgistan as well as autonomy for the Lezgins. According to MAR, Lezgin mobilization for self-determination subsided in 1994, when the war over Karabakh ended. MAR reports that Lezgin nationalism entered a “calm period” and that Sadval has recently abandoned the claim for an independent Lezgistan. Meanwhile, the movement continued its activities in Russia (Southern Dagestan is clearly the epicenter of the Lezgin contention, see MAR). MAR codes non-zero protest scores for 1990-1998 and 2001-2002. The 2001-2002 protests, however, were over language rights (see the MAR Risk Assessment). We found no evidence for other protests over self-determination in more recent years, either. Sadval continues to exist but it does not appear to promote separatism. Minahan (2002: 1089) reports that the Lezgin movement sent a letter to the Russian and the Azeri governments in 1996, calling for the unification of their nation. However, it is not clear whether Lezgins in Azerbaijan were involved. Again, the center of Lezgin self-determination agitation is clearly in Dagestan and not in Azerbaijan (MAR). In 2008, Moscow organized a conference (to put pressure on Azerbaijan) “designed to be a propaganda platform for advocating the creation of an independent Lezgin state or Lezgistan with accompanying territorial claims on the Lezgin-populated areas of northern Azerbaijan” (Melikishvili 2008). Whether Lezgins from Azerbaijan participated is not clear. In an interview, a leader of the Sadval organization states that Sadval gave up its work in Azerbaijan due to harsh repression, but that they are working to revive the movement (the interview was in 2012; see BBC Monitoring). In a 2008 report BBC Monitoring stated Sadval was active in both Russia and Azerbaijan, but the report does not say whether Sadval made self-determination claims. In sum, it appears there was limited Lezgin separatist activity in Azerbaijan post-1994. Based on this we code an end to the movement in 2004, following our ten-years rule. In 1993 six Lezgin protestors were killed by the Azeri police according to Minahan (2002: 1088). There have been allegations that Sadval was involved in a 1994 terrorist attack in Baku’s metro, which caused about a dozen deaths. This is insufficient to warrant a LVIOLS code. Another terrorist bombing in 2001 appears not to have exceeded the LVIOLS threshold, either. The whole movement is coded with NVIOLS.

Sources:


SADVAL. “Free Movement Lezgistan.” [http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=en&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dsadv
al%2Bazerbaijan%2B2013%26biw%3D1240%26bih%3D950&rurl=translate.google.com&sl=ru&u=http://lezgistan.tv/category/sadval/&usg=ALkJrhhbfhH2q0KRAXR-j4cBx67DhPreUw] [December 10, 2013].

**Talysh**

*Summary:* Prior to Azerbaijan’s independence, the Talysh lobbied for cultural freedom. This continued until the late 1980s and into the new Azerbaijani nation. After Azerbaijan’s independence, there has been some contention for increased self-determination in the form of autonomy or even independence (Minahan 2002: 1840). The first evidence of separatist activity is in June 1993, when Talysh nationalists declared an autonomous republic (Socor 2005). Already in 1992, the Talysh National Party had been formed (Minority Rights Group International), but it is not clear whether this party advocated separatist goals. The self-declared Talysh republic was quickly dissolved by Azeri forces (in August 1993). Those behind the declaration were arrested and three of them were later convicted of crimes against the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. This appears to have ended Talysh contention for self-determination activity. With Armenian support, the leader of the 1993 uprising, Hummatov, and some others continue to demand secession or autonomy, but there appears to be little local support and no real self-determination movement (Socor 2005; Goble 2013). We code the movement as terminated in 1993. There is no evidence of violence and casualties. The Talysh movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com] [May 28, 2003].


BANGLADESH

Chittagong Hill Peoples

Summary: Upon Bangladesh’s independence, representatives of the Chittagong Hill Peoples presented their case for autonomy to the constitutional drafting committee. Their demands were turned down. In 1972, the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS or Chittagong Hill Tribal People's Coordination Association) was formed, an organization that initially was dedicated to the fight for autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project). Hence, 1972 is coded as the start date. In 1974, the Chittagong Hill peoples came under violent attack by the Bangladeshi army (e.g. large-scale massacres and even allegations of genocide) in its attempts to make way for the settlement of Muslim Bengalis in the Hill Tracts. Soon the tribal leaders began to make claims for outright secession: the establishment of a sovereign state to be called Kaderia or the Confederacy of Chittagong. Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006) we code 1974-1997 as HVIOLSD. Since we found no evidence of violent activity, 1972-1973 is coded as NVIOLSD. Despite a peace agreement in 1997 that provided for a degree of regional autonomy, separatist protests continued in 1998-99 by rebel factions opposed to the peace deal. MAR protest scores are non-zero up until 2004, indicating that the movement was ongoing during those years. The UNPO reports activity going beyond 2004. We find no evidence of violence in the 2000s except for clashes over land-rights protests in 2010. Several people were killed but the deaths do not reach the threshold needed for an LVIOLSD coding (Amnesty International 2/27/2010). Based on this, we code the movement as NVIOLSD from 1998 onward.

Sources:
**Hindus**

**Summary:** As Hindus made up a large percentage of the population in Bengal before Bangladesh separated from Pakistan, a portion of the Hindus were partitioned into Bangladesh after Bangladesh separated from Pakistan. The Hindu population remains the largest religious minority in Bangladesh, but its population has fallen from around 20 percent in the 1970s to only eight percent in 2013 (Minority Rights Group International; Amnesty International 2013). The Hindus are mainly engaged in fighting for political rights, but have also organized against religious discrimination. When Bangladesh was first founded, leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared the country to be secular. However, in 1977, leader Ziaur Rahman changed the policy and instated Islamism as the national religion. In 1988, the Bangladeshi government formalized the move towards Islamism by passing the Eighth Constitutional Amendment, which overturned the Bangladeshi constitution’s declaration of secularism. Despite this, Minority Rights Group International reports that “Article 41 of the constitution recognizes other religions and gives citizens the right to practice and promote their religious beliefs”. Though Article 41 allows religious minorities to practice and teach their own religion to their own communities, the Hindus of Bangladesh have complained of behavior ranging from implicit discrimination to direct persecution of the Hindu religion. The Hindus thus aim to change the Bangladeshi constitution and reinstate a policy of secularism. However, the Bengal Army (Banga Sana) also made claim for a separate Hindu homeland within Bangladesh. Discrimination against Hindus is most starkly demonstrated by the Vest Property Act, which allows the government to repossess land belonging to Hindus – and also demanded the rebuilding of temples that had been destroyed in 1971 (Minorities at Risk Project). Minority Rights Group International claims that the Vest Property Act, which was originally meant to seize enemy property during the seventeen-day war between India and Pakistan in 1965, continue to be implemented even though the war has long ended. In 2001, the Awami League party passed a bill requiring the government to return property to rightful owners within 100 days, but in 2002, the BNP government amended this bill to allow the government an unlimited grace period for returning the property. Subsequent confiscations of land have continued, not only of Hindu land but also those belong to other minorities in Bangladesh (Minority Rights Group International). The Servajanin Puja Udjapar Committee Conference, a Hindu organization, has called for the government end repeal the Vested Property Act (Minorities at Risk Project). The Hindu community continues to protest against the persecution that takes place today, including land confiscations and the desecration of Hindu temples (Amnesty International 2013). Latif (2013: 35) reports a number of Hindu organizations claiming increased self-determination: Banga Sena, Bir Banga Hindu Prajatantra, the Bangladesh Udbastu Unnayan Parishad, the Bangladesh Udbastu Mancha, and the Bir Banga Sena. According to Latif (2013: 35), the idea of a Hindu Republic of Bir Banga first “floated in 1973 in protest against the Pakistani army’s brutal targeting of Hindus in Bengal’s eastern wing.” An organization called Bangabhumi allegedly represented this claim, but the evidence for movement activity in the 1970s and early 1980s is very thin. According to the BBC (2001), “there was never any concrete evidence that it existed.” Thus, we only code the start date in 1985, the year when MAR begins to code non-zero protest scores. These protests have continued, and thus the movement is coded as ongoing (Lexis Nexis). No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

**Sources:**


**BELGIUM**

**Flemish**

*Summary:* The People's Union (Volksunie, VU) was founded in December 1954 as a nationalist party seeking autonomy for Flanders on a “socially progressive, tolerant, modern and forward-looking” platform. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1954. While Flemish political parties have been consistently active in Belgian politics since 1954, separatist riots and demonstrations have also been common. But we find evidence of only one death: Jacques Georgin, a teacher who was putting up election pesters for the Front des Democrates Francophones (FDF), was killed in a Brussels suburb on September 12, 1970, by members of the Vlaamse Militantenorde, an extremist Flemish organization. Since 1970, the movement has remained ongoing but we found no separatist violence. Given this low death count and our coding rules, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [February 24, 2002].


**Germans**

*Summary:* In 1970 the Party of the German-speaking Belgians (Partei der Deutschsprachigen Belgier, PDG) was formed, a party that advocated federalist goals and autonomy for Belgium’s small German-speaking part. The party also advocated an equal status for the German entity within the Belgian federal system, once this had been established. Since this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity, 1970 is coded as start date. In 2009 the PDG was abolished after a weak performance in the 2006 local elections. However, already in 2008, members of the PDG had formed the ProDG (Pro Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft), a party that advocates an equal role for the German-speaking entity within a Belgium of the four regions (the three existing: Wallonia, Flanders, and Brussels, and a fourth, German-speaking entity). ProDG continues to be active. We found no of separatist violence, hence the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. The source cited below contains a basic, though possibly biased overview of concessions to Germans in Belgium.
Sources:


Walloons

Summary: The Democratic Front of French-Speakers (Front Démocratique des Francophones, FDF) was founded in May 1964 with the aim of preserving the French character of the Belgian capital and it incorporated various militant francophone groupings of Brussels. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1964. Its three Chamber seats in the 1965 elections were increased to 10 by 1977, after which it joined a coalition government with the Christian Socialists and Socialists and assisted with the enactment of the 1978 Egmont Pact on regional devolution. Under the plan, Brussels was to become a separate (bilingual) region, i.e. not included in surrounding Flanders as some Flemish nationalists had demanded. The Rassemblement Wallon (RW), another Walloon party, was formed in 1968. The RW participated in a coalition government with the Christian Socialists and Liberals in 1974-77, which helped to secure the passage of the Egmont Pact on devolution, but it gradually became weakened by defections of moderates to what became the Liberal Reformist Party. In 1985 it merged with other radical Walloon groups to form the Walloon Party (Parti Wallon, PW), a left-wing nationalist party advocating a socialist Wallonia, which since then has been consistently active in Belgian politics. Riots and demonstrations have been common, but no reports of deaths, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [February 24, 2002].


Belize

Mayans

Summary: The National Indigenous Council of Belize was founded in 1996, but there were protests already in 1995. Thus, we peg the start date to 1995. There are several organizations representing Mayan and indigenous interests other than the National Council, including the Maya Leaders Alliance and the Toledo Maya Cultural Council, but information about the organizations’ histories is generally scarce. The Mayas asked for a declaration that the villages and its members hold collective and individual rights and title to the land and that government determine, demarcate, and provide official documentation of their titles. The issue seems to be largely about building and development on the land in question: The Supreme Court of Belize ruled in 2007 and again in 2010 that the Mayans who have ancestrally cared for these forests shall hold the legal titles to these lands. However, the Mayans are usually not consulted before the government gives green light for oil extraction. The movement is ongoing. No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:


Note: Belize’s population is less than 500,000. Movements in countries with a population of less than 500,000 are not included in the random draw.
BOLIVIA

Lowland Indigenous Peoples

Summary: In 1982 various groups in eastern Bolivia combined to form the CIDOB (Indigenous Confederation of the East, Chaco and Amazon of Bolivia). As the organization’s central demands are territory and autonomy for the 200,000 lowland Indians who reside in three departments of the country’s eastern region, we peg the start date of the movement at 1982. No reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. MAR reports a rebellion score of 8 in 2003, but this appears to be a typo (the scale goes only to 7 and the coding notes do not make mention of a rebellion). Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1980-99 indicate that the movement was active throughout that time period. CIDOB remains active as of 2012 and thus the movement remains ongoing.

Sources:
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [July 2, 2002].

Quechua-Aymara

Summary: The start date (1952) follows this account in Minahan (2002: 1556): “In April 1952 the Quechuaaymara in the mountains of Bolivia took up arms against the Bolivian government and the mining companies in the first widespread uprising.” The 1952 episode is not coded as armed conflict in any of the major sources (UCDP/PRIO; Doyle & Sambanis 2006; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Hewitt et al. 2008; MAR). But Minahan’s account makes it likely that the LVIOLSD threshold was crossed in 1952, thus 1952 is coded as LVIOLOSD. We found no evidence for nonviolent claim-making prior to the violence that occurred in 1952. In response to the rebellion, Bolivia adopted an agrarian reform that ended the traditional system of serfdom. The Quechua-Aymara continue to make claims for land rights and stronger environmental regulation up to today, and there are instances of organized protest. Thus, we code the movement as ongoing. No violence past 1952 was found, and thus 1953-ongoing is coded as NVIOLSD. MAR reports a rebellion score of 8 in 2002-2003 for Bolivia’s Highland Indigenous Peoples, but this appears to be a typo (the scale goes only to 7 and the coding notes do not make mention of a rebellion).

Sources:


**Santa Cruz (Lowlanders)**

*Summary:* According to Minahan (1996: 479-480) there was significant contention for independence in Santa Cruz in the early 20th century. Minahan (1996: 480) reports a nationalist resurgence in the late 20th century, but we found no clear evidence of organized separatist activity before 2003. In the wake of the 2003 overthrow of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada, hundreds of thousands of Santa Cruz residents answered a call from Santa Cruz’s Civic Committee (Comité Pro Santa Cruz). We peg the start date to 2003. The Santa Cruz movement seeks a higher percentage of local tax revenues for local use; it is a whites-dominated movement. They demand that an autonomous region should be able to keep two-thirds of non-trade tax revenues collected in the region. Measures of fiscal decentralization favored municipal, not regional, governments. Other demands include regional legislatures with law-making abilities, regional control over land tenure, and greater regional control over public security. The support behind autonomy in Santa Cruz is quite strong: solid majorities of voters have consistently voted in favor of referenda and popular consultations that call on the national government to recognize sweeping forms of autonomy. A referendum was held in July 2, 2006, where 71% of Santa Cruz residents voted in favor of autonomy (56% of Bolivians rejected it). There is analogous agitation for autonomy in three other departments (Beni, Pando, and Tarija); however, due to the strong link with the Santa Cruz movement and the overlapping goals we code them all together. The movement is ongoing as of 2012. No violence associated with the Santa Cruz movement could be found, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


**Bosnia**

**Bihacs (Western Bosniaks)**

*Summary:* The short-lived movement was initiated by Fikret Abdić, a member of the Bosnian state presidency and a Bosniak businessman, who opposed the division of Bosnia into three ethnically-based territories and declared the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia in September 1993. 1993 is thus coded as start date. The Autonomous Province set up a 400-strong Constituent Assembly and elected Abdić as president. Bosnian troops entered the territory and serious fighting around the city of Cazin killed more than 50 people (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). According to UCDP, the start date for the armed conflict was on October 5, 1993, just a few days or weeks after the autonomy declaration, and the movement emerged in the midst of an ongoing civil war, so it is best qualified as violent from the start. Cooperating with separatist Serbs from Bosnia and Croatia, Abdić managed to gain and maintain control over large parts of the Bihac area throughout 1994 and despite another offensive by the Bosnian army in August. In July 1995 the status of the Bihacka Krajina was unilaterally upgraded from 'Autonomous Province' to 'Independent Republic.' The movement was eventually defeated in August 1995 when troops of the Bosnian and Croatian government launched another offensive and Abdic, having lost the support of his allies, admitted defeat. The movement ended in 1995 (O’Shea 2011; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The Bihacs were involved in the 1992-1995 Bosnian war that is coded as a civil war by Doyle & Sambanis (2006). However, data from UCDP suggests that casualties in the dyad in question (Bihacs-Bosnian state) did not cross the HVIOLSD threshold (though crossing the LVIOLSD threshold in all years), thus we apply a LVIOLSD code in 1993-1995.

*Sources:*


**Bosnian Croats**

*Summary:* The Bosnian Croat movement became active on November 18, 1991, when the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna (HZHB) was formed and began to make claims for “a separate or distinct political, cultural, economic and territorial [entity] in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina“ (ICTY 2001). However, the foundation of the HZHB was a direct consequence of the Bosnian independence declaration in 1991 and therefore, we only code a Bosnian Croat self-determination movement in independent Bosnia (thus as of 1992). HVIOLSD coding for 1992-95 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The 1995 Dayton accords created a confederal Bosnian state with a collective presidency. Although recognized as a constituent people, Croats continue to demand more rights and autonomy, though
nonviolently. This is reflected in non-zero MAR protest scores and newspaper articles from 2011 and 2013. The Bosnian Croats movement is thus coded as ongoing and NVIOLSD from 1996 onward.

**Sources:**


ICTY (2001). The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No: IT-98-34-PT.  

Lexis Nexis.  


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**Bosnian Serbs**

*Summary:* The Serb Democratic Party was established in Bosnia in 1990 (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 150). In spring 1991 the SDP set up “Serbian Autonomous Regions” in Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia and declared them no longer under the authority of the republican government (Gagnon 1994: 159). In November 1991, a referendum was organized in the Serbian part of Bosnia on a merger with Serbia. Note: we do not code a Bosnian Serb movement under Yugoslavia since demands for autonomy/independence only surfaced as a reaction to the prospect of Bosnia’s secession and the conflict was over autonomy/separation from an independent Muslim-controlled Bosnia. Thus, this was not a case of an autonomy movement targeting the Yugoslav state, which was Serb-controlled. We do, however, indicate that this movement was active prior to Bosnia’s independence. Fighting between Serbs (including from Croatia and Serbia proper) had spilled over into Bosnia prior to Bosnia’s independence. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, violence flared up in early March 1992, thus shortly after the Bosnian independence referendum of February 29/March 1. According to Correlates of War (Russet et al. 1968; Sarkees & Wayman 2010), Bosnia’s date of independence is in early April 1992. Gleditsch & Ward (1999) even peg the date of independence to late April 1992. Based on this, we note prior violent activity. Violence escalated markedly after independence, which was perceived by the Serbs as a violation of their rights and an uneven application of the right to self-determination. The HVIOILSD coding for 1992-95 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The 1995 Dayton accords created a confederal Bosnian state with a collective presidency, marking the end of the war. There continues to be a strong secessionist movement among Serbs. As an example, we note that in 2011, Republika Srpska’s Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, threatened to organize a unilateral referendum on secession (International Crisis Group 2011). Thus, the movement is coded as ongoing and NVIOLSD from 1996 onwards.
Sources:


BOTSWANA

San Bushmen

Summary: The San Bushmen are indigenous hunters that live in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Angola. Altogether, there are 100,000 San Bushman, of which 5,000 Gana, Gwi, and Tsila Bushmen reside in Botswana. In Botswana, the San Bushmen live in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, which was created to preserve the traditional territories of the Bushmen tribes. There, they continue to live according to their hunter-gatherer traditions separated from modern Botswana society. However, the 1980s discovery of diamonds in the reserve resulted in forced displacements that began in 1988, destroying Bushmen property and their hunting culture (Washington Post 3/27/1988, Lexis Nexis). Survival International reports, “In three big clearances, in 1997, 2002, and 2005, virtually all the Bushmen were forced out. Their homes were dismantled, their school and health post were closed, their water supply was destroyed and the people were threatened and trucked away” (Survival International 2013). The Bushmen have been active in fighting to regain their traditional lands, access to water wells, and retain rights to their traditional hunting and herding lifestyle. In 2002, the Bushmen began a movement to take legal action. The movement has led to a court case in 2006, which resulted in a historic victory for the Bushmen as the Botswana judges deemed the government actions as unconstitutional. However, despite the ruling, the Kenyan government continues to oppress the Bushmen and prevent their return by claiming that “the ruling applies only to the 189 Bushmen named in the original court papers – it refuses to allow the others to enter the reserve without a permit. Permit last just a month…” (All Africa 3/21/2013). Those who have been able to return are prohibited from resuming their cultural traditions as they are not allowed to possess hunting permits and livestock used for transportation are banned. Thus despite their victory in 2006, the San Bushmen continue to fight for cultural and regional autonomy. In 2011, they were successful in appealing for the right to create wells in the Game Reserve to ensure access to water. All Africa reports that, for the third time, the Bushmen are fighting against the government in court for unrestricted access to the Game Reserve, which is their ancestral homeland. The first instance of formal protest against such measures seem to have begun in 1995, when the Bushmen hired a lawyer, Roger Chennells, to help regain their ancestral territory (The Observer 1/7/1996, Lexis Nexis). Based on this, self-determination movement is coded as starting in 1995, and remains ongoing as of 2012. No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:
BRAZIL

Geralians

Summary: Geralians are descendents of German and Italian immigrants who settled in southern Brazil. The Movement for the Independence of the Pampas (MIP) was founded in 1990, hence the start date of the movement. In 1990 Geralian separatists also advanced a plan for an independent Republic of the Pampas in southern Brazil. A poll in 1991 demonstrated overwhelming support in the region for some form of political and economic autonomy and 2/5 of those polled favored complete independence. Geralian separatists were reported in news sources to have been active also in 1992 and 1993. No subsequent movement was found, and thus the end of the movement is coded as 2003. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Indigenous Peoples

Summary: Minorities at Risk reports that based on research from the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), there are over 233 documented indigenous groups on Brazilian territory and that over 100 indigenous languages are spoken by these groups. Many of the social and cultural traditions of these groups are local and tribal-based. The largest groups include the Guarani, who number over 20,000 people and the Yanomami (also called Yanomamo), who number over 18,000. Other large indigenous groups include the Baniwa (5,000), the Guajajara (10,000), the Kaimbla (11,000), the Kaingang (18,000), the Kaiwa (14,000), the Terena (15,000), and the Ticuna (12,000). A number of these groups have sought increased autonomy. Since these groups are very small and it is difficult to identify every indigenous group that has sought autonomy, we follow Marshall & Gurr (2003: 63) and code a single indigenous movement. Marshall & Gurr (2003: 63) note organized self-determination activity since the early 1970s. MAR codes non-zero protest scores since 1970. Thus 1970 is coded as start date. Newspaper reports and non-zero MAR protest scores indicate that the movement has been active since then. We found no evidence for separatist violence in 1970-1979, thus these years are coded with NVIOLSD. The 5-year MAR rebellion score of the Amazonian Indians is 3 in 1980-1984. The MAR coding notes do not make clear the specific event(s) this is due. In line with general practice, all five years are coded with LVIOLSD. 1985-1992 are again coded as NVIOLSD. The MAR rebellion score of the Amazonian Indians is again 3 in 1993, thus 1993 is coded as LVIOLSD. 1994-2002 are coded as NVIOLSD. The MAR rebellion score of the Amazonian Indians is again 3 in 2003, thus 2003 is coded as LVIOLSD. Furthermore, the MAR coding notes mention a massacre caused by the indigenous people that killed 29 diamond prospectors in 2004. It is somewhat ambiguous whether the 2004 incident should be coded as
violence over self-determination, thus only 2003 is coded with LVIOLSD and 2004-2012 as NVIOLSD. It should be noted that there are murders every year, which often add up to more than 25 deaths per year. For example, there were 83 indigenous deaths in 2007. However, we do not code it as LVIOLSD since it was not a result of organized violence, but of murders related to land disputes.

Sources:

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [February 24, 2002].


Bakassi

*Summary:* Bakassi Penninsula was a disputed territory between Nigeria and Cameroon that caused interstate tensions and border clashes throughout the 1990s. In 2002, the ICJ ruled that the Penninsula was to be ceded from Nigeria to Cameroon. The process of transfer began in 2006 and was formally completed in 2008. Though the territory was disputed, those living in Bakassi consider themselves Nigerians and thus protested their change in nationalities. In 2006, hundreds of Bakassi residents formed the Bakassi Movement for Self Determination (BAMOSD) a militant group aiming at complete secession and the formation of a new state, the Democratic Republic of Bakassi. BAMOSD refused to accept Cameroonian sovereignty but also refused relocation within Nigeria (BBC UK, 8/7/2006). Since Bakassi was not under Cameroonian sovereignty until 2008, we code the Bakassi movement as of 2008, but we note prior non-violent activity (see Bakassi under Nigeria). BAMOSD remains active as of 2012 but another group, the Bakassi Freedom Fighters, surrendered under amnesty in 2009. In 2012, the Bakassi Self-Determination Front (BSDF) was founded to declare an independent Bakassi. Thus, the movement is ongoing. There has been violence stemming from the Bakassi movement, although the rebel groups have engaged mostly in kidnapping and holding hostages. On December 19, 2009, rebels killed one police officer during an attack and clashes in mid-February 2010 injured 24 civilians (CrisisWatch Database). Two soldiers were killed in February 2011 (Lexis Nexis). Since violence does not reach the 25 deaths per year threshold, we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*

Bakassi Movement for Self Determination. “About.”

http://bakassimovementforselfdetermination.wordpress.com/about/ [April 14, 2014].


International Crisis Group. “CrisisWatch Database.”


Johnson, Constance (2013). “Cameroon

Nigeria: Bakassi Peninsula Transition Completed.” August 23.


Bamileke

*Summary:* The first openly nationalistic organization advocating self-determination, the Union Bamileke, was formed in 1948 while Cameroon was still under colonial rule (Minahan 2002: 263). Note: French Cameroon became independent in 1960 and British Cameroon was joined to it in 1962 to form a united country. In the late 1940s, there were strikes and demonstrations demanding a united Bamilekeland.
Bamileke claims included the reunification of East and West Canada. In 1954 British Cameroon was added to Nigeria. According to Minahan (2002: 264), the Union of Cameroonian Peoples (UPC), an organization that recruited heavily from Bamilekes, began an armed struggle for the independence of Cameroon in 1955. In partial agreement with this, UCDP/PRIO codes an extra-systemic conflict involving the UPC over Cameroon from 1957-1959. Keesing’s, too, suggests violence in the pre-independence phase: Keesing’s reports separatist violence in 1959 resulting in at least 200-300 deaths. We begin to code the movement in 1960, the year of Cameroon’s independence. However, because there was (anti-colonial) activity from 1948 we peg the start date to 1948. We denote violent prior activity due to the armed conflict from 1957 (or possibly 1955)-1959. In 1961 British Cameroon (including a significant Bamileke population) joined Cameroon after a plebiscite. However, this did not whet the appetite of the Bamilekes, who continued to contend for an independent Bamilekeland (Minahan 2002: 264). The Bamileke rebellion was defeated in 1963, with French military assistance. The revolt resurfaced in the late 1960s, though with lower intensity. It ended in 1971 when “the Bamileke rebellion became a liberation movement, supported by many Marxist and socialist states” (Minahan 2002: 265). Thus, we code an end to the first phase of activity in 1971. Violence over self-determination resulted in about 120 deaths in 1960. In 1966 violence resulted in another 127 casualties. It seems likely that there were casualties also in 1961-1963 (Minahan 2002: 264 reports that the “five-year rebellion” that ended in 1963 “cost over 70,000 lives”. Thus, 1960-1966 is coded with LVIOLSD. We do not code HVIOLSD despite Minahan’s report of 70,000 casualties since Doyle & Sambanis (2006) do not code a war. There are also reports of some killings in 1967, 1969 and 1970, but in each year the number of deaths was in the single digits. Therefore, 1967-1971 is coded as NVIOLSD. Organized Bamileke activity geared towards self-determination resurfaged in 1992 with the introduction of multi-party elections. Cooperating with the South Anglophones, Bamileke groups demanded a return to the pre-1972 federal system, among other things. Non-zero MAR protest scores extend until 1998, and no subsequent separatist sentiments were found in Lexis Nexis or Keesing’s. Following the 10 years inactivity rule, the end date is coded as 2008. We found no evidence for separatist violence and hence code the second phase with NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [December 11, 2013].
Lexis Nexis. [December 10, 2013].

Westerners

Summary: Westerners are English-speaking ethnic Cameroonians who live primarily in the country’s Northwest and Southwest provinces. In 1980, Cameroon’s Anglophones launched an organization, the Cameroon Action Movement, that advocated a return to the federal system (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 59). Thus 1980 is coded the start date. In March 1990 the Social Democratic Front (SDF), an Anglophone opposition party, was inaugurated. By the mid-1990s the SDF was advocating autonomy for the Anglophone region, though it seems that self-determination for the Westerners was not an issue for the SDF at its founding. According to a January 1992 news report, “after 30 years of silent submission, the ‘Anglophone’ (English-speaking) minority of Cameroon have decided to fight for their rights. Since the
beginning of last week, the Cameroon Anglophone Movement has been circulating a pamphlet calling on English-speaking Cameroonians to stage nationwide demonstrations Feb. 11 to press for a return to the federal system of government abolished in 1972.” While the SDF seems to have advocated just more autonomy for the region, the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) and some other smaller groups took a harder line by advocating secession with, if necessary, the use of violence. In September 1993 rumors spread that the Bamenda All-Anglophone Conference, an additional Southwestern movement, and two self-determination movements in the Northwest and Southwest provinces planned to proclaim on October 1 the independence of their respective provinces. The Southern Cameroon National Council continues to remain active in seeking secession. The movement is thus ongoing. Violence since onset has been minimal. The Westerners’ MAR rebellion score is 3 in 1992; however we found only two deaths and thus do not code LVIOLSD: in October 1992, illegal protest and demonstrations by members of CAM resulted in two deaths. There was some violence in subsequent years. For example, in 2004, a member of the SCNC was killed by plain-clothed attackers, suspected to be security forces; two students in April 2005 were killed by security forces during a protest for better education; the Administrative Secreta of the SDF was killed in May 2006 by an unknown group, and two more students were killed in November 2006 during a riot at Buea University. Since the death count does not meet our definition of LVIOLSD, we classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Acadians

Summary: The revival of Acadian culture in the 1970s set off a cultural and political movement. The cultural movement, represented by the Société Acadienne du Nouveau-Brunswick (SANB), primarily focused on French-language education in New Brunswick. Organized demands for more political autonomy surfaced with the formation of the Parti Acadien in 1972. The Parti Acadien called for a “decentralization of government offices and the eventual creation of an Acadian province by splitting New Brunswick from northeast to southwest” (Magocsi 1999: 134). Given the linguistic proximity and the fact that Acadians have a large community in southeastern Quebec, the Parti Acadien was supported by the Parti Québécois in its pursuit of an own province. After an unsuccessful performance in the 1974 elections, the party won 7.9% in the 1978 elections in the province of New Brunswick. Following a defeat in the 1982 elections, the party officially disbanded in 1986 (Magord 2009). The SANB is still active but given that its purpose is restricted to cultural goals, we code an end to the movement with the dissolution of the Parti Acadien in 1986. No violence was found; hence the entire movement is coded with NVIOLOSD.

Sources:

Alberta

Summary: Alberta is a Canadian province in the bordering British Columbia and Saskatchewan. Separatists have been recently active in fighting for an independent Albertan nation. Grievances against Canada revolve largely around Ottawa’s economic policies and Alberta’s economic resources: Separatists believe that secession would provide a better economic foundation for Albertans when they are not subject to Canadian politics. The website Free Alberta notes that “Alberta would be better off economically, where [their] per capita would rise to the world’s 2nd best behind Luxembourg” (FreeAlberta.com). Besides economic reasons, Albertan separatists also cite their frustration over their lack of input in the government due to the federalized nature of Canada especially because of the small population living in Alberta. Free Alberta writes, “[it] means that areas with greater population make the rules. Albertans are not masters in our own house. That is why legislation antithetical to Alberta gets passed” (FreeAlberta.com). Several groups have lobbied for separatism in Alberta. Alberta had originally made an attempt at secession in the 1980s, when it formed the Western Canada Concept (WCC) along with British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. The WCC continues to exist, but new groups have emerged as well. CBC News reports in 2001: “About 200 people took part in the founding convention of
the Alberta Independence Party” and “made passionate pleas for separation arguing that the regional divisions within Canada are already too wide to bridge any longer” (CBC News 1/22/2001). Unlike the WCC, the AIP represented an effort that solely represents Alberta. However, the AIP was never able to achieve party status despite putting several candidates up for provincial elections. Subsequently, the Separation Party of Alberta was created and aimed to take part in the 2004 provincial elections, but was not able to get elected. In 2013, the Separation Party of Alberta renamed itself to the Alberta First Party. Based on this information, the start date of the self-determination movement is coded as 1982 to coincide with the birth of the WCC. The movement is coded as ongoing as the Alberta First Party continues to remain active. No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:

Cree

Summary: The Cree are an indigenous people mainly located in the northern part of the Quebec province. The Grand Council of the Crees, the first formal Cree political organization, was formed in 1974 to negotiate for the protection of land rights in face of the James Bay hydro-electric project. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1974. Since then the Cree have actively opposed Quebecois separatism, with the argument that the independence of Quebec would be a violation of their right to self-determination. (Quebecois separatists do not want to give up the Indian territory, largely because it includes Quebec’s hydro-electric power plant.) We therefore classify the movement as ongoing. The Cree have stated that if Quebec were allowed to secede, they would declare their own independence. For example, in July 1991 Chief Ted Moses, a leader of the Grand Council of the Crees, told a UN commission that if Quebec were to declare sovereignty, the Cree would in turn declare themselves an independent nation. On other occasions the Cree have sought formal arrangements to remain part of Canada in the event of Quebec’s independence. For example, in February 1998 the Grand Council of Crees filed suit in the Supreme Court of Canada to try to remain part of Canada should Quebec try to secede. In 2002, the Cree and the Canadian government signed an agreement (the “Agreement Concerning a New Relationship”) addressing hydroelectric development. In 2005, the Mikisew Cree First Nation formally took to court an appeal regarding land rights. Besides formal arrangements, the Cree have also protested for more autonomy. From 2012-2013, organized protests – Idle No More – involve many indigenous tribes and have become a global movement. The grievances include infringement of land rights and environmental pollution on tribal lands. It aims to “help build sovereignty and resurgence of nationhood.” We found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. The MAR rebellion score of Canada’s indigenous peoples is three in 1990. This relates to an event involving the Iroquois and, furthermore, is considered too minimal to constitute armed rebellion (just a single casualty; for more details see the entry of the Iroquois).
Dene

Summary: The Dene speak Northern Athabaskan languages and are the largest tribe in what remained of the Northwest Territories after the establishment of Nunavut in 1999. The Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories (now Dene Nation) was established in 1970 to protect the rights and interests of the Dene (Dene Nation). The foundation charter, however, does not contain any reference to self-determination. The Dene first articulated their claims for self-determination in the Dene Declaration of 1975 where they stated that the “Dene of the NWT insist upon the right to be regarded by ourselves and the world as a nation” and that they “seek independence and self-determination within Canada” (Papillon 2014: 41). More specific, the Dene demanded the establishment of a separate Dene-controlled government within the Mackenzie Valley. The declaration was approved by more than 300 delegates from all Denendeh communities representing the Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories. 1975 is thus coded as start date. According to Hewitt and Cheetham (2000: 203), the Dene movement has waned in recent years (thus in the late 1990s). However, we did not find evidence of dissolution of the Dene Nation or its claim for autonomy and thus code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. Note: the above-mentioned 1975 declaration in support of Dene autonomy was also supported by the association of the Northwest Territories’ Métis. However, in 1976, the Métis Association argued that it does not want to support the autonomist goals of the Dene, but instead work towards the well-being of the Métis themselves. Though there are some Métis who appear to have autonomist sentiments, we found no organized activity towards increased self-determination among the Métis. In particular, the Métis National Council (MNC) which had been founded in 1983 and became the main Métis organization, did not raise demands for autonomy but only stated that the MNC’s goal is “to secure a healthy space for the Métis Nation’s on-going existence within the Canadian federation” (Metis National Council). Based on this, we do not code a separate Métis movement.
**Haida**

**Summary:** Since 1980 when the Council of the Haida Nation was founded, the Haida Nation has begun a legal battle to claim sovereignty over the Queen Charlotte Islands and the Pacific Ocean waters around the islands. The Council continues to fight for “full independence, sovereignty, and self-sufficiency of the Haida Nation.” From 2012-2013, the Haida have also taken part in organized protests – Idle No More – involving many indigenous tribes and have become a global movement. The grievances include infringement of land rights and environmental pollution on tribal lands. It aims to “help build sovereignty and resurgence of nationhood.” We found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. The MAR rebellion score of Canada’s indigenous peoples is three in 1990. This relates to an event involving the Iroquois and, furthermore, is considered too minimal to constitute armed rebellion (just a single casualty; for more details see the entry of the Iroquois).

**Sources:**

Council of the Haida Nations “Mandates and Responsibilities.”
[http://www.haidanation.ca/Pages/governance/mandate.html](http://www.haidanation.ca/Pages/governance/mandate.html) [December 11, 2013].


**Innu**

*Summary:* The main Innu self-determination movement, the Innu Nation, was formed as the Naskapi-Montagnais Innu Association (NMIA) in 1977. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1977. Since then the movement has been actively seeking to resolve land claims and win greater autonomy for the Innu in Quebec and Labrador, who inhabit a region known as Nitassinan. From 2012-2013, the Innu have also taken part in organized protests – Idle No More – involving many indigenous tribes. The grievances include infringement of land rights and environmental pollution on tribal lands. It aims to “help build sovereignty and resurgence of nationhood.” We found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. The MAR rebellion score of Canada’s indigenous peoples is three in 1990. This relates to an event involving the Iroquois and, furthermore, is considered too minimal to constitute armed rebellion (just a single casualty; for more details see the entry of the Iroquois).

*Sources:*


Innu Nation. [http://www.innu.ca/the_innu.html](http://www.innu.ca/the_innu.html) [July 2, 2003].


**Inuit**

*Summary:* In 1963 Inuit nationalists put forward a plan to divide the Northwest Territories and create a self-governing Inuit homeland. As this seems to have been the first public demand for self-government (and a demand made by several Inuit organizations), we peg the start date of the movement at 1963. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 213) report that Tapirisat, a national Inuit organization, began to advocate partition in 1977. News reports indicate that the movement was active throughout 1963-99. In 1999 Nunavut became an autonomous Inuit state within Canada. We found no subsequent activity, and therefore pegged the end of the self-determination movement at 1999. We found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. The MAR rebellion score of Canada’s indigenous peoples is three in 1990. This relates to an event involving the Iroquois and, furthermore, is considered too minimal to constitute armed rebellion (just a single casualty; for more details see the entry of the Iroquois).
Iroquois

Summary: A growing demand for Native American rights and for redress of past injustices merged with the liberation philosophy of the 1960s to produce Red Power. Specifically, in 1977 Iroquois representatives presented a petition seeking that the Iroquois Confederacy, a political unit that predates both Canada and the US, be recognized as a sovereign nation. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1977. The Haudenosaunee government continues to operate and, notably, has issued its own passports. From 2012-2013, the Iroquois have also taken part in organized protests – Idle No More – involving many indigenous tribes. The grievances include infringement of land rights and environmental pollution on tribal lands. It aims to “help build sovereignty and resurgence of nationhood.” Thus the movement is coded as ongoing. The MAR rebellion score of Canada’s indigenous peoples is 3 in 1990. The MAR chronology makes clear that this is due to a local rebellion by the Mohawks, a member of the Iroquois confederacy (see Jul 11 – Sep 26, 1990); however, the incident involves a single death and thus we do not code LVIOLSD: “The Surete de Quebec launches an unsuccessful raid on a 4-month blockade (which began on March 11) of a road leading to some disputed land at Oka municipal golf course. In sympathy the Kahnawake Mohawks blockade a main arterial bridge into Montreal sparking protests and racial confrontations by enraged commuters. Police failure to dismantle a barricade erected by warriors and Mohawk sympathizers at Oka result in a 78-day armed standoff. During this period: up to 3,700 Army personnel are involved at a time; a policeman is killed; up to 7,000 angry Canadian demonstrators clash with police, throw Molotov cocktails and burn Native effigies; the Canadian federal Deputy Indian Affairs minister accuses the Indians at Oka of being “criminals” and engaging in “armed insurrection”; and white protestors hurl rocks and debris at fleeing Mohawk elders, women and children while police and soldiers look on with apparent disinterest. Mohawk demands include: that the government turn over all disputed lands at the Kanesatake reserve to the Mohawks; that the government legalize the operation of an existing high-stakes bingo parlor on the Kahnawke reserve; and the government make a commitment to the creation – within 3 years – of an autonomous domain that would encompass 6 Mohawk communities. The government does agree to purchase the disputed land. Most of the protesters flee on September 1 when army troops raid the barricade but about two dozen members of the paramilitary Mohawk Warrior Society, together with about 30 women and children, hold out until September 26 when they surrender because they prefer to surrender to the federal troops rather than the Quebec provincial police.” We found no reports of separatist violence in other years, thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.
Newfoundlanders

Summary: Newfoundland’s dominion status under the British crown was suspended from 1933-46. During that time two major political factions emerged: pro-Canada and pro-independence. Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949 as the tenth province, under protest of the pro-independence faction. Following unification with Canada, protests for independence declined. Since this period of Newfoundlander separatism sought independence not from Canada, but from British colonial status, it is considered a colonial liberation movements, and we do not code it not in our dataset of ethnic self-determination movements. However, there was a resurgence of Newfie separatism in the 1980s with the formation of the Party for an Independent Newfoundland in 1983 (Minahan 2003: 1374). We therefore peg the start of the movement at 1983. We find no further reports of separatist activity in news sources (Keesing’s and Lexis-Nexis) and while there continues to be strong separatist sentiment, there appears to have been no organized activity. Based on this, we peg an end to the movement at 1993, following the ten-years rule. We found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Quebecois

Summary: The evidence we collected suggests at least more or less uninterrupted activity since the early 19th century. Linguistic conflict has been an enduring feature of Canadian history ever since the British conquest of Quebec in 1759 (Fenwick 1981: 196). The first evidence we found for organized activity that could be termed as separatist is the formation of the Canadian Party in the early 19th century, which among other things demanded full responsible government – a form of internal autonomy (Encyclopedia Britannica). We were unable to uncover an exact date of formation, though the party was active since at least 1806, when it launched its own newspaper, Le Canadien (Canadian Encyclopedia). In the 1830s, the secessionist Patriot Party sought an independent Quebec; the agitation culminated in an unsuccessful rebellion in 1837-1838 (Encyclopedia Britannica). According to Britannica, the “British military forces crushed the rebels” and “a few were hanged and others exiled in Australia.” Overall, the rebellion cost about 250 lives (Greer 1993: 3). According to an 1839 report, the source of the rebellion was “two nations warring in the bosom of a single state” (Encyclopedia Britannica). Responsible government was granted in 1848. Encyclopedia Britannica suggests that agitation for increased self-determination continued, as the Quebecois political elite “pushed hard for and won the right to use their own language in the assembly and gained full control over educational, social, and municipal institutions in Canada East” (Encyclopedia Britannica). In 1867, the Canadian Dominion was created; Quebec received far-reaching autonomy (Encyclopedia Britannica). According to Minahan (2002: 1546), other Quebecois nationalist organizations pressing for political and linguistic autonomy were formed in the late 19th century, including the Sons of Liberty and the Association of St. Jean Baptiste. Encyclopedia Britannica, too, suggests some activity in the latter half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, led by nationalists such as Henri Bourassa and Lionel-Adolphe Groulx. In 1935, the conservative-nationalist Union Nationale (UN) was formed, a major, yet now defunct political party advocating more autonomy for francophone Quebec (Quinn 1949). The Union Nationale often dominated the provincial government between 1936 and 1970. Quebec’s other major party at the time, the liberal party, PLQ, was also federalist (which in the Quebecois context means they want Quebec to gain in competencies but also stay in Canada, see Meadwell 1993: 203-204). In contrast to the UN, the PLQ remains active up to date. In the 1960s parts of the self-determination movement radicalized, and an independence movement emerged. One of the first significant independentist groups was the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ), founded in 1963. Then, in 1968, the Parti Quebecois (PQ) was founded, the major political party advocating independence for Quebec. The PQ formed the (regional) government three times (including the current minority government), and continues to advocate sovereignty to date. The UN lost in significance after the PQ’s founding, and was finally dissolved in the 1980s. The PLQ continues to advocate federalist positions, i.e., more autonomy but not secession. Movement activity thus continues beyond 2012. Based on this narrative, we code the Quebecois as of 1945, the first year covered in our data set, but note prior activity. The evidence we collected suggests a more or less continually active movement since the formation of the Canadian Party in the early 19th century. The party’s date of formation is unclear, but it has been active since at least 1806 (see above). Thus 1806 is coded as start date. The movement is coded as ongoing as of 2012. There was a violent uprising in 1837/1838 (see above), but we found no evidence of separatist violence above the threshold thereafter. Minahan (2002: 1546) reports two “short-lived rebellions” in 1870 and 1884. The 1870 rebellion was fought by the Métis, an aboriginal people, though half French and half Indian. It led to the establishment of Manitoba Province. The 1884 rebellion referred to by Minahan likely corresponds to the Métis rebellion noted by Fenwick (1981: 202), in which the Métis attempted to gain independence. The rebellion was quickly suppressed after government troops were sent in. Since the Métis are an aboriginal people and not located in Quebec, the Métis’ rebellions should not be associated with the Quebecois. Furthermore, Quebecois separatists appear to have engaged in violent activity in 1970, namely the kidnapping of several Canadian politicians and the murder of one of these. Since fewer than 25 persons were killed and the MAR rebellion score for 1970-75 is less than 3 (i.e. 2), we nevertheless code the entire movement as NVIOLSD. We also note that activity immediately prior to 1945 was non-violent.
Westerners

Summary: The term Westerners, as employed here, relates to English-speaking Canadians in British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan; some also include English-speakers in Manitoba and the Northwest and Yukon Territories. In 1974, the Committee for Western independence was founded (Minahan 2002: 2062), the first evidence of separatist activity we came across. In 1980, the Western Canada Concept (WCC) was registered as a political party, advocating independence for the above-mentioned four western provinces and the Northwest and Yukon Territories. However, the WCC ceased to exist as a movement in 2001 after losing elections. Also the Western Independence party, which split from the WCC in 1987, appears to have ceased its activities by then. Those supporting independence readjusted their goals to fighting for the independence of individual provinces (relevant organizations

Sources:
include the Separation Party of Alberta and the Western Independence Party of Saskatchewan). A new Western party emerged in 2005, the Western Block Party, but this party never got any significant support. We therefore code the end date as 2001. As we find no reports of separatist violence, we also classify it as NVIOLSD. Note: of the separatist movements in Alberta and Saskatchewan, we only code the former as the movement in Saskatchewan appears too fringe.

Sources:


CHAD

Northerners

Summary: In 1966 several Muslim leaders demanded the secession of the Northern provinces and the establishment of an independent Islamic Republic of North Chad. Hence we peg the start date of the movement at 1966. The Front de Libération du Tchad (FROLINAT) assumed the leadership of the diverse Northern groups and the nationalists’ demands for autonomy, a larger share of power, and a fairer distribution of development funds were rejected by the Southern-dominated government. In 1978 FROLINAT forces gained control of most of northern Chad, but the French intervened and forced negotiations. A government of national reconciliation, including Muslim leaders, fell apart and war resumed in 1979. In March 1979 FROLINAT forces took control of the capital and drove the Southerners from power. It seems that no further demands for more autonomy were made once the Northerners were in power. Since these years (1966-79) correspond to civil war in the Doyle & Sambanis (2006) dataset they are coded as HVIOLSD, though marked as “ambiguous” since the war was primarily over the control of the central government and not over secession (c.f. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér & Wallensteen 2014). The evidence is limited but overall suggests that the movement could have emerged as violent, with no prior nonviolence.

Sources:

Southerners

Summary: Keesing’s reports that a secessionist movement among the southern Chadians was formed in 1980 and that it right away engaged in skirmishes against the northern rebels (suggesting that the movement was violent from the start). Marshall & Gurr (2003: 61) state that separatist violence started in 1979, but since this claim contradicts what appears to be the case study reports, we pegged the start date
of the movement to 1980. The Southerners were a party to the civil wars in Chad. Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006) we coded 1980-87 and 1990-1994 as HVIOLSD, though marked as “ambiguous” since it appears that the war was primarily over the control of the central government and not over secession (c.f. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér & Wallensteen 2014). We found no reports of violence in 1988-1989, thus the NVIOLSD code. Marshall & Gurr (2003: 61) report that the Southerners engaged in separatist armed conflict from 1992-98. However, no source other than Marshall & Gurr reports violence in 1995-1997, suggesting that Marshall & Gurr’s code bases on their 5-year recurrence rule (they code ongoing conflict if conflict recurs within five years). Specifically, the MAR rebellion score is zero in 1995-1997 and UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict either. Thus 1995-1997 is coded with NVIOLSD. 1998 is coded as LVIOLSD following Marshall & Gurr and a MAR rebellion score of three. We again apply an ambiguous code. We found no reports of separatist violence since 1999, hence a NVIOLSD classification for those years. MAR gives non-zero scores in 2001 and 2006, and an umbrella group of exiled armed movements and political parties, including former Southern Chadian separatists, reopened dialogue with the government in 2002. However, it seems that the 2002 dialogue and the 2006 non-zero protest score pertains to a fight over power in the government rather than the issue of autonomy, which was last raised in 2001. These incidents are thus not considered part of the self-determination movement. Based on a lack of activity, we code the end of the separatist movement as 2011, following the ten-years rule.

Sources:


CHILE

Easter Islanders (Rapa Nui)

Summary: In 1994, the Rapa Nui demanded control of their own affairs in order to save the remnants of their culture through their Council of Elders. We peg the start date to 1994. Previously, the Rapa Nui had petitioned to emigrate to Tahiti in the 1930s, but were subsequently more engaged in gaining Chilean citizenship. The Rapa Nui Parliament was founded in 2000 (a more radical grouping that emerged from the Council of Elders). The Rapa Nui Parliament demands more autonomy over its own lands, both political and cultural. The Parliament requested secession in a letter to Sebastian Pinera in 2010. In 2012, they crowned their own king, Valentino Ririroko Tuki. We code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. Protests have become more violent in recent years and have resulted in injuries, but we found no instances of deaths. Thus, we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Mapuche (Araucanians)

Summary: The Mapuche People’s Liberation Organization was formed in 1978, hence the start date of the movement. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1975-99 indicate that the movement has been active from 1978 onward. Under a 1993 law, Chile has gradually returned land to its indigenous peoples (The Economist 2009). The MAR rebellion score for Chile’s indigenous peoples is 3 in 2001-2003. The MAR coding notes make clear that this has to be attributed to the Mapuches: “Mapuche indigenous groups continued to rebel violently against occupations of their land (REB01-03 = 3)”. However, the number killed has remained in the single digits (IPS 2/12/2001; IHS Global Insight 1/31/2002; IPS 10/1/2003). Thus, we overrule MAR and do not code 2001-2003 as LVIOLSD. Protests have continued in recent years, occasionally involving violence (NY Times 8/11/2004; VOA 3/7/2005; IPS 1/28/2006; IPS 1/8/2007; IPS 1/3/2008; US State News 5/21/2009; IPS 2/11/2010; IPIR 5/29/2011; AP 10/16/2012; States News Services 10/29/2013). However, again, violence does not cross the LVIOLSD threshold. Thus, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. Note: see Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 185) for a short overview of the claims and status of Mapuches in Chile.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [February 24, 2002].


CHINA

Eastern Mongols

Summary: Eastern Mongols refers to Mongols in the eastern regions of Inner Mongolia. Eastern Mongol leaders in 1946 declared the Eastern Mongolian People’s Autonomous Government (SMHRIC). We peg the start date to 1946. We code the movement separately from the Southern Mongols because the Eastern Mongols made separate claims and were represented by separate organizations. Clashes with both Communist and Nationalist forces followed. Later in 1946, the Eastern Mongols movement merged with the Southern Mongols movement to form the Southern Mongolian Joint Autonomous Movement (see South Mongols under China). Thus we code the Eastern Mongols movement as terminated in 1946. The Eastern Mongols were involved in the civil war coded in Doyle & Sambanis (2006). However, the Eastern Mongols were minor players in the violence. Thus 1946 is coded as LVIOLSD. We code this conflict as “ambiguous” since the civil war was primarily over control of the central government. It is not fully clear whether the movement was violent from the start, but our best guess based on the available evidence is that there was no nonviolent claim-making prior to the start of the movement.

Sources:


Hui (Dungans)

Summary: Hui guerillas fighting the advancing Communists formed the Chinese Islamic Association in 1953. Pressed by the attempted collectivization of the Ningsia Plateau and suppression of Muslim religious rights, Hui nationalists declared Ningsia independent of China on August 9, 1953 as the Chinese Islamic Republic. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1953. In 1957 the Hui demanded the socialist self-determination preached by the Communist leaders; official reprisals against this demand

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1 Taiwan is considered an independent country since 1949. Thus, the Taiwanese are not coded as a self-determination movement under China.
sparked a renewed Hui uprising in 1958. The rebels were once again defeated and the Hui lost all of their religious rights as the government enforced the state’s official atheism. Yet, in a bid to undermine Hui nationalism, the government reconstituted an autonomous Hui region in 1958. This appears to have ended the Hui self-determination movement. While the Hui have been politically active in the 1990s (i.e. have non-zero MAR protest scores), it does not appear that they have been campaigning for greater political autonomy ever since. Hence, we code an end to the movement in 1958. While the above narrative from Minahan (1996: 395-397) indicates that the Hui separatists did engage in violence, neither MAR nor Gleditsch et al. (2002)/Themnér & Wallensteen (2014) include this violence in their list of armed conflicts. Neither were we able to find information regarding the number of people who died and in order to classify this violence as either LVIOLSD or HVIOLSD, we would need to have such information. Hence, for the moment we code 1953-58 as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Southern Mongols

Summary: A puppet Mongol state collapsed with the Japanese defeat in 1945. Southern Mongols (or Inner Mongols) then erected a provisional government and organized a referendum on unification with Mongolia. We peg the start date to 1945. In 1946, the Eastern Mongols movement merged with the Southern Mongols movement to form the Southern Mongolian Joint Autonomous Movement (see above). We code a separate Eastern Mongol movement in 1946 because the Eastern Mongols made separate claims and were represented by separate organizations. The Chinese Communists, embroiled in the civil war, appealed to Joseph Stalin, who asserted his influence with the Mongolian government, effectively blocking Southern Mongol unification with Mongolia and forcing the withdrawal of the Mongol army from the region. The Chinese Communists moved into the region in 1947 and quickly suppressed the Southern Mongol self-determination movement. Based on this, we code 1945 as NVIOLSD and 1946-1947 as LVIOLSD. We do not code HVIOLSD even if Doyle & Sambanis (2006) code a civil war because it is not clear whether casualties are sufficient to warrant a HVIOLSD code (the civil war coded in Doyle & Sambanis includes other conflicts too). This case would profit from more research. We apply an “ambiguous” coding since the civil war was primarily over control of the central government. The movement appears not to have disappeared, however. Minority Rights Group International reports that there was another attempt to erect an independent Inner Mongol state in 1949. We found no evidence of
further activity. It appears the movement was crushed, thus we code an end to it in 1949. 1948-1949 is coded with NVIOLSD. Minahan (2002: 1783) reports that “nationalism reemerged during the violence and destruction and violence of the Cultural Revolution in 1966-1967” but that “strict censorship kept details from reaching the West”. This is not coded as we lack conclusive evidence. The Southern Mongol self-determination movement appears to have resurfaced in the early 1980s. In Hohhot, the capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, 3,000 students protested for increased autonomy in 1981 (Han 2011: 58), hence we code 1981 as the second start date. In 1995 the Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance was established, which seeks greater autonomous rights for ethnic Mongolians and promotes Mongolian language, history and culture. In December 1996, two Mongol activists belonging to this Alliance were sentenced to 10 and 15 years in prison for separatism. This act of repression provoked international outcry among human rights groups and brought the cause of the Southern Mongols to the world stage. Since 1996, no domestic movement was found. However, there is overseas activity: the Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center (SMHRIC), based in New York, and the Inner Mongolian People’s Party (IMPP) in Princeton, New Jersey. The SMHRIC fights for human rights concerns, but also has self-determination aims that include indigenous rights and cultural problems. Finally, it wishes to ultimately “establish a democratic political system in Southern Mongolia” (SMHRIC). The IMPP fights for the liberation of Inner Mongolia (Southern Mongolia). In light of this we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. No violence stemming from either group was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding from 1981 onward.

Sources:

Tibetans
Summary: The start of the current phase of activity can be pegged to the early 20th century. As the British gained foothold around Tibet, the Tibetans rejected British overtures. The British dispatched forces to occupy Tibet in 1903-1904 and opened the area to trade. In 1906, the British signed a treaty with China without Tibetan participation that recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. In 1910 China sent forces to enforce this claim – the Dalai Lama and many followers fled to British India. The overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 seriously weakened Chinese control of Tibet. The Dalai Lama returned from exile in 1912 to declare Tibet’s independence (Minahan 2002: 1892; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 293-294), thus the start date. We found no clear evidence for nonviolent separatism prior to 1912, but this would profit from more in-depth research.

Tibet remained in a state of flux/de-facto independence until 1950, when Communist China invaded Tibet. COW codes two incidents of war with Tibet in the period, one in 1912-1913 and the other one in 1918. Minahan (2002: 1892) in addition reports a brief border war in 1930-1931 that ended in loss of territory to China; Minahan does not report casualty estimates, but his account is rather detailed and appears correct, as he correctly reports both the 1912-1913 and 1918 incidents. In the rest of the 1930s and 1940s, China, weakened by its civil war, left Tibet in relative peace (Minahan 2002: 1892). Based on this, we code from 1945 but note prior activity. There was separatist violence in 1912-1913, 1918, and 1930-1931, but not immediately before 1945, thus we indicate prior non-violent activity. In 1950 China invaded and annexed Tibet. UCDP/PRIO codes a low-intensity armed conflict over Tibet in 1950, thus the LVIOLSD code in 1950. We found no separatist violence in 1945-1949, thus NVIOLSD for these years. After the Chinese annexation, they left the area in relative peace for the next half decade, thus the NVIOLSD code in 1951-1955. Even the Dalai Lama was allowed to remain as the head of the Tibetan people. Until 1955 Tibet’s government under the leadership of the Dalai Lama sought to resolve the conflict with China through peaceful means. The Dalai Lama went as far as to declare in 1955 that the Chinese communists, since that they could be of great help to backward Tibet, ought to be welcomed, provided that they respect the Tibetan people’s own culture, honor the wishes of the Tibetan people and do not obstruct or do damage to the high principles of the Tibetan nation. But the Chinese were obstinate in their attempts to transform Tibet into an atheist and socialist region of China. By 1954 Mao had begun a massive immigration project in the region with the aim of outnumbering Tibetans “five-to-one” with Han Chinese. Tibetan discontent with the occupation grew to the point that in February 1956 major revolts broke out in various places in the Kham and Ambo regions of eastern Tibet. Though somewhat coordinated, the Tibetan fighters were not organized into a cohesive army, but rather led by local chieftains. The main target of the rebellion was the Chinese army, who retaliated with large-scale massacres, brutal tortures and the systematic burning of monasteries. Throughout 1957 and 1958 the revolt spread westward, gradually approaching the capital. The capital, Lhasa, fell to the Chinese in March 1959. While some rebels continued to fight in the mountains, the fall of Lhasa was the end of the conflict. Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006), we code 1956-59 as HVIOLSD and following Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59), we code 1960-67 as LVIOLSD (this is in line with MAR, where the quinquennial rebellion score is >=3 from 1960-1969). Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1970-2006 indicate an ongoing movement. Since 2006, the movement continues to remain active as well. There were 120 fatalities from 2009-2013 in the form of self-immolation, but these deaths cannot be considered part of an armed rebellion, thus we do not consider them for LVIOLSD coding. There are yearly deaths due to violence from protests, but these do not add up to at least 25 deaths per year. Thus, 1968 onward is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [June 19, 2003].


**Uyghurs**

*Summary*: The Uyghur homeland came under Chinese control in 1759, followed by repression of Uyghur culture, in particular religion (Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002: 1961). The Uyghurs repeatedly revolted against Chinese rule (42 times between 1759 and 1862 according to Minahan 2002: 1960). COW, for instance, notes a rebellion from 1864-1871; in 1876 the Chinese government sent an army of 100,000, and the Uyghur uprising was suppressed by 1877 (Sarkees & Wayman 2010). In 1911 the Manchu dynasty was overthrown, and the Chinese Republic was installed. In subsequent years, the central government’s hold on the Uyghurs was relatively weak. According to Minahan (2002: 1961) the Uyghurs took advantage of China’s weak hold and launched a rebellion, initiating several decades of instability. However, we found no evidence of organized activity until the early 1930s. In 1933, the independent Islamic Republic of East Turkestan in was declared. We found no clear evidence for prior nonviolent activity, but the evidence is limited. China was able to retake the region only shortly thereafter, in 1934 (Minahan 2002: 1961; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 310). In line with this narrative, COW notes a civil war over Xinjiang from 1931-1934. The revolt was suppressed in 1934, but activity appears not to have ended as a new revolt began in the years of 1936-1937 (Minahan 2002: 1961). In 1944, the Uyghurs established a de-facto independent East Turkestan. Based on this, we code the movement from 1945, the earliest possible date. There appears to have been more or less continuous activity since 1931, thus the start date. Prior to the start of the dataset, the Uyghurs launched the Ili Rebellion in 1944 to fight for independence. Thus we note prior violent activity. Moreover there were rebellions in 1931-1934 and 1936-1937, and in previous years too (see above). Uyghur rebels declared the independence of the Republic of East Turkestan on January 31, 1945. The unilaterally declared East Turkestan was dissolved in 1949, after negotiations with the Chinese government. After reintegration in 1949, Uyghur leaders continued to press for far-reaching autonomy until 1954 (Bovingdon 2004: 12). The 5-year MAR rebellion score is 7 from 1945-1954. Based on this,
we code LVIOLSD in 1945-1949, which corresponds with the Ili Rebellion. We do not code low-level violence in 1950-1954 as case study evidence suggests that violence was too minimal after 1949. After 1954, there was little or no separatist activity until the late 1950s/early 1960s, when the Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate. The Soviet Union began to incite separatism in Xinjiang through propaganda. The Soviet Union also encouraged and may have even financed Kazakhstan-based ethnic guerillas to raid Xinjiang’s frontier posts (Sichor 2004: 139). In 1967 or 1968, the East Turkestan People’s Revolutionary Party was founded, a clandestine group advocating an independent Uighur state that was presumably supported by the Soviets (Dillon 2004: 57-58). In the 1970s, another organization was formed, the Uyghur Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan, again most likely with Soviet assistance (Reed & Raschke 2010: 37). Degenhardt (1988: 57) reports that there were armed clashes between Uyghurs and Chinese officials and soldiers in April 1980. In January 1983 there was serious rioting in Kashgar after a Chinese student was reported to have murdered an Uyghur peasant; and in December 1986 there were student protests to demand greater local autonomy and increased opportunities for those of Uighur birth. 1990-2002 is coded as LVIOLSD based on Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005), Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 310-311) and Hewitt et al. (2008). It has to be noted that none of our other major low-level conflict sources would suggest a low-level violence code. Specifically, the MAR rebellion score is two in 1990-2000 and even zero in 2001-2002 and UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict. But case study evidence bolsters up the code given by Marshall & Gurr. Specifically, violence has increased since 1996 with assassinations of pro-Chinese clerics, bombings, brief armed skirmishes and uprisings. Chinese authorities, in fact, have cited several thousand violent operations carried out by Uighur separatists. The Uyghurs have also been the victims of violent repression. For example, in February 1997 security forces fired on protestors, killing 167 persons. In October 1998, an unknown number of people were sentenced to death for participating in the February 1997 demonstration. The Regional Uighur Association reports that 61 Uighurs were executed by China for “separatism” in 1999; other groups report up to 90 or 100 persons executed. In September 1999, up to 100 people were killed in clashes between Uighurs and Chinese troops. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) also code 2003 with armed conflict, but there were no violent incidents between 2003-2006 according to Clark (2008). In 2007, a raid on rebel training camps killed 18 Uighur separatists and one government policeman (VOA). Since the 25 deaths threshold is not met, we code 2003-2007 as NVIOLSD. There is evidence for LVIOLSD from 2008 onward: 2008 saw 25 deaths from bomb attacks and clashes on the street (UCA). UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over East Turkestan in 2008. Furthermore, 200 deaths were recorded during violent demonstrations in Urumqi, Xinjiang province in 2009 (VOA 5/4/2011). In 2011, there were at least 49 deaths from Uyghur attacks. We found no reports of violence in 2010/2012, but code ongoing LVIOLSD because it may well be that we missed relevant information due to China’s highly repressive system.

Sources:


COLOMBIA

Cacarica

Summary: The communities of Colombia’s Cacarica River Basin have fought for their right to self-determination and collective land rights since being forcibly displaced in 1997 due to paramilitary abuses and military operations. The relevant organization, the Self-Determination, Life and Dignity Community (CAVIDA) was formed in 2000. The start date is pegged to 2000. There is evidence of continued activity, thus we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. There has been some one-sided violence against the Cacarica communities as well as casualties stemming from rebel and drug-trafficking violence that take place on Cacarica land. However, the Cacarica protesters have not been associated with any violence. Thus, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Cumales, Paez, Guambiano, and Nasa

Summary: Cumbales, Paez and Guambianos came together in 1980 to form the Indigenous Authorities of the Southwest movement, whose aim is to create an autonomous nation within the Colombian state. We therefore peg the start date of movement at 1980. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1980-2006 indicate that the movement has been continually active since 1980. Newspaper reports indicate that there have been subsequent protests up until 2013. For instance, in 2007, the Guambian and Nasa peoples protested laws that they claimed jeopardized the autonomy of indigenous people over control of their ancestral lands and self-government. Thus we code the movement as ongoing. MAR’s rebellion score for Colombia’s indigenous peoples is 6 in 1999, but we found insufficient evidence to attribute this incidence to this movement/these indigenous groups. We found no separatist violence in other years, thus a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


**Raizals**

*Summary:* The Raizals are an English-Creole speaking, Protestant Afro-Caribbean group located mainly in the Caribbean San Andrés Archipelago. The archipelago is under Colombian sovereignty based on a 1928 treaty (though de-facto much longer). It is also claimed by Nicaragua (Romero 2008). Beginning in the late 19th century, this remote archipelago has increasingly been Colombianized (implying centralization and the promotion of the Spanish language and Catholicism), which met some opposition by the English-Creole speaking, mainly Protestant Raizals (Ross 2007: 18-19). Assimilation pressure went as far as teaching of English in schools was prohibited in schools. Furthermore, migration (at its height in the 1950s/1960s) reduced the native Raizals to a minority (Ross 2007: 24; Mow n.d.).

According to Romero (2008), the Raizals nowadays make up roughly a third of the local population, though note that Romero pegs the total population at approximately 100,000 while Mow (n.d.) pegs it at approximately 80,000. The Raizals began to mobilize for self-determination after the Second World War. According to Ross (2007: 24), “Islanders not only demonstrated against the ‘abuses’ of the government but also tried to have the matter raised at an international level by appealing to the British Queen, the Vice-President of the U.S.A., and the United Nations with the argument that they should have the status of a ‘Self-governing Territory of Colombia.’” None of these met with a positive response but in Bogotá, the ‘Club Archipiélago Unido’ met throughout the 1960s and 70s and acted as a pressure group to defend Islander culture under the slogan “La isla para los isleños” (Clemente 1991:254). Their main aims were the removal of the Mission Territory status of the islands, the election of Mayors and the development of education programmes in traditional Islander activities such as fishing. They also advocated the setting up of schools and social centres through community action. They focused on the issues of identity and the preservation of the traditions and the ecology of the islands.” Based on Ross (2007: 24), we code 1960 as the start date since he reports that the Club Archipiélago Unido met throughout the 1960s (see above); we lack a clearer indication regarding the movement’s start date. The movement continued to gain track throughout the 1970s. According to Ross (2007: 25), “[b]y the end of the 1970s these feelings had developed into a clear resistance to Colombianisation with the appearance of publications and organisations such as the Islander Civic Movement, founded in 1978, and followed in the 1980s by MAR (Movimiento Autónomo Regional) and SOS (Sons of the Soil). The Islander Civic Movement proposed a return to traditional Islander culture, the officialisation of English, bilingual education and television programmes, the restoration of civic pride and consciousness and the right to self-government (Clemente 1991:163). MAR and SOS continued the resistance in these areas but focused particularly on controlling immigration and establishing political autonomy.” In 1991, the archipelago gained some limited
autonomy but the reform did not succeed in taming the simmering conflict as political power went mainly to the majority of “non-native” Colombians (Ross 2007: 5). Furthermore, since 1991, immigration from the mainland has been limited. Further 1993 legislation aimed to protect the island’s environmental and cultural identity (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Boards Canada 2001). The movement appears to be ongoing. Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board (2000) makes mention of a separatist movement among Raizals; they report a protest that took place in July 1999, which was organized by the Movimiento por la Autodeterminación de la Isla (MAI), an organization they say is led by local pastors, priests, and other native leaders. Another 2001 report by Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board suggests that the SOS (that was formed back in the 1980s, see above) continued to exist. Mow (n.d.: 9) gives further evidence of an ongoing separatist movement: “many native islander groups, aware of the struggle between the two worlds and the consequences of the complete loss of their identity and extinction as an ethnic group, have risen up against the growth and socio-economic system imposed by the Colombian government and have made serious attempts to reaffirm and protect their people. Pastors of Baptist and Adventist churches are leading an initiative to take an active stand on issues related to native rights, equity, land and sea tenure, and self-determination.” Moreover, Martinez & Nelson (2008: 787) report that “Afro-descendants” on San Andrés founded an umbrella organization, the Archipelago Movement for Ethnic-Native Self-Determination (AMEN-SD). Finally, a 2008 article in the NY Times reports a separatist movement in San Andrés (Romero 2008). According to this, AMEN-SD symbolically declared independence in June 2007. Based on this, we code an ongoing movement. We found no evidence for separatist violence, hence the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. Note: in 2012 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favor of Colombia’s sovereignty over the island but assigned a 200 nautical miles (370 km) maritime economic exclusion zone to Nicaragua (The Economist 2012).

Sources:


COMOROS

Anjouanese

Summary: In August 1997 Anjouanese separatists unilaterally declared the independence of their island, Anjouan, after Anjouan’s autonomy was significantly curtailed in 1996. But separatist agitation appears to have started earlier. The evidence is limited, however. Minahan (2002: 127) reports that the first openly nationalist organization, the Anjouan Liberation Movement (MLA), was formed in 1996. UCDP appears to suggest that there has been separatist agitation already before that date, but does not give clearer indications. Hence, we peg the start date at 1996. Although Marshall & Gurr (2003: 64) classify this movement as a nonviolent self-determination movement, there are reports in Keesing’s of separatist violence. In September 1997 clashes between Anjouanese secessionists and Comorian army personnel resulted in at least 46 deaths (30 government troops and 16 secessionists). In line with Keesing’s, UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over Anjouan in 1997. An additional thirteen people were killed in December 1998 in clashes between separatist factions. In light of these reports, we code 1997 as LVIOLSD. In 2001, an accord to end Anjouanese separatism was signed (Agence France Presse 2/17/2001, Lexis Nexis). Yet separatist agitation continued. Lansford (2014: 310) reports limited evidence of self-determination activity after members of the Anjouanese movement were arrested in 2005, but this is insufficient to code an end to the movement. Thus, the movement is coded as ongoing as of 2012.

Sources:
Bakongo

Summary: The Bundu dia Kongo (Kingdom of Kongo), a nationalist politico-religious group founded in 1969, has been demanding autonomy for Bas-Congo Province in southwestern DRC. The Bas-Kongo province is inhabited primarily by the Bakongo. Bundu dia Kongo demands that its adherents renounce western and eastern religions and has sometimes pushed them into committing acts of violence. It seeks the restoration of the ancient Kongo kingdom within its pre-colonial boundaries, which encompassed parts of today's Angola, the Republic of Congo and Gabon. The center of the kingdom was located in Bas-Congo Province and in neighboring Bandundu Province of modern-day DRC. At a demonstration in July 2002, 14 protestors were shot to death, but this does not meet the LVIOLSD threshold. LVIOLSD coding is used for 2007-2008: In 2007, around 100 BDK members died when policemen clashed with the BDK in the Bas-Congo province, where the BDK had begun to set up a government; in 2008, more than 100 died during the conflicts. In 2008, the group changed its name to Bundu dia Mayala after BDK became a banned organization under Congo law. UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over the Kongo Kingdom in 2007-2008. There is no evidence of low-level violence beyond 2008, and thus we code LVIOLSD from 2007-2008 and NVIOLSD from 2009 - 2012.

Sources:

Katangans (Lunda and Yeke)

Summary: In 1957, the Confederation of Tribal Associations of Katanga (CONAKAT) was founded, a political party formed from several Katangan ethnic associations. CONAKAT called for a federal Congo (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 151; Minahan 2002: 968-696). As this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, 1957 is coded as start date. Since Zaire did not become independent until 1960, we begin to code the movement in 1960 but note prior nonviolent activity. HVIOLSD dates (1960-65) follow Doyle & Sambanis (2006). UCDP/PRIO, however, codes this conflict as a minor war and claims that the Katangan secession was over in 1962. Although the 1960-65 civil war in Doyle & Sambanis (2006) does include other conflicts as well (e.g. the Kwilu and Eastern rebellions), we nevertheless code this self-determination movement HVIOLSD until 1965 because case studies (e.g.
Goldstone 1998: 113) indicate that there was indeed unrest in the region until 1965. A MAR anti-government rebellion score of 1 for 1965-69 indicates that the movement continued to be active following the end of the war and following our “ten-year rule” we code the entire period from the end of the Katangan secession to the onset of the Shaba war as NVIOLSD. The Shaba war, another attempt at secession, began in March 1977 when a Zairian insurgency group invaded Shaba (formerly Katanga) from Angola and was defeated. In May 1978, the same insurgency group again invaded Shaba and was again defeated. Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006), we code 1977-78 as HVIOLSD. The 5-year MAR rebellion index remains at six until 1984, suggesting that low-level violent activity continued beyond 1978. Thus we code 1979-1984 as LVIOLSD. We classify both 1977-1978 and 1979-1984 as “ambiguous” given UCDP/PRIO’s indication that this conflict was over an incompatibility in government. In December 1993 the Governor of Katanga and other political leaders declared the region autonomous and announced that the region would impose taxes on all goods entering and leaving the area (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 327 too note separatist activity in the 1990s). MAR reports that following this declaration of autonomy there have been repeated clashes between the army and militants who favor regional autonomy. However, MAR codes a rebellion score of zero and were not able to find reports of violence in either Keesing’s or Lexis-Nexis. In light of non-zero MAR protest scores for 1990-2006 and our coding rules, we code the movement as ongoing. Katanga secessionist attempts have continued under the Mai-Mai, which are multi-ethnic militias formed within communities. However, since not all Mai-Mai groups fought for self-determination, it is difficult to parse out the casualty estimates for only pro-autonomy or pro-secessionist groups. In 2005, there was an alleged secessionist attempt with no casualties reported. In 2001, the Union of Forces for the Liberation of Katanga was formed to fight for secession but no casualty estimates could be found for that group. After a prison raid released 1,000 ex-Mai Mai soldiers in September 2011, the Mai Mai Kata Katanga group was formed as distinct Mai Mai group that fought distinctly for self-determination (Lexis Nexis: Sydney MX (Australia) 9/8/2011). Death estimates could not be found for Kata Katanga in 2011, but there were at least 25 casualties in 2012 attributed to the group (Lexis Nexis: AP 1/25/2012). Based on this information, we code an ongoing movement with NVIOLSD from 1985-2011, and LVIOLSD in 2012.

Sources:


Luba

Summary: According to Minahan (2002), the Lubas started to make claims for increased autonomy around June 1960, when the DRC gained independence from France. We code the start date in 1960 while noting that the movement could have been active already in 1959 when the DRC was still a French colony. The movement appears to have been nonviolent initially, but the conflict soon escalated when after Luba nationalists had declared the independence of Kasai, either in August or September 1960, depending on the source. Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006), we code HVIOLSD from 1960 to 1963, the year in which the Luba abandoned their demand for secession. We find no further evidence of separatist activity following the defeat of the rebels, and they seem to have abandoned their goals, perhaps because the Luba were severely repressed under Mobutu (but have been privileged since 1996 under the Kabila regimes). Hence, we code an end to the movement in 1963.

Sources:
COTE D'IVOIRE

Agni

Summary: The French took control of the Agni kingdoms in 1887 (Minahan 2002: 149). During WWI, the Agnis rebelled against the French over French land taxes and demands for forced labour. The rebellion was suppressed in 1916. Agni self-determination activity re-erupted in 1948, when “severe rioting erupted over French attempts to interfere in the succession to the throne of Indenié. The Anyi claimed that their treaties with France covered only military matters and demanded the separation of the Anyi homeland from the Ivory Coast as a separate Anyi state in French West Africa” (Minahan 2002: 149). Minahan (2002: 149) reports that Agni nationalism grew rapidly in the 1950s. In 1959, the Agni king asserted the Agnis’ right to separate independence (Minahan 2002: 149). Violence erupted in 1959 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 264). Since that demand was not met as Côte d’Ivoire moved to independence, the Agni mobilized for secession from the new state. We code the movement from 1960, the year Côte d’Ivoire attained independence. In line with the above narrative, we peg the start date to 1948. Minahan and Hewitt & Cheetham report violence in 1948 and 1959, respectively. We found no casualty estimates, but nonetheless indicate prior violent activity due to the 1959 incident. In February 1960 the Agni king declared Sanwi independent of both France and Côte d’Ivoire. Unable to halt Ivorian soldiers moving into the region, many Agni fled to Ghana, but the king and over 400 supporters were arrested. The king and his head of government were sentenced to 10 years of prison, plus 20 years of banishment. But in 1962 the government released them, in an attempt to quell ongoing separatist disturbances. The Ivorian recognition of the Biafran secession in Nigeria provoked a new crisis in Sanwi. Agni nationalists claimed the same right the government acknowledged in Biafra and prepared to declare independence, but Ivorian soldiers moved in to crush the movement. It does not appear to be known how long the operation lasted or how many Agni were killed. A second secessionist attempt took place in 1969, but was definitively put down in 1970 and the Agni movement ended. We thus code the end of the first movement in 1970. Minahan (2002: 150) reports that the 1969 uprising was violently crushed, but we could not find evidence on casualties. According to Minahan (1996, 2002), Agni nationalists, suppressed for nearly two decades, reorganized in 1991 and asserted that the Agni kingdoms, which were separate French protectorates until forcibly incorporated in the Ivorian state in 1960, had the legal right to decide democratically to continue their ties to Côte d’Ivoire or to separate under the protectorate agreements of the nineteenth century. According to Minahan (2002: 151), a leading member of the Agni exile community in Ghana called for increased autonomy for the Agni as a prelude to independence in November 2001. We could not find further evidence of self-determination activity. Based on this we code a second phase of activity from 1991-2011 (10-years rule). However, it has to be noted that the only evidence for the second phase of activity starting in 1991 we came across is from Minahan (1996, 2002). Since we did not find evidence of violence that would qualify as LVIOLSD, both phases are coded with NVIOLSD.

Sources:


CROATIA

Croatian Serbs

Summary: Following an economic and political crisis in Yugoslavia that made it clear that the federal republic could no longer stay united, and after an upsurge of Croatian nationalism aimed at securing Croatia independence, Serbs in Croatia agitated for autonomy from an independent Croatian state. Huszka (2014: 71) reports that the Croatian Serbs had stepped up their demands for political autonomy in 1989 and that the Milosevic regime orchestrated the first Serbian demonstration in the Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia in July 1989. In February 1990, the Serb Democratic Party (Croatia) was founded, which advocated the merger of Serbian territories in Croatia with Serbia. In October 1990 the Croatian Serbs unilaterally declared an autonomous entity within Croatia, the Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina. The so-called Log Revolution ensued: Serbs erected barricades on important roads in opposition. In March 1991 the Krajina Oblast together with other unilaterally declared Croatian Serb Autonomous Oblasts that had been formed in the meantime (the SAO of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem and the SAO Western Slavonia) declared their secession from Croatia. Although the movement was active prior to 1991, we code it only as of 1991 to coincide with Croatia’s independence. We note, however, that the movement was active and non-violent prior to that date. We do not code the Croatian Serb movement as an autonomy movement under Yugoslavia (i.e. targeting the Serb-controlled Yugoslav state) since demands for autonomy/independence were targeted at the Croatian parties in anticipation of Croatian secession. With Croatia’s independence in June 1991, the Yugoslav Army and Serb militia groups in Croatia set out to seize control of Serb-inhabited territory inside Croatia and unite the territory with Serbia as a defense against potential repression. The Krajina de-facto entity was abolished and reintegrated with Croatia in 1995. However, non-zero MAR protest scores until 2006 indicate an ongoing movement. The Independent Democratic Serb Party continues to participate in conventional politics, and has aims that include cultural and language autonomy as well as regionalism. The LVIOLSD coding for 1991 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003: 57). The HVIOLSD coding for 1992-95 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Although there was violence between Croatian forces and Serb separatists in Eastern Croatia as of the first year of Croatia’s independence, we code this as a switched movement to reflect the fact that violence escalated with Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia after a failed process of resolving Serb claims for autonomy peacefully. For details on the escalation process, see Sambanis and Shayo (2013), who in turn summarize several historical accounts of the conflict. The MAR rebellion score is 3 in 1996, suggesting a LVIOLSD code. But Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005), Hewitt et al. (2008) and UCDP/PRIO all agree that armed conflict ended in 1995. We found no evidence for separatist violence in subsequent years, thus 1996-2012 are coded with NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**Istrians**

*Summary*: The Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) was formed in 1990, one year prior to Croatian independence. Thus, we code the movement as of 1991 and note prior nonviolent activity. According to Ashbrook (2006: 638), the IDS worked “toward the regionalization of Croatia and securing increased autonomy for Istria within a democratic Croatian state”. The autonomy claim is confirmed by Minahan (2002), Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 139) and Beovic (2013). The party won 72% of the votes in the county in the 1993 parliamentary elections and has been represented in the national parliament since 1992. The IDS and its splinter party, the Istrian Socialdemocratic Forum, have been continually active. Thus we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. No violence was found, hence the entire movement is coded with NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


CYPRUS

Turkish Cypriots

Summary: The Turkish Cypriot demand for taksim, the partition of the island between the two national groups, originates in the early 20th century. In the post-independence era, underground organizations of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were revived in 1961, hence the start date of the movement. In December 1963 serious violence erupted in Nicosia after Greek Cypriot policemen killed two Turkish Cypriots on the edge of the Turkish quarter. Communal tensions arose in November when President Makarios introduced a thirteen-point proposal to amend the constitution in a way that would ensure the dominance of Greek Cypriots. In early 1964 the UN authorized a peace-keeping force for Cyprus under the direction of the Secretary General. In March and April, severe communal violence occurred. In June 1964, the Greek Cypriot government formed the National Guard and Greek soldiers were clandestinely transferred to Cyprus. At the same time, Turkish Cypriots organized militarily under the TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization). Sporadic violence continued through 1967. HVIOLSD codings for 1963-67 and 1974 follow Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Since then the Turkish Cypriots have enjoyed de-facto independence and have upheld their claim for independence. In light of no further evidence of separatist violence we classify the movement as NVIOLSD for the period since 1975.

Sources:


CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechs

Summary: Most Czechs were not very receptive to the Slovak demands for increased sovereignty (or even independence), and increased autonomy for the Czech Republic was a non-issue (Hilde 1999: 659). In 1992, and especially in the context of the June 1992 elections, opposition against the Slovak proposals strengthened, and the view that the federation should be dissolved if the Slovaks continue contending for increased sovereignty became widespread (Hilde 1999: 661). On June 13, 1992, a group called the Czech Initiative launched a petition calling for an independent Czech state. In only four days, 50,000 had signed the petition (Hilde 1999: 661). Since this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we have found, we peg the start date to 1992. Czechoslovakia’s nonviolent “Velvet Divorce” on December 31, 1992 resulted in the creation of independent Czech Republic and Slovakia, hence the end of the movement in 1992. For a more detailed account of the Velvet Divorce, see the entry for the Slovak self-determination movement. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Hungarians

Summary: A Hungarian movement was active in Czechoslovakia at least since 1947, when Hungarian nationalists formed the Cultural Alliance of Hungarian Workers in Czechoslovakia (CSEMADOK). However, during the communist era the Hungarian claims were limited to cultural rights and inclusion at the center. With the assistance of the CSEMADOK, Hungarian-language instruction in primary and secondary schools could begin again in September 1949, although the building of new schools was not permitted until the 1960s. The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1956 for the first time made a brief mention of the Hungarian minority, and the 1960 Constitution promised to ensure for all minorities education and culture in their native language. In spring of 1968 CSEMADOK proposed the setting up of nationality bodies alongside the Slovak parliament and government, the establishment of a Hungarian-language school system, ranging from the primary level to institutes of higher education institutions, and a modification of the territorial administration division. CSEMADOK’s draft proposal was sharply criticized by the Czech and Slovak sides. After the 1989 Velvet revolution, nationalist sentiment began to flourish among the Hungarian population. While only a small portion of ethnic Hungarian leaders advocated secession from Slovakia, many ethnic Hungarians made claims for a greater degree of autonomy and self-determination within the Hungarian areas in southern Slovakia, especially with respect to language, education, and cultural issues. Based on this, we code the start date in 1989. In the wake of the regime change, they set up four political parties, including Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, Co-existence Party and Hungarian Civic Party, which merged in 1998 to become the
Hungarian Coalition Party (MKP). The Hungarian movement continued to be active in Slovakia (see Hungarians under Slovakia). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Moravians

Summary: There is no clear indication when the first organization representing the Moravist Movement was founded. Minahan indicates the movement emerged in the 1960s. We peg the start date to 1968, the year the Moravians put forward a declaration that called for a tripartite federation of equal republics (Bohemia, Slovakia and Moravia-Silesia). After the overthrow of the Communist government, the Moravian movement gained momentum, but autonomy demands soon subsided as the country was divided into its Czech and Slovak halves. There is continued activity in the Czech Republic after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (see Moravians under Czech Republic). No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding for the entire movement.

Sources:

Slovaks

Summary: According to Kirschbaum (1980: 220), the first calls for Slovak autonomy date to 1918 (thus the start date), when Czechoslovakia was about to be created. From Kirschbaum (1980: 221-224) it appears that Slovak contention for self-determination continued throughout the interwar years. As a result
of Hitler’s territorial ambitions, Czechoslovakia was effectively dissolved in 1939, shortly before WWII. While the Czech part became a German protectorate, the Slovak part became an “independent” puppet state. Communist resistance developed, initially aiming for a “free and independent” Slovakia (Kirschbaum 1980: 226-227). When it became clear that a post-war settlement would necessarily mean the reunification of Czechoslovakia, the claim shifted to a better status within Czechoslovakia. In 1943, a number of resistance groups signed the Christmas Agreement, which while acknowledging that Czechoslovakia should be reunited, also called for the new state being built on the principle of national equality, implying increased autonomy for the Slovaks (Kirschbaum 1980: 231-232). We note prior non-violent activity (while resistance groups fought German troops, there was no separatist violence as we define it). Slovak contention for self-determination carried over into the post-WWII period (Kirschbaum 1980: 236). In the 1946 elections, almost all Slovak politicians demanded increased autonomy (Hilde 1999: 650). The Communist coup in 1948 signalled the beginning of a highly repressive phase (Kirschbaum 1980: 238). Kirschbaum (1980: 243) writes that Slovak minority nationalism had been virtually eliminated in Slovakia by the early 1950s. Based on this, we code the end of the first phase in 1948, the year of the communist coup. One could also code the end in 1958 based on the ten-years rule, but the Communist coup appears to be a good cut-off (there was very little, if any, subsequent activity). In the early 1960s, Slovak nationalism re-emerged, aiming for the federalization of Czechoslovakia. We found no exact start date, though Kirschbaum (1980: 244) suggests that there was significant contention at least from 1963 onwards. Thus 1963 is coded as the second start date. In the 1968 Prague Spring, Czech aspirations for democracy clashed with the Slovak quest for national reassertion. The Prague Spring was quickly suppressed, and most of the reforms that had been initiated were stopped. The only reform that was allowed to continue was the 1968 federalization reform, which led to the creation of two federal entities, the Czech and Slovak Republics, with the right of secession and parity in all federal institutions (Kirschbaum 1980: 245). Whether or not the movement can be considered active in 1968-1989 is not fully clear based on the sources we consulted. As of 1970, there was again centralization and according to Kirschbaum (1980: 245), it is not clear whether the Slovaks actively opposed the re-centralization, given the strong censorship. Malova (2003: 55), on the other hand, suggests that there were small-scale protests involving nationalist claims also in subsequent years. We code an ongoing movement based on the ten years rule. With the collapse of Communism in 1989, two state governments with diverging trajectories came into being. More specifically, the Czech state was a pluralistic democracy with a market economy while the Slovak state was characterized by a socialist-leaning orientation, the continuing paternalistic role of the state in the economy, and strong nationalism. In the 1992 elections, 70% of the Slovak electorate voted for parties bent on quitting the federation and pro-Czechoslovak parties failed completely in the region. On July 17, 1992 the Slovak National Council declared independence, on September 1, 1992 it adopted the new Slovak constitution, and at the stroke on midnight ending 1992, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. Therefore, we pegged the end of this movement at 1992. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


CZECH REPUBLIC

Moravians

Summary: The Moravian movement emerged when the Czech Republic still belonged to Czechoslovakia (see Moravians under Czechoslovakia). There is continued activity in the Czech Republic, hence we code the Moravians under the header of the Czech Republic as of 1993. The popularity of regional parties declined and in the 1996 election, the various regional parties even failed to make the 5 percent threshold for entering the parliament (Strmiska 2000). However, in 2005 a new Moravian autonomist party, Moravane, was formed. We code the movement as ongoing. No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
DENMARK

Faroe

Summary: The first evidence for organized separatist activity we found is in 1909, when the first autonomist party was formed, Sjálvstýrisflokkurin. Following the German invasion of Denmark in 1940, the Faroe Islands were occupied by the United Kingdom. When the Second World War came to an end, the Faroe Islands were returned to Denmark. Pro-independence sentiment grew rapidly and in 1946 the Faroese parliament, following a plebiscite, declared the island independent. Danish authorities moved quickly to dissolve the parliament and nullify the declaration, but faced with continuing separatist sentiment, in 1948 the Danish granted autonomy over all aspects of the island’s administration except for defense and foreign relations. Based on this, we code the start date in 1909, but code the movement only from 1945 (we do not code the pre-1945 phase). We found no separatist violence before 1945 and thus indicate prior non-violent activity. Note: Contrary to Greenland (which was decolonized only in 1953), the Faroe Islands were a normal Danish county; they had representation in the Danish parliament since 1849 and the Danish constitution applied directly to the Islands. Thus Faroe Islands is not considered a colony (Jensen 2003: 171). There has been continued agitation towards increased self-determination ever since. The year 1948 saw the foundation of Tjódveldisflokkurin (the Republicans), who demand a Faroese republic. Other political parties advocating self-government for the Faroese, though in varying degree, are Folkeflokken, the Selvstyre Party, and the Progressives. Self-determination was less of an issue from the 1950s to the 1980s. According to Reyquejo and Nagel (2011: 121), “[t]he question of self-governance or independence were in the party manifestos but did not occupy much of everyday life.” The salience of the self-determination has, however, increased in recent years. In 2000, the Faeroese local government proposed an “associated state-relationship” which included “a common monarch and common currency” and also an “annual contribution” from the Denmark government to the Faeroese government until the Faeroese economy can be completely independent (Reyquejo and Nagel 2011, 121). In 2007, Lagtinget suggested total independence within 4 months. The proposal was rejected (Reyquejo and Nagel 2011: 121). Since the movement has been continually active, we code it as ongoing as of 2012. We found no evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Greenlanders

_Summary:_ Greenland’s interest in regional autonomy grew in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1971 Siumut was formed, a political movement advocating self-determination for Greenland (start date). Siumut later (in 1977) transformed into a political party. Following the accession of Denmark to the EC in 1972, which was strongly opposed by Greenlanders, Greenland’s local council notified the Danish government that it felt that the time had come for a commission to study the issue of Greenlander autonomy. Denmark set up a Committee on Home Rule composed exclusively of Greenlanders. In 1975 the Commission on Home Rule was set up, composed of both Greenlanders and Danish representatives (Foighel 1980: 3-5; Hannum 1996: 342). The Commission’s report formed the basis for the November 1978 law on home rule for Greenland passed by the Danish Folketing. The proposal included provisions for a local parliament, a local government and extensive autonomy. Home rule was made subject to a consultative referendum in Greenland, which was held in January 1979. Upon a turnout of 63%, 73% agreed to the proposal. Subsequently Denmark moved quickly to implement home rule: the first elections to the local parliament were on April 4, 1979 and the law took full effect on May 1. In 2008 Greenland’s autonomy was yet broadened. Suimut – which favors eventual independence, but would settle for extensive regional autonomy – has been a dominant player in Greenland politics from its founding up to 2012, along with Ataqatiqiit, which favors independence from Denmark as the first step to the establishment of a transpolar Inuit state uniting all Inuit people and Atassut, which favors remaining part of Denmark, but with extensive regional autonomy. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. Note: Greenland was decolonized in 1953 (see Faroese Islanders).

_Sources:_


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [March 24, 2002].


Afars

Summary: The Afars of Djibouti, along with the Afars of Eritrea and Ethiopia, formed the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) in 1975, which is coded as the start date of the movement. Since Djibouti did not become independent until 1977, we begin to code the movement from 1977. We found no separatist violence before 1977, and thus code prior non-violent activity. ALF violence in Djibouti in 1977 led to the death of 10 people, but since that death count does not meet our operational criteria for LVIOLSD, we code 1977 to 1990 as NVIOLSD. The HVIOLSD coding for 1991-94 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006) and it is marked as “ambiguous” following Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) classification of the conflict as being over “mixed motives”. There continued to be sporadic violence until 2001: according to MAR “[i]n early 1994, the main Afar rebel group, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), split and the faction led by Ougoure Kefle Ahmed began negotiations with the government. A formal peace agreement between the government and Ahmed's faction was signed in December 1995. This faction of FRUD has become a conventional political party allied with the government and its main party, the Rassemblement Populaire Pour le Progres (People's Rally for Progress) (RPP). However, sporadic fighting continued by the faction led by Ahmed Dini (FRUD-Dini) until a peace agreement was negotiated in December 2000 and ratified in May 2001.” Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code ongoing armed conflict until 2001. However, violence appears too limited in 1996-1998 and 2000-2001 to warrant a LVIOLSD code: the MAR rebellion score is four in 1995, one in 1996-1998, again 4 in 1999 and then one in 2000 and zero in 2001. Based on this, 1995 and 1999 are coded as LVIOLSD (again marked as “ambiguous” and 1996-1998 and 2000-2004 as NVIOLSD. The 2001 peace agreement included clauses that would decentralize the Afar-dominant regions and allow the Afars to rule themselves. Non-zero MAR protest scores suggest that the movement was ongoing. Protests and clashes took place due to frustrations over the slow pace at which the 2001 peace agreement was being implemented. Other grievances from 2005-2006 also include a destruction of homes and accusations of electoral fraud. The MAR rebellion score again reaches the low-level violence threshold in 2005: “[f]rustration with the slow pace of implementing the 2001 peace accord led to an outbreak of armed clashes in 2005 and rumors of the rebirth of an armed FRUD faction (REB05 = 4). The government quickly stamped out the incipient rebellion (REPVIOL05 = 5; REPVIOL06 = 3), and no violence was reported in 2006.” Thus 2005 is coded as LVIOLSD (again marked as “ambiguous”). In accordance with the 10-year inactivity rule, the Afar movement is coded as ongoing; however, it should be noted that no protests subsequent to 2006 could be found in Lexis Nexis or Keesings. 2006 onwards is coded NVIOLSD as we found no evidence of separatist violence.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [December 11, 2013].


ECUADOR

**Guayas**

*Summary:* Protests were organized in Guayaquil in March 1999 “after the collapse of the city’s major financial institutions” (Eaton 2011: 296). “A group called Fuerza Ecuador began to collect signatures towards… enabling the Prefect of Guayas… to request holding a popular consultation on autonomy” (Eaton 2011: 296). The Guayas movement seeks a higher percentage of local tax revenues for local use. They demand that “an autonomous region should be able to keep one-half… of non-trade tax revenues collected in the region” (Eaton 2011: 294). “Measures of fiscal decentralization… favored municipal, not regional, governments” (Eaton 2011: 294). Other demands include regional legislatures with law-making abilities, regional control over land tenure, and greater regional control over public security. Eaton argues that the autonomy movements in Guaya and Santa Cruz (Bolivia) are different from other autonomy movements in Latin America: The autonomy sought is more sweeping and not directly connected to indigenous land use. Both movements have a lot of popular and business support. There is analogous agitation for autonomy in three other departments (El Oro, Los Rios, Manabi); however, due to the strong link with the Guaya movement and the overlapping goals we code them all together. We peg the start date to 1999 when the first protests flared up. The movement is coded ongoing as of 2012. No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding for the entire movement.

*Sources:*


**Highland Indigenous Peoples**

*Summary:* Ecuador’s Highland Indigenous Peoples refers to a number of indigenous groups located in the highlands, including in particular the Kichwas, a Quechua group. According to Minorities at Risk, the Highland Indigenous Peoples began to mobilize in the early 1940s, when the Ecuadorian Indigenous Federation (EIF) was formed. FEI was closely associated with the Communists and it mainly espoused class struggle goals (Rappaport n.d.). The first evidence for organized separatist activity we came across is in 1972, when ECUARUNARI (Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui) was established (Minorities at Risk Project). At the national level, ECUARUNARI advocated a class-based agenda, but at the local level local activists often also made claims for local autonomy (Yashar 2005: 108). In 1986 ECUARUNARI established an umbrella indigenous organization, the Confederation of the Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE), together with CONFENAIE, the main organization representing the lowland indigenous. According to Minority Rights Group International, the founding of CONAIE was “[one of the most important political developments in Ecuador.” Furthermore, “[t]his confederation has been instrumental in organizing pan-indigenous uprising. A key player in Ecuadorian politics, CONAIE has demanded land restitution for indigenous peoples and envisaged a national economy based on territorial autonomy. Its sixteen-point demands included the right to practice traditional medicine, to bilingual education and to indigenous control of archaeological sites.” CONAIE continues to be active in fighting for indigenous cultural, language, and land rights. Furthermore, Minorities at Risk codes the Highland Indigenous Peoples in Ecuador with SEPX= 3, indicating an active movement in the 1990s and/or 2000s. Thus the
movement is coded as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. MAR reports a rebellion score of 8 in 2003, but this appears to be a typo (the scale goes only to 7 and the coding notes do not make mention of a rebellion).

Sources:

Lowland Indigenous Peoples

*Summary:* Ecuador’s Lowland Indigenous Peoples include a number of groups, in particular the Shuar, lowland Kichwa, Huaroni, and the Achuar. The first evidence for lowland indigenous mobilization in Ecuador we found is in 1964, when the Shuar Federation was formed. The Shuar Federation was formed in opposition against the incoming oil and agrarian companies with the main aim to protect the land of lowland indigenous peoples (Rubenstein 2001; Yatchana.org). Thus 1964 is coded as the start date. An oil boom in the 1970s further eroded indigenous communities’ hold on their ancestral lands. The Organization of the People of Pastaza (OPIP) and the Federation of the Indigenous Organization of Napo (FOIN) were both formed in 1973. FOIN represents over 60 Runa Indian communities, mainly provincial organizations throughout the Amazonian region, and it is primarily concerned with land struggles. In 1980, Amazonian groups united to form the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENAIE). The organization’s leadership includes Shuar, Quichua, Achuar, Woaroni, Cofan, Siona, and Secoya tribal representatives. Its principle decision-making body is a congress held every two years. Through this alliance, Ecuador’s lowland indigenous peoples have brought their issues to public attention, placing them on the political agendas of national and international groups. CONFENAIE has formed alliances with environmental and human rights organizations to force oil companies and the Ecuadorian government to negotiate development practices in the Amazon region. Again, land rights have been a central issue. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1970-2006 indicate that the movement has been consistently active since its founding. Protests continued to take place, notably in 2012 and 2013 against oil-drilling but no fatalities were recorded. In 1986 CONFENAIE merged with other organizations to form the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). According to Minority Rights Group International, the founding of CONAIE was “[one of the most important political developments in Ecuador.” Furthermore, “[t]his confederation has been instrumental in organizing pan-indigenous uprising. A key player in Ecuadorian politics, CONAIE has demanded land restitution for indigenous peoples and envisaged a national economy based on territorial autonomy. Its sixteen-point demands included the right to practice traditional medicine, to bilingual education and to indigenous control of archaeological sites.” CONAIE continues to be active in fighting for indigenous cultural, language, and land rights. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. MAR reports a rebellion score of 8 in 2003, but this appears to be a typo (the scale goes only to 7 and the coding notes do not make mention of a rebellion).
Sources:


**EL SALVADOR**

**Indigenous Peoples**

*Summary:* The indigenous peoples of El Salvador make up about ten percent of the nation. Most belong to the Nahua-Pipil tribe, which is native to the Sonsonatem Ahuachapan, La Libertad, and Santa Ana states in the southwest region of the country. Though a small portion of indigenous people speak Nahuat and maintain cultural traditions such as lifestyles, traditional dress, etc., most only speak Spanish and have abandoned indigenous traditions (Minority Rights Group International). Thus, as Cultural Survival writes, “A commonly held notion…is that there are no longer any Indians in the country; …that indigenous culture has been abandoned, except for a few extremely threadbare and insignificant pockets in remote, rural areas” (Cultural Survival 1989). While a large portion of the indigenous peoples of El Salvador have integrated themselves into El Salvadorian society, they remain discriminated politically and economically and thus have no say in the redistribution of traditional lands or the allocation of natural resources (Minorities at Risk Project). According to Minority Rights Group International, uprisings over land allocation took place in the 19th and 20th century. A large uprising in 1932 resulted in government-sponsored massacres, named La Matanza, which killed between 35,000-50,000 people. A subsequent massacre in 1983, La Hojas, killed 74 indigenous people. Today, despite laws against discrimination in El Salvador, indigenous people remain the poorest group of people in El Salvador. They have been relegated to menial jobs such as harvesting coffee and sugar cane, industries that have decreased over the years. Minority Rights Group International reports that 78 percent of indigenous peoples are illiterate, as most do not have access to basic services such as education. Only five percent own land in comparison to the 95 percent landowners amongst non-indigenous people. A key grievance remains the lack of formal recognition of indigenous communities, histories, and cultures (Minorities at Risk Project). The indigenous peoples of El Salvador, led by the organization Asociacion Nacional de Indigenas de El Salvador (ANIS), aim to revive indigenous language and cultures. ANIS was founded in 1959, and remains active today. The National Coordinating Council of Salvadoran Indigenous Coordination Council (CCNIS) was subsequently founded in 1994. CCNIS aims to defend indigenous rights and preserve cultural identity. Though the indigenous people have protested in the early 1900s, Cultural Survival notes that, since the 1932 massacre, “The Indians of El Salvador went underground, for decades denying their existence to the outside world and hiding their identity” (Cultural Survival 1989). No instances of protest were found between 1932 and 1959 in Keesing’s. Thus, the start of the movement is coded as 1959 when ANIS was formed. The movement is coded as ongoing since ANIS and CCNIS remain active. The above-mentioned 1983 massacre of 74 indigenous people is not coded as low-level violence as this was an instance of one-sided violence (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1993). All other years are coded as NVIOLSD too as, despite some violence, deaths do not rise above 25 deaths a year.

*Sources:*


Bubis

Summary: According to Minahan (2002: 332-333), the decolonization of Ghana in 1957 fuelled ethnic conflict in the island of Bioko (the homeland of the Bubis), then part of Spanish Guinea. The first evidence for organized activity we found is in 1958, when Bubi nationalists organized demonstrations to support demands for separation of their island from the mainland of the Spanish colony (Minahan 2002: 333). In 1963 Bioko was granted autonomy, and when Equatorial Guinea gained independence in 1968, Bioko was vested with autonomy and guaranteed representation in the national parliament. We found no evidence of a self-determination movement in the immediate post-independence phase. In 1973, the Bubis’ autonomy was effectively revoked and in subsequent years, the Bubis faced harsh repression. According to Minahan (2002: 333), the movement re-emerged in 1989, when Bubi nationalists stepped up demands for independence. Note: the report in Minahan refers to exile nationalist organizations and remains ambiguous about whether they had already exited beforehand. We still use 1989 as the start date, which is also roughly in line with Marshall & Gurr (2003: 64), who note that the movement has been active since the early 1990s. It is possible that there were exile organizations even before 1989, but it does not appear as if there was any significant activity between independence and 1989. According to Minahan (2002: 334), Bubi nationalist groupings remained forbidden in the early 1990s. According to Keesing’s and Minahan (2002: 334), a group called the Self-Determination of the Island of Bioko was alleged to have murdered 5 government soldiers in 1998. The group denies the allegations, saying that it advocates only peaceful means for gaining Bubi autonomy. Said group has remained active in subsequent years fighting for autonomy, and thus the movement is coded as ongoing. We found no separatist violence above the LVIOLSD threshold and thus classify the entire movement as non-violent.

Sources:
ERITREA

Afars

Summary: The Afars of Eritrea, along with the Afars of Djibouti and Ethiopia, formed the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) in 1975. This was the first Afar self-determination movement, though the Afars in Eritrea later came to be represented by the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union (ARDU) and its military wing, Ugugumo. These groups continue to represent the Afar. Since Eritrea did not become independent until 1993, we begin to code the movement under the header of Eritrea in 1993, but indicate that the movement, through the AFDU’s involvement in the Eritrean war of independence, was active and violent prior to independence, though non-violent immediately prior to independence (the Afars under Ethiopia are coded with LVIOLSD from 1975-1990, but not in 1991-1993). The ARDU Afars were against Eritrea's independence, mainly because it would divide Afar territory for which the ARDU continues to claim autonomy. Rather, they seek a union between the Afars of Eritrea and those of Ethiopia in an autonomous entity within a federal Ethiopia. This plan excludes Djiboutian Afars, but this may be a limit imposed merely to appease French sensitivity. The Afars in Eritrea have literally been caught in between Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and Ethiopia’s mainly Tigrean armed forces in their long-standing dispute and recent border clashes as each state has attempted to undermine the other by seeking Afar assistance against one another. Since the 1990s, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) has been politically active as a rebel group that straddles Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 2007 and 2012, Afar separatists in Eritrea kidnapped tourists in Ethiopia but brought them over the border into Eritrea. Five tourists were killed in 2012, but none were killed in 2007. While there appear to have been some separatist clashes in 1994-95, we found no reports of deaths and thus classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


International Business Times. April 19. 


Russians

Summary: Estonia harbors a significant Russian minority, residing primarily in Tallinn and the border cities of Narva and Sillamae. When Estonia regained its independence in 1991, some Russian leaders from the North-East began to advocate territorial autonomy for Russians within Estonia. We therefore peg the start date to 1991. In July 1993 a referendum on autonomy was held in Narva and Sillamae, yielding significant support for autonomy. The referendum was declared illegal by the Estonian government. Soon after, the movement appears to have died down as more moderate politicians took over, leading to the stabilization of the situation. We did not find evidence for further separatist activity. Following our ten-year rule, we code an end to the movement in 2003. We did not find any instances of violence, and thus code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
**ETHIOPIA**

**Afars**

*Summary:* Afars of Ethiopia, along with Afars of Djibouti, formed the Afar Liberation Front in 1975. This is the first clear evidence of organized separatist activity that we have come across, and hence 1975 is coded as start date. However, separatist activity could predate 1975. Minahan (2002), for example, suggests that demands for Afar autonomy had emerged earlier (1950s or 1960s) but we found no clear evidence that they were organized. Fearon & Laitin (2003) code a civil war involving the Afars in Ethiopia since 1997, but many other sources suggest an earlier onset. UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over territory involving the Afars in 1975-1976 and then again in 1997. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) report ongoing armed conflict from 1975-1998. It has to be noted that Marshall & Gurr/Hewitt et al. code ongoing armed conflict if conflict recurs within five years. Hence this does not necessarily imply that the LVIOLSD threshold was met in all of these years. In particular, we found evidence suggesting a NVIOLSD code for 1991-1994: in those years the MAR rebellion score is zero and UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict. It is three or higher in 1975-1991 (note though that the MAR rebellion score is available only on a five-year basis until 1984) and 1996-1998. In 1995 it is missing. Based on this, we code 1975-1990 and 1995-1998 as LVIOLSD. We do not apply a HVIOLSD code as Doyle & Sambanis (2006) demonstrate that the Afar violence did not rise to the level of civil war for while there were numerous clashes between the Afar and their neighbours (Issa, Oromo and Tigray) during which the government intervened, none resulted in more than a few hundred deaths. 1991-1994 is coded as NVIOLSD. While certain Afar groups since 1991 attempt to work conventionally within the Ethiopian political system in alliance with the EPRDF (e.g. Afar National Democratic Movement and Afar Peoples Democratic Organization), the Afar Liberation Front has continued its local rebellions in recent years in the pursuit of an independent Afar state. The MAR rebellion score exceeds the LVIOLSD threshold in 1999-2000, thus 1999-2000 are also coded with LVIOLSD. Since 1998, MAR has coded zero protest scores. However, the movement continues to remain active: the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) is a separatist Afar group that lays claim to land straddling Ethiopia and Eritrea. There is also evidence that the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) has maintained activity in the early 2000s. ARDUF remains politically active in Ethiopia. In 2002, one faction of ARDUF sought to reach an agreement with the Ethiopian government but other factions “denounced this move… and vowed to continue the secessionist campaign by military means” (BBC UK). Known kidnappings have taken place in 2004, 2007, and 2008. ARDUF claims to have killed 49 government soldiers in 2011. In 2012, ARDUF claims that it had engaged in clashes against Ethiopian-led TPLF and killed 26. As these are rebel-reported numbers (government numbers could not be found using Lexis Nexis), it is not clear whether they are reliable. We tentatively code 2011-2012 as LVIOLSD. We found no report of secessionist violence between 2001 and 2010, hence a NVIOLSD coding for those years.

Note: while the Afar movement is coded as violent in its first year, the account in Minahan (p. 44) suggests that this violence emerged after the Ethiopian government violently repressed nonviolent protests demanding famine aid and the “protection of their traditional grazing lands”. This seems to suggest that the conflict was nonviolent initially, but this case would profit from more research.

**Sources:**


Anuaks

Summary: The Anuaks are a Nilo-Saharan people located mainly in Gambella, a region of Ethiopia’s. The Nilo-Saharans are a much larger group that also includes e.g. the Dinkas, the Nuer, and the Benishangul. Minorities at Risk codes the Nilo-Saharan with SEPX=3 in an earlier version, which indicates an active movement in the 1980s/1990s. While the Benishanguls appear not to have espoused separatist claims at the time, we found some evidence of an Anuak self-determination claim. The first evidence for organized activity we found is in 1979, when some Anuaks formed the Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) (Young 1979: 326). Thus 1979 is coded as start date. Initially, the GPDM made demands for independence, but dropped the independence demand at some point in the late 1980s before it established...
an alliance with the Tigray Front (Young 1979: 326). It appears that they continued to demand autonomy, however. In 1991 the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) liberated Gambella from the Derg and the GPDM attained power in the region (Young 1979: 326). According to Young (1979: 326), the GPDM launched a guerilla campaign immediately after its establishment (suggesting the movement was violent from the start), but was generally weak and “unable to mobilise more than a negligible portion of the population”. The start of a guerilla campaign noted by Young matches at least to some extent with Minorities at Risk, which attributes the Nilo-Saharan (though a much larger group that includes also e.g. the Benishangul, Nuer and Dinkas) an (five-year) anti-rebellion score of three in 1975-1980. We found no exact casualty estimates, but since both MAR and Young note a guerilla campaign that lasted (so it appears from Young 1999: 296) until 1991 we code 1979-1991 as LVIOLSD. In the 1990s and 2000s, the Anuaks were mainly involved in inter-ethnic conflict with local Nuer and “highlanders”, but there appear to have been some claims for self-determination too. According to a Human Rights Watch report, the Anuaks were Gambella’s majority group until the mid-1980s, when Nuer and “highlanders” moved into the region due to resettlement programs initiated by the Derg. This sparked resistance, and there is a long history of inter-ethnic violence. Conflict is over land, it appears, as the Anuaks lost part of their tribal lands: “These dramatic demographic changes are, to a large degree, responsible for the persistent ethnic tensions and frequent explosions of ethnic violence that have plagued Gambella since the fall of the Derg in 1991. The flow of non-Anuak migrants into Gambella has led many Anuak to fear the erosion of their political power, and some believe that the very survival of Anuak culture is at risk. Additionally, some traditionally Anuak lands are now inhabited almost exclusively by Nuer and Anuak widely regard the continual shrinking of their territory as a threatening development. The most frequent outbreaks of ethnic violence in Gambella have pitted the Anuak against the Nuer. This violence reached a bloody peak in 2002, a year that saw over one hundred people killed in clashes that displaced several thousand people. Violent Anuak-Nuer conflict subsided by late 2003, but the resulting respite was an extremely brief one, as ethnic conflict between Gambella’s Anuak and highlander communities had also been simmering throughout this period. Many Anuak bitterly resented the arrival of the settlers brought to Gambella by the Derg, and in May 1991, groups of Anuak villagers attacked and murdered large numbers of highlander farmers who had been living alongside them near the town of Abobo. More recently, in the past several years, a number of ambushes attributed to armed Anuak have left scores of highlander civilians dead.” The aims of the Anuak agitation in the post-1991 period are not fully clear, but they appear to have involved some claims for self-determination. According to Human Rights Watch, “Anuak fighters are not unified under the banner of any one group and do not share a common set of goals. They include Sudan-based rebels fighting against the Ethiopian government for Anuak “self-determination”; farmers carrying out isolated revenge attacks against ENDF soldiers and highlander civilians; and a small number of radicalized gunmen who seem to target the highlander population as a whole.” Based on this, we code an ongoing movement. There has definitely been violence in the post-1991 phase. Most of it was inter-ethnic and pitted Anuaks against Nuer (see above). But Human Rights Watch also makes mention of government involvement in attacks (mostly one-sided attacks on civilians, however) as well as rebel attacks on the government (see above). We could not find casualty estimates, but other sources confirm that there has been violence in Gambella. Feyissa (2011: 156), for instance, notes two major episodes of violent inter-ethnic conflict in 1991 and 2003, both involving significant numbers of deaths. Feyissa (2011: 159) also notes that Anuaks took up arms against the government after the 2003 massacre. A November 2014 article describes Gambella as one of Ethiopia’s most conflict-ridden regions (Horn Affairs 2014). Furthermore, also Lie & Borchgrevink (2012: 137) state that Gambella is one of the most conflict-ridden regions of Ethiopia, though they are quite clear that most of the conflict is inter-ethnic. In sum, there was violence post-1991. It was mostly inter-ethnic, but some rebel groups also attacked the government and the government engaged in counter-insurgency tactics as well as one-sided massacres of Anuaks. It is not clear whether there was violence in all years. Casualty estimates are also not clear. Still, we code 1992-2012 as LVIOLSD because there continued to be violence and we want to avoid a bogus de-escalation and re-escalation. This case would
profit from further research. Note: in 1987 the Gambella region was upgraded, and in 1991/1995 it received some limited autonomy, though it has remained dominated by “highlanders” (Feyissa 2011).

Sources:


Benishangul

Summary: The Benishangul-Gumuz region lies in the northwest of Ethiopia. It is dominated by the Gumuz, Benishangul (Berta) and Amhara ethnic groups, followed by the Oromo, Shinasha, Agnew, Mao, and Komno. Ethnic tensions within the region run high at times, particularly between the Gumuz and the Benishangul, who make up the two largest ethnic groups. The Benishangul are a Nilo-Saharan people. Nilo-Saharan is a much larger group that also includes e.g. the Dinkas, the Nuer, and the Anuaks. Minorities at Risk codes the Nilo-Saharan with SEPX=3 in an earlier version, which indicates an active movement in the 1980s/1990s. The Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM) was founded in 1995. It operates from Sudan, where they have been fighting for the secession of the Benishangul region in Ethiopia. In 1997, the BPLM allied with other organizations, including the Ethiopian Democratic Motherland Party, the Ethiopian People’s Unifying Organization, the Ethiopian Unity Democratic Movement, the Ethiopian Unity Front, the Kafegn Patriotic Front, and the Medhin party, to form the Ethiopian Democratic Patriotic United Front (EDPUF). As the BPLM is a Muslim organization that was ideologically similar to the Sudanese government, Khartoum extended its support to the rebel group. According to the Small Arms Survey, “A faction of the BPLM fell under the influence of the NIF and advocated self-determination for Benishangul as a prelude to union with Sudan” (Young 2007, 26). Besides aid from Sudan, the BPLM also received support from Eritrea. On August 17, 2012, the BPLM and the Ethiopian Government signed a peace agreement to end the 17-year armed conflict. However, since then, the BPLM have renewed their commitment to the freedom of Benishangul as a result of new dam constructions planned for the region. According to the BPLM, Benishangul has “never been part of so called Abyssinia…” because Ethiopia invaded and illegally occupied Benishangul with the help of the British in 1898. Thus, the BPLM contends that the Ethiopian government does not hold the right to approve dam construction in the region. Based on the information above, the Benishangul movement is coded as starting in 1995 with the formation of the BPLM, and remains ongoing in 2012. Young (1999: 333) suggests that there must have been violence: “A jihad was declared [by Benishangul separatists], and the party [i.e. the BPLM] began military operations against government infrastructure, military outposts and resident highlanders.” A 2012 article in the Sudan Tribune reports a peace accord signed in 2012 between the BPLM and the Ethiopian government. Another peace pact was signed in 2005, but it
was broken soon thereafter. The article suggests that the BPLM was involved in a low-level insurgency ever since its establishment in 1995: “[s]ince its establishment in 1995 the BPLM carried out cross-border attacks, mainly against developmental facilities in Ethiopia’s Benishangul Gumuz state, which borders Sudan.” We apply a LVIOLSD code throughout based on this, though noting that we could not find information on casualties. This decision is somewhat ambiguous and this case would profit from further research. Note: Young (1999) contains some information on the Benishangul’s degree of autonomy and other political developments. Note as well: Young (1999: 327-328) notes that the Benishangul organized already under the Derg in the late 1970s/1980s, but Young does not explicitly state that there were separatist claims and we could not find other evidence in this direction.

Sources:

Benishangul People’s Liberation Front (2013). “Declaration No 4 of BPLM.”


Sudan Tribune (2012). “Benishangul Peoples’s Liberation Movement (BPLM).”


Eritreans

Summary: Eritrea was colonized by the Italians in 1890 and became part of Italian East Africa when the fascist Italian forces occupied the Ethiopian Empire in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935/1936. British forces liberated Italian East Africa in 1941, reestablished Ethiopian independence, and placed Eritrea under British administration. After World War II, Eritrean organizations emerged calling for independence (allied under the header of the Independence Bloc, formed in 1949). Against the wishes of many Eritreans, the UN General Assembly decided to turn over Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1950 (as a war compensation). While the Eritreans’ desire for independence was ignored, the UN resolution foresaw autonomy for the Eritreans: Eritrea should have its own administration with control over domestic affairs, including police and taxes. The merger took place in 1952. Confronted with severe repression, the movement appears to have been dormant until 1958, when the Eritrean Liberation Movement was formed. The Movement was succeeded by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in 1961 (Encyclopaedia Britannica; Ofcansky & Berry 1991). 1958 is coded as start date. We find no reports of separatist violent activity in the initial years, hence a NVIOLSD coding. Marshall & Gurr (2003: 62) peg the start of the low-level armed conflict at 1961; UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict over Eritrea from 1964-1991. We use 1962 as the start year of the LVIOLSD phase of this movement because we found reports indicating that the ELF was still preparing for violence in 1961, not yet actually carrying it out. Degenhardt (1988: 100) writes that in 1961 the ELF was increasingly active in preparing for armed struggle inside Eritrea with weapons brought in from Sudan. We code 1974-1991 as HVIOLSD following Doyle & Sambanis.
The war ended when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front seized the capital in 1991 and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front took control of the province of Eritrea. The two groups agreed that Eritrea would have an internationally-supervised referendum on independence. In April 1993 an election was held with almost unanimous support for Eritrean independence and Ethiopia recognized Eritrea as an independent state. The international community also recognized Eritrea as an independent state in 1993. We therefore peg the end of the movement 1993. 1992-1993 were coded as NVIOLSD since we found no reports of separatist violence.

Sources:


Oromos

Summary: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was formed in 1973, hence the start date of the movement. There is evidence for prior Oromo resistance in the 1960s with the formation of the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association in 1964. However, the aim of this self-help association was predominantly restricted to the improvement of conditions in Oromo lands and hence does not qualify as a self-determination movement as defined in the codebook. Doyle & Sambanis code a civil war from 1999-2002, thus these years are coded with HVIOLSD. It has to be noted, however, that this is a borderline case in terms of casualties (the maximum is in 1999 with just under 700 and 2000-2002 are much lower). All other years are coded with LVIOLSD, though it has to be noted that there is some ambiguity about this. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code ongoing armed conflict from 1973-2006, the least year they cover. MAR is only partially in line with this. The quinquennial MAR rebellion score is four in 1970-1979. It is only one and thus below the LVIOLSD threshold in 1980-1984. But UCDP/PRIO provides evidence for low-level activity during most of these years: 1980-1981 and 1983-1984 are coded as armed conflict in UCDP/PRIO (as well as 1977-1978). Since there is ambiguity whether the conflict de-escalated or not, we code ongoing low-level activity throughout 1973-1984. There is less ambiguity concerning the 1985-1998 period. While Marshall & Gurr/Hewitt et al. suggest a LVIOLSD code for all

Note: while we code the movement as violent from its first year, it seems that the movement was initially nonviolent. Keller's detailed description of Oromo history describes the OLF as a militant organization from the start, but it is questionable whether the low-level violence threshold was met immediately. We code violence in 1973 only because of Marshall & Gurr. Most other sources suggest that violence emerged only later – UCDP, for example, codes violence from 1977. According to Keller, p. 628, the OLF “began an offensive against the Ethiopian authorities in Hararge Province in 1974, but sustained activities did not occur until after the collapse of the imperial regime. The OLF subsequently spread its activities to Wollega in the west.” The account in Minahan (2002) similarly suggests initial nonviolence.

Sources:

Sidama

Summary: Advocating the secession of Sidamaland, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) was founded in 1978. We peg the start date to 1978. The Sidama movement got significant support from the Somalia government. According to UCDP/PRIO, armed conflict emerged in 1983 after a few years of low-level guerilla activity and that conflict was quickly contained (UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict in 1984). However, a 1991 Human Rights Watch report provides evidence that casualties were above 25 also in 1980-1982. First, footnote 111 suggests that the government committed “atrocities” in Sidama throughout 1980-1982. Furthermore, it is noted that “[t]he Sidama Liberation Front (SLF) was becoming more active, largely in response to pre-emptive government counter-insurgency policies. The war in Sidamo in 1981 was one of the Dergue's best-kept secrets. In January, 200 people were reported killed by an army patrol at Godaboke Mito and Chire villages in Sidamo. Between March 19-21, helicopter and airplane at tacks at Gata Warrancha in Sidamo caused at least 20,000 people in one valley to flee, and over 1,000 (and possibly more than 2,000) were reported killed when a "wall of flames" was ignited by bombing using either phosphorous or ethylene. Ethylene is a heavier-than-air gas which can be sprayed from the air, whereupon it spreads out, hugging the ground, and can be ignited by an incendiary to create instantaneous combustion over a large area. Its use in this attack has not been confirmed by other independent sources […] [i]n the highlands of Sidamo and Harerghe, widespread violence by government forces continued throughout 1982” (Human Rights Watch 1991: 78-79). Moreover, violence appears to have continued well into 1984: “[o]n April 1, 1983, in a government reprisal for SLF activities during the previous two months, soldiers killed 100 civilians in the village of Halile, Sidamo. In 1984, the government was able to recapture most of the areas previously held by the SLF, and forcibly relocated the population in relief shelters. In Chire camp 3,000 people died, mainly children, before relief agencies were allowed to provide services in 1984” (Human Rights Watch 1991: 80). Thus 1980-1984 are coded LVIOLSD. We found no casualty information for 1978-1979, and thus code that period NVIOLSD. According to Minorities at Risk and Human Rights Watch (1991: 75), the SLM disappeared in the 1984, but reappeared in June 1991. Since the SLM was decisively defeated in 1984 and no other movement fighting for Sidamaland was found between 1984-1991, we code the end of the first movement in 1984. The second movement begins in 1991, and since then, there is evidence of continued separatist activity. We code the movement as ongoing in 2012 and NVIOLSD from 1991-2012 since we found no casualties for that period.

Sources:
Ethiomedia. [February 2, 2014].
Sidama Liberation Front (SLM). [February 2, 2014].


Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Conflict Encyclopedia. [February 2, 2014].

Tigreans

**Summary:** The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was established in 1975, hence the start date of the movement. It was formed under the auspices of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front to further separatist aspirations among the people of Tigre provinces (Degenhardt 1988: 104). The LVIOLSD coding for 1976-77 follows UCDP/PRIO who classifies these years as “war,” but since they are not included in the Doyle & Sambanis (2006) codings of civil war, we code those years as LVIOLSD. The violence in 1976-1977 is denoted as “ambiguous” as the conflict was primarily over the government (i.e. associated with a Marxist movement aimed at overthrowing the government). The 1978-1991 civil war involving the Tigreans is coded as HVIOLSD following Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Fearon and Laitin (2003) indicate that the conflict was over “mixed motives” and Gleditsch et al. write that the war was a contest over control of the central government. However, from Minahan (1996: 570-572) it appears that the Tigreans were also mounting a separatist rebellion during this period. The mixed motives of the rebellion make this an ambiguous case. Although representing only one-tenth of Ethiopia’s population, the Tigreans have been the dominant ethnopolitical group in Ethiopia since 1991 and the defeat of Mengistu’s army by the TPLF, which later organized itself into the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). As the country’s dominant group, the Tigreans have not protested or rebelled in recent years. We therefore code an end to the movement in 1991.

**Sources:**


Western Somalis

Summary: The idea of “Greater Somalia” evolved during Italian occupation in the mid-1930s, when the Somali peoples were united under one government for the first time. In 1941, the allied forces liberated the Somali-inhabited areas, including the Ogaden, and put them under British military administration (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 217; Human Rights Watch 2008; Minahan 2002: 2067). In 1942, the Dir and Darod clans rebelled; an event that Minahan (2002: 2067) defines as the “beginning of the modern Western Somali national movement.” The movement was put down by the British and the Western Somali clans were disarmed but violent protest erupted again in 1948 when the Ogaden territory, against heavy Somali opposition, was incorporated into Ethiopia. We follow Minahan (2002) and code 1942 as the start date of the movement, but only code the movement from 1948, the year of the incorporation of Ogaden into Ethiopia. We found no casualty estimates for the incidents in 1942 and 1948 reported by Minahan, and thus indicate prior non-violent activity and code 1948 as NVIOLSD. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the Ogaden Liberation Front emerged in 1963. In 1975 another important Western Somali rebel group was formed, the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 217). We code 1963-1975 as LVIOLSD, though noting that there is some ambiguity about this code. UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over Ogaden in only one year, 1964. The quinquennial MAR rebellion score, on the other hand, is six from 1960-1969 and zero in 1970-1974. Our decision to code ongoing armed conflict bases on Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) who code armed conflict throughout 1963-1975. Note that Marshall & Gurr/Hewitt et al. code ongoing armed conflict if conflict recurs within five years. Nevertheless, they appear to have picked up some violence in 1963 and in 1970-1974 that other sources missed (otherwise they could not have coded ongoing armed conflict since 1963). The HVIOLSD coding for 1976-88 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Despite the peace agreement in 1988, the Ogaden issue remains unresolved. Tense relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have persisted, particularly in the early and mid-1990s due to Ethiopia’s support of the Somali National Movement (SNM), a rebel organization which engaged the Somali government in the civil war of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Also, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), formed in 1984 from a split in the WSLF and with which the nearly defunct WSLF merged in 1991, has continued to pursue Ogadeni self-determination via both the conventional political process (after 1992) and intermittent armed struggle, particularly in the late 1990s. The LVIOLSD code for 1989-1997 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003: 62, 2005: 89) and Hewitt et al. (2008) who code ongoing armed conflict throughout 1989-1997. It is possible that violence did not meet the LVIOLSD threshold in some years (in particular in 1997). The the MAR rebellion score is above two in all years except 1997 and as UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict in 1997 either (in addition, UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict in 1989-1990, 1992 and 1995; UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict over Ogaden only in 1993-1994 and 1996 as well as an armed intrastate armed conflict over Hararghe in 1991 involving a Somali-dominated rebel group, the Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF)). We retain the LVIOLSD code throughout 1989-1997 to avoid a bogus de-escalation. The HVIOLSD code for 1998-2012 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The WSLF and the government signed an agreement in 2010, but the ONLF remains active. The movement is coded as ongoing.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [June 27, 2003].


FINLAND

Alanders

Summary: Alander nationalism, which had been dormant for many decades, was revitalized in the late 1980s, stimulated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Finland's application to join the European Union. News reports indicate that Alander political parties have campaigned for greater autonomy since at least 1992, but possibly even before that. Somehow arbitrarily, we peg the start date of the movement to 1990. Already inhabiting an autonomous province, Alanders gained greater economic and legislative freedom in 1993 and are seeking full independence within the context of the European Union. Aland separatism remains ongoing, although there is little yearly information on it. Most recently in 2006, Alanders have demanded to leave the EU in response to new laws abolishing duck hunting and impending laws on chewing tobacco. In 2012, International Policy Digest included the Aland Islands as one of the places that are seeking autonomy or independence. We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:

Sami (Lapps)

Summary: Sami activists formed the Nordic Saami Institute in 1973 to press for political and land rights. Since 1973, the Sami have elected a representative body, a Sami Parliament, from amongst themselves. Its 20 representatives are elected every four years and the purpose of the Sami Parliament is to attend to the rights and interests of the Sami by presenting initiatives and proposals and by preparing opinions to the authorities. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1973. In 1983 Sami leaders declared the sovereignty of the divided nation (the Sami are also found in Norway and Sweden). In 1986 the Chernobyl disaster spread radiation across Lapland and made necessary the destruction of reindeer herds, the Sami’s livelihood. Two years later Sami leaders demanded the creation of a Sami parliament that
would have influence over planning and development of the region. In response to this demand, since 1991 the Sami have been heard in the Finnish Parliament on matters especially concerning them. The Sami are the only indigenous people in Finland to have such a right. Since Finland’s entry into the European Union in 1995, some Sami nationalists began a campaign to join the EU as a separate European people. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1970-99 indicate that the movement has been consistently active since 1973. In 2000, the Sami Parliamentary Council was formed to represent the Sami parliaments in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. A 2011 UN document also indicates that the Sami movement remains ongoing in all three countries, and the Sami Parliamentary Council remains active today. Issues include cultural and language autonomy as well as the freedom to cross borders between the countries. We found no evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:


Alsatians

Summary: There was an Alsatian home-rule movement seeking greater autonomy within the French Republic in the interwar years. The first evidence of organized separatist activity in the post-WWII era we found is in 1969, when the Movement of Alsace Lorraine was founded, which called for “a free Alsace-Lorraine within a European federation” (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 21). Thus 1969 is coded as start date. Keesing’s (January 1976) reports that “Autonomist tendencies in Alsace resulted in part from the fact that the regional dialect did not enjoy equal rights with the French language in law and education or in the press, radio and television (so that a majority of television users regularly tuned in to West German or Swiss television). Moreover, the region bordered on two of Europe’s wealthiest nations – West Germany and Switzerland – to which thousands of Alsatian workers were attracted by higher wages. M. Bernard Wittmann, president of the European Federalist Party in Alsace-Lorraine, stated in a letter published in Le Monde on March 29, 1974, that a majority of Alsatians believed in the eventual advent of a ‘Europe of the regions,’ which might force France, as ‘the last bastion of centralism (with Spain, Greece and Portugal) to grant a statute of autonomy within a federal framework to the regions of France.’” News reports indicate that various Alsatian separatist parties have been actively participating in regional and national politics since 1969. The two most prominent parties in the 1990s appear to be Alsace-Lorraine National Forum (Nationalforum Elsass-Lothringen/Forum Nationaliste d'Alsace-Lorraine) and the Union of the Alsatian People (Union du Peuple Alsacien/Elsass Volksunion, UPA/EVU). In 2009, a new party, Unser Land, was formed with the merging of two separatist parties, Union du Peuple Alsacien and Fer's Elsass, to join the call for autonomy from France. Unser Land remains active and thus the movement is ongoing. Since we find no reports of separatist violence, we classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
**Basques**

*Summary:* What appears to be the first French Basque self-determination movement – a political party by the name of Enbata – was formed in 1963, hence the start date of the movement. Presently there are many active French Basque separatist organizations. Moderates tend to support the various conventional Basque political parties that form and reform before every election. Those who call for more militant action tend to support Iparretarak, or the newly formed Haika – a coalition of some members of Iparretarak and a Spanish-based Basque youth group. MAR codes non-zero protest scores until 2005. Based on additional research, the movement is still ongoing. In August 2006, a new militant Basque separatist organization, Irrintzi, was formed. Irrintzi subsequently claimed responsibility for five bombings and four additional attacks before disappearing in October 2006. During this time, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, a predominantly Spanish Basque rebel group, also operated in France. It should be noted that we found no evidence of separatism following the October 2006 attack, but the movement is coded as ongoing in accordance with the 10-year rule. No fatalities relating to separatist violence were found, and thus the movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 28, 2002].


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**Bretons**

*Summary:* While the first Breton separatist groups were formed in the late 19th/early 20th century, in the post-1945 era the movement seems to have been politically dormant until 1957, when the Mouvement pour l’Organisation de la Bretagne (MOB) was formed, an organization widely described as federalist (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 51). In 1962 another Breton separatist organization was formed, the Union Démocratique Bretonne (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 307). In 1958 Breton regionalists won 23% of the
vote in their districts (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 51). In 1964, the Union Démocratique Bretonne (Breton Democratic Union, UDB), a leftist party in quest of complete autonomy for Brittany in the French Republic and European Union by non-violent means, was founded. Although Breton separatists have carried out over 250 bomb attacks since 1966, these attacks seem to have resulted in human deaths only in three instances: one person was killed in 1974 while two people were killed in 2000. Following our coding rules we nevertheless classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD. Both the UDB, which has been active since its founding, and the Party for the Organization of a Free Brittany (Parti pour l'Organisation d'une Bretagne Libre, POBL), which proclaims “the inalienable right of the Breton people freely to rule itself and to become independent again,” were active in both regional and national politics during the 1990s. POBL was dissolved in 2000 and its members created Adsav, a new party fighting for Bretagne secession. Adsav remains active but no separatist violence has been found in Lexis Nexis. The movement is thus coded as ongoing and NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Corsicans

Summary: With the reimposition of French rule in 1945, the nationalist Corse movement that had existed became dormant (Minahan 2002: 489). The movement resurfaced in the late 1950s. In 1960, Corsican students in Paris formed the Union Corse and began to voice their dismay about French development programs towards Corsica (Hossay 2004: 408). While demands were framed in nationalist terms, they did not clearly extend to self-determination as we define it. Then, in 1967, the Regional Front of Corsica (FRC) was founded, one of the first organizations advocating Corse autonomy (De La Calle and Fezi 2010: 399). Thus, we peg the start date to 1967. In 1973, the Action for the Revival of Corsica (ARC) was founded, another group aiming for Corse autonomy (De La Calle and Fezi 2010: 399). However, while the Corsicans are represented by numerous conventional and militant organizations, the largest Corsican self-determination organization is a low-level terrorist organization known as the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) founded in 1976. We code NVIOLSD from 1967-1975 because no violence was found during that period. The LVIOLSD coding for 1976-2003 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008). The Peace and Conflict reports note that hostilities were “low-
level” since 2001, but continue to code armed conflict until 2006, the last year they cover. However, the FNLC declared a unilateral ceasefire from November 2003 - March 2005 and attacks during this period of time resulted in no casualties. Few casualties were found in subsequent years as well, including accidental deaths from failed bombing attacks (The Guardian 8/28/2006; Lexis Nexis). According to the Guardian, fatalities are rare as the FNLC targets buildings when empty so as to avoid deaths (The Guardian 8/28/2006; Lexis Nexis). The Associated Press also notes that “[m]ost of the attacks cause damage to property, but not human casualties” (Associated Press International, 10/16/2006; Lexis Nexis). Based on this, the movement is coded as NVIOLSD from 2004-2012. It has to be noted that the LVIOLSD code in 1976-2003 is somewhat ambiguous as other sources (UCDP/PRIO, MAR) would not suggest that violence rose to the LVIOLSD level.

Sources:
### French Guianans

**Summary:** French Guiana became a Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM) in 1946. Thus it was fully integrated with France and decolonized according to our definition. In 1956 the Guyanese Socialist Party (PSG) was formed. The PSG advocated autonomy for French Guiana (now it supports autonomy as a step leading towards full independence) (Auzias & Labourdette 2010: 42). The PSG is the most important representative of the movement, but there are other organizations too. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 102) report that the Guyanese Movement for Decolonization was active in 1973 elections. In 1976 the Boni Liberation Movement was formed. Other presently active self-determination organizations in French Guiana include: the Guianese Democratic Action (Action Démocratique Guyanaise, ADG), a left-wing pro-independence party founded in 1981; the Guianese National Popular Party (Parti National Populaire Guyanaïs, PNPG), a leftist party founded in 1985 that supports independence for French Guiana; and the Movement for Decolonization and Social Emancipation (Mouvement pour la Décolonisation et l'Émancipation Sociale, MDES), which also advocates independence for French Guiana. French Guianan citizens voted against increased autonomy in 2010, but self-determination activity has continued. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence the NVIOLSD classification.

**Sources:**


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [March 25, 2002].


### French Polynesians (Tahitians)

**Summary:** In 1947 the Comité Pouvanaa was formed (Pouvanaa was a local nationalist politician). The Comité made claims that Tahiti should be ruled by locals rather than expatriate Frenchmen (Henningham 1992: 121). In 1950 the Comité Pouvanaa was transformed into a political party, the Rassemblement Populations Tahitiennes (RDPT). The RDPT tended to an autonomist position. However, in April 1958 the RDPT leader, Pouvanaa, came out in favour of independence for Tahiti (Henningham 1992: 122;
Fisher 2013: 73). Based on this, the start date is coded in 1947. However, at this point Tahiti had still been a colony according to our definition. In 1946, Tahiti was granted the status of a Territoire d’Outre-Mer (TOM), and thus a degree of autonomy. Furthermore, French citizenship was extended to all inhabitants of Tahiti. However, TOMs retained a colonial-like structure that involved racially separated representative bodies. An important step towards decolonization came in 1956 with the adoption of the Loi Deferre, which granted universal suffrage (Fisher 2013: 47; Henningham 1992: 49). However, some discriminatory practices continued. The installation of the Fifth Republic in late 1958 constitutes a good cut-off to consider Tahiti decolonized. That year, a referendum was held in which TOMs, including Tahiti, could choose between continued union with France and immediate independence. Tahiti, like all other TOMs except for Guinea, opted for continued union with France. TOMs, including Tahiti, then faced a choice whether to i) be fully integrated with France, ii) become a state in free association with France or iii) retain the status of a TOM. Free association was a non-official status but understood as a transitional status leading towards independence. All African TOMs chose the status of free association, while Pacific islands such as New Caledonia and Tahiti TOM status (Mrgudovic 2012: 85-87; Henningham 1992: 49; Fisher 2013: 47). Furthermore, the 1958 constitution promised the TOMs ‘free-determination’. Based on this, we code the movement from 1958, but note prior non-violent activity. After the 1958 empire-wide referendum, the independence movement was significantly weakened (Henningham 1992: 125-126). Economic development and strong repression of advocates of independence pushed independence off the political agenda during the 1960s and 1970s (Henningham 1992: 132-133; Fisher 2013: 133). In 1963, the RDPT was first banned, then abolished and reformed (Henningham 1992: 133). Yet, self-determination activity continued (Henningham 1992: 133). RDPT supporters regrouped as the Patriot’s Party (Pupu Here A’i’a Te Nuina’a la Ora), a pro-autonomy rural party. The Patriot’s Party cooperated with E’a Api (The New Way), another emerging autonomist party. The autonomists argued that Tahiti should be given increased control over its own affairs, and called for social and economic reforms (Henningham 1992: 133). The two parties enjoyed strong support in what remained of the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s (Henningham 1992: 135). In the 1960s and early 1970s, calls for autonomy were routinely rebuffed. In 1976 autonomists occupied Polynesia’s Territorial Assembly, continuing the occupation through 1977 (Henningham 1992: 136). Frustration over France’s continued refusal to accommodate the autonomists led again to organized activity in favour of independence. The most significant of these groupings was la Mana Te Nuna’ (Power to the People), a party that had been formed in 1975 and came out in favour of independence in 1978 (Henningham 1992: 137). Independence-minded groups enjoyed some support, but clearly less compared to the autonomists (Henningham 1992: 137-138). In the late 1970s, France finally responded to the heightening nationalist pressure. A new 1977 statute devolved some limited competencies to Tahiti (Henningham 1992: 139). The limited nature of the autonomy granted led to a renewed campaign for increased autonomy (Henningham 1992: 140). Even the local conservative affiliate now favored autonomy (Henningham 1992: 141). Independence remained a minority position (Henningham 1992: 141). In 1984 Polynesia was granted far-reaching autonomy (Henningham 1992: 148-149). Nevertheless some calls for autonomy and/or independence continued to be made, with pro-independence parties being in the minority (Henningham 1992: 156-157, 162; Fisher 2013: 72). In 1990 and 1996 Tahiti gained some autonomy. In 2003/2004, Tahiti won a fully new autonomy statute which implied much increased autonomy. In 2004, pro-independence parties for the first time took over Polynesia’s government, though they tend to make claims for sovereignty-in-association rather than full independence (Fisher 2013: 180). The surge of pro-independence parties followed changes to the electoral law in 2004, which gave the biggest party a major bonus. With independence-feeling on the rise, France attempted to stabilize the situation and again amended Tahiti’s statute in 2007, scrapping the bonus to the biggest party and instead introducing PR with a hefty 12.5% threshold. Most local parties were opposed to the changes, which they saw as France tampering with local issues. Following this, the pro-autonomy parties did better again, though the pro-independence have remained in a strong position (Fisher 2013: 181-185). Pro-independenceists now seek the re-inscription of French Polynesia on the UN’s list of non-self-governing territories (Fisher 2013: 187). Thus the movement is coded as ongoing. There was limited separatist violence. In particular, we
found evidence for the death of one person in 1977. Following our coding rules, we classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Guadeloupe Islanders

Summary: Guadeloupe became a Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM) in 1946. Thus it was fully integrated with France and decolonized according to our definition. The first nationalist organization, the Group d’Organisation Guadeloupéenne, was formed in 1965, hence the start date of the movement. The Guadeloupe Liberation Army (GLA) has employed acts of terror, but only three such events appear to have resulted in any deaths: in March 1980 gunmen shot and wounded the only white member of the city council of Pointe-a-Pierre. In September 1980, GLA terrorists attached a bomb to an Air France Boeing 727 and killed a French explosives expert. In May 1985 a bomb in a restaurant killed one person. Given this death count and our coding rules, we nevertheless classify the movement as NVIOLSD. Guadeloupe rejected an autonomy offer in 2003 by way of a popular vote. There is though continued contention directed towards increased self-determination (Bonilla 2009). Hence, the movement is coded as ongoing.

Sources:
Kanaks (New Caledonians)

Summary: Melanesians or Kanaks are the indigenous inhabitants of New Caledonia, a French Overseas Territory in the Pacific Ocean. In 1951, the Union Calédonienne (UC) was formed (Henningham 1992: 49). Initially, the UC was a multi-ethnic party (though with many Kanak members), but by the 1970s it mainly consisted of ethnic Kanaks. In its early days, the UC was moderate in its demands and decidedly pro-French. Nevertheless the UC made demands for autonomy and in particular increased local control over natural resources (Henningham 1992: 53-55). In 1956 the UC had a major success when the Loi Cadre (Deferre) was adopted, which granted New Caledonia a Territorial Assembly (TA) elected by universal suffrage. This gave New Caledonia some real autonomy (Chappell 2003: 190), though autonomy remained relatively limited (Henningham 1992: 61). The UC favored continued integration with France in a 1958 referendum, but according to Henningham (1992: 56), UC leaders also hoped, in the longer term, for full autonomy with France retaining control only over foreign affairs, defense, and the financial system. Starting in 1958, the French government re-centralized a number of previously devolved competencies (Chappell 2003: 190-191). This prompted the opposition of the UC, which in the 1967 regional elections campaigned for a restoration of the powers that had been granted back in 1956 (Chappell 2003: 191). Based on this, we code the start date in 1951, the year when the UC began to campaign for autonomy. There was a significant accommodation in 1956, but powers were re-centralized starting in 1958, which prompted the UC to lobby for the restoration of autonomy in 1967. Whether or not one can speak of an autonomy movement between 1956-1966 is somewhat ambiguous, but we consider it an ongoing movement for the following reasons: i) we found no clear-cut evidence that would allow us to code an end to the movement, ii) there is the somewhat ambiguous statement that UC leaders continued to dream of full autonomy by Henningham (see above), and iii) the fact that competencies were stripped away from 1958 onwards makes it likely that UC had made claims for the restoration of autonomy already before the 1967 campaign cited above. Note that in the data set, we only code the movement from 1958, despite its start date in 1951. In 1951, New Caledonia had still been a colony according to our definition. In 1946, New Caledonia was granted the status of a Territoire d’Outre-Mer (TOM), and thus a degree of autonomy. Furthermore, French citizenship was extended to all inhabitants of New Caledonia (note: according to Encyclopedia Britannica was granted only in 1953). However, TOMs retained a colonial-like structure that involved racially separated representative bodies. An important step towards decolonization came in 1956 with the adoption of the Loi Deferre, which granted universal suffrage (Fisher 2013: 47; Henningham 1992: 49). However, some discriminatory practices continued. The installation of the Fifth Republic in late 1958 constitutes a good cut-off to consider New Caledonia decolonized. That year, a referendum was held in which TOMs, including New Caledonia, could choose between continued union with France and immediate independence. New Caledonia, like all
other TOMs except for Guinea, opted for continued union with France (see above). TOMs, including New Caledonia, then faced a choice whether to i) be fully integrated with France, ii) become a state in free association with France or iii) retain the status of a TOM. Free association was a non-official status but understood as a transitional status leading towards independence. All African TOMs chose the status of free association, while Pacific islands such as New Caledonia and Tahiti chose continued TOM status (Mrugdovic 2012: 85-87; Henningham 1992: 49; Fisher 2013: 47). Furthermore, the 1958 constitution promised the TOMs “free-determination”. Based on this, we code the movement from 1958, but note prior non-violent activity. By the 1960s, the Kanak population had been a minority within New Caledonia, mainly due to in-migration from French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, two other French overseas entities (Henningham 1992: 55). In the late 1960s/early 1970s, Kanak students began to form a number of self-determination organizations with increasingly radical claims. In 1968, Kanak students formed the Comité d’action pour l’autonomie de la Calédonie et de la defense de la France. That same year, the Association des jeunes Calédoniens à Paris (AJCP) was formed, an organization that advocated increased autonomy for New Caledonia (Chappell 2003: 193). Soon also calls for independence were made. Radical students in France, for instance, launched a study group called Groupe d’action pour l’indépendance accélérée de la Calédonie (Chappell 2003: 194). In 1969, the Marxist Foulards Rouges was formed and began to make calls for independence (Chappell 2003: 194-197). In May 1977 the UC also adopted a pro-independence stance (previously it had favoured autonomy). This signaled the shift of the majority of Melanesians into the independence camp (Henningham 1992: 67, also see 77). Violence began to be used more systematically in 1979, following a declaration by another organization, the Front Independantiste, which denounced “French colonialism and imperialism in the Pacific” and declared that “by its obstinate refusal to grant the Kanak people sovereignty in their own country” the French government bore full responsibility for the “inevitable” confrontation to come. This confrontation consisted of various violent attacks on Europeans, looting, damage to property, particularly in response to a 1981 assassination of a FI leader. In 1983, two policemen were killed when Melanesian tribesmen ambushed a convoy carrying equipment for a timber plant. 1984 was a particularly violent year: between November 13 and December 31, a total of 107 roadblocks were erected, 15 bombs exploded, 96 cars or buildings were burnt, 41 buildings were ransacked and a total of 16 people died in either separatist acts of violence or in clashes between separatists and the police. The Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, a socialist secessionist group, was formed in 1984. Five people were killed in separatist clashes in 1985 and in 1986, a 14-year-old boy was killed in violent clashes between pro-independence and pro-French groups. In 1987 Paris decided to hold a referendum on independence. The referendum resulted in a decisive vote against independence. The referendum had been boycotted by the local Kanaks. Violence escalated again in 1988. According to Thompson (2014: 243), Kanak nationalists killed an opponent of independence in early 1988. In April 1988, members of the independence movement took 27 police officers, a prosecutor and seven members of a French paramilitary unit hostage on the island of Ouvéa, demanding talks about independence. Four gendarmes were killed in the process. France refused to negotiate. 19 Kanak independentists and two French soldiers died in the subsequent rescue mission. In sum, 1988 saw 26 deaths. Thus 1988 is coded as LVIOLSD. After the outburst of violence, negotiations followed. In June 1988, the Matignon Accord was signed, which led to much increased autonomy and a promise of another vote on independence to be held in 1998 (BBC UK). In 1998, instead of holding a referendum, the two sides signed the Noumea Accord, “which gave New Caledonia greater autonomy and stipulated that the independence vote should be held between 2014 and 2019. The accord also created New Caledonian citizenship” (BBC 2013). In 2006, France passed laws that only allow New Caledonian residents to vote in territorial elections, thereby restricting French citizens from voting. This has “long been sought by the Kanak community” (BBC UK). 2010 saw the adoption of a Kanak flag. The movement is ongoing. As of 2012, active pro-independence groups include: UC, Parti de Liberation Kanak, Union Progressiste Melanesienne, and Parti Travailliste. We found no violence above the LVIOLSD threshold except for 1988, thus all other years are coded as NVIOLSD.
Martinique Islanders

Summary: Martinique became a Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM) in 1946. Thus it was fully integrated with France and decolonized according to our definition. The first Martinique party to demand greater autonomy for the island – the Martinique Progressive Party (PPM) – was founded in 1957, hence the start date of the movement. On the basis of their common belief that autonomy was a necessary step towards the independence of Martinique, the island’s two major political parties – the PPM and the Martinique Communist Party (PCM) – formed in 1975 the Front National Martiniquais pour L’Autonomie (National Martinique Front for Autonomy). By early 1980 this Front had effectively collapsed, with the PCM accusing the PPM of seeking “absorption rather than alliance.” Both parties, however, continued to champion the cause of greater autonomy: at its eighth congress in 1980 the PPM adopted a motion calling for “autonomy for the Martinique nation as a stage in the struggle of the Martinique people for
independence and self-managing socialism.” Also in 1980, at its seventh congress the PCM abandoned the party’s previous commitment to “popular and democratic autonomy within the framework of the French Republic” and opted instead “struggle for national liberation” with the aim of achieving autonomy as a stage towards eventual independence. The PPM and PCM (also founded in 1957) have been consistently active in Martinique politics since 1957. Besides these two groups, in 1978, the Mouvement Independantiste Martiniquais was founded to fight for Martinique independence. The party continues to be active in Martinique politics as of 2012, and has become more successful in elections in the early 2000s. We found no evidence of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Normans

Summary: In 1969 the Youth Movement of Normandy (Mouvement de la Jeunesse de Normandie) was founded and in 1971 it became the Normandy Movement (Mouvement Normand, MN), a political party that has been active since then and which advocates a self-governing Normandy within the European Union. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1969 and code the movement as ongoing to the present. The other major Norman self-determination movement is the Party for Independent Normandy (Parti pour la Normandie Indépendante, PNI), which seeks an independent Normandy with its political capital at Caen, its industrial capital at Le Havre and its military capital at Cherbourg, to which end it has set up a “provisional government.” It is unclear whether the PNI is active past the 1990s. However, PN remains active as of 2012, as does the Parti Federaliste de Normandie, a regionalist organization that aims for Norman autonomy and the creation of a federalist autonomous region. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Mouvement Normand. [http://mouvement-normand.org/Mouvement_Normand/Accueil/Accueil.html](http://mouvement-normand.org/Mouvement_Normand/Accueil/Accueil.html) [June 19, 2014].


**Occitans**

*Summary:* The Partit Nacionalista Occitan (Occitan Nationalist Party, PNO) was founded in 1959, hence the start date of the movement. As of 2012, it aims for an independent Occitan that would participate in the European Union. Another separatist organization is Volem Viure al Pais, which at first advocated autonomy and then independence (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 216). Several smaller organizations, including Volem Viure, merged to form the Partit Occitan (Occitania Party, POC) in Toulouse in 1987 to seek “self-government” for the region of southern France where Occitan is spoken. We found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 19, 2002].


**Réunion Islanders**

*Summary:* La Réunion became a Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM) in 1946. Thus it was fully integrated with France and decolonized according to our definition. Although pro-independence sentiment exists in Réunion, the main political debate in recent years has been over the degree of local autonomy that is appropriate for the island. The main separatist group is the Marxist Movement for the Independence of Réunion (MIR), which was formed in November 1981. The predecessor of the MIR is the Marxist-Leninist Communist Organisation of Reunion, which was founded in 1975. This was in turn preceded by the Communist Party of Reunion, which once held autonomist goals when it was founded in 1959 (Edward A. Alpers Board of Editors: 25). We therefore peg the start date of the movement to 1959. MIR has been consistently active in Réunion politics since its founding up until 2004 although it had very little support from Réunion Islanders. The movement is ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.
Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events [http://www.keesings.com][March 25, 2002].


Savoyards

Summary: In 1946 Savoyard nationalists in the Aosta Valley in Italy demanded secession and unification with Savoyards in France. This spurred separatist agitation among the Savoyards in France, but this agitation died down after the Italian government separated Val d’Aosta from Piemonte and granted some political autonomy to the region in 1948. Therefore, we coded a phase of NVIOLSD from 1946-48. A period of dormancy in the movement’s history followed until 1972, the Mouvement Région Savoie was founded, an autonomist party. In 1995 another Savoyard self-determination organization was founded, the Savoy League (Ligue Savoisienne/Liga de Saboya, LS), with the aim of reversing French annexation of Savoy in 1860 and re-establishing it as a sovereign independent state. Both the Savoy League and the Savoy Region Movement remain active as of 2012 and thus the movement is coded as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com][April 19, 2002].


**St. Barthélemy**

*Summary:* Until 2007 St. Barthélemy had been part of Guadeloupe, a French Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM). There was agitation for separation from Guadeloupe and increased autonomy at least from 1996 (Natale n.d.). 1996 is coded as onset. The main claim apparently was for fiscal and tax autonomy, but also identitarian claims are made based on the island’s Anglo-Saxon culture (contrary to Guadeloupe). In a 2003 referendum the residents of St. Barthélemy voted for separation from Guadeloupe and a more autonomous status. This was finally accomplished in 2007. Since we do not find evidence for further separatist activity, we code the movement as terminated in 2007. The movement has not been violent, and thus we code it as NVIOLD.

*Sources:*


**St. Martin**

*Summary:* Until 2007 St. Martin had been part of Guadeloupe, a French Département d’Outre-Mer (DOM). There was agitation for separation from Guadeloupe and increased autonomy at least from 1996 (Natale n.d.). 1996 is coded as onset. In a 2003 referendum the residents of St. Martin voted for separation from Guadeloupe and a more autonomous status. This was finally accomplished in 2007. Since we do not find evidence for further separatist activity, we code the movement as terminated in 2007. No violence was found, and thus we assign a NVIOLSD coding.

*Sources:*


GEORGIA

Abkhaz

Summary: The Abkhaz movement was active since 1988 when Georgia still belonged to the USSR (see Abkhaz under Russia). We code the movement in Georgia as of 1991 (when Georgia became independent). Under Russia, the Abkhaz are coded with LVIOLSD in 1989, but NVIOLSD in 1990-1991. Thus we indicate that activity immediately prior to independence had been non-violent. In 1992 Abkhaz leaders declared Abkhazia independent. From 1993 onwards Abkhazia enjoyed de-facto independence from Georgia. The HVIOLSD coding for 1992-94 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The MAR rebellion score remains at three in 1995-1996, but casualties were minimal and the code was presumably assigned due to Abkhazia’s continued de-facto independence and implicit sovereignty declaration. In 1997 and 1998 Georgin partisans (White Legion, Forest Brotherhood) who had remained in Abkhazia after the retreat of Georgia’s regular army were involved in skirmishes with the Abkhaz de-facto government, which led to more than 25 deaths in both years (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The MAR rebellion score is three in 1997 and seven in 1998. Marshall & Gurr (2003) also suggest that there was an armed rebellion in 1998. UCDP, however, considers the 1997-1998 episode as a non-state conflict. We nonetheless code 1997-1998 as LVIOLSD because, according to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, both the While Legion and the Forest Brotherhood had indirect support from the Georgian government: “The militant groups White Legion and Forest Brothers were formed in Abkhazia after fighting between the Abkhaz forces and the Georgian government officially ended in 1993 with the defeat of the Georgian army. The groups consisted of ethnic Georgians with their major base for recruitment being the community of ethnically Georgian internally displaced persons. They were supported by the Executive Council of the Abkhaz Government in Exile, which was subsidized by the Georgian government. In line with the objective of the Georgian government and the exile government to regain control over Abkhazia, the primary goal of the Forest Brothers and the White Legion was to destabilize Abkhazia and to disturb the efforts by Abkhaz authorities to consolidate a de-facto regime. However, the Georgian government soon lost control over the White Legion and the Forest Brothers. Increasingly, the groups shifted their focus on organized crime and smuggling across the ceasefire line, profiting from the thriving parallel economy in the region. The groups broke up soon after the Rose Revolution and the Abkhaz Government in Exile stopped the financial support. The groups were mainly active in the Kodori Valley and the region around the town of Gali, infiltrating Abkhazia by crossing the porous ceasefire line. The leader of the White Legion was Zurab Samushia while Dato Shengelia headed the Forest Brothers. Each group numbered about 150 to 200 men. In 1998, both groups fought together against Abkhaz forces.” The conflict escalated again in October 2001 (2001 Kodori crisis), when fighting between Abkhazia and Georgian partisans in collaboration with a band of Chechens led to 40 casualties. According to Radio Free Europe (2001), the Georgian government’s involvement in the clashes is again not clear (and controversial), but 2001 is coded as armed conflict in Marshall & Gurr (2003). Marshall & Gurr (2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) also code armed conflict in 1999-2000, but this appears based on their five-years rule (they code ongoing armed conflict if conflict recurs within five years) as we found no corroborating evidence for separatist violence crossing the LVIOLSD threshold. The Peace and Conflict reports suggest that LVIOLSD continued into 2002, but we found no corroborating evidence of casualties. Based on this, 1999-2000 and 2002 are coded with NVIOLSD and 2001 as LVIOLSD. In 2002, Georgia and Abkhazia agreed on demilitarization of the Kodori area. When UN peacekeepers (the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) had been established in 1993 to observe the 1993 cease-fire agreement) left the area, Russian forces entered the Kodori region but left after four days. Subsequently Georgian troops moved into the area in violation of the demilitarization agreement, a step that was condemned by both Abkhazia and the UN. In 2006 tensions mounted again as Georgia again occupies the Kodori area and declares it the location of an Abkhaz government-in-exile (Hewitt et al. 2008). During the 2008 war over South
Ossetia, Abkhaz forces re-took most of the Kodori area, which since has remained under Abkhaz control (UNOMIG). According to the CrisisWatch Database, from 2003 onward, there have been casualties almost every year but numbers do not reach the LVIOLSD threshold with 4 deaths in 2003, 8 in 2005, 2 in 2006, 5 in 2007, 5 in 2008, and 9 between December 2011 and mid-2012. Thus, 2003-2012 is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Ajars

Summary: The Ajar separatists first lobbied Moscow for removal from Georgian jurisdiction in 1988. However, we do not code this initial period because it essentially was directed against Georgian independence. The movement remained active when Georgia became independent in 1991. Thus, we code the movement in Georgia as of 1991, but note prior nonviolent activity. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1990-2006 indicate that the movement has been active since. 2004 saw a sudden spike in violence as Georgian president Saakashvili encroached upon Adzharia's autonomy by trying to campaign in the region. MAR's anti-government rebellion score in 2004 is 3 due to this increase in violence, and thus 2004 is coded as LVIOLSD. The situation was resolved by the end of 2004 and Ajaria was permitted to retain its status as an autonomous region. We found no reports of separatist violence in other years, hence a NVIOLSD classification from 1991-2003 and NVIOLSD from 2005 onward.

Sources:

Armenians

Summary: The National Unification Party (NUP) was formed in Yerevan in 1966. The NUP called for an independent Armenia which would include Western Armenia, Nakhichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1988 in what then used to be the Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic the national-popular movement Javakhk (the Armenian for Javakheti) was created whose influence rapidly grew among the local Armenians. The official goals of the organization were the preservation of Armenian cultural heritage, science and history of Armenia in local schools, protection of national institutions and also the development of the region. While initially there were also Russians, Georgians and Greeks among the Javakhk leaders, only after Gamsakhurdia came to power 1990 did the organization assume the role of a protector of the rights of the region’s Armenian population frightened by the threats on the part of the Georgian nationalists. From the very beginning, however, the goal of Armenians in Javakheti was at least to obtain autonomy, if not to unite with the region with Armenia. This initial separatist activity was still in the USSR (see Armenians under Russia). The Armenian movement in Georgia remained active when Georgia became independent in 1991. We code the movement as of 1991, but note that it was both active and nonviolent prior to Georgia’s independence (the Armenians in Azerbaijan were involved in violence before 1991 over Nagorno-Karabakh, but not the Georgian Armenians). Since then, the movement is ongoing. In 1999, Virk was established as a radical party stemming from the Javakhk. In early 2005, the United Javakhk was created as a youth movement modeled after Javakhk to demand autonomy. These parties remain active today. For instance, in 2005 and 2006 mass demonstrations and political meetings were organized by Samtskhe-Javakheti activists, whose demands included autonomy within Georgia for Samtskhe-Javakheti and Tsalka Armenians (Minority Rights Group International). However, separatism
is not a popular issue amongst ethnic Armenians in Samtske-Javakheti (International Crisis Group 2011: 14). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding for 1991 onward.

Sources:


South Ossetians

Summary: The movement emerged in 1988, and thus still under Soviet rule (see South Ossetians under Russia). The South Ossetian movement remained active when Georgia became independent. We code South Ossetians under the header of Georgia as of 1991. We do, however, also indicate that this movement was active and nonviolent prior to Georgia’s independence. Soon after Georgia’s independence, the conflict turned violent (and thus the movement “switched” from non-violence to violence). The HVIOLSD coding for 1991-92 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The LVIOLSD coding for 1993 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003: 57). MAR gives a rebellion score of 3 from 1994-2000, but several sources note that there were no open hostilities. The conflict remained unresolved and in particular, Georgia did not offer South Ossetia autonomy in return for reintegration. But the cease-fire agreement did work reasonably well while Shevardnadze was in power (George 2009: 114; Jones 2013: 95; Lynch 2004; Wolff n.d.), that is until 2003. MAR appears to have coded a 3 due to South Ossetia’s de-facto independence. Thus, 1994-2003 is coded with NVIOLSD. After the Rose Revolution in which Shevardnadze was ousted, violence flared up again in 2004. MAR gives a rebellion score of 5 in 2004, Marshall & Gurr (2005) report armed conflict in 2004, and UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over South Ossetia in 2004. Thus 2004 is coded with LVIOLSD. 2005-2007 is coded with NVIOLSD as there was little violence during these years (Hewitt et al. 2008 code armed conflict in 2006 but we found no corroborating evidence except for an incident involving four casualties of Chechen origin in October 2006 in which the Georgian government, however, denied its involvement). 2008 is coded as LVIOLSD due to the Russo-Georgian war over South Ossetia (see e.g. UCDP/PRIO; the total death toll was under 1,000 and Doyle & Sambanis (2006) do not list it as a war). Subsequent violence has taken place, but there were not enough casualties to code LVIOLSD. There were 3 deaths in 2009; no deaths in 2010; no deaths in 2011; 1 death in 2012 based on CrisisWatch Database data. We thus code NVIOLSD from 2009 - ongoing.
Sources:


GERMANY

Badeners

Summary: With the foundation of the German Federal Republic there were plans to merge the three south-western Länder (Baden, Württemberg, and Hohenzollern). The government of Baden was vehemently opposed to the merger. Despite Baden’s opposition the merger took effect in 1952. The opponents to the unification did not surrender, and began to agitate for the restoration of Baden; hence, we code 1952 as the start date of the movement. The main organization associated with the movement, the Heimatbund Badenerland, enforced the holding of a referendum on the separation of Baden from Baden-Württemberg by handing in a petition signed by more than 15 per cent of Baden’s citizens (a vote had to be held if at least 10 per cent sign a petition). After a lot of back and forth and two rulings by the constitutional court, the vote was finally held in 1970. However, the vote turned out against the separation of Baden. We do not find further evidence of separatist activity, and following our ten-year rule we code an end to the movement in 1980. We found no separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:

Bavarians

Summary: The Bavaria Party (Bayernpartei, BP), was founded in 1946 to seek the restoration of an independent Bavarian state. Since this is the first evidence for organized separatist activity we found in the post-WWII phase (note: there had been separatist activity in the interwar years, see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 39, but not during the Nazi reign), 1946 is coded as start date. However, in the data set, we do not code the movement before 1949, the year the German Federal Republic was founded. We found no violence in 1946-1948 and thus note prior nonviolent activity. The Bavaria Party was represented in the Bundestag in 1949-53 (but not since) and influential in the Bavarian Landtag until the mid-1960s. Keesing’s reports that it was an active participant in the 1969, 1974, 1986, 1987 and 1990 regional and/or national elections. It won 0.1% of the vote in 1994 and 1998 federal elections and 0.1% in 1999 Euro-elections. It remains active in German politics as of 2012. In addition, the (much more powerful and significant) Christian Social Union (CSU) has made claims for increased autonomy (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 39). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:
Franconians

*Summary:* In 1989 Franconian regionalists formed the Fränkische Bund, an organization making claims for a separate Franconian Bundeland to be carved out of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and possibly Thuringia. This is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, thus 1989 is coded as start date. Immediately, the Fränkische Bund began to collect signatures for a separate Franconian Land. More than 8,000 signed the petition (approximately 7,200 signatures were considered valid by the Federal Government), enough to request a popular vote in accordance with the German constitution. However, the Federal Government declined the request. Complaints with the German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights remained unsuccessful. The Fränkische Bund has continued its activities, mainly in Bavaria. For example, since 1990, the Fränkische Bund organizes an annual Franconian day. Its statute contains a claim for the creation of a separate Franconian land. Furthermore, in 2009 the Partei für Franken was formed. The party makes a somewhat ambiguous claim for a separate Franconian land: while saying that separation is currently an “unrealistic political vision”, they also state that the establishment of a separate Franconian Land should be seriously considered if a reorganization of Germany’s administrative structure is on the agenda. Furthermore, the party advocates the merger of three Frankish districts (Lower, Middle and Upper Franconia). In the 2013 Bavarian state elections the party achieved between 1.6% (in Lower Franconia) and 2.9% (in Upper Franconia). The movement is coded as ongoing. We found no evidence for separatist violence, thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*
Partei für Franken. [http://www.parstei-fuer-franken.de/grundsatzprogramm](http://www.parstei-fuer-franken.de/grundsatzprogramm) [February 18, 2015].

Lusatian Sorbs

*Summary:* Domowina, an umbrella organization for Sorbian associations, was founded in 1912. The primary goal of the organization has been the promotion of the Sorb culture and language. Only at two occasions after 1945 did we find evidence of claims that go beyond cultural demands. The first time occurred at the end of the Second World War when the Sorbs sought allied support for independence (Minahan 2002) or the unification with Czechoslovakia (Oschlies 1990: 30). Their demands were ignored and the Sorb national movement was subsequently suppressed by the Soviets. At this time, there was no German state as Germany was occupied; the German Democratic Republic was founded only in 1949. Thus we do not code this first phase of activity. Plans for an autonomous Sorbian homeland reemerged in late 1989 in the context of German re-unification (Minahan 2002). We code 1990 as the start date since this is when Germany reunified. Domowina and another Sorb cultural organization, the Sorbian National Assembly, have been active since then but, besides demands for the preservation of their culture and language, we did not find further evidence of separatist activity. Thus, we code the movement as
terminated in 2000 based on the ten-years rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


**Oldenburgers**

*Summary:* After the Second World War, the three Länder Oldenburg, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Hannover were merged to form the new Land of Lower Saxony in 1946, similar to the merger of Baden-Württemberg. This occurred against the will of many Oldenburgers. Taking advantage of a constitutional provision, the Oldenburger movement in 1956 successfully petitioned for a referendum on separation from Hannover by collecting the signatures of more than 10 per cent of the former Land’s citizens. Because this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, we peg the start date to 1956. However, the government refused to hold the vote, until it was forced to hold the referendum by way of a constitutional ruling (following an appeal by the Heimatbund Badenerland – the Badeners faced a similar problem). The vote was eventually held in 1975, and a majority opted for separation, requiring the central government to react. The central government refused to partition Lower Saxony. We do not find evidence of further separatist activity, and following our ten-year rule we code the movement as terminated in 1985. No violence was found for the Oldenburgers movement, and thus we code it as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


**Schaumburg-Lippeners**

*Summary:* After the Second World War, the three Länder Oldenburg, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Hannover were merged to form the new Land of Lower Saxony in 1946, similar to the merger of Baden-Württemberg. Similar to the Oldenburg movement, the Schaumburg-Lippener movement successfully collected signatures to demand the holding of a referendum on restoration of the old Land in 1956. Because this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, we peg the start date to 1956. The central government did not hold the vote until it was forced to do so by way of a constitutional ruling (following an appeal by the Heimatbund Badenerland – the Badeners faced a similar problem). The vote was eventually held in 1975, and a majority opted for separation, requiring the central government to react. The central government refused to partition Lower Saxony. We do not find evidence of further
separatist activity, and following our ten-year rule we code the movement as terminated in 1985. No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding for the entire movement.

Sources:
GHANA

Ashanti, Brong, and Ahafo

Summary: Nationalists mobilized in 1954 as the British began to move the Gold Coast colony toward self-government. 1954 is thus coded as the start date of the movement. However, since Ghana did not become independent until 1957, we only code the movement from 1957. We found no separatist violence before 1957, and thus code prior non-violent activity. In 1957 violent demonstrations broke out in Ashanti cities following the arrest of Ashanti leaders, the closure of the Ashanti assembly and the banning of regional political parties. A wave of anti-government terrorist attacks shook the new Ghanian state as the Ashanti pressed for secession. This rebellion was firmly crushed in 1964 by the Nkrumah government, which established a one-party dictatorship. Since neither Marshall & Gurr (2003) nor UCDP/PRIO code the Ashanti rebellion as a violent conflict and we were not able to find specific death counts, we do not have evidence that would justify a coding of LVIOLSD for 1957-64. Hence we code this period as NVIOLSD. In light of a MAR protest score of 0 for 1965-69 we code no activity for that period. Under Acheampong’s rule (1972-1978), the Ashanti appeared to play a key role in politics. Rawlings led his second coup and assumed the chairmanship of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). Although Rawlings cut back on the prominence of Ewes in his cabinet, Ashanti demands for greater representation and a separate nationhood increased. MAR codes non-zero protest scores for 1980-84 and 1990-1995 but all subsequent years are coded zero. We found no self-determination movement in Lexis Nexis after 1995 either, and thus the end is coded as 2005 in accordance with the 10-year rule. We found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Ewes

Summary: Brown (1980: 578) notes that Ewe separatism began prior to Ghanaian independence, and arose due to social and economic problems resulting from the Anglo-German and Anglo-French partition. Agitation to unite all Ewes in the Gold Coast began in the early 1900s and later targeted the reunification of the two Togolands. Before World War II, the Deutsch Togo Bund was founded; in 1943, the irredentist
Togoland Union was founded; in 1946, the Comite de l’Unite Togolaise was founded. The Togoland Union later became known as the Togoland Congress Party. A referendum on unification with Togo was held in 1956. Unification won due to Ewe turnout. However, the colonial powers did not follow the election results. On Ghana’s independence day, the Togoland Congress attempted an armed riot but was suppressed by the government (Brown 1980). The establishment of the German Togo Bund is not coded as the start date of the movement because, although the Ewe dominated, it did not seek “greater autonomy nor independence but rather the return of German colonial rule” (Greene 2010). Instead, we code 1943 as the start date of the movement, the year the irredentist Togoland Union (later Togoland Congress Party) was formed. Note that in the data set, we only code the movement from 1957, the year of Ghana’s independence. We found no separatist violence before 1957, and thus code prior non-violent activity. Minor protests continued from 1957-1972. Brown claims that the second wave of separatism began in 1972 (Brown 1980: 575). According to Chazan, “Ewe militancy was partly a carryover from the period of antagonism to Busia, and it revived the troubles of Ewe absorption into Ghana that dated back to the 1956 referendum. In part also, Acheampong’s forceful rejection of Ewe aspirations and his problematic relations with Togo (with its concentration of Ewe) fueled Ewe displeasure” (Chazan 1982: 465). Thus, the Ewe revived the sentiments of secession. The second separatist attempt appears to have lasted until 1977. EPR codes the Ewes as in armed conflict in 1981 because Rawling’s 1981 coup led to armed clashes that caused 30-70 deaths according to UCDP. We do not code this incident as separatist violence since it is clearly related to the government. Since Rawlings assumed power in 1981 there have been no Ewe protests or Ewe rebellion, with the exception of some minor, non-separatist protests in 1996. This seems to be because Ewes are privileged in the administration of Rawlings, who is half Ewe. However, even if we found no evidence for separatist activity beyond 1977, we did not find sufficient evidence to clearly peg an end to the self-determination movement in 1977. Hence, and following our ten-years of inactivity rule, we code one phase of nonviolent separatist activity: 1957-1987.

Sources:


GUATEMALA

Mayans

Summary: Guatemala’s indigenous population is dispersed throughout the country with the largest populations in rural departments north and west of Guatemala City, particularly Quiché, Alta Verapaz, Sololá, Totonicapán, Quetzaltenango and Huehuetenango (Minorities at Risk Project). The overwhelming majority of Guatemala’s indigenous population is Mayan. However, note that the Mayans do not constitute a coherent ethnic bloc and consists of 22 different indigenous nations, including the Quiche, Tzutujil, Cakchiquel, Mam, Achi or Pokoman. As from the mid-1970s, Mayans were heavily involved in the communist insurgency in Guatemala. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia notes that the EGP (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, Guerrilla Army of the Poor), in particular, recruited heavily from the Mayan population. According to UCDP, another rebel group that was heavily Maya-based was ORPA (Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas, Organization of People in Arms). In 1982 EGP, ORPA and two other rebel groups (FAR I and FAR II) joined forces and formed the Guatemala National Revolutionary Unit (URNG). While the Mayans thus played a crucial role in the civil war that ended in 1995, that war was not fought over autonomy. The EGP, for instance, “was […] more focused on a battle between classes than promotion of the indigenous peoples’ rights per se” according to UCDP. UCDP/PRIO accordingly codes the Guatemalan civil war as one over the government. In line with this, EPR considers the Mayans involved in an ethnic insurgency from 1975-1995, but considers the insurgency a conflict over the government. Minorities at Risk, too, codes the Mayans as involved in a rebellion but does not note separatist motives either. Doyle & Sambanis (2006) also note indigenous involvement in the civil war, but mention no separatist motives. This is confirmed by Sieder (1997: 66), who states that the “efforts of indigenous organizations have focused on integration and inclusion, not separatism”. Only in the early 1990s did the Mayan movement turn towards devolution and autonomy. According to Minahan (2002: 1217-1218), Mayan activists began to make calls for cultural and land rights in the early 1990s. The first evidence for organized separatist activity we found is in 1991, when the Council of Mayan Organization of Guatemala (COMG) was formed, an umbrella group of research centers and cultural organizations that publicly advanced demands for devolution. 1991 is thus coded as the start date. COMG was the vanguard of the Coordination of Maya Peoples’ Organizations of Guatemala (COPMAGUA), which was formed in 1994 out of 200 separate Maya organizations. COPMAGUA was formed in order to press for Mayan issues in the peace negotiations that led to the end of the civil war in 1995.

COPMAGUA’s program evolved around loosely-defined terms ‘autonomy’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘participation’. This claim is confirmed by Montejo (1997) and Sén (1999), who also state that land rights, participation and self-determination on cultural, linguistic, political, and religious levels are the primary goals of the Maya organization. Minorities at Risk notes that indigenous organizations have also made claims for autonomy and land rights in more recent years, including the Equality Committee on Indigenous People’s Land Rights, and that there have been protests over land rights up to 2006, the last year they cover. Based on this, we code the movement as ongoing. Though the Mayans were involved in a civil war until 1995, we do not code this period as violence over self-determination due to the lack of separatist motives (see above). In October 2012, six demonstrators were killed by the military in the context of a demonstration in Totonicapán; this protest was mostly over economic issues (in particular rising electricity prices), but land rights ranged among the demands too (International Crisis Group 2013: 18). In any case, the LVIOLSD threshold is not met, thus we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


HONDURAS

Black Karibs

Summary: The Black Karibs, also known as Garifuna, are indigenous to Honduras, Belize, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Altogether, there are around 180,000 Garifunas with 120,000 living in Honduras. According to Minahan (2002), the Garifuna have “incorporated traditions and customs from Africa, Europe, and the South American rain forest to produce a unique culture and language” and that they “have been able to retain their ethnic identity due to an ability to absorb foreign influence an to change their cultural patterns as needed…” (Minahan 2002: 649-650). The Garifuna people were recognized as an ethnic group in 1975. Due to accusations of providing support for rebel groups, the Garifuna “began to press for closer ties between all the Garifuna communities and for cultural and economic autonomy” (Minahan 2002: 653). Today, the Garifuna seek more autonomy over their traditional lands and aim to prevent intrusions that would disrupt cultural traditions and lifestyles. As a result of an influx in land developers and tourism, lands belonging to Garifuna are increasingly being acquired by developers to create tourist havens. Development has resulted in the erosion of cultural lifestyles and languages, and thus the Garifuna have launched protests by forcefully claiming ownership of land by citing land reforms and ancestral titles. The Garifuna also seek environmental protection, specifically to protect the Meso-American Reef from commercial fisheries (Minorities at Risk). The Garifuna are represented by the Organizacion Fraternal Negra Hondurena (OFRANEH), which “works to protect the Garifuna community’s capacity for self-determination through programs promoting their political, social, economic and cultural advancement” (OFRANEH). There have been no instances of violence stemming from self-determination, hence the entire movement is coded NVIOLSD. The start of the movement is coded as 1979 to coincide with OFRANEH’s founding date. OFRANEH continues to remain active in its advocacy as of 2012, and thus the movement is coded as ongoing. No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:


Miskitos

Summary: The primary organization which represents the interests of Miskito Indians to the Honduran government is the Miskito Asla Takanka (Unity of the Miskito, MASTA), which was founded in 1976. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1976. Recent concerns of Miskito Asla Takanka include environmental issues, land rights and cultural autonomy. During the Miskito separatist war in Nicaragua (1981-90), MISURATA leaders and followers escaped to Honduras from Nicaragua. Although
the Miskito guerrilla forces launched their attacks into Nicaragua from Honduras, we found no reports of separatist violence in Honduras. In 1992, the National Coordinating Body of Autochthonous Peoples of Honduras (CONPAH) was founded. It consisted of representative organizations from several different indigenous tribes. MASTA was one of these organizations, representing the Miskitos (IPS 12/8/1992). CONPAH fought primarily for land rights. A Lexis Nexis search produced no significant results between 1976 and 1992, but based on scholarly works it seems that MASTA had been active in fighting for land and cultural rights since its formation. From 1992 onward, both CONPAH and MASTA have been active based on Lexis Nexis. In the early 2000s, activity increased and in September 2013, the Honduran government returned 750,000 hectares of traditional lands to five Miskitos groups “after 40 years of conflicts, protests, and negotiations on the land” (La Tribuna 9/13/2013). No casualty estimates could be found, and thus we code the movement as ongoing and NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Achiks (Garos)

Summary: The Achiks are one of the three main tribes in Meghalaya state alongside the Khasi and Jaintia. They are also known as the Garo, and were a part of the Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC) with the latter two tribes until inter-tribal differences resulted in an intragroup split (this movement became defunct already in 1972). The split in 1992 resulted in the formation of the Achik Liberation Matgrik Army (ALMA), which aimed to establish a separate state for the Garos, hence 1992 is coded as start date. ALMA ceased activities in 1994. Subsequent groups have been formed, however. In 1995, ex-ALMA rebels formed the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) to fight against the Hynniewtrep and establish an Achik-dominated state. The ANVC remains active as of 2012. ALMA’s breakup also founded the People’s Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF-M), which operates in the Garo hills and fights for economic development, increased education for the Garo tribes, and a separate state. The PLF-M is no longer active, although the South Asia Terrorism Portal reports that the group may have been rebranded as the Achik National Council (ANC). In 2004, the Achiks once again founded the United Achik National Front (UANF). The Liberation of Achik Elite Force (LAEF) was founded in 2005 as a peaceful separatist movement. In 2009, the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) was founded to fight for a “sovereign Garoland” and commands around 70 soldiers altogether. The Achik organizations have remained active since 1992. SATP reports activity for ALMA, PLF-M, LAEF, and GNLA. No reports could be found for UANF, but START UMD reports that the group’s activities have been minimal. In addition to the Garo movement for a separate state, Garo organizations have lobbied for the creation of an autonomous district within Assam, a status the Garos in Meghalaya attained in 1976, but has been denied thus far to the Garos in Assam (Khan 2013).

Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict from 1992-2004, noting that “Garo armed conflict begins shortly thereafter [i.e. 1992] and reaches its zenith in 2002-04. Ceasefire signed with government in July 2004, renewed each year since, and monitored by joint commission.” Thus 1992-2004 is coded with LVIOLSD. Note that it is not fully clear whether the 25 deaths threshold was met in all these years (or even a single year), but we follow Hewitt et al. in line with general practice. Also note that we found no clear evidence for nonviolent claim-making prior to the armed conflict starting in 1992. We found no reports for violence in 2005-2011. 2012 is coded LVIOLSD based on UCDP/PRIO.

Sources:


Assamese

Summary: The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was founded in 1979, hence the start date of the movement. Up through 1989 there are only reports of nonviolent action on the part of the ULFA, hence a NVIOLSD coding for that period. HVIOLS from 1990 onward follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Violence continues as government and rebels both call for negotiations in 2002. The rebels are considering a truce to encourage peace talks, but demand preconditions of UN mediation in a neutral location and state sovereignty as part of the agenda. The government, however, is unwilling to hold talks until the rebels abandon violence. The movement is ongoing.

Sources:


Bodos

Summary: The All Bodo Student’s Union was formed in February 1967 to fight for Bodo autonomy. The organization remains ongoing but little evidence of separatist violence was found. On October 3, 1986, the Bodo Security Force (BSF) was formed. In 1988, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) was founded. The All Bodos Students Union (ABSU) and Bodo Security Force (BSF) were formed in 1989 to press for a separate state for the Bodos, while the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) were formed on June 18, 1996, for the same purpose. The LVIOLSD coding for 1989-2003 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008). This is supported by MAR rebellion scores exceeding two in all years except 1993 and 2003 and UCDP/PRIO, which codes armed conflict over Bodoland in all years except for 1990-1991. In 2003, peace talks took place (SATP, Rubin and Rubin - Chronologies of Modern Terrorism) and in December 2003, the BLT surrendered. However, the LVIOLSD code is maintained for 2004 based on UCDP/PRIO. No deaths were found for 2005-2007. 53 are killed during inter-communal violence between Bodo and Muslim settlers in 2008, but these are not attributed to separatist violence. Thus 2005-2008 are coded with NVIOLSD. 2009-2010 are coded with LVIOLSD based on UCDP/PRIO. We found no evidence for separatist violence in 2011-2012, thus a LVIOLSD code.

Sources:


Minorities at Risk Project (2009), College Park, MD: University of Maryland.


Gorkhas (Gurkhas)

Summary: In 1907 the Hillmen Union was formed, an organization representing the interests of the Gorkha (Indian Nepalese). In 1909 the Union petitioned the British government that Darjeeling remains a scheduled district. Note: this is not coded as start date because the claim did not exceed the status quo. The first claim for more autonomy we found is in 1917, when the Union demanded an independent administrative unit and thus a certain degree of autonomy. The Hillmen Union continued to contend for a separate status. In 1935, Darjeeling became a partially excluded area, a status that implies a certain degree of autonomy. Yet the Hillmen Union continued to make claims for more autonomy. With independence on the horizon, the Gorkhas stepped up their demands (Chadha 2005: 382). An important contender was the All India Gorkha League, an organization that had been formed in 1943. Based on this, we code 1917 as the start date. In the data set, we code the movement from 1947, the year India attained independence. We found no separatist violence in 1917-1947, and thus note prior non-violent activity. In 1952 the All India Gorkha League proposed the creation of a separate Nepali-speaking state (Dhakal 2009: 160). Agitation for separate statehood continued but did not gain much traction until the 1980s when the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) was formed (in 1980) (Gungaly 2005). The GNLF demanded the creation of a separate Gorkha state within India (Chadha 2005: 386). The LVIOLSD coding for 1986-87 follows this report from Keesing’s: “Agitation by the Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) for a separate state within the Indian union (Tarun Gorkha or Gurkhaland) resulted in the deaths of over 100 people during 1986 and continued into 1987.” Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 114), in contrast, suggest that fighting continued into 1988. In 1988 the GNLF officially gave up its claim for separate statehood, but agitation towards a separate state continued, if at a lower level of intensity (Ganguly 2005; Minahan 2002: 681). In 1997 the GNLF leader once again called for the creation of a separate Gorkha state. In 2007, Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) was founded, which continued the GNLF’s fight for a separate Gorkhaland state (Rai 2008). The movement is coded as ongoing. No violence was found except for the 1986-1987 clashes, hence a NVIOLSD classification for the remaining years.

Sources:


Hynniewtresps (Khasi-Jaintia)

Summary: The Khasi and Jaintia people are ethnically Mon-Khmer people who represent two of the three main tribes in Meghalaya state alongside the Achiks, and are together known as the Hynniewtresps. In 1992, the Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (HNLC) was formed to represent the Khasi-Jaintia (start date). The HNLC was formed out of tribal conflict within the Hynniewtre Achik Liberation Council (HALC) that was previously fighting for Meghalayan self-determination, and the group claims to fight against Achik domination and ‘outsider’ influence. It thus aims to transform Meghalaya state into a Khasi-dominated state. The HNLC operates in Meghalaya state, but maintains bases in Bangladesh. The HNLC was outlawed in 2000 (SATP). The account in Hewitt et al. (2008) suggests that the movement was violent from the start (or that there at best was a very short period of nonviolence), and that violence continued up to, or beyond, the last year they cover (2006). According to Hewitt et al. (2008), “inter-communal antagonisms force a Khasi-Garo split in 1992. Khasi armed self-determination conflict begins shortly thereafter and reaches its zenith from 2001 to 2003. Formidable government repression weakens rebels in recent years; most news reports since 2004 are of rebel surrenders or detentions. Little progress made on peace talks despite numerous attempts to jumpstart the process. In 2005, it is reported that Khasi rebels are receiving support from Bodo, Naga, and Assamese militants, as well as Bangladesh and Pakistan. Khasi militants often target non-Khasi with extortion, intimidation, and violence. Primary goal of Khasi militants is creation of autonomous Khasi-only Meghalaya. Heavy inter-communal conflict between Khasis and Garos in 2005-06.” SATP reports multiple casualties every year in 2000-2009 though below the 25-deaths threshold (though there may be reporting problems). In addition, SATP (in agreement with Hewitt et al.) reports increasing numbers of surrenders and that the HNLC was increasingly weakend. Based on this, we code 1992-2006 as LVIOLSD. Note: the 25 deaths threshold may not be met in all years, possibly not even in a single year, but the code follows Hewitt et al. (2008) in line with general practice. We extend the LVIOLSD code to 2009 because it appears from SATP that sporadic attacks continued, though again possibly below the threshold. SATP reports no casualties in 2010-2012, thus 2010-2012 is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
Jharkhandis

Summary: The Jharkhandis consists of a number of tribal peoples in northeastern India, officially included in the Scheduled Tribes category. The largest tribal group associated with this movement is the Santhals. According to Minahan (2002: 841), the Jharkhandis began to organize after the First World War, though initially the Jharkhandi movement was directed mainly against Hindu immigrants. We found no evidence of claims that can unambiguously be interpreted as directed towards self-determination as we define it until 1938, when Jharkhandi nationalists founded the Jharkhand Party to press for pan-tribal unity and autonomy. As Indian independence in 1947 neared, militant nationalists demanded that the British grant separate independence to Jharkhand as a Christian majority area outside Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. Based on this, 1938 is coded as start date. In the data set, we code the movement only from 1947, the year of India’s independence. We found no evidence of separatist violence in 1938-1946 and thus indicate nonviolent prior activity. With India’s independence the Jharkhand Party began to demand a separate Jharkhand State. Non-zero MAR protest scores indicate that the movement was active in 1950-59 (MAR’s “Scheduled Tribes” group overlaps to a high extent the Jharkhandis) and as we find no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence for that period, we code 1947-59 as NVIOLSD. Movement support increased in the 1960s, but it took until the year 2000 for a state of Jharkhand to be created. The creation of Jharkhand appears to have ended agitation towards increased autonomy. Minahan (2002: 844) notes that nationalists demand the incorporation of several districts around Jharkand into an enlarged Jharkhand state. But we found no evidence of organized activity. Thus, we code an end to the movement in 2000. The LVIOLSD coding for 1960 to 1988 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003), and the HVIOLSD coding for 1989 onward follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006) (parts of the Jharkhand movement appear involved in the Maoist insurgency which Marshall & Gurr and MAR subsume under an umbrella ‘Scheduled Tribes’ group while we attribute it to the Jharkahndis). We note that both LVIOLSD and HVIOLSD codings are ambiguous, since the Maoists are fighting mainly for ideological and land reform issues rather than autonomy.

Sources:
Kashmiri Buddhist Ladakhis

Summary: In 1949, the Ladakh region was subsumed into Kashmir despite ethnic differences. This gave way to autonomist agitation among Kashmiri Buddhist Ladakhis, led by the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA). "A memorandum submitted to Prime Minister Nehru on May 4, 1949, by Cheewang Rigzin, President, LBA, pleaded that Ladakh not be bound by the decision of a plebiscite, should the Muslim majority of the State decide in favour of Pakistan. They sought to be governed directly by the Government of India, or to be amalgamated with the Hindu-majority parts of Jammu to form a separate province, or to join East Punjab. Failing all options, they would be forced to consider the option of reuniting with Tibet" (Behera 2001). We code the movement as of 1949. Nehru convinced the LBA to drop its more radical demands and the movement began to make calls for internal autonomy within Kashmir in 1952 (Behera 2001). There was a plan to give both Jammu and Ladakh limited autonomy within Kashmir in the early 1950s, but the plan was soon dropped (Behera 2001). In 1962 the Ladakhis began to demand central administration along the lines of the North-East Frontier Agency (today the union territory of Arunachal Pradesh); this can be read as a demand for separation from Kashmir (van Beek 2000). Indeed there was a short spell of central administration between 1962 and 1964 in the context of Chinese aggression (the Ladakhis protested against the restoration of the status quo in 1964) (van Beek 2000). There was another round of protest in 1969 (van Beek 2000). We found no evidence of activity in the 1970s. We do not code an end to the movement in the 1970s since the LBA continued to exist and sources do not suggest that the movement ended. The movement resurfaced in 1980. There was violence in the context of protests against transferring a diesel generator from Zanskar to Kargil. The protests quickly turned into calls for regional autonomy and scheduled tribe status. The Ladakh Action Committee “launched a full-fledged agitation” in January 1981 for a separate union territory (implying outright separation from Kashmir) (Behera 2001; van Beek 2000). The Kashmiri Buddhist Ladakhs set up the All-Party Ladakh Action Committee to represent their calls for autonomy. Violence took place in 1980, 1981, and 1982, but death estimates could not be found. In 1989 the LBA initiated another campaign for the formation of a Ladakh union territory. Violence took place in 1989 when the police killed a few Buddhist Ladakhi protestors. Peace talks begun in late 1989; the LBA could be convinced of dropping its demand for a separate union territory in favour of an autonomous council (regional autonomy within Kashmir) (Behera 2001). The peace talks continued until May 1995, when an autonomous council was set up for the Ladakhis. It is not clear whether agitation continued in subsequent years but in 2000 the LBA re-launched its agitation for union territory status (Behera 2001). In 2002, the Ladakh Union Territory Front (LUTF) was founded as a coalition of political parties fighting for
separation from Kashmir (now part of BJP). The movement has continued to demand union territory status and remains active (Economic Times 2014). We could not find detailed violence information for 1980-1982 and 1989; thus, we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Kashmiri Hindus

Summary: The Praja Parishad Party, the dominant party in Hindu Jammu (the Hindu portion of Kashmir), was formed in 1947. Since 1952 it has campaigned for a separate status for Jammu, a demand which over the years has been shared by other organizations like Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Bharatiya Janata Party, and Shiv Sena. Since 2000 the Praja Parishad Party has actively campaigned for the trifurcation of Kashmir into Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist Ladakh regions. Since we found no evidence of separatist violence, we classify the movement as NVIOLSD.
Kashmiri Muslims

Summary: The first clear evidence for organized separatist activity we found is in 1939, when the Kashmir National Conference was formed. This is generally considered the inception of modern Kashmiri nationalism (Minahan 2002: 956). Thus, 1939 is coded as start date. Note: there had been activity already before 1939 that could be interpreted as geared towards self-determination as we define it, but this is somewhat ambiguous and thus not considered: In 1931 the Kashmiri Muslims rebelled against their local Hindu ruler, who was thereby forced to legalize political parties and in 1934 granted a legislative assembly (Minahan 2002: 956). In the data set, we begin to code the movement in 1947, the year India gained independence (Kashmir accessed India in 1947). Pakistan and India fought two wars over the Kashmir region. The first was in 1946-1948. It appears that the Kashmiri Muslims living in India engaged in separatist violence during these years. Note: Neither MAR nor Marshall & Gurr/Hewitt et al. 2008 nor UCDP/PRIO would suggest a LVIOLSD code, but case study evidence leads us to code LVIOLSD in those years. In particular, we found evidence for separatist armed conflict in the Balawari region in Northern Kashmir as well as in today’s Azad Kashmir (Minahan 2002: 244-245; 956). In 1949, the region was divided between Pakistan and India, with most of Balawaristan and Azad Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan. Based on this, we code 1947-1948 as LVIOLSD and indicate prior violent activity. MAR codes a rebellion score of four in 1960-1964. We extend the LVIOLSD code to 1965, as this is the year when the second Indo-Pakistani war was fought; again it appears that the Kashmiri Muslims engaged in separatist violence during the war (though note that none of our major armed conflict sources would indicate a separatist violence code). In the aftermath of the 1965 war with Pakistan there was an upsurge of protest by militant Muslim students. In order to curb this, the Indian government invoked the Defense of India Rules, instituting censorship, jailing all advocates of self-determination, and prohibiting gatherings of more than five people without prior permission. These measures were later relaxed somewhat, but the government continued to make laws relating to the prevention of separatist activity.

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2 While Minahan (2002) considers the Balawaris a separate group, we include them under the header of the Kashmiri Muslims.
Beginning in mid-1988 there was a series of bomb blasts, arson attacks, shootings and strikes organized by various Islamic separatist organizations, to which the government responded by police and military action; it appears that fewer than 25 deaths have occurred in 1988 (e.g. UCDP/PRIO does not code 1988). The HVIOLSD coding for 1989 onward follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Note: non-zero MAR protest scores in 1945-1989 suggest an ongoing movement in-between the periods of LVIOLSD noted above; all remaining years are coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**Keralans**

*Summary:* According to Minahan (2002: 1160), the first stirrings of Keralan nationalism date to the immediate post-WWII phase, and grew dramatically as India prepared for independence in early 1947, when the rulers of the Keralan (Malayali) princely states, Travancore and Cochin, expressed their preference for association rather than incorporation into India. Since this is the first clear-cut evidence for organized separatist activity, we code 1947 as the start date. Travancore and Cochin remained an Indian protectorate until their formal merger with India (as a united Travancore-Cochin state) in 1949. After accession, the Keralans’ demand shifted to the creation of a Malayalam-speaking state, implying the separation from some parts of the former Madras state and their amalgamation with Travancore-Cochin. Based on this, we code the movement from 1949, but indicate prior non-violent activity. In 1956 the state of Kerala was established; this appears to have ended the movement. Minahan (2002: 1161) notes that the Kerala Socialist Party (KSP) advocated secession in subsequent years, but this could not be confirmed with other sources. We code an end to the movement in 1956. We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [March 25, 2002].
Kodavas (Coorgs)

Summary: Historically, Coorg was an independent and autonomous province both during the medieval and British period. After India’s independence in 1947, Coorg first became a province, and in 1952 a “Part C” state of the Republic of India. However, under the States Reorganization Act of 1956, the state of Coorg and the Kodagu-speaking region of the adjoining states were incorporated into the Mysore state, despite protests by a strong section of the Kodava people (Assadi 1997). According to Minahan (2002), economic neglect, exploitation and deforestation led to the formation of a national movement in the late 1970s. The movement started gathering momentum when the Liberation Warriors of Kodagu (LIWAK) was formed in 1991. The organization, renamed the Coorg National Council (CNC) in 2000, has raised claims separation from Karnataka (initially) and later for autonomy within Karnataka. Despite already existing separatist sentiments, we peg the starting date of the movement at 1991, the year the LIWAK was founded. There is evidence of continued activity in recent years. We code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. We found no separatist violence associated with the Kodavas, and thus code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Kuki

Summary: In 1946, the Kuki National Assembly KNA was formed to protect Kuki identity, culture, and land. It initially strove to bring all Kukis (in today’s Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India) under a single administration and made threats of secession. The movement appears to have soon died down and there do not appear to have been calls for Kuki autonomy in the first years of India’s independence. Only in 1960, the KNA renewed its claim to self-determination (start date), when it began to make demands for the creation of a separate Kuki state within the Indian union (Haokip 2012: 59). The KNA continued to make claims for autonomy for the Kukis. From 1970 the KNA supported a pledge for a separate Kuki autonomous district within Manipur (Tohring 2010: 67). In the late 1980s the movement gained ground
but also became increasingly factionalized. Among the many organizations/rebel groups making claims for a Kuki homeland are the Kuki National Front and the Kuki National Army. Both strive for a Kuki state within the Indian union (Haokip 2012: 68; SATP). Other organizations making demands for the self-determination of Kuki in India include the Kuki Liberation Army and the United Kuki Liberation Front. Some of the organizations demand outright secession. There is evidence of continued activity in recent years. We code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. We code 1960-1996 as NVIOLSD, as casualties do not reach the 25 deaths per year threshold according to reports in Lexis Nexis and SATP. 1997 is coded as LVIOLSD based on UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset v.5 and SATP data. In subsequent years, the Kukis were involved in occasional clashes with government forces (according to UCDP), but not above the 25 battle-related deaths threshold. SATP lends this support: it notes a relatively high number of casualties associated with the various Kuki outfits, but usually notes that these are due to inter-factional clashes. Thus 1998-2012 are coded with NVIOLSD. The Kuki have also been active in Myanmar, where they are listed under “Zomi (Chin)”.

Sources:


**Manipur**

*Summary:* Manipur was a princely state and thus given the option to join either India or Pakistan upon partition. In 1947, the Manipur government signed an interim agreement acknowledging Indian sovereignty but did not formally join India until 1949. This sparked major protests and demands for full independence (Minahan 1947: 1222). Irawat, a social movement against social and economic inequalities (Kshetri 2006: 53), began to make claims for secession after Manipur’s (formal) merger with India in 1949 (Kshetri 2006: 18-19). Based on this, the start date is coded as 1947. Since Manipur formally joined India only in 1949 and had the status of an Indian protectorate beforehand, we code the movement from
1949, though noting prior non-violent activity. Minahan (1996) reports separatist activity throughout the 1960s and 1980s, which allows us to code the movement as ongoing throughout that period. Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict in 1978-2006, the last year they cover. UCDP/PRIO also codes armed conflict in most of these years (except for 1978-1981, 1989-1991 and 2000-2001) – and in addition from 2007-2009. It is possible that the low-level violence threshold was not met in some of these years. For instance, we counted only 14 casualties on SATP for 2001: 5 casualties in clashes between the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the government and 9 casualties in clashes between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA; another Meitei/Manipuri outfit) and the government. In 2002 we counted 17 casualties, 14 casualties attributable to UNLF and 3 due to the PLA (plus 3 civilians and 4 unconfirmed casualties claimed by the rebels). The same goes for 2010-2012, when UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict: based on SATP reports, we counted 7 deaths in 2010 (1 in UNLF-government dyad, 4 in PLA-government dyad, and 3 in KLP (Kangleipak Communist Party, another Meiti outfit)-government clashes), 12 in 2011 (1 in UNLF-government dyad and at least 11 in KLP-government dyad) and 15 in 2012 (3 in UNLF-government dyad, 3 in PLA-government dyad, 4 in KLP-government dyad and 5 in PREPAK (the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, another Meiti outfit)-government dyad). In sum, there has been violence since 1978 but possibly below the LVIOLSD in some of the years. To avoid coding a bogus de-escalation, 1978-2012 are coded with LVIOLSD.

Sources:


Masas (Dimasas)

Summary: Concentrated in the Cachar Hills region of Southern Assam, the Masas begun to mobilize for the separation of their own state in the 1970s (Minahan 2002: 1210). Yet the first separatist organization we found, the Dimasa National Security Force, emerged only in the 1980s (UCDP). Since the exact year is unclear, we code the movement from 1980. In the years before the 1970s/1980s, agitation focused on cultural matters (Barman 2014). In the 1990s, nationalist campaigns intensified and became increasingly
violent. While the DNSF surrendered in 1994, another Masa separatist outfit, the Dima Halam Daogah (DHD) continues to exist but entered into a “cease-fire” in 2009. Thus, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict from the early 1980s-2003: “Fearing marginalization and insecurity, Dimasa begin agitating for self-determination in early 1980s. Rebel outfit forms and begins armed separatist conflict shortly thereafter (precise date unknown). Original rebel organization surrenders in 1995, causing dissident militants upset with this move to promptly form a new rebel group. Latter rebel group signs ceasefire agreement with government in January 2003; ongoing talks on peace and self-determination issues, but little progress has been made. Ceasefire has been renewed each year since 2003. Rejecting negotiations and the ceasefire, several smaller rebel factions form in 2003 and continue steady string of violent attacks into early 2007.” Based on Hewitt et al., we code LVIOLSD from 1980-2003. Note: this low-level violence is not noted in MAR and UCDP/PRIO and the start date is ambiguous. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia violence reached the 25 battle-deaths threshold in 2008, thus 2008 is coded with LVIOLSD. 2004-2007 and 2009-2012 are coded with NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Meghalayans

Summary: The campaign for the separation of the Meghalayan hill tracts from Hindu-dominated Assam and the creation of a new tribal state in the region began in 1947 (Minahan 2002: 987), hence the start date of the movement. Activity continued until Meghalaya was granted its own state in 1972. While there has been intermittent separatist violence, it does not appear that any of this violence qualifies as LVIOLSD. We therefore classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD. Subsequently, the Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC) which represented the three main tribes – the Achiks (Garo), Hynniewtrep (Khasi, and Jaintia) – aimed to “fight against the outsiders (Dkhars)” (Bharati 2007: 55). There is no evidence that this group was fighting for self-determination as it was mainly a militant group focused on tribal warfare. Thus, the end of the movement is coded as 1972. In 1992, HALC split into the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and Achik Matgrik Liberation Army (AMLA) as a result of inter-tribal tensions between the tribes involved. The HNLC “aims at transforming Meghalaya into a State exclusively for the Khasi tribe” while AMLA and subsequent rebel group Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) “demand[ed] the Achikland comprising of three Garo districts of Meghalaya
and adjoining areas of Assam (Bharati 2007: 55). These movements are coded separately from the Meghalaya movement.

Sources:

Mikirs (Karbi)

Summary: The Mikir National Council (MNC) was founded in the late 1930s. It remained loyal to the British during the WWII. At the end of the war, the MNC entered into negotiations with the British for the establishment of an autonomous Mikir district, but their demands were ignored (Minahan 2002: 1258). The MNC and Mikir leaders have remained active claiming self-determination for the Mikirs since the independence of India. As we lack a clearer indication as to when the Mikirs began to demand self-determination (Minahan simply states that activity started after the end of WWII), we code 1946 as the start date. As India gained independence only in 1947, we code the movement from 1947 in the data set, but note prior non-violent activity. According to Minahan (2002: 1258), the Indian government “in an effort to offset growing Mikir militancy” offered some concessions in 1952. The government formed the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council, which gave Mikirs some control over the land, but this “was denounced by the more militant groups as inadequate and too limited to be effective. […] Mikir leaders demanded the creation of a more extensive territory…” According to Prakash (2007: 569), the “search for autonomy continued even after they [the Mikirs] got the ADC [autonomous district council] for themselves.” Eventually the perception of the concessions as too limited resulted in the formation of several rebel organizations in the 1980s that launched military campaigns to support their demand for autonomy in a new Mikir state (Minahan 2002). Among these was the Karbi National Volunteers, founded in 1980 (TRAC; SATP). There is evidence of continued activity in recent years. Hewitt et al. (2008) suggest a LVIOLSD code for 1986-2002: “Rebel outfit forms [in 1986] and begins armed separatist conflict shortly thereafter. This organization merges with another rebel faction in 1999 to form the current main militant Karbi organization. Rebels sign ceasefire agreement with government in May 2002 and begin negotiations soon following; ceasefire has been renewed each year since, despite regular accusations of truce breaking from both sides. Rejecting ceasefire and negotiations, additional rebel factions form and continue steady violent attacks into early 2007. In January 2006, main rebel faction (the one on ceasefire with the government) reportedly drops long-time goal of separate Karbi Anglong state in favor of more autonomy.” However, the evidence we found does not suggest that violence was significant enough to warrant a LVIOLSD code. For instance, SATP reports that the Karbi National Volunteers maintained only 50 members (SATP). Thus, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Mizos

**Summary:** In 1946, the Mizo Union was formed (initially named the Mizo Common People’s Union). While the Mizo Union favored remaining in India, a secessionist group, the United Mizo Freedom Organisation (UMFO), split from the Mizo Union in July 1947 (Prudaite 2005: 161-162). Thus, 1947 is coded as start date. It is not fully clear to what extent the UMFO agitated for separate independence after the petition, but it seems some self-determination agitation continued. In 1953, after the creation of the Mizo Autonomous District Council, the UMFO began to call for statehood (Prudaite 2005: 164). The Mizo National Famine Front was founded in 1959 to combat the famine in the area. In 1961 it changed its name to the Mizo National Front (MNF), and thus became a political organization. The MNF declared independence as its goal. In 1966 the MNF led an insurgency against the government and declared independence (Prudaite 2005: 165). In 1986, when a peace accord was signed and Mizoram was granted statehood, the MNF officially renounced the goal of secession and it transformed into a political party. There appears to be little contention for self-determination beyond 1986. Not all Mizos seem to be happy about Mizoram’s borders, but at least since 1986 there has not been organized political activity around the issue (Prudaite 2005: 165). Hence, we code an end to the movement in 1986. UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over Mizoram in 1966-1968. MAR (the quinquennial MAR rebellion score is four or higher in 1965-1984) and Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59) (armed conflict from 1966-1984), on the other hand, suggest a LVIOLSD code throughout 1966-1984. We follow the latter and code 1966-1984 as LVIOLSD. All other years are coded NVIOLSD.

**Sources:**


Summary: In 1929 Naga leaders demanded the unification of several Naga districts of India and Burma under a separate administration and asked for a promise by the British that the Nagas would be granted separate independence should the British ever leave India. The British did not respond to these claims, which prompted a Naga rebellion that continued until WWII (Minahan 2002: 1330). In 1942 the Japanese invaded northeast India. They sought to win dissident Nagas with promises of independence, and some Naga leaders collaborated, which divided the national movement. In 1945, the Naga National Council (NNC), an organization that had been formed during WWII to promote Naga interests, opened negotiations on separate independence in 1945. In August 1947 it proclaimed Naga independent. In sum, the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found is in 1929, thus the start date. In the data set, we begin to code the movement in 1947, the year of India’s independence. From Minahan (2002: 1330) it appears that the Nagas were involved in a rebellion from 1929 until the start of WWII (“Outraged at the British failure to reply, several of the Nagas rebelled; the resulting disturbances continued until World War II”). Note: we could not find casualty estimates, but tentatively code this period as prior separatist violence. There was, however, no ongoing rebellion in 1946/1947. Thus we note that activity immediately before 1947 was non-violent. The Nagas were involved in low-level violence in the post-1947 phase, but sources differ on periods of peace and war. On the one hand, Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59) indicate LVIOLSD from 1952-1964 and 1972-2001. The MAR rebellion score, on the other hand, exceeds two (and thus the LVIOLSD threshold) in 1955-1964, 1970-1974, 1985-1996 and in 1999-2000. Complicating things further, UCDP/PRIO reports armed conflict at yet different dates: from 1956-1959, from 1961-1968, 1992-1997 and in 2000. Based on this, we code LVIOLSD from 1952-1968 and 1972-2001. Note that the following periods are based on a single source: 1952-1954 is solely on Marshall & Gurr. 1965-1968 solely on UCDP/PRIO, and 1975-1979, 1997-1998 and 2001 again solely based on Marshall & Gurr. 1947-1951 and 1969-1971 are coded as NVIOLSD as no source reports separatist violence. 2002-2012 is coded as NVIOLSD. According to UCDP, the organizations related to the Naga movement were involved in significant inter-factional clashes throughout the period, but clashes with government forces were rare (cease-fires between the government and the most important factions were continually renewed and only very occasionally broken during the period). Information on SATP confirms UCDP’s account.
Sources:

Pangals

Summary: The Meitei Pangal are the Muslim minority in the state of Manipur. Ethnic and religious tensions in Manipur increased and around 150 Pangals were killed in riots in 1993. Several Pangal self-defence groups were subsequently formed, among them the PULF (People’s United Liberation Front). The start date is thus coded as 1993. Apart from protection of the Muslim minority, the PULF also stated their wish to create an 'Islamic State' in the Northeast. The first recorded attacks on government targets occurred in 2004, while only very little had been known about the PULF’s activities in the ten years before. Attacks have continued and intensified since. We code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. According to Gleditsch et al. (2002)/Themnér & Wallensteen (2014), the conflict reached the 25 battle deaths threshold in 2008, thus 2008 is coded with LVIOLSD. All other years are coded with NVIOLSD since even if there was violence, the threshold for LVIOLSD was not met.

Sources:

Rabhas

Summary: The Rabhas are a Tibeto-Burman nation located in northeastern India. The incorporation in the state of Assam and years of Assamese dominance alienated the Rabhas, so that in 1950 the idea of separation from Assam was first pronounced by a group of Rabha students (Minahan 2002: 1561). The first instance of organized self-determination activity we found is the formation of the All Rabha Students Union (ARSU), an organization that mobilized for ethnic autonomy, in 1980 (Das 2012: 4-5). The start date is thus pegged at 1980. The Rabha National Security Force (RNSF) was formed in the mid-1990s, after over a decade of persistent conflict between government officials and Rabha students over autonomy. The RNSF is no longer active, but the Rabha Viper Army and Rabha National Liberation Front (RNLF) have recently been active in fighting for Rabhaland. The movement is ongoing. The RNLF has been involved in violence, but casualties do not reach LVIOLSD levels. The Rabha Viper Army’s activities generally involve kinappings and extortion. Based on this, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Rajbangsis

Summary: In 1966 an organization called All Koch Rajbanshi Student Union began to demand scheduled tribe status for the Rajbangsis (this would imply the protection of language and tribal culture as well as affirmative action). In 1969 the former ruler of a princely state demanded the formation of a separate Rajbangsi state (Das 2011). However, several sources note that organized agitation for a separate Rajbangsi state dates to the 1990s. In 1991, the Kamatapur Youth Organization was formed which made demands for a separate state (Barma 2007: 282). Since this is the first organization dedicated to a separate Rajbangsi state we found, this coded as the start date. Several additional Kamatapur organizations were formed in the following years, notably the Kamatapur Liberaton Front in 1993, the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO) in 1995, and the Kamatapur People’s Party in 1996 (SATP; Barma 2007: 281-282). The Rajbangsi movement, in particular the KLO, has been involved in the war that began in Assam in 1990 (see Doyle & Sambanis 2006). According to SATP (also see Prakash 2007: 484-493), the Kamatapur Liberation Organization has cooperated with the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and has been involved in armed struggle soon after its inception in 1995. However, we lack clear information on the violent activity of this group. From the sources we reviewed it appears that only a small number of the casualties are associated with the Rajbangsi insurgency. The first reported armed operation (jointly with ULFA) was in July 1999 (abduction of a tea garden owner). According to Minahan (2002: 1568) the KLO was involved in skirmishes with the Indian police in 2001-2002. According to Prakash (2007: 76), the KLO is “the main source of violence” in North Bengal and has unleashed a “massive spate of violence” until 2003. SATP attributes a number of casualties to the KLO, starting in 2000 (2) and continuing up to 2012. The maximum number of casualties reported by SATP is in 2002 (14); some of the 14 casualties stem from terrorist attacks. The second-highest is in 2006, when ten persons were killed in a terrorist attack attributed to KLO. In 2003 the KLO suffered a severe blow when its camps in neighboring Bhutan were cleared. SATP furthermore reports that some militants that were associated with the KRLO (that quickly became defunct after its inception in 1995) joined the ranks of ULFA. In sum, based on the sources we reviewed the Rajbangsi movement was involved in several violent activities during the war in Assam that had started in 1990. The first clear-cut evidence of casualties associated with the Rajbangsi movement is in 2000. It is highest in 2002 and 2006. The number of casualties that can be clearly attributed to the Rajbangsi movement has not exceeded 25 in any of these years. However, the casualty estimates may well under-estimate the actual death toll, in particular because part of the violent activity has presumably been under the banner of ULFA. Based on this, we code LVIOLSD from 2000 onwards and 1991-1999 as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Reang (Bru)

Summary: According to Minahan (2002: 1273) a group called the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) began a violent campaign for autonomy in 1992. However, other sources (e.g. SATP) agree that the BNLF was formed only in 1996. Already before that, in 1994, another Reang organization, the Bru National Union (BNU) was formed (SATP). The BNU has made claims for the establishment of an autonomous district in Mizoram under the sixth schedule of India’s constitution (Das 2010: 37; SATP).

1994 is coded as the start date. According to SATP, there have been some casualties attributed to the BNLF but these fall below the LVIOLSD threshold, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD. SATP reports that the BNLF moderated its demand to a regional council with fewer powers in recent years (also see Grant 2013) but it is somewhat ambiguous whether that means that the claim for autonomy was fully dropped. Thus the movement is coded as ongoing (in accordance with the ten-years rule).

Sources:


Santhals (Assam)

Summary: According to UCDP, the Santhals (also known as Adivasis, Hor, Santals or Sangtals) are India’s largest tribal group, with a population of approximately 10 million. Most Santhals are located in north-east India, mainly in Jharkhand, Assam, and West Bengals. The Santhals in Jharkhand are included under the header of the “Jharkhandis” movement, which aimed at the creation of a separate Jharkhand state. This movement refers to Santhals in Assam. The Santhals in Assam are migrants that came in mainly to work on tea plantations. In the 1980s and 1990s Assam’s Santhals were involved in inter-ethnic conflict with the Bodos that resulted from the Bodos’ desire for an autonomous homeland. There were Bodo campaigns to drive out the incoming Santhals, sometimes described as ethnic cleansing. In response, the Santhals organized and formed several militant outfits. They primarily fought the Bodos for land, but it appears they also made some separatist claims. Minahan (2002: 1650-1651), for instance,
promising that all localities with over 50% Bodos will be included in the BEC, it triggered a lengthy
of Assam establishing a non-
communal violence, multiple clashes occurring between them and the Bodo people.” UCDP summarizes
Encyclopedia, “[b]y the mid-
ethnic sort and driven by land dispu-
militant outfits were involved in significant violence. However, violence was predominantly of the inter-
formation of the ACF in “the second half of the 1990s”, see above.  The above
 peg the start date to 1996: the earliest evidence we
confirmed th-
scheduled tribe status for the Santhal community in Assam (SATP). The claim for scheduled tribe status
the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), wh-
Cobras are a rebel group demanding a separate Santhal homeland within Assam. Another Santhal outfit is
S
revolution” (see SATP).  START classifies the ACF as “nationalist/separatist”, arguing that the BCF has demanded an
independent state in Assam. CDPS India also notes that the creation of a separate Adivasi land ranges
among the BCF’s claims. Hussain (2004) and Wars in the World (2012) as well confirm that the BCF is a
rebel group demanding a separate Santhal homeland within Assam. Finally, Sentinel Assam (2013) also
suggests that the BCF has had separatist goals. However, separatism appears not BCF’s primary goal. START
notes that “the BCF is mostly a protection outfit for Santhals” and only “technically a separatist
group.” In addition, the BCF has made claims for scheduled tribe status, which the Santhals in Assam
lack. Scheduled tribe status does not necessarily imply autonomy, but always some limited form of
cultural protection and positive discrimination. START reports that the BCF was mostly involved in inter-
ethnic conflict with the Bodos. A second Santhal militant group is the Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF), which
also appears to have made some separatist claims. The ACF was formed in the second half of the 1990s
“with the purported objective of protecting the Adivasi (tribal) people of Lower Assam through an armed
revolution” (see SATP). START classifies the ACF as “nationalist/separatist”. However, according to
START they “do not explicitly demand a separate state for Adivasis.” Hussain (2004) confirms that the
Cobras are a rebel group demanding a separate Santhal homeland within Assam. Another Santhal outfit is
the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), which was formed in 2006 and primarily demands
scheduled tribe status for the Santhal community in Assam (SATP). The claim for scheduled tribe status
is confirmed by CDPS India. Sentinel Assam (2013) and Wars in the World (2012), however, while
confirming that the AANLA advocated schedule tribe status, suggest that the AANLA made claims also
for a territorial council, which appears to mean an autonomous status within Assam. Another group that
apparently has made separatist claims is the Adivasi People’s Army (APA) (Sentinel Assam 2013; Wars
in the World 2012). Mohan (2011), for instance, suggests that APA demands the set-up of an Adivasi
autonomous council in Assam. APA was formed in 2011 according to TRAC. There are many more
Santhal outfits but it is not clear whether all have also espoused separatism. For instance, there is the
National Santhali Liberation Army (NSLA), formed in 2005. This group represents an umbrella
organization uniting several of the above-mentioned groups (CDPS India). The NSLA’s aims are not
clear. In short, the Santhal militants in Assam appear to be mainly involved in inter-ethnic conflict with
the Bodos, but have also made claims for scheduled tribe status and, in some cases, an autonomous status
within Assam (which appears to be the dominant claim in terms of self-determination as we define it) or
even separate statehood for the Santhals. Based on this, we code an active and ongoing movement. We
peg the start date to 1996: the earliest evidence we found is the formation of the BCF in 1996-1997 and
the formation of the ACF in “the second half of the 1990s”, see above. The above-mentioned Santhral
militant outfits were involved in significant violence. However, violence was predominantly of the inter-
ethnic sort and driven by land disputes with the local Bodos. According to UCDP’s Conflict
Encyclopedia, “[b]y the mid-late 1990s, the Santhals were confronted by a significant spread in
communal violence, multiple clashes occurring between them and the Bodo people.” UCDP summarizes
the non-state conflicts as such: “[a] further step on the path to violence came as a direct result of the State
of Assam establishing a non-autonomous Bodoland Executive Council (BEC) in 1993, in areas of Bodo
majority, under the pressure of Bodo militancy. By not establishing precise borders (until 1999), and by
promising that all localities with over 50% Bodos will be included in the BEC, it triggered a lengthy
campaign of ethnic cleansing, as various Bodo groups would try to reach the target. Santhals were the primary targets, as they were seen as ‘tea people’, immigrants brought by the British and Indians, taking away land, resources and jobs from the native Bodos. Further, violence levels were increased by infighting between various Bodo groups acting within the Bodo community (such as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NFDB) or the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF)), each having different views of whether the Bodos should collaborate or not with the Assamese authorities. Attacked, Santhals responded similarly, by organizing militias for both self-defense and to attack Bodo positions, such as the Adhiviya Cobra Force (ACF), leading to a severe spiral of violence that reached its peak in 1996 and 1998, leading to over 200,000 Internally Displaced Persons (over 45,000 of them still being housed in relief camps). Violence began to subside as the borders of BEC were delineated in 1999 and as the Government of India and the state of Assam took stronger measures for maintaining security and initiated negotiations with the militant groups. Violence between the two ethnic groups did not erupt significantly after 1999, even with the creation of a stronger Bodo Territorial Council in 2003.” Based on this, UCDP codes two non-state conflicts between the Santhals and the Bodos (in 1996 and 1998), but does not list an armed insurgency by the Santhals against the state. However, UCDP recognizes that the Santhals have also been involved in violence against the state when they state that the Santhals also “challenged the government.” It is extremely difficult to get by reliable information on casualty estimates regarding the various Santhal militant outfits’ involvement in armed insurgency against the state. However, there is evidence that a number of militant outfits also engaged in violence against the state and not only in inter-ethnic strife. START, for instance, notes that the ACF’s attacks “are generally focused on Assamese government targets or against Bodo militants.” Furthermore, the BCF is “mostly a protection outfit for Santhals” but “have carried out several small attacks on police and government targets”, again according to START. Furthermore, SATP reports a number of deaths resulting from agitation from the AANLA, though annual figures do not appear to add up to 25. However, in 2007, there had been more than 100 cases “of murder and abduction in Assam” related to the activities of the AANLA. Note: some of the groups have stopped engaging in violence against the government in the early/mid-2000s. In 2001 the ACF has signed a cease-fire with the government and has largely sticked to it according to START. Furthermore, START reports that BCF signed a cease-fire agreement with the Indian government in 2004 and has largely sticked to it. However, some groups/factions appear to have continued their insurgency, as a 2012 article reports that various Santhal rebel outfits surrendered in that year (Wars in the World 2012). In short, while violence is primarily inter-ethnic, there appears to have been some violence against the state as well. Possibly violence was more intense in the early years rather than in later years, but there appears to have been at least some violence in all or most years. Exact casualty estimates are difficult to get by. Thus, we apply a tentative LVIOLS code throughout 1996-2012.

Sources:


After World War II Sikh leaders began negotiations on the creation of a Sikh homeland separate from both India and Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 1723). This is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found. We lack a clearer indication and thus, somewhat arbitrarily, peg the start date to 1946. India gained independence in 1947, thus in the data set, we begin to code the movement in 1947. We found no violence in 1946, thus we note prior violent activity. In 1947 the areas where Muslims constituted a majority were partitioned to create Pakistan (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 154). Ayres (2000: 118) indicates that the Sikhs engaged in violent nationalist conflict in 1947-48. Minahan (1996: 298-300) corroborates this report and states that the fighting left thousands dead in communal massacres. However, this was not an armed rebellion but appears to relate to the genocide in the context of the partition. Thus, we do not code LVIOLSD in 1947-1948. After independence, Akali Dal (originally a revivalist Sikh religious movement formed in 1920) led a campaign for a separate Sikh state, which was achieved in 1966. Still, the movement continued (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 154). In 1973 Akali Dal issued a resolution that demanded maximal autonomy for the Sikh state, and in the 1980s the demand shifted to independence. Marshall & Gurr (2003) suggest a LVIOLSD code in 1978-1983. Other sources suggest a later conflict onset: UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict over Khalistan in 1983 and not in previous years while the MAR rebellion is zero 1975-1979 and only two in 1980-1985. We follow Marshall & Gurr and code 1978-1983 as LVIOLSD, though noting that this is not unambiguous. Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006) we code 1984-93 as HVIOLSD. Since the government militarily suppressed the Sikh militants, there has been sporadic violence in the region and a few arrests of alleged rebels. The MAR rebellion score is 4 in 2001-2003, thus 2001-2003 is coded with LVIOLSD. All other years are coded as NVIOLSD. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1990-2006 allows us to code the movement as ongoing.

Dhillion (2007) writes, “[t]oday, there are a few groups still fighting for the creation of Khalistan, but the
movement has lost its popular support both in India and within the Diaspora community” (Dhillion 2007: 10). In 2013, there is still evidence of an ongoing militant movement.

Sources:


Sikkimese

Summary: Around 1817 Sikkim became a de-facto protectorate of the British Empire, a status that was formalized in 1861 (Minahan 2002: 1729). Sikkim was unwilling to give up its separate status upon India’s independence in 1947. The Sikkimese king declared Sikkim an independent state on August 15, 1947, the day of India’s independence. A party loyal to the Sikkimese king and committed to Sikkim’s independence, the Sikkim National Party, was formed. In its resolutions, the party opposed accession to India and favored independence (Bareh 2001: 94-95). In 1950 India signed an agreement with the Sikkimese king. According to the agreement Sikkim became an Indian protectorate with far-reaching autonomy (India directed defense, foreign relations and communications). Thus, Sikkim did not have to
(formally) merge with India (Minahan 2002: 1729). This initial phase of activity is not coded as Sikkim was not fully integrated with India. The agreement appears to have satisfied the Sikkimese: we did not find activity in subsequent years. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 268) report that the Sikkimese king in 1974 declared that since he had never signed an instrument of accession, Sikkim was not part of India. We considered this statement too ambiguous to code movement activity. In 1975 India annexed Sikkim, thus ending Sikkim’s last vestiges of independence. The king was deposed. The movement unambiguously re-erupted in the 1980s. According to Minahan (2002: 1731): “[i]n 1981-1983 serious disturbances shook the state as nationalists demanded the expulsion of the newcomers and the restoration of Sikkimese independence under United Nations auspices.” And: “[i]n 1990 Sikkimese nationalist leaders declared the annexation of Sikkim to be illegal and reiterated their demands for the restoration of the kingdom […] In November 1994 state elections the Sikkimese nationalists won a substantial portion of the vote.” Based on this, the start date is coded with 1981. We found no activity beyond 1994 except for an instance in 2003 that may or may not qualify as a protest for independence (“the [Sikkimese] protestors challenged the merger of Sikkim into India”, see Arora 2007: 215). Based on this, we code the end of the movement in 2004 based on the ten-year rule. Note the post-1980s activity is coded exclusively based on Minahan (2002). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:
Keesing’s Record of World Events [December 11, 2013].
Lexis Nexis. [December 10, 2013].

Tamils

Summary: Tamil contention for a separate state pre-dates India’s independence. According to Minahan (2002: 1846), the first organized call for self-determination dates to 1925, when a Tamil political party adopted a secessionist program. In 1938, the Justice Party (a Tamil party) adopted a resolution demanding an independent Tamil state in South India (the claim actually included Telugu, Malayalam, and Kannada-speaking areas but was brought forward by Tamils and not supported by the other linguistic groups). A similar call was made in 1944 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 291-292). In 1949 the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam – the Dravida Progressive Federation (DMK) – was formed, a breakaway organization of the Justice Party. The DMK campaigned for an independent Dravidian. Based on this, 1925 is coded as the start date. In the data set, we begin to code the movement in 1947, the year India attained independence. We note prior non-violent activity. According to Minahan (2002: 1846) the Tamils were involved in violent protests in 1938, but these were related to language and not separatism. In 1956, the Tamils
received a separate state, which was given its current name (Tamil Nadu) in 1969. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 291) report that the movement has remained active, but other sources suggest that the movement ended in the early 1960s. Kohli (1997: 335) suggests that the DMK has focused more on Tamil cultural and language rights since 1956. The DMK removed the claim for an independent Tamil state from its program in 1960 (see e.g. Chandra 2005: 238). In 1963 the DMK formally dropped its claim for separation (Chandran 2012). 1963 is thus coded as end date. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:


Telangana

Summary: In 1969, there were clashes between separatists and the police. Official estimates claim 30-40 deaths, but unofficial estimates go as high as 200-300. The uprising was led by the Telangana Praja Samithi (TPS), which was founded in 1969. 1969 is coded as start date. The TPS continued to operate until 1973 when it reached a political settlement with the government (One India News 8/1/2013). This appears to have ended separatist agitation, and hence we code an end to this first phase in 1973. We code 1969 as LVIOLSD and 1970-1973 as NVIOLSD. Note that while we code violence in the movement’s first year, the account in Minahan suggests an initial period of nonviolence with swift escalation to violence (see p. 1872): “Telangana discontent intensified in 1969, when the unification guarantees were scheduled to lapse. Student agitation for the continuation of the agreement spread across Telangana,
though most Telenganas felt that the agreement had been violated by the leaders of the Andhra region. Government employees and opposition groups threatened to support the students. New agreements on revenue sharing and local government employment failed to appease the separatists, and violent mob attacks on railroads, highways, and government facilities spread across the Telengana, threatening civil war in the state. Police fired on demonstrators, killing 23 people, according to official figures.”

In 1983, the Telugu Desam Party was founded to safeguard the “political, economic, social and cultural foundations of Telugu speaking people in the country” (Telugu Desam Party website). This party did not fight for separatism, but for cultural and language autonomy, and thus does not qualify as a self-determination organization under our definition. Ram (2007) notes that separatism resurfaced again in the late 1980s in the civil society realm at first. “The present phase of the movement led by various civil society groups started in 1989 and intensified from 1996 onwards” (Ram 2007: 93). In 1999, separatist agitation resurfaced in the political realm with the Congress party at the helm of the movement. Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) was founded in 2001 as a political party with separatist aims. The movement remains ongoing. Hence, we code a second, non-violent phase: 1989-ongoing.

Sources:


Telugus

Summary: In 1921, the first Telugu (Andhran) politico-cultural organization was formed, Andhra Jana Sangh (AJS) (Minahan 2002: 117). At this point in time, the movement appears to have focused on language; we found no calls for political self-determination. After independence in 1947, the Telugus asked the Congress to implement its old resolution – dating to 1920 – in favor of linguistic states (Guha
The first evidence for organized activity directed towards self-determination as we define it we found is in 1950 (see Minahan 2002: 118). Thus 1950 is coded as start date. After the movement’s leader had fasted to death, which caused several strikes and protests, the Indian government gave in in 1953 and the state of Andhra Pradesh was established out of the Telugu-speaking areas of the Madras state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 127; Guha 2003). In 1956 the Telugu-speaking areas from Hyderabad were added to Andhra Pradesh (Minahan 2002: 118). We found no separatist activity beyond 1956, thus 1956 is coded as end date. We found no evidence for separatist violence. Hence, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

**Tripuris**

*Summary:* Following the partition of British India into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan, the numerous British protectorates (princely states) were given a choice which of the two new states they wished to join. Predominantly Hindu, Tripura favored India, but as it was considered too small to maintain itself as a separate state, the British recommended that it become part of Assam. This recommendation was vehemently opposed and set off the beginning of the Tripuran self-determination movement: an organization named Seng Krak was formed in 1947 to press for separate statehood, but it was banned shortly afterwards. Tripura formally joined India in 1949, when the local king signed the Tripura Merger Agreement (Minahan 2002: 1918). Based on this, the movement is coded from 1949, though we note prior non-violent activity. The start date is coded with 1947. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1945-69 indicate that the movement was active in the years until the outbreak of violence. We also find no reports of separatist violence during this period. In the late 1960s, a new organization, the Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS), began a political campaign to create an autonomous tribal district council. The militant Tripura National Volunteer Force (TNV) emerged in 1978. A Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council was created in 1982. However, the TNV continued its armed campaign until 1988, when it signed an accord with the federal government. The agreement promised to address various tribal concerns including migrations from Bangladesh, the loss of tribal lands to Bengali settlers, and greater participation of tribals in the state administration. Limited implementation of the accord led to the emergence of the next phase of the Tripuri rebellion. Disgruntled members of the TNV formed the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) in 1990 and began launching attacks against state authorities. Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59, 2005: 86) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict in 1967-72 and 1979-2006. UCDP/PRIO does not code the first episode but largely coincides with regard to the second: it codes armed conflict over Tripura in 1979-1988, 1992-1993, 1995, 1997-2004 and 2006. Also MAR does not code the first episode, but supports the second: the MAR quinquennial rebellion score exceeds two in 1975-1984 and the annual rebellion score exceeds two in 1985-1989 and 1991-2000. In sum, there appears to have been low-level violent activity in 1967-1972 and 1979-2006. In some years the LVIOLSD threshold may not be met, but given scarce and conflictive information we code ongoing LVIOLSD throughout these years. According to SATP, deaths fall below 25 a year from 2007 onwards, thus a NVIOLSD code for those years.
Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 3, 2002].


Uttarakhandis

**Summary:** After India attained independence from the British, Uttarakhand was merged into the state of Uttar Pradesh in 1949. Destruction of their lands and livelihoods resulted in the formation of separatist sentiment. Fiol (2008: 70) dates the emergence of the Uttarakhand separatist movement to the 1950s and 1960s, but only as of 1976 have we found evidence for organized separatist activity, when a youth group called Uttarakhand Jan Sangharsh Vahini began to pick up the call for an autonomous region (Fiol 2008: 72). Thus, we peg the start date to 1976. Initially the Uttarkhanadi nationalist organizations were distinctly nonviolent, grassroots movements that were mostly village-based cooperatives focusing on land and environmental issues. However, in 1979, the Uttarakhand Revolutionary Front was formed in order to fight for separation from Uttar Pradesh. Emerging protests and outbreaks of violence were met with governmental repression. The division of Uttarakhand from Uttar Pradesh finally took place in 2000. A militant minority was still unsatisfied and aimed for full-fledged sovereignty, but the movement was only of marginal influence and we did not find any evidence of continued demands for more autonomy by the main representatives of the Uttarakhandis. We thus code an end to the movement when the Uttarakhand state was formed in 2000. No violence was found for this movement, and thus it is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Acehnese

Summary: Acehnese rebel leaders declared Aceh independent of Indonesia on February 11, 1950. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1950. In 1953, a rebellion led by All-Aceh Ulama Association (PUSA) leader Daud Beureueh broke out in resistance to the central government’s rule. We code 1953 as HVIOLSD following Doyle & Sambanis (2006). In 1957, the riot ceased after Aceh was granted as a full province. However, according to Ross, there was low-level insurgency up to 1962: “[…] Aceh was the site of a 1953-62 rebellion led by Teungku Daud Beureueh. Importantly, the rebellion did not call for Acehnese independence, but rather, greater local autonomy and a stronger role for Islam in the national government.” In partial agreement with Ross, MAR codes a rebellion score of 3 throughout 1950-1959 (but zero from 1960-1964). Based on Ross, 1954-1962 are coded with LVIOLSD. In 1959, Aceh was given “special region” status with autonomy in customary law, religious and educational affairs. The grievances of the Acehnese grew as Suharto’s New Order policy began to tighten its control over the religion, society, and economy of the region since 1969. The group has sought independence from the Indonesia Republic since 1976, when the Aceh-Sumatra Liberation Front (ASNL, later known as Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM), pronounced the independence of the region. The LVIOLSD coding for 1977-1989 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59). It has yet to be noted that no other source suggests a LVIOLSD code in 1980-1988 (UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict in these years and the MAR rebellion score is three in 1975-1979 but zero from 1980-1988). It seems that Marshall & Gurr picked up some violence that other sources have missed. The HVIOLSD coding for 1990-91 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The LVIOLSD coding for 1992-1998 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59). Note that no other source (MAR, UCDP/PRIO) would suggest a violence code for those years, but at least in partial support the MAR rebellion score is two for most of these years. The HVIOLSD coding for 1990-91 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The LVIOLSD coding for 1992-1998 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003: 59). Note that no other source (MAR, UCDP/PRIO) code armed conflict in these years. The movement once again reaches HVIOLSD levels from 1999-2005 based on Doyle & Sambanis (2006). In 2005 the GAM signed a peace deal with Jakarta that led to far-reaching autonomy. Subsequently GAM surrendered its separatist intentions, disbanded and transformed into political parties (in particular: the Independent Aceh Movement Party) (e.g. TRAC; Ansori 2012). We found no evidence of separatist activity beyond 2005, thus 2005 is coded as end date.

Sources:


Balinese

Summary: Unlike Indonesia’s majority, the Balinese mostly practice a special form of Hinduism, Balinese Hinduism. The Balinese have their own language, Balinese, but many also speak Indonesian. Bali’s population is 3.9 million (Erviani 2013). In 2007, Bali’s regional government drafted a proposal outlining why Bali should be granted a special form of autonomy. The special autonomy regime they aim at would involve a greater degree of independent decision-making, greater control over the region’s natural resources and over revenues stemming from tourism (The Bali Times 2007). Erviani (2013) reports that the Balinese “continue to fight for special autonomy status for their province, following years of being ignored by the central government.” Ramstedt (2009: 331) also reports that Bali had not been granted special autonomy yet. Furthermore, Erviani reports that “[t]he public pressure to have special autonomy status spread widely at least 8 years ago. In 2005, a number of prominent politicians and academics launched a campaign to push for special autonomy.” Ramstedt (2009: 331), however, notes that already in 2004, Bali made “a formal call for special autonomy status for the Province of Bali.” And Picard (2005: 111) notes that there were claims already in 1999: “[o]n 27 September 1999, the Jakarta Post ran an article titled ‘Bali wants special status’, opening with the following statement: ‘Community leaders have urged the province’s newly elected regional representatives to the People’s Consultative Assembly to seek special status for the province be granted.’” In 2001, Balinese leaders repeated their calls, according to Picard (2005: 114). Based on this, we code 1999 as the start date, the earliest evidence of organized separatist activity we found, and code the movement as ongoing. We found no evidence for separatist violence above the LVIOLSD threshold, hence a NVIOLSD code. Note: the 2002 bombing that had killed more than 200 people was not over separatism. Similarly, the 2005 bombing that killed 20 was not over separatism either.

Sources:


East Timorese

Summary: The Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETILIN; originally the Timorese Social Democratic Association or ASDT), which advocated immediate independence, was formed in 1974 (Minahan 2002: 552). That same year, the Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense was formed, which advocated integration into Indonesia (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 85). As this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, 1974 is coded as start date. At that time, East Timor had still been a Portuguese colony. FRETILIN was involved in a short civil conflict in 1974, which ended in a partial victory on the part of FRETILIN (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 85; Marshall & Gurr 2003). We code prior violence in 1974 while noting that the timeline in Minahan (2002) suggests that claims were initially nonviolent and that violence may only have emerged in 1975 rather than 1974 (contrary to Marshall & Gurr).

In 1975, East Timor declared its independence. However, later that year it was annexed by Indonesia. In the cross-national version of the data set, we thus code the movement from 1975. The HVIOLSD coding for 1975-99 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). In a UN-supervised popular referendum on August 30, 1999, the people of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia. On May 20, 2002, East Timor was internationally recognized as an independent state. Therefore, we code an end to the movement in 2002.

Sources:


Indigenous Peoples
Summary: Indonesia’s indigenous people have mobilized against deforestation and seizing of indigenous lands by the palm oil industry. According to the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center, the indigenous movement on land rights is represented largely by the Community Alliance of Adat Nusantara (AMAN). AMAN is an organization founded in 1999 during the first Congress of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (KMAN I), and aims to unify indigenous communities and groups to fight for their rights, religion, culture, land, and natural resources. There have since been three more KMAN sessions, with the most recent one (KMAN IV) in April 2012. AMAN’s activity remains primarily focused on deforestation and land rights. Besides the overarching campaign, indigenous groups have mobilized around land issues individually as well, such as the Mentawai, Bataks, Dayaks, and others. For example, the Mentawai are an indigenous tribe living in the Mentawai Islands in West Sumatra and are formally represented by several groups including the Foundation for the Development of Mentawai Society (Yayasan Pembinaan Masyarakat Mentawai), the Vision for Autonomy (Yayasan Citra Mandiri), Deliberative Body for the Mentawai Community (Badan Musyawarah Masyarakat Mentawai), and several others. These organizations have been active since the 1990s, and aim to strengthen Mentawai culture, promote indigenous political rights, and protect indigenous lands and natural resources from private drilling companies. They continue to be active today. The Bataks, on the other hand, are a group of tribes that live in the North Sumatra region of Aceh province. From 1988 onward, the Bataks have been active in a struggle to retain their lands in the face of industrial deforestation. No formal organization fighting specifically for the Bataks could be found, however. In light of this evidence, we code an indigenous movement that subsumes individual indigenous groups and peg the start date to 1988, the first year we found evidence for separatist activity. The movement is ongoing as of 2012. No violence was found for this movement, and thus we code NVIOLSD for the entire time period.

Sources:


**Melayus**

*Summary:* Today, Riau is a province of Indonesia. Riau has a relative Malay majority. A serious rebellion against the Dutch rule erupted in Riau in 1911, when the last Riau sultan was forced into abdication (Minahan 2002: 1227; Wee 2002: 499), but this appears not to have given way to continued self-determination activity. Riau was occupied by the Japanese military forces during WWII but returned to Dutch control in 1946. A Melayu self-determination movement emerged after WWII. According to Wee (2002: 498-499), the Melayus attempted to re-establish the Riau sultanate between 1945 and 1950. The Dutch, however, turned down the Melayus’ demand. Riau was incorporated into Indonesia in 1950 (Wee 2002: 499). Separatist activity continued under the leadership of the Persatuan Melayu Riau Sejati (the Union of True-Born Riau Malays). Based on this, we code the start date in 1945, but do not code the movement in the data set before 1950, the year Riau was incorporated into independent Indonesia. We found no violent activity in 1945-1949 and thus note prior non-violent activity. There was a revolt against Indonesia in 1959 (Minahan 2002: 1227). Sukarno’s centralization policy and repression of the Melayu leadership appears to have caused the movement to peter out (Wee 2002: 499-502). We found no mention of this movement after 1965, and hence code an end to this first phase in 1975, following the ten-years rule. In 1985, there was an attempt by Riau’s provincial parliament to elect its own governor, but this appears an isolated event and is not coded. After the fall of Suharto, several self-determination organizations sprung up (such as the Riau People’s Congress or the Free Riau Movement or Riau Merdeka). Separatists are led mainly be the Free Riau Movement, which was founded in 1999 (Crouch 2010: 95), hence the second start date. Petroleum production from Riau fields without economic control by the Melayus gave the autonomist movement more momentum. The movement’s demands were focused around reforming the revenue-sharing system, but also included federalism, and outright independence, depending on the organization. The movement is ongoing. Though Riau separatist garner large support and have threatened violence in the future, it seems that there has been no violence so far. Thus we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


**Papuans**

*Summary:* The West Papuans were involved in uprisings against Dutch or Japanese rule (during WWII), but the first clear-cut evidence for organized separatist activity we found is in 1945, when the Suara Rakyat (Voice of the People) was formed, an organization advocating independence. Indonesia’s declaration of independence in 1945 resulted in a split, with some supporting integration into Indonesia and others in favor of separate independence. The latter formed the Gerakan Persatuan Nieuw Guinea (New Guinea Unity Movement or GPNG). (Vermonte 2007: 280). Thus 1945 is coded as start date. At the time, Papua was still a Dutch colony. Although forced to recognize Indonesian independence in 1949,
the Dutch rejected the Indonesian claim to Dutch New Guinea, the homeland of the Papuans. Despite Indonesian and international pressure to decolonize New Guinea, the Dutch refused to relinquish control. The Papuans were vehemently opposed to inclusion in Indonesia, even with guarantees of autonomy. A Dutch plan for Papuan independence, prepared in 1959-60, was blocked by Indonesia’s Communist and Third World supporters in the UN General Assembly. In April 1961 the Dutch created a Papuan legislature and granted a degree of self-government (Minahan 2002: 2055). December 1, 1961, the West Papuans declared their independence (Minahan 2002: 2054). Despite Papuan resistance, Papua was eventually turned over to Indonesia in 1963. It appears that the movement was active throughout 1945-1963; however, we do not code colonial movements, and thus only code the Papuans as of 1963 and under the header of Indonesia. We found no separatist violence in 1945-1962 and thus note prior non-violent activity. In 1969 West Papua became a proper Indonesian territory as a result of the Act of Free Choice. The primary leading force of the Papuan independence movement is the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement), or OPM, a political and armed guerrilla group that was founded in 1965. The OPM was the result of a merger of two pre-existing factions, Aser Demotekay (founded in 1963) and Manokwari (founded in 1964, see Vermonte 2007: 284-285). 1963 is coded as NVIOLSD. 1964-75 is coded with LVIOLSD following Marshall & Gurr (2003) and MAR quinquennial rebellion scores above two in all these years (note though that UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict in four years only, 1965 and 1967-1969). The HVIOJSDL coding for 1976-78 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Sources differ on low-level activity in 1979-2006. First, Marshall & Gurr (2003) report LVIOLSD for 1979-1996 and 2000-2002. In contrast, Marshall & Gurr (2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) report LVIOLSD for 1979-2006, thus also for 1997-1999. MAR, on the other hand, would suggest a NVIOLSD in 1993-1994 and 1997-2006 (in these years the rebellion score does not exceed two). Finally, UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict in only two years, 1981 and 1984. To avoid a bogus de-escalation, we code all years (1979-2006) as LVIOLSD based on this, considering also figures from Project Ploughshares (they report significant violent activity in 1995-1996, “several deaths” in 1997, dozens of casualties in 1998, at least 11 in 1999, at least 100 in 2000, etc.). According to Hewitt et al. (2008), open hostilities ended in 2006. We found no reports of violence crossing the LVIOLSD threshold in subsequent years, thus 2007-2012 are coded with NVIOLSD.

Sources:


South Moluccans (Ambonese)

**Summary:** South Moluccan nationalism in the early twentieth century focused on the creation of a separate Christian state in union with the Netherlands. Vehemently opposed to Muslim rule, the South Moluccans joined the Dutch forces in fighting the Indonesian nationalists from 1946-49. After Indonesia’s independence in 1949, a secessionist war (HVIOLSD coding following Doyle & Sambanis 2006) erupted in 1950. We begin to code the movement in 1950 as the previous activity involved the Ambonese fighting with the Dutch against the Muslims and not for their own state. Note that while we code a war in the first year, the description in Minahan (2002: 99) suggests a sequence of events starting with nonviolent claims that quickly escalated to violence. “The Indonesian government, soon after independence, began to centralize the government over the objections of the people other than the central island of Java. In 1950 the Ambonese announced their intention to secede from Indonesia. The Indonesian government retaliated by dissolving the local administration and imposing direct rule from Djakarta. The Dutch-trained Ambonese army rebelled and drove the Indonesians from the southern islands.” Following defeat in the 1950 war, many South Moluccans left their ancient homeland to resettle in the Netherlands. All South Moluccan separatist activity after 1950 appears to have taken place in the Netherlands, but since this movement is seeking South Molucca's separation from Indonesia, we list the movement solely under Indonesia. Specifically, the movement resurfaced in 1975 (hence the start date of the second phase of the movement) and from 1975-77 South Moluccans staged several hijackings, occupations and arsons in the Netherlands. Five Dutch and six South Moluccans were killed in these confrontations, but since this violence does not qualify as LVIOLSD we classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD. News reports indicate that the South Moluccan self-determination movement has been active in the Netherlands up to 2012.

**Sources:**


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [March 22, 2002].


South Sulawesis

Summary: The South Sulawesis were engaged in a Darul-Islam inspired revolt from 1950 to 1965. The start date is pegged to 1950. Since then, there has been an ongoing movement for increased autonomy and even independence. We code 1953 and 1956-1960 as HVIOLSD following Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Since fighting associated with the Darul Islam movement took place in several regions, we could not find casualty data specific to South Sulawesi. However, it is likely that significant violence took place because the revolt was active throughout the entire 1950-1965 period. Thus we code 1950-1952, 1954-1955 and 1961-1965 as LVIOLSD. Note that evidence is difficult to get by on whether the South Sulawesi SDM was violent from the very start and for a lack of better sources we code the movement as violent from the start. Subsequent violence in South Sulawesi was largely intra-communal, land dispute-related, or gang violence and thus not considered self-determination violence. Based on this, we code 1966 onward as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Arabs (Arabistanis)

Summary: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 25) report that Iraq encouraged separatist Arab forces in Iran in the 1960s, but we found no corroborating evidence of organized activity in the 1960s. The Arab Political Cultural Organization (APCO) was formed in 1979, hence the start date of the movement. It requested some concessions in April 1979 and was given the green light to form a provincial council with limited autonomy. Unrest occurred afterwards due to the presence of Revolutionary Guards, especially in the Khuzestani city of Khorramshahr. The unrest continued and escalated when the Arabs started bombing oil refineries and pipelines on “Black Wednesday” June 14, 1979. On April 30, 1980, they seized the Iranian embassy in London demanding freedom for 91 Arabs imprisoned in Iran. The LVIOLSD coding for 1979-80 follows UCDP/PRIO’s classification of the conflict as a minor war. After 1980 we found no evidence of separatist activity until 1995 (MAR protest score for 1995-99 = 1). We therefore code a restart to the movement in 1995 and code the 1995-2004 period as NVIOLSD. Clashes took place in 2005, but the number of casualties are unclear: According to the government, there was 1 death. However, rebels say 30 had died while hospitals says between 15-20 fatalities occurred. We code based on the hospital’s numbers as that is likely to be the most objective. A bombing on March 2 killed 6, and another bombing in June killed 10. Altogether from this, we code 2005 as LVIOLSD. 2006 saw 12 deaths, and no casualties were found from 2007-2010. Thus, we code 2006-2010 as NVIOLSD. Violence during protests in April 2011 (6 year anniversary of 2005 protest) killed between 27-48 protesters and is thus coded LVIOLSD. No deaths were found in 2012, and thus it is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Azerbaijanis

Summary: The northern part of the Azeri territories was annexed by the Russian Empire in the early 19th century. Henceforth, the northern part belonged to Russia and (later) the Soviet Union, while the southern part remained under Persian rule (Minahan 2002: 1767). Both Russia and Iran suppressed the awakening Azeri nationalism (Minahan 2002: 1768). In 1909 Russia occupied southern Azeri territories in the context of a revolution in Persia, but the territory was quickly returned (Minahan 2002: 1768). In 1911 an Azeri nationalist organization was formed, Musavat, with supporters in both Russian and Iranian Azerbaijan (Minahan 2002: 1768). The northern Azeris became de-facto independent with the collapse of tsarist Russia in 1917. In 1918 Russian Azerbaijan declared independence, fueling nationalism in Southern Azerbaijan. In 1920 a nationalist leader declared a separatist government in Southern Azerbaijan, Azadistan. The separatist attempt was quickly suppressed. The de-facto independent entity in northern Azerbaijan also collapsed in 1920 and the northern part of Azeri Azerbaijan was made a Soviet republic (Minahan 2002: 1768-1769). Under the Soviets, Azeri nationalism was heavily suppressed. Minahan (2002: 1769) reports that separatist activity now concentrated in the southern, Iranian part, but we could not find corroborating evidence of continued separatist activity. Possibly this is due to the significant repression against ethnic minorities in the period of 1925-1941 under Reza Shah Pahlavi (Samii 2000: 129). According to Minahan (2002: 1769), Iranian Azerbaijan was split in two provinces in 1938 to dilute growing Southern Azeri nationalism. In 1941 Southern Azerbaijan was occupied by the Soviet Union (Minahan 2002: 1769). In September 1945 Southern Azeri nationalists formed the Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP). ADP declared the independence of Southern Azerbaijan after a bloodless local coup d’état. Since this is the first clear-cut evidence of organized separatist activity we found since the aftermath of the First World War, 1945 is coded as start date. In late 1946 Soviet troops withdrew, giving Iran the opportunity to take back Southern Azerbaijan. The self-declared government surrendered to Iranian troops in December 1946 (Shaffer 2002: 56; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 131), thus ending the secessionist movement. Although many separatists managed to flee to the Soviet Union, “the end of the Azeri movement was a bloody one” (Raine 2001: 29). There was strong cultural and physical repression of Southern Azeris thereafter (Shaffer 2002: 57; Raine 2001). Following UCDP/PRIO, 1946 is coded as LVIOLSD. 1945 is coded as NVIOLSD. According to Minahan (2002: 1769), Southern Azerbaijani nationalism re-emerged after the fall of the shah in 1979. “Southern Azeri opposition to the Islamic Revolution fueled nationalist rioting in Tabriz and other large cities. The Azeri spiritual leader Ayatollah Shariamadari was placed under house arrest in Tabriz after his followers clashed with Revolutionary Guards during nationalist rioting in the city” (Minahan 2002: 1770). Minorities at Risk also reports a short resurgence of nationalist activity in 1979. Soon the Islamic regime cracked down on the Azeri nationalists: “[i]n 1983 the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and the leftist Tudeh Party were officially dissolved by Iran’s Islamic government. In a massive crackdown hundreds of party members and suspected Southern Azeri nationalists, including many women, were imprisoned. Of the many Azeri language publications that emerged after 1979, by 1984 only one remained” (Minahan 2002: 1770). Yet Southern Azeri nationalism appears to have re-emerged soon after: “[t]he relaxation of Soviet rule in the late 1980s began a series of events that fueled the rapid growth of Southern Azeri nationalism. Azeri demonstrators on the Iranian border tore down the border posts and the frontier fence that divided the two halves of the Azeri homeland, while the Northern Azeri leaders called for independence for a “Greater Azerbaijan” […] In August 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed, and Northern Azerbaijan became independent as the Azerbaijan Republic. The event led to a rise of Southern Azeri nationalism and diffusion of national identity into the higher social strata. The national movement in the region continued to win support. Three major groups emerged. The first consisted of religious leaders, industrialists, and bureaucrats closely tied to the Iranian state; this group supported the unification of Northern Azerbaijan with Iran. The second group, led by intellectuals, supported the democratization of Iran and national-territorial autonomy for the Southern Azeris. The third group was represented by a growing number of political organizations and nationalist groups that supported the independence of South Azerbaijan” (Minahan 2002: 1770). According to Minahan (2002: 1771), four Southern Azeri political parties merged
under the Front for the Independence of South Azerbaijan in 1996. Minahan (2002: 1771) reports several deaths resulting from student demonstrations in Southern Azerbaijan in early 2000. In support of Minahan, Samii (2000: 134) reports that nationalists claim that 50 people were wounded in a 2000 nationalist rally, but also says that these reports have not been independently confirmed. In any case, the LVIOLSD threshold appears not met. Minahan (2002: 1771) reports that the fall of the Islamic government of Afghanistan in 2001 led to calls for autonomy for the Southern Azerbaijanis. Separatist activity continued. Minorities at Risk reports that “Azeri grievances primarily revolve around a desire for greater cultural freedoms, such as teaching and publishing in their own language (CULGR04-06= 1). While the dominant political grievance seems to be a wish for some decentralization of decision-making or limited autonomy, there are demands for independence or incorporation into Azerbaijan (POLGR04-06 = 4).” Azeri nationalist organizations are banned in Iran and their extent of activity in Iran is difficult to judge. However, there are several exile groups (see Minorities at Risk Project). In particular, in 1995 the Baku-based Southern Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement (SANAM) was formed, a nationalist organization represented at the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). Based on this, we code a second, ongoing phase of activity from 1979-2012. The evidence we have collected suggests that there may not have been separatist activity throughout this period, particularly not between 1983 and the end of the 1980s. However, it is not fully clear whether organized separatist activity had fully ceased and the interruption(s) is (are) shorter than ten years. Thus, based on the ten-years rule we do not code an interruption. We found no evidence of separatist violence crossing the LVIOLSD threshold in 1979-2012, thus the entire second phase is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Baluchis

Summary: Demands for Baluchi autonomy in Pakistan originated in the 1930s. In 1973 rebellion broke out in the Pakistani Baluchi province and soon spread to Iranian Baluchistan (Minahan 2002: 258). Since
this is the first clear evidence of organized separatist activity that we found in Iran, we peg the start date of the movement at 1973. The MAR quinquennial rebellion score is zero from 1970-1974 and only crosses the LVIOLSD threshold in 1975-1979. Yet Minahan (2002: 258) suggests a LVIOLSD code also for 1973 (when rebellion broke out according to Minahan) and 1974: “[a]t the movement’s height in 1974, around 55,000 Baluch were engaged in battle with between 80,000 and 100,000 Pakistani and Iranian troops. Pakistani and Iranian military cooperation finally crushed the rebellion in 1977, razing whole villages and leaving over 10,000 Baluch dead.” We do not code HVIOLSD since this conflict has not been coded by Doyle & Sambanis (2006) as a war in Iran. Note that it remains ambiguous, based on the evidence we found, whether violence erupted immediately in 1973 or only after some initial nonviolent activity. In the absence of clear evidence we code the movement as violent from the start. Although it appears that Iran has not allowed Baluchi political organizations to exist openly, news sources report separatist activity in the form of local uprisings and mass demonstrations from 1979 onward. Moreover, the MAR rebellion score remains above two until 1995. Based on this, 1973-1995 are coded with LVIOLSD. The LVIOLSD code in 1990-1995 is supported by Minahan’s (2002: 259) reports of “serious clashes in Iran in the 1990s” which “where blamed on drug traffickers or bandits, but Baluch nationalists continue to fight for self-rule.” In 1995, according to Minahan, “a group of 97 Baluch ‘bandits’, including many nationalists, surrendered to Iranian troops.” 1996-2005 are coded as NVIOLSD. Jundullah, a militant organization based in Balochistan, was formed in 2002. It is unclear whether Jundullah has separatist motives. The rebels claim they do not, but the government and media portray them as separatists. UCDP Battle Deaths v.5 lists at least 25 deaths per year from 2006-2010. Other attacks are attributed to Baluchi separatism, although not necessarily by Jundullah. In 2009, a suicide bombing killed 40, 12 policemen were killed in ambush, and another bombing kills 25 (Lexis Nexis). Based on this, we code LVIOLSD from 2006 until 2010 (using an “ambiguous” code since UCDP/PRIO considers this a conflict over government) and NVIOLSD from 2011 onward.

Sources:


**Gilakis**

*Summary:* Gilaki separatists rebelled in 1918, demanding autonomy, and declared their independence in 1920. The Persian state invaded the breakaway state and crushed the rebellion, thus putting an end to Gilaki separatist activity until 1975, when separatists made new appeals for regional autonomy. These appeals were met with a brutal crackdown by the Iranian secret police, which may explain why we find no further evidence of separatist activity. We therefore code this movement from 1975 to 1985, following our ten-year rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, we classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 3, 2002].


**Kurds**

*Summary:* The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was formed in 1945, hence the start date of the movement. It has maintained a constant policy of demanding democracy for Iran and autonomy for the Kurds. It has not demanded a separate state, perhaps because of the close historical and cultural ties between Iran and its Kurds. Most of its support comes from the urban middle class, intellectuals, merchants and government employees. In 1946, Kurdish rebels had declared the autonomous Republic of Mahabad. The republic lasted only for a year, when it was overthrown by Iranian troops (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 131). The HVIOLSD coding for 1979-84 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Sources differ on the Kurds’ involvement in low-level violence before 1979. UCDP/PRIOR, on the one hand, code armed conflict in 1946 and 1966-1968. Marshall & Gurr do not code armed conflict at all before 1979. At the other extreme is MAR: its quinquennial is above the LVIOLSD threshold of three throughout 1945-1978. Since there is conflictive information and to avoid a bogus de-escalation, we code LVIOLSD throughout 1946-1978 (we do not code violence in 1945 as the MAR score is quinquennial and UCDP/PRIOR states that the conflict began in 1946). The LVIOLSD code for 1985-1994 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003: 61), MAR rebellion scores above two and UCDP/PRIOR reports armed conflicts over Kurdistan in all years except 1989, 1991-1992 and 1994. We found no reports of violence in 1995, thus a NVIOLSD code. UCDP/PRIOR codes an armed conflict over Kurdistan in 1996, thus a LVIOLSD code in 1996. Since then up until 2004, the movement has been active and nonviolent, hence a NVIOLSD coding for 1997-2004. UCDP/PRIOR codes an armed conflict involving the PJAK, a Kurdish party described as having secessionist goals, from 2005-2009 and in 2011. This matches with Hewitt et al. (2008) who code armed conflict in 2005-2006 (the last year they cover) and partially with MAR (rebellion score is four in 2005 but only one in 2006). Thus these years are coded as LVIOLSD. UCDP/PRIOR codes the conflict as mainly over government, thus we apply an ambiguous code. 2010 and 2012 are coded as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*
Turkmen

Summary: The Turkmen minority makes up around 2% of the Iranian population. The Turkmen primarily live in the northeastern part of Iran along the border with Turkmenistan and in the region of Golestan with smaller settlements in Razavi Khorasan and North Khorasan (Fee and Soltani 2010). According to Samii (2000: 133), the Turkmen resent the fact that there are three Turkmen provinces rather than one; local observers believe that the main motive for the division of what used to be two provinces into three was the diffusion of nationalist sentiment. The Turkmen are Sunni Muslims and speak local dialects of Turkmeni. Only days after the victory the revolution in February 1979, the Turkmen rebelled against the new government and demanded “autonomy, official recognition of their language, and representation in local revolutionary councils dominated by Shi'i Muslims” (Minorities at Risk Project; also see Minahan 2002: 1931). As this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, 1979 is coded as start date. Based on the available evidence, our best estimate is that the movement was violent from the start. Autonomy was hailed until 1982 when the Turkmen lost the second war of Gonbad against Khomeini’s troops (Rashidvash 2013). Thus 1982 is coded as end date. The MAR 5-year rebellion score is four from 1975-1984, coinciding with the case study evidence on the 1979-1982 rebellion. Thus 1979-1982 are coded as LVIOLSD. According to Minorities at Risk, the Turkmen have been relatively unorganized in subsequent years, but “this appears to be changing.” According to MAR, several movements have emerged in recent years, including Turkmensahra Freedom Organization, the National Democratic Movement of Turkmenia (Turkmenlik) and Organization for Defense of the Rights of Turkmen People. Very little information on these organizations can be found, which has to do with Iran’s highly repressive system. However, there is some indication that these organizations made claims for a federal Iran. Specifically, all three signed a 2009 declaration for a federal Iran (UNPO 2009). At least one of them, the
Organization for Defense of the Rights of Turkmen People, appears to have signed another 2005 manifesto, also for a federal Iran (Congress of Iranian Nationalities for a Federal Iran). It is not fully clear when the three above-mentioned organizations were formed. Minorities at Risk appears to suggest that they were formed at some point between 2004-2006. We could not find a clearer indication, thus 2004 is coded as second start date. The movement is coded as ongoing. As we found no evidence of separatist violence in the second phase, we code the entire second phase as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Assyrians

**Summary:** Nationalists in the United States, insisting that only an independent Assyria would ensure the ultimate survival of their beleaguered nation, formed the Bet Nahrain Democratic Party in 1976, with the aim of creating an Assyrian state in their ancient homeland. We therefore peg the start of the movement at 1976. The International Confederation of the Assyrian Nation, founded in 1977, organized a provisional Assyrian government. In 2005, the Assyrians formed the Assyrian General Conference, which aims to establish an Assyrian region in Iraq. The AGC continues to operate. Since most Assyrians live in Iraq and Syria, the countries that encompass the state of Assyria, we list the Assyrian self-determination movement under both Iraq and Syria. Although Assyrians in Iraq have participated in Kurdish uprisings, we found no evidence that they have engaged in secessionist violence, hence the NVIOLSD coding for the entire movement. The Assyrians have, however, been the victims of one-sided violence: in 1988, over 2,000 Assyrians died when the Iraqi military, also shelling Kurdish villages, bombarded 5 Assyrian villages with chemical weapons.

**Sources:**


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 3, 2002].


Kurds

**Summary:** The Democratic Party of Kurdistan, the major Kurdish movement in Iraq, was formed in 1946, hence the start date of the self-determination movement. The MAR 5-year rebellion score is 4 in 1945-1949. MAR’s coding notes give no clearer indication as of when violence erupted, thus we code LVIOLSD throughout 1946-1949. In support of this, Nagel (1978) also suggests that the movement was violent from the start (Nagel also suggests that the movement had antecedents in a revolt against Iraq by the Kurdish Barzani tribe (p. 21), so the movement’s start data could also be coded in 1945). No evidence of separatist violence in 1950-1960 allow us to code 1950-1960 as NVIOLSD. Doyle & Sambanis (2006) code a civil war over Kurdistan in 1961-70 and 1974-75. Thus these years are coded with HVIOLSD. UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict in 1973 too, thus a LVIOLSD code. 1971-1972 is coded as NVIOLSD. The only source that would indicate separatist violence is the 5-year MAR rebellion score and the other sources give more exact information on armed conflict incidents. The 1976-1984 LVIOLSD code follows UCDP/PRIO. The conflict again reaches the HVIOLSD threshold in 1985-96 based on Doyle & Sambanis (2006). 1997-2000 is again coded as LVIOLSD following a MAR rebellion score of 4. 2001-2002 are coded as NVIOLSD. 2003 is again coded as LVIOLSD based on a MAR rebellion score of six. Iraqi Kurds were involved in violence after 2003, but not of the separatist sort. EPR considers the Kurds involved in the armed conflict between Ansar-al-Islam (an Islamist organization) and the Iraqi government from 2004-2007 and in 2011. However, the 2003-2007 and 2011 episodes relate to
ideology/the central government, thus we do not code separatist violence. 2004 onward is coded with NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Shiites

Summary: There was a strong separatist movement in Basra at the beginning of the 1920s, when a group of wealthy notables demanded Basran independence in a 1921 petition to British authorities. The movement, however, had a non-sectarian basis with its leaders also being Sunnis, Christians and Jews (Visser 2007). There is no evidence of separatist activity from southern Iraqis or Shiites in particular for the rest of the twentieth century. However, separatist sentiment reemerged after the US-led invasion in
2003, when Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and the hard-core electorate of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI) brought the separation of the Shiite-majority provinces or the establishment of a single Shiite federal entity back on the agenda. While the ISCI was formed in 1982, the separatist claim emerged only after the 2003 U.S. invasion. According to a report by the ICRC the claim first appeared in the summer of 2005. In line with this, Minorities at Risk indicates an active separatist movement in its 2004-2006 version but not in previous versions. Other sources also provide evidence for an onset in 2005 (Iraq and Gulf Analysis 2011; Visser 2007, 2011; Hewitt et al. 2008). Thus 2005 is coded as the start date. The separatist idea has not been very prominent since but has seen a revival following the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 according to Viser (2014): “[…] following the rise to prominence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, Iraqi Shiite discourse on the Iraq state appears to have changed quite dramatically – in the direction of separatist solutions. It is true that some of the talk of a separate Shiite entity, often referred to as the “Sumer” project in a reference to one of the ancient civilizations of Iraq, may have gained extra prominence because of the proliferation of social media, meaning that a wider array of Iraqi Shiite voices are accessible to outside analysts than at any point in history. However, it is noteworthy that also more established political parties among the Iraqi Shiites appear to be warming up to ideas that were considered a taboo just a few years ago. A case in point is the State of Law alliance of former PM Nuri al-Maliki and current PM Haydar al-Abadi. In a first, during Ramadan, a key website supportive of Maliki accorded much prominence to an article that openly hinted at the possible secession of the Shiite areas from the rest of Iraq. Also, changes in the regional environment contribute to a greater push towards separatist solutions. Iran, in particular, has altered its approach to Iraq in a dramatic way since the emergence of ISIS. In unprecedented ways, it is openly acknowledging and even propagandizing its military support for the Iraqi government through the presence of Iranian advisors among Iraqi military forces deployed on the frontlines against ISIS. The confirmation by the Iraq parliament of an interior minister with a background in the Iran-sponsored Badr brigades arguably gives Tehran more direct influence in Iraq’s security forces than they had under Maliki.” Hence the movement is coded as ongoing in 2012. The Shiites’ MAR rebellion score is 6 in 2005 and 2006, but we could not find an indication that this violence was over separatism. Hewitt et al. (2008) also indicate that the movement was non-violent. Hence the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Turkmen

Summary: Turks are the third largest ethnic group in Iraq. Minahan (2002: 1931) notes separatist sentiment among Turks in Iraq at least since the late 1970s. However, the earliest evidence for organized
separatist activity we found is the foundation of the Iraqi National Turkmen Party (INTP) in 1988. The founder of the party represents the Iraqi Turkmens at the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). Thus, we peg the start date to 1988. In 1995, the Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF) was founded, a Turkic organization representing the interests of Turkmen in Iraq and advocating territorial autonomy, if not independence, for Turks. There is evidence of continued separatist activity, in particular after the fall of Saddam Hussein. We code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. News archives indicate that there has been violence associated with the ITF, but casualties do not reach LVIOLSD levels. Further, it seems that a significant portion of the violence stems from Arab and Kurdish attacks on the Turkmen civilian population, and thus does not count as SD violence. Based on this, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**Palestinians**

*Summary:* The Arab League formed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1963 (1964 according to Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 225). While there was Palestinian resistance to Israel prior to 1963, we code the start date of the movement in 1963 because that is the first clear evidence of organized separatist activity that we found. The HVIOLSD coding for 1987-97 and 2000-2009 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The LVIOLSD coding for 1965-1986 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005), Hewitt et al. (2008) and UCDP/PRIO. 1998-1999 are coded as NVIOLSD as no source reports violence above the low-level threshold. The LVIOLSD code in 2010-2012 follows UCDP/PRIO.

*Sources:*


ITALY

**Emilians**

*Summary:* Emilia and Romagna Freedom (Libertà Emilia e Rumagna, LER) was founded in 1999 as the successor to Emilian Freedom/Emilia Nation (Libertà Emiliana/Nazione Emilia), itself dating from a 1994 breakaway by an Emilian faction of the Northern League opposed to the latter's participation in the Freedom Alliance. A center-left liberal political party, the LER seeks self-government for Emilia-Romagna within a European Union of historic regions. The Emilian movement continues under the Lega Nord, which remains an active organization (see the “Lombards” entry). In light of this case history we peg the start date of the movement at 1994 and as we found no reports of separatist violence, we classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [July 2, 2003].

**Friuli**

*Summary:* The Moviment Friül (Friul Movement) was formed in 1966 as a pressure group to win real political autonomy for Friuli, hence the start date of the movement. Since then various Friuli political parties have been active seeking greater regional political autonomy, recognition as a separate European people, and even independence. Since 1990, the Lega Nord Friuli-Venezia Giulia has been the dominant representative of the movement (see the “Lombards” entry). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

*Sources:*
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 3, 2002].
**Ladins**

*Summary:* After World War II, the Ladins attempted to win Allied support for the creation of an independent state modeled on Liechtenstein and under the protection of the UN. Specifically, since 1945 various Ladin political organizations have sought regional autonomy, even independence, for the Ladin area in northern Italy. 1945 is coded as the start date. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

*Sources:*
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 3, 2002].

**Ligurians**

*Summary:* The Ligurian regionalist movement, evolving from the partisan groups that fought the German occupation, began to agitate for regional autonomy in 1945, which is thus coded as the start date. Calls for autonomy or even independence have been raised ever since and continue up to today. Since 1989, the movement’s main representative has been the Lega Nord Liguria, which joined the Lega Nord in 1991 (see the “Lombards” entry). The movement has not been violent, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

*Sources:*

**Lombards**

*Summary:* The Lombard League, which continues to be active in Italian regional and national politics, was formed in 1982, hence the start date of the movement. Since then, the Lombard League has merged with other regions to form the Lega Nord, a regional autonomist organization aimed at a federalist Italy with the Northern region “Padania” as an autonomous region. Lega Nord merges autonomist movements from Alto Adige-Sudtrol, Emilia, Friuli, Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte, Romagna, Toscana, Trentino, Valle d’Aosta, and Veneto. The Lega Nord is also represented in Marche and Umbria, but in these two regions the autonomy claims are too limited to warrant inclusion in our data set. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

*Sources:*
**Piedmontese**

Summary: The main Piedmont self-determination movement, Piemont Autonomista, was founded in 1977, hence the start date of the movement. Since then, it has merged with other regions to form the Lega Nord, a regional autonomist organization aimed at a federalist Italy with the Northern region “Padania” as an autonomous region (see the “Lombards” entry). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 6, 2002].


**Romanians**

Summary: The Romagna Autonomy Movement (Movimento per l'Autonomia della Romagna, MAR) was founded in 1991 to advocate self-government for the Romagna region of central Italy. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1991. The MAR has found support for its cause in the Lega Nord and its regional subsidiary, the Lega Nord Romagna, a regional autonomist organization aimed at a federalist Italy with the Northern regions “Padania” as an autonomous region (see the “Lombards” entry). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 6, 2002].

**Sardinians**

*Summary:* In 1919 Giovane Sardegna (Young Sardinia) was formed and after World War II it transformed into the Sardinian Action Party (Partito Sardo d’Azione), Sardinia’s main self-determination organization. Based on this we code 1919 as the start date. However, we only code the movement from 1945 because we do not include the pre-1945 years. Prior activity was non-violent. Beyond outright separatism, the Sardinian Action Party also calls for more political autonomy for the island vis-à-vis the central government. Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 265) claim that nationalist agitation was absent up until the late 1960s, but their report is contradictory as they describe the Sardinian Action Party was federalist in the post-WWII period. The Sardinian Action Party remains active in politics as of 2012, and thus the movement is ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 28, 2002].


Minorities at Risk Project (2009), College Park, MD: University of Maryland.


**Sicilians**

*Summary:* With the devastation of World War II behind it, Sicilians reviewed their modern link with the Italian mainland, with thousands deciding the union had been a disaster. A separatist movement gained hold, demanding complete independence for the island. In 1945 Sicilian separatists pleaded for independence before the United Nations, hence the start date of the movement. In 1946, bowing to pressure, the government in Rome agreed to give Sicily limited independence. Since then Sicilian political parties, such as Due Sicilie (Two Sicilies) and Partito d’Azione Siciliano (Sicilian Action Party) have consistently worked through the conventional political process to gain greater autonomy for the island. Specifically, the Sicilian Action Party is seeking the full implementation of Sicily’s regional statute while the Two Sicilies party is seeking autonomy for the area once covered by the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the creation of a “new Europe” based on historic regions. In recent decades, new autonomist parties have joined the separatist movement, such as the Alleanza Siciliana (Sicilian Alliance), which remains active today. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*

South Italians

Summary: The Mezzogiorno, or Ausonia as it is referred to by southern nationalists, comprises the southern part of the Italian Peninsula and the territory that was part of the former kingdoms of Naples and Sicily (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies). Southern regionalism developed already in the 1970s and 1980s as a consequence of industrialization in the north that further divided the country and as a result of deterioration of political institutions and resentment of northern nationalists (Minahan 2002: 1351). Organized separatist agitation, however, only emerged in the 1990s with the formation of several small autonomist parties such as the Lega Sud Ausonia (Southern League), founded in 1996 (Lega Sud Ausonia 2013) or the Movement for Autonomy (Movimento per le Autonomie MpA), which was founded in 2005 and advocates greater autonomy primarily for Sicily but also for the other southern regions (Movimento per le Autonomie MpA 2015). The MpA, allied with the Lega Nord, won 1.1% of the votes in the 2008 general election. The year the Lega Sud Ausonia was founded, 1996, is coded as the start date. Note: already in 1992, another Southern Italian organization, the Southern Action League (Lega d'Azione Meridionale), was formed. However, the Southern Action League’s activities appear concentrated in a single city, Taranto. More importantly, the League’s primary goal was opposition against the north’s secessionist aspirations (Sorens 2008: 348) rather than autonomy, thus 1996 rather than 1992 is coded as the start date. The movement is ongoing: both above-mentioned autonomist parties continue to be active in Italian politics. No separatist violence has been found, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 28, 2002].


South Tyroleans

Summary: The South Tyrol People's Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei, SVP), the Christian democratic party of the German-speaking population of Bolzano/Bozen province (Alto Adige), was founded in 1945, hence the start date of the movement. As of 2012, the Sudtiroler Volkspartei maintains immediate goals that include minority rights, cultural rights, and economic autonomy. In the long term, the party also aims for South Tyrol’s autonomy; specifically, it champions a federal Europe in which South Tyrol would be an autonomous region. From 1948 onwards it has consistently held three seats in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and from 1979 one directly elective seat in the European Parliament. The party’s struggle for equal rights for the German-speaking and Ladin-speaking population of South Tyrol led to Austro-Italian agreements on the status of the province in 1969-71 and a new statute for the Trentino-Alto Adige region in 1971. The SVP became the strongest party in the South Tyrol Landtag and the second strongest in the regional council of Trentino-Alto Adige, winning 22 seats out of 70 in November 1983. Normally securing representation in the Rome parliament thereafter, the SVP again won one seat in the June 1994 European Parliament elections. For the April 1996 general elections the SVP was part of the victorious center-left Olive Tree Movement. There are other, more radical secessionist parties in addition to the SVP. The first secessionist group is the Befreiungsausschuss Sudtirol (BAS), which was formed in 1956 as a terrorist group aimed at secession from Italy. BAS was mainly active throughout the 1960s, but its activities continued until the late 1980s. Die Freiheitlichen was founded in 1992 as a breakaway group from the SVP and aims for a sovereign state. The Lega Nord Alto-Adige/Südtirol also represents the claim for more self-determination (see the “Lombards” entry), but in South Tyrol the Lega Nord has remained never had more electoral support than the SVP. Südtiroler Freiheit (STF) was founded in 2007 and aims to secede from Italy and reunite with Austria. The South Tyroleans were originally united with the Trentino region of Italy after 1948. BAS was instrumental in fighting against this, while the SVP also demanded a separate autonomous state for South Tyrol. The region was granted its own autonomous district in 1972, which also gave lawful protection to South Tyrolean language (German) and culture as well as greater control over taxes. This grant of greater autonomy pacified South Tyrolean citizens and reduced separatist sentiments. Separatism has been revived due to Italy’s economic recession, which threatens to decrease South Tyrol’s autonomy over taxation. Since 2008, separatist parties have received greater support. Sudtiroler Volkspartei and other separatist organizations continue to operate, and thus the movement is considered to be ongoing. There has been violence, particularly in the 1960s. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 40) report that over the years 32 Italian policemen were killed in the 1960s. Yet, the annual casualty numbers are below the LVIOLSD threshold. In the 1980s there was another bombing campaign, but we found no evidence of casualties. The movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com] [April 28, 2002].


Südtiroler Volkspartei – SVP. http://www.svp.eu/de/ [December 12, 2013].

Trentini

*Summary*: Trentino (today) is an autonomous region in Italy that together with South Tyrol makes up the Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol region. The Associazione Studi Autonomistici Regionali (ASAR) was founded in 1945. The student association “demanded total regional autonomy for the territory from Trentino to the Brenner” (Anderson 2013: 118). Note: this would also have included some territories that then had belonged to Austria (namely they demanded autonomy for the whole area that had been Austrian until 1919). Based on this, 1945 is coded as start date. In 1948 the ASAR dissolved to form the Partito del Popolo Trentino Tirolese (PPTT). The PPTT came second in the 1948 Regional Council elections and has established itself as the second most important party in the Trentino. The PPTT advocated increased autonomy for Trentino (Panizza 2008). PPTT split in 1982 and reunited again in 1988 as the Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese (PATT), which has also advocated increased autonomy. Other autonomist parties are the Union for Trentino, Loyal to Trentino (Leali al Trentino) and the Lega Nord Trentino (see the “Lombards” entry). Apart from the 2008 provincial elections, the PATT had always become the second strongest regionalist party. With PATT, Union for Trentino, Loyal to Trentino (Leali al Trentino) and the Lega Nord Trentino active as of 2012 we code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


Triestines

*Summary*: Trieste was claimed by both Italy and Yugoslavia after the Second World War. In 1947 Trieste was designated an independent Free Territory under UN protection and was named the Free Territory of Trieste. It was divided into two zones: Zone A (including Trieste) and Zone B (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 299). Minahan (1996: 584) reports a Triestine declaration of independence in 1947. He probably refers to the peace treaty that was signed with Italy on February 10 of that year that led to the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste. Minahan (2002) does not report this as a declaration of independence, and we found no evidence of a separatist movement. In any case, we would not code this because Trieste at the time had not been part of either Italy or Yugoslavia, but occupied by the allies. In 1954, Zone A was de facto incorporated into Italy and Zone B into Yugoslavia, following the London Memorandum of
Understanding (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 299). The 1975 Osimo Treaty formalized the de-facto border changes made in 1954. The Osimo Treaty prompted the emergence of a Triestine self-determination movement. The relevant organization, Per Trieste (For Trieste) was formed in 1975, thus the start date. Per Trieste is an autonomist group that advocates a special status for Trieste within the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia. The Lega Nord Trieste, founded in 1990, has also made claims for increased autonomy (see the “Lombards” entry). The movement remains ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:

Tuscans

Summary: The Committee for Tuscany (Comitato per la Toscana) was founded by Thomas Fragassi in September 1985. The Committee appears not to have had separatist goals. Two years later, in 1987, the Committee for Tuscany with a group of sympathizers founded the Movement for Tuscany (Movimento per la Toscana, MpT). We found somewhat inconclusive evidence as to whether the MpT made self-determination claims. According to Tambini (2001: n.d.), the MpT “had little to do with real politics” and was a “cultural, debating and historical society rather than a protest movement”. In contrast, the MpT is described as regionalist and autonomist by the Lega Nord Toscana. In any case, after a few years, the MpT joined the (unambiguously) separatist Lega Nord. The party was renamed Tuscan Alliance (Alleanza Toscana, AT) in 1988 and participated in the 1989 European Parliament Elections as part of the election coalition Lega Lombarda-Alleanza Nord. In 1991, the AT integrated into the (unambiguously) separatist Lega Nord, a regional autonomist organization aimed at a federalist Italy with the Northern region “Padania” as an autonomous region (see the “Lombards” entry), and has since formed its regional section as the Lega Nord Toscana. Based on this, we code the start date in 1987, the year the MpT had been formed, and code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:
**Valdaostans**

*Summary:* The Valdostan Union (Union Valdôtaine/Unione Valdostana, UV) was founded in 1945 to further the interests of the French-speaking minority in Val d’Aosta. The UV demanded secession from Italy and reunification with French Savoy in an independent Etat Montagne. Hence, 1945 is coded as start date. Although secessionist sentiment among the Valdaostans died down after the Italian government separated Val D’Aosta from Piedmont and granted some political autonomy to the region in 1948, the movement is coded as ongoing since the UV has since demanded increased autonomy. Another party, the Movimento Autonomista Valdostano has also made claims for increased autonomy. Both have been active players in Val d’Aosta’s politics throughout this period. Specifically, the UV has been represented in the regional assembly from 1959, winning 17 of 35 seats (40.1% of vote) in the May 1998 elections and it has usually also been represented in the national parliament, retaining one Chamber and one Senate seat in 1999. The UV continues to operate as of 2012, and thus the movement is ongoing. Another ongoing organization representing the Valdaostan claim is the Lega Nord Valle d’Aosta (see the “Lombards” entry), though this party never gained more electoral support than the UV. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 6, 2002].


**Venetians**

*Summary:* The Liga Veneta (Venetian League) was founded in 1979 with the aim of restoring of the historic Republic of Venice (which fell in 1797) within a region-based European Union. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1979. Since then, it has merged with other regions to form the Lega Nord, a regional autonomist organization aimed at a federalist Italy with the Northern regions “Padania” as an autonomous region (see the “Lombards” entry). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 6, 2002].


JAPAN

Ainu

Summary: The Hokkaido Ainu Association was formed in 1930 by the Ainu people and aimed to “organize the social action to cause the social change for respecting the human dignity of the Ainu people and improving their social condition by changing the social policy toward the Ainu people.” These include land rights, as the Ainu people oppose the construction of a new water reservoir on their land. In 1984 separatists demanded a new statue to replace the racist aboriginal law of 1899, under which the Ainu are still governed by Japan. Since this appears to be the first report of post-1945 separatist action by the Ainu, the start date is pegged at 1984. News reports indicate that Ainu separatists have been consistently active since 1984, at least up to 2002. Since then, the Ainu Association of Hokkaido continues to organize on behalf of the Ainu. However, besides for “[a]ctivities for the preservation, transmission and development of our ethnic culture,” it is not clear that the Association was necessarily fighting for self-determination. Thus, we code the movement as terminated in 2012 based on the ten-years rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Okinawans

Summary: The island of Okinawa was occupied by the United States after the Second World War. The Ryukyu independence movement emerged in 1945 in opposition to allied occupation and advocated an independent state or unification with the mainland. In November 1969 President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato signed an agreement to return Okinawa to Japan as the Okinawa Prefecture in 1972 (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Howell 1996). Based on this, we code the start date in 1945. However, the movement is only coded from 1972, the year Okinawa was transferred back to Japan. Prior activity was non-violent. U.S. military presence has remained ever since and fuelled continued demands for an independent state as “the only real way to free ourselves from the American bases” (New York Times 2013). The movement is ongoing, as evidenced by recent newspaper reports (e.g. The Guardian 2014). We found no separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


KAZAKHSTAN

Cossacks

Summary: There are three Cossack communities in Kazakhstan: the Ural Cossacks in the north-western region, the Siberina Cossacks in the north-central region, and the Semirech’e Cossacks in the south-east (Batta 2013: 197). The Cossacks have long been considered (including by most Cossacks themselves) members of a military caste, the ‘fist’ of the Tsar. Under the Tsar, the Cossacks maintained three distinctive characteristics: i) tax-free land ownership, ii) their own local self-government, and iii) mandatory military service for all male Cossacks (Skinner 1994: 1017). The Cossacks are divided into thirteen ‘hosts’, that is, regional branches of Cossacks. After the October Revolution, the Semirech’e Cossacks sided with the Whites, and the Ural region became a White stronghold. After the Red Army had defeated the Whites in 1920, the Cossacks suffered from harsh repression. Determined to end the Cossack threat to their regime, the Soviets ended all traditional Cossack privileges, banned the use of the Cossack language, and outlawed references to Cossack culture or history. The Cossacks were not recognized as an ethnic group, and reclassified as ethnic Russians. Contrary to many other groups, the Cossacks were not awarded with an ethnic homeland. Some Cossacks fought on the German side in the Second World War. After the war, they were forcibly repatriated and sent to the gulags, with most subsequently suffering death. The Cossacks remained a repressed group until Gorbachev’s perestroika (Skinner 1994: 1018). The liberalization initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s triggered a Cossack revival, with increasing numbers self-identifying as Cossacks. From the 1990s, Cossack organisations were established throughout Russia (and adjacent areas, like Kazakhstan). The first national Cossack organization, the Union of Cossacks, was organized in 1990 (Skinner 1994: 1018). Initially, the Cossack national movement was focused on the recognition as a separate people, the reinstatement of Cossack military duties, and a cultural revitalization. But with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Cossacks in Kazakhstan began to make public claims for reunification with Russia and/or autonomy (Batta 2013: 196; Minahan 2002: 1968; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 74). We peg the start date at 1991, the year Kazakhstan attained independence. In 1992 a Cossack community in eastern Kazakhstan demanded autonomy (MAR). Similarly to the Russian movement, self-determination activity appears to have soon died down. Mobilization for self-determination appears to have faded after 1995, when a Cossack Ataman (leader) who had openly advocated annexation of northern Kazakhstan by Russia, Nikolai Gun’kin, was arrested (MAR). Later Gun’kin emigrated to Russia. Essentially all Cossack groups subsequently moved towards reconciliation with Nazarbaev. We found no evidence of self-determination activity after 1995 (even though the Cossacks continued to have separatist sentiment according to Minahan (2002: 1969)). Thus, 1995 is coded as end date. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:


Республика Казахстан – МСРС.”
[December 12, 2013].


**Russians**

*Summary:* As a newly independent state in 1991-92, Kazakhstan embarked on “Kazakhization”, including the promotion of ethnic Kazakhs in the government bureaucracy and promotion of Kazakh language education. Kazakhstan also passed several language laws, including naming Kazakh the national language with Russian relegated to a secondary status as a working language. Ethnic Kazakhs argue that such programs are necessary to rectify the legacies of 200 years of discrimination and forced Russification. However, many Russians fear that the language law is just the first step in a strategy to destroy Russian identity and culture in Kazakhstan. Additionally, ethnic Russian leaders point out that ethnic Russians comprise only 5% of government employees, despite comprising over a third of the country’s population. As a result of such measures, there is a strong out-migration of Russians. The first evidence of organized self-determination activity is in 1992, when “[s]ome 15,000 residents of Ust-Kamenogorsk rally to demand the adoption of Russian as an official language, dual citizenship, and greater autonomy for East Kazakhstan” (Olcott 1997: 567). Also Batta (2013: 193) pegs the beginning of Russian separatism in 1992. In 1994, a 12,000-strong rally organized by the Society of Slavonic culture appealed to the government to give national autonomy to ethnic Russians. They also demanded dual citizenship and material and moral compensation to all those who were forced to leave Kazakhstan since the proclamation of its independence. In 1994 Lad, at the time the main Russian organization, went a step further and supported annexation of northern Kazakhstan by Russia (Batta 2013: 195). Russian agitation for autonomy (or even incorporation into Russia) ceased after the mid-1990s. The only post-mid-1990s event we found is in 1999, when the Kazakh authorities arrested Viktor Kazimirchuk for leading a Russian separatist group, Rus, that allegedly planned to seize the administration of the city of Oskemen (formerly Ust-Kamenogorsk) and adjoin it to Russia. Notably, Kazimirchuk resided in Moscow and not in Kazakhstan (Peerson 2014). After that we found no evidence for organized activity towards self-determination. MAR codes non-zero protest scores up until 2006, but from the description it appears that protest focused on the language issue. MAR argues that separatist sentiment continued, but we found no evidence for organized activity. Thus, 1999 is coded as end date. We found no evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


KENYA

Maasai

Summary: According to Minahan (2002: 1125), the Maasai nationalist movement emerged in the 1950s during the Mau Mau uprising (1952-1956), but he does not give evidence of organized activity. Hughes (2006: 6) suggests a yet earlier start date. According to Hughes, the first Maasai political organization was formed in 1930, the Masai Association, which presented Maasai land claims before the 1932 Kenya Land Commission (KLC). It is not clear whether this phase of activity carried over to the 1950s/1960s, but it appears it did not. Hughes notes that in 1945 another Masai organization was formed, the Group of Educated Masai (OLO), but it is not clear whether this group had separatist aims. Then, in 1960, Maasai nationalists formed the Maasai United Front (MUF). The MUF propagated ideas of an independent Maasai state (Minahan 2002: 1125; Hughes 2006: 6). According to Minahan (2002: 1125) land disputes increased in the 1960s and 1970s, including formal appeals to the government in the 1980s (Minahan 2002: 1125). Based on this, we code the start date in 1960. We code the Masai in Kenya as of 1963, the year of Kenya’s independence. We found no separatist violence in 1960-1962, and thus note prior nonviolent activity. Since President Moi came into power in 1978, the Maasai have become less marginalized. However, even then, they continue to fight for the return of ancestral lands that are under Kikuyu control. Territorial issues resulted in large-scale inter-ethnic fighting in the Rift Valley in the 1990s, as well as pre/post-election fighting in the late 2000s. The Maasai have submitted demands to the Kenyan government over the return of indigenous lands originally leased to British settlers, but the government does not recognize leases with the British. Besides demanding the return on land from the Kenyan government and the eviction of white farmers, the Maasai have also demanded compensation from the United Kingdom. This has resulted in demonstrations, some of which led to the forceful dispersal of protesters in the early 2000s. The Maasai are represented by several groups such as: the Organization for the Survival of IL-Laikipia Indigenous Maasai Group Initiatives (OSILIGI), Maasai Cultural, Wildlife and Ethical Tourism Society, and Maasai Mara Women’s Group Pastoralist Indigenous NGO. News article suggest that these forceful dispersals did not result in at least 25 deaths per year. Protests have continued into 2013. Deaths have resulted from inter-ethnic fighting, but this is not considered violent conflict with the government. Based on this, the movement is coded as NVIOLSD. As Maasai nationalism and land disputes have remained active since the early 1900s, the movement is coded as ongoing.

Sources:


### Mombasa

**Summary:** Based on Kenya’s Indian Coast, the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) was formed in 1999 as a result of indigenous land rights issues; the MRC advocates the independence of coastal provinces from Kenya. Thus, we peg the start date to 1999. The MRC was declared illegal by the Kenyan government in 2010, but the MRC appealed against this decision. Thus we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. No violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

**Sources:**


### Somalis

**Summary:** According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 275), the Somalis of Kenya’s Northern Frontier District began to make calls for attachment to Somalia when talks on Kenyan independence began in 1961. In 1963, shortly before Kenya’s independence, the Somalis voted in a referendum to secede from Kenya. We code the movement from 1963, the year of Kenya’s independence. The start date we peg to 1961. We found no separatist violence before Kenya’s independence and thus indicate prior non-violent activity. The results of the referendum were ignored by the incoming government, which led to a four-year secessionist war. The HVIOLSD coding for 1963-67 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). We could not find further evidence of separatist activity, which implies that the movement was defeated in 1967. Thus we code the end of the war (1967) as the end of movement activity. Note: Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 275) report a resurgence of the Somali insurgency in the early 1980s to which police responded by massive sweeps of the region in which “scores of ethnic Somalis were killed.” We found no corroborating evidence on this potential second phase of activity. MAR does neither note armed conflict nor separatist activity in the 1980s. UCDP/PRIO does not note an armed conflict involving the Somalis in the 1980s either. Thus, we do not code a second phase of activity.
Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 6, 2002].


Banabans

Summary: Banaban separatism began in the 1960s and 1970s when Kiribati was still fighting for independence (Hermann 2004: 198). We found no exact start date; thus, we code 1960 as the start date of the movement. Kiribati became independent in 1979; accordingly, in the data set we only code the movement from 1979 and indicate prior, non-violent activity. Just prior to Kiribati independence, the Banabans formally submitted a petition to the United Nations to denounce British occupation. Pomerance notes that, “when, in July 1979, the Gilbert Islands received their independence as the new State of Kiribati, the independence ceremonies were boycotted by the Banabans of Ocean Island” (Pomerance 1982: 86). When Kiribati attained independence, the Banaban fought for independence for another 4 years before accepting a financial settlement. The settlement also brought along some measure of autonomy as the Banabans were given dual citizenship in both Fiji and Kiribati. Hence, we begin to code the Banabans in 1979, the year of Kiribati’s independence, but note prior non-violent activity. The 1983 settlement appears to have ended the movement. Thus, we code 1983 as the end of the movement. No violence was found so we code this as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Note: Kiribati’s population is less than 500,000. Movements in countries with a population of less than 500,000 are not included in the random draw.
KOSOVO

Serbs

Summary: Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Serbs in the North of Kosovo have protested against Kosovar independence from Serbia. Kosovar Serbs set up a rival assembly in Mitrovica, in the Serb-dominated North of the country. We peg the start date to 2008. The movement is ongoing. There has been a lot of tension between Kosovo and Serbia over two security checkpoints in Northern Kosovo. Tensions arose in 2011, when Northern Kosovar Serbs announced that they would hold a referendum about whether they would accept Pristina institutions (a move not supported by Belgrade). The referendum was held in 2012 (February) with overwhelming votes against Kosovo. There has been sporadic violence. In 2008, Serbs protested against Kosovo’s independence and attacked Kosovo border posts and other governmental and international institutions (Bilefsky 2008). Violence erupted again in 2011, when Serbs blocked two Kosovo border posts and barricaded the bridge connecting north and south Mitrovica (Spiegel 2011). Based on reports in the CrisisWatch Database, violence has not reached LVIOLS levels. We code the movement as ongoing in 2012 and NVIOLS.

Sources:
KYRGYZSTAN

Kyrgyz Uzbeks

Summary: The Uzbek movement in Kyrgyzstan emerged when Kyrgyzstan was still part of the USSR (see Kyrgyz Uzbeks under Russia). In 1989, Kyrgyz Uzbeks demanded local autonomy from Moscow and some pressed for annexation of the Uzbek populated area in Kyrgyzstan by neighboring Uzbekistan. Such demands were raised, in particular, in the context of the Osh riots in 1990. The movement appears to have faded soon after. Minorities at Risk notes that demands for union with Uzbekistan or territorial autonomy have not been heard recently, and that demands have shifted to civil rights and greater Uzbek representation in the government. Writing in 2007, Fumagalli notes that Uzbeks are wary of any move that might be interpreted from part of the Kyrgyz elites as separatist or autonomist, and that even radical representatives of the Uzbek ethnic movement have gradually moderated their demands. Furthermore, Fumagalli (2007: 583) reports that in interviews conducted in 2003 and 2005, the number of Uzbeks advocating autonomy is practically zero. However, note that part of the Kyrgyz elite continues to accuse the Uzbeks of separatist agitation. In particular, the mayor of Osh explained the riots in Osh in 2010 as a reaction to a secessionist coup attempt by ethnic Uzbeks. According to the International Crisis Group (2012: 7), this assertion should be dismissed, since the Uzbeks are no longer demanding autonomy. Since we lack a clear date when the self-determination claim was abandoned, we continue to code the movement in independent Kyrgyzstan (noting non-violent prior activity), and peg the end of the movement to 2000, following the 10-year rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


LAOS

Hmong

Summary: The Hmong called for the establishment of an independent state in a rebellion in 1919. The insurrection ended in 1921 with the establishment of an autonomous district by the French and by the early 1920s “mutual trust had developed, and the Hmongs became mostly pro-French” (Minahan 2002: 741). We found no self-determination activity until after WWII. According to Marshall & Gurr (2003: 6) armed separatist conflict emerged in 1945, which is coded as the start date of the movement (we found no evidence for prior nonviolent activity). Since Laos did not become independent from France until 1953 we code the movement from 1953 and indicate that the movement was both active and violent prior to independence. The HVIOLSD coding for 1960-1961, 1963-1973, and 1976-1979 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006), and it has been marked as “ambiguous” because Hmong involvement in the civil war was not exclusively secessionist, but rather to fight the communist Pathet Lao guerrillas. Scott (1990: 116) notes that the Hmong fought the Pathet Lao guerillas and North Vietnamese regular forces in their homeland, particularly from 1960-1964, and in the process incurred over 30,000 casualties. Obtaining autonomy for Hmong-majority areas is a goal shared by most of the tribals. In addition to seeking greater opportunities to improve their economic status, group members are concerned about protecting the opportunity to practice their religion and culture. Marshall & Gurr (2005) code armed conflict in 1945-1979 and the quinquennial MAR score is above two throughout 1955-1979 (previous years are missing). Since we lack clearer information, we code LVIOLSD throughout 1953-1979, except for those years that are coded with HVIOLSD. Again, we apply an ambiguous code. In the early 1980s, Hmong insurgency seems to have been minimal. By 1979, the Hmong rebel groups had fled to Thailand to escape the war, and “about one-third of the entire Hmong population eventually fled the country” (Stuart-Fox 1997: 177). According to Lee (1982), the Hmong resistance had largely petered out by 1979 due to government-led atrocities. Vang Pao of the “secret army” formed the Lao National Liberation Front (LNLF) in 1981, but only launched small-scale sporadic attacks. None of our major sources reports violence in 1980-1984, thus these years are coded with NVIOLSD. 1985-2004 are coded with LVIOLSD following Marshall & Gurr (2005) (note that Marshall & Gurr (2003) do not not report armed conflict in 1997-1999 in their older report). MAR would suggest an end to low-level violence in 1996 as the MAR rebellion score is below four in all subsequent years. We nonetheless follow Marshall & Gurr to avoid a bogus de-escalation. 2005 onward is coded as NVIOLSD. There was a massacre in April 2006, but this was an instance of one-sided violence against the Hmong (see Amnesty International). All LVIOLSD episodes are marked as ambiguous because of mixed motives.

Sources:


LIBYA

Cyrenaicans

Summary: On March 6, 2012, about 2,800 political and social activists gathered in an old soap factory near Benghazi to announce the formation of an interim council that would eventually lead to the creation of an autonomous government in Barqa state. They hoped that such a move would provide them with better community services and a greater share of the spoils of the oil industry. The start date is pegged at 2012. The autonomy demands were still active in late 2013; the group has taken to blockading several oil-exporting ports. Thus we code the movement as ongoing. There has been minimal violence associated with the Cyrenaica movement, and thus we code it as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Toubou

Summary: The Toubou are a nomadic group located in Libya, Chad, Sudan, and Niger. In response to decades-long fierce repression in 2007 the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya (TFSL) was founded and soon engaged in fights with the Gaddafi regime. Initially, the Front was however concerned more with basic rights of the Toubou population and not with separatism. This changed after Gaddafi’s fall, when Front leaders have begun to claim autonomy or even secession. The claim is most likely made as a bargaining strategy to extract concessions from the center; however, given that the claim is made by a formal organization this still counts as a self-determination movement. We code the start date in 2011, when the first separatist claims were made, and code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. There has been significant inter-ethnic violence involving the Toubou, but this is not considered violence over self-determination. Indeed, the TFSL was reactivated in 2011 in order to protect the Toubou people from more ethnic attacks. According to Al-Jazeera, the TFSL brought up the possibility of an independent Toubou state as a reaction to rampant ethnic attacks that receive no attention from the Libyan government. There is no evidence that the TFSL has engaged in violence related to separatist goals. Based on this, we code the movement as NVIOLSD.
Sources:

Al Jazeera (2014). “Scores Killed in Libya Tribal Clashes.”


LITHUANIA

Lithuanian Poles

Summary: We code the movement as of 1991 since that year corresponds to Lithuania’s first year of independence. We do, however, indicate that this movement was active and nonviolent prior to independence (see Lithuanian Poles under Russia). Conventional politics continues to be the main strategy for advancing group demands. Some of the most active political organizations acting on the group’s behalf currently are the Union of Lithuanian Poles, Congress of Poles of Lithuania, Lithuanian Polish Minority, the Alliance of Lithuanian Citizens, and the Lithuanian Polish Election Action, among others. News reports indicate that these organizations have been consistently demanding greater autonomy up to the present. In 2005, Lithuanian Poles organized and protested against the government over the issue of land reprivatization. The Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania continues to remain active in conventional politics. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
MACEDONIA

Macedonian Albanians

Summary: The first political parties claiming to speak for the Albanian minority in Macedonia appeared as soon as communism made its way out (see Macedonian Albanians under Yugoslavia). In Macedonia we code the Albanians as of 1991, the year of Macedonian independence and indicate that the movement was active and non-violent prior to independence. The Party of Democratic Prosperity, the Democratic Party of Albanians, the National Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance of Albanians are among the organizations that represent the Albanians in Macedonia. Some of them came to life as a consequence of a split within older parties, most of them are competing against each other in the elections. Most also ask for regional autonomy with widespread powers. In 2000, two militant organizations appeared as well: the Kosovo Protection Corps and the Albanian National Army (AKSH). These groups enjoy support from similar ones active in Kosovo. Albania has spoken in the name of the Albanians in Macedonia in international forums and defended their demands. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1990-2006 indicate that the movement has been active and remains ongoing. The MAR rebellion score is 3 in 1997, suggesting a LVIOLSD code. However, the MAR coding notes make mention of only two deaths, thus 1997 is coded as NVIOLSD: “Demands by ethnic Albanian for greater rights erupted into conflict on July 9 after the government sent in special forces to take down the Albanian, Turkish and Macedonian national flags flying outside Gostivar's town hall. Police shot dead two young ethnic Albanian, a third man was beaten by police and later died from his injuries, while several policemen received bullet wounds. The interior ministry said 312 people had been arrested, including the town's newly-elected radical mayor, Mr Rifi Osmani. Officials suspected some of the Gostivar protestors had been brought in from Albania and Serbia.(Financial Times).” The LVIOLSD coding for 2001 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003), UCDP/PRIO (which however considers this an insurgency over the government) and a MAR rebellion score of 6. In line with this, Keesing’s reports that separatist clashes in 2001 led to 81 deaths. As noted in Minorities at Risk, violence from 2002 onward has been minimal. Marshall & Gurr (2003) code 2002 as armed conflict, but this appears to be an error: Marshall & Gurr (2005) do not code an armed conflict incident in 2002. Thus 2002-2012 is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:

3 Two things are worth noting. First, we do not include the Serbs in Macedonia. The evidence we found suggests that claims have been focused on cultural autonomy. In particular, Serbs in Macedonia have demanded schools, churches and media in their native language. Second, while some Macedonian activists in the Republic of Macedonia have laid irredentist claims to the area of northern Greece inhabited by Macedonians, the Macedonians in Greece only appear to seek recognition of their basic human rights, many of which have been long denied by the Greek government. At this time they do not appear to be seeking greater political autonomy, though that may change. Source: Danforth, Loring M. (1995). The Macedonian Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


MALAYSIA

Ibans

Summary: According to Minahan (2002: 754), the Ibans and dissident Chinese began to form nationalist organizations in the 1950s, but we could not find clear evidence for separatist agitation before 1962, when Britain considered ceding Sarawak (the Northeastern part of Borneo or Kalimantan) to the Malaysian Federation, which was soon to be created. This prompted a revolt by the North Kalimantan Liberation Front (no casualties found), who occupied several towns. Sarawak joined the Malaysian Federation on September 16, 1963. We code the start date in 1962 but only code the movement from 1963, the year Sarawak joined Malaysia. The movement is ongoing. Minahan (2002) reports secessionist activity up until recently, but we could not find much evidence of explicitly secessionist activity beyond the 1960s, and even there it was relatively tame and “strategic”. For instance, in 1966, secessionism was used as an election threat (Burns 1966), but already then the core demand was for autonomy. Generally, the focus is on cultural rights, autonomy, and land rights (Minorities at Risk Project). Minahan (2002) notes violent protests in the 1960s, but no casualties could be found. It seems that subsequent land rights protests were not violent. Based on this, we code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Kadazan

Summary: The Kadazan of Malaysia refers to a group of aboriginal tribes, which also includes the largest ethnic group, the Dusuns (Minorities at Risk Project). According to Minahan (2002), they are “a collection of closely related ethnic and linguistic groups including the Rungus, Lotud, Orang Sungai, Tambanuo, Kuijau, Kimarangan, Sanayou, Minokok, and Tenggera” (Minahan 2002: 877). The Kadazan, numbering around 755,000 people, live in Sabah, Malaysia within mountainous and heavily forested areas. In total, they make up about 54% of the Sabah population. The Kadazan speak a language formally known as the Kadazandusun, which is a standardized version of the Kadazan and Dusun languages. Since 1961, there have been organized calls for Kadazan independence. In 1961, the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO) was founded in order to discuss the possibility of an independent Sabah as Great Britain went through the decolonization phase (Roff 1969: 333). 1961 is thus coded as the start date of the movement, although the movement is only coded from 1963, when Sabah was incorporated into Malaysia. Nationalist sentiments was exacerbated by the suggestion for the adoption of a formal state religion, Islam, because most Kadazan are Christians. Also, “[t]he development of extensive petroleum
reserves in the late 1970s encouraged Kadazan nationalism as the state’s Muslim-dominated government signed away 95% of the state’s oil and natural gas revenues” (Minahan 2002: 879). Minahan too notes that nationalism was alive in the 1970s in Sabah. Kadazan nationalism had been on the rise in the 1980s, which resulted in the creation of two nationalist political parties – the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak and the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS). In 1989, the Kadazans demanded secession due to a Malaysian government campaign emphasizing the predominance of ethnic Malays and the possibility of naming Malaysia an Islamic state (Minahan 2002: 879). According to Weiss (2006: 90), the movement lost ground in subsequent years due to intra-group disagreement over their commitment to either of the two parties (Weiss 2006: 90). However, the PBS remains active in politics, and hence the movement is coded as ongoing. The Kadazan also have a history of protest over environmental damages to traditional lands, in particular deforestation that has led to pollution of waters and an increase in flooding (Minorities at Risk Project). In the mid 1990s, the Kadazans launched several protests against the Malaysian government’s siphoning of oil and natural gas revenues, which have greatly reduced Sabah’s forests. We found no separatist violence and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD; also, we indicate that prior activity was non-violent.

Sources:


MALI

Tuaregs

Summary: The movement has its roots in a Touareg rebellion against the newly independent Malian State in the early 1960s (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 300). According to Hewitt and Cheetham, the rebellion started in 1962, whereas Lecocq (2010: ch. 4, esp. pp. 161ff) suggests the First Tuareg Rebellion started in 1963, not 1962, while preparations for the rebellion had begun before 1963. We peg the start date at 1962. We found no evidence for nonviolent claim-making before the rebellion.

The government violently repressed the rebellion in 1964 and instituted military rule, sending many Touareg into exile. We found no casualty estimates for 1962-1964, but about 1,500 Tuareg rebels were involved and the sources we consulted suggest a significant number of casualties. Thus 1962-1964 is coded with LVIOLSD. The violent suppression in 1964 appears to have ended the short-lived Tuareg movement. The exiled Touareg rebels from 1962 later participated in the 1990 rebellion. Many immigrated to Libya, where they received military/insurgency training. Together with migrants from Niger, they formed a Tuareg liberation movement, which in 1988 became (after shedding the Niger connection), the Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l’Azawad (MPLA). Hence, we code 1988 as the second start date. The MPLA invaded Mali from Libya and attacked government posts in the summer of 1990. The conflict erupted immediately as a violent one with no prior political claims made nonviolently (Humphreys and ag Mohamed 2003). The government used political cooptation of elites to divide the movement, talks followed in 1991 following mediation efforts by Algeria, and the movement went through a re-organization process, shedding the “liberation” claims and becoming the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad (MPA) with the Arab groups distinguishing themselves from the larger movement by creating the Front Islamique et Arabe de l’Azawad (FIAA). Generous terms offered by the government in the Tamanrasset Accords led to a decline in violence. Regime change in the spring of 1991 and public opposition to Tamanrasset Accords, which were perceived as granting autonomy to the North, led to more attacks and intensification of the conflict. The MPA remained committed to the Accords and tried to resist conflict escalation, which led to fragmentation in the group with the FIAA breaking off to form the Front Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad (FPLA), with another splinter group, the Armée Révolutionnaire pour le Libération de l’Azawad (ARLA), forming later on. The government tried to organize all the groups in a unified movement, the Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad (MFUA). A National Pact signed in 1992 offered economic concessions to the North, as well as substantial autonomy (decentralization) through proposed constitutional reforms. However, just as with the earlier peace efforts through the Tamanrasset Accords, the resources were not available to deliver on all the promises made by the National Pact. Inter-communal violence continued due to frustrations with the implementation of the National Pact, increased banditry, and factionalism. 1988-1989 is coded as NVIOLSD (see Macartan & Mohamed 2005: 255). The HVIOLSD coding for 1990-95 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Though there is sporadic violence, fatalities from 1996-2006 do not meet requirements to be considered low-level violence, and this period is thus coded NVIOLSD. UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict over Azawad 2007-2009, thus these years are coded as LVIOLSD. No source codes violence over Azawad in 2010-2011, thus these years are coded as NVIOLSD. Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006), 2012 is coded as HVIOLSD due to the Tuareg war in Azawad involving the MNLA.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 6, 2002].


MAURITANIA

Kewris

Summary: The Kewris rejected inclusion in Maure-dominated Mauritania, which for them only meant a transformation from colonial rule to Arab domination. Increased repression and land reform laws to confiscate Kewri farm land led to an organized Kewri activism through the Forces de Libération Africaine de Mauritanie (FLAM) in 1983. This is coded as start date. MAR’s annual rebellion score is 4 in 1985-1986, 3 in 1987 and 4 in 1988-1990. Thus 1985-1990 are coded with LVIOLSD. Although violence has declined in the early 1990s and many Kewri refugees have returned to Mauritania, the FLAM is still active, though more conventionally and mostly from neighboring Senegal. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada notes that there has been limited violence associated with FLAM activity, and that FLAM has recently been using media and courts to seek self determination rather than through violence. We found no reports of violence in years other than 1985-1990, thus all other years are coded as NVIOLSD. The movement is ongoing.

Sources:


Saharawis

Summary: According to Minahan (2002: 1624) the Saharawis first rebelled against Spanish colonialization in the early 20th century. The campaign re-emerged in 1950s. The first evidence of activity we found is when two Saharawi tribes rebelled in 1957, driving out the Spanish authorities and soldiers. The Ifni War ensued. The revolution was helped considerably by Moroccan forces. Morocco and neighboring Mauritania both laid claim on Western Sahara. With French support, the Spanish returned in 1958 and “inflicted severe punishment on the rebel tribes” (Minahan 2002: 1625). The Moroccan forces were driven out; the ensuing agreement gave a small territory to Morocco but Spain remained in control of Western Sahara. Note: UCDP/PRIO codes the Ifni war as a low-level extrasystemic armed conflict in 1957/1958 involving France and Spain on the one hand and Morocco and Mauritania on the other. In 1969, Spain had to cede Ifni to Morocco, faced with international pressure. Meanwhile, Western Sahara agitation for self-determination continued, though at a much less intense level. For instance, Harakat Tahrir, a clandestine organization dedicated to Western Saharan independence, was formed in 1966. In 1966, Spain told the United Nations that it would allow Saharawi self-determination. However, this promise was not kept, which led to Saharawi mobilization for self-determination. In 1970, a demonstration for independence was violently repressed, involving several deaths (Zemla Intifada). This led the Saharawis to launch an armed struggle. In 1973, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El Hama and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) was formed and the insurgency began (Marshall & Gurr 2003: 61).
In the waning days of General Franco’s rule the Spanish government signed a tripartite agreement with Morocco and Mauritania as it moved to transfer the territory on November 14, 1975. Subsequently, Morocco and Mauritania each moved to annex the territories. This was met by fierce resistance by the Saharawis and POLISARIO, in particular. In line with the above narrative, the movement’s start date is pegged to 1957. However, because we do not code anti-colonial movement, we only code activity in Mauritania and Morocco, in both cases as of 1975. In line with Marshall & Gurr, who note separatist violence starting in 1973, we note prior violent activity. The conflict with Mauritania ended in 1978 with a cease-fire. In 1979, Mauritania withdrew from Western Sahara. Morocco extended its control to the rest of the territory. Thus, we code an end to the Saharawi movement in Mauritania in 1979. 1975-1978 are coded as LVIOLSD in line with UCDP/PRIO. 1979 is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [July 3, 2003].


MEXICO

Mayans

Summary: Indigenous mobilization around indigenous issues in Mexico began in earnest in the mid-70s within the framework of the newly emerged peasant’s rights movement. In 1975, the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) convoked the First National Congress of Indigenous Peoples in Pátzcuaro, Michoacán. All 56 ethnic groups in the country were present at the congress – the representatives concurred on the importance of indigenous self-determination even while they expressed their willingness “as part of the peasant class” to “unite with workers and the government for access to education, health, work, and freedom” (quoted in Mattiace 1997: 38). We do not code this as the movement’s onset, however, because the CNPI was not effectively advocating self-determination as we define it. The first evidence for separatist activity among Mayans in Mexico we found is in 1987, when the Indigenous Organization of the Highlands (ORIACH) was founded in Chiapas, where the majority of Mexican Mayans are located. The ORIACH mobilized based on Indian identity and rights; thus we code 1987 as the start date of the movement. The Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), which advocates the rights of Mayans and all Indians of southeastern Mexico, emerged from the 1994 Chiapas uprising as a militant organization, but has since favored political forms of mobilization and is currently the most widely recognized pro-indigenous organization in Mexico. The EZLN remains active as of 2012. Mayan and indigenous causes are also supported in Mexico by numerous smaller organizations, both militant and conventional, including the People’s Revolutionary Army (EPR) and the Revolutionary Army of Insurgent People (ERPI). 1987-1993 is coded as NVIOLSD. The LVIOLSD coding for 1994-1996 corresponds to the Chiapas rebellion (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér & Wallensteen 2014). We do not code the episode as ambiguous even if UCDP/PRIO notes the insurgency aimed to topple the government: the evidence we found suggests the primary objective of the rebellion was over territory/autonomy. Following the end of the Chappas rebellion, there was continued repression and some low-level violence between government troops and separatist guerillas in the region until 1998. An example of such violence was the massacre of 45 people on December 22, 1997 in Acteal. Given the Acteal massacre, we maintain the LVIOLSD code for 1997. Although Gurr (2000: 46) states that the armed conflict was still going on in 1999 and MAR retains a rebellion score of five until 2003, we code the period from 1998 onward as NVIOLSD because we found no reports that would justify a LVIOLSD code.

Sources:
Other Indigenous Peoples

Summary: The “Other indigenous peoples” group refers to a large number of Mexican tribes. There are altogether 23 such groups, the largest of which is the Nahua who lie in Morelos and Tamaulipas. They speak a variety of different languages with the Nahuatl language being the most used indigenous language. These groups have been actively protesting for regional autonomy, which include: “conservation of natural resources in indigenous regions, opposition to foreign commercial interests in indigenous regions, the demilitarization and removal of paramilitary groups from indigenous regions and promotion of group culture and lifeways” (Minorities at Risk). Note: Two indigenous groups are coded separately, the Mayans and the Zapotecs, because there was significant group-specific mobilization. Until the respective date of formations, these two groups can be considered part of this umbrella indigenous group as well. The indigenous peoples were represented first by the Autonomous Department of Indigenous Affairs, and later the National Indigenous Institute, the National Union of Indigenist Organizations, the National Federation of Indigenist Youth, and the Mexican Association of Indigenous Professionals and Intelectsions. The first organization representing the movement, the Autonomous Department of Indigenous Affairs, was established in 1940, thus the start date. Since we do not cover the pre-1945 period, we begin to code this movement in 1945. We found no separatist violence in 1940-1944. Thus we note prior nonviolent activity. In 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) launched a rebellion against Mexico to fight for greater autonomy, as well as for other social and economic reasons. Talks began in early 1994 and in February 1996, the two sides signed the San Andres Accords, which gave political autonomy to the indigenous people. However, the government did not follow through with its promises and thus EZLN continued to participate in militant activities while other armed groups such as the Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR) and the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo Insergente (ERPI) aided the EZLN in conducting military operations. The 1994 conflict is not coded as a civil war in the updated version of the Doyle & Sambanis (2006) civil war dataset due to
insufficient casualties; however, casualties reached at least 25 deaths (Parker et al. estimates at least 100 deaths; UCDP estimates 145-445 battle-related deaths) and thus 1994 is coded as LVIOLSD. Despite peace talks, violence continued. There were around 36 casualties attributed to the EPR in 1996 (UCDP Battle Related Deaths v.5). Though there were some skirmishes after 1996, we did not find any evidence of deaths going above 25 deaths a year. In mid-2000, a wave of government-sponsored violence took place as paramilitaries loyal to the government as well as federal forces launched incursions into indigenous communities. Deaths from these episodes are not clear (Lexis Nexis) but we do not consider them as violence pertaining to self-determination since there is no indication of retaliation from the side of the indigenous peoples. Thus, 1994-1996 is coded as LVIOLSD while 1997 onward is coded as NVIOLSD. The movement remains ongoing: For example, in 2011, the indigenous peoples petitioned for land rights (Chavia 2011).

Sources:

Zapotecos

Summary: The Zapotecs are a people indigenous to region that is currently Oaxaca, Mexico. They are also known as the Sapatokos, Be’ena’a, Di’zh, and Didxaza. Altogether, there are around 600,000 Zapotecs in Mexico, and they speak 54 Zapotecan dialects (Minahan 2002: 2091). However, they do not speak Spanish and thus face language discrimination in society. Today, the Zapotecs live in the mountainous Tlacolula, Zimatlán, and Etla valleys, where they continue to live according to agricultural lifestyles. Their traditional cultures have been mixed with Spanish and Mexican cultures as well as dictated by their regional geography and local economy (Minahan 2002: 2092; Cultural Survival 1987). Therefore, the Zapotecs have abandoned traditional crops and subsistence agriculture for cash crops like coffee. The Zapotecs have also mixed their indigenous religions with Roman Catholicism. The Mexican Zapotecs are spread across several regions of Mexico where they claim rights to indigenous lands used for their agricultural lifestyles. According to Amnesty International, the Zapotecs have “suffered human rights violations in the context of unresolved land conflicts involving indigenous communities, ejidos and powerful private landowners, otherwise known as caciques or “local bosses” (Amnesty International 1992: 1). Protests have arisen between Zapotec organizations such as the Grupo de Trabajo Comun Oganizado (TCO) and local landowners over the seizure of land that the Zapotecs consider to be part of their rightful ancestral land. According to the TCO, which protested about the land in La Trinidad Yaveo, the Zapotec ancestral land totaled 57,000 hectares, but land seizures and invasions have whittled this
down to 3,600 hectares (Amnesty International 1992: 2). Other Zapotec organizations, such as the Worker-Peasant-Student Coalition of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (COCEI) have lobbied for regional autonomy and the right to self-government, in light of environmental and human rights abuses resulting from oil industry pollution and paramilitary violence on their lands. In 1980, COCEI won municipal elections and became the first leftist opposition group to the governing party PRI. Ristow notes, “Observers of the COCEI’s resuscitation of indigenous culture, history, and politics were inspired by this ‘Zapotec Renaissance’ – the hallmark of the COCEI success” (Ristow 2008: 43). In 1911 and 1931, Zapotecs rose in rebellion against the state but were crushed. Subsequent protests resulting from land disputes have been reported – notably, in 1983, COCEI led mass protests after it was impeached and removed from office by the Mexican government – but these numbers do not reach the 25 deaths per year threshold (Lexis Nexis). Thus, the movement is coded as NVIOLSD throughout – despite a MAR rebellion score of three in 1980-1984. The start date of the movement is coded as 1973 when COCEI was first founded to fight for indigenous rights. The movement remains ongoing since COCEI remains active in politics.

Sources:


Faichuk

*Summary:* Faichuk is part of the Federated States of Micronesia and belongs to the state Chuuk (Truk). According to a 2003 Pacific Island Report article, Faichuk leaders have been pressuring for separate statehood within Micronesia or even separate independence (in association with the U.S.) since before Micronesia’s independence in 1986. In agreement with this, Bautista (2010: 56) reports that the current request for statehood dates back to the early 1970s. Since we lack a clearer indication, we peg the start date to 1970. However, because Micronesia attained independence only in 1986, we only code the movement from 1986. We found no evidence of violent separatist activity and thus indicate prior non-violent activity. The movement’s dominant claim appears to be for separation from Chuuk, but there is also talk about becoming a separate associated state of the US. There was a referendum on the separation from Chuuk in 2000, but while the vote resulted in a clear majority for separation neither Chuuk nor the central government did take any action. We find evidence for continued separatist activity at least until 2003, and following our ten-year rule we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. Note: in 2001 and 2007, bills were introduced for the formation of a separate Faichuk, but the proposals have not been implemented. No violence was found for the Faichuk movement, and thus we code the entire time period as NVIOLSD.

**Sources:**


*Note:* Micronesia’s population is less than 500,000. Movements in countries with a population of less than 500,000 are not included in the random draw.
Gagauz

Summary: The Gagauz movement was both active and nonviolent prior to Moldova’s independence (see Gagauz under Russia). The movement remained active in independent Moldova. An autonomous Gagauz region was created in 1995; regional elections were held and rebels joined the Moldovan armed forces. In fall 2002 countrywide talks began regarding the federalization of Moldova. Minorities at Risk report that the Gagauz are “satisfied with the existing arrangement, and the final step to enshrine the region’s autonomy in law was taken by the central Chisinau authorities in 2005” (MAR). However, in 2014 the Gagauz held a referendum on independence. Thus, we code the movement as ongoing. LVIOLSD coding for 1991-92 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003) and a MAR rebellion score of 3. No violence has been found since 1992, hence a NVIOLS classification for 1993 onwards. The MAR annual rebellion score is 3 also for 1993-1995, but this appears due to the Gagauz’ declaration of sovereignty in 1991 and de-facto independence maintained until 1994/1995 and is thus not coded.

Sources:


Trans-Dniester Slavs

Summary: In the late 1980s Moldovan nationalists took a series of mostly symbolic steps that were widely perceived as moves toward unification with Romania. The most threatening of these steps to non-Moldovans was legislation passed by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in 1989 that made Romanian the only official state language and required all officials to demonstrate proficiency in Romanian, even if serving in Gagauz and Russian-speaking communities. In September 1990 the Moldovan Supreme Soviet declared its sovereignty and nullified the transfer of Moldavia from Romania to the USSR by the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In response to this move, Slavs in the Dniester Region began to mobilize for autonomy in 1989 (Sato 2009: 144-146). The Trans-Dniester Slavs created the Dniester Soviet Republic and announced their intention to secede from Moldavia in order to rejoin the Soviet Union. While separatist activity was evident prior to 1991, we code the movement only as of 1991 because Moldova did
not become independent until 1991. Before Moldova’s independence, the Trans-Dniestr mobilization was mainly directed against the Moldovans’ efforts to gain autonomy and secede, and not at self-determination as we define it. We do, however, indicate that this movement was both active and nonviolent prior to Moldova’s independence. The HVIOLSD coding for 1991-92 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Marshall & Gurr (2003: 58) suggest a LVIOLSD code for 1993-1997, but this appears to follow a MAR rebellion score of 3 in 1993-1997 that is likely due to Transnistria’s declaration of independence and de-facto independent status. MAR codes 0 after the 1997 peace agreement. We code 1993-1997 as NVIOLSD based on the following report by UCDP: “In negotiations in March 1992, the parties agreed on a ceasefire that was soon broken. However, talks between Russia and Moldova were concluded in a ceasefire agreement on 21 July. This agreement put an end to the violence.” While the OSCE mediation team drafted a document calling for the division of Moldova into autonomous territories with their own constitutions and parliaments, many Dniestrians claim the proposal is insufficient and continue to press for independence. Non-zero protest scores from 1998 until 2006 indicate an ongoing movement. News sources up until 2013 indicate that it is an ongoing movement as well. It seems that protests have not resulted in fatalities and thus 1998 onward is coded as NVIOLSD, although the deployment of Russian and Moldovan troops have created a tense situation.

Sources:


Summary: With the secession of Montenegro from Serbia the Sandzak region became divided between Serbia and Montenegro. After the secession the Sandzak movement has been active in both Serbia and Montenegro (see Sandzak Muslims under Yugoslavia). In Montenegro, the primary organization representing the Sandzak interests is the Bosniak Party. There have been claims for autonomy, and sporadically also for separate independence together with the Serbian Sandzak region. We code movement activity as of Montenegro’s independence in 2006, but note that the movement was active and nonviolent before. There is continued evidence for separatist activity. We code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. No separatist violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 28, 2002].
**Riffians**

*Summary:* Promised autonomy, the Riffians (a Berber group) celebrated Morocco’s independence in 1956, but this enthusiasm was short-lived as the Riffians were excluded from the government and pressured to assimilate. In 1958 the Riffians rose in rebellion against the Moroccan state. 1958 is thus coded as the start date. We found no evidence for nonviolent claim-making prior to the rebellion. Various demands were raised, including the return of al-Khattabi (a former Riffian rebel leader) to Morocco, inclusion in the national cabinet, more favourable economic policies and language rights, but also regional autonomy. The uprising was crushed in 1959, hence the end of the first period of activity. No information on casualties could be found, but it is likely that the 1958 rebellion resulted in over 25 deaths. Thus, 1958-1959 is coded LVIOLSD. In subsequent years the Riffians endured harsh repression. In the 1980s the Riffians again rose in protest, but it seems that this time protest concerned cultural and language rights and not autonomy. Though demands continue to focus mainly on language rights, agitation towards territorial self-determination appears to have flared up against in the 2000s. The Rif Autonomy Movement was founded in the 2000s, but this organization appears insignificant. In 2012 an organization called the Rif Independence Movement joined the Organization of Emerging African States. According to its Facebook page, the Rif Independence Movement was founded in April 2012. The significance of the independence movement is not entirely clear, but it appears more significant than the Autonomy Movement. Hence, we code a second ongoing phase of activity beginning in 2012. We did not come across evidence of separatist violence that qualifies as low-level violence, hence 2012 is coded as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


**Saharawis**

*Summary:* According to Minahan (2002: 1624) the Saharawis first rebelled against Spanish colonialization in the early 20th century. The campaign re-emerged in 1950s. The first evidence of activity we found is when two Saharawi tribes rebelled in 1957, driving out the Spanish authorities and soldiers. The Ifni War ensued. The revolution was helped considerably by Moroccan forces. Morocco and
neighboring Mauritania both laid claim on Western Sahara. With French support, the Spanish returned in 1958 and “inflicted severe punishment on the rebel tribes” (Minahan 2002: 1625). The Moroccan forces were driven out; the ensuing agreement gave a small territory to Morocco but Spain remained in control of Western Sahara. Note: UCDP/PRIO codes the Ifni war as a low-level extraneous system armed conflict in 1957/1958 involving France and Spain on the one hand and Morocco and Mauritania on the other. In 1969, Spain had to cede Ifni to Morocco, faced with international pressure. Meanwhile, Western Sahara agitation for self-determination continued, though at a much less intense level. For instance, Harakat Tahrir, a clandestine organization dedicated to Western Saharan independence, was formed in 1966. In 1966, Spain told the United Nations that it would allow Saharawi self-determination. However, this promise was not kept, which led to Saharawi mobilization for self-determination. In 1970, a demonstration for independence was violently repressed, involving several deaths (Zemla Intifada). This led the Saharawis to launch an armed struggle. In 1973, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) was formed and the insurgency began (Marshall & Gurr 2003: 61). In the waning days of General Franco’s rule the Spanish government signed a tripartite agreement with Morocco and Mauritania as it moved to transfer the territory on November 14, 1975. Subsequently, Morocco and Mauritania each moved to annex the territories. This was met by fierce resistance by the Saharawis and POLISARIO, in particular. In line with the above narrative, the movement’s start date is pegged to 1957. However, because we do not code anti-colonial movement, we only code activity in Mauritania and Morocco, in both cases as of 1975. In line with Marshall & Gurr, who note separatist violence starting in 1973, we note prior violent activity. The conflict with Mauritania ended in 1978 with a cease-fire. In 1979, Mauritania withdrew from Western Sahara. Morocco extended its control to the rest of the territory. Thus, we code an end to the Sahrawi movement in Mauritania in 1979. The HVIOLSD coding for 1975-91 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The MAR rebellion score is 3 in some subsequent years (1992-1995, 1999-2003). This appears due to declarations of sovereignty and thus we code 1992-2009 as NVIOLSD. Tensions escalated in late October and November 2010 during UN talks – In October, one civilian was killed (Vanguard (Lagos) 12/7/2010; Lexis Nexis). In the first week of November 2010, the Moroccan government was accused of a raid and massacre in Western Sahara but subsequent news reports confirmed that 11 security officers were killed along with two or three accidental civilian deaths (The International Herald Tribune 12/9/2010, Lexis Nexis). Attacks on November 8th resulted in 6-11 deaths (ANSAmed 11/9/2010, Lexis Nexis). On November 12th, Adnkronos International reports 12 deaths during separatist clashes as a result of tear gas and pressure hoses in Laayoune, Western Sahara (Adnkronos International, Rome 11/12/2010, Lexis Nexis). Based on this, we code 2010 as LVIOLSD. 2011 onward is once again coded as NVIOLSD due to a low number of casualties.

Sources:


Buddhist Arakanese

Summary: The Arakan National Congress (ANC), formed in 1939, propagated separate Arakanese independence and was soon dominated by politically active Buddhist monks. 1939 is thus coded as the start date of the movement. However, since Burma became independent only in 1948 we code the movement from 1948. During the Second World War, the Arakan Defence Force was formed. It first supported the Japanese invaders against British colonial forces and was promised separate administration as a reward for their efforts. The Defence Force later unified into the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) and supported the British reconquest of the territory. Tensions between Buddhist and Muslims increased after the war and both “Buddhists and Rohingyas became increasingly militant in their demands for independence” (UCDP). The Arakan People’s Liberation Party (APLP) was formed in 1947 and, in close cooperation with the outlawed Communist Party of Burma, started an insurgency in southern Arakan. UCDP notes that the insurgency began in November 1947; thus we indicate prior violent activity. In 1946, the Muslim Arakanese also formed a self-determination organization, the Muslim Liberation Organization (later Mujahid Party). It started a separate rebellion (see “Rohingyas”). The APLP and the Mujahids quickly came to an agreement to first jointly expulse the Burmese forces from Arakan and then split the territory into two separate independent states. However, the agreement was only short-lived, as the APLP forces defected and openly co-operated with government forces, which primarily targeted Muslims. The APLP was definitively dissolved when its last troops took advantage of a government amnesty in 1958. In 1956, a separate Communist Party of Arakan was set up. The Arakan unit agitated relatively independent from the Communist Party of Burma and fought for the independence of Arakan. The organization surrendered in 1980 during the general amnesty (Lintner 1990). Hence, we code an end to the movement in 1980. Following UCDP/PRIO, we code the movement as LVIOLSD from 1948-1957 (1957 is the last year the APLP was involved in armed conflict according to UCDP/PRIO). For the remaining years, when the movement was represented by the Communist Party of Arakan, the information is very scarce. While Lintner (1990) indicates that the Buddhist Arakanese engaged in violence, there is no information regarding the number of people who died in order to classify this violence as either LVIOLSD or HVIOLSD. The Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Cederman et al. 2010) codes low-level armed conflict in 1964-1973, based on UCDP/PRIO. We code the movement as LVIOLSD from 1964-1973, and NVIOLSD in 1958-1963 and 1974-1980.

Sources:
Kachins

Summary: The earliest evidence for separatist activity we found is in 1947, when the Kachins demanded separate independence at the Panglong Conference. The British, however, were convinced that the small protectorates lacked the resources to become viable independent states and thus urged for the creation of a Burmese federation. After promises of autonomy and the guaranteed right of secession under British protection if they decided to leave Burma after ten years or more, the Kachins eventually agreed to be part of the federation. We thus code 1947 as the start date but only code the movement from 1948, when Burma was granted independence. We found no separatist violence in 1947 and thus code prior non-violent activity. Soon after independence in 1948 the Burmese government abrogated this autonomy agreement by incorporating large tracts of Kachin land into the neighboring provinces and creating a truncated Kachin state with only semiautonomous status. The Kachins rebelled, hence the LVIOLSD coding for 1949-1950 following UCDP/PRIO. The rebellion was suppressed in 1950. According to MAR, “[b]y the mid-1950s, the Kachin were engaged in rebellion against the state”. The MAR quinquennial rebellion score exceeds three from 1955-1959, thus 1955-1959 is coded as LVIOLSD. In 1958 the Kachins formally notified the Burmese government of their intention to secede under the 1948 independence agreement. The principal Kachin rebel organization in the war that followed, the Kachin Independence organization, was formed in 1961. The HVIOLSD for 1960-1994 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). A ceasefire in 1994 appears to have ended the violence and allowed the Kachins to retain some weapons and to control some areas (Hewitt et al. 2008). Non-zero MAR protest scores in subsequent years indicate that the movement is ongoing. Clashes in 2010 took place, but fatalities do not reach the level of LVIOLSD. Thus, the movement is coded NVIOLSD until 2010. In recent years, the Kachin Independence Army was revived. The 17-year ceasefire ended in June 2011 when violence between the government and the Kachin Independence Army resumed. 2011-2012 is coded as LVIOLSD based on Gleditsch et al. (2002)/Themnér & Wallensteen (2014) (for reports independent of UCDP/PRIO, see The Straits Times 5/5/2012, Lexis Nexis; Thai News Service 11/16/2011, Lexis Nexis; States News Service 10/20/2011, Lexis Nexis; Daily the Pak Banker 6/15/2011, Lexis Nexis; Sydney Morning Herald 12/10/2011, Lexis Nexis).

Sources:


**Karenni (Kayah)**

Summary: According to UCDP, “Karenni leaders rejected involvement in the post-War [WWII] discussions about the transfer of power to independent Burma as they did not consider them as being part of the British colony. Instead, they focused on setting up a Karenni administrative structure and the United Kar administrative structure and the United Karenni Independent State Council (UKISC) was set up in 1946 and work on a Karenni draft constitution was initiated.” Based on this, 1946 is indicated as the start date. Burma became independent in 1948, thus we include the movement from 1948. Note: Marshall & Gurr (2003) suggest that the Karenni had begun a separatist insurgency already in 1945, but UCDP’s richer account suggests a later start date (1946). We do, however, follow Marshall & Gurr and indicate that the movement had been violent before independence. It is not clear though whether the movement employed violence from its very start.

Two of our main sources on low-level violence include the Karenni case, but there are substantial differences. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) suggest ongoing armed conflict from 1945-2006, the last year they cover. UCDP/PRIO, on the other hand, codes armed conflict over Karenni only in selected years: 1957, 1987, 1992, 1996, and 2005. Even if one considers that Marshall & Gurr code ongoing conflict if conflict recurs within five year, the Peace & Conflict reports pick up much more violence than UCDP/PRIO. To avoid coding bogus de-escalations, we follow Marshall & Gurr/Hewitt et al. and code ongoing armed conflict 1948-2006. We extend the LVIOLSD code to 2012 to remain consistent with the 1945-2006 period: according to UCDP/PRIO, the 25 battle-deaths treshold was not met in any of these years, but there continued to be sporadic clashes.

Sources:


Karens

Summary: The first Karen cultural organization, the Karen National Organization (KNA) was founded in 1881; it was the forerunner of the later separatist movement (Minahan 2002: 942). The first formal call for self-determination came in 1928 (UNHCR; Thawngmung 2008: 5), thus the start date. When the Japanese occupied Burma during the Second World War, the Karen, who provided over half of the recruits to the British colonial army, fought alongside the British in the hope that their allegiance would lead to the British granting broad autonomy or independence. This demand resurfaced in 1946, when a Karen delegation travelled to London to discuss the promised independence. Britain rejected the Karen aspirations and group areas were incorporated into Burma when independence was achieved in 1948. By Burmese independence, the KNA had joined forces with other Karen nationalist organizations to form the Karen National Union (KNU), Burma’s oldest rebel group which has been involved in separatist armed conflict with the government ever since independence (UCDP). Note: Marshall & Gurr (2003) indicate separatist violence from 1945 onwards, thus we denote prior violence. HVIOLSD coding for 1948-51 and 1960-95 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). LVIOLSD coding for 1952-1959 follows UCDP/PRIO and Marshall & Gurr (2003: 60). There is relatively high agreement among sources that low-level violence continued after the end of the war in 1995 until 2011. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code ongoing armed conflict 1996-2006, the last year they cover. The MAR rebellion score exceeds two (the LVIOLSD threshold) throughout 1996-2006 except for a single year: 1996. UCDP/PRIO, on the other hand, codes armed conflict throughout 1996-2011 except for two years: 1996 and 1999. In sum, low-level violence continued, potentially except for 1996 where only the Peace & Conflict reports suggest a LVIOLSD code (note that they code ongoing armed conflict if conflict recurs within five years). Since there were sporadic clashes also in 1996, we nonetheless follow the Peace & Conflict reports and code LVIOLSD for 1996-2011. In 2012 the conflict de-escalated. According to UCDP: “During late 2011 and early 2012 major advances were made towards ending the Karen conflict. On 6 November 2011 the DKBA 5 (Kloh Htoo Baw, Brigade 5) signed a ceasefire agreement with the government that among other things consisted of declaring Kayin State's inclusion in the Union of Myanmar, economic development of the Sukali region, agreement of all parties to combat drug trafficking and to continue discussions to establish a lasting peace. In early 2012 the KNU followed suit by agreeing to a ceasefire with the government on 12 January. The KNU followed up on its ceasefire agreement by holding high level talks with the government and agreeing to establish set locations for
garrisoning troops, a transparent ceasefire process as well as the establishment of liaison offices in border regions. As a result of the ceasefire agreement the Karen conflict did not reach 25 battle-related deaths in 2012.” We found no contradicting evidence, thus 2012 is coded as NVIOLSD based on UCDP/PRIO.

Sources:


Kokang

Summary: The autonomy of the Federated Shan States, of which Kokang was part, was undermined when the government set up local defense militias and placed the area under military administration in order to dislodge the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces from northern Burma. In 1958, the Kokang were the only sawbwas (traditional hereditary rulers in the Shan state) who resisted an agreement with the government that envisaged incorporation into the Union’s political structure. Since the Kokang leader
gave in a year later, but also because we did not find any information on the foundation of the Kokang Defence Army (KDA), which was involved in fighting with the Burmese government in 1961, we code 1958 as start date, the first year we found activity for. No violence could be found between 1958-1959. The Kokang self-determination movement was associated with the Shan rebel groups during the Burmese civil war (1960-1995), which is coded as a war in Doyle & Sambanis (2006). In 1989 the Kokang signed a cease-fire agreement that was largely respected (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). The conflict intensity code is somewhat ambiguous. We code 1960-1989 as low-level violence rather than HVIOLSD because of the limited information we found specifically on the Kokang and the small size of the group (around 100,000). 1990-2008 is again NVIOLSD. The Kokang incident in 2009, in which Kokang (and other) opposition to their assimilation into the Myanmar Armed Forces as “border guards” resulted in violent clashes. 2009 is coded as LVIOLSD based on UCDP/PRIO. We found only minimal violence from 2010 onward; violence does not reach the LVIOLSD threshold.

Sources:


**Lahu**

_Summary:_ The Lahu homeland was incorporated into the new Burmese state in 1948. Alienated by harsh and arbitrary Bamar rule, they soon (early 1950s) allied with other minorities in order to be granted more autonomy, a claim that later turned into the idea of an independent Greater Lahuland that included the Lahu territories in neighboring states (China, Thailand, Laos). First clashes with the Burmese state happened in 1958, when the Lahu and Shans openly rebelled. Since this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we have found, we code 1958 as the movement’s onset. There may have been prior nonviolence, but nothing is reported in the sources we consulted. In 1984, the Lahu National Organization (LNO) was formed, a small rebel group led by Kya U. Previously Kya U had led a small rebel army based at Doi Lang at the Thai border (Lintner 1990: 106). There is evidence of continued separatist activity, and we code the movement as ongoing. Minahan (2002: 1076) reports “open rebellion” in 1958 and 1962
alongside the Shan. Since it is likely that casualties rose above 25 deaths per year for both years and we found little evidence on this case, we code 1958 and 1962 as LVIOLSD. 1959-1961 are coded as NVIOLSD. Based on Minahan, it seems that the Lahu were not involved in the Burmese war from 1960 onward. However, UCDP/PRIO codes a low-level intensity armed conflict over Lahu from 1973-1982. And according to Doyle & Sambanis’ (2006) coding notes, in 1976, Lahu separatists formed a coalition with other ethnic rebels to form the National Democratic Front, which was active in the Burmese civil war. The NDF was suppressed in 1988 but the LNO continued to fight in the Burma civil war until a ceasefire took place in 1994 (Minahan 2002: 1077). The Lahu-Myanmar dyad did not meet the HVIOLSD threshold, thus we code 1973-1994 as LVIOLSD (1963-1972 is NVIOLSD). There is evidence of ongoing activity from 1995 onward, but not of separatist violence. 1995-ongoing is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Mons

Summary: In 1948 Mon nationalists formed the Mon National Defense Organization (MNDO), hence the start date of the movement. In 1958 the New Mon State Party was formed. According to UCDP, the Mon insurgency started in February 1949: “The Mon leadership made an alliance with leaders of the ethnic Karen as communal violence became increasingly common in 1948 and started forming armed militias. Both the Karen and the Mon militias were declared illegal by the end of the year and the Karen-Mon forces attacked government and pro-government paramilitaries in February 1949. During the first decade of the Mon conflict, the military situation was extremely complex as several organisations as well as bandits and other armed gangs were active.” Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 192) also peg the start of violence to 1949. In contrast, the University of Central Arkansas' conflict data base suggests that armed rebellion had broken out already in 1948. Based on the latter, we code 1948-1959 as LVIOLSD. However, note that all sources agree that the initial phase was nonviolent, as the University of Central Arkansas' conflict project suggests that the movement was founded in early January 1948 but escalated to violence only in July.
UCDP/PRIO (armed conflict in 1996) and MAR (rebellion score of three in both years). Since 1998, the Mon rebels have been involved in inter-communal conflicts and inter-group violence, but not separatist violence against the government. However, despite a lack of violence, the New Mon State Party and the Mon National Liberation Army continue to remain active in Burma, and thus the movement is ongoing. According to Minahan, “[m]odest reforms adopted by the Myanmar government in 2011-12 allowed Mon candidates to participate in local elections and to openly express Mon desires for an enlarged Mon autonomous territory” (Minahan 2012: 200). Separatist violence took place from 2010-2012, but the number of fatalities do not qualify for LVIOLSD.

Sources:


Nagas

Summary: The Naga National Council (NNC) was formed in the Indian state of Assam during World War II to promote Naga interests. The NNC opened negotiations on separate independence in 1945. In August 1947 it proclaimed Naga independent of both India and Burma (Minahan 2002: 1330). The proposed independent Naga state included large parts of the states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, but
also territory in Myanmar, in particular in Kachin State and Sagaing Division (Eastern Nagaland). Initially, the NNC’s activities, however, were limited to India and only with the formation of the Eastern Naga National Council (ENNC) in 1949 is there evidence of an organized claim for self-determination by the Burmese Nagas (Iralu 2003). Hence, we code the movement in Myanmar as of 1949. The ENNC and the NNC merged in 1952. January 31, 1980, the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was founded in opposition to the NNC’s signing of the Shillong Accord. The NSCN, which split into two factions (NSCN-IM and NSCN-K) in 1988, set up camps in Myanmar’s northwestern Sagaing Division (Human Rights Watch 2002). As of 2012, the two factions of the NSCN and various other Naga factions have continued their activities in Myanmar (South Asia Terrorism Portal), thus the movement is coded as ongoing. UCDP/PRIO codes two periods of armed conflict, both in the 2000s (one from 2000-2001 and one from 2005-2007). However, we found some indications that Myanmar’s Nagas were also involved in the Burmese civil war (1960-1995, see Doyle & Sambanis 2006; Human Rights Watch 2002).

Information on the Naga’s involvement in the war and the number of casualties is very scarce, which is at least in part due to the high number of different insurgencies and the various alliances formed (e.g. the NSCN established links with the Kachin rebels). According to Vashum (2000: 158), the Burmese government “started to interfere in the Nagas areas of North-Western Myanmar sometime in 1962”. We found evidence of a cease-fire that was unilaterally declared by the NSCN in 1996 (Vashum 2000: 158), but it is neither clear whether the Nagas were involved in separatist violence above the LVIOLSD threshold throughout 1962-1996 nor whether the violence really abated after 1996 before resuming in 2000. Topich and Leitich (2013: 5) appear to suggest that there has not been a proper de-escalation when they state that the Nagas have been in a “constant state of war”. As already mentioned above, UCDP/PRIO notes two episodes of armed conflict (2000-2001 and 2005-2007). However, the conflict appears to have continued at least until 2012. In April 2012, the NSCN-K signed a ceasefire with the Myanmar government (Myanmar Peace Monitor; Burma Center for Ethnic Studies (2014). Terms of the agreement included, among others, the cessation of armed conflict, the opening of a liaison office by NSCN-K at Khamti, the freedom of movement of unarmed NSCN-K cadres and the holding of sustained negotiations. The evidence we found suggests that the HVIOLSD threshold was not met (see e.g. Doyle & Sambanis 2006). In order to avoid a bogus de-escalation, we code low-level violence throughout 1962-2012.

Sources:


Palaung

Summary: The Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO) was founded in 1963, hence the start date of the movement. Since the Palaung are a small ethnicity, they have sought the protection of larger ethnic groups (i.e. from 1963-1967 they were allied with the Shans, but from 1968 until 1991, when the Palaung signed a cease-fire agreement with the Burmese government, they were allied with the Kachins) and as a result have engaged in concerted military efforts with these groups. The HVIOILSD coding for 1963-95 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Since 1995, news reports indicate that the PSLO continues to press for autonomy, but not through violent means. The Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) continues to remain active as of 2012, and thus the movement is coded as ongoing. No separatist violence was found from 1996 onward, hence the NVIOLSD classification from 1996 onward.

Sources:


Pa-O

*Summary:* Despite promises of local autonomy by the British in return for anti-Japanese guerilla warfare during the war, the Pa-O districts remained part of the Shan State once Burma gained independence. The revolts that started in 1949 (start date) soon spread across Paoh and, while first targeting taxation by local landlords, soon pursued nationalist goals. According to Minahan (2002: 1483), the Pa-O were involved in a war against the Burmese government “during the 1950s.” In line with this, South (2013: 112) writes that the Pa-O were in revolt “by 1950.” Based on this, we code HVIOLSD from 1949 onwards. There may have been prior nonviolent claim-making, but we lack clear evidence.

Minahan continues to write that the rebels, almost defeated, retreated into the jungle in 1958, and that many surrendered during a general amnesty. In 1961, the government’s military commander in the region announced that the Pa-O rebellion was defeated, according to Minahan. But the 1962 coup reignited the rebellion and renewed the Pa-O insurgency. We code HVIOLSD from 1960 onwards because the Pa-O rebels fought in the Burma civil war (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). After decades of fighting the Pa-O insurgents capitulated and signed a cease-fire deal with the military junta in 1991 (South 2008). Minahan (2002: 1483) notes that the subsequent good two years were peaceful. Thus we code an end to HVIOLSD in 1991. Fighting re-erupted in December 1994 and lasted until 1997 (Minahan 2002: 1483-1484). Accordingly, 1994-1997 are coded with LVIOLSD. Note: Casualty information for 1949-1959 and 1994-1997 could not be found. However, based on Minahan’s description of the insurgencies during those years, it appears likely that violence reached above the LVIOLSD threshold. No casualty information could be found for 1998 onward but it seems clear that violence has decreased substantially since the 1997 ceasefire. Thus we code 1998 onward as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [March 8, 2014].


**Rohingyas (Arakanese)**

*Summary:* The North Arakan Muslim League, fearing dominance by the Buddhist Burman majority, sent a delegation to the Indian Muslim League in 1946 to request the incorporation of northern Arakan into East Pakistan (Chan 2005; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 27; Minorities at Risk Project; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). That same year, the separatist North Arakan Muslim League was formed (later Mujahidin Party). Based on this, we code 1946 as the start date of the movement. However, since Burma became independent in 1948 we only code the movement from 1948. UCDP/PRIO codes low-level armed conflict over Arakan in 1948-1961. Thus these years are coded as LVIOLSD. Note: according to UCDP, the insurgency started in April 1948, thus after independence. Accordingly, we denote that prior activity had been non-violent. In 1961 the last Rohingya rebels surrendered to the government. Neither UCDP/PRIO nor MAR nor Marshall & Gurr code violence in 1962-1963, thus the NVIOLSD code. UCDP/PRIO again codes low-level intensity armed conflict over Arakan in 1964-1978. In 1964-1972 the conflict involved the following rebel organizations: the Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP) and the Communist Party of Arakan (CPA). Both are associated with the Buddhist Arakanese and not the Muslim Rohingyas (see EPR coding notes). From 1973-1978 the conflict involved the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), a Rohingya organization. Based on this, 1962-1972 are coded as NVIOLSD, while 1973-1978 are coded as LVIOLSD. The LVIOLSD code for 1979-1984 follows a MAR quinquennial rebellion score of 4 in these years. It is possible that there was a de-escalation and subsequent re-escalation, but the MAR coding notes are unhelpful (it is only noted that “rebellion by group members reemerged in the mid-1970s”). No violence is reported for 1985-1990, thus a NVIOLSD code. The MAR rebellion score is 4 in 1991-1994 and UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict over Arakan in 1991 and 1994. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. also code armed conflict 1991-1994. Thus 1991-1994 are coded with LVIOLSD. Since the ceasefire agreement in 1994, Arakan separatists have continued to press for autonomy (c.f. non-zero MAR protest scores). According to Minorities at Risk, there was an outbreak of separatist violence in 2000 (rebellion score < three, however), but Rohingya rebel groups were inactive militarily from 2001-2006. However, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization remained active politically and became increasingly militaristic since 2012. No fatalities were found despite an increase in militarism, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD from 1995 onwards.

*Sources:*


Shan

Summary: The Shan States were not included in British Burma but existed as separate protectorates with relative autonomy in internal affairs. As of 1920, these various Shan states were brought together to form the Federated Shan States (“1919 Act of Federated Shan States”), The Federated Shan State Council served as the first common governing body of the Shan principalities. When WWII began, many Shans initially collaborated with the Japanese. In 1942, Shan nationalists declared independence, thus the start date. In late 1943 the Japanese abrogated their de-facto independence; the Shan subsequently rebelled against the Japanese. The revolt continued until March 1945, when the British returned (Minahan 2002: 1700). At the end of World War II, the United Kingdom announced its intention to grant Burma independence. The Shan States demanded separate independence at the 1947 Panglong Conference, a request that was not met. After promises of autonomy, the Shan eventually agreed to be part of the Burmese federation. We code 1942 as the start date but only code the movement from 1948, when Burma was granted independence. The rebellion against the Japanese is not coded as separatist violence, and we found no other instances of separatist violence before 1948. Within months of independence the new Burmese government abrogated the autonomy agreement and attempted to impose direct rule on the Shan federation. The Shans, led by rival princes, produced several rebel organizations in the 1950s and in 1958 the Shan princes notified the Burmese government of their intention to secede under the 1948 independence agreement. The Burmese government responded by stripping the princes of their titles and privileges, a move that was the trigger for the rebellion. The LVIOLSD code for 1959 follows UCDP/PRIO. The HVIOLSD coding for 1960-95 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). There is relatively high agreement among sources that low-level violence continued until 2011. First, Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2006) code ongoing armed conflict until the last year they cover, 2006. Second, the MAR rebellion score exceeds three in all years (up until and including 2006, the last year covered by MAR) except for 2003. Finally, UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict throughout 1996-2011 except for only two years. Based on this, one could code a de-escalation in 2003 (only the Peace & Conflict reports suggest a LVIOLSD code and they code ongoing armed conflict if conflict recurs within five years), but we code ongoing low-level violence due to possible reporting problems (1996-2011 LVIOLSD). According to UCDP: “As part of the civilian-led government's peace effort, there were also several rounds of talks between the government and the Shan rebels. RCSS agreed to a temporary
ceasefire and continued negotiations in late 2011, eventually signing a ceasefire on December 2, 2011. RCSS followed suit, signing a ceasefire on 28 January. Since the two agreements were largely respected, fighting in the Shan conflict did not cause 25 battle-related deaths in 2012." We follow UCDP and code 2012 as NVIOLSD, though noting we found 22 deaths in 2012: clashes on July 18 killed 10 (The Shan Herald Agency for News 7/31/2012), 10 deaths on September 7 (The Shan Herald Agency for News 9/30/2012) and 2 deaths on October 30 (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 11/1/2012).

Sources:


**Wa**

*Summary:* Although the Wa had rebelled against the Burmese in 1959 after the government deposed their princes, Wa leaders first espoused a separatist platform in 1972 with the formation of the Wa National Organization (WNO). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1972. We find news reports indicating the WNO was active from 1976 to 1988 under the aegis of the National Democratic Front (NDF). The LVIOLSD coding for 1989 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003). 1997 is coded as LVIOLSD because UCDP/PRIO reports an armed conflict over Wa in this year. Minor Wa factions continued to engage in sporadic anti-government violence as of 2012. Since none of this violence appears to qualify as LVIOLSD, we code all other years as LVIOLSD.

Sources:


Zomi (Chin)

Summary: Sources differ on the Zomi’s involvement in low-level violent activity. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008), on one hand, code separatist armed conflict involving the Zomi from 1985-2006 (note that we code the movement only from 1988 in light of case study evidence). On the other hand, the MAR rebellion score is above two only in the following years: 1985-1993 and 2002-2003. In order to avoid a bogus switch, we follow the Peace & Conflict reports and code armed conflict from 1988-2006. We found no evidence for prior nonviolent claim-making. Minahan (2012: 367) notes that “[a] number of Zomi military organizations continue to resist the brutal military government of Myanmar to the present.” Some separatist violence took place in 2007 and subsequent years, but fatalities do not reach the threshold for LVIOLSD.

Sources:


NAMIBIA

Basters

Summary: The Basters of Namibia are also called Rehoboths or Rehoboth Basters. There are altogether around 55,000 Basters in Namibia, largely concentrated in the region of Rehoboth, Namibia (RehobothBasters.org). In Rehoboth, they make up about 92 percent of the population. According to Minorities at Risk, “Basters are the descendants of French or Dutch men who had liaisons with indigenous Khoi women in the Cape Colony of South Africa in the 18th century.” Prior to Namibian independence, the South African government had granted the Basters autonomy; however, this autonomy was taken away when Namibia became independent in 1990. Thus, in Namibia, the Basters have actively lobbied for political autonomy in the form of self-government. Minahan writes, “Baster nationalists have refused to recognize their incorporation into independent Namibia and continue to recognize their autonomous homeland” (Minahan 2002: 290). The Basters declared independence on the same day as Namibian independence but this was not recognized. The Basters speak Afrikaans rather than English. Under the policy of equal treatment for all citizens, the Namibian government “dismantle[ed] the local governments that functioned under South African rule” and “declared English to be the only official language, which means the end of the Afrikaans education and administration in Rehoboth” (Minahan 2002). Subsequently, the Namibian government pursued a policy of land confiscation and redistribution. Though they occupy land that is in dispute as they had gained the rights to land by displacing the Nama tribe, the Basters claim a right to their land and aim to protect it from state redistribution laws. These claims have resulted in court cases that continue on as of 2012. The start date of the movement is coded as 1990 to coincide with Namibia’s independence. Minorities at Risk notes that the Basters have not been violent in their claims for autonomy, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

East Caprivians

Summary: In 1989, when Namibia was still part of South Africa, the United Democratic Party (UDP) was formed to advocate Caprivi secession (see East Caprivians under South Africa). The movement remained active when Namibia seceded from the Republic of South Africa in 1990. We code the movement from 1990 (the year of Namibia’s independence), though noting prior nonviolent activity. The Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) was formed in 1998. Upon its appearance the military targeted suspected rebel camps for destruction and massacred suspected rebels. People fled to Botswana to avoid persecution. The CLA’s first and only attack occurred on August 2, 1999 when the rebels attacked a military base at Mpacha airport and the police station and radio center in Katima Mulilo, the regional capital. Five police officers and three soldiers were killed while dozens more were injured. The separatists lost five and had eight captured. This attack is not coded LVIOLSD as casualties do not meet the necessary threshold. 1998-1999 is coded as LVIOLSD following a MAR rebellion score of 3. After the attack, a state of
emergency was declared and there was heavy repression in the area. Hundreds of suspected rebels or sympathizers were arrested, tortured, forcibly relocated, and even executed. The leaders of the CLA fled to Botswana and then to Denmark. The state of emergency was soon lifted, but there was still a heavy military presence in the area and reports of arrests, torture, and execution after the lift. In 2006, the UDP was banned and leaders were granted amnesty in Botswana. However, the UDP continues to remain active in advocating secession as of 2012. There has been no separatist violence since the 1999 attacks, and thus all other years are coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
**NEPAL**

**Limbus**

*Summary:* The Limbus, an indigenous (Adivasi/Janajati) group, are located in Nepal’s Eastern hills. Limbu activists claim a Limbuwan state covering nine of Nepal’s Eastern regions, vested with extensive powers. According to a 2011 International Crisis Group report: “The most active Limbuwan groups are the three factions of the Federal Limbuwan State Councils (FLSC). The FLSC was established in December 2005, with Sanjuhang Palungwa as its first president.” However, another Limbu organization advocating Limbu autonomy, the Limbuwan Front, was founded already in 1986. Therefore, we peg the start date to 1986, the year the Limbuwan Front was established, and given continued separatist activity we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. Note: both the Rais and the Limbus are indigenous groups, and hence so-called ‘Adivasis/Janajatis’. There is also a broader movement for indigenous autonomy, but the Rais and the Limbus stand out in terms of both organizational capacity and support for autonomy (International Crisis Group 2011: 13; Lawoti 2013: 201). Hence, we code Rais and Limbus separately, and an umbrella movement of ‘other’ Avidasi/Janajati groups. Avidasis/Janajatis were involved in the Maoist insurgency (1996-2006), but this is not coded as separatist violence since the insurgency’s aim was the toppling of the government. The movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


**Madhesi (Terai People)**

*Summary:* The term Madhesi refers to people living in the Terai; languages spoken by Madhesi include Hindi and Urdu (Kantha 2010: 157). In 1951, the Nepali Terai Congress was formed, claiming an autonomous Terai region, recognition of Hindi as a national language, and inclusion of Madhesi in the civil service (Hachhethu 2007: 10; International Crisis Group 2011: 4). Hence, we code movement activity as of 1951. However, in 1959 the party lost all seats in the parliamentary elections, and subsequently disappeared (Hachhethu 2007: 10). Thus, we code an end to the first phase of the movement in 1959. The Madhesi movement resurfaced in the mid-1980s under the banner of Nepal Sadbhavana Parisad (which turned into the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) after the restoration of multi-party elections in 1990). Somewhat arbitrarily, we code the beginning of the second phase in 1985. Again, federalism was among the core demands. The movement is ongoing in 2012, and became virulent after the civil war came to an end in 2006. In 2006, the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum was formed, an organization advocating ethnic federalism, and soon others followed. In 2007 the United Democratic
Madhesi Front was created, a common platform of three Madhesi parties. We found no evidence of separatist violence and thus code both phases of this movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Other Adivasis/Janajatis

Summary: Nepal’s indigenous groups, commonly called Adivasis/Janajatis, began to organize their interests in the 1990s. With the aim of protecting indigenous culture and fostering indigenous autonomy, the Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN) was formed in 1990; in 2003 it was renamed the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN). Core demands include political autonomy for indigenous groups, language rights, and representation in state bodies. Hence, we begin to code the movement in 1990. Despite the continual ban on ethnic parties, two parties linked to the indigenous movement contested in the 1991, 1994, and 1999 general elections. The movement continues to be active, louder than ever, demanding the federalization of the country. Note: two of Nepal’s indigenous groups, the Rais and the Limbus, are coded separately since they stand out in terms of both organizational capacity and support for autonomy (International Crisis Group 2011: 13; Lawoti 2013: 201). The movement coded relates to all indigenous groups other than Rais and Limbus (including the Tharus, Tamang, and Magar), who are separately coded, and the Hindu Newars, who do not seek self-determination (other Adivasi groups are typically not Hindu). Moreover, note that the Avidasis/Janajatis were involved in the Maoist insurgency (1996-2006), but this is not coded as separatist violence since the insurgency’s aim was the toppling of the government. The movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Rais

Summary: The Rais, an indigenous (Adivasi/Janajati) group, live in Eastern Nepal. Rai activists demand an autonomous Rai state, called Khambubwan. The most important Rai autonomist organizations are
the Kirat Janabadi Workers Party (KJWP) and the Khambuwan Rashtriya Morcha (KRM). While the KJWP was only founded in 2007, the KRM had its inception in 1992 (start date). The movement continues to be active, and is coded as ongoing. Note: both the Rais and the Limbus are indigenous groups, and hence so-called ‘Adivasis/Janajatis’. There is also a broader movement for indigenous autonomy, but the Rais and the Limbus stand out in terms of both organizational capacity and support for autonomy (International Crisis Group 2011: 13; Lawoti 2013: 201). Hence, we code Rais and Limbus separately, and an umbrella movement of ‘other’ Adivasi/Janajati groups. Adivasis/Janajatis were involved in the Maoist insurgency (1996-2006), but this is not coded as separatist violence since the insurgency’s aim was the toppling of the government. The movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


NETHERLANDS

Frisians

*Summary:* Frisian demands for cultural and linguistic autonomy first surfaced in the 1880s. In the post World War II era, the Frisian National Party (Fryske Nasjonale Partij, FNP) was founded in 1962 to seek autonomy for northern province of Friesland within a federal Europe. We therefore peg the start date of the movement in 1962 and as it has been consistently active in Dutch politics since then, we code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 6, 2002].
NEW ZEALAND

Maoris

Summary: What appears to be the first Maori political organization, the Maori Congress, was formed in 1962, hence the start date of the movement. In 1975, Maori activists organized a land march, calling for the return of their lands and access to natural resources (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 185). The Maori have a variety of grievances with the New Zealand government. At the extreme are calls for an independent Maori state. More widely-shared demands include greater participation at the state level, more public funds, and the promotion of the Maori language and way of life. The essential concern, however, is the protection of Maori lands and the enforcement of land treaties. The organizations are as varied as the Maori Pacific Party, to the Maori Congress, the Maori Council, the Maori Mana Motuhake, to the Treaty Tribal Coalition, to a new organization that styles itself the Government of Aotearoa. The latter has called for more militant strategies in dealing with the New Zealand government, although they have yet to use strategies of rebellion. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1960-99 indicate that the movement has been consistently active throughout this time period. The movement is coded as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. Note: “Beginning in 1982, the Kohanga Reo movement set up centers to promote the Maori culture and language, and by 1990, almost half of Maori preschoolers were enrolled in the program. In 1990, tribal leaders established a Maori Congress to provide a national forum for Maori issues. The New Zealand government responded to Maori demands by adopting policies that promoted community-based development using traditional tribal structures, and government departments were reorganized in an attempt to be sensitive to Maori cultural values. Also, the Waitangi tribunal was set up to examine Maori land claims and disputes over natural resources dating back to 1840” (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 185).

Sources:
NICARAGUA

Miskitos

Summary: In 1974 Nicaraguan indigenous peoples organized to protect their rights and traditional lands through the organization of ALPROMISU (Alliance for the Progress of Miskitos and Sumus). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1974. Replacing ALPROMISU in November 1979, MISURASATA (Mascot, Rama, and Sandinista United) was formed to represent the indigenous populations’ more serious grievances to the Sandinista government. Over 80 percent Miskito, MISURASATA supported claims for indigenous communal land grants and the promotion of language and culture. When the Sandinistas banned it in 1981, the group began launching attacks on the Sandinista military from Honduras, with funding from the CIA and in collaboration with the Contras. The Sandinistas responded by forcibly relocating 8,500 Miskitos and destroying as many as 100 villages. Following Doyle & Sambanis, 1981 is coded as HVIOLSD. The Miskitos were also involved in the 1982-1990 insurgency against the Sandinistas. Casualties are too limited to warrant a HVIOLSD code, thus 1982-1990 are coded with LVIOLSD. We mark the 1982-1990 period as “ambiguous” because the primary scope of the war was to gain control of the central government (c.f. Gleditsch et al. 2002;Themnér & Wallensteen 2014). After 1990 we found no reports of separatist violence and non-zero MAR protest scores for 1990-2006 indicate that the movement has continued to be active. The Miskitos declared independence in 2009, while subsequent protests have centered around land rights. No separatist violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


**Sumos (Mayangnas)**

*Summary:* The relevant organization representing Mayangna interests is the Sumu Kalpapakna Wahaini Lani (or SUKAWALA – it means “National Organization of Indigenous Mayangna Communities of Nicaragua). It was founded in 1974, hence the start date. SUKAWALA advocates, among other things, for the Nicaraguan government to defend indigenous land rights; they protest the lack of initiative and action on the titling of the Indigenous Mayangna (Sumu) communities’ territories, guaranteeing the legal control of property and recognition of the rights of the use, administration, and management of the traditional lands and natural resources, by means of their boundary, demarcation and titling. The Sumos were involved in the 1981 uprising that is coded as a civil war in Doyle & Sambanis (2006). However, most of the casualties are due to the Miskitos-Sandinistas dyad, thus we code 1981 as LVIOLSD. The Sumos were also involved in the 1982-1990 insurgency against the Sandinistas. Again, Casualties are too limited to warrant a HVIOLSD code, thus 1982-1990 are coded with LVIOLSD. We mark the 1982-1990 period as “ambiguous” because the primary scope of the war was to gain control of the central government (c.f. Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér & Wallensteen 2014). All other years are coded as NVIOLSD. The movement is ongoing.

*Sources:*


**NIGER**

**Toubou**

*Summary:* The Toubou are nomadic peoples inhabiting the Tibesti Mountains that are centred in the Sahara of northern Chad and reach into Libya and north-eastern Niger. In Niger, they constitute a small minority group, inhabiting the remote eastern areas of the country and make up around 0.3% of the population (Minority Rights Group International). According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, two separate Toubou armed movements emerged, both demanding autonomy for ethnic Toubous in eastern Niger. In 1994 the FDR (Front démocratique du renouveau) was formed, initially demanding a federal structure to be set up in Niger. We thus peg the start date at 1994. In 1995 they called for far-reaching autonomy for a vast region in eastern Niger. Later that year, the first clashes with Niger’s security forces occurred and resulted in 34 deaths (UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset v.5). Their armed struggle reached the level of a minor intrastate conflict in 1996 and ended in August 1998 when the FDR signed a ceasefire agreement. In 1997, a new rebel group, FARS (Forces armées révolutionnaires du Sahara) was established and started fighting the government of Niger. Their goal was the same as the FDR’s. The conflict was terminated by the signing of a ceasefire agreement in November 1997. The accord was successfully upheld until September 2001, when there was renewed fighting between Nigerien troops and FARS fighters (did not cross 25 battle-related death threshold of UCDP/PRI). The movement should thus be coded as still ongoing. The information on the Toubou in Niger is very scarce. An additional source that could be cited is Idrissa and Decalo (2012) who also describe the Toubou as an irredentist movement that wants reunification with its kin in Chad, Libya and Sudan. Based on this information, we code NVIOLSD in 1994, LVIOLSD in 1995-1997, and 1998-ongoing as NVIOLSD.

**Sources:**


**Tuaregs**

*Summary:* In 1985 the Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger was set-up in Libya, mostly by ethnic Tuaregs (University of Central Arkansas). However, it is not clear whether this organization immediately advocated separatist goals. The first unambiguous evidence for separatist activity is in 1988 (Marshall & Gurr). Sources differ on the Tuaregs’ involvement in low-level violence. Our coding follows Marshall &
Gurr (2003) who code armed conflict in 1988-1997. In agreement with this, the MAR rebellion score exceeds two in 1988-1994 and 1997. We found no clear evidence for prior nonviolent claim-making. MAR’s rebellion score is only in 1995-1996, rendering our LVIOLSD code in these years ambiguous. MAR’s coding appears due to a cease-fire signed in 1995. According to the University of Central Arkansas, “April 24, 1995, representatives of the Niger government and Tuaregs formally signed a peace agreement mediated by France, Algeria, and Burkina Faso in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, which provided for the amnesty for and disarmament of some 3,000 Tuareg rebels.” However, “[s]everal Tuareg militants rejected the 1995 peace agreement and established a new Coordination of the Armed Resistance (CRA) on July 21, 1995. The CRA resumed the rebellion on September 12, 1995. The Union of Armed Resistance Force (l’Union Armée des Forces de Resistance- UARF) was established by Tuareg militants on November 13, 1996. Government troops clashed with Tuareg militants near Agadez on December 29, 1996, resulting in the deaths of three individuals.” In sum, 1995-1996 is a candidate for NVIOLSD, but we retain the LVIOLSD code because the rebellion continued and because of possible reporting problems. Note: UCDP/PRIO codes an armed conflict in but a single year, 1994, but this is too limited.

In 2007, Tuareg rebels formed the Niger Movement for Justice (Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice, MNJ). Subsequent violence from 2007-2009 is coded as LVIOLSD to reflect the level of fighting and the resulting number of casualties and based on the following account: “Tuareg militants, members of the Movement of Nigeriens for Justice (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice-MNJ) led by Aghalay ag Alambo and Mohamed Acharif, attacked a military base in the town of Iférouane near Agadez on February 8-9, 2007, resulting in the deaths of three government soldiers. MNJ militants killed three government soldiers in a mine attack near Iferouane on April 15, 2007. MNJ militants killed seven government soldiers in a mine attack near Tadek on April 19, 2007. MNJ militants killed seven government soldiers in a mine attack in Iferouane on April 22, 2007. MNJ militants attacked and captured the town of Tazerzait on June 22, 2007, resulting in the deaths of 15 government soldiers. MNJ militants killed three government soldiers in Abardokh on July 20, 2007. MNJ militants killed four government soldiers in a mine attack in Tourayat on July 31, 2007. MNJ militants killed four government soldiers in a mine attack near Agadez on August 20, 2007. MNJ militants attacked government troops in Gougaram on August 21, 2007, resulting in the deaths of at least three government soldiers. The Nigerien government declared a state of alert in the Agadez region on August 24, 2007. MNJ militants attacked a military convoy near the town of Iferouane on December 4, 2007, resulting in the deaths of three government soldiers. According to the Nigerien military, eight militants were killed in clashes following the attack on the military convoy. Government troops clashed with MNJ militants in the Tiguidit region on December 9, 2007, resulting in the deaths of seven civilians and one militant. MNJ militants attacked the town of Tanhout on January 21, 2008, resulting in the deaths of seven government soldiers. Government troops clashed with Tuareg militants in northern Niger on March 9-29, 2008, resulting in the deaths of ten militants and five government soldiers. Government troops recaptured the town of Tazerzait from MNJ militants on June 27, 2008, resulting in the deaths of 17 militants. Some 200 Tuareg militants and 70 government soldiers were killed in the fighting between February 2007 and June 2008. The Nigerien government renewed the state of alert in the Agadez region on August 20, 2008. Libya mediated negotiations between representatives of the Nigerien government and the MNJ in Tripoli, Libya on April 4-6, 2009. The MNJ agreed to a cessation of military hostilities on May 15, 2009” (University of Central Arkansas). 2010-ongoing is coded NVIOLSD to reflect a low number of deaths per year due to sporadic separatist violence.

Sources:


**Summary:** Bakassi Peninsula was a disputed territory between Nigeria and Cameroon that caused interstate tensions and border clashes throughout the 1990s. In 2002, the ICJ ruled that the Peninsula was to be ceded from Nigeria to Cameroon. The process of transfer began in 2006 and was formally completed in 2008. Though the territory was disputed, those living in Bakassi consider themselves Nigerians and thus protested their change in nationalities. In 2006, hundreds of Bakassi residents formed the Bakassi Movement for Self Determination (BAMOSD) a militant group aiming at complete secession and the formation of a new state, the Democratic Republic of Bakassi. BAMOSD refused to accept Cameroonian sovereignty but also refused relocation within Nigeria (BBC UK, 8/7/2006). The group claims, “[w]e will no longer have anything to do with Nigeria, since Nigeria does not want anything to do with us” (BBC UK 8/7/2006). Since Bakassi was not formally ceded to Cameroon until 2008, we code a movement in Nigeria from 2006-2008. There has been violence stemming from the Bakassi movement, although the rebel groups have engaged mostly in kidnapping and holding hostages. 10 were killed on July 22, 2008, 12 days before the territorial transfer (CrisisWatch Database). Since violence does not reach the 25 deaths per year threshold, we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

**Sources:**

- Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 13, 2014].

**Edo**

*Summary:* In 1948 Edo students formed the first openly nationalist organization, the Edo National Union, the forerunner of the later Out Edo, an organization dedicated to defending Edo interests against

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4 Nigeria is a difficult case to code because the willingness of the government to create new states and local government areas, particularly in the 1990s, has led many ethnic groups to request the creation of their own state and local government areas. For example, prior to the 1996 constitutional convention, over 60 demands for the creation of new states were made. Although we researched extensively self-determination movements in Nigeria, we found only sparse information regarding many of these groups, particularly with respect to their level of political organization. Therefore, for this version of the dataset we only include those movements for which we found conclusive evidence indicating that the movement is politically-organized.
domination from the Yorubas (Minahan 2002: 568). 1948 is accordingly denoted as start date. The movement’s activities carried over into independent Nigeria (see Minhaan 2002: 568-569). Since Nigeria did not become an independent state until 1960, we code movement activity from 1960 and indicate that it was active and nonviolent prior to independence. In an attempt to thwart Edo threats of secession, the Nigerian government created in 1964 a fourth region – the Midwest Region. In August 1967 Edo separatists declared Benin independent of both Biafra and Nigeria, but the government suppressed the rebellion by September 1967. Since we found no information regarding how many people were killed in this rebellion, we code NVIOLSD 1960-1967. Separatist demands resurfaced in 1989 and culminated in the creation of Delta state in 1991. We found no further evidence of separatist activity, suggesting that the movement ended in 1991. 1989-1991 is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [April 6, 2002].
Lexis Nexis. [July 4, 2003].

Hausa and Fulani

Summary: In 1949 the Hausa and Fulani (Northern Muslims) launched their own political party, the Northern People’s Congress. In 1966 Ibo officers overthrew the government and established a new regime dominated by the Ibo (Christian) tribe. In response Northern leaders planned to reassert Muslim control over Nigeria or, alternatively, to proclaim secession of a new Republic of Hausa, hence the start date. Before the chosen “secession day” – July 29, 1966 – a new Nigerian government, headed by a Northern Christian and therefore supposedly neutral, proposed a compromise acceptable to Hausa-Fulani leaders, namely a loose-confederation of Nigerian states. But before the compromise took effect, severe anti-Ibo rioting spread across the north of Nigeria. The Hausa-Fulani leadership evacuated all northern civil servants and military personnel from the federal capital in Lagos and prepared to declare the north independent of Nigeria. This declaration, overtaken by the Ibo declaration of Biafra’s independence, was put aside as the Muslims regained their predominance in the military and government. We code an end to the first phase in 1966. With the founding of the Arewa People’s Congress in 1994, some Hausa-Fulani are again calling for secession. The last separatist activity we detected is in 2006. No separatist violence was found in Lexis Nexis. In light of this case history, we code 1966 and 1994 to 2012 as NVIOLSD. We would code the end of the movement in 2016 if no new information becomes available on the Hausa and Fulani movement, but code it as ongoing as of 2012.

Sources:
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [April 6, 2002].
Ibibios

Summary: The Ibibios are an ethnic group indigenous to Ibibioland, also called Calabar, in southeastern Nigeria within Akwa Ibom State and Cross River State. In the early 1900s, Ibos began migrating to Calabar and created ethnic tensions between the indigenous Ibibios and the migrant Ibos. Ibibio rioting over the Ibo issue in 1929 killed 32 people. In 1944, the Ibibio State Union was formed to “press for restrictions on Ibo immigration to their traditional lands, and to demand the creation of a separate Calabar region within Nigeria” (Minahan 2002: 760). As this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity we found, 1944 is coded as start date. Separatist demands grew after 1949, when there were again nationalist riots aimed at the more numerous Ibos (Minahan 2002: 760). We code movement activity for 1960 onwards, in accordance with Nigeria’s independence. Note: we could not find casualty information on the 1949 riots, but according to Minahan these mainly involved inter-ethnic violence, which is not coded. We found no other reports of separatist violence; thus we consider the Ibibios movement non-violent prior to Nigeria’s independence. According to Minahan, Ibo control over Ibibioland increased with Nigeria’s independence, and in the first few years of independence the Ibibio’s demands for a separate region increased. In 1965, Ibibio organizations began to demand separation from Nigeria entirely. In 1967, the new Nigerian constitution divided Nigeria into twelve ethnic states and the Ibibios were given their own South-Eastern State. In 1976, the Ibibios further demanded that South-Eastern State be divided into two states so that the Ibibios, who settled in the south, would be separate from other ethnic groups in the northern parts of the state. No movement was found after 1976. Tribal tensions occurred in the late 1980s and in 1987, the Nigerian government divided Ibibioland. According to Minahan (2002), the division of Ibibioland roused nationalist sentiments once again; however, we were not able to find a formal organization advocating self-determination during that time or thereafter. Since the last instance of separatist activity we found was in 1976, we code the end of the movement as 1986 in accordance with the ten-years rule. No violence was found from 1960-1986, and thus we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**Ibos (Biafrans)**

*Summary:* Ibo officers took part in a coup in January 1966. In protest Northerners massacred thousands of Ibos living in the North in May 1966 and in July 1966 a counter-coup installed General Gowon, a northerner, as head of state. With the massacre of approximately 30,000 Ibos and other Easterners by Northern troops and civilians in October 1966 came ever more serious calls for Eastern secession, for it was becoming clear that the safety of the Ibo community was indeed jeopardized in a federal Nigeria. According to Horowitz (1992: 122, cited in Baker 2001: 90): “The Ibo were the most prominent proponents of one Nigeria [...] But when recurrent violence, culminating the massacres of September-October 1966 drove the Ibo back to the east, then, and then only, did the Ibo become secessionists. Meanwhile, the Hausa travelled the opposite direction, from their openly secessionist inclination of mid-1966, to their strong role in suppressing the Biafra secession and preserving an undivided Nigeria.” 1966 is coded as start date. In response to this mounting tension, regional and federal leaders signed in January 1967 the Aburi Agreement, which regionalized the national army and mandated unanimous approval by the regional military governors for any new federal legislation. On May 26, 1967 the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly voted to secede from Nigeria and two days later Gowon proclaimed a state of emergency and unveiled plans for the redivision of the country into twelve states, which purportedly undermined the possibility of continuing Northern domination and thus offered a major concession to the East. But at the same time the Ibo heartland would be deprived of control over the Niger Delta’s oil fields and access to the sea. With claims that this decree violated the Aburi Agreement, Ojukwu declared Biafra’s independence. On July 6, 1967 federal troops invaded the breakaway region. The HVIOLSD code in 1967-1970 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). While Doyle & Sambanis (2006) code 1966 as HVIOLSD, the violence in 1966 consisted of a coup and reprisals. The civil war, which is what we code, is typically coded as starting in 1967. We code an end to the movement in 1970 because the rebels were decisively defeated. Demands for secession were revived in 1999 with the creation of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). While MASSOB and government have clashed on occasion, none of the violence appears to qualify as LVIOLSD. MASSOB has remained active as of 2012. In 2010, the Biafra Zionist Movement was created in Nigeria to fight for Biafran independence. There have been some separatist violence attributed to the Biafra Zionist Movement as well, but fatalities do not qualify as LVIOLSD and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD.

**Sources:**


**Ijaw**

*Summary:* The Ijaw, Nigeria’s fourth largest ethnic group, inhabit the oil-rich Niger Delta region. In 1966 Ijaw youth declared their homeland the Niger Delta People’s Republic, but the rebellion was suppressed and we code an end to this NVIOLSD period in 1966. In 1992 when the Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality adopted its charter and began to lobby for an Ijaw state, a demand that came to fruition in 1996 with the creation of Bayelsa State. We do not code low-level violence in 1995-1996 as suggested by Hewitt et al. (2008) as our research indicates 1997 as the start of low-level violence: anti-government and ethnic violence, as well as militant actions against oil multinationals, began in March 1997 after the relocation of the Warri Southwest local government headquarters – and the correlated access to municipal patronage, oil royalties and government funds – from an Ijaw to an Itsekiri town. From March 1997 to December 2002, at least 290 persons were killed in clashes between Ijaw youths and government forces, at least 596 persons were killed in ethnic warfare, and Nigerian security forces massacred at least 2,500 civilians. As the conflict is ongoing, we code 1997 to 2002 as LVIOLSD. In accordance with Marshall & Gurr (2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008), the movement is coded LVIOSD from 2003 – 2006 as well. Additional research indicates over 25 deaths a year from 2007-2009, and 15 deaths in 2010. We thus code LVIOLSD from 1997-2009, and NVIOLSD from 2010 onward. The drop in violence appears due to an amnesty offered to the rebels in 2009, which led to a decrease in violence in subsequent years (Global Security).

*Sources:*


**Itsekiris**

*Summary:* Once the Warri Kingdom from 1949-1884, the Itsekiri homeland is now Warri province, located in the northwest region of the Niger Delta. An 1884 treaty brought the Warri Kingdom under colonialism and in 1894 it became part of Southern Nigeria. Nigeria was later created in 1914 as an amalgamation of different ethnic homelands, one of which was the Itsekiris of the Warri Kingdom. Since the colonial period, the Itsekiris and other ethnic groups within Warri such as the Ijaw and Urhobo have been embroiled in ethnic conflict over which group is the true indigene of Warri. Such conflicts were often communal and pertained to local government, rather than formal self-determination claims against the Nigerian government. No organized Itsekiri secessionist or autonomist movement was found until 1987 when the Itsekiris released a document entitled “Itsekiri and Delta State,” which demanded “[a] local Government Council exclusively to the Itsekiris in which they can exclusively control and preserve: a) [t]heir lands, b) [t]heir language and customs, c) [t]heir culture” (Obiomah). In 1999 the Itsekiri organization, the Itsekiri Leaders of Thought, released a memorandum for the creation of a new Warri state that is separate from Delta State. They note that “Nigeria is a mere geographical expression” and thus they demand the creation of either their own Warri State, or for Warri to be designated a Special Area (Ekpoko and Ede). Demands have arisen in the context of complaints about a lack of fiscal federalism, ethnic marginalization, and a lack of control over natural resources within Warri. The Itsekiris are a small minority in Nigeria and are not represented in the Senate, but they produce almost a third of Nigeria’s oil and gas. They thus believe that the creation of a Warri State would give them more representation. Alongside the memorandum released in 1999 by the Isekiri Leaders of Thought, the Warri Council of Itsekiri Chiefs in 1999 also sponsored a bill to create The Federal Protected Territory for Warri Division. The bill would create an administrative structure dominated by Itsekiris as well as a Territorial Force Command that would allow Itsekiris to administer justice within Warri. The movement remains ongoing as of 2012. Although there have been some periods of inter-ethnic violence, we do not consider that as violence for self-determination. No violence against the Nigerian government over the creation of a Warri state could be found. Thus, we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*

Kanuri

Summary: Although a Kanuri state called Borno was created in 1976, in November of that year mass demonstrations erupted, demanding immediate independence. Hundreds of armed men tried to force the new state government to establish a separatist Kanuri government. The uprising was suppressed by Nigerian troops. Since we have not yet been able to find information on death counts, for the moment we code 1976 as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Northerners

Summary: In the late 1990s northern politicians began to press for the introduction of Islamic Law in Nigeria’s North. Then, in 2002, Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa (popularly called Boko Haram) was formed with the aim of breaking away some of the Northern regions from Nigeria (Kanamma, Yunusari, and Toshiya) and establishing an Islamic state. Thus, we peg the start date to 2002. In 2003 Boko Haram launched its first attacks on a number of police stations in Yobe State. In subsequent military action, the Nigerian army managed to flush the group out of Yobe State, eventually killing or arresting most of its members. However, Boko Haram again launched several attacks on the Nigerian government in recent years. Thus, we code the movement as ongoing. We code 2002 and 2003 as NVIOLSD since it seems violence did not reach 25 deaths per year that year. Boko Haram began its attacks in 2003 and in December 2003, attacks
killed 18 rebels, which does not meet the 25 deaths per year threshold. We code 2004 as LVIOLSD following the UCDP battle deaths dataset v.5. According to Irin News, Boko Haram went underground from 2005-2008. The casualty estimates in those years do not meet the LVIOLSD threshold, thus 2005-2008 is coded as NVIOLSD. 2009 onward is coded as HVIOLSD following Doyle & Sambanis (2006).

Sources:


Ogoni

Summary: The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni Peoples (MOSOP), aiming for increased self-determination for the Ogonis, was founded in 1990, hence the start date of the movement. The movement is ongoing, based on non-zero protest scores in MAR until 2006. Although the Ogoni have been involved in communal conflict since 1990 and have been the victims of severe government repression (2,000 Ogoni are reported to have been killed by the Nigerian army and police), these are not considered separatist violence. MOSOP engaged in separatist violence from 2006-2012, but fatalities do not qualify for an LVIOLSD classification, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**Orons**

*Summary:* The Orons are located in the Niger Delta in Nigeria; most Orons live in the Cross River and Akwa Ibom States. Several Oron organizations claim increased control over the natural resources and a separate Oron state. The earliest evidence for separatist activity we found is in 1999, when a couple of Oron organizations including the Oron National Forum and the Oron Youth Movement proclaimed the Oron Bill of Rights. The Oron Bill of Rights, among other things, demands a separate Oron state. The movement is ongoing. No violence was found, and thus the entire movement is coded NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2014].


**Tiv**

*Summary:* According to Minahan (2002: 1904-1905), Tiv chiefs began to press the British to set up an autonomous Tiv government in the 1940s. According to Minahan, rejection of the plan led to riots and rebellion, with Tiv insurgents attacking both the government and neighboring peoples, in particular the Jukum. In reaction, the British gave in and in 1947 “established the office and title of Tor Tiv, with rights and duties similar to the northern Muslim emirs.” We lack a clearer indication as to when the first demands were made. We code the start date in 1945: Minahan (2002: 1905) reports that the Tiv, along with other non-Muslim northerners, formed the Northern Non-Muslim League in 1945 “to fight for the rights of the tribes living in the region.” The date of formation appears to coincide with the above report on claims for the set-up of an autonomous Tiv government. However, in the data set, we only code the Tiv from 1960, the year of Nigeria’s independence. In 1950 the League changed its name to the Middle Zone League (MZL). MZL led a campaign for separation from (Muslim-dominated) northern Nigeria and the formation of a fourth region in Nigeria. In particular, in the late 1950s, the MZL’s president, J.S. Tarka (an ethnic Tiv), publically demanded a separate Middle Belt region separate from the Muslim north. Self-determination activity carried over into independent Nigeria. While Minahan notes a Tiv rebellion in the 1940s, we could not find an indication that the LVIOLSD threshold was met. We found no other reports of separatist violence before 1960, and thus note prior non-violent activity. Following the end of the Biafran Civil War in 1970, demands for a separate Tiv state were renewed. In 1976, Benué state was created, a state with a majority Tiv population. With this, the Tiv self-determination movement appears to have come to an end (Minahan 2002: 1906), hence the end date. We found no evidence for violence over self-determination.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 6, 2002].
Urhobos

Summary: The Urhobos live in Delta State amongst the Itsekiris, Ijaws, and other minority groups, but they are the majority ethnic group within Delta State. Since the colonial period, the three groups have been embroiled in ethnic conflict over which group is the true indigene of Warri. However, during the colonial period, Urhobo nationalist groups – the Urhobo General Council and the Urhobo Progress Union – did not aim for self-determination but for greater representation and equal treatment under Britain in comparison to the Itsekiris (Ukiwo and Okonta: 7). Towards the late 1990s however, the Urhobos have been active in preventing Itsekiri dominance over the region and have proclaimed self-determination on behalf of their ethnic group within Warri over land rights (control of natural resources) as well as language and cultural issues. The Urhobos are represented by many groups, including the Urhobo Nationalist Movement, the Movement for the Advancement of Urhobo Nation, and the Urhobo National Youth Movement. A communique on the 1998 First Urhobo Economic Summit states that protests in the 1980s over the “economic enslavement of the oil producing areas and the massive reduction of the application of the principles of derivation” resulted in a slight increase in derivation. However, the Summit indicated that the slight increase in derivation was not enough: “[t]he Summit wishes to replace the principles of derivation with complete ownership and control of oil and gas wealth in our domain as the only way out of forty years of marginalization and deprivation” (Urhobo Historical Society 1998). The Summit also expressed dissatisfaction over environmental pollution as a result of the oil companies, loss of oil jobs to outsiders, and loss of language and culture. It asked for “the immediate establishment of Urhobo Language Centres at Delta State University, Abraka and the College of Education, Warri to propagate Urhobo culture in its entirety and offer scholarship awards for the study of the language” (Urhobo Historical Society 1998). Further research indicates that protests in the 1980s were over taxation and not necessarily over land rights. Thus, we code the start date as 1998 to coincide with the First Urhobo Economic Summit. The movement has since expanded from land rights and cultural rights into requests for an Urhobo state and more fiscal freedom. In 2009, the Urhobo Progress Union (UPU) submitted a request for the creation of an Urhobo State that “will consist of contiguous Urhobo kingdoms which comprise homogenous communities with common cultural and traditional values” (Ibru 2009). They also requested a return to “the Fiscal Federalism Principle (ownership and control of resources by states), which was the Revenue Allocation Principle in the 1960-63 Nigeria constitution” (Ibru 2009). The request for an Urhobo State was reiterated in 2013 when the Delta monarch called for the creation of a new Delta State that would be an Urhobo state. Although there have been some periods of ethnic violence, we do not consider that as violence for self-determination. No violence against the Nigerian government over land rights was found. Thus, we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Frynas, Jedrzej G. (2000). *Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities*. Münster: LIT.

http://www.waado.org/organizations/UPU/president_general/urhobo_state/request_submission.html [June 20, 2014].


http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/12/delta-monarch-calls-creation-urhobo-state/ [June 20, 2014].

**Yorubas**

*Summary:* Yoruba leaders threatened and made preparations for secession in 1966-67. We could not find further separatist activity. Following the ten-year rule, we code an end to this first phase of activity in 1977 and code this first period as NVIOLSD. In 1994 the Odua People’s Congress, which both promotes the self-determination of the Yoruba and is an ethnic vigilante group, was formed, hence the start date of the second phase of the movement. As of 2012, the OPC has continued to remain active, and notably has aimed to prevent Boko Haram from taking over Yorubaland. Keesing’s reports that at least 60 people were killed in 2000 in clashes between the OPC Hausas and government police and troops and that comparable violence continued through 2003. We therefore code 2000 to 2003 as LVIOLSD. From 2004 onward, clashes largely took place between OPC factions rather than between the OPC and the government. Though there continues to be some separatist clashes, casualties do not go above the 25 deaths per year threshold. We thus code 2004-2012 as NVIOLSD.
Sources:


NORWAY

Sami (Lapps)

Summary: Sami activists formed the Nordic Saami Institute in 1973 to press for political and land rights. Since 1973, Sami have elected a representative body, a Sami Parliament. Its 20 representatives are elected every four years and the purpose of the Sami Parliament is to attend to the rights and interests of the Sami by presenting initiatives and proposals and by preparing opinions to the authorities. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1973. In 1983 Sami leaders declared the sovereignty of the divided nation (the Sami are also found in Norway and Sweden). In 1986 the Chernobyl disaster spread radiation across Lapland and made necessary the destruction of reindeer herds, the Sami’s livelihood. Two years later Sami leaders demanded the creation of a Sami parliament that would have influence over planning and development of the region. In response to this demand, the Norwegian government inaugurated in October 1989 the Sami Assembly, which consists of 39 representatives that are directly elected from 13 constituencies covering the whole country. From 1989 until 1999, the Assembly was the main vehicle of Sami separatism and there has been an ongoing debate in the Norwegian parliament with respect to how much power the Sami Assembly should have in regard to land claims, self-government and resource management. In 2000, the Sami Parliamentary Council was formed to represent the Sami parliaments in Norway, Sweden, and Finland to overlook issues include cultural and language autonomy as well as the freedom to cross borders between the countries. A 2011 UN document indicates that the Sami movement remains ongoing in all three countries, and the Sami Parliamentary Council remains active as of 2012. We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLOSD classification.

Sources:


OMAN

Dhofari

Summary: This conflict was known as the Dhofar rebellion. The Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) was formed in 1963. It involved a small insurgent group (1,500-2,000) of Marxists battling an eventual combined force of Omani, Iranian, and British Special Forces troops. In 1971 the DLF joined with other non-Communist groups to form the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (FLOAG), which fought both government troops and the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). Peterson’s (2007) comprehensive book on rebellions in Oman provides some statistics on deaths during this conflict. According to Peterson, total combatant deaths for the 1967-1970 period stood at 181. Peterson also reports a total of 513 combatant deaths between January 1, 1971 and March 1, 1972 (excluding British officers), and a total of 21 British troops (officers and enlisted) killed between January 1, 1971 and April 30, 1974 (Peterson 2007:330). Following Doyle & Sambanis (2006) we code 1964-75 as HVIOLSD. Note: Doyle & Sambanis do not code 1964-1970 as a civil war since they follow COW and assume that Oman gained independence only in 1971: “This could be coded as a civil war for either the period 1964-1975 or 1971-75, but the total death count may be under 1,000 so this makes it a borderline case. We code a war as of 1971 – the date of independence.” For the present purposes we follow Gleditsch & Ward (1999) and consider Oman independent already by 1963. Thus we code a civil war from 1964-1975. We mark the HVIOLSD phase as “ambiguous” because it appears from Gleditsch et al. (2002)/Themnér & Wallensteen (2014) that secession was not the primary objective of the violence. The Dhofari rebellion was crushed in December 1975, and though Minahan (2002: 530-531) suggests continued separatist sentiment, we could not find evidence of further separatist activity. Hence, we code an end to the movement in 1975.

Sources:


5 Peterson worked for the government of Oman. His biography printed on the book jacket states that he “spent some years in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defence in the Sultanate of Oman.”
Baluchis

Summary: There are some references to a Baloch movement way pre-dating Pakistan’s independence. Grare (2013: 7) argues that some historians peg it to the late 19th century, while others argue that nationalist contention started quite a bit closer to Pakistan’s independence. In line with the latter position, Minahan (2002: 257) argues that nationalist organizations began to put forward demands for autonomy and reunification of all Baluch populated territories in the 1930s. Also according to Bresee (2004: 221-222), the first organized activity dates to the late 1920s/early 1930s: Namely, according to Bresee, Anjuman-e Ittehad-eBalochan (Organization for the Unity of Baloch) was formed in the late 1920s; Anjuman had varied goals, but ultimately they aspired at a united independent Baluchistan. Anjuman operated openly as of 1931, having started out as a clandestine organization in 1920 under a different name, Young Baloch (Bresee 2004: 221-222). The aims of Young Baloch are not clear. While it is possible that there was organized political activity already before 1931, 1931 is used as start date since this is the first clear-cut evidence of separatist activity we found. In 1937 the Kalat State National Party was formed, a Baloch nationalist party (Siddiqi 2012: 57). We code the Baloch movement from 1947, the year of Pakistan’s independence. As we found no evidence of separatist violence prior to 1947, we denote prior non-violent activity. In August 1947, the Khan of Kalat declared his Khalat independent from Pakistan. Khalat was forcibly annexed to Pakistan after a couple of months (we found no evidence that would allow us to code a LVIOLSD phase, however) (Grare 2013: 7). In 1958, the Khanate of Kalat again declared Balochistan independent from Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 258). In the 1950s and 1960s there were several uprisings. The MAR quinquennial rebellion score exceeds two in 1965-1974. However, case study evidence suggests that there was nothing close to rebellion until 1973 (the rebellion score of three in 1965-1969 appears due to the named declarations of sovereignty and the rebellion score of six in 1970-1974 is likely due to the 1973-1977 war). Hence 1947-1972 are coded NVIOLSD. In 1971 the government agreed to negotiations on Baluch autonomy, but then arrested Baluch leaders when they arrived to negotiate. Suspecting Baluch intentions to follow Bangladesh’s lead in secession, Pakistani authorities then clamped down on Baluch nationalist and autonomist organizations. In response rebellion broke out in 1973, HVIOLSD coding for 1973-1977 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). No violence reported in 1978-2002, though non-zero MAR protest scores during that time period indicate that the movement remained ongoing. Thus 1978-2002 are coded with NVIOLSD. There is evidence for low-level violence in 2003-2005. First, Marshall & Gurr (2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) report armed conflict in 2003-2005. Second, the MAR rebellion score is six in 2005. Finally, UCDP/PRIO reports an armed conflict over Baluchistan in 2004, Thus, 2003-2005 is coded as LVIOLSD. 2006 onward is coded as HVIOLSD based on Doyle & Sambanis (2006).

6 There have also been calls for increased self-determination from the Balawari region in Northern Kashmir. The Balawari region was disputed amongst India and Pakistan after the partition; in 1949 a large share of the Balawari region went to Pakistan. Fueled by Shia mobilization in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, nationalism began to flourish among the majority Shia Balawaris. The first evidence of separatist activity we found is the formation of the Balawaristan National Front (BNF) in 1992, a party seeking the independence of Balawaristan (officially known as the Gilgit Baltistan). Other groups agitating for the independence of Balawaristan include the Gilgit Baltistan United Movement and the Karakuram National movement. We do not code the Balawari movement because the region qualifies as a colonial entity according to our definition: The area has not been formally integrated with Pakistan and the inhabitants are not Pakistani citizens. Sources: Gilgit Baltistan United Movement. http://skardu.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2007-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2008-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=12 [March 4, 2014]; Minahan, James (2002). Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 242-248; Singh, Priyanka (2013). “Gilgit Baltistan between Hope and Despair.” Monograph Series No. 14. New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. http://idsa.in/monograph/GilgitBaltistan_pSingh [March 8, 2014]; Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) (2013). “Gilgit Baltistan Congress Hold Event in Baltimore, Maryland.” May 6. http://www.unpo.org/article/15867 [March 4, 2014].
Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [June 25, 2003].


**Bengalis**

*Summary:* In 1949, the All-Pakistani Awami Muslim League broke away from the pro-centralization and pro-partition Muslim League, advocating increased autonomy for the Bengalis. In 1950 the East Bengal Muslim League began to demand that “maximum autonomy” be granted to East Pakistan too. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1949. Disagreements over language and the constitution paralleled conflicts over how the government should be formed and who would control it, and it was these conflicts that ultimately led to secession in 1971. HVIOLSD coding for 1971 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Since the 1971 war led to the independence of Bangladesh, we code an end to the self-determination movement in 1971.

*Sources:*


Pashtuns (Pathans)

Summary: In 1707 the Durrani Sultanate of Afghanistan was formed, thus uniting the Pashtuns. The British took hold of the eastern bit of the Pashtun territory in 1849, thus dividing the Pashtun territory (Minahan 2002: 1538). The Pashtun lands became a source of continual threats to British control. However, the Pashtuns’ resistance to British colonialism is difficult to see as an ongoing, organized movement for the self-determination of Pakistan’s Pashtuns as a whole; most often, these were rather local rebellions by certain Pashtun tribes. The first pan-Pashtun political organization in British India we have found is the Frontier Congress (Khudai Khidmatgar) that was formed in 1929. Khudai Khidmatgar was a social reformist and anti-colonial movement committed to the independence of a united India. Khudai Khidmatgar was strongly opposed to the partition of India, and at least initially did not make claims for Pashtun independence (Ghufran 2009: 1095-1096). This changed once India’s partition became imminent after WWII, when Khudai Khidmatgar won widespread support with demands for a separate status (Ghufran 2009: 1097; Minahan 2002: 1539). According to Khan (2003: 11-12), the first formal call for separate independence was made in June 1947, thus the start date. Since the movement started shortly before Pakistan’s independence, we note prior non-violent activity. In the run-up to the partition, the Afghan government had proposed a referendum to be held in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), where most of Pakistan’s Pashtuns live, involving the options of joining Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, or separate independence. In July 1947, a referendum was indeed held, but it involved only two options: joining India or joining Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 1540-1541). The vote came out in favor of Pakistan. Khudai Khidmatgar was unwilling to recognize the result given the omission of the options of separate independence and union with Afghanistan. Pakistan attained independence in August 1947. Soon after the partition, when it realized that an independent Pushtunistan is unattainable, Khudai Khidmatgar shifted its demand to autonomy within Pakistan (Ghufar 2009: 1098; Mushtaq 2009: 283; Khan 2003: 12-13).

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7 The following provides a short overview of the Pashtuns’ long history of resistance to British colonial rule. Between 1849-1902, the British undertook a total of 54 expeditions against the Pashtun tribes, at least two of which rose to the level of war (Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 237). In 1863, the British fought a war against Pashtun tribes to secure the borders of the growing Indian colony (Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 237-238). On the other hand, in 1897-1898 local Pashtuns unsuccessfully rebelled against British rule (Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 276-277). A key problem had been that the border between Afghanistan (a British protectorate since the Second Anglo-Afghan war in 1878-1880) and British India was not demarcated. Thus, in 1893, the UK forced Afghanistan to agree to a demarcation line (the Durand line). Discontent with the borders had prompted the rebellion in 1897-1898. Having failed to militarily subdue the Pashtuns, in 1901, the British created a semi-autonomous region for the Pashtuns, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Minahan 2002: 1539). After the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, Afghanistan, where many Pashtuns reside, became independent again, though the UK was able to reaffirm the Duran Line. In this context, another rebellion took place in Waziristan, a tribal territory formally outside of colonial British India but under British sovereignty (Barfield 2007: 1, 4): In 1919-1920, Pashtun tribes in Waziristan rebelled against British rule, though without success. Since Waziristan had been outside of colonial British India, COW considers this an “imperial” war (Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 299-300). In 1936-1938, Waziristan again rebelled “against potential British rule”, which COW again considers an “imperial” war (Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 310). Note: when Pakistan became independent in 1947, Waziristan was merged with Pakistan, though with a very high share of autonomy. Pashtun resistance to British rule continued during WWII, forcing the British to divert units to fight Pashtun uprisings (Minahan 2002: 1539). Note as well: Afghanistan repeatedly made irredentist claims on Pashtun territories outside its borders. For instance, in 1944, Afghanistan’s government notified the governor of British India of its interest in the Pashtun area (Minahan 2002: 1539).
Nevertheless, in 1948 it was outlawed and its leaders imprisoned. This does not appear to have ended activity for long, as the Pashtun demands for regional autonomy resumed shortly. According to Minahan (2002: 1540), “[t]he Pakistani government, unable to subdue fully the rebellious tribes, finally adopted the earlier practice of paying local chiefs to keep the peace. Pushtun separatism, supported by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, continued to destabilize the region in the 1950s and 1960s.” Thus we code the movement as ongoing in the late 1940s and the 1950s. In 1957, the National Awami Party was founded, an important representative of the movement, and began to advocate autonomy for Pashtunistan. The party was disbanded after the 1958 coup, but was revived in March 1964. In 1967, it fragmented into the NAP (Bhasani) and NAP (Wali); the latter was pro-Soviet while the former was pro-China. In 1969, NAP (Bhasani) organized a mass movement. During the 1970s and 1980s, both the NAP (Bhasani) and the NAP (Wali) had fragmented into many different parties and factions. In 1972, the NAP formed a coalition with Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). The coalition lasted until 1973. During that period, NAP “moved away from Pashto…Instead, the NAP chose to declare Urdu the official language of the NWFP and assured the PPP’s leadership that it would support Pakistan’s integrity and had left the Pushtunistan issue behind” (Rahman 1995). However, Rahman notes that “Pashto did…remain an issue in the legislative assembly. The fact that members of the NAP took their oath in Pashto and delivered speeches in it, politicized the language issues” (Rahman 1995). In 1975 the NAP was again banned and it remained in this condition until December 30, 1985 when President Zia removed martial law, restored the fundamental rights safeguarded under the constitution, and lifted the Bhutto government’s declaration of emergency powers, which had been in effect since 1975. In 1976, the NAP was banned again but its members founded the National Democratic Party, which became “the de facto successor of the defunct NAP.” The first months of 1986 witnessed a rebirth of political activity throughout Pakistan, including political activity by the NAP. The National Democratic Party merged with Baloch and Sindhi nationalist parties to form the Awami National Party (ANP). Non-zero protest scores from 1985 until 2006 indicate that the movement is ongoing. The Pashtun’s quinquennial MAR rebellion score is 4 in 1960-1964 and 6 from 1980-1984. MAR’s coding notes do not make clear the exact dates of the rebellions. Since we lack more exact information, we code all years (1960-1964 and 1980-1984) with LVIOLSD. Based on MAR anti-rebellion scores of 5 in 2004-2005, the movement is coded LVIOLSD from 2004-2005. From 2006 onward, the movement is classified as HVIOLSD in accordance with Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Note: Minahan (2002: 1540) reports a “terrorist campaign” that was launched by Pashtuns against the newly independent Pakistan in 1947, but we found no indication of casualties and thus 1947 is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Saraikis (Bahawalpuris)

Summary: Upon partition, the largely Saraiki-speaking Bahawalpur (a princely state prior to independence) decided to merge with Pakistan, and was granted province status in 1951. In 1955, when the One Unit system was inaugurated, Bahawalpur was merged with West Pakistan. The leaders of Bahawalpur were promised that Bahawalpur would be a province once again if the One Unit system were to be abolished. At a time when it was clear that the One Unit system was not working, on November 22, 1969, the parties of Bahawalpur passed a unanimous resolution to stress upon the government that Bahawalpur be made a separate province. However, and despite the earlier promise, when the One Unit system was ended in 1970, Bahawalpur was merged with Punjab. The Bahawalpur Awami Party was founded with the aim of re-establishing Bahawalpur as a separate province and gaining more control over natural resources. We code the start date in 1969, when the Bahawalpur parties declared their support for province status. Since then, there were repeated calls for a separate Saraiki province as well as for increased autonomy. The movement appears ongoing, though it has to be noted that it was driven underground by the military leadership of Pakistan. Note that the movement is divided over the territorial contours of a Saraiki province. While some make claims for the reinstatement of the Bahawalpur province, others contend for a larger Saraikistan that would also include parts of neighboring provinces. The Saraiki self-determination claim regained prominence in 2009, when the World Bank gave Pakistan a large loan in order to expand the road network, but none of the money was apportioned for projects in the Saraiki area. No violence was found, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Pakistan Country Background Note [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm] [June 21, 2014].


Sindhis

Summary: The first Sindhi autonomist organization, the Sindh United Front, was established in 1967 (Sathananthan 2000: 236), hence the start date. In 1986 the another self-determination organization was founded, the Sind-Baluchistan Patriotic Front (SBPF). Several other Sindh separatist political parties have been active, too, most notably the Sindh Taraqqi Pasand Party, but in recent years also the Sindh National Party and the Sindh National Front. According to Minahan (2002: 1735), Minorities at Risk, and Mustaq (2009: 284) the movement’s dominant claim is increased autonomy, though there are some radical groups (such as the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz and the Sindh National Party) that agitate for independence. The Sindhis’ quinquennial MAR rebellion score is 4 from 1980-1984. However, the aim of the rebellion concerned the center according to MAR coding notes: “[t]he execution of Z.A. Bhutto in 1979 by the Punjabi general Ziaul Haq further exacerbated tension between the two ethnic groups and led to a political situation that has counter-posed Sindhi-led civilian movements against a Punjabi-led military establishment for control of the Pakistan government bureaucracy.” Thus, we do not code violence over self-determination. The Sindhis were involved in inter-communal violence in the late 1980s up to the mid-1990s (MAR). In particular, in October 1988, 245 persons were killed in clashes between the separatist Long Live Sind Front and Mohajirs, the other principal inhabitants of the region. In May 1990 approximately 300 people were killed in such clashes. Since this is inter-ethnic strife, we do not code LVIOLSD. Moreover, the Sindhis were involved in the 1994-99 civil war coded in Doyle & Sambanis (2006). However, the insurgency was mounted by the Mohajir MQM and the violence involving the Sindhis is classified as inter-ethnic strife. Non-zero protest scores from 2000 onward indicates that the movement has been ongoing, and recent events suggest an ongoing movement as well. The entire movement is coded with NVIOLSD.

Sources:


PANAMA

Embera-Wounaan

Summary: The Embera-Wounaan Congress was established in 1968 to secure legal recognition of land claims. The start date is pegged at 1968. To date, the Congress has achieved two major goals: legal recognition of the comarca in 1983 and physical demarcation in 1993, and development of the carta organica, the legal document guiding the functioning of the comarca. There is continued activity, and thus the movement is coded as ongoing. No violent activity was found, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Kuna

Summary: When Panama gained independence in 1903, its government sought to assimilate the local indigenous population (Foss 2012: 3). This prompted a violent reaction: in 1925, the Kuna successfully rebelled against Panama. As a result, in 1930 the Kuna were granted some limited form of autonomy (MAR; Foss 2012: 4). The Kuna were the first Panamanian indigenous group to press for their own reservation and land rights. The Kuna continued to press for more autonomy (Foss 2012: 5). In 1953, the Kunas gained increased autonomy and land rights (Foss 2012: 5). The Kuna continue to push for rights, and the movement is pegged as ongoing (e.g. Foss 2012: 98; MAR). Based on this, we code the start date in 1925. However, since the data set starts in 1945, we code the Kuna only from 1945. We did not come across casualty figures for the 1925 incidence, but the violent uprising is mentioned consistently across sources (Foss 2012; MAR). We found no other incident of separatist violence before 1945, and thus note that activity immediately before 1945 was non-violent. MAR notes that the Kuna “again took up arms” in 1962. Due to the 1962 incident, the MAR quinquennial rebellion score for Panama’s indigenous peoples is 3 in 1960-1964. However, it is not clear whether this incident was related to self-determination. According to Foss (2012: 12) violence erupted over the Kuna’s contraband trade with Colombians. Moreover, the incident appears rather minimal (we were unable to get by exact casualty estimates, however). Thus we do not code low-level violence in 1962. We found no evidence for separatist violence in other years, either, thus the movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
Ngöbe-Bugle

Summary: The Ngöbe and Bugle indigenous groups in Panama have long campaigned for land rights and their own reservations. The first evidence of separatist activity we found is in 1940, when the Ngöbe-Bugle Congress was established (Thorne 2004: 322), thus the start date. We begin to code the movement in 1945, though noting that the movement had been active (and non-violent) already before. The Ngöbe-Bugle Comarca (reservation) was established in 1997. The Congress continues to press for increased autonomy. Thus the movement is pegged as ongoing in 2012. No violent activity was found, and thus the entire movement is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:
PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Bougainvilleans

Summary: Already prior to Papua New Guinea’s independence in 1975, Bougainville had announced its intentions to secede, following increased environmental degradation due to the exploitation of natural resources as of the 1960s. Napidakoe Navitu, formed in 1969, was the first Bougainvillian nationalist movement (Regan and Griffin 2005: 480) and demanded a referendum on whether Bougainville should remain within Papua New Guinea (Minority Rights Group International). Only days before Papua New Guinea gained its independence from Australia, the Bougainville provincial government voted in favor of a separate state and proclaimed the independence of Bougainville (Republic of the North Solomons). We peg the start date of the movement at 1969 but only code the movement from 1975, the year of PNG’s independence. There is no evidence of separatist violence before 1975. Bougainvillian independence was rejected by both the Australian government and the soon to be PNG government. When PNG finally gained independence, it suspended the Bougainville provincial government and dispatched troops. After months of negotiations following violent clashes, Bougainville was granted autonomy in 1976. Minahan (2002) and Minority Rights Group International argue that separatist sentiment declined after the 1976 autonomy grant. However, Caspersen (2012) describes Bougainville as de-facto independent from 1975-1997, suggesting that the claim for independence was upheld. The major economic enterprise on Bougainville was the Australian mining company CRA Ltd. which controlled the Panguna copper mine. Dissatisfaction over the limited benefits group members received from the mine, concern over the resulting environmental degradation, along with a lack of local political control were among the reasons that led to the formation of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in 1988. 1975-1987 is coded with NVIOLSD (we found no evidence of casualties that would imply a LVIOLSD code). The HVIOLSD coding for 1988-98 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Since then the movement has been nonviolent. Legislation based on the 2001 peace agreement was passed in March 2002 giving Bougainvilleans broad autonomy, but full implementation of the agreement is contingent on completion of a UN-sponsored weapons disposal program. A referendum on independence was also scheduled to be held in 10-15 years. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 2002-2005 indicate that the movement continued. In 2005, the people elected the first autonomous government. In 2006, there were 8 deaths attributed to the Bougainville Freedom Fighters, a new rebel group, but attacks were aimed at businessman Noah Musingku rather than government soldiers (ABC Premium News 11/22/2006). We code the movement as ongoing as of 2012.

Sources:


PARAGUAY

Indigenous Peoples

Summary: The indigenous peoples of Paraguay are located mainly in the Chaco region and make up only about two per cent of Paraguay’s population. The various indigenous groups are not per se unified in their demands, but they are mostly too small to record individually. There are also clear efforts to mount a unified indigenous challenge/movement. Thus, we code a single indigenous movement. Indigenous mobilization for land rights began in the 1970s, when indigenous leaders sought to establish a system of “autogestion”, in which the indigenous groups would represent their own interests and push their own demands (see MAR). Since MAR does not provide a more exact date, we somehow arbitrarily peg the start date to 1975. However, the indigenous rights movement in Paraguay only really took off after the ousting of General Alfredo Stoessner in 1989. In 1992, the most important indigenous organization, Tierra Viva, was established. Paraguay’s 1992 constitution clearly recognizes and guarantees that indigenous cultural and legal (with land rights clearly specified) will be protected. This was hailed as a major victory by indigenous organizations. Still, indigenous peoples in Paraguay continue to engage in their struggle over land rights, and thus the movement is coded as ongoing. No violence associated with the indigenous movements can be found, and thus we code entire period as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
**Lowland Indigenous Peoples**

*Summary:* Peru’s lowland indigenous peoples live primarily in the department of Madre de Dios, in the country’s Amazonian region. They account for 1.2% of the Peru's total population of 26,111,000 and comprise over 80 distinct linguistic families. The largest groups are the Shipibo, Amuesha, Campa, Piro, and Machiguenga. Isolated from other sectors of Peruvian society, they maintain unique traditional semi-nomadic or agricultural cultures, though most Peruvians, indigenous and non-indigenous alike, are Roman Catholic. The major grievances of indigenous peoples in the Amazon are territorial autonomy and protection from resource development that damages their local environment and communities. While the government has made a strong effort since 1995 to address lowland peoples’ desire for bilingual education, government protection of their lands from development has been less successful. Note that we were not able to find a precise start date. Marshall & Gurr (2003) state that the movement has been active since the early 1980s. Since we were unable to find more conclusive evidence, we peg the start date of the movement at 1980. Non-zero MAR protest scores for the ensuing years allow us to code the movement as active from 1980 onward, and news sources indicate that the movement is ongoing as of 2012 as well. We found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


**Loreto**

*Summary:* Loreto is a relatively impoverished region in Peru’s Amazonian northeast that is though rich in oil. While there are indigenous peoples in Loreto, they make up only a minority of the local population. We found a self-determination claim by an organization called the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front’s main goal appears to be resistance to a 1998 treaty between Peru and Ecuador that ceded a small share of Loreto’s territory to Ecuador. That treaty was signed in the context of the 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador. In 1998 the Patriotic Front organized protests against the treaty; three people were reportedly killed in these protests (Washington Office on Latin America 2000: 5). However, the Patriotic Front of
Loreto also makes claims for Loreto’s political and economic autonomy as well as the continuation of a beneficial tax and trade regime (IPS 2002; Washington Office on Latin America 2000: 5). We code 1998 as the start date because the above-mentioned protest in 1998 is the earliest evidence of organized activity we came across. A 2007 U.S. cable suggests that the Patriotic Front continued to press for autonomy; according to the cable, a leading member “claimed the organization sought above all to press the government to pay attention to local needs” and has two primary goals: i) resisting Ecuadorean territorial designs on Loreto (and a 1998 peace treaty signed with Ecuador) and ii) protecting the special tax breaks given to residents of the department. The Patriotic Front continued to be active as of 2013; we found evidence of a strike they organized in protest of corruption (Global Voices 2013). It is not fully clear whether the Front has continued its separatist activities, but we code the movement as ongoing based on the ten-years rule anyway. The Patriotic Front was involved in bloody protests (see above), but we found no violence above the LVIOLSD threshold. Thus, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


www.wikileaks.org/plsd/cables/07LIMA3581_a.html [March 6, 2015].

http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Andes/Peru/past/peru_peace_democratization.pdf [March 6, 2015].

Quechua-Aymara

Summary: The Quechua-Aymara, the largest of Peru’s highland indigenous peoples, jointly make up more than a third of Peru’s population. About 8 million self-identify as Quechua and about 500,000-600,000 as Aymara. The majority of Peru’s Aymara live in the southern Andean region of Puno. The Quechua-Aymara did not traditionally have much collective organizations, but this has changed in recent years (Minority Rights Group International; Petterson 2011: 160). In 1999, the National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) was formed. CONACAMI is often described as the first major success in organizing highland indigenous interests (e.g. Minority Rights Group International; van Cott 2005: 153). CONACAMI though has a strong focus on defending the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to mining operations rather than self-determination as we define it. Most other indigenous organizations appear not to have separatist goals either. The first evidence for organized separatist activity is in 2002, when the Movimiento por la Autonomía Regional Quechua y Aymara (MARQA) was formed, an organization promoting regional autonomy and located primarily in Puno, one of Peru’s regions (MARQA n.d.). In 2002, David J. Sardon won the regional presidency of Puno as head of MARQA (Petterson 2011: 160). Sardon’s successor, Hernan Fuentes, though not from the MARQA, has put forward a “radical indigenist secessionist agenda” (Petterson 2011: 160). In 2008, Fuentes demanded an autonomy referendum (mimicking Santa Cruz, a separatist region in Bolivia that organized a referendum on autonomy in 2008) and unilaterally changed the region’s name into “Quechua and Aymara Autonomous Federal Region” in early 2009 (Peruvian Times 2008, 2009). Fuentes remained
Puno’s regional president until 2011. We found no clear-cut evidence of organized separatist activity beyond 2009 but code the movement as ongoing based on the ten-years rule. We found no evidence of separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


PHILIPPINES

Igorots (Cordillerans)

Summary: The terms Igorots and Cordillerans are used to collectively refer to a number of tribal groups including the Bontoc, Ifugao, Apayao/Isneg, Kalinga, and Tinggians. The Igorots reside in the mountainous north and central Luzon areas in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). During the 1970s, encroachments by the logging industry coupled with Manila's attempt to build a series of hydroelectric dams activated tribal opposition. Along with engaging in protests, some group members joined the Communist Party of the Philippines’ military wing, the New People's Army (NPA), which was waging an anti-government rebellion. But by the early 1980s, Igorot members began to defect from the NPA, and founded the Cordillera People’s Congress in June 1984, calling for the establishment of an autonomous region (Walter 2009: 182). Moreover, in 1986 the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) was founded. We code 1984 as the start of the movement. There is evidence for low-level violent activity in the movement’s early days, though sources differ on the exact dates. We follow Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) who code armed conflict from 1976-1986 as their dates are supported by case study evidence: in 1986, the CPLA entered into talks with the government and on December 15, 1986 a peace agreement that included greater self-rule was reached. Note that we do not code the movement (and thus low-level violence) in 1976-1983 since case study evidence indicates that the Igorots did not make separatist claims before 1984. Note furthermore that while UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict involving the Igorots, MAR would suggest a LVIOLSD code at least until 1988, if not 1993: the MAR quinquennial rebellion score is four in 1980-1984 and the annual rebellion score is 5 from 1985-1987 and 4 in 1988. It remains at 3 in 1989-1993, but this may be due to declarations of sovereignty. Following the 1986 agreement, the first step toward regional autonomy occurred the next year when the Cordillera Administrative Region was established. Two agencies, the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly, were charged with the task of preparing the region for autonomous rule. Plebiscites were held in 1990 and in 1998 in the CAR to determine whether the residents supported the creation of an autonomous region. However, this proposition was widely rejected by both the lowland Filipinos and the highland groups. In each referendum, only one province supported autonomy. President Estrada terminated the two agencies mandated with helping to implement autonomous rule in 2000. Major factions of Igorot rebels have aligned with communist NPA guerillas in 2002 and conducted anti-government attacks. Following Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) we code 2002-2006 as LVIOLSD. Note that no other source reports violence. According to Hewitt et al. (2008) the conflict intensified in 2005 but returned to low level in 2006. Separatist violence occurred sporadically between 2007-2012, but fatalities do not meet the threshold for a LVIOLSD coding.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [March 25, 2002].

Moros

Summary: The first Moro self-determination movement, the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), was launched in 1968 by radical Islamic leaders calling for independence from the Philippines and the creation of a Moro nation. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1968. LVIOLSD coding for 1970 follows Gleditsch et al. (2002)/Themnér & Wallensteen (2014) and HVIOLSD coding for 1971-2012 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006).

Sources:


Silesians

Summary: The Silesian Autonomy Movement was founded in 1990, hence the start date of the movement. Since then it has been active in campaigning for greater autonomy. News sources indicate an ongoing movement as of 2012. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
PORTUGAL

Azoreans

Summary: The Front for the Liberation of the Azores (FLA) was formed in 1975, hence the start date of the movement. In 1976, the Azoreans were granted autonomy, which apparently satisfied most Azoreans. Separatist demonstrations continued sporadically until 1980 (Minahan 2002: 227). We were unable to locate conclusive evidence of separatist activity beyond 1980. Minahan (2002: 227) suggests that there was some limited activity beyond 1980, but we were unable to locate supportive evidence, and hence code an end to the movement in 1990, following the “ten-years inactivity rule”. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:

Madeirans

Summary: The Madeira Archipelago Liberation Front (FLAMA) was founded in 1974, hence the start date of the movement. In 1976 Madeira was granted substantial autonomy, in short its own parliament and budget. The saliency of the self-determination issue subsequently declined, but the nationalists again became active in the late 1980s, according to Minahan (2002: 1138). Madeiran nationalists issued demands for independence in an integrated European federation, and a plan was drawn up for a federation of the Madeiran, Azorean, and Canary Islands. In October 1990, the region’s president met with nationalist leaders to discuss the independence issue. We were unable to locate conclusive evidence of further activity, and hence code an end to the movement in 2000, following our “ten-years inactivity rule”. Keesing’s reports several bomb attacks carried out by FLAMA in November 1975, but since no deaths have been reported, the movement was classified as NVIOLSD for its entire period.

Sources:
ROMANIA

Magyars (Hungarians)

Summary: The Hungarians have organized rapidly and effectively since 1990 in various associations based on religion or culture, later melted under the aegis of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DUHR), who has assumed the task of political representation of the community. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990. In the general elections the DUHR has won seats in every legislature since 1990 and they have sent representatives to two consecutive cabinets. The DUHR remains active in politics as of 2012. The grievances of the Hungarian minority are focused on several issues: limited local autonomy in the regions where they form the majority; the right to use their language in the public administration and tribunals; the right to have instruction at all levels of education in their language; and restitution of church property confiscated by the communist regime. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
RUSSIA (USSR)

Abaza

Summary: The Abazas are concentrated in the Karachai-Cherkessian Republic of the Russian Federation (Minahan 2002: 1). Roeder (2007: 134) contends that by March 1992, the Abazas in Karachai-Cherkessia have begun to agitate for a separate Abazian republic within the Russian Federation. In February 1992, Yeltsin presented a plan to partition Karachai-Cherkessia into three autonomous regions: Karachai, Cherkessia, and Batalpashinsk (a homeland for Cossacks). Fearing loss of power, the Karachai-Cherkess government responded by calling a referendum on the unity of the republic, which was supported by 78.5 per cent of the vote. There were widespread reports of vote rigging, and soldiers were sent to polling places in Karachai areas. Many Karachais boycotted the vote; the entire process heightened ethnic tensions even further. Yeltsin subsequently withdrew his partition plan (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75-76). In the context of the heavily contested 1999 republican presidential elections (from which, under dubious circumstances, a Karachai turned victorious), Cherkess leaders declared a separate Cherkess state (Orttung et al. 2000: 198, 200; AFP 1999). The proposed republic would have included Abazian lands (Minahan 2002: 5). Abazian leaders supported the move, but demanded their own autonomous homeland within the proposed Cherkess-Abaza state (Minahan 2002: 5). In 2000 Abaza and Cherkess parliamentarians refused to take part in sessions of the local parliament, arguing that participation would be invalid since they would soon separate from Karachai-Cherkessia (Minahan 2002: 5). We were, however, unable to find evidence of self-determination-related activity beyond 2000, and code an end to the movement in 2010, following the ten-year rule. 26 injuries were found from the 1999 agitation but no casualties were reported, and thus the movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Abkhaz

Summary: In December 1977, 130 Abkazh intellectuals sent a petition to Moscow, demanding the separation from the Georgian SSR and association with the Russian Federation. In 1978 there were demonstrations and further petitions (Jones 1997: 510). Several died, but death estimates are below the 25 marker. Moscow, together with Tbilisi, made minimal concessions in an attempt to calm the situation, ranging from increased investment in the region to minimal language concessions. This appears to have
appeased the Abkhaz and ended self-determination activity. We code an end to this first (non-violent) phase in 1978. The movement re-emerged in the late 1980s. A separatist popular front organization called Aiglara (Unity) was formed in 1988. In 1989, 30,000 signatures were gathered to demand full Union Republic status. In August 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic declared independence from the Georgian Republic, claiming that the territory had been illegally annexed by the latter. In addition, the Abkhaz legislature called for the granting of full Union Republic status to the region, which it had briefly enjoyed between 1921 and 1930. In April 1989 twenty Abkhazian protesters were killed by Soviet internal security forces and skirmishes between Abkhazian separatists and Georgian police left another 20 dead. Given this death count, we coded 1989 as LVIOLSD (1988 is NVIOLSD). We found no evidence for separatist violence in 1990-1991. The movement remained active when Georgia became independent from the USSR in 1991 (see Abkhaz under Georgia). Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 255-256) note that Abkhazians in North Ossetia, Russian Federation, wish to be united with the Abkhaz in Georgia. Probably they mean that some Abkhaz in North Ossetia want Georgian Abkhazia to merge with Russia (which would not constitute a self-determination claim as we define it). We found no Abkhaz self-determination claims in Russia beyond 1991. Thus we code an end to the movement in 1991 and continue to code it under the header of Georgia.

**Sources:**


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 19, 2002].


Adyghe

Summary: The Adyghe are concentrated in the North Caucasus in today’s Adyghe Republic. Adygea was awarded with Autonomous Oblast status in 1922. July 2, 1991, Adygea issued a sovereignty declaration, and thereby unilaterally raised its status to republican level, implying separation from Krasnodar Krai, to which it had been subordinated since 1937. Since this is the first evidence of organized self-determination activity we found, we peg the start date of the movement at 1991. Shortly thereafter, the status increase was granted, with the upgrade fully implemented by March 1992. Subsequently a movement emerged that demanded the reunification of the Circassian lands (Adyghe, Cherkess, Kabard, and Shapsug are commonly referred to as Circassians) and redress for part injustices. There are also demands for an independent Circassia. In addition, Adygeh nationalists continued to demand increased autonomy for the Adyghe Republic. The Russian Press Digest reports that 2,000 people demonstrated in March 2000 for greater Circassian autonomy. In the mid-2000s, there was a plan to unify Adygea with Krasnodar Krai, implying the abolishment of the Adyghe’s autonomous status. Fiercely resisted by the Adyghe, the plan was eventually abolished, but nonetheless it stirred Adyghe nationalism and led to renewed calls for increased autonomy in the re-centralized Russia of Vladimir Putin. The so-called Circassian Congress has continued to defend the sovereignty of the Adyghe Republic. In light of this evidence, we code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
**Altaians**

*Summary:* In 1989, the Siberian Cultural Center was established, an organization formed by ethnic Khakass, Shor, and Altaians advocating increased autonomy for the South Siberian peoples (Khakass, Altai, and Shors) and/or the unification of the three territories to a single autonomous entity (Fondahl 1997: 207). Hence, we code 1989 as the start date of the movement. In October 1990 the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast (then under the administration of the Altai Krai) unilaterally declared republic status (Ross 2002: 21). The Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast was upgraded to the status of a constituent republic of the Russian Federation in July 1991 (Ross 2002: 21), and thereby separated from the Altai Krai. We were unable to find clear-cut evidence of movement activity beyond 1990, and hence code an end to the movement in 2000, following the ten-year rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence the movement’s NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


**Armenians**

*Summary:* The National Unification Party (NUP) was formed in Yerevan in 1966. The NUP called for an independent Armenia which would include Western Armenia, Nakichevan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. We peg the start date to 1966. In the late 1980s several organizations were formed in Armenian-inhabitated territories, which all advocated the unity of Armenian lands. Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh began to make irredentist demands in 1987 when dissidents known as the Karabakh Committee organized a petition drive to voice that demand. On February 28, 1988, the Karabakh Soviet of People’s Deputies passed a resolution supporting the transfer of Karabakh to Armenian control. A million Armenians marched in Yerevan in support of the transfer of territorial control and Gorbachev promised action on the issue. In 1989 the Armenian National Movement was formed, demanding first sovereignty and then independence of the Soviet Republic of Armenia. Finally, in 1988 in what then used to be the Georgian Soviet Republic the national-popular movement Javakhk (the Armenian for Javakheti) was created whose influence rapidly grew among the local Armenians. The official goals of the organization were the preservation of Armenian cultural heritage, science and history of Armenia in local schools, protection of national institutions and also the development of the region. From the very beginning, however, the goal of Armenians in Javakheti was at least to obtain autonomy, if not to unite with the region with Armenia. The Armenian movements in Armenia itself, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are coded under the same header during the Soviet period (after the dissolution of the Soviet Union we code the Armenians in Georgia and Azerbaijan separately, see Armenians in Georgia and Armenians in Azerbaijan). Marshall and Gurr

Sources:


Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland


Avars

Summary: The Avar are a mountain-dwelling Islamic people that comprise the largest single nationality in the complex autonomous Republic of Dagestan in Russia, which, being situated on the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, is located in one of the most ethnically complex regions of the world. Its two million inhabitants are divided into approximately 36 different nationalities and speak more than two dozen mutually unintelligible languages. There has been a movement demanding increased self-determination for Dagestan as a whole, but at the same time several of Datestan’s ethnic groups have agitated for increased self-determination themselves. These are listed separately from the Dagestan movement. According to Minority Rights Group International, the Avars formed a national movement as the Soviet Union began to collapse. The movement was named after a local, famous 19th century leader, Imam Shamil. According to Gammer (1999), the Shamil Foundation was formed in 1990, hence the start date of the movement. Minahan (2002: 221) suggests that the Shamil Foundation was active throughout the 1990s, pushing for greater sovereignty for the Avars either within Dagestan or even as a separate republic of the Russian Federation. Both Minority Rights Group International and Minorities at Risk note that the Avar’s Shamil national movement was disbanded in 2000. Hence, we code an end to the movement in 2000. We found no reports of deaths from Avar separatist violence, although there has been Dagestani separatist violence. We therefore classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Azerbaijanis

Summary: Compared to other Soviet republics, nationally oriented groups were slow to emerge in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Popular Front was formed in 1988. Initially, the Front’s goals were limited to achieve Perestroika’s goals. However, in 1989 the Front’s goals expanded, now including greater independence for Azerbaijan, hence the start date of the movement. The LVIOLSD coding for 1990 follows UCDP/PRIO. Azerbaijan became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement.

Sources:


**Balkars**

*Summary:* Kabardino-Balkaria is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Kabards (making up about half of the local population) and the Balkars (making up about ten per cent of the republic’s population). Balkar nationalists have advocated the division of the republic in two so as to provide for a Balkar-only national homeland (Roeder 2007: 130). The Balkars are among those peoples who were deported by Stalin in 1944 (rehabilitated and allowed to return in 1956). In 1989 Tere was formed, an organization dedicated to the re-establishment of Balkar sovereignty, the preservation of the Balkar language and the development of effective education (Richmond 2008: 143). 1989 is thus coded as start date. In November 1990 a commission was formed in Kabardino-Balkaria to examine the question of restoring Balkar autonomy (Ormrod (1997: 132). An unofficial Balkar National Congress was formed in March 1991 in order to promote demands for a Balkar autonomous region within the Russian Federation. When the demand was ignored, the Balkar Congress unilaterally proclaimed a separate Balkar republic on November 17, 1991, and initiated an unofficial referendum on the question of national sovereignty (Radio Free Europe 2005; Roeder 2007: 130; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 147-148). According to Minahan (2002: 253), “[t]he Balkars have long felt disadvantaged in Kabardino-Balkaria […] In a referendum in December 1991, they voted to create a separate Balkar republic within the Russian Federation”. Agitation towards self-determination continued, though there is conflicting information regarding the exact nature of the claim raised in 1994. Minahan (2002: 253), on the one hand, notes that Balkar leaders in 1994 once again called for a separate Balkar republic by formally requesting the permission from the Russian Federation to sign a federal treaty, but that the request was rejected. Ormrod (1997: 110), on the other hand, argues that the Balkar leaders in 1994 modified their demand to autonomy within Kabardino-Balkaria, and that they explicitly renounced claims for separation from Kabardino-Balkaria. In any case, in 1994 the Kabardino-Balkarian government initiated a referendum on the question of separation, according to which 96 per cent of the Balkars supported a unified Kabardino-Balkaria (Roeder 2007: 130). And in March 1994 Yeltsin signed a decree, rehabilitating the Balkars, reviving their cultural heritage, repatriating those still living abroad, and providing special pensions to deportees. Valerii Kokov, Kabardino-Balkaria’s governor, proceeded to reinstate the the region’s territorial divisions as they had existed prior to the Balkars’ deportation in 1944 (Orttung et al. 2000: 161; Minahan 2002: 254). November 17, 1996, the Congress of Balkars once again unilaterally proclaimed a separate republic, suspending the laws of Kabardino-Balkaria on its territory, and declaring itself as the governing authority (Roeder 2007: 130-131; Orttung et al. 2000: 162; Hahn 2007: 144). The demand was repeated in 1997 (Hahn 2007: 145). Agitation towards self-determination carried over into the next millennium (Hahn 2007: 146). Protests over separation from Kabardino-Balkaria took place in 2005 and 2010. Moreover, in 2005 Balkars protested a local territorial-administrative revision (Minority Rights Group International). Land rights for the Balkars have been a primary issue as well, with protests taking place in 2009 and in 2013 over contested grazing areas. Casualty information could not be found but it is
unlikely that year fatalities would have reached 25 deaths per year, so the movement is coded NVIOLSD and ongoing.

Sources:

Bashkir

Summary: In response to ethnic mobilization by Tatars in Bashkortostan, the Bashkirs began to organize in 1989, when White Yurt, a cultural organization, and the Bashkir National Center were formed.
Bashkortostan declared sovereignty in October 1990; Bashkir organizations participated in the drafting process (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170-171). Hence, we peg the start date of the movement at 1989. With the disintegration of the USSR demands for increased autonomy, even independence, gained public support in the republic. News reports indicate that the movement for greater Bashkir autonomy has been consistently active up until 2013 (though at a much smaller scale). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Belarussians

Summary: The first evidence for agitation towards self-determination we found is in 1987, when the Confederation of Belarussian Youth Associations issues an appeal asking for popular support for the cause of self-determination. At its second convention, in January 1989, the Youth Association called for outright independence (Zapruđnik & Urban 1997: 287). In the meantime, in October 1988, the Belarussian Popular Front is established, which soon became the major vehicle of the Belarussian self-determination movement. The Belarussian SSR issued a declaration of sovereignty in 1990. There are no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding. Belarus became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement.

Sources:

Buryats

**Summary:** The Buryat national movement, suppressed for over 50 years, resurfaced with the liberalization of Soviet life in the 1980s, demanding the reunification of the Buryat lands separated in 1937 and increased autonomy (Fondahl 1997: 209). In October 1990, the government of the Soviet Autonomous Republic of Buryatia issued a draft declaration on sovereignty stating that the republic enjoys the right of self-determination. In November 1990, the Buryat-Mongolian People’s Party was formed. Hence, we peg the start date of the movement at 1990. In 1991, the Buryat-Mongolian People’s Party demanded union with Mongolia (Sanders 2010: 131), but advocates of outright secession have remained a minority (Balzer 1994: 79). Primary demands include the establishment of a single, united Buryat Republic within the Russian Federation and with increased autonomy from Moscow (MAR). In 1992, the Negedel National Unity Movement was registered in Buryatia (Fondahl 1997: 229). MAR non-zero protest scores for 1990-2005 suggest an ongoing movement. In 2008, two of the three titular Buryat units (the former Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug and the former Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug) were amalgated with Irkutsk and Chita Oblast, respectively, and thereby lost their autonomous status, provoking protest (though at a modest scale, according to MAR) among Buryats. We code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

**Sources:**


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].


Chechens

Summary: By 1987, the effects of Gorbachev’s liberalization began to be felt also in the North Caucasus. Several informal organizations sprang up in support of further liberalization (Dunlop 1998: 88; Minahan 2002: 440). In Chechnya, the first openly separatist organization, Bart (Unity), was formed in July 1989. At an August 1989 Congress of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, members of Bart advocated the idea of “a federal statehood of the peoples of the Caucasus” (Dunlop 1998: 90). Hence, we peg the start date of the movement at 1989. In February 1990 Bart was transformed into the Vainakh Democratic Party; the organization’s leaders aimed for a sovereign Vainakh republic (Dunlop 1998: 90). In November 1990, a Chechen National Congress “in the name of the Chechen people” declared the sovereignty of the Checheno-Ingush Republic (Dunlop 1998: 233). At the Congress, there were three factions, with the moderate one composed of the republican leadership advocating full sovereignty within the Soviet Union, and the two others full-fledged independence, either as a secular or as an Islamic state (Dunlop 1998: 93). At the end of the month, the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet followed the suggestion, and adopted its declaration of sovereignty, and thereby not only claimed increased autonomy, but also unilaterally updated its administrative status to union republic (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60). Following the August Coup, Dudaev (a former Soviet Air Force general and leader of the Chechen separatist movement) and his Congress of the Chechen People stormed the Checheno-Ingush parliament in early September 1991, forcing the resignation of the Communist leadership (Dunlop 1998: 105). After the ouster, the Chechen nationalist movement moved to hold presidential and parliamentary elections, announced for October. This was met with fierce resistance from anti-Dudaev forces both in Moscow and in Chechnya itself (Dunlop 1998: 108). Yeltsin had initially supported the ouster of the Communist forces in Chechnya (Roeder 2007: 314). However, fearing that the outright secessionist Dudaev would win the presidential election, Yeltsin and the Russian Supreme Soviet attempted to stop the elections; in the end, their efforts proved unsuccessful. Dudaev was elected as Chechnya’s president on October 27, 1991 (Dunlop 1998: 113; George 2009: 80; Ormrod 1997: 104). The Russian Supreme Soviet subsequently declared the elections unlawful. Dudaev, on the other hand, moved on to declare Chechnya independent on November 1 (Dunlop 1998: 114; Ormrod 1997: 103; Roeder 2007: 314). A week later, Yeltsin introduced emergency law in the Chechen-Ingush Republic, removed Dudaev from power, replaced him with Moscow-loyal Akhmet Arsanov, and sent troops to Grozny. However, Chechen forces managed to block the troops at Grozny airport. Shortly thereafter, Russia’s Supreme Soviet rescinded Yeltsin’s decree and ordered the troops back (though the Chechens, notably, kept their weapons; Dunlop 1998: 116-120). According to Minority Rights Group International, Moscow subsequently introduced an economic blockade of Chechnya. From this point on, Chechnya was de-facto independent. Negotiations aimed at finding a peaceful middle ground went nowhere, for the Chechens demanded independence and Moscow was unwilling to let the new Russian Federation splinter any further. Moscow moved back and forth from a hard stance and negotiation offers; for instance, in early March a high-ranking official signed an agreement which recognized Chechnya’s independence and sovereignty, and at the end of the same month Moscow backed an attempted coup aimed at overthrowing Dudaev (Dunlop 1998: 171). In turn, Moscow either offered significant autonomy or threatened invasion. Chechnya, along with Tatarstan, refused to sign the 1992 Federal Treaty, which would have promised a much greater extent of republican autonomy. In 1994, the Yeltsin government began in earnest to seek to destabilize Chechnya, supporting and arming the Chechen opposition in an attempt to remove Dudaev from power (Dunlop 1998: 156).
May, there was a failed assassination attempt against Dudaev (Dunlop 1998: 192). In November, Moscow installed an alternative government in Chechnya (Dunlop 1998: 163). The “proxy-war”, however, failed, and eventually led to the decision, taken at the end of November, to invade Chechnya (Dunlop 1998: 206-209), leading to the First Chechen War. After a long and bloody war, in 1996, a cease-fire was signed, and in 1997 a formal peace treaty. After the assassination of Dudaev in 1996, Aslan Mashhadov, a rebel leader, was elected president of Chechnya in 1997. Though he was more flexible compared to Dudaev, Mashhadov shared the latter’s goal of attaining independence for Chechnya (Orttung et al. 2000: 72). Negotiations over Chechnya’s status continued. In 1998, associate membership with the Russian Federation (a status giving maximum freedom, independence, and sovereignty) was allegedly discussed (MAR). In 1999, the Second Chechen War erupted, with Moscow’s stated ambition to end the insecurity in the region and bring back Chechnya under Russian control (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Though officially fighting terrorism, Russia also fought Mashkadov’s de-facto government, claiming that Mashhadov was not elected to his post in accordance with Russian legal norms. Moscow no longer recognized Mashkadov as Chechnya’s legitimate president (Orttung et al. 2000: 75). In May 2000, Putin established president’s rule in Chechnya. By February 2000, Russian forces had taken control over Grozny, and by mid-2000 over most of Chechnya (Minahan 2002: 441; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Putin moved to appoint a Moscow-minded local administration. In 2000, the Chechen president, Maskhadov, was removed from office and instead Moscow placed its own ethnic Chechen clients in power. Putin named Akhmad Kadyrov “interim civilian administrator” of Chechnya. Kadyrov had fought with Dudaev against Russia in the First Chechen War, but had abandoned the cause in time. Nonetheless, clashes with rebel forces continued throughout the following years. In 2003, President Putin introduced a “peace plan”, which included a referendum on a new constitution for a Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation with some local autonomy. Kadyrov delivered the constitution, popularly ratified in 2003, that formally re-integrated Chechnya into Russia in 2003 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Maskhadov, one of the rebel leaders and the (former) president of Chechnya ousted by Putin, condemned the referendum and rejected the validity of the results. In October 2003, Kadyrov was elected as Chechnya’s president (Roeder 2007: 315). After his assassination in 2004, Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan Kadyrov, became deputy prime minister, only to be promoted to the presidency in 2007, once he reached the minimum age of 30. Both Kadyrovs have acted as Putin’s prolonged arm in the region (George 2009: 156-157). Still, both have had significant autonomy (George 2009: 157). Despite Putin’s establishment of a pro-Moscow minded government in Chechnya, the independence movement has been continually active. In recent years, the Chechen movement has split into two factions. One faction continues to agitate for an independent Chechnya, while the other aims to establish an Islamic state encompassing the whole of the North Caucasus, of which Chechnya would only form part. The movement is ongoing. Marshall & Gurr (2003) code armed conflict in 1991-1993. However, this code seems based on a MAR rebellion score of 3 in 1992-1993 (MAR does not code 1991). And MAR’s code appears due to Chechnya’s 1991 declaration of independence and de-facto independence since then. We found no reports of violence in other sources (e.g. UCDP/PRIO; Zürcher et al. 2005). Thus 1989-1993 are coded with NVIOLSD. The HVIOLSD coding for 1994-96 and 1999 onward follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Marshall & Gurr (2003) code armed conflict in 1997-1998, but this appears to be based on the 5-years rule they apply. The only other source that would suggest LVIOLSD in these years is MAR, which codes a rebellion score of 3 in 1997 (but 0 in 1998). The 1997 score appears due to Chechnya’s continued de-facto independence and declaration of sovereignty. UCDP, for instance, notes that there was peace in 1997-1998 (also see Zürcher et al. 2005). Thus we code 1997-1998 as NVIOLSD. For 2007 onward, violence is primarily over the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate rather than an independent Chechnya.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].


Cherkess

Summary: Karachai-Cherkessia is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Karachais and the Cherkess. According to the 1989 census, the Karachais made up around a third of the local population, and the Cherkess around ten per cent. At the time Russians had made up a relative majority in the republic (around 40 per cent in 1989), but out-migration reduced their population share so that the Karachais now make up a relative majority in Karachai-Cherkessia (around 40 per cent). The Cherkess were historically a subgroup of the Circassian people. In 1922 the Soviet Union formed the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast, which in 1926 was split into two, a Karachai and a Cherkess Autonomous Oblast (note: until 1928 the Cherkess entity had the status of an Autonomous Okrug). In 1957, upon the return of the Karachai from their deportation to Central Asia, the joint Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast was reestablished. During perestroika, ethnic separatism began to flare in the region. The Karachais began to agitate for a separate Karachai state in the late 1980s, and the local Cossacks for a Cossack autonomous state in 1991. The early 1990s also saw the emergence of a Cherkess movement for autonomy, with Cherkess leaders demanding the reunification of the Circassian people (comprised of Adyghes, Cherkess, Kabards, and Shapsugs) and the dissolution of Karachai-Cherkessia. The earliest evidence for separatist contention we found is in 1991, when a Cherkess republic was unilaterally proclaimed (Peters 1995: 208; also see Minahan 2002: 447 and Roeder 2007: 134). In 1991, the status of the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast was elevated to Republic status. In February 1992, Yeltsin presented a plan to partition Karachai-Cherkessia into three autonomous regions: Karachai, Cherkessia, and Batalpashinsk (a homeland for Cossacks). Fearing loss of power, the Karachai-Cherkess government responded by calling a referendum on the unity of the republic, which was supported by 78.5 per cent of the vote. There were widespread reports of vote rigging, and soldiers were sent to polling places in Karachai areas. Many Karachais boycotted the vote; the entire process heightened ethnic tensions even further. Yeltsin subsequently withdrew his partition plan (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75-76). In the context of the heavily contested 1999 republican presidential elections (from which, under dubious circumstances, a Karachai turned victorious), Cherkess leaders declared a separate Cherkess state (Orttung et al. 2000: 198, 200; AFP). There were large-scale demonstrations. Cooperating with the Abazas, another local minority, the Cherkess leaders “drafted a legal document providing for a separate Abaza-Cherkess autonomous republic within Russia” (Minahan 2002: 5). In 2008 and 2010, the Cherkess people once again demanded a separate Cherkessia. The movement is hence coded as ongoing. 26 injuries were found from the 1999 agitation but no casualties were reported, and thus the movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
Chukots

Summary: The first openly separatist organization was formed in early 1990 (Minahan 2002: 459). In September 1990, the Chukchi Autonomous Okrug, facing Alaska across the Bering Strait, declared sovereignty and demanded control over its reindeer and fish resources. The sovereignty declaration entailed a unilateral upgrade to republican status, implying the separation from Magadan Oblast, to which it was subordinated (Fondahl 1997: 227). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990. In late 1991, the Chukot Autonomous Okrug’s government sent a delegation to Moscow to negotiate republican status in a revamped Russian Federation (Minahan 2002: 459). While Moscow refused to grant the status increase, the Chukot Autonomous Okrug was granted separation from Magadan Oblast in 1992 (Fondahl 1997: 229). Thereby the Chukot Autonomous Okrug became the only fully independent Autonomous Okrug; all other regions with this status are subordinate to Oblasts or Krais (Orttung et al. 2000: 98). We found no evidence of separatist activity beyond 1991, though Minahan (2002: 461) suggests that the movement remained active at least until the end of the 1990s. Following our “ten-year inactivity rule” we code an end to the movement in 2001. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


**Chuvash (Chavash)**

**Summary:** As of the 1960s, there was significant Slavic immigration into the Chuvash ASSR, prompting a cultural revival. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the movement took on a more nationalist agenda. By 1989, language and culture-related claims became linked to the issue of state sovereignty. The first organization we found that appears to have openly made claims for self-determination is the Chuvash Social and Public Cultural Center, which was formed in 1989 to promote Chuvash culture (Frank & Wixman 1997: 172; Minahan 2002: 434). Thus, we peg the start date to 1989. In October 1990 the Chuvash ASSR declared sovereignty and union republic status within the Soviet Union. In October 1992 the Chuvash National Congress was formed. In addition to culture- and language-related demands, the Congress also made a number of self-determination demands in the sense we define it, including increased regional control over taxation, cultural, and education policies (Frank & Wixman 1997: 173). It appears that the movement continues to be active, though evidence is scarce. The Chuvash Republic’s long-term president, Nikolai Fedorov, was one of the most outspoken critics of Putin’s federal reforms aimed at power verticalization (Orttung et al. 2000: 105). The Chuvash National Congress openly protested against Putin’s 2004 effort to abolish regional gubernatorial elections. Hence, we code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

**Sources:**


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].


**Crimean Tatars**

**Summary:** Collectively accused of treason by Stalin, the Crimean Tatars were deported to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia in 1944. The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was abolished in 1945, and the area was russified. In the second part of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the Crimean Tatars launched a campaign for the full restoration of their rights, including in particular the right to return to Crimea and the re-establishment of their autonomous status. The campaign involved repeated petitions to
Moscow and demonstrations (Minahan 2002: 502-503). The earliest evidence of activity we found is in 1957, when a petition campaign began and several thousands of signatures were collected asking for the full rehabilitation and repatriation. Hence, we code 1957 as the start date. The movement was severely repressed, but non-zero MAR protest scores indicate that the movement continued to be active throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In 1967 the Crimean Tatars were absolved from mass treason, but still denied the right to return. After 1967, some Crimean Tatars attempted to return, but most were re-deported. There were plans to an autonomous entity for the Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan, but the Tatars rejected this plan. After almost 50 years of deportation, the Crimean Tatars were finally granted the right to return in 1990. Thousands of Crimean Tatars took the opportunity and returned to Crimea. The movement remained active after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see Crimean Tatars under Ukraine). We found no evidence for separatist violence and code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Dagestanis

Summary: Dagestan compromises more than 30 ethnic groups. The largest include the Avars, the Dargins, the Kumyks, the Lezgins, the Laks, the Tabasarans – and Russians (Ormrod 1997: 117). Several of Dagestan’s ethnic groups have agitated for increased self-determination for themselves, but there has also been a movement demanding increased self-determination for Dagestan as a whole. In May 1991 the Republic of Dagestan unilaterally declared sovereignty (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Ormrod 1997: 116), hence the start date of the movement. With the local elite closely allied to Moscow, and several of the groups located in Dagestan embroiled in their own self-determination movements, the Dagestan movement for increased sovereignty remained a short interlude, however. In the late 1990s, a Sunni Muslim sect referred to as the “Wahabbis” gained ground in Dagestan. Entertaining close links to Islamic Chechen rebels, the Wahabbis aimed for an independent Islamic Chechen-Dagestan region. In 1998, the Wahabi sect declared the independence of Dagestan’s Buinaksk district, and took control of the area. Moscow retook the Buikansk in August/September 1999. In 1999 there was a spill-over of violence to Dagestan led by Chechens and other Islamists, thus 1999 is coded as LVIOLSD following UCDP/PRIO. 1991-1998 is coded as as NVIOLSD. In 2000, the Wahabbi sect was banned by the Dagestani parliament. The insurgency then moved back to Chechnya until 2007, when it spread back to Dagestan. 2000-2006 is coded as NVIOLSD. In 2007 Doku Umarov unilaterally declared the independent Caucasus Emirate, which is supposed to span “all historically Muslim lands” in the North Caucasus including Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. As of 2007 the Caucasus Emirate has been involved in an insurgency. We associate the proclamation of the
Caucasus Emirate and the separatist violence associated with it to the Dagestan movement since rebel activity has been concentrated in this area (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). 2007 onward is coded as HVIOLSD, following Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The movement is coded as ongoing.

Sources:


Don Cossacks

Summary: The Cossacks have long been considered (including by most Cossacks themselves) members of a military caste, the ‘fist’ of the Tsar. Under the Tsar, the Cossacks maintained three distinctive characteristics: i) tax-free land ownership, ii) their own local self-government, and iii) mandatory military service for all male Cossacks (Skinner 1994: 1017). The Cossacks are divided into thirteen ‘hosts’, that is, regional branches of Cossacks. The Don Cossacks are located in Southern European Russia. After the fall of the Tsarist regime, in 1918 the Don Cossacks formed an unrecognized anti-Bolshevik state in the Don River Basin. The so-called Don Republic claimed what today are the Rostov and Volgograd Oblasts in the modern Russian Federation and Luhansk and Donetsk in modern Ukraine. The self-proclaimed republic was defeated by the Red Army in 1920. Subsequently the Cossacks suffered from harsh repression. Determined to end the Cossack threat to their regime, the Soviets ended all traditional Cossack
privileges, banned the use of the Cossack language, and outlawed references to Cossack culture or history. The Cossacks were not recognized as an ethnic group, and reclassified as ethnic Russians. Contrary to many other groups, the Cossacks were not awarded with an ethnic homeland. Some Cossacks fought on the German side in the Second World War. After the war, they were forcibly repatriated and sent to the gulags, with most subsequently suffering death. The Cossacks remained a repressed group until Gorbachev’s perestroika (Skinner 1994: 1018). The liberalization initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s triggered a Cossack revival, with increasing numbers self-identifying as Cossacks. Still, the actual number of Cossacks in Russia is disputed (many self-identify as both Russians and Cossacks, for instance), as is their status as an ethnic group (Toje 2006: 1060). From the 1990s, Cossack organisations were established throughout Russia. The first national Cossack organization, the Union of Cossacks, was organized in 1990 (Skinner 1994: 1018). Initially, the Cossack national movement was focused on the recognition as a separate people, the reinstatement of Cossack military duties, and a cultural revitalization. But soon also claims for increased territorial self-determination were made. In 1993 Don Cossack leaders demanded the establishmen of an autonomous republic (Minahan 2002: 543). Hence, we code 1993 as the start date of the movement. Though Toje (2006: 1058) notes that the Cossack movements’ level of mobilization has faded in more recent years, the Don Cossack movement has remained active, led by the Don Cossack Grand Council. In November 2005 Don Cossack leaders reiterated their territorial demand, but their pledge was rejected. ( Minority Rights Group International). A 2008 ‘All-National Congress of the Cossack People” called for the preparation of a draft constitution for the Don Cossack Republic (Goble 2010), with activity continuing in the most recent years (Goble 2013). July 3, 2010, Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossacks gathered to demand Cossack autonomy (Bugajski 2010: 40). Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has taken a more accommodative stance towards the Cossacks, in the hope that they could help control the Caucasus. In 1992 Yeltsin and the Russian parliament rehabilitated the Cossacks as a cultural-ethnic community, with stated rights to land use, military service, and self-administration. However, implementation of these measures was slow, if at all they were implemented (Skinner 1994: 1018; Minahan 2002: 543). Decrees in 1993 and 1994 promised special privileges and dispensations, but the demand for the establishment of a Don Cossack autonomy has remained unfulfilled. We found no reports of separatist violence and thus classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**Estonians**

*Summary:* Estonia had been independent between the two World Wars. In 1940 it was annexed into the Soviet Union, which caused violent resistance among Estonians. Between 1941 and 1944, Estonia was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944 it was annexed again by the Soviet Union, and the Estonian SSR was re-established. The (re-) annexation by the USSR prompted a resistance campaign by the so-called Forest Brothers (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). 1944 is coded as the start date. The movement had clearly already been active already in 1940-1941, but we found no evidence of organized activity during the German occupation, suggesting that the movement had ended in 1941. In the data set, we begin to code the Estonians in 1945, the earliest possible date. Since the resistance campaign started in 1944, we note prior violent activity. By the early 1950s the movement was defeated, and most of the remaining fighters gave up when offered an amnesty after Stalin’s death in 1953 (see Senn 1997: 355). However, Minahan (1998: 90) notes limited activity until 1956; hence we code an end to this first phase in 1956. The HVIO LeSD coding for 1945-48 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). 1949-1956 is coded as NVIOLSD. The self-determination movement then appears to have been dormant until the late 1980s. The first evidence for organized separatist activity we found is in 1987, when Estonian dissidents organized a protest in Tallin against the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, thus questioning Soviet rule. 1987 is coded as second start date. In April 1988, the Estonian Popular Front was founded, and there were major demonstrations for Estonian sovereignty (Beissinger 2002). In 1989, the Estonian Supreme Soviet unilaterally annulled the 1940 annexation of Estonia to the USSR. Estonia became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. The second phase of the movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

**Sources:**


European Russians

Summary: The 1992 Federal Treaty devolved powers to both ethnic and “normal”, non-ethnic regions, but the former gained much more than the latter and thus it created an asymmetrical federation in which ethnic republics enjoyed several privileges, including control over their natural resources, the right of secession, and citizenship (Ross 2002: 23). This caused resentment in many Russian-dominated non-ethnic republics, including many ‘European’ ones but also in other regions: in the Ural region, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk unilaterally raised their status (see Uralians), in Siberia Krasnoyarsk Krai and Irkutsk declared their republic (see the Siberians) and in the Far East, the Maritime Republic was declared in 1993 (see the Far-Eastern Slavs). The European Russian movement combines claims put forward in this context in a total of 15 regions: i) the Leningrad Oblast unilaterally declared itself a republic (implying increased autonomy) in 1993 (Ross 2002: 24), ii) Vologda Oblast organized a referendum on republican status in April 1993 and subsequently proclaimed the Vologda Republic on May 14 (Slider 1994: 264; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 315), iii) Voronezh Oblast sought some status in-between Republic and Oblast (Slider 1994: 264) and unilaterally in 1993 declared that the region was henceforth “an independent participant in international and foreign-economic relations” and that the federal bodies “may not promulgate legal acts that fall within the jurisdiction of the regional bodies of power” (Ross 2002: 25), iv) Arkhangelsk Oblast unilaterally declared itself the Pomor Republic in 1993 (Ross 2002: 24) and finally v) a total of eleven central Russian regions, in 1993, unilaterally proclaimed a unified Central Russian Republic under the lead of Orel Oblast. The republic appears based on the already existing Central Economic Region, which also includes Moscow (Teague 1993, 1994: 45; Ross 2002: 24). We found no evidence of organized separatist activity before 1993 and thus code 1993 as start date. Russia’s December 1993 constitution, at least at first sight, did away with the asymmetrically beneficial treatment of ethnic republics (though it left open the possibility of bilateral power-sharing treaties, thus introducing asymmetry again through the back door). The movements in the European Russian republics soon faded from view (though some regions continued to make claims for a while, see e.g. Orttung et al. 2000: 567-568). Thus, we code an end to the movement in 2003 in accordance with the ten-years rule. We found no separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Evenks

Summary: The Evenks are one of Siberia’s indigenous peoples. Until 2007, when it was amalgated with Krasnoyarsk Krai, the Evenks had their own autonomous okrug – in which they, however, made up only a minority (14% in the 1989 census, see Fondahl 1997: 194). Minahan (2002: 587) reports that a nationalist movement emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to Minahan (2002: 587), “Evenki nationalism, which has developed since the collapse of the Soviet state in 1991, presses for the production of new teaching materials in the Evenki language, creation of a cultural center in Tura, and enhancement of traditional economic activities. Activists support Evenki land claims, rights to traditional land use and resources, and a greater say in local government areas with Evenki populations. Evenk activists working for self-determination seek to revive the obshchina territorial system as the basis for territorial organization. Presentations by the Evenks to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples have emphasized the difficult circumstances in which they find themselves. Since the late 1980s, the Evenks have demanded reforms to reverse the process of alienation from their lands, which in turn would improve their control over their own destiny.” Lacking a clearer indication, we peg the start date at 1989. A 2002 report by the Guardian (Brown 2002) discussing the implications of a proposed pipeline through Evenk territory suggests that the Evenks continued to make land claims. We found no organized claims thereafter and code an end to the movement in 2012 based on the ten-years rule. We found no evidence of separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**Far Eastern Slavs**

*Summary:* The Far Eastern Slavs are descendants from ethnic Slav settlers (Ukrainians and Russian). Far Eastern Slavs are located in the Primorski and Khabarovsky Krais, in the Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan, and Sakhalin Oblasts, as well as in Yakutia (Minahan 2002: 600). In the late 1980s nationalists began to call for the resurrection of the independent Far Eastern Republic of 1918. By June 1991 the Far East Freedom Party was actively demanding the restoration of the Far East Republic. Since this is the first clear evidence of separatist activity that we found, we peg the start date of the movement at 1991. In 1993, the Primorski Krai unilaterally declared itself a republic (the Maritime Republic), a status that would imply increased political and economic autonomy (Minahan 2002: 603; Ross 2002: 25; Slider 1994: 264). Viktor Ishaev, the governor of Khabarovsk Krai, called for the creation of a Far Eastern Republic in 1995 (Orttung et al. 2000: 223). News reports indicate that in 1997, separatists were still actively demanding the restoration of the Far East Republic, but no subsequent activity could be found. Based on this, we code the end of the movement in 2007, following the ten-years of inactivity rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].


**Gagauz**

*Summary:* In the late 1980s Moldovan nationalists took a series of mostly symbolic steps that were widely seen as moves toward unification with Romania. Most threatening to non-Moldovans was legislation passed by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in 1989 that made Romanian the only official state language and required all officials to demonstrate proficiency in Romanian, even if serving in Gagauz and Russian-speaking communities. Largely in response to this law, in November 1989, the Gagauz formed the Gagauz Khalk movement and proclaimed autonomy within Moldova. In August of the next year, they declared the independence of the Republic of Gagauzia, announced their intention to remain within the Soviet Union, and called for presidential elections. In response, the Moldovan legislature declared the Gagauz Khalk illegal and ordered some tens of thousands of young Moldovan “volunteers” to enter Gagauz towns and block the elections. We peg the start date to 1989. The Gagauz movement remained active when Moldova gained its independence in 1991 (see Gagauz under Moldova). There is no evidence
of separatist violence prior to the end of 1991. We code the movement as NVIOLSD. The violence that erupted in late 1991 is coded under the header of Moldova.

Sources:


Georgians

Summary: In October 1987, the Il’ia Chavchavadze Society was formed and began to agitate for greater national autonomy (Beissinger 2002: 178; Wheatley 2005: 30-31, 42). In March 1988, the radical wing, whose demands fell well short of independence, split from the Il’ia Chavchavadze Society and formed the Fourth Group (later renamed the Society of Saint Il’ia the Just). Only months later, in August 1988, the National-Democratic Party of Georgia was formed, which openly proclaimed independence (Beissinger 2002: 179). In June 1989, the Georgian Popular Front was formed. In November 1989 the Georgian Supreme Soviet declared that its incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1921 was the result of military force and was therefore involuntary and illegitimate. The Supreme Soviet also claimed that it had the right to secede from the USSR and to nullify laws and decrees emanating from the central government in Moscow. We peg the start date of the movement at 1987, the first year of organized nationalist activity. Note that there was some, though very limited activity towards territorial self-determination already prior to Glasnost. In particular, in the 1960s, the independence-minded Union for the Freedom and Independence of Georgia was established in Tbilisi (Mikaberidze 2007: 43). However, according to Beissinger (2002: 178) dissident activity before Glasnost was focused mainly on language, cultural issues, and human rights rather than self-determination as we define it. Thus, this earlier activity is not coded. Georgia became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


**Ingrians**

**Summary:** Ingrians are ethnic Finns living in Russia. Ingrian congresses held in 1990 and 1991 endorsed for the first time since after World War II the group’s right to self-determination and closer ties to Finland. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990. News reports and the Independent Ingermanland website indicate that this self-determination movement has been consistently active throughout the 1990s to 2013. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

**Sources:**


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].


Ingush

Summary: The Ingush are among the thirteen peoples that, accused of treason, were deported to Central Asia during the Second World War. In 1956 they received official rehabilitation and were allowed to return to their homes, and shortly thereafter the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) that had existed prior to the deportation was re-established, with both groups again attaining titular status (George 2009: 77). However, the Prigorodny that had once belonged to the Ingush remained with North Ossetia (George 2009: 87), sparking the modern Ingush national movement. The earliest evidence of organized activity towards self-determination – that is, the restoration of the Prigorodny region – we found is in 1970, when there was an Ingush demonstration in the Prigorodny region demanding that the territory be ceded to the Chechen-Ingush Republic (Minahan 2002: 785). Hence, we peg the start date at 1970. In the 1970s, the Ingush petitioned the Soviet government to restore the Prigorodny region to the Chechen-Ingush Republic (Ormrod 1997: 107). In the late 1980s, the Ingush began to agitate for their own national homeland. In 1988-1989, about 60,000 signed a petition demanding the formation of an autonomous Ingush Republic (Ormrod 1997: 107). In March 1991 Ingush rallied for the restoration of Ingush statehood within a separate Ingush polity. Protestors also demanded the return of the majority-Ingush region of Prigorodny. In July 1991 the parliament of Ingushetia declared the region an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. In late 1991, a referendum was organized on the question of separation from Chechnya and formation of its own autonomous Ingush homeland, with an overwhelming majority turning out in favor (Dunlop 1998: 122). The Chechen Parliament agreed to the separation in early 1992. The federal center did not, initially, recognize this change, but the Russian Supreme Soviet approved the separation in June 1992 (George 2009: 80-81; Minahan 2002: 786; Ormrod 1997: 134). Meanwhile, in 1991, armed Ingush forces had attempted to seize Ossetian homes in the Prigorodny region. In response, the North Ossetian government imposed a curfew over the region, and began armed retaliation against the region. The conflict continued to escalate throughout 1992, leading to 600 deaths and dozens of thousands of internal refugees (Orttung et al. 2000: 375 Ormrod 1997: 108). Given the fighting and death count, we code LVIOLSD for 1992. In 1994 Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed the Beslan Agreement, which provides for the return of Ingush refugees to the Prigorodny region in North Ossetia (Ormrod 1997: 135, 137). Apparently not implemented, another such agreement was signed in 1998, but the situation remained tense (Orttung et al. 2000: 375). Ruslan Aushev, the long-term president of Ingushetia, even threatened a referendum on independence if Moscow fails to solve the Prigorodny problem (Orttung et al. 2000: 132). In the late 1990s, Ingush nationalists proposed joint Ossetian-Ingush rule over Prigorodny, but this was rejected (Minahan 2002: 787). In addition, Ingushetia’s then-president Aushev demanded increased autonomy (Orttung et al. 2000: 132). Non-zero MAR protest scores also suggest an ongoing movement. MAR’s rebellion score is 4 in 2004 based on the following account: “[w]hile the war in Chechnya has largely ended, a low-level insurgency continues, and its violence has spread to neighboring republics, with militant Ingush organizations, such as the Ingush Jamaat, continuing to target the state (REB04 = 4) in what appears to be an increasingly religiously based movement.” Thus 2004 is coded with LVIOLSD. 1970-1991, 1993-2003 and 2005-2006 are coded as NVIOLSD. In 2006, the Ingush Parliament called on Moscow to return the disputed Prigorodny region to Ingushetia (Minority Rights Group International). In 2007, the Islamic insurgency demanding the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus Emirate spanning Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria spread to Ingushetia, supported by local Ingush groups, such as the Ingush Islamic Jamaats (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Doyle & Sambanis (2006) code the Caucasus Emirate uprising as a war, but violence involving the Ingush is too limited to warrant a HVIOLOSD code. There were just under 200 deaths in 2008, about the same in 2009, 254 in 2010 and declining violence in 2011, 2012. Based on this, 2007-2012 is coded as LVIOLSD.
Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].


Kabards

Summary: In January 1991 Kabardino-Balkaria, at the time an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, declared sovereignty, meaning it proclaimed increased autonomy and unilaterally raised its status to union republic, implying separation from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Orttung et al. 2000: 162; Kahn 2000: 60). Kabardino-Balkaria is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Kabards (making up about half of the local population) and the Balkars (making up about ten per cent of the republic’s population). We attribute the sovereignty declaration to the Kabards for three reasons. First, while both Kabards and Balkars participate in the regional government, given the numerics the Kabards are more influential (Ormrod 1997: 109-111). Second,
Kabardino-Balkaria’s sovereignty declaration was proclaimed upon Valerii Kokov’s initiative, an ethnic Kabard and soon the region’s governor. Third, already prior to the sovereignty declaration in 1991, a separate Balkar movement had emerged which demanded separate Balkar autonomy (see Balkars). We code 1991 as the start date. In reaction to the Balkars’ demand for a separate republic, a Kabard congress convened in early 1992, and proclaimed a separate Kabard republic. In September activists of the Kabard movement attempted to seize the local television center and the regional parliament (Roeder 2007: 131). We could not find much evidence of separatist activity beyond 1992. Minahan (2002: 861) notes that the Kabards renewed their calls for a separate Kabard republic in 1996, but without giving further details. Hence, we code an end to the movement in 2002, following the ten-year rule. The movement is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Kaliningrad Slavs

Summary: Königsberg, previously Prussian territory, was assigned to the Soviet Union after the Second World War, was associated with the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (as an Oblast) and was given its current name, Kaliningrad (Orttung et al. 2000: 168). Subsequently Kaliningrad, Russia’s only exclave, was de-Germanized, and Slavs moved in. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Poland and Lithuania’s subsequent accession to the EU and NATO, left Kaliningrad increasingly isolated from the rest of Russia. In the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a coalition of national and cultural groups gained support, including the Baltic Republican Party. Claims for increased autonomy were for the first time raised in 1990, hence the start date of the movement (Minahan 2002: 1020; Holtom 2003: 168). In October 1991, Yuri Matchokin, then governor of Kaliningrad, proposed upgrading the status of Kaliningrad Oblast to the status of an autonomous republic (the fourth Baltic Republic, in addition to the
Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian SSRs; Holtom 2003: 170). Kaliningrad’s political elite continued to demand an autonomy upgrade throughout the 1990s (see Holtom 2003: 170-172). Minahan (2002: 1022) notes that the demand was again voiced in mid-2000. Subsequently the movement appears to have petered out. In 2005 the Baltic Republican Party was disestablished due to a new law that requires political parties to have regional branches in at least half of all Russia’s regions. We code an end to the movement in 2010, following the ten-years of inactivity rule. In Moscow, Kaliningrad’s thrive towards increased autonomy was interpreted as outright secessionism, and Kaliningrad has not received the desired autonomy upgrade. Still it received substantial economic autonomy in September 1991 as a free economic zone, and further substantial concessions by way of the 1996 bilateral treaty. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [December 11, 2013].


Kalmyks

Summary: In 1943 the Kalmyk people, accused of collaboration with the Nazis, was deported to Siberia. Officially rehabilitated in 1956, three years after Stalin’s death, many Kalmyks began to return to their homeland. In 1957 Kalmykia was officially re-established as an Autonomous Oblast, to be upgraded to the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1958 (Minahan 2002: 886; Minority Rights Group International). The reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s led to the emergence of a number political movements in the Kalmyk Republic. The Popular Front of Kalmykia was created in 1990 (Minority Rights Group International). In August 1990, a Kalmyk congress met in Elista, the capital of Kalmykia, adopting a nationalist agenda and advocating Kalmyk self-determination (Minahan 2002: 886). Hence, we code 1990 as the start date of the movement. In October 1990, the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic proclaimed its sovereignty and unilaterally upgraded its administrative status. The Kalmyk movement remained active after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, with demands focusing on increased local control of natural resources and increased autonomy. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 149) report that there were also demands for the return of former Kalmyk territories that are now part of Dagestan. The last evidence of separatist activity we found was in 1998, when Kalmykia's governor, Kirsan Ilyumzhinow (an ethnic Kalmyk) publicly demanded increased sovereignty (potentially even independence) for the Kalmyk Republic (Minahan 2002: 887). Subsequently the movement appears
to have petered out. We thus code the end of the movement as 2008 in accordance with the 10-year inactivity rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding for 1990-2008.

Sources:
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].

**Karachais**

Summary: Karachai-Cherkessia is among those autonomous regions in Russia which have more than one titular nationality – the Karachais and the Cherkess. According to the 1989 census, the Karachais made up around a third of the local population, and the Cherkess around ten per cent. At the time Russians had made up a relative majority in the republic (around 40 per cent in 1989), but out-migration reduced their population share so that the Karachais now make up a relative majority in Karachai-Cherkessia (around 40 per cent). In October 1989 the first Karachai congress met, demanding the creation of a separate Karachai homeland – ultimately with the status of a union republic. Several other such congresses followed (Roeder 2007: 134). Hence, we code 1989 as the start date. Karachai activists gathered more than 70,000 signatures on a petition to declare Karachai autonomous (Comins-Richmond 2002: 74). According to Comins-Richmond (2002: 74), a Karachai republic was unilaterally declared on June 9, 1990; he may, however, refer to the November 17 declaration in which Karachai-Cherkessia declared sovereignty and thereby unilaterally raised its status to union republic level (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226; Minorities at Risk Project). The fact that a Karachai SSR (rather than a Karachai-Cherkessian SSR) was declared makes it likely that Karachais played an important role in this process. In July 1991, Karachai-Cherkessia, formerly an Autonomous Oblast subordinated to Stavropol Krai, was elevated to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic status (it became a constituent republic of the Russian Federation after the fall of the Soviet Union). In November 1991 Karachai nationalists rallied, demanding the restoration of their own autonomous status, which the Karachai had enjoyed prior to their deportation in 1944 (Minahan 2002: 911). A Karachai congress held in 1992 again called for the restoration of the Karachi’s autonomous status, along with similar proclamations in the same year (Minorities at Risk Project). In February 1992, Yeltsin presented a plan to partition Karachai-Cherkessia into three autonomous regions: Karachai, Cherkessia, and Batalpashinsk (a homeland for Cossacks). Fearing loss of power, the Karachai-Cherkess government responded by calling a referendum on the unity of the republic, which was supported by 78.5 per cent of the vote. There were widespread reports of vote rigging, and soldiers were sent to polling places in Karachai areas. Many Karachais boycotted the vote; the entire process heightened ethnic tensions even further. Yeltsin subsequently withdrew his partition plan (Comins-Richmond 2002: 75-76). According to Richmond (2008: 137), the Karachai movement lost momentum after 1994, but non-zero MAR protest scores for 1990-99 indicate that the movement has been active throughout the decade. According to Minahan (2004: 305), calls for a separate state
resurfaced in 2001 (Minahan 2004: 305). Since we were unable to find evidence of organized activity beyond 2001, we code an end to the movement in 2011, following the ten-year rule. No separatist violence was found, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Karakalpaks

Summary: Karakalpak nationalists advocating autonomy began to organize in 1989 and in 1990 the Karakalpak government declared the republic a sovereign state. Therefore, we peg the start date to 1989. The Karakalpak movement remained active when Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991 (see Karakalpaks under Uzbekistan). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
Karelians

**Summary:** The Karelians are a Finnic people. The Karelian homeland borders Finland. In June 1991 a Karelian congress met, demanding increased autonomy for the Karelian nation (Minahan 2002: 932). However, the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic had declared sovereignty already on August 9, 1990. Hence, we peg the start date of the movement at 1990. Nationalist mobilization increased after the fall of the Soviet Union. Due to Karelian out-migration to Finland, Slavic in-migration and Russification of the local Karelian population, the Karelians make up a minority within the Karelian Republic only. In the 1990s, Karel organisations campaigned for the partition of the Karelian Republic so as to provide for a Karelian-majority homeland (Minahan 2002: 932). Other Karelians want Karelia to become part of Finland. According to Minority Rights Group International, the Karelian Association campaigns for unification with Finland. In Finland itself, an organization called ProKarelia campaigns for the incorporation of Karelia into Finland. Moreover, Free Karelia has continually campaigned for greater autonomy within the Russian Federation. Hence, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

**Sources:**

Free Karelia. [http://free-karelia.org/eng/About.aspx](http://free-karelia.org/eng/About.aspx) [December 12, 2013].


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].


Kazakhs

**Summary:** In December 1986, there was a nationalist uprising in Alma-Ata (today: Almaty) when the long-standing leader of the Republic, ethnically Kazakh Kunaev, was forced to retire and replaced with Kolbin, a Russian with no prior connection to Kazakhstan. The subsequent crack-down on the
demonstration cost dozens, if not hundreds, of lives (Olcott 1997: 451-452). We do not code a start to the movement in 1986, however, since no clear-cut autonomy demand was raised in the context of the demonstration. In 1988, Kazakh nationalist groups began to form, with some groups even advocating independence from the Soviet Union (Minahan 1998: 135). Hence, we peg the start date of the movement at 1988. In September 1989, Kolbin was replaced with Nazarbaev. Nazarbaev began to demand increased sovereignty, but he also was Gorbachev’s staunchest ally in keeping the Union together. In his address to the newly elected Parliament in April 1990, Nazarbaev spoke of a need for increased Kazakh self-finance and self-administration. However, due to close ties with Moscow, Kazakhstan did not issue a declaration of sovereignty until October 1990, more than four months after Russia had declared sovereignty. Kazakhstan withheld its declaration of independence until December 16, 1991, only 9 days before the official disintegration of the USSR. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. Kazakhstan became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement.

Sources:

Khakass

Summary: In 1989, Khakass intellectuals formed the Siberian Cultural Center, an organization that lobbied for increased national autonomy for the South Siberian peoples (Khakass, Shor, Altay), for improvements in language protection and protection from “degradation caused by industrialization” (Fondahl 1997: 207). According to Fondahl (1997: 207), “SSC [Siberian Cultural Center] membership spanned the political spectrum from radical separatists to more conservative “sovereignists”. Some dreamt of an independent South Siberia Turkic republic, reminiscent of the vision of Oirotia earlier in this century. Pragmatists pointed to basic demographic problems inherent in establishing such a republic – the indigenous peoples are now minorities throughout their homelands. A less radical component of this movement proposed establishing indigenous administration over an archipelago of rural areas which do still have an indigenous majority.” This is the earliest evidence of self-determination activity we found, thus 1989 is coded as start date. Note: the Altai are coded separately while the Shor are coded together with the Khakass since they form a sub-group of the Khakass (Minahan 2002: 979). Another organization, Tun, was also formed in 1989 (Minahan 2002: 983) and began to make calls for an autonomous region for the Khakass within Khakassia (the Khakass are territorially concentrated but constitute only 11-12% of the local population, see Fondahl 1997: 207; Minority Rights Group International). According to Fondahl (1997: 207), “[Tun] also lobbied for a bicameral republican government, with at least half the seats in one of the two chambers, the Council of Nationalities, dedicated to Khakassy, and a prerequisite of Khakass nationality applied to the positions of prime
minister, parliamentary chair, and minister of culture. Such platforms incurred the wrath of Russian and Cossack factions, who accused the association of separatist tendencies. While some of Tun’s radical members do espouse separation, the group as a whole has not, rather working to ensure avenues for Khakaass participation in the republic.” In August 1990 Kakassia declared sovereignty and unilaterally elevated its status to that of a republic (Treisman 1997: 226; Kahn 2000: 60; Fondahl 1997: 207). In July 1991 Moscow indeed granted Khakassia republican status (Fondahl 1997: 207, 227; Orttung et al. 2000: 229). The Khakass movement quickly declined after 1991 and claims in subsequent years were primarily related to cultural (rather than territorial) autonomy (Gorenburg 2003: 195-196). Orttung et al. (2000: 231) also report that nationalist sentiment has not been a local factor since 1991. Based on this we code an end to the movement in 1991. We found no evidence of separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Khants and Mansi

Summary: Khanty-Mansi is extremely rich in natural resources. The Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug unilaterally declared itself independent from Tyumen Oblast in 1990 (Fondahl 1997: 228), hence the start date of the movement. Separation would allow Khanty-Mansi to retain an increased share of the tax revenues. In 1993, the Yamalo-Nenets and the Khant-Mansi pressed for a separate republic, encouraged by the Chukchi autonomous okrug’s separation from Magadan Oblast and the prospect of controlling the area’s oil resources (Minority Rights Group International). Aleksandr Filipenko, the region’s governor until 2010, ran on a platform of increased sovereignty for the Autonomous Okrug and separation from Tyumen Oblast in the 1996 gubernatorial election (Orttung et al. 2000: 237). Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug filed a complaint with the constitutional court against their subordination to Tyumen Oblast. In 1997 the court ruled against their pledge, reaffirming that all three had an equal status as federal subjects but that the two Autonomous Okrugs are subordinate to Tyumen Oblast. Subsequently Filipenko halted separatist activities (Orttung et al. 2000: 239), hence we code an end to the movement in 1997. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.
Summary: An extraordinary session of the Komi Supreme Soviet in August 1990 adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty and declared that from the now on the official name of the political unit would be Komi Soviet Socialist Republic. While this name change did not change the unit’s status, it was an indication that a step had been taken toward greater independence for the Komi Republic. More specifically, under the declaration of sovereignty the republic’s mineral wealth, water resources, air space, flora and fauna, as well as cultural heritage were proclaimed its property and on the territory of the sovereign republic only its laws would have primacy. Since the declaration of sovereignty is the first evidence of organized self-determination agitation we found, we code 1990 as the start date of the movement. Several nationalist Komi organizations were formed in 1991, demanding local control of natural resources and increased fiscal autonomy (Minahan 2002: 1007). In addition to increased autonomy, the movement demands re-unification of the Komi Republic with the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug (which was separated from the former in the late 1920s). The so-called Komi People’s Congress continues to demand increased sovereignty and reunification with Komi-Permyansk, hence we code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com][April 11, 2002].
Komi-Permyaks

Summary: Most Komi-Permyaks live in what used to be the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, an autonomous ethnic entity sub-ordinated under Perm Oblast, established in 1925. In 2005 Komi-Permyak lost its autonomous status and became the Komi-Permyak Okrug. According to the World Directory of Minorities and Minahan (2002: 1508), in the late 1980s a local movement emerged advocating the unification of the Autonomous Okrug with the neighboring Komi Republic, and thus separation from the Perm oblast. We were unable to find more detailed information on the start date of the movement. Somewhat arbitrarily, we peg the start date at 1989. October 11, 1990, the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug declared sovereignty and thereby unilaterally upgraded its administrative status (Kahn 2000: 60; Treisman 1997: 226). In the early 1990s a number of nationalist organizations were formed, advocating increased regional control over natural resources, the upgrading of the (former) Autonomous Okrug to the status of a full republic. Others continued to advocate unification with the neighboring Komi Republic (Minahan 2002: 1508). Minahan (2002: 1508-1509) suggests that the movement has remained active at the time of his writing. December 1, 2005, the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug was downgraded and merged with Perm Oblast to form the Perm Krai, following a 2003 referendum. The merger led to the birth of a movement demanding the re-establishment of the autonomous status (Goble 2009, 2012). Hence, we code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


**Koryaks and Itelmen**

*Summary:* In 1990 the Koryaks joined with other small northern nations to form the Association of Northern Minorities, a coalition of nationalist and cultural groups dedicated to reclaiming the northern people’s lands, cultures and languages. In October 1990, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug declared sovereignty and unilaterally raised its administrative status. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990. In 1991 the local Soviet attempted to secede from Kamchatka Oblast, hoping to establish a Koryak republic within the Russian Federation. According to Minahan (2002: 1028) claims for increased autonomy continued throughout the 1990s. Indigenous rights ranked among the top priorities of Valentina Bronevich (herself an ethnic Itelmen), the region’s governor from 1996 to 2001 and vice-governor from 2005 to 2008 (Ortung et al. 2001: 264). In 2005, Koryakia voted in favour of a referendum to merge with Kamchatka Oblast to form Kamchatka Krai, implying the loss of Koryakia’s autonomy. In 2007, the merger was accomplished. No separatist claims were found after the merger; still we code the movement as ongoing following our ten-years of inactivity rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com] [April 11, 2002].


[http://www.minorityrights.org/2520/russian-federation/koryaks.html] [June 2, 2014]

**Kuban Cossacks**

*Summary:* The Cossacks have long been considered (including by most Cossacks themselves) members of a military caste, the ‘fist’ of the Tsar. Under the Tsar, the Cossacks maintained three distinctive characteristics: i) tax-free land ownership, ii) their own local self-government, and iii) mandatory military service for all male Cossacks (Skinner 1994: 1017). The Cossacks are divided into thirteen ‘hosts’, that is, regional branches of Cossacks. The Kuban Cossacks are located Russia’s Kuban region, which encompasses the modern Krasnodar Krai, parts of Stavropol Krai, and the republics of Adygea and Karachai-Cherkessia. After the fall of the Tsarist regime, in 1917 the Kuban Cossacks formed an
unrecognized anti-Bolshevik state in the Kuban region, the Kuban People’s Republic. The self-proclaimed republic was defeated by the Red Army in 1920. Subsequently the Cossacks suffered from harsh repression. Determined to end the Cossack threat to their regime, the Soviets ended all traditional Cossack privileges, banned the use of the Cossack language, and outlawed references to Cossack culture or history. The Cossacks were not recognized as an ethnic group, and reclassified as ethnic Russians. Contrary to many other groups, the Cossacks were not awarded with an ethnic homeland. Krasnodar Krai, at least partly coinciding with the historic Kuban Cossack homeland, was established in 1937 (Minahan 2002: 1039), but not as an ethnic homeland, hence the Kuban Cossacks do not have the status of a titular nation in Krasnodar Krai. Some Cossacks fought on the German side in the Second World War. After the war, they were forcibly repatriated and sent to the gulags, with most subsequently suffering death. The Cossacks remained a repressed group until Gorbachev’s perestroika (Skinner 1994: 1018). The liberalization initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s triggered a Cossack revival, with increasing numbers self-identifying as Cossacks. Still, the actual number of Cossacks in Russia is disputed (many self-identify as both Russians and Cossacks, for instance), as is their status as an ethnic group (Toje 2006: 1060). From the 1990s, Cossack organisations were established throughout Russia. The first national Cossack organization, the Union of Cossacks, was organized in 1990 (Skinner 1994: 1018). Initially, the Cossack national movement was focused on the recognition as a separate people, the reinstatement of Cossack military duties, and a cultural revitalization. But soon also claims for increased territorial self-determination were made. Some Kuban Cossack nationalists demanded the creation of a Kuban Cossack autonomous republic, while others demanded outright independence or even the establishment of a pan-Cossack entity encompassing numerous historic Cossack lands (including the lands of branches other than the Kuban Cossacks). The first evidence for separatist activity we found is in 1991, when a Cossack group proclaimed an autonomous middle-Kuban Cossack Republic (Minahan 2002: 1039), hence we peg the start date at 1991. According to Minahan (2002: 1040), the movement remained ongoing in subsequent years. Though Toje (2006: 1058) notes that the Cossack movements’ level of mobilization has faded in more recent years, there is evidence of continued activity. July 3, 2010, Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossacks gathered to demand Cossack autonomy (Bugajski 2010: 40; Goble 2010). Hence, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has taken a more accommodative stance towards the Cossacks, in the hope that they could help control the Caucasus. In 1992 Yeltsin and the Russian parliament rehabilitated the Cossacks as a cultural-ethnic community, with stated rights to land use, military service, and self-administration. However, implementation of these measures was slow, if at all they were implemented (Skinner 1994: 1018; Minahan 2002: 543). In 1995, Krasnodar Krai adopted a flag similar to the traditional Cossack flag (Minahan 2002: 1040). In 1997, the governor of Krasnodar Krai set up a regional Kuban Cossack militia. We found no reports of separatist violence and thus classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Kumyks

Summary: The Kumyks are a Turkic minority group located primarily in the lowlands along the coast of the Caspian Sea in the complex Dagestan republic. There has been a movement demanding increased self-determination for Dagestan as a whole, but at the same time several of Datestan’s ethnic groups have agitated for increased self-determination themselves. These are listed separately from the Dagestan movement. The Kumyks organized a national movement called Tenglik (“Equality”) in November 1989 (Minahan 2002: 1046), hence the start date of the movement. At the first national congress of the Kumyks, held in November 1989, the Kumyk movement announced its aim of creating a Kumyk autonomous republic within a revamped Dagestan (Roeder 2007: 131; Minahan 2002: 1046). In 1990, the Kumyk movement repeated its claim, and Kumyk deputies in the regional Soviet called for increased sovereignty for Kumyk-dominated territories within Dagestan (Ormrrod 1997: 118). Minahan (2002: 1046) suggest similar calls were made throughout 1991. Towards the mid-1990s, the Kumyk campaign for autonomy lost ground. But Minority Rights Group International notes that activists associated with the Tenglik movement have continued to advocate autonomy within the Dagestan Republic. Hence, we code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


**Kyrgyz**

*Summary:* In the summer of 1989, Ashar was formed, becoming the first independent association in Kyrgyzstan. Ashar mobilized around housing and land matters. Soon after other groups emerged, many of which were openly nationalist. We code 1989 as the start date of the movement. In May 1990, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, an umbrella group for various pro-democracy and pro-independence movements, was founded. Kyrgyzstan became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


**Kyrgyz Uzbeks**

*Summary:* In 1989, Kyrgyz Uzbeks first demanded local autonomy from Moscow and some pressed for annexation of the Uzbek populated area in Kyrgyzstan by neighboring Uzbekistan. Such demands were raised, in particular, in the context of the Osh riots in 1990. The 1990 Osh riots led to 300-600 deaths (official estimates) or 1,000 deaths (unofficial estimates). The 1990 Osh riots are nonetheless not coded since this was an incident of inter-ethnic strife involving the local Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The movement appears to have faded soon after the 1990 riots. Minorities at Risk notes that demands for union with Uzbekistan or territorial autonomy have not been heard recently, and that demands have shifted to civil rights and greater Uzbek representation in the government. Writing in 2007, Fumagalli notes that Uzbeks are wary of any move that might be interpreted from part of the Kyrgyz elites as separatist or autonomist, and that even radical representatives of the Uzbek ethnic movement have gradually moderated their demands. Furthermore, Fumagalli (2007: 583) reports that in interviews conducted in 2003 and 2005, the number of Uzbeks advocating autonomy is practically zero. However, note that part of the Kyrgyz elite continues to accuse the Uzbeks of separatist agitation. In particular, the mayor of Osh explained the riots in Osh in 2010 as a reaction to a secessionist coup attempt by ethnic Uzbeks. According to the International Crisis Group (2012: 7), this assertion should be dismissed since the Uzbeks are no longer
demanding autonomy. Since we lack a clear date when the self-determination claim was abandoned, we continue to code the movement in independent Kyrgyzstan, and peg the end of the movement in 2000, following the 10-year rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

**Sources:**


**Latvians**

**Summary:** Latvia had been independent between the two World Wars. In 1940 it was annexed into the Soviet Union, and the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic was established on July 21, 1940. Between 1941 and 1944, Latvia was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944 it was annexed again by the Soviet Union, and the Latvian SSR was re-established (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 168). This prompted a resistance campaign by the so-called Forest Brothers (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). We begin to code the movement in 1945, the earliest possible date in our data set, but note prior activity. The HVIOLOSD coding for 1945-47 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006) although we note prior violence in 1944: the war began in 1944 around the same time as the Lithuanian insurgency. As this is also the first evidence for organized separatist activity we found, 1944 is coded as start date. In Latvia, there were around 40,000 partisans fighting against the USSR to end the occupation. The Latvian resistance was significantly weaker than the Lithuanian resistance, and by the end of 1946, USSR soldiers had regained control of Latvian territory. The war petered out by 1947 based on PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset v.3 coding notes. The Latvian movement was militarily weaker from the beginning of the war. Statiev attributes this to the Latvians’ belief that they would be unable to achieve independence, which therefore translated to lesser support for the resistance. By the end of 1945, when Latvians realized there would be no foreign support for their movement, “they lost interest in the insurgency” so “[t]he government firmly controlled most of the Latvian countryside even in 1945” (Statiev 2010: 115). In late 1945, Latvian rebel groups attempted to merge and form a larger movement, “but the police destroyed their general headquarters in 1945-1946, killing and arresting their top leaders…” (Statiev 2010: 115). By the end of the war in 1947, the government had clearly overpowered the rebels. There was no peace agreement or ceasefire. Still resistance appears to have continued, though at very low intensity. By the early 1950s the movement was defeated, and most of the remaining fighters gave up when offered an amnesty after Stalin’s death in 1953 (see Senn 1997: 355). Hence, we code an end to this first phase in 1953. 1948-1953 is coded as NVIOLSD. The movement re-erupted with Perestroika and Glasnost. The first evidence of organized separatist activity we found is the forming of Helsinki ’86 in 1986. The organization called for an end to Russification and the restoration of Latvian independence. In 1988, diverse groupings coalesced into a
Popular Front that sought to support Perestroika and decentralization of authority from Moscow (Muiznieks 1997). Latvia became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. 1986-1991 is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**Lezgins**

*Summary:* The Lezgins are located in the North Caucasus, with significant populations in Russia’s Dagestan Republic and adjacig Azerbaijan (Minahan 2002: 1084). Shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union, the Lezgin national council – Savdal (Unity) – began to demand the creation of a Lezgin homeland within Russia (Roeder 2007: 131). According to Minahan (2002: 1088), Savdal was founded in 1990, hence the start date of the movement. On September 28, 1991, the third national council proclaimed a Lezgin republic within the Russian Federation (Roeder 2007: 131). In December 1991, a Lezgin congress called for the creation of a “national-state formation, Lezgistan”, which would unite the Lezgin populations and territories (Ormrod 1997: 118). This, most likely, implies that less than full independence would be acceptable. Lezgin separatist activity continued in the post-Soviet period period (also see Lezgins under Azerbaijan). The Lezgins began to protest what they consider an arbitrary boundary resulting from the Soviet Union’s collapse. Since the division of territories, the Lezgins have been unable
to continue their traditional lifestyles. The Lezgins are herders who have spent centuries grazing their flock on Dagestani land and remaining on the Azerbaijani land during the winter. Grazing activity has decreased drastically as a result of the new international boundary. Similarly, burial grounds are located in Azerbaijan, and water-sharing traditions between the Lezghis have ended as a result of the formal split. In 1993, more than 10,000 protested near the Azeri-Dagestani border to demand the unification of the Lezgin people (Ormrod 1997: 135). In 1996, the Lezgin movement sent a letter to the Russian and the Azeri governments, calling for the unification of their nation (Minahan 2002: 1089). According to Minority Rights Group International and Minorities at Risk, the Lezgin’s movement split into two in 1998. The radical faction continued to demand the creation of an independent Lezgistan, to which the Lezgin-populated regions in Northern Azerbaijan should also be annexed. The more moderate wing instead advocated an autonomous status within Dagestan (note that Minahan (2002: 1089) in contrast argues that the more radical wing aimed for a separate republic within the Russian Federation). In 2004, the demand for the unification of the Lezgin people in a state was repeated, according to Minorities at Risk. News reports suggest the movement has continued its activities. Hence, the movement is coded as ongoing. It is coded as NVIOLSD, as there has been no violence associated with the Lezgin movement.

Sources:

Lithuanian Poles

Summary: In response to Lithuania’s 1989 language law, in 1989 the Salcininkai regional council began to advocate greater autonomy for ethnic Poles in Lithuania. In 1991 the Third Congress of the Union of Poles in Lithuania declared their intention to form a political party with the aim of unifying the Polish-dominated districts of Vilnius and Soleczniki into a single district with considerable autonomy. Thus, we peg the start date to 1989. The movement remained active when Lithuania gained its independence in 1991. We found no report of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.
Lithuanians

**Summary:** Lithuania had been independent between the two World Wars. In 1940 it was annexed into the Soviet Union, and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic was established on July 21, 1940. Between 1941 and 1944, Lithuania was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944 it was annexed again by the Soviet Union, and the Lithuanian SSR was re-established (Senn 1997; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 175). The Soviet annexation was resisted by the Forest Brothers, who organized a resistance campaign throughout the Baltic states. We begin to code the Lithuanians in 1945, the earliest possible date, but note prior activity. The HVIOILSD coding for 1945-48 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006) although we note prior violence in 1944: the war began on August 3rd 1944, when Lithuanian partisans launched an insurgency against the Soviet Union over the occupation of Lithuania. As this is also the first evidence for organized separatist activity, 1944 is also coded as start date. Similar wars took place in the other two Baltic regions, Latvia and Estonia, over the same issues. However, the Lithuanian war was the largest of the three due to the high level of participation. Rieber (2003: 158) writes, “Of the three Baltic peoples the Lithuanians continued to display the highest level of political consciousness and organization. An estimated 100,000 took part at least one time or another in the struggle against the restoration of Soviet power.” According to Vardys, there were two distinct phases in the war: 1944-1948 saw a full-fledged resistance and the anti-Soviet resistance received popular support as well as a large number of volunteer fighters. Battles took place between the partisans and the USSR, with the partisans retaining strong control of the Lithuanian countryside. 1949-1952 was then a period of decline for the rebels, which led to a reorganization of the resistance. They formed a new rebel group, the Lietwos Laisves Kovu Sajudis (LLKS), and used tactics more suitable for small bands of anti-resistance fighters before petering out by 1952. Based on deaths estimate in PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset v.3, fatalities decreased from almost 4000 per year in 1946 and 1947 to 900 in 1948. This indicates that the war had decreased greatly in scale by 1948 and supports Vardys’s claim that 1949-1952 was a period of decline. Most of the remaining fighters gave up when offered an amnesty after Stalin’s death in 1953 (see Senn 1997: 355). Hence, we code an end to this first phase in 1953. No deaths estimates could be found for 1949-1953. MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score, however, continues to be coded with 6 (that is, it is six throughout 1945-1954). Thus 1949-1953 are coded with LVIOLSD. The ensuing period of dormancy ended at the latest when large-scale protests for Lithuanian sovereignty began in the late 1980s (Beissing 2002). In August 1987, the dissident Liberty League organized a demonstration against the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. While this is the first evidence of sovereignty-related protest we found, the independence-minded Liberty League was founded already in 1978, operating underground until the late 1980s (Senn 1997: 370). Hence, we peg the start date to 1978. In June 1988, the Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika (better known as ‘Sajudis’) was formed; initially, this was a reform movement, but soon the Sajudis turned nationalist and advocated Lithuanian sovereignty (Senn 1997: 355). In 1990, the secessionist Lithuanian Reform Movement became politically
active. Lithuania became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. 1978-1991 is coded as NVIOLSD.

**Sources:**


**Mari**

*Summary:* Mari Ushem, a nationalist organization demanding increased sovereignty for the Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic about 500 kilometers east of Moscow, official status for the Mari language, and an end to Russification, was formed in 1989 (Giuliano 2011: 172; Minahan 2002: 1191) – note that Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 186) in contrast (and probably erroneously) note that the organization was formed in 1990. Hence, the start date of the movement is coded as 1989. According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 186), a yet more nationalist grouping was formed in 1990, Kugeze Mlande (Land of Our Fathers) that called for the separation of Mari El from Russia. In October 1990 the Mari ASSR proclaimed sovereignty, announcing that its natural resources would become the exclusive property of its people and that Mari and Russian would become official state languages. The republic adopted the new vernacular name “Mari El” (meaning “Mari Territory”) and that name won official approval from the government in Moscow. The influence of Mari Ushem remained insignificant (Giuliano 2011: 172), and so did the influence of Kugeze Mlande, on which we found no information except for a short note in Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 186). We did not find further reports of separatist activity. Thus, following our “ten-year inactivity rule” we peg an end to the movement in 2000. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.
Summary: In 1969, the National Patriotic Front was founded, an organization seeking the establishment of the Moldavian Democratic Republic, separation from the Soviet Union, and union with Romania. Eventually, the organization totaled over 100 members. Three of the Front’s leaders were arrested in 1971, and the Front was dissolved (Brezianu & Spanu 2007: 91). The organization is described as clandestine, thus it is somewhat ambiguous whether the criterion of public claims for self-determination is fulfilled. Noting the ambiguity, we nonetheless include it. Hence, we code a start to the movement in 1969 and an end in 1971. No separatist violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD classification. In early 1988, the Moldavian intelligentsia formed the Democratic Movement in Support of Restructuring, which in 1989 was reconstituted as a Popular Front, following the example of the Baltic Republics. Initially, mobilization focused on revising the Republic’s language laws, but as of 1989 agitation towards independence and/or unification with Romania began. Hence, we code 1989 as the second start date of the movement. We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. Moldova became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement.

Sources:


Mordvins

Summary: Like other indigenous peoples of Russia, Mordvins experienced a rise of national consciousness following Soviet disintegration. In 1989, Mordvin nationalists formed the Mordvin Mastorava Society for National Rebirth, an organization devoted to defend the interests of the Mordvin nation (IRB). Mastorava held its constituent congress in April 1990 (Frank & Wixman 1997: 175, 183). Among the demands of the movement was the introduction of bilingualism in the Mordvin republic (which was soon to be granted), Mordvin language education, and increased economic and political autonomy (Frank & Wixman 1997: 175-176; Minahan 2002: 1313). Hence, we code 1989 as the start date of the movement. The Mordovian ASSR declared sovereignty in December 1990 (according to Kahn 2000: 60; Frank & Wixman 1997: 184, in contrast, note that the Mordovian ASSR dropped the word autonomous from its name, but did not declare sovereignty). After 1993 a more radical wing which demanded reunification of all Mordvin lands in an independent state began to gain grounds. However, both the more moderate and the radical wings remained weak, and did not substantially influence republican politics (Frank & Wixman 1997: 176). By 1994, the Mastorava Society has disappeared, following the death of its founder. In early 1994, another organization was formed, the Council for the Rebirth of the Mordovian People, but the Council has limited itself to culture-related claims, and does not demand increased sovereignty (IRB 2000). Hence, we code an end to the movement in 1994. No violence was found, and thus we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/192750/296509_en.html [May 19, 2014].

**Nenets**

**Summary:** The Nenets are a Siberian people living in the Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okrug, the Nenets autonomous okrug and the former Taimyr (Dolgan) autonomous okrug (Taimyr was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007 following a 2005 referendum). In October 1990, the Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrug declared sovereignty and unilaterally elevated itself to a republic (Kahn 2000: 60; Fondahl 1997: 228; Orttung et al. 2000: 636). According to Treisman (1997: 226) and Minahan (2002: 1358), the Nenets autonomous okrug also unilaterally raised its status in 1990 and the Taimyr autonomous okrug at least declared sovereignty in 1990. Already in December 1989 the Association of the Nenets people had been founded but it is not clear whether this organization had separatist goals (Blakkisrud 2002: 179).

Furthermore, Minahan (2002: 1358) suggests that there had been some protests before that, but he does not give a clear date. Hence, 1990 is coded as the start date. In 1993, the Yamalo-Nenets and the Khant-Mansi pressed for a separate republic, encouraged by the Chukchi autonomous okrug’s separation from Magadan Oblast and the prospect of controlling the area’s oil resources (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 1358). Similarly, activists in the Nenets and Taimyr autonomous oblasts agitated for republican status (Minahan 2002: 1358-1359). In 1996 the Nenets autonomous okrug boycotted the elections of Arkhangesk oblast, of which it is formally a part. According to Orttung et al. (2000: 360), “[T]his measure was taken as an attempt to increase Nenets’ control over its natural resource revenues.” Analogously, the Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okrug boycotted Tyumen oblast’s 1996 gubernatorial elections (Minahan 2002: 1358). Orttung et al. (2000: 530, 635) furthermore suggests that separatist agitation continued in the mid-1990s to late 1990s in the Taimyr and the Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrugs, which wanted to secede from Krasnoyarsk Krai and Tyumen oblast, respectively. According to Minahan (2002: 1359), “Nenet activists, in early 2001, presented a plan for a new autonomous region to include the northern districts of the three administrative regions from the Taimyr Peninsula to the Kanin Peninsula to the west. The plan, which would include areas of vital economic interest to the Russian government, was accepted for study, but the Nenets and the other small national groups of the vast region have little hope that their desires will be respected.” We did not find further separatist activity. In the 2000s, the three autonomous okrugs were busy attempting to preserve their limited autonomy. There were plans to abolish the three autonomous okrugs (Lexis Nexis 2006; Economic Press Review 2006). Following a 2005 referendum, Taimyr was merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai in 2007. The other two autonomous okrugs have been spared this fate thus far. Blakkisrud (2002: 178) that demands for “full sovereignty” have been abandoned at least in the Nenets autonomous okrug. We code an end to the movement in 2011, following the ten-years inactivity rule. We found no separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

**Sources:**


Nogai

Summary: The majority of the Nogai live in northern Dagestan and the Karachai-Cherkess Republic, with some in the in the Chechen and Ingush Republics and in Stavropol Krai (Minority Rights Group International; Ormrod 1997: 120). The Nogai national movement (Birlik) was founded as a cultural organization in 1957. Birlik turned into a self-determination movement in the sense employed here when it first demanded an autonomous Nogai republic to be carved out of the several territories with significant Nogai populations in 1989 (Minahan 2002: 1380-1381; Roeder 2007: 131). The start date of the movement is thus pegged at 1989. Notably, the activities of Birlik focused on the Nogai region in Dagestan, the only region with a compact Nogai settlement (Ormrod 1997: 120). According to Ormrod (1997: 120), the Nogai's interest in increased sovereignty has weakened by the mid-1990s. Minority Rights Group International, too, suggests that Nogai demands for the creation of a Nogai homeland were limited to the early 1990s. However, the Birlik organization continues to be active, and we found calls for increased sovereignty in 1997, 2011 and 2012. Moreover, also Minahan (2002) suggests that the Nogai movement remained active beyond the early 1990s. Based on this, we code the movement as ongoing. Unlike many other ethnic groups of the Caucasus, they still do not have an administrative territory of their own. No violence was found, and thus we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


North Ossetians

Summary: In the early 1990s, the North Ossetian Republic was involved in a bargaining process with Moscow, demanding increased sovereignty (Ormrod 1997: 114, 116). The Republic of North Ossetia declared sovereignty in July 1990, and thereby unilaterally raised its administrative status. Since this is the first evidence of separatist activity, we code 1990 as the start date of the movement. The North Ossetian elite has supported the South Ossetian attempt to join North Ossetia, and thereby the Russian Federation (Ormrod 1997: 115). In 1993 the North Ossetian Supreme Soviet recognized the independence of South Ossetia from Georgia (Ormrod 1997: 135). At the same time, the conflict with the Ingush over the Prigorodnyi region (which North Ossetia gained in 1944 upon the deportation of the Ingush) led to violence in October 1992 leading to 600 deaths and a state of emergency in the affected areas (Orttung et al. 2000: 375). In 1994 Ingushetia and North Ossetia signed the Beslan Agreement, which provides for the return of Ingush refugees to the Prigorodnyi region in North Ossetia (Ormrod 1997: 135, 137). Apparently not implemented, another such agreement was signed in 1998, but the situation remained tense (Orttung et al. 2000: 375). In March 1995, North Ossetia signed a bilateral power-sharing treaty with Moscow, becoming the fourth republic to do so (Ormrod 1997: 139; Orttung et al. 2000: 377). We were unable to find evidence of organized activity beyond that, and hence code an end to the movement in 2005, following the ten-year rule. The North Ossetians are technically a part of the Northern Caucasus war from 1999-ongoing, but that is attributed to the Islamists rather than the people of North Ossetia in general. As we found no reports of separatist violence that qualifies as LVIOLSD, we classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Pamiri Tajiks

*Summary:* Lali Badakhshan, a political party seeking increased autonomy for the Gronyi-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in the Tajik SSR, was formed in 1989 in reaction to the rising Tajik nationalism (Bliss 2006: 276). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1989. Lali Badakhshan gained control of the region in 1991. The movement remained active after the Soviet Union was dissolved (see Pamiri Tajiks under Tajikistan). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:


Rusyns

*Summary:* In February 1990 the Society of Carpathian Rusyns was formed, demanding the restoration of the autonomy Rusyns had enjoyed under Czechoslovak rule (Batt 2002: 159). The Rusyns are located mainly in Transcarpathia (Zakarpattyia Oblast), once a province of interwar Czechoslovakia, but after 1945 a part of Soviet Ukraine. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990. The movement remained active after Ukraine’s independence (see Rusyns in Ukraine). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.
Siberians

**Summary:** The term “Siberians” as employed here relates to Slavs in the Siberian region, which according to Minahan (2002: 1708) comprises Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Kurgan, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Tyumen, and Chita Oblast (the latter is now the Zabaykalsky Krai), Altai and Krasnoyarsk Krai, as well as several ethnic regions – the Republics of Altai, Buryat, Khakass, and Tuva. The Siberian national movement, dormant for decades, reemerged in 1988 with demands that Siberia become the sixteenth union republic (Minahan 2002: 1712). The start date of the movement is therefore pegged at 1988. After the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the movement’s principle demand changed to republican status within the new Russian Federation (see e.g. Orttung et al. (2000: 216). More militant groups debated the issue of Siberian independence. The movement is ongoing as of 2012 based on news sources (e.g., Goble 2013). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

**Sources:**
- Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [December 11, 2013].
Shapsugs

Summary: From 1924 to 1945 there existed a Shapsug national district. In 1990 the first congress of the Shapsug people (numbering only about 10-12,000) was organized. The congress called for the re-establishment of their autonomous status in the Tuapse area in Krasnodar Krai in southwestern Russia. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990. In 1993, the third Congress of the Shapsug people was held in Sochi, whereupon calls for autonomy within Krasnodar Krai were repeated (Ormrod 1997: 137). Evidence of subsequent activity is scarce, but the movement appears to have remained active. Goble (2011) notes that Shapsug representatives repeated their demand for the formation of an autonomous district within Krasnodar Krai at a pan-Circassian congress (that is including Adyge, Cherkess, and Kabard representatives) in 2011. Hence, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

South Ossetians

Summary: According to Minahan (2002: 1478) and Minorites at Risk, South Ossetians began to demand separation from Georgia and unification with North Ossetia (which was located in the former RSFSR, today Russia) in 1988. Thus we code the start date in 1988. In October 1989 South Ossetian activists, organized into the Popular Front of South Ossetia, called for an end to the official use of Russian and Georgian and demanded a revision of Ossetia’s status from an Autonomous Region to an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, a measure that would significantly increase the territory’s independence from authorities in Tbilisi. The movement remained active after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see South Ossetians under Georgia). There is no evidence for separatist violence under the header of the USSR, thus a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
Tajiks

Summary: The movement for the sovereignty of the Tajik Soviet Republic emerged in 1990 when the Tajik Democratic Party was formed to push for Tajik sovereignty within a framework of confederal states. This movement ended with the independence of Tajikistan in 1991. We peg the start date to 1990. We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Tatars

Summary: In the summer of 1988 the Tatar Social Center was formed, hence the start date of the movement. The Center holds its first congress in February 1989 and announces its support for increased sovereignty for the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Frank & Wixman 1997: 183). In September 1990 the legislature of the Tatar ASSR declared sovereignty and in 1992 Tatarstan approved a
constitution that described the republic as being on an equal footing with the Russian Federation. News reports and non-zero MAR protest scores indicate that the Tatars have continued their campaign for political autonomy as of 2012. Tatars are represented by a variety of groups within Tatarstan, including the Ittifak Party, the Tatar National Congress, and the All-Tatar Public Centre. The Ittifak Party and the Tatar National Congress advocate independence, and some members advocate independence as an Islamic state. The All-Tatar Public Center, while formerly advocating independence, has softened its stance and now advocates increased autonomy for Tatarstan, especially greater control over economic resources. These organizations have enjoyed relative freedom to organize in Tatarstan. In addition, Tatars in the neighboring Bashkortostan have also called for autonomy within Bashkortostan or even a merger with Tatarstan (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 38). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


**Terek Cossacks**

Summary: The Cossacks have long been considered (including by most Cossacks themselves) members of a military caste, the ‘fist’ of the Tsar. Under the Tsar, the Cossacks maintained three distinctive characteristics: i) tax-free land ownership, ii) their own local self-government, and iii) mandatory military service for all male Cossacks (Skinner 1994: 1017). The Cossacks are divided into thirteen ‘hosts’, that is, regional branches of Cossacks. The Terek Cossacks are located in the Northern Caucasus in what today is North Ossetia, Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia (Ormrod 1997: 121) as well as Stavropol Krai (Minahan 2002: 1875). After the fall of the Tsarist regime, in 1918 the Terek Cossacks formed an unrecognized anti-Bolshevik state. By 1920 the Soviets had taken hold of most of the breakaway region.
Subsequently the Cossacks suffered from harsh repression. Determined to end the Cossack threat to their regime, the Soviets ended all traditional Cossack privileges, banned the use of the Cossack language, and outlawed references to Cossack culture or history. The Terek homeland was divided among several regions. The Cossacks were not recognized as an ethnic group, and reclassified as ethnic Russians. Contrary to many other groups, the Cossacks were not awarded with an ethnic homeland. Some Cossacks fought on the German side in the Second World War. After the war, they were forcibly repatriated and sent to the gulags, with most subsequently suffering death. The Cossacks remained a repressed group until Gorbachev’s perestroika (Skinner 1994: 1018). The liberalization initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s triggered a Cossack revival, with increasing numbers self-identifying as Cossacks. Still, the actual number of Cossacks in Russia is disputed (many self-identify as both Russians and Cossacks, for instance), as is their status as an ethnic group (Toje 2006: 1060). From the 1990s, Cossack organizations were established throughout Russia, including the Terek homeland. The first national Cossack organization, the Union of Cossacks, was organized in 1990 (Skinner 1994: 1018). Initially, the Cossack national movement was focused on the recognition as a separate people, the reinstatement of Cossack military duties, and a cultural revitalization. But soon also claims for increased territorial self-determination were made. In 1991, a Terek organization proposed the establishment of an autonomous Terek republic (Minahan 2002: 1880). Hence, we code 1991 as the start date of the movement. Though Toje (2006: 1058) notes that the Cossack movements’ level of mobilization has faded in more recent years, the movement has remained active. In 1999, a Terek leader reiterated the claim for a Terek Cossack autonomous homeland (Minahan 2002: 1880). July 3, 2010, Don, Kuban, and Terek Cossacks gathered to demand Cossack autonomy (Bugajski 2010: 40; Goble 2010). Hence, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has taken a more accommodative stance towards the Cossacks in the hope that they could help control the Caucasus. In 1992 Yeltsin and the Russian parliament rehabilitated the Cossacks as a cultural-ethnic community, with stated rights to land use, military service, and self-administration. However, implementation of these measures was slow, if at all they were implemented (Skinner 1994: 1018; Minahan 2002: 543). We found no reports of separatist violence. The Terek Cossacks were involved in inter-ethnic strife (Minahan 2002: 1880) but inter-ethnic strife is not coded as LVIOLSD. Thus we classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Turkmen

Summary: In September 1989, Agzybirlik was formed, the ‘Society for the Protection of the Turkmen Language’. In addition to language claims, Agzybirlik advocated sovereignty (Suyarkulova 2011: 134). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1989. We found no reports of violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding. Turkmenistan became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement.

Sources:


Tuvans

Summary: The Tuvan Popular Front was set up in 1989, with some demanding increased autonomy, and others outright secession (Fondahl 1997: 227). We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1989. In May 1990, the Tuva ASSR witnessed civil strife between the Russian and Tuvinian populations. Charging that Russia had failed to provide them with employment opportunities or suitable housing and had sought to eradicate their indigenous culture, the Tuvinians attacked Russian neighborhoods, setting fire to homes and forcing about 3,000 Russians to flee. According to Fondahl (1997: 218), the Soviet press attributed as many as 88 deaths to interethnic strife in 1990 in Tuva. We do not code the 1990 riots as LVIOLSD since it is an incident of inter-ethnic strife. In 1992 the Tuvan Popular Front and another nationalist party, the People’s Party of Sovereign Tuva, lobbied for a referendum on secession from the Russian Federation. Tuva’s Supreme Soviet, however, overwhelmingly rejected the holding of such a referendum, given the strong economic dependence on Russia (Fondahl 1997: 218). In 1993, Tuva adopted a constitution that was in direct conflict with the Russian one and conferred significant
autonomy, including precedence of Tuvin law over Russian law and the right to secede from Russia. Also, the republic’s name was changed to Tyva. In a referendum that was held simultaneously with the referendum on the Russian constitution in December 1993, the Tuvan constitution was adopted with 62.2 per cent of the vote, while the Russian constitution was rejected with only 29.7 per cent of voters approving (Orttung et al. 2000: 582). Under federal pressure, in 1996 (MAR; 1997 according to Orttung et al. 2000: 582) Tuva removed those parts from its constitution which directly violated the Russian constitution, including powers in the realms of the military. Minorities at Risk notes that agitation towards self-determination has been more limited in recent years, and that levels of protest have been low. However, Minahan (2002: 1940) notes that the re-centralization of powers under Putin raised national sentiment. Goble (2008) suggests that there remains separatist activity. Based on this, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [December 11, 2013].


**Udmurts**

*Summary:* In the more relaxed atmosphere during Perestroika, Udmurt cultural organizations began to be formed in the late 1980s. Their agenda, at least initially, was focused on preservation and fostering of Udmurt culture and language, and not as self-determination as we define it. One of the first such organizations was the Udmurt Cultural Club, which was formed in January 1988; another was the Society for Udmurt Culture, formed in 1989 (Frank & Wixman 1997: 173-174). The first organized separatist activity we found is when the Udmurt ASSR declared sovereignty in 1990 (hence the start of the
After the fall of the Soviet regime, a small independence developed in Udmurtia, of which the Society for Udmurt Culture was an important vehicle (Frank & Wixman 1997: 174). The main drive, however, was for increased autonomy. According to Minahan (2002: 1957), the autonomy has remained active at the time of his writing, hence we code the movement as ongoing, following our ten-year inactivity rule.

We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Ukrainians

Summary: Ukraine enjoyed a short period of independence at the end of the First World War. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, Ukrainian nationalists seized the opportunity and took control of Western Ukraine (Galicia) and proclaimed the independent Republic of Western Ukraine in 1918. In Eastern Ukraine, nationalists proclaimed the independent Russian Ukraine, also in 1918. In 1919 the two Ukrainian states were merged, but in late 1919 the Bolsheviks gained control of Ukraine, and in 1920 the Ukrainian SSR was proclaimed (note that a significant part of Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union only later; Transcarpathia, then part of Czechoslovakia, was annexed into Ukraine after the Second World War, and mainly catholic Western Ukraine, then part of Poland, as well). A period of harsh repression followed. In 1930, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was banned. Western Ukraine (then part of Poland) and Transcarpathia (then part of Czechoslovakia) were denied autonomy, despite earlier post-World War I agreements. In 1938, Transcarpathia was made an autonomous entity within a federal Czechoslovakia. Transcarpathia declared independence in 1939, but it was quickly occupied by Hungarian forces. As a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviets occupied Polish Western Ukraine in 1939, followed by harsh repression and deportations. Nazi Germany then invaded Ukraine, but was forced out by the Red Army in 1944. The Polish Western Ukraine, Czechoslovak Transcarpathia, and Romanian Bessarabia were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR (Minahan 1998: 282-283; Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 240-242; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 306). This gave rise to a Ukrainian resistance campaign, starting in 1944, that fought against the incorporation of Ukraine into the USSR. HVIOLSD started in 1944 (Doyle & Sambanis 2006) and continued to 1950. Accordingly, 1944 is coded as start date, though we only code the movement from 1945, the earliest possible date in our data set. Since armed conflict had erupted already in 1944, we note prior violent activity. We code an end to the movement in 1950 since the movement was defeated and we find no subsequent movement. A period of dormancy followed until 1989, when the Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh) was formed to advocate for Ukrainian sovereignty (and later independence) (Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 250; Hewitt &
We therefore peg the start date of the second phase of the movement at 1989. Ukraine became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement.

Sources:


Uralians

Summary: The term “Uralians”, as employed here, relates to ethnic Russians in four Uralian Oblasts, Perm (now Perm Krai), Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, and Kurgan Oblast (Minahan 2002: 1970). In the context of the fall of the Soviet Union, Uralians began to demand increased political and economic autonomy, fueled by the asymmetric concessions given to the ethnic republics like Tatarstan or Bashkortostan (Minahan 2002: 1973). The 1992 Federal Treaty, though devolving powers to both ethnic and “normal”, non-ethnic regions, created an asymmetrical federation in which ethnic republics enjoyed several privileges, including control over their natural resources, the right of secession, and citizenship (Ross 2002: 23). The most active contenders came from Sverdlovsk Oblast, Yeltsin’s home region (Orttung et al. 2000: 519). According to Easter (1997: 617, 622), Sverdlovsk Oblast’s political elite began to advocate increased economic autonomy in 1991, hence the start date of the movement. In July 1993 the government of Sverdlovsk Oblast unilaterally declared the region a member republic of the Russian Federation, a move that would increase the region’s political and economic autonomy (Easter 1997: 622; Roeder 2007: 192). By October 1993 the remaining Uralian Oblasts had joined the revolt. To pressure Moscow, the Uralian Oblasts began to withhold tax money and blocked Muscovite directives (Minahan 2002: 1974). In November Yeltsin signed a decree to dissolve Sverdlovsk’s regional Soviet and declared all of its actions regarding the creation of the Ural Republic null and void (Easter 1997: 617, 625). Sverdlovsk’s governor that had pushed for increased autonomy, was also sacked. Sverdlovsk subsequently formed a party dedicated to the autonomy issue, winning significant support in the 1993 regional parliamentary elections (Easter 1997: 625; also see Orttung 2000: 520). After negotiations, a watered down version of the unilaterally proclaimed Ural Republic constitution was passed by the Duma in 1994. The most significant concession was that Sverdlovsk was allowed to hold gubernatorial elections (following the adoption of another law in 1995) – thus becoming the first non-ethnic region to hold gubernatorial elections, which had repeatedly been postponed by Yeltsin (Easter 1997: 617, 625). Rossel became Sverdlovsk’s first popularly elected governor (Easter 1997: 627; Orttung et al. 2000: 520), and...
continued to negotiate increased sovereignty. In January 1996, Sverdlovsk signed a bilateral treaty with Moscow, conferring additional sovereignty on Sverdlovsk (Easter 1997: 627-628; Orttung et al. 2000: 522-523). Sverdlovsk was the first non-ethnic region to sign a bilateral treaty (Orttung et al. 2000: 523). News reports indicate that the movement has remained active: claims for increased autonomy continue in the Urals region as of 2011 (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, Lexis Nexis) and thus the movement is coded as ongoing. However, note that no activity was found in 2012 and 2013. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Uzbek Tajiks

Summary: The first report of separatist activity by Tajiks in Uzbekistan we found is in 1988, when in demonstrations in Samarkand and Bukhara (two mainly Tajik cities in Uzbekistan) demands were raised that majority Tajik regions be united with Tajikistan (Melvin 2000: 50). In November 1989, a meeting was organized by citizens of the Tajik region of Samarkand, where claims were raised for the autonomy of Tajiks in Uzbekistan, for the removal of borders between Bukhara and Samarkand, and for the establishment of an autonomous republic by the name of Sogdiana. The Tajik movement in Uzbekistan remained active after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see Tajiks in Uzbekistan). We peg the start date to 1988, the first year we found evidence for separatist activity among UzbekTajiks. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 25, 2002].


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**Uzbeks**

*Summary:* Birlik, the first organization making claims for sovereignty, was formed in 1988 (Suyarkulova 2011: 134). This movement ended with the independence of Uzbekistan in 1991. In light of this evidence we peg the start date to 1988, the first year of Uzbek separatist activity. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


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**Veps**

*Summary:* The Veps are a Finnic people located mainly in the Karelian Republic and the Saint Petersburg and Vologda Oblasts (Minahan 2002: 1993). The Veps never had a single autonomous district, neither in tsarist nor in Soviet Russia (Kurs 2001: 70). They were subjected to severe assimilation pressure, particularly under Stalin (Minahan 2002: 1996; Kurs 2001: 73). Their autonomous national districts were dissolved in 1939 (Minahan 2002: 1996). Under Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost policies, a Veps
ethnic revival took place. In 1989 the Veps Cultural Society was formed, “the first openly Vep association since 1937” (Minahan 2002: 1997). The movement was primarily focused on language rights (in 1990 the Republic of Karelia in its sovereignty declaration recognized the Vep language as one of its official languages according to Minahan 2002: 1997 and Kurs 2001: 79 reports that the Vepsian language has been taught in two schools (Sheltozero and Rybreka, both in Karelia) since the early 1990s), but there were also some claims for autonomy. According to Minahan (2002: 1997-1998) Vep activists “demanded a separate Veps homeland, an autonomous region that would allow the Veps the same rights as other national groups in the Russian Federation.” The earliest evidence for activity we came across is in 1989, when “Vepsian scholars submitted proposals to the authorities in Karelia as well as in Leningrad and Vologda provinces about re-establishing 15 rural councils” (Kurs 2001: 78). Thus 1989 is coded as start date. Vepsian intelligentsia furthermore advocated “an all-Vepsian autonomous district” that “was to include Vepsian-inhabited territories in Karelia, Leningrad, and Vologda provinces” (Kurs 2001: 78). The Vepsian autonomy movement is noted by Mastyugina & Perepelkin (1996: 73) as well. The movement appears to have petered out relatively quickly. Minahan (2002: 1997) reports that several nationalist groups emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but we did not find much evidence for separatist activity beyond 1991 and in particular not after the mid-1990s. Thus, we code an end to the movement in 2001, following the ten-years rule. We found no evidence for separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD code. Note: in 1994 the republic of Karelia granted a village inhabited mainly by Veps a very limited extent of autonomy (Kurs 2001: 78). In 1996 Karelia granted the municipal government some budgetary autonomy, but its competencies remained very limited (Kurs 2001: 79). The municipal autonomy was discontinued in the mid-2000s. Note as well: Minahan (2002: 1993) claims that there are 40,000 Veps, but the Soviet/Russian censuses counted much fewer Veps. Minahan (2002: 1997) argues that Soviet census figures are suspect and that the Veps misrepresented their nationality to avert discrimination. Whether or not this is due to the threat of discrimination, many indeed appear to have stopped indicating their Veps nationality: the number of Veps fell from 33,000 in the 1926 census to 8,100 in the 1979 census. The ethnic revival led to more citizens indicating a Vep identity: in the 1989 census a total of 12,000 individuals declared themselves Veps (Kurs 2001: 76).

Sources:

Volga Germans

Summary: The Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, created in 1924, was abolished during the Second World War, in 1941, and the Volga Germans were deported to Siberia. In 1964 the Volga Germans were partially rehabilitated but not allowed to resettle in the region. The Volga Germans began to organize for the right to return to their homeland and the restoration of autonomy. The first evidence of organized activity we found is in 1964, when Russian Germans sent a delegation to Moscow to present a petition for the re-establishment of the Volga Republic (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 342-343). Thus 1964 is coded as start date. Some low-level organized activity continued in subsequent years, though the movement faced harsh repression (Minahan 2002: 2010; Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 343-345). In 1972, Moscow removed travel and residency restrictions on ethnic Germans, though the right to return
to their homeland remained largely theoretical and was poorly enforced (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 334-335). A number of German organizations emerged in the more relaxed atmosphere of the late 1980s. The Vozrozhdeniye (Rebirth) society was organized in 1988 to return the autonomy of the Volga Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within its former borders. Other German organizations were established at the same time, including Svoboda (Freedom) and the Interstate Organization of Russian Germans (Zwischenstaatlicher Verein der Russlanddeutschen). In 1991, ethnic Germans regained the right to settle in their ancient homeland. Most, however, chose to emigrate to Germany or stay where they were (Schmaltz & Sinner 2002: 346). News reports indicate that the movement has continued to be active until 2003. In 2003 the Association of Volga Germans organized a congress in Saratov; the congress called for the restoration of the autonomous status. The calls have remained unanswered thus far, though there were plans to re-establish autonomy. The idea was first raised by Brezhnev in 1972, but each time when the idea was brought on the table it was met by fierce resistance from the Russian population now located in the area that used to be the Volga German ASSR prior to 1941. In July 1991, the Soviet government promised the formation of a German autonomy in the Altai Krai, which was to be the first of a number of autonomous territories for the Russian German population that is scattered throughout the country due to the earlier deportation. However, the plan was abandoned following the collapse of the union (Minahan 2002: 2010). In negotiations with Germany, Russian officials agreed to the reestablishment of the autonomous homeland in the 1990s, but failed to implement the agreement (Minahan 2002: 2010). Note that we found no evidence for self-determination activity beyond 2003. Still we code the movement as ongoing in 2012, following the ten-year rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, and thus we classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com] [April 11, 2002].


Western Ukrainians

Summary: Western Ukraine, also known as Galicia, was annexed from Poland in 1939. In June 1941 nationalists declared Western Ukraini an independent state, but it was retaken by the Red army in 1944. Since 1989 the inhabitants of Western Ukraine, who are ethnic Ukrainians, have been demanding cultural and political autonomy. We peg the start date to 1989. The movement continues to be active after
Ukraine’s independence (see Western Ukrainians under Ukraine). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Yakuts (Sakhas)

Summary: The Republic of Yakutia, the largest autonomous republic in the Russian Federation, is located in north-central Siberia. Sakha nationalism increased with the decline of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. In 1989, Sakha Omuk was formed, an organization to preserve and revive Sakha (Yakut) culture (Fondahl 1997: 227). Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 263) describe Sakha Omuk as nationalistic, but it is not clear whether they at this point have already made self-determination claims. In September 1990 Yakutia proclaimed its sovereignty within the Russian Federation, thereby upgrading its status to union republic. Since this appears to be the first instance of self-determination activity, we peg the start date of the self-determination movement at 1990. Yakutia has been at the forefront of the movement demanding increased control over natural resources (Fondahl 1997: 213; Minority Rights Group International). Also, non-zero MAR protest scores for 1990-99 indicate that the movement has been active throughout the decade. In the 2000s, the Yakuts protested for more control of the diamond industry in Yakutia (MAR). This is considered agitation towards self-determination, as it is aiming for control over natural resources. We code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events http://www.keesings.com [April 11, 2002].


SENEGAL

Casamançais

Summary: The diverse peoples of Casamance, impelled by common interests, began to unite in the early 1950s. The first nationalist organization, the Casamance Autonomy Movement, was formed in 1954 to press for autonomy and a separate administration within Africa. Following Senegalese independence in 1960, the party was banned and forced underground. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 61) report that “several movements for independence emerged in the early 1960s”, but we found no corroborating evidence. The nationalist movement resurfaced in the 1980s, led by the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (re-constituted in 1982), with the aim of secession. On December 26, 1982 several hundred separatists, organized by MFDC, demonstrated outside the governor’s office in the regional capital of Ziguinchor in favor of secession from Senegal. The demonstration led to numerous clashes that killed several people. Since this is the first evidence of organized separatist activity that we found, we peg the start date of the movement at 1982. On December 18, 1983 supporters of the MFDC held a demonstration in Ziguinchor calling for independence from Senegal. The protests led to the deaths of at least 29 people, at least 19 of whom were protestors. We therefore code 1983 as LVIOLSD. After that we could not find evidence of secessionist violence at the level of at least LVIOLSD until 1989, hence a NVIOLSD coding for 1984-88. HVIOLSD coding for 1989-99 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). While a ceasefire was reached in December 1999, it has not been completely respected as a more militant rebel faction rejects the peace agreement and continues low-level hostilities. Marshall & Gurr (2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict in 2000-2001. Marshall & Gurr (2003) in addition code 2002 as armed conflict. The MAR rebellion score is 4 in 2000-2002. UCDP/PRIO codes low-level intensity armed conflict over Casamance in 2000-2001 and in 2003. Thus 2000-2003 is coded LVIOLSD. In 2004 a peace accord was signed. Sporadic violence continued, but below the LVIOLSD threshold. According to MAR, “violence escalated in 2006 (REB06 = 4).” However, UCDP/PRIO does not code the incident on the grounds that the “MFDC lost their traditional backer [Guinea-Bissau] due to developments in Guinea-Bissau in 2005. In that year, Guinea-Bissau got a new president when President Nino Viera regained power. President Viera promptly decided to root the MFDC rebels from Guinean territory once and for all and launched an offensive against one of MFDC’s factions - the so called Front Sud-Sadio and their main base on the border with Senegal. Fierce fighting between Guinean troops and the MFDC-Sadio faction raged from mid-March to mid-April 2006, after which the rebels were forced to flee across the border into Casamance. Guinea-Bissau insisted that the operation was a strictly Guinean affair, launched to pacify the northern part of the country, wherefore it is not recorded as part of the Senegalese-MFDC conflict.” We follow UCDP/PRIO and do not code the 2006 episode as LVIOLSD as it does not appear to concern the Senegal-Casamançais dyad. According to UCDP/PRIO, 2009-2010 saw another escalation of violence in Casamance, but casualties did not meet the 25-threshold. Thus 2004-2010 are coded with NVIOLSD. In 2011 there were 25-43 casualties according to UCDP/PRIO, thus the LVIOLSD code in 2011. The conflict de-escalated in 2012. According to UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: “[t]he fighting continued at a relatively high level during the first months of the following year, but then de-escalated. In April Macky Sall was elected new Senegalese president, stating that solving the Casamance conflict was one of the first national priorities and that he was willing to work with neighboring Gambia and Guinea-Bissau in the search for lasting peace. On 13-14 October the Sadio faction of MFDC met with a government delegation in Rome, initiating a formal peace process under the auspices of Saint Egidio community. The peace process continued during 2013 and in November a break-through was reported, as the parties agreed on an agenda for further talks. Neither the mediators nor the two parties commented on what the agenda looked like, but sources close to the talks revealed that it included issues such as ceasefire, disarmament, reintegration of former combatants, and the development of Casamance, but not independence and autonomy.” Thus 2012 is coded as NVIOLSD.
Sources:


SLOVAKIA

Hungarians

Summary: After the 1989 Velvet revolution, nationalist sentiment began to flourish among the Hungarian population (then still in Czechoslovakia). While only a small portion of ethnic Hungarian leaders advocate secession from Slovakia, many ethnic Hungarians make claims for a greater degree of autonomy and self-determination within the Hungarian areas in southern Slovakia, especially with respect to language, education, and cultural issues. In the wake of the regime change, they set up four political parties, including Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, Co-existence Party and Hungarian Civic Party, which merged in 1998 to become the Hungarian Coalition Party (MKP). The MKP continues to remain active in politics as of 2012. While the group claims they are not a separatist party, they do aim for greater cultural and language freedom as well as greater autonomy over the Hungarian regions. Although this movement has been active since 1989, Slovakia did not become an independent state until 1993. We therefore begin to code movement activity in Slovakia in 1993, but indicate that the movement was both active and nonviolent prior to independence. The movement is coded as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


SOLOMON ISLANDS

Gwales (Guadalcanalese)

Summary: The Gwales consider themselves indigenous to Guadalcanal, an island belonging to the Solomon Islands. With independence in sight, the Guadalcanal Council began to push for a federal system, demanding a federalized Solomon Islands (Kabutaulaka 2008: 101). Kabutaulaka does not provide an exact date as to when the first claims were made, and we could not find one in other sources either. However, Kabutaulaka discusses the Guadalcanalese claim jointly with the Westerner claim, suggesting that it originated at roughly the same time. Thus, we use the Westerners’ start date (1975) also as the start date for the Gwales. The Solomon Islands attained independence in 1978. Accordingly, in the cross-national version of the data set, we only code the movement from 1978. We found no violence in 1975-1977, and thus note prior non-violent activity. According to Kabutaulaka (2008: 101) the desire for autonomy “continued and was expressed publicly on various occasions in the post-independence period. Tensions began to mount in 1997. Again, Guadalcanal’s provincial government threatened secession. Tensions escalated in late 1998/early 1999 (dates differ, see BBC and Global Security for 1998 and Hewitt et al. 2008 and Minahan 2002: 1154 for early 1999; also note that Minahan 2002: 1154 reports inter-ethnic violence during the early and mid-1990s), when the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), a militant Guadalcanalese organization, began to attack and forcibly displace Malaitan settlers (Global Security; Hewitt et al. 2008; BBC). The Malaitans are immigrants from another Solomon Islands province, Malaita, and constitute a minority in Guadalcanal. Claims to self-determination and land rights were central during the civil unrest. The Malatai settlers established their own organization, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), in 1999 to defend their interests and undertake armed action against the IFM. The violent campaigns resulted in “several deaths” and the flight of around 23,000 persons from Guadalcanal, mainly Malaitans. According to Global Security 12 people were killed and 17 went missing. Minahan (2002: 1154) states that over 60 Malaitans died in the violence and another 50 in the fighting around Solomon’s capital. The BBC states that up to 100 died in 1998-2000. It appears that much of the violence can be attributed to inter-ethnic strife, but Hewitt et al. (2008) state that there were “[c]lashes between Guadalcanalese [Gwale] militants and both Solomon Islands government and Malaitan rebels”. We apply a tentative LVIOLSD code from 1998, though noting that it is not clear whether violence in the government-movement dyad was sufficient for a LVIOLSD code, particularly in 1998 (violence erupted only in late 1998). A cease-fire agreement was signed in August 2000 and comprehensive peace agreements in October 2000 and February 2001 (Hewitt et al. 2008). The peace agreements promised greater autonomy for Guadalcanal, among other things (Hewitt et al. 2008) (for centre-province relations since independence see Scales 2007: 235-236, 2008: 224-229). Some violence continued, but it was mostly crime-related (Global Security; BBC). Thus, we end the LVIOLSD code in 2000. In 2003, a peace-keeping mission was established (Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, RAMSI). The movement is ongoing. Hewitt et al. (2008) report that Gwale separatists again threatened secession in October 2006 if a bill promising increased autonomy was not passed. 1978-1997 and 2001-2012 are coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**Malaitans**

*Summary:* Malaita is one of Solomon Islands’ provinces. Malaita lies 30 miles northeast of Guadalcanal, another Solomon province with a substantial share of Malaitan immigrants. In 1998, Gwales in Guadalcanal began to target Malaitan immigrants in inter-ethnic strife (see Gwales). The Malaitans constitute a minority in Guadalcanal, but make up around 40 per cent of the Solomon Islands’ population (Minahan 2002: 1151). In 1999, Guadalcanal’s Malatai settlers established their own organization, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), to defend their interests. Hewitt et al. (2008) indicate that the Eagles made separatist claims. The sources we consulted suggest that the Eagles’ main aim has been the defense of Malaitan-owned property and land against the raiding Gwales. However, other sources appear to agree with Hewitt et al. that the Eagles also made separatist claims. Minahan (2002: 1156), for instance, reports that Malaitan leaders openly threatened secession in 2000 (also see Kilford 2000). Thus we code 1999 as the start date. In the course of the violent campaigns in 1998-2000, around 23,000 persons fled from Guadalcanal, mainly Malaitans. According to Global Security 12 people were killed and 17 went missing. Minahan (2002: 1154) states that over 60 Malaitans died in the violence and another 50 in the fighting around Solomon’s capital. The BBC states that up to 100 died in 1998-2000. It appears that much of the violence can be attributed to inter-ethnic strife. However, Hewitt et al. (2008) report that the Malaita Eagles were from their inception involved in clashes with both Gwale militants and the government. Analogously to the Gwales, we apply a tentative LVIOLSD code from 1999, though noting that it is fully not clear whether violence in the government-movement dyad was sufficient for a LVIOLSD code. In June 2000, the Eagles supported a coup against the Prime Minister (Hewitt et al. 2008). A cease-fire agreement was signed in August 2000 and comprehensive peace agreements in October 2000 and February 2001 (Hewitt et al. 2008). The Townsville Peace Agreement signed by the warring Gwales and Malaitans in mid-October 2000 foresaw a federal form of government (for centre-province relations since independence see Scales 2007: 235-236, 2008: 224-229). Some violence continued, but it was mostly crime-related (Global Security; BBC). Thus, we end the LVIOLSD code in 2000. In 2003, a peacekeeping mission was established (Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, RAMSI). The movement is ongoing. Hewitt et al. (2008) report that “several Malaitan provincial leaders begin pursuing secessionism via conventional politics in 2004.” Furthermore, in 2005, another Malaitan-nationalist militant organization appeared, the Malaita Separatist Movement (MSM). The MSM consisted mainly out of former members of the Malaita Eagles, which had to be disbanded (UNIFEM 2005). 2001-2012 are coded as NVIOLSD.
Sources:


Makiras

Summary: Makira-Ulawa is a province in the Solomon Islands. In 2000, the province announced its intention to secede, thus the start date. This followed a similar move by the Western Province (see Westerners) and Temotu (see Temotus). The Townsville Peace Agreement signed by the warring Gwales and Malaitans in mid-October 2000 foresaw a federal form of government (for centre-province relations since independence see Scales 2007: 235-236, 2008: 224-229). However, Makira-Ulawa continued to make claims for independence (Böge 2001: 37). Scott (2011) reports that the movement has remained active. Thus we code the movement as ongoing. We found no evidence of separatist violence, thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Summary: Rennell-Bellona is a province in the Solomon Islands. In 2000, the province announced its intention to secede, thus the start date. This followed a similar move by the Western Province (see Westerners) and Temotu (see Temotus). The Townsville Peace Agreement signed by the warring Gwales and Malaitans in mid-October 2000 foresaw a federal form of government (for centre-province relations since independence see Scales 2007: 235-236, 2008: 224-229). However, Rennell-Bellona continued to make claims for independence (Böge 2001: 37). Freedom House (2004) reports that Rennell-Bellona renewed its claim in 2003 (also see Radio New Zealand 2005). We found no evidence of further separatist activity, but code the movement as ongoing based on the ten years-rule. We found no evidence of separatist violence, thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Summary: Temotu is a province in the Solomon Islands. In 2000, the province’s executive announced its intention to secede (Meesa 2004), thus the start date. The declaration followed a similar move by the Western Province (see Westerners). In 2001, the central government rejected the claim to independence. The province’s Premier, Gabriel Teao, said that his government would continue to pursue independence (Radio Australia 2012). The Townsville Peace Agreement signed by the warring Gwales and Malaitans in mid-October 2000 foresaw a federal form of government (for centre-province relations since independence see Scales 2007: 235-236, 2008: 224-229). A 2001 draft constitutional amendment foresaw a much more decentralized form of government, which met many of the Westerners’ demands (Scales 2007: 207-208). BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (2006) reports that the Temotu provincial government repeated its threat to secede in 2006. We could not find more recent evidence of separatist activity, but
code the movement as ongoing based on the ten years-rule. We found no evidence of separatist violence, thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Westerners

Summary: With independence in sight, Solomon Islands’ Western Province began to lobby for a federal set-up. The Western Province makes up about 20 per cent of the local population and about 30 per cent of the land area (Premdas et al. 1984: 34). The earliest evidence for activity that can be seen as organized we found is in 1975, when the Western Council began to circulate a proposal for a federal Solomon Islands (Premdas et al. 1984: 52). Thus 1975 is coded as start date. The Westerners’ demand was not met. “Western Council leaders were unhappy with the failure of the Independence Constitution to guarantee the devolution of powers to the provinces. The Western Council wanted a more federal political structure; it feared “internal colonialism” since its population constituted a minority in the country’s multiethnic setting” (Premdas et al. 1984: 34). In the run-up to independence, the Westerner government threatened to declare unilateral independence if no federal set-up is granted, similarly to Bougainville (Premdas et al. 1984: 52). However, “[t]he so-called breakaway movement of the West did not display the same overt passions, articulate arguments, and mass mobilization of the Bougainville secessionist movement” and in particular, “the activities of the Western movement were almost always undertaken by legal means” (Premdas et al. 1984: 35); its methods were generally “non-violent” (Premdas et al. 1984: 54). The movement continued to press its demands up until independence and shortly thereafter. Meesa (2004) reports that there were separatist demonstrations in 1978-1979. Thus, in the data set, we code the movement from 1978 but note prior non-violent contention. The Westerners movement died down very quickly after independence, even if no federal system had been installed (Premdas et al. 1984: 55). Though separatist sentiment does not appear to have died down, the movement remained more or less dormant until the 1998-2000 unrests. Since we found no activity after the above-mentioned 1979 protests and have quite clear evidence that the movement ended thereafter, 1979 is coded as end date. The 1998-2000 unrests mainly involved inter-ethnic strife in Guadalcanal, another Solomon Islands province (see Gwales and Malaitans). However, there was also some inter-ethnic strife in the Western Province involving local groups and Malaitans (Scales 2008: 214-215, 222). In mid-2000 Westerner leaders began to make calls for a federal system that would grant the west increased autonomy (Scales 2007: 204, 2008: 215), thus the second start date. Westerner leaders declared their “intention” to unilaterally declare a federal form of government, but refrained from formally issuing a unilateral declaration (Scales 2007:
A new state flag was also raised (Scales 2007: 205). The Townsville Peace Agreement signed by the warring Gwales and Malaitans in mid-October 2000 foresaw a federal form of government (for centre-province relations since independence see Scales 2007: 235-236, 2008: 224-229). A 2001 draft constitutional amendment foresaw a much more decentralized form of government, which met many of the Westerners’ demands (Scales 2007: 207-208). Yet Mills (2004) reports that the Western Province leaders have continued to lobby for greater autonomy. We found no evidence of separatist activity beyond 2004, but code the movement as ongoing based on the ten years-rule. We found no evidence of separatist violence (see e.g. Scales 2007, 2008: 213), thus both phases are coded as non-violent.

Sources:


SOMALIA

Northern Somalis (Issaqs and Others)

Summary: This movement relates to today’s de-facto independent Somaliland. We found some inconclusive evidence of separatist activity already in the 1960s. Hussein (1994: 24-25), on the one hand, reports that Northerners felt disadvantaged after the union with the South in 1960/1961, which manifested itself in the referendum on the constitution in June 1961: the north featured an abysmally low turnout and the majority of those voting voted against the constitution (and thus union with the south). This paved the way for an attempted military coup in 1961 (in the former British colony of Somaliland). The coup, which had “unmistakable secessionist objectives”, failed and enjoyed little support, however. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 274), on the other hand, report a secessionist rebellion that broke out in Hargeysa (the capital of today’s Somaliland) in 1963, which resulted in several deaths before order was restored in 1965. Finally, and in partial agreement with Hewitt & Cheetham, MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score is four from 1960-1964. However, this code is somewhat ambiguous as in the MAR coding notes it says that “[t]he various clans in the country lived in relative peace for nine years after independence.” Neither the 1961 nor the 1963 episode are mentioned in other sources we consulted. Jacquin’s (2002: 189-250) relatively detailed account, for instance, does not make mention of them; Minahan (2002: 809), Spears (2003), Kaplan (2008), and MAR do not make mention of them either (though MAR codes a low-level rebellion, see above); UCDP/PRIO does not report an armed conflict, nor do Marshall & Gurr (2003) note separatist activity. In sum, it is possible that there was separatist activity already in the 1960s, but the evidence we found is inconclusive and insufficient to code a phase of activity. Thus we do not code activity in the 1960s.

We do, however, code activity from 1991 onwards. Note: some sources would suggest an earlier start date (early or mid-1980s). Minahan (2002: 809) reports that: “[i]n 1981, with clan conflicts growing, several northern leaders openly espoused separatism and formed the Somali National Movement (SNM).” The SNM went on to become one of the most important insurgent groups in the ensuing civil war. Marshall & Gurr (2003), on the other hand, code separatist armed conflict involving the Issaqs in 1986-1990. But contrary to Minahan and Marshall & Gurr, separatism appears not to have been on the SNM’s agenda until after Siad Barre’s ouster in early 1991, when SNM leaders declared the independence of Somalia’s northwestern region (Somaliland) on May 18 (Minahan 2002: 809-810; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 274). According to UCDP/PRIO, SNM’s main goal during the 1980s had been to overthrow President Barre and establish a representative democracy. Doyle & Sambanis (2006) and Fearon & Laitin (2003) do not note separatism as a motive for the SNM’s insurgency, either. Based on this, we code 1991 as the movement’s start date. 1991 is coded as HI-VIO-LSD following Doyle & Sambanis (2006), who code a civil war involving the SNM in 1988-1991. We apply an “ambiguous” code because the insurgency’s main motive was the overthrow of the national government. Ever since, Somaliland has enjoyed de facto independence.

8 Since 2006, more than 30 semi-regional states have been declared in Somalia. All have their own self-declared presidents, and a number have even appointed foreign ministers. Many of these self-declared entities have flags, anthems and “official” web sites. The practice of self-declaring a state was pioneered by Galmudug in 2006. Others include Jubaland and Himan and Heeb. This development is owed to Somalia’s recent experience with federalism. In 2004 the UN-backed Transitional Federal Government adopted a charter that included broad references to federalism. The exact territorial delimitation of the federal system was not spelt out, prompting the self-declaration of federal entities. The transitional government has recognized a high number of these self-declared entities. We do not include any of these entities that have been self-declared since 2006. Many if not most appear rather fringe: most are only able to make effective control of the territory they claim, and a number have even been declared by Somalis living abroad. Thus a high share of the 30-odd self-declared entities do not constitute self-determination movements as defined here. It proved impossible based on the sources we consulted to identify those (probably few, if any) groups that would count as a self-determination movement as defined here. It has to be noted, though, that this case would profit from further research. Source: Africa Research Bulletin (2012). “Somalia: Balkanizing Somalia.” Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series 49(5): 19280B-19283C.
independence, but it has not been internationally recognized as a sovereign state. We therefore code the movement as ongoing as of 2012, which is consistent with the Issaqs’ non-zero MAR protest scores for 1990-2006. MAR continues to code the Issaqs with a rebellion score of 3 throughout 2003 except for a single year, 2002. This code appears due to declarations of sovereignty/Somaliland’s de-facto independence. No other source reports separatist violence involving the Issaqs and MAR notes that “[o]ften the subject of repression during Siad Barre’s [rein], the Issaq took the opportunity of Somalia’s collapse to secede from the state. As a result, the Issaq have largely been able to avoid the death and anarchy that plagued Somalia for much of the 1990s, although sub-clan fighting between those who supported Ali Tour and those who supported Mohamed Hajo Ibrahim Egal did occur sporadically in the early 1990s.” Since sub-clan fighting does not qualify as separatist violence, 1992 onwards is coded with NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Puntland Darods

Summary: In 1998, the area of Puntland in the northeast of Somalia declared itself autonomous (although not independent) as the “State of Puntland,” with its capital at Garowe. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1998. Puntland declared it would remain autonomous until a federated Somalia state was established. Abdullayi Yusuf, Puntland’s original president, ruled until mid-2001. In November 2001, a convention of elders, in a process disputed by Abdullayi, selected Colonel Jama Ali Jama to succeed him. Forces loyal to Abdullayi, who had retreated to Galkayo, attacked Garowe in November, resulting in a de facto division of Puntland. As many as 30 other factions vie for some degree of authority in the country. Violence associated with this movement stem from warring clans rather than fatalities from the movement for autonomy, and thus we classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
**Afrikaners**

*Summary:* The Group of 63 was founded in May 2000 primarily to ask the government to recognize and protect the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner institutions. Some members of the group aimed to promote greater autonomy as one solution to these issues while a small minority is hoping for a white homeland (Volkstaat). It seems that the Group of 63 is no longer active as of 2012. However, the movement is ongoing: In 2010, the Pro-Afrikaanse Aksiegroep (Praag) was founded to promote an Afrikaan nation. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 2000 and code it as ongoing. The Europeans’ rebellion score is 3 in 1996 (‘Europeans’ are a MAR group including both the Afrikaners and the English-speakers). It is not clear why this code was assigned; the only incident that could be interpreted as involving violence noted in MAR’s coding notes (group chronology) is the following: “Nov 15, 1996: Pagad was becoming more militant in recent months and had begun to target journalists whom it now regards as the enemy along with drug lords and peddlers. The Muslim-based group warned the media to stop focusing on the role of Qibla, a militant Muslim organization, and how it supports Pagad. (Africa News Service [ANS] & Reuters).” However, PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) is a vigilante group formed in 1996 in Cape Town that draws its support mainly from Muslim Coloreds. Thus we do not code 1996 as LVIOLSD. We found no violence in any other year, thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


**East Caprivians**

*Summary:* In 1989 the United Democratic Party (UDP) was formed to advocate Caprivi secession. We peg the start date to 1989. Caprivi is located in today-Namibia. The movement remained active when Namibia seceded from the Republic of South Africa in 1990 (see East Caprivians under Namibia). We found no reports of separatist violence in 1989-1990, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 6, 2002].

Khoisans

Summary: In 1995, “South African Khoisan people attended United Nations conferences to make their presence known to the world. They succeeded in speaking for themselves rather than being spoken for by the South African Government and were recognized as the first indigenous peoples of Africa” (Garman 2001). It seems that the earliest San organization was founded in 1996 – the South African San Institute was established in April 1996 in affiliation with the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa, which aims to fight for language, culture, traditions, and land rights of the Khoisan. The founding of these two organizations coincided with a “Khoisan Revivalism” or “Khoisan Renaissance,” in which issues include “the right to assert their own identity and not have identity imposed on them… and the restitution of traditional lands” (Garman 2001). 1996 is coded as start date. The movement remains ongoing as the Khoisan fight for land rights and cultural rights with the Khoi and Boesman National Assembly at the helm of the self-determination movement (The Guardian 9/7/2010); there have been yearly protests along with some calls for autonomy. No separatist violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
Namibians

Summary: Both major national liberation movements, the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) and South West Africa Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO) were formed in 1959, hence the start date of the movement. LVIOLSD coding for 1966-76 follows UCDP/PRIO. HVIOLSD coding for 1977-89 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Namibia became fully independent from South Africa in 1990, hence the end date of the movement.

Sources:

Ndebele

Summary: The chief minister of KwaNdebele declared in 1982 that his self-governing homeland would seek to become independent in 1986. Between 1985 and 1986 clashes between opponents of independence and state-supported vigilantes claimed over 2,000 lives. Since it is not clear whether the Ndebele were involved in the civil war ongoing at this time, we code this period as LVIOLSD. In 1986 the KwaNdebele voted against independence, thus the end of the self-determination movement.

Sources:

Tswana

Summary: A homeland for the Tswana people of South Africa, Bophuthatswana, was set up in 1971. At the first summit of the eight homeland leaders in 1973, the leader of Bophuthatswana expressed a preference for links with Botswana, rather than an independent federation of the homelands. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1973. In 1975 a meeting of Tswana chiefs and headmen called for independence and this was followed by supportive resolutions passed by the Bophuthatswana National
Party and the legislative assembly. During negotiation between the South African government and the ANC about the constitution for a post-apartheid state, Bophuthatswana’s political leaders called for Bophuthatswana to remain independent, but it was reincorporated into South Africa in 1994, hence the end date of the movement. We found no evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Xhosa

Summary: The Xhosa had two Bantustans (homelands) under Apartheid South Africa, Ciskei and Transkei, which were separated from each other by a narrow strip of white-owned land). Transkei became nominally self-governing in 1963 and from then the Transkei National Independence Party worked for greater political autonomy. 1963 is coded as start date. Transkei declared itself independent in 1976, which was recognized by South Africa but no other state. Ciskei, on the other hand, was granted nominal self-government in 1972 and declared independence in 1981 after a 1980 referendum initiated by the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party upon pressure by South Africa. Many of the leaders of the Anti-Apartheid movement came from Ciskei, including Nelson Mandela and Steve Biko. Both Ciskei and Transkei were reincorporated into South Africa in 1994, hence the end date of the self-determination movement. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Zulus

Summary: Initially the Zulu resisted South Africa’s Apartheid/Bantustan policy, but eventually had to give in. In 1970, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the leader of Zulu dissidents, was elected chief executive officer of the Zulu Bantustan (KwaZulu). According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 165), Buthelezi promptly “called on South Africa to give the Zulu more land and resources” (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 165). Thus 1970 is coded as start date. In 1975 Buthelezi formed the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement (later Inkatha Freedom Party, IFP). Buthelezi continued to make claims for an autonomous and enlarged Zulu state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 165). We found minimal separatist violence from 1970-1983 and thus code this period NVIOLSD. Doyle & Sambanis (2006) code 1984-1994 as civil war, but most of the violence was not over self-determination. Still, following Keesing’s, violence carried out by the Inkatha Freedom Party was at least in part inspired by its separatist aims. We therefore mark the HVIOLSD phase as “ambiguous.” Continuing violence between the Inkatha and the ANC led to the death of 308 people in 1995, hence a LVIOLSD coding for that year (marked as ambiguous as well). Six people were killed by Inkatha in 1997. Non-zero protest scores in MAR until 2006 indicate an ongoing movement, but calls for autonomy have largely faded in recent years and Inkatha turned to fighting for
political power in South Africa rather than regional autonomy. Following the ten-years of inactivity rule we code an end to the movement in 2007. The movement is coded NVIOLSD 1996 onward as separatist violence from 1996-2007 does not meet the threshold for LVIOLSD.

Sources:


SOUTH VIETNAM

Chams

Summary: The earliest Cham nationalist organization we found was the one led by Les Kosem, a Cham Muslim, founded in 1944. Based on this we code 1944 as the start date. However, since South Vietnam became independent only in 1954 we code the movement only from 1954, the earliest possible start date, indicating that the Cham movement was active and nonviolent prior to 1954. Kosem’s movement aimed for the “restoration of the former kingdom of Champa” and was distinctly anti-French colonialist. Around the same time, the Minorities of the Western Highlands (of which the Chams were a large part) were fighting for recognition as an ethno-nationalist movement (Noseworthy 2013: 11). In 1954, the United Liberation Front of Highland Champa (FLC) was founded. Soon after, the FLC merged with with other liberation movements - the Front pour la Liberation des Montagnards and the Front pour la Liberation des Khmer Krom - to form the Front Unifie de Lutte es Races Opprimees (FULRO). The Cham movement remained active in the unified Vietnam (see Chams under Vietnam). We found no reports of separatist violence from 1954-63, hence a NVIOLSD classification. From 1964 onward, the Chams were involved with FULRO. Thus we code 1964-1965 as LVIOLSD and 1966-1975 as NVIOLSD (see Montagnards below for more details on violence coding).

Sources:
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [April 28, 2002].

Khmer Krom

Summary: The Khmer Krom have been active in seeking more autonomy over the Mekong Delta region both as a distinct group as well as under an umbrella group with the Chams and Montagnards. The Khmer Krom are ethnic Cambodians who were annexed into Vietnam in 1949. They have since mounted protests over issues including land, linguistic, and religious rights. The onset of the Khmer Krom movement is pegged at 1955, when the Front de Liberation du people Khmer (Khmer Liberation Front, FLK) was founded, the first self-determination organization we found. The group aimed for greater self-determination for the Khmer people in resistance against assimilation into South Vietnam. The group subsequently became a part of the Front Unifie de Lutte es Races Opprimees (FULRO) alongside the Chams and the Montagnards. The Khmer Krom movement remained active in the unified Vietnam (see Khmer Krom under Vietnam). We found no reports of separatist violence from 1955-63, hence a NVIOLSD classification. From 1964 onward, the Khmer Krom were involved with FULRO. Thus we
code 1964-1965 as LVIOLSD and 1966-1975 as NVIOLSD (see Montagnards below for more details on violence coding).

Sources:


Montagnards

Summary: The Montagnards are a diverse collection of ethnolinguistic groups including the Jarai, Rhad, Bahnar, Ede, and Stieng. Their resistance to rule by outsiders predates South Vietnam’s independence in 1954, but it is not clear that this resistance was organized in the form of a self-determination movement until 1958 when the Bajaraka organization was founded. Thus, we peg the start date to 1958. In 1964 another self-determination organization was founded, the rebel United Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races (FULRO), which sought widespread autonomy in the Montagnards’ regions of residence to help ensure the survival of their culture and lifeways. In the early 1960s Montagnards violently opposed the South Vietnamese government’s efforts to control their regions of residence and assimilate the population. FULRO revolted against the South Vietnam government twice over self-determination claims, in 1964 and again in 1965 (Hickey 2002: 152, 180-181). Casualties for both years would qualify for LVIOLSD. During the Vietnam War, the Montagnards fought with the United States against the communist north. We do not code this as violence over self-determination because the Montagnards were fighting on behalf of South Vietnam. However, even though FULRO was fighting primarily against North Vietnam, there was still ethnonationalist contention against South Vietnam (Hickey 2002: 202). According to Salemink (2003: 204), “[a]fter 1965, FULRO continued to be active both within and outside of the ranks of the [South Vietnamese] Special Forces, and for some time there was a tacit agreement that FULRO forces could control portions of Darlac province if they would fight the NLF…From 1964 onward the GVN started to give in to some of the demands of FULRO during a series of negotiations and following massive American pressure.” FULRO formally surrendered in 1969 when the South Vietnam government promised to recognize land titles. However the South Vietnam government did not really make good of their promises so “In 1972 FULRO was in fact re-established outside of the CIDG forces, and eventually took sides against the Saigon government. In March 1975 it
was the non-cooperation of the Montagnards with the Vietnamese authorities that would make the Communist surprise attack…possible” (Salemink 2003: 204). Based on this, we code LVIOLSD from 1964-1965 and NVIOLSD from 1966-1975. The movement remained active after the fall of South Vietnam and subsequent unification with Vietnam (see Montagnards under Vietnam).

Sources:


SPAIN

Alavese

Summary: Alava is one of the three provinces that jointly make up the Basque Country. Support for Basque nationalism is comparatively low in this region where only approximately 14% of its approximately 320,000 inhabitants speak Basque (Alavanet; Baztarrika 2008: 18). In 1989 a regionalist anti-Basque nationalist party was formed, Alavesa Unity (UA) (Schrijver 2006: 109), thus the start date. UA was an offshoot of the Partido Popular that was popular in the 1990s, when it scored up to twenty per cent of the vote in regional elections in the Basque Country (Schrijver 2006: 107). The party was opposed to Basque separatism and Spanish-nationalist. In addition, UA was “foralist”, that is, it made claims for Alavesan self-government and the set-up of its own autonomous community within Spain with traditional “foral” rights akin to Navarra (Douglass 1998: 92; Nuñez 2000: 129-130). Moreover, the UA mobilized against allegedly “colonial” policies by Basque nationalists. UA dissolved in 2005, thus the end date. UA members were targeted by ETA terrorism but we found no evidence of violence emerging from UA crossing the LVIOLSD threshold. Hence, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
Alavanet. “Su Población.”

Andalusians

Summary: The Socialist Party of Andalusia was founded in 1976 on a progressive nationalist platform, seeking self-determination for Andalusia. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1976. In 1977 more than a million Andalusians took to the streets to demonstrate for Andalusian autonomy (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 22). That same year, the Socialist Party of Andalusia was legalized. The party fought the 1979 general elections on a moderate nationalist manifesto, securing five seats in the Congress
of Deputies. It won two seats in the Catalan assembly in March 1980 and three seats in the Andalusian assembly in May 1982 (with 5.4% of the vote). The party adopted its present name, Andalusian Party (Partido Andalucista, PA), at its fifth congress in February 1984. In the 1986 Andalusian elections it was reduced to two seats, but slightly raised its vote in the 1987 local elections. The PA regained national representation in 1989, winning two lower house seats, and advanced strongly to 10 seats in the Andalusian regional assembly in 1990. However, it lost its national seats in 1993 and fell back to three regional seats in 1994. In the 1996 contests the PA again failed at national level, while improving to four seats in the Andalusian assembly. It contested the June 1999 European elections as part of the European Coalition (Coalición Europea, CE) of regional parties, winning one of the CE's two seats. In March 2000 the party regained national representation, winning one lower house seat with 0.9% of the vote. The Partido Andalucista remains active in Spanish politics as of 2012 and thus the movement is coded as ongoing. No separatist violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Aragonese

Summary: The Aragonese Regionalist Party (renamed the Aragonese Party in 1990) was founded in 1978 (start date). It advocates Aragonese autonomy. The Spanish government granted a statute of autonomy on 10 August 1982. The movement is ongoing, as the ARP is campaigning for a greater degree of autonomy. In 1986, a second Aragonese nationalist party was formed, the Chunta Aragonesista. No violence was found, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Aranese

Summary: The Aranese are a small linguistic minority in northern Catalonia that speaks Aranese, a dialect of Occitan (4,700 native speakers in 2001). The Aran Valley is the only region left where Occitan-speakers dominate. The Aranese have their own nationalist movement that makes claims for increased self-government and self-determination – most often, it seems (though this would profit from more research), within Catalonia, but there have also been claims for the establishment of an Aran autonomous
community separate from Catalonia. The first nationalist organization we found is Es Terçons, which was formed in 1978 to lobby for a special status for Aran in Catalonia’s Autonomy Statute. Thus 1978 is coded as start date. The movement is ongoing. In 1980, Unity of Aran was formed, an autonomist party that is in a coalition with the Socialist Party of Catalonia. Another kea organization is the Aranese Democratic Convergence (formerly the Aranese Nationalist Party), an offshoot of Catalonia’s Democratic Convergence. Esquerra Republicana, the Catalan independentist party, also has an offshoot in Aran since 2008 that is dedicated to Occitan nationalism. Catalonia’s 1979 autonomy statute gave Aran a special status within Catalonia. In particular, it foresaw special protection of the Aran language, including in education. In 1983 the Catalan Parliament recognized Aranese as Aran’s official language (Jordi & Huguet 2001: 144). In 1990 the Arran Valley attained a very limited extent of self-rule (CAN 2015). Critically, the 1990 law made Aranese a school subject and the “language of common usage in the public documents of the town councils and the Consell General” (Jordi & Huguet 2001: 145). However, no legislative powers were devolved (Nationalia 2015). The Arran Valley was granted further concessions with Catalonia’s new 2006 Autonomy Statute, as a result of which Aranese became Catalonia’s third official language in 2010 (CAN 2015). In January 2015, the Catalan Parliament recognized the Aran Valley’s special status including a special status over areas such as education, health, culture, and local government. Furthermore, the law recognized the Valley’s right to decide its future relations with Spain separately from the rest of Catalonia (CAN 2015). However, the local government still lacks legislative powers (Nationalia 2015). We found no evidence of separatist violence, thus a NVIOLSD code for the entire movement.

Sources:


Asturians

Summary: Asturia is a region in northwestern Spain. According to Minahan (2002: 213-214) the Asturians had strong separatist tendencies in the 1930s which, however, were quickly suppressed. After Franco’s death in 1975, an Asturian nationalist movement emerged. According to Zimmerman (2012: 25) the first nationalist organization was Conceyu Bable, a cultural organization formed in 1974 and legalized in 1976. It appears that Conceyu Bable’s claims were at least initially primarily focused on language. The Conceyu Nacionalista Astur (CNA), an Asturian party that openly advocated separatism, grew out of Conceyu Bable in 1976. The CNA made “self-determination for Asturias the party’s central goal”, advocating autonomy for Asturias within or even outside of Spain (Zimmerman 2012: 26). Since this is the first clear-cut evidence of organized separatist activity, 1976 is coded as the start date. In 1981 the Asturians were granted an autonomy statute, though Asturia received less autonomy compared to Andalusia and the three ‘historic’ nations, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia (Minahan 2002;
Zimmerman 2012: 34). The CNA disbanded in 1981 and no separatist party fought the 1982 elections (Zimmerman 2012: 32). However, soon thereafter the CNA’s successor party, the Ensame Nacionaliste Astur was formed (Zimmerman 2012: 32). We do not code an interruption in activity based on the ten-years rule. In 1985, the Asturian Party (PAS) was formed, a nationalist party aiming at a reform of Asturia’s autonomy statute giving Asturia increased self-government, recognition as a historic nation and official status for the Asturian language. Andecha Astur, another nationalist party, was formed in 1990. Minahan (2002: 215) reports that “[t]he Asturian Party (PAS), the largest of the regional political organizations, has gained widespread support for its campaign to win greater self-government for Austrians. The party has elected members to the national legislature, local mayors in Asturian municipalities, and many members of regional and local councils. The Asturians seek the same rights as the neighboring region of Galicia, which has been granted greater autonomy within Spain, along with the regions of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Andalusia.” According to Minahan (2002: 215) the Asturian language was given an official status in 1998 but it did not become an official language. The PAS, the Andecha Astur, and other nationalist organizations continue to be active in Asturia as of this writing, thus the movement is coded as ongoing. There has been some separatist violence (Zimmerman 2012) but not above the low-level violence threshold. Thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Basques

Summary: According to Minahan (2002: 286), Basque nationalism grew in the 1850s and 1860s in the context of increased centralization, though he does not give clear evidence of organized activity. The first evidence of organized activity we found comes with the foundation of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV – Basque National Party) in 1895 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 39, 234), thus the start date. The Basques won their first major concession – the Basque statute of autonomy – in 1936, which ran parallel to the Catalan statute of autonomy. During the Spanish Civil War, the Euzko Gudarostea, an army of Basque nationalists, fought against Franco’s army. As the Basque nationalists fought on the side of the government, this does not qualify as separatist violence. During Franco’s dictatorship all Basque parties were prohibited. However, the PNV established an exile government in France. Thus, we code the Basque movement as of 1945, but note prior non-violent activity. Basque nationalism began to reemerge in the 1950s among the younger generations. In 1959 separatists formed the main Basque rebel organization, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Freedom for the Basque Country, ETA). ETA continued to remain active and receive political support from a large minority of the Basque population in France from its founding until 2011. In October 2011, ETA announced a unilateral ceasefire. In 2012, a new separatist militant organization, Euskaral Herria Bildu (EHB), emerged to continue the fight for Basque separatism. Note: the Basque nationalist movement has been active not only in the Basque Country, but also in Navarre. Navarre is a region in northern Spain that borders the Basque Country; 10-20% of the local population are Basque speakers. Basque nationalists have laid claim on Navarre, wanting to incorporate it into the Basque Country. Basque nationalist parties, variably claiming increased autonomy or joint independence with the Basque Country, have run in Navarre’s regional elections (Sorens 2012: 181). Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict from 1959-2006, reporting that open hostilities
ceded in 2006. However, the dates suggested by the Peace & Conflict reports appear too extensive and do not match well with other sources. UCDP/PRIO codes armed conflict over the Basque Country only in the following years: 1978-1982, 1985-1987 and 1991 (the Conflict Encyclopedia in addition flags 1992 as low-intensity conflict). Our third major source, MAR, does not suggest a LVIOLSD code in any year: the rebellion score is below three throughout. Note that 1959, the year noted as the start of low-level violence in the Peace and Conflict reports, is the year ETA was formed. According to MAR, violence indeed started around the time suggested by Marshall & Gurr: “ETA continues a campaign of bombings and intimidation that began in the 1960s and continues to the present, although with fewer casualties and deaths than in previous years (REB06 = 1).” However, the LVIOLSD threshold appears not met until 1978, the first year UCDP/PRIO codes low-level violence. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: “Violence first broke out in 1961, when ETA attempted to derail a train transporting politicians. […] The first deadly attack occurred on 7 June 1968, when a policeman was killed during a gun battle at a police roadblock. […] the level of an armed conflict [was reached] for the first time in 1978.” Thus we begin to code LVIOLSD in 1978 in line with UCDP/PRIO. 1945-1977 are coded as NVIOLSD. We retain the LVIOLSD code until and including 1992. Note: UCDP/PRIO does not code armed conflict in 1983-1984 and 1988-1990 (see above). It is possible that the number of deaths was below 25 in those years, but the conflict did not de-escalate. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: “The conflict was active during most of the 1980s, and again in 1991-1992. Attempts to bring about negotiations between the parties have usually failed: the government has demanded that ETA lay down its weapons before any talks and has rejected discussion on political issues, while ETA has maintained demands of Basque self-determination, incorporation of Navarra into the Basque region, withdrawal of Spanish forces, and legalisation of Basque groups and an amnesty for ETA members. Official negotiations were held for the first time in 1989 in Algeria, but failed to overcome these differences and violence again resumed. […] Since 1992, the violence has not reached this [i.e. the low-level violence] level.” Casualty figures from START, too, suggest that the conflict intensified in 1978, was active throughout most of the 1980s, and abated in the early 1990s. Thus coding de-escalations in 1983 and 1988 and re-escalations in 1985 and 1991 based on UCDP/PRIO would miss the point. There was some violence in 1993-2012 too, but below the LVIOLSD threshold. Thus 1993-2012 are coded as NVIOLSD. Note: the conflict flared up in 1999-2000 according to both START and UCDP, but casualties remained below the LVIOLSD threshold. In 2011, ETA declared the cessation of its armed insurgency.

Sources:


**Canarians**

*Summary:* The Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Archipelago was founded in 1961, hence the start date of the movement. After Franco’s death, a host of self-determination organizations were formed, including in 1986 the National Congress of the Canaries (Congreso Nacional de Canarias, CNC), a pro-independence group which favors leaving the EU and joining the OAU. The Canarian movement is ongoing, though the organizations which today enjoy most support reject independence and instead advocate increased autonomy. While there have been assassination attempts and bombings, we found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


Cantabrians

Summary: The first evidence for organized Cantabrian self-determination activity is the formation of the Association for the Defence of the Interests of Cantabria in May 1976. Thus, we peg the start date of the movement at 1976. In 1977, Cantabrian nationalists formed the United Cantabria Association (ATROPU), campaigning for Cantabrian autonomy. The Cantabrian autonomous community was established by statute on December 30, 1981. Similar to the Aragonese movement, the Cantabrians still campaign for more autonomy. Hence, the movement is coded as ongoing as of 2012. The Cantabrians have sought autonomy through conventional party politics, and thus we found no instance of violence. Based on this, we code NVIOLSD for the entire movement.

Sources:

Catalans

Summary: The first Catalan nationalist party and in fact the first modern cohesive political party in Spain – the Lliga Regionalista – was founded sometime between 1900 and 1905. Under Franco’s regime (1937-75) Catalan nationalism was suppressed in various ways. Following 1975, pro-Catalan political parties flourished (hence the start date of the movement), gained representation in the national Parliament, and in 1980 won an overwhelming majority in the legislative assembly of the newly established Catalonian Autonomous Community. Buffery & Marcer (2011: xxxix) report that there were demonstrations in favor of autonomy throughout the Catalan lands in 1977 (that is, in Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands). The key organizations associated with the movement are Convergence and Union (CiU), a political party formed in 1978 that seeks greater autonomy, as well as the more radical Esquerra Republicana. The more militant organization Terra Lliure (Free Land) ceased its activities in the 1990s: In 1995, Terra Lliure broke up and members subsequently joined the Republican Left of Catalonia, a party championing an independent Catalan nation. The Reagrupament Independentista was formed in 2009 as an umbrella group for Catalan organizations aiming at independence. In 2010, the Solidaritat Catalana founded to fight for Catalan independence. Note: Catalan nationalists have been active not only in Catalonia but also in other Catalan-speaking regions, primarily Valencia and the Balearic Islands. Valencia, on the one hand, is a region in eastern Spain that borders Catalonia. Catalan nationalists see Valencia as part of a greater Catalonia and contend for increased autonomy or even independence in a greater Catalonia including Valencia (Fusterianism). In 1978, the first Fusterian party was formed, the Valencian Nationalist Party. In 1982 the Valencian Nationalist Party joined another nationalist party to form the Unitat del Poble Valencia (UPV). Today, the main organization associated with the Fusterian part of the movement is the Bloc Nacionalista Valencia (BNV) (Black et al. n.d.: 15) that was formed in the late 1990s as a result of a merger of several smaller nationalist parties (Buffery & Marcer 2011: 84). According to Sorens (2012: 181) the main representatives of this wing, the Bloc and the Unitat del Poble, made mainly autonomist claims. There has also been contention for independence: Catalonia’s independentist Esquerra Republicana has a Valencian branch that became a separate party in 2000 and so did Estat Catala (Sorens 2012: 181). Adherents of Fusterianism in Valencia believe that the Valencian language is a dialect of Catalan. They are opposed by the right-wing blavers who do not see Valencia as part of a greater Catalonia and consider Valencian a separate language. Blavers contend for a separate Valencian identity. Organizationally, Blaverism is mainly represented by the Valencian Union (VU) that was formed in 1982. The VU enjoyed considerable support in the 1980s but not thereafter (Ross et al.
The Balearic Islands, on the other hand, are a set of islands in Spain’s west, including Mallorca, Mellorca, and Ibiza. Both Spanish and Catalan are spoken in the Balearics. The first evidence for organized separatist activity we found is in 1975, when the Socialist Party of the Islands was formed and began to campaign for autonomy. The two main nationalist organizations associated with the movement are the autonomist Partit Socialista de Mallorca-Entesa nacionalista (PSM-EN), which was formed in 1976 (the result of a split in the above-mentioned Socialist Party of the Islands) and continues to exist (along with similar autonomist Socialist parties in the smaller Balearic islands), and the Unio Mallorquina (formed in 1982) (Fazi 2012; Sorens 2012: 181). The Unio was dissolved in 2011 and the Convergence for the Isles emerged out of its remnants, aiming for increased autonomy. In 2012 Convergence merged with other smaller nationalist parties to form the Proposa per les Illes, an autonomist party. In addition, since 1993 Catalonia’s Esquerra Republicana entertains an offshoot in the Balearic Islands which contends for joint independence with the other Catalan lands (mainly Catalonia and Valencia) (Fazi 2012: 476). However, the autonomist parties clearly have had more support in the Balearics (Fazi 2012: 485). Beyond the calls for more autonomy or full independence, the Catalans are concerned with the protection of their culture, language, and a new issue: protection from Basque militants who have recently begun carrying out terrorist campaigns in the Catalan region. No separatist violence above the LVIOLSD threshold was found, hence the movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Galicians

Summary: The first two Galician political organizations in the post World War II era were Partido Socialista Galega (PSG), founded in 1963, and the Marxist-Leninist oriented Galician People's Union, Unión do Pobo Galega (UPG), founded in 1964. We therefore peg the start date of the movement in 1963. It has been reported that the UPG was actually the only organization that managed to maintain some structured and disciplined coordination before Franco’s death. It postulated the right to self-determination for Galicia, but it did not clearly opt for independence. The Galician Armed League disbanded in 1980. However, the movement remains ongoing, with different organizations forming to champion separatism. Most recently, the Resistencia Galega (REGA) was formed in 2005 as a militant separatist organization. REGA mainly launches attacks through bombings, and is branded as a terrorist organization by the Spanish government. Other than the killing of a guard by the Armed Galician League in 1978, we found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence. Despite numerous bombings from 2005 onward, there were no fatalities. Since the 1978 event does not qualify as LVIOLSD, we classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

CMI Brasil. “CMI Brasil - Manifesto Da Resistência Galega.” 


**Leonese**

*Summary:* The Leonese are concentrated in the historical region of León in northwestern Spain (and the Mirandese region in northeastern Portugal). The first evidence for organized self-determination activity we found is the formation of the Partido Regionalista del Pais Leones in 1980, hence the start date. An umbrella nationalist party, the Leonese People’s Union, was founded in 1986 out of several smaller regionalist and autonomist organizations. The movement’s main drive has been for the separation from Castile and Léon, an autonomous community established in 1978 (Conversi 2000: 140). In 1983, Leon’s provincial legislature proposed the creation of a separate Leonese autonomous community, backtracking on its 1980 endorsement of the creation of a joint Castile and Léon autonomous community. The Spanish constitutional court rejected the proposal. Some smaller Leonese organizations (e.g., AGORA País Llionés) have also advocated full independence, but with little following. No violence was found for the Leonese movement, and we thus code NVIOLSD for the entire period.

*Sources:*

**Navarrians**

*Summary:* Navarre is a region in northern Spain that borders the Basque Country; 10-20 percent of the local population are Basque speakers, the rest are Spanish speakers. Basque nationalists have laid claim on Navarre, wanting to incorporate it into the Basque Country. Basque nationalist parties, variably claiming increased autonomy or joint independence with the Basque Country, have run in Navarre’s regional elections (Sorens 2012: 181). The Basque nationalists are coded under the header of the Basques. The main opponent of Basque separatism in Navarre is the Navarrese People’s Union (formed in 1977, thus the start date); the People’s Union advocates a separate Navarrese regional identity and increased autonomy for Navarre. The People’s Union is closely allied with the Partido Popular and has dominated the regional government since 1996 (Schrijver 2006: 109). We found no evidence of separatist violence. Hence the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*
SRI LANKA

Tamils

Summary: The first Tamil self-determination movement, the Tamil Federal Party was formally established in December 1949 as the competitor of the more conciliatory Tamil Congress. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1949. The Tamil Federal party desired a federal system of government and the right to political autonomy – an independent Tamil state. It was renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1971. A new constitution approved in 1972 changed the island’s name to Sri Lanka and institutionalized Buddhism as the state religion, despite Tamil protests. In response, Tamil separatists formed both rebel organizations and additional nonviolent political parties. Specifically, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the strongest of Tamil separatist groups, was founded in 1972 when Tamil youth espousing a Marxist ideology and an independent Tamil state established a group called the Tamil New Tigers. The name changed to the LTTE in 1976. In addition, Tamil United Front was founded in May 1972 as a reaction against the 1972 constitution. It was a coalition of Tamil interest groups and legal parties including the Tamil Congress and the Federal Party, which were united by the goal of Tamil autonomy and espousing nonviolent means. This coalition was renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976. The HVIOLSD coding for 1983-2002 and 2005-2009 follow Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Marshall & Gurr (2003) suggest a LVIOLSD code in 1975-1982. In line with Marshall & Gurr, Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 290) report that the LTTE and other smaller rebel groups aunched a separatist insurgency in the early 1970s. We follow Marshall & Gurr and Hewitt & Cheetham and code 1975-1982 as LVIOLSD. However, note that this code is somewhat ambiguous: MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score is only 2 in 1975-1979. It is 7 from 1980-1984 but this code could be due to the outbreak of the civil war in 1983. UCDP notes that “[r]egular fighting did […] not erupt until 1983” and SATP notes that the LTTE began its armed campaign only in 1983. Furthermore, most of the pre-1983 violence involved inter-ethnic strife (in particular in 1958, 1977, and 1981, see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 290). Nevertheless, two of our main sources (Marshall & Gurr 2003; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000) concur that there was a low-level insurgency already in the 1970s and thus we code low-level violence from 1975-1982. 2003 is coded as LVIOLSD as UCDP/PRIO codes a low-level intensity armed conflict over Tamil Eelam and following a MAR rebellion score of 4. 2004 is coded as LVIOLSD based on Hewitt et al. (2008) and based on SATP, which counts 33 dead civilians, 7 security force personnel and 69 ‘terrorists’. 2010-2012 is coded as NVIOLSD, as no source reports separatist violence.

Sources:


Muslims

Summary: Founded in 1981, the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) is the main Muslim self-determination organization in Sri Lanka. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1981. While remaining committed to a united Sri Lanka state, the SLMC has campaigned for regional autonomy and a separate administrative entity for the Muslims living in southeastern Ceylon. It remains active as of 2012. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
Nevisians

Summary: Marshall & Gurr (2003) peg the start of the movement to the early 1960s. However, we could not find organized activity before the formation of the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP) in 1970. Premdas (2000) in line with M&G argues that separatist sentiment increased in the 1960s, but he does not give evidence of organized activity before the formation of the NRP in 1970. Minahan (2002: 1362), too, reports that the Nevisians had repeatedly indicated a preference for a separate status in the late 1950s and 1960s, but does not give clear-cut evidence of organized separatist activity before the formation of the NRP in 1970 either. The NRP later dropped its secessionist aims in the early 1980s at the London Independence Constitutional Conference. Soon after, the Concerned Citizens Movement (CCM) was established in 1987 to fight for independence, and the party continues their separatist goals today, hence the movement is coded as ongoing. In 1998, the Nevisians voted on their independence; the proposal was narrowly defeated. Since St. Kitts and Nevis did not become an independent state until 1983, we code movement activity from 1983. The start date is pegged at 1970. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence we note prior non-violent activity and classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Note: St. Kitt and Nevis’ population is less than 500,000. Movements in countries with a population of less than 500,000 are not included in the random draw.
SUDAN

**Easterners**

*Summary:* In 1958 the Beja Congress (BC) was established, an organization making claims for a federal status within Sudan and a fairer distribution of resources. Thus 1958 is coded as start date. The Beja are an ethnic group in Sudan’s east. The party was banned from 1960 until 1964, from 1969 until 1984 and again in 1989. Despite the bans, the BC continued to recruit and mobilize members (International Crisis Group 2006, 2013). The BC has been part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) since 1995. In 1999 another Easterner rebel group was formed, the Rashaida Free Lions. The Free Lions recruited mainly from the Rashaida, another ethnic group in Sudan’s east. The Free Lions have also made claims for increased self-determination (Assal 2013: 157-158). In 2005 the Free Lions and the BC established a formal yet fragile alliance and formed the Eastern Front. The Beja and the Rashaida are combined under the header “Easterners”. The Easterners were involved in armed conflict. EPR codes the Bejas as involved in armed conflict from 1983-2004. However, a number of other sources indicate a later conflict onset. International Crisis Group (2013: 3) notes that the BC launched its armed struggle in April 1995. A number of other sources note that the Easterners took up arms already in 1994 (Assal 2013: 145; Hewitt et al. 2008; Thomson Reuters 2013). According to Hewitt et al. (2008), “[c]iting increasing poverty and perceived marginalization of the region, Easterners take up arms in 1994 and demand autonomy, increased power and wealth sharing, and greater control over the region’s resources. Over the course of a 13-year low-level insurgency, Eastern militants develop alliances with Southern Sudanese and Darfurian rebels, as well as Eritrea. Despite their alliance with Southern rebels, Eastern rebels demanded separate negotiations on the status of their region. Two main rebel factions united in February 2005 and continued hostilities until talks with Khartoum eventually produced a June 2006 ceasefire. Comprehensive peace agreement follows in October 2006, covering military and security issues and providing for power- and resource-sharing. Eastern rebels demobilize in December 2006. Southern rebels withdraw from the East in June 2006; renegade Southern elements may remain.” Assal (2013: 145) also notes that the Easterner insurgency ended in 2006, thus 1994-2006 is coded as LVIOLSD. Implementation of the 2006 agreement has been very slow (Assal 2013: 153, 155; International Crisis Group 2013: 10-14). The movement is ongoing; in particular, the Eastern Front and the BC continue to exist. According to the International Crisis Group (2013: 24) calls for outright secession have become increasingly prevalent in recent years. In 2011 a splinter group of the Eastern Front, the Federal Alliance of Eastern Sudan, merged with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur and the BC joined the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition of armed opposition groups (Thomson Reuters 2013). We found no evidence of separatist violence in years other than 1994-2006 (see e.g. International Crisis Group 2013), thus all other years are coded with NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


Fur

**Summary:** According to Minahan (2002: 627), Fur agitation towards self-determination emerged as a force following Sudanese independence and the creation of an Arab-dominated unitary state. Both Minahan (2002) and Salih (2005) report that the first self-determination organizations emerged in the early 1960s. Lacking clearer evidence we code 1960 as the start date. In 1966 the Fur movement was forced underground according to Minahan (2002: 627), Thus, we code an end to this first phase of separatist activity in 1966.

In 1986 the Front for the Renaissance of Darfur (FRD), an organization that has agitated for autonomy in the 1960s, resumed its activities, thus we code a second onset. MAR codes a rebellion score of 3 from 1985-1987, thus 1986-1987 are coded with LVIOLSD (we do not code 1985 as we found no evidence for separatist claims).

However, note that the detailed account in Salih (2005) suggests that the FRD initially focused on nonviolent activities and in particular contested the 1986 election. Hence, the movement was nonviolent initially. Further support from this comes from Minahan (2002: 627), who suggests that the Fur’s rebellion started only in 1987. Although a Fur rebel movement, with arms from neighboring Libya, has operated in Darfur since 1987, we could not find further evidence of an armed insurgency until the start of the Darfur war in 2003. We code HVIOLSD in 2003 onwards based on Doyle & Sambanis (2006).

**Sources:**


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].


Southerners

Summary: In a dramatic reversal of policy, the British decided in 1946 to grant southern and northern Sudan joint independence. Previously the south and the north had been administered separately. At the 1947 Juba Conference, Southerner representatives agreed only under the condition that there would be explicit safeguards, including regional autonomy and inclusion in the central government (Ali et al. 2005: 197). As it became ever clearer that these preconditions would not be met, the Southerners began to contend for self-determination. The first evidence for organized activity we found is in 1950, when the Southern Liberation Party was formed to advocate federal status within Sudan and an equal share in development programs (Minahan 2002: 1788). 1950 is coded as start date. As Sudan did not become an independent state until 1956, we only code the movement from 1956, the year of Sudan’s independence. Violence erupted in 1955, one year before Sudan’s independence (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 9; Ali et al. 2005: 194; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281). Thus we indicate prior violent activity. The LVIOLSD coding for 1956-62 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003). Case study evidence supports the LVIOLSD code in 1956-1969: Ali et al. (2005) and Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 281) argue that the only years the conflict with the Southerners was inactive was 1972-1983. HVIOLSD coding for 1963-72 and 1983-2005 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The 2006 LVIOLSD code follows a MAR rebellion score of 4. In 2005, the South signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government and the war ended. Among other things the 2005 agreement conceded the South autonomy and foresaw the holding of a secession referendum in South Sudan. This referendum was held in January 2011, with the South Sudanese almost unanimously voting for independence. South Sudan became independent in July of the same year. Separate referendums were foreseen for Abyei (on joining the South) and the Blue Nile and South Kordofan area (on some undetermined form of autonomy). These three areas were awarded a special status due to their strategic location along the border and their resource wealth. The promised referendums in Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan have not been held so far. In these areas the Southerners’ agitation for secession is ongoing. For instance, in Abyei in 2013 a unilateral referendum was held on joining the South (Aljazeera 2013). The conflict over South Kordofan led to a resurfacing of violence (SPLM/A-North war). Thus, we code 2011 and 2012 as HVIOLSD, based on Doyle & Sambanis (2006).

Sources:


SURINAME

Indigenous Peoples

Summary: The first indigenous rights organization in Suriname is KANO; their first visible event with broad mobilization and clearly spelled out demands (that their traditional authorities and village boundaries be recognized) was a protest march from Albina to Paramaribo in 1976, hence the start date of the movement. We found evidence of continued activity, and code the movement as ongoing. We found no violence, and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

SWEDEN

Sami (Lapps)

Summary: In 1945, Same Atnam (the National Association of Saamiland) was founded to “promote Saami interests that are not connected with reindeer herding” (Wessendorf 2005: 196). These include land, cultural, and language rights (Wessendorf 2005), and hence not self-determination as we define it. This was followed by the National Union of Swedish Saami (SSR - 1950) and the Swedish Saami Youth Association (1963). Sami activists formed the Nordic Saami Institute in 1973 to press for political and land rights, hence the start date of the movement. Since 1973, Sami have elected a representative body, a Sami Parliament. Its 20 representatives are elected every four years and the purpose of the Sami Parliament is to attend to the rights and interests of the Sami by presenting initiatives and proposals and by preparing opinions to the authorities. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1973. In 1983 Sami leaders declared the sovereignty of the divided nation (the Sami are also found in Finland and Sweden). In 1986 the Chernobyl disaster spread radiation across Lapland and made necessary the destruction of reindeer herds, the Sami’s livelihood. Two years later Sami leaders demanded the creation of a Sami parliament that would have influence over planning and development of the region. In 2000, the Sami Parliamentary Council was formed to represent the Sami parliaments in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Issues include cultural and language autonomy as well as the freedom to cross borders between the countries. The Sami Parliamentary Council remains active today. No violence was found, and thus this movement is coded as ongoing and NVIOLS.

Sources:


Scanians

Summary: The Skanepartiet (Scanian Party), today mostly known for its right-wing, anti-immigration politics, was established as an advocate of regional autonomy for Scania, particularly with regard to media, alcohol, energy, tourism and education. The party was founded in 1979, hence the start date of the movement. The Stiftelsen Skånsk Framtid (SSF), another organization representing the Scanian claim for more self-determination, was founded in 1989 and is a non-profit organization dedicated to safeguarding the cultural, social and economic interests of the Region of Scania. It has actively campaigned for devolution in Sweden and its goal is that Scania, being a distinct region, will survive as a cultural entity with its own regional government in the forthcoming “Europe of Regions”. Both organizations remain active as of 2012, and thus the movement is coded as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

**Jurassians**

*Summary:* The first evidence of organized separatist activity we found is in 1947, when the Comité Moutier was founded. Thus, we peg the start date to 1947. In 1951, the main separatist party, the Rassemblement Jurassien (Jura Gathering, RJ), was founded. The aim of the RJ was the formation of a new canton out of the French-speaking territories of the canton of Berne. In 1974 the majority French-speaking districts of northwestern Bern voted to form a new canton called Jura. This canton was finally established in 1979 after a series of further referendums, including a 1978 federal vote. However, the demands of Jurassian separatists were not fully met, mainly because some of the Jurassian districts voted to remain with Berne. There is evidence of continued separatist activity. For example, the Mouvement Autonomiste Jurassien (MAJ) was created in 1994 as a coalition of movements aiming for the liberation of Jura. MAJ continues to remain active as of 2012. Moreover, Jurassian separatists have repeatedly agitated for the merger of all Jurassian territories to the canton of Jura. We found no reports of separatist violence crossing the LVIOLSD threshold, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].


SYRIA

Alawites (Alawi)

*Summary:* The Alawites demanded self-government in 1917 and, disappointed with the French response, rebelled in 1919. Separatist sentiments, however, appear to have died out following the granting of an autonomous Alawi State in 1920 and the French favouring of the Alawi minority which was also included in the colonial armed forces (Khoury 1981). In 1936, the Alawis’ autonomy was abolished. A 1936 letter by 80 Alawi leaders to the French Prime Minister had expressed the demand of the Alawi people to remain under French protection. Separatism subsequently re-emerged. Latakia, the Alawite homeland, was declared independent in 1939. The French authorities, ignoring Alawite demands, ceded the territory to Syria in 1942. The Alawites resisted submission to the central government and also continued to do so once Syria had become independent in 1946, but were not able to obtain French support for an independent Alawite state. We code activity in Syria as of 1946, the year Syria became independent, and note prior activity. The exact start date is not fully clear, but 1936 appears to make sense since this is when the Alawites’ autonomy had been abolished. We found no separatist violence before 1946, and thus indicate prior non-violent activity. Unsuccessful revolts flared up in 1946 and in 1952, but it was not until the Alawites became reconciled to Syrian citizenship in 1954 that they gave up their struggle for an independent state (Fildis 2012; Pipes 1989). We thus code an end to the movement in 1954. In 1970 the pragmatic military faction of the Ba’ath party, which consisted mainly of Alawites from the region of Latakia and was led by Hafez al-Assad, seized power in a coup. Since then Alawites have controlled the Syrian government, which most likely explains why there have not been any further demands for political autonomy. We found no evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 11, 2002].


Assyrians

*Summary:* Nationalists in the United States, insisting that only an independent Assyria would ensure the ultimate survival of their beleaguered nation, formed the Bet Nahrain Democratic Party in 1976, with its stated aim the creation of an Assyrian state in their ancient homeland. We therefore peg the start of the movement at 1976. Bet Nahrain remains active in Syrian politics as of 2012, and thus the movement is
coded as ongoing. The International Confederation of the Assyrian Nation, founded in 1977, organized a provisional Assyrian government. Since most Assyrians live in Iraq and Syria, the countries that encompass the state of Assyrian, we list the Assyrian self-determination movement under both Iraq and Syria. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Druze

Summary: The Druze are an Arab group, primarily located in Jabal Druze in south-western Syria bordering Jordan (Minority Rights Group International). Jabal al-Druze had an autonomous status under the French Mandate of Syria from 1922 until 1936 (1942 according to Minahan 2002: 547), when the territory – against Druze petitions insisting on remaining separate from Syria (see e.g. Firro 1997: 92-93) – was incorporated into Syria. Jabal al-Druze retained a special status. In 1944 the Syrian government dismantled much of Jabal al-Druze’s autonomy, though guaranteeing the Druze cultural and religious rights (Minahan 2002: 547). A number of Syrianists have concluded that the Druze leadership at that point in time had committed to relinquishing autonomy and to full incorporation into the Syrian state. Landis (1998: 370) disagrees, arguing that “[o]n the contrary, the incorporation of the Jabal Druze into the Syrian state was not carried out smoothly. The Atrash family and other leading tribes of the Jabal resisted the Syrian government’s attempts to dismantle the administrative autonomy of the Jabal Druze at every step. They fought government attempts to undermine their traditional authority in the Jabal community as best they could. The Atrash leaders used both military [note: Landis appears to refer to the intra-ethnic clashes in 1947-1948 discussed below] and moral force in their attempt to preserve the political independence and economic privileges their community had enjoyed under the French and to resist the encroachment of central authority into Druze politics.” Furthermore, “[t]he political leaders of the Druzes were not content to demand only economic benefits from the government in Damascus in exchange for Druze cooperation [economic demands included spending on education and the expansion of the irrigation and water purification systems], they also insisted that the Jabal be permitted most of the political privileges and autonomy it had enjoyed under the French. The Atrashes did not want the government to supplant them or undermine their authority in the name of Arab nationalism, republicanism, or Syrian independence. They had not fought for Syrian independence in order to exchange French meddling in their local affairs for that of the Government in Damascus. The leading families of the Jabal saw themselves as guardians of the Druze way of life and communal traditions which was anchored in the quasi-feudal and tribal institutions, or mashyakha system, of the Jabal. To ensure the continuation of Atrash leadership and the mashyakha system on which it was founded, Amir Hasan demanded that a separate Druze Ministry of Defense be established with a minister chosen from the Jabal Druze” (Landis 1998: 374). In line with Landis, Firro (1997: 91) also suggests that at least some of the Druze leaders had separatist tendencies at the time. Based on this, we code a Druze movement from 1946, the year of Syria’s independence. The start date is not fully clear, but 1936 appears to make sense based
on the above narrative as this was when the Druze’s separate status was abolished. We found no separatist violence before 1946, and thus code prior non-violent activity. The newly independent Syrian government pursued pan-Arabist goals and attempted to centralize power and assert control over the provinces. This led to an armed conflict between unionist and separatist Druze factions in 1947-1948 (Landis 1998: 376-378; Firro 1997: 97). We do not code separatist violence as this appears to have been primarily an intra-ethnic conflict. It has to be noted though that this coding decision is not completely unambiguous as the unionist faction was supported by the Syrian central government. Under the presidency of Shukri al-Quwatli (1946-1949), the Druze managed to resist centralization. Minahan (2002: 547) reports a Druze revolt in 1949; he likely refers to coup d’états in March and August 1949 that were supported by Druzes and a further coup plot after the December 1949 coup that had brought Adib Shishakli to power (Landis 1998: 380-381). We do not code separatist violence. After the December 1949 coup, “the process of national integration was carried out by force” (Landis 1998: 370). The central government under Adib Shishakli began to dismantle the autonomous legal, economic, and administrative institutions of the Druze and limited Druze representation in the regional as well as the national government. Minahan (2002: 547) reports another Druze revolt in 1954. In line with Minahan, Landis (1998: 389) reports that protests broke out in Jabal al-Druze in early 1954 “which quickly out of control when the Syrian army tried to put them down. When a small column of gendarmes was cut down outside of Qraya, the home of Sultan Pasha, where they had been sent to arrest the Druze leader, Shishakli dispatched 10,000 regular troops to occupy the Jabal. Several towns were bombarded with heavy weapons, killing scores of civilians and destroying many houses. According to Druze accounts, Shishakli encouraged neighboring Bedouin tribes to plunder the defenseless population and allowed his own troops to run amok.” We found no casualty estimates for the 1954 events, but the total toll likely exceeds 25. Also consider this quote from Lund (2013): “sent the army to occupy the Arab Mountain, massacring scores of villagers in arbitrary artillery barrages.” Most of the violence appears one-sided, but more importantly, this was not separatist violence. Landis (1998: 393) clearly states that these were “anti-government” protests and that the Druzes’ main aim at the time was to bring down the Shishakli regime. Thus, we do not code separatist violence in 1954. The self-determination movement ended in the early or mid-1950s. Landis (1998: 378, 381) reports that the Druze leadership continued to cling “to their independence, communal privileges, and multiple loyalties” by 1948/1949 and that its leadership continued to have “a desire to maintain the autonomy of the Jabal”, suggesting that the movement was ongoing at the time. However, the movement appears to have ended soon thereafter. Landis (1998: 394) notes by 1954, Druze separatism was a “thing of the past”. Landis does not give a better indication of when the Druze gave up on their separatist aspirations. Based on this, we code an end to the movement in 1954. This is in line with Minahan’s (2002: 547) relatively ambiguous report that the Druze “were defeated” and “lost all their former autonomous rights” following the 1954 events. 1946-1954 are coded as NVIOLSD based on the above arguments. Note that Druze army officers participated in a successful February 1954 coup against Shishakli after the violent repression of Druze protests that brought Syria’s traditional rulers back to power. In 1964 a Druze murdered Shishakli in revenge for the 1954 bombardment. Minahan (2002: 549) suggests that Druze separatism re-emerged in 1999: “Druze separatism, long suppressed in the heartland in Syria, emerged to some extent with the death of the Syrian dictator Hafiz al-Assad in 1999. His son Bashar, more moderate and less enamored of radical Arab nationalism, has allowed some stirrings of opposition and opinions suppressed for over three decades, although many of the harsh aspects of the dictatorship were reinstated in 2001.” However, we found no corroborating evidence; thus we do not code a second phase of activity.

Sources:

Kurds

Summary: The Kurdish population in Syria is significantly less than the Kurdish population in Iraq and Turkey, and thus historically the group has received less attention than their counterparts. Minority Rights Group International estimates around 2.5 million Kurds in Syria, half of whom live in the Taurus Mountains and the other half along the Turkish border. Smaller populations of Kurds live in Jarabulus and Hayy al-Akrad. The Kurds are Sunni Muslims who speak Kurdish, but most Kurds in Syria also speak Arabic due to assimilation into Syrian society (Minority Rights Group International). Kurds in Syria have faced harsh repression. Subsequent coups led by Kurds resulted in the purging of Kurdish soldiers from the army as well as increased repression in society (Minority Rights Group International). One key grievance is the Arabization of Syrian society, which has prevented the Kurds from using their own language and living according to their own cultural lifestyles (Minorities at Risk Project). A USIP report notes, “Important elements of Kurdish cultural identity, such as language, music, and publications, were banned...The Syrian government also began to replace the names of Kurdish villages and sites with Arabic ones” (Ziadeh 2009: 2). The right to print in Kurdish was taken away in 1958. In 1986, the Syrian government forbade the use of Kurdish in the workplace, and in 1988 Kurdish songs were no longer allowed to be sung at weddings and festivals. Renewed policies to ban the Kurdish language took place again in 1989 and 1996 (McDowall 2004: 476). In the early 1990s, a government policy preventing Kurdish parents from giving their children official Kurdish names had resulted in a backlash from the Kurdish community and consequently forced the government to back down on the matter (Ziadeh 2009: 4). There is an active and ongoing Kurdish self-determination movement in Syria: a minority of the Kurds in Syria has followed the footsteps of Kurds in Iraq and Turkey by demanding the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region, or separate Kurdish state (Minorities at Risk Project). Kurdish nationalism in Syria has its roots in colonialism, as France encouraged minority separatism as a colonizing tactic. In 1927, a pan-Kurdish league was created in Lebanon and attracted Syrian Kurdish nationalists (Sinclair & Kajjo 2011). The League, called the Xoybun (Independence), eventually waned and when Syria gained its independence in 1946, Xoybun had dissolved. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Kurds have mostly participated in politics by supporting the communist party. In 1957, ex-Xoybun members created the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS) as a “‘left-wing and nationalist’ alternative to the Communists, who were led by a Kurd, but did not promote Kurdish rights” (Sinclair & Kajjo 2011). “The KDPS was, many observers say, just a continuation of Xoybun as most of its founders and leaders had been prominent members of that defunct pan-Kurdish group.” (Sinclair & Kajjo 2011). Since KDPS promoted an independent Kurdistan, 1957 is coded as the start date. In 1960, the KDPS renamed itself the Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Syria. By 1965, the Kurdish communist party “had fragmented into numerous organizations divided over issues such as whether to work for Kurdish autonomy or work within the Communist Party...” (Ziadeh 2009: 5). Though increasingly factionalized and repressed, the movement appears to have continued, as evidenced e.g. by MAR which codes an active separatist movement in the 1980s/1990s/2000s (SEPX=3; note that MAR does not code the period before 1979). McDowall notes that while “the possibility of Kurdish irredentism within Syria was a real worry roughly between the years 1920 and 1970 the threat of secessionist warfare had been greatly reduced until the the early 2000s
In 2003, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) was founded as a Kurdish party affiliated with the PKK but there has been no instance of violence. Since the early 2000s, protests within the Kurdish regions of Syria have increased, resulting in government militarization within those borders in anticipation of security concerns. “Large-scale political clashes were not infrequent…Such violent events affecting the Kurdish community, once relatively rare, have become more commonplace, raising the possibility of a further escalation of violent resistance from Syria’s Kurds” (Ziadeh 2009: 6). In 2011, 12 Kurdish parties came together to create the National Movement, meant to “streamline the Kurd’s message in the face of Arab opposition.” However, it should be noted that the National Movement did not declare aims regarding self-determination, but instead called for “an end to one-party rule, a modern, civil state that ensures the rule of law, and true equality for all citizens…” (Sinclair & Kajjo 2011). In 2012, the Free Kurdish Army was formed as the successor of the PYD. The Free Kurdish Army has captured Kurdish-populated towns in Syria “without a fight” and has begun to fly the Kurdish flag (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 2012). There was violence in late-2012 and 2013, but this was fighting between rebel groups rather than against the government, and thus is not considered self-determination violence. Thus, the movement is coded NVIOLSD from 1957 onward.

Sources:


**Indigenous Taiwanese**

Summary: After the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to Taiwan, it dominated the island’s administration and sequestered property belonging to the indigenous population. Since the 1980s, the aboriginal Taiwanese have agitated for more autonomy. In particular, in 1988 the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (formed in 1984) started a land rights campaign, hence the start date. In 1993 there were protests for autonomy. In 1995 they proposed a constitutional amendment that would have allowed indigenous self-rule and would have granted full land rights to Aboriginal groups, but it was rejected. The indigenous peoples are also seeking greater political and economic autonomy including control over education and the formation of a cabinet-level agency responsible for Aboriginal affairs. MAR codes non-zero protest scores up until 2006. The movement is thus coded as ongoing. We found no evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [December 11, 2013].


TAJKISTAN

Pamiri Tajiks

Summary: The Pamiri Tajik movement was active already in the USSR (see Pamiri Tajiks under Russia). Thus, we code the movement as of 1991, but note prior nonviolent activity. Subsequently, “the Gorno-Badakhshan Oblast made ambiguous threats to secede in 1992 and 1993 (Roeder 2007: 316). In demonstrations, the demand was issued that the status of Gorno-Badakhshan be raised to that of an autonomous republic. At the same time, it was made clear that Gorno-Badakhshan should remain in Tajikistan. April 11, 1992, the regional legislature unilaterally declared an autonomous republic. Subsequently, the Tajik government imposed an economic blockade, cutting Gorno-Badakhshan off from all supplies (Bliss 2006: 276). Self-defense forces were established to maintain order within the Autonomous Oblast’s borders, but soon they were involved in the raging civil war (Roeder 2007: 316). Based on Doyle & Sambanis (2006), we code 1992 as LVIOLSD and 1993 as HVIOLSD. We apply an “ambiguous” code since the war was mainly about the central government. 1991 is coded as NVIOLSD. According to Minority Rights International, Gorno-Badakhshan at the time was a de-facto ruled breakaway region. An agreement with the central government was signed in mid-1993, and Gorno-Badakhshan accepted reintegration into Tajikistan. The leaders of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast officially proclaimed the end of separatist aims in June 1993. The autonomous status of Gorno-Badakhshan was confirmed in the 1994 constitution (Roeder 2007: 317). The economic blockade was lifted in September 1993 (Bliss 2006: 276). Subsequent violence in Badakhshan was found, but these were not over self-determination issues. Peyrouse (2012) notes that separatism is no longer on the agenda in the region. Based on this, we code the end of the movement as 1993.

Sources:


Uzbeks

Summary: The Uzbeks of Tajikistan make up about 15 percent of the total population, and are the second largest ethnic group in Tajikistan behind the Tajiks. According to Minorities at Risk: “Tajiks and Uzbeks are often portrayed in studies of Central Asia as one people who speak two different languages” (Minorities at Risk Project). The Uzbeks generally live in Leninabad in the eastern Ferghana Valley, Hissar, and the Kurgan-Tyube regions. Ferghana Valley is home to various Islamist organizations that straddle Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. The Uzbek movement described here is separate from those religious movements. Starting with Tajik independence, there was agitation for secession in the Sughd province. The first “wave” of secessionism, according to Fumagalli, lasted only a year and petered out by the end of 1992. However, “A second wave of separatist tendencies emerged in the second half of the 1990s, when elements of the northern opposition coalesced under Abdullajonov’s Movement for National Revival” (Fumagalli 2007: 583). Between 1996 and 1998, several uprisings took place but the secessionist leader Khudoiberdiev was eventually forced to flee to Uzbekistan (Fumagalli 2007: 583-584). With Khudoiberdiev forced out of the country, the movement appears to have ended, given that there have been no attempts at secession since then. The Uzbeks of Tajikistan have mounted limited protests in the past over language autonomy. Demands include the ability to teach, publish, and deal with the government using the Uzbek language. Minorities at Risk notes that Uzbeks have not expressed these grievances recently. The start date of the movement is coded as 1991 to coincide with the beginning of secessionism as well as Tajik independence. The movement remained nonviolent until the uprisings between 1996-1998, which are coded LVIOLSD based on casualty reports from Lexis Nexis and a MAR rebellion score of 5 in 1998. 1998 is coded as end date.

Sources:


TANZANIA

Zanzibaris

Summary: The first evidence of organized separatist activity we found is in 1955, when the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) was formed. Note: originally, the ZNP was called the National Party of Subject of the Sultan of Zanzibar (NPSSZ). Other Zanzibari nationalist parties soon developed, including the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP). In late 1963 Zanzibar attained independence (thus ending the anti-colonial movement). After a coup against the local sultan in 1964, Shirazi Sheik Abeid Karume declared Zanzibar a people’s republic in January 1964. Severe violence followed, in which Arabs and Asians were primarily targeted (Minahan 2002: 2088). In October 1964, Zanzibar united with Tanzania. A Zanzibari national movement immediately developed (Minahan 2002: 2088; Hewitt et al. 2008). Based on this, we code the start date 1964, the year of the merger with Tanzania. The 1964 purges were not violence over separatism, thus we do not code separatist violence. The ZNP continued to operate. Donge and Liviga (2008) suggest that separatism remained organized in the late 1970s-1980s and had permeated Zanzibari politics. There is yearly activity from 1989-1999 according to Minorities at Risk, and Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 328) note that separatist activity increased in the 1980s. In particular, separatism flared in 1984-1985 and 1994-1995, both during election seasons. In 1992, the Civic United Front (CUF) was founded to fight for separatism in Zanzibar. Uamsho was found in 2001 as a religious organization aimed at Zanzibari secession. It has been active since its founding. Despite yearly violent attacks, there have not been enough deaths to classify any year as LVIOLSD.

Sources:
THAILAND

Muslims (Malays or Pattani)

Summary: The Patani People’s Movement (PPM) emerged in early 1947, hence the onset of the movement. The PPM demanded autonomy, language and cultural rights as well as the implementation of Sharia Law (Human Rights Watch 2007; Melvin 2007). In the same year, the Association of Malays of Greater Patani (GAMPAR) was formed in Malaysia to support secession and union with the Malay Federation (Sulong and Mayhiddin 2002). The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) was formed in 1971.

MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score is 3 from 1945-1949, but a series of of more detailed sources suggest that the movement was nonviolent initially and only turned to violence after making nonviolent claims. Because MAR only codes 5-year periods, it is not clear whether the violence was immediate. Minahan (2002) does not make mention of violence until the 1950s, but makes mention of nonviolent claims in the 1940s. A 2007 report by Human Rights Watch suggests that movement started a “petition campaign for autonomy, language and cultural rights, and implementation of Islamic law” in 1947. The report continues to suggest that the Thai government responded with repression to the protest campaign and arrested the movement’s leaders in early 1948. The report does not make mention of violence until the late 1950s. Finally, Melvin (2007) gives clear evidence of escalation from nonviolence to violence. The violence seems to have been sparked by the arrest of movement leaders als mentioned in other sources. “Sulong’s arrest was one of the factors behind an upsurge of unrest during 1948, most notably the 26–28 April Dusun Nyur rebellion in Narathiwat on. Another religious leader, Haji Abdul Rahman, led hundreds of men against the police, resulting in the deaths of some 400 Malay Muslims; thousands more fled to Malaysia. The uprising in 1948 is widely regarded as the onset of the modern violent struggle in the South” (p. 15). This suggests that the movement wasn’t immediately violent and that violence only emerged in 1948. Based on this, we code LVIOLSD in 1948-1949.

MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score again exceeds 3 from 1965-1974 (4 in 1965-1969 and 6 in 1970-1974. The armed conflict onset was in the late 1960s according to the MAR coding notes: “Muslim resentment against the government’s assimilation policies turned from localized resistance to broad support for the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) by the early 1970s. The PULO rebellion began in the late 1960s with the most intense phase emerging in the early to mid 1970s (REB65X = 4; REB70X = 6).” Based on this we code LVIOLSD from 1967-1974. 1950-1966 and 1975-1994 are coded as NVIOLSD. The LVIOLSD coding for 1995-98 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003: 61) and MAR (rebellion score exceeds two in all years except 1996). While 1996 could be coded as NVIOLSD based on MAR, the rebellion score of two suggests continued sporadic violence, thus we retain the LVIOLSD code for 1996. We found no reports of separatist violence in 1999, thus the NVIOLSD code. The LVIOLSD code for 2000-2003 follows MAR (rebellion score of 4 in all years) and Gleditsch et al. (2002)/Themnér & Wallensteen (2014) who indicate 26-28 battle-related deaths in 2003. From 2004 onward, we code the movement as HVIOLSD in accordance with Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The war began on January 4th 2004, when 100 Muslim insurgents attacked the Royal Thai Army’s 4th Engineering Battalion and captured 400 weapons. The Muslim insurgency emerges out of the marginalization of Malay Muslims in Thailand and is “inspired and motivated by pride in the ‘glorious past’ of Patani and a ‘history of oppression’ under Thai rule”. The main insurgent groups are: the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and its offshoot, the BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C); the Gerakan Mujahadeen Islam Pattani (GMIP); Permuda, a separatist youth movement with close ties to the BRN; and New PULO, an offshoot of a rebel group, Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), that maintained a strong preference in the 1970s and 1980s. While media also includes the Runda Kampulan Kecil (RKK) as a rebel organization, “this is inaccurate because there is no RKK ‘organization’ – the RKK refers to small group guerrilla tactics that militants from groups such as the BRN-C acquired through training in Indonesia”. All of the insurgent
Northern Hill Tribes

Summary: The Northern Hill tribes in Thailand refer to tribes indigenous to the hills of Thailand’s northern regions, such as the Karen, Hmong, Akha, H’tin, Khamu, Lahu, Lisu, Lua, Med, and Yao (Thai Freedom House). Of these, the Karen and the Hmong make up the largest population, with the Karen accounting for half of the hill tribe population. Each of the tribes maintains their own languages,
religions, customs, and lifestyles, and stand in contrast physically from ethnic Thais. While the hills of northern Thailand originally were parts of Burma, China, and Laos, the territory was annexed into Thailand in 1874. The northern hill tribes, which are ethnically indigenous to the former three countries, subsequently lost their political autonomy. Altogether, there are around 1.2 million hill tribe people living in Thailand today, but only about half are registered as Thai citizens while others have trouble applying for citizenship. Despite their differences in ethnicity, “recent political activism points to the early development of a broader sense of identity” (Minorities at Risk Project). The northern hill tribes have fought in the past both for ideological reasons as well as for identity issues. Particularly the Northern Hill tribes have also mounted protests over land rights, access to education, citizenship, and cultural autonomy. Due to an increase in the tourism industry in Thailand, companies have begun developments to promote tourism in tribal areas, which disrupt the northern hill tribes’ traditional lifestyles. Another key grievance remains the environmental damages resulting from deforestation and the effects of these activities on indigenous agricultural lifestyles. The government has passed several acts that declare certain forests as government land, thus allowing them to seize hill tribe land (NIPT 2010). In 2007, the government passed the Community Forest Act, which “deviated substantially from the original proposal of civil society organizations and resulted in de facto nullifying of the rights of numerous forest communities…” (NIPT 2010). The tribes have protested against forced evictions to make way for Thai forestry officials, and want “a clear policy on granting them permanent access to forests” (Minorities at Risk). According to Minorities at Risk, the northern hill tribes are represented by several organizations, including the Tribal Assembly of Thailand, the Inter-Mountain Peoples Education and Culture, the Assembly of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of Thailand, Karen Network for Culture and Environment (KNCE), and Hmong Association for Development in Thailand (MDT). Additionally, the Network of Indigenous Peoples in Thailand (NIPT) is “an alliance of twenty-six indigenous organizations in Thailand” that “works for the promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights and issues such as identity, citizenship and natural resources management” (NIPT 2010). Information on the founding dates of these organizations aiding the hill tribes could not be found. The start date of the movement is coded as 1997 to coincide with the start of non-zero MAR protest scores. The movement is coded as ongoing, since the NIPT continues to remain active in its advocacy for hill tribe land and cultural rights. According to Minorities at Risk, the hill tribes were involved in the Thai insurgency in the mid-1950s, but we do not code this as self-determination violence since the insurgency was based on ideological goals. Subsequent protests did not lead to casualties, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD.

Sources:


**TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO**

**Tobagonians**

*Summary:* The first organized attempt at secessionism occurred in 1970 when the Tobago Emancipation Action Committee was formed. According to the founder, Tobago would be far better off economically if they seceded or that they would at least not be worse off (Luke 2007; 241). It should be noted that there is evidence of separatist sentiment prior to 1970, but no organized movement was found. In 1971, the Democratic Action Congress (DAC) was founded. It favored not only economic and social changes in Tobago but also more autonomy for the Tobagonians (Luke 2007: 245). Subsequent claims for secession were made in 1973 when Tobagonians made the case of separate ethnic identities to a government constitution commission. However, the commission denied secession. The secessionists rejected this outcome and three years later, secessionists again formally pursued self-determination (Luke 2007, 242). After pushing for more self-determination through conventional politics from 1976-1979, the Tobago House of Assembly was reestablished in 1980 as an autonomous regional parliament (Luke 2007, 250). However, calls for secession continued. In 1983, Tobagonians brought up the issue of secession in the Tobago House of Assembly. In 1986, the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), a party alliance including the DAC, was elected into government. Though NAR rejected secessionism, it pushed for self-government. In 1989, the Group With Tobago At Hearth (GROWTH) was founded. It called for independence on the grounds that Tobago was being treated like a colony. When an anti-secessionist party, the People’s National Movement (PNM) was voted back into power in 1991, GROWTH continued to advocate for secessionism. Since being voted out of office in 1991, the ANR has continued to contest in elections as well. Based on this, the entire movement is coded as ongoing and NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 23, 2002].


TURKEY

Kurds

Summary: The first evidence for separatist activity we found is in 1965, when the separatist Kurdish Democratic Party was formed (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 301; Atlas n.d.). In 1974 the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) was formed. MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score is 4 from 1975-1984. The 1980-1984 rebellion score can be attributed to the civil war that emerged in 1984. Why MAR codes a rebellion in 1975-1979 is not clear; the coding notes make mention only of the 1984 onset: “[the] Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) [is] a militant organization comprised of approximately 10,000 troops that have been engaged in large-scale guerrilla activity in the southeast from 1984 to 2000 (REB99-00 = 6), seeking an independent Kurdistan and union with Kurds living in Iraq, Iran and Syria.” Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) do not note armed conflict before 1984. UCDP/PRIO does not note armed conflict before 1984 either. Thus we do not code violence before 1984. The HVIOLSD coding for 1984-2003 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The LVIOLSD coding for 2004 follows Marshall & Gurr (2005), Hewitt et al. (2008) and a MAR rebellion score of 5. From 2005 onward, we code this movement as HVIOLSD based on Doyle & Sambanis (2006).

Sources:


Baganda

Summary: The first stirrings of Baganda nationalism occurred in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1953, the possibility of a federation of East African states spurred the Baganda into further action. Afraid of a white-dominated government that would impose apartheid-like policies, the Baganda demanded separation from the rest of the protectorate. The Baganda, rallying around their traditional king, came to be a strong political force in the independence movement and an alliance between the Baganda nationalists and the United People's Congress led by Milton Obote led Uganda into independence in 1962. In the post-independence era we could not find clear evidence of organized separatist activity until the mid-1990s, although it appears that separatist sentiment had not disappeared in the many years of war and oppression. MAR, for instance, notes that “[s]ince independence, the Baganda have consistently demanded a higher degree of autonomy and protection of their traditional customs.” In 1966 all kingdoms were banned, which implied that the Baganda king was stripped of his powers to collect taxes and his role limited to the cultural sphere (MAR). In 1993 the Baganda kingdom was partially restored, though the king’s role remained limited to the cultural sphere. After the restoration of their king, the Baganda have consistently brought up the issue of autonomy for their region and more power for their king. In 1995 the National Democratic Alliance was formed and it demands semi-autonomy for the Buganda kingdom, the most populous and wealthy of Uganda's tribal kingdoms. Also, in 1995 a new group, the Buganda Youth Movement, began fighting for autonomy for the Buganda region. Non-zero MAR protest scores since 1995 indicate an ongoing movement. According to MAR, “[i]n 2003, the Baganda submitted a list of demands, which included: a federal system of government for Buganda; the recognition of Kampala City as part of Buganda; the granting of privileges of immunity to the traditional leaders; and the return of the 9,000 square miles of land to the Kingdom. Of these, the demand for federal government is the most significant (PROT04-05 = 3).” Furthermore, MAR notes that “the push for autonomy grew during the 2004 presidential elections, Baganda threatened to remove their political support of Museveni if he refused to grant Buganda administrative autonomy” and that “[i]n 2005, the central government negotiated and agreed to a proposal with the Baganda Mengo government that would allow for the Buganda Kingdom to control education and health care in the region. The Lukiiko, the regional council, quickly approved the proposal, which was later rejected by the Baganda in 2006. Critics complained that it failed to give them adequate autonomy over the region in areas such as taxation for revenue generation and also included provisions for the election of the katikkoro, Prime Minister of the kingdom, who is traditionally appointed.” Based on this, we peg the start date of the movement at 1995 and code it as ongoing. We found no evidence of violence that qualifies as LVIOLSD. According to MAR, the Baganda’s agitation has so far been channeled into institutional mechanisms. Thus we classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Banyala

**Summary:** The Banyala are a minority group who were originally ceded to the Buganda Kingdom by the British following the 1890-1899 war. To escape Bugandan rule, many Banyala people left the area and settled in Teso, Lango, Busoga, and Bunyoro. Today, the Banyala live in Kayunga district within the Buganda Kingdom in Central Uganda near the Nile River-Lake Kyoga basin. The Banyala tribe is one of the 56 tribes living in the area, but is the only tribe indigenous to the region. In 2004, Buganda Kingdom demanded greater autonomy and a separate regional government, as well as “the return of the 9,000 square miles of land to the Kingdom” (Minorities at Risk). The demands would also prevent any areas within Buganda to leave the kingdom. Beginning in 2009, the Banyala have been active in lobbying for autonomy from Buganda kingdom as the Banyalas have remained bitter about the history of Buganda rule. In a conference in 2009, the Banyala “declared that in the event Buganda got federo, Buruuli and Banyala would not be part of it” (New Uganda). In addition, the Banyala demanded autonomous cultural recognition. In 2010, the Banyala declared their autonomy during a public rally and sang their own anthem. The Banyala cultural leader, Captain Baker Kimeze, submitted a petition for breaking away from Buganda Kingdom and establishing the Banyala region as an “autonomous cultural institution” (The Observer 2/11/2010). No instance of Banyala protest prior to 2009 could be found, suggesting that the Banyala movement for autonomy is likely a recent affair. This is bolstered by the lack of information about the Banyala in Minorities at Risk, Minorities Rights Group International, or Minahan (2002). Based on this, the Banyala movement is coded as starting in 2009 to coincide with the first news article on Banyala autonomy. The movement remains ongoing as of 2012. No violence linked to this movement was found, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD throughout.

**Sources:**


**Banyankole**

*Summary:* British colonial policy gradually reduced the Ankole kingdom’s powers, sparking a separatist movement (Minahan 2002: 132). According to Minahan, agitation for autonomy or separate independence swept the Ankole kingdom in the late 1950s, but after extensive negotiations the Banyankole accepted semi-federal status within an independent Uganda. Since Uganda did not become independent until 1962 and since separatist activity appears to have continued straight through independence, we code movement activity from 1962. We note prior activity. However, we lack a clear indication as of when the movement started. The first evidence of organized activity we found is the above-mentioned agitation in the late 1950s. Based on this, we peg the start date to 1958. We found no separatist violence before independence, and thus indicate prior non-violent activity. In 1966 amid growing tensions and moves toward secession the Obote government ended all Banyankole autonomy and in 1967 abolished the four Southern kingdoms (Minahan 2002: 132). After an abortive secessionist revolt in 1972, Amin unleashed his army on the Banyankole and thousands were massacred according to Minahan (2002: 132). We do not code the 1972 incident as LVIOLSD as it appears to have been one-sided violence. However, we flag this case for further research. Its leadership decimated, murdered or disappeared, the Banyankole separatist movement collapsed in 1972, hence the end date of the first phase of the movement. In 1993 a new law restored all former kingdoms except the Ankole kingdom. In defiance, Banyankole separatists crowned their own king and unilaterally declared the restoration of their kingdom (Tumushabe 2012). This is coded as the beginning of a new phase of the separatist movement. The movement remains ongoing as of 2012. Since we found no reports of separatist violence we code this phase as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 25, 2002].


**Banyoro**

*Summary:* The Banyoro kingdom was incorporated into British Uganda in 1896. An attempt to re-establish the kingdom in 1899 was quickly quelled (Minahan 2002: 1428). The Banyoro king was exiled. He was allowed to return in 1900, but forced to sign an agreement that gave parts of Nyoro land to the Buganda, a local British ally (Minahan 2002: 1428). The “Lost Counties” issue contributed significantly to the growth of the Banyoro national movement. In 1921 Banyoro nationalists formed a political group called Mubende-Banyoro, which advocated the return of the Lost Counties as well as secession from Britain. Mubende-Banyoro quickly became the region’s major political party (Minahan 2002: 1428).
1933, the Banyoro kingdom became a British protectorate. Mubende-Banyoro continued to make self-determination claims, in particular regarding the return of the Lost Counties. The issue became ever more salient as Uganda was approaching independence. Based on this, we code movement activity from 1962 onwards to coincide with Ugandan independence. The start date is pegged at 1921 to coincide with the formation of Mubende-Banyoro. We found no separatist violence before 1962 and thus indicate prior non-violent activity. In 1964, the “Lost Counties”, which had been assigned to Buganda under colonial rule, were returned to Banyoro after a referendum. Upon independence, the Banyoro kingdom had been granted a semifederal status. However, in 1966, the Ugandan government revoked the Banyoro kingdom’s autonomy and in 1967, all Bantu kingdoms were abolished (Minahan 2002: 1429). The Banyoro self-determination movement continued to be active through independence up to 1972 when, following an abortive secession attempt, it was suppressed. We therefore code the first phase of the movement as beginning in 1962, Uganda’s first year of independence, and continuing through 1972. We found no evidence of casualties that would allow us to code 1972 as LVIOLSD. Minahan (2002: 1429-1430) reports that the Banyoro movement re-emerged in the late 1980s/early 1990s. However, he does not give clear evidence of organized activity before 1993, when the government allowed the partial restoration of the Banyoro kingdom and Banyoro separatists demanded the restoration of the kingdom’s traditional boundaries, including the Mubende area of Baganda. Based on this, we code a second phase starting in 1993. News reports indicate that this conflict is continuing through 2012 as the Mubende-Banyoro continues to fight for the restoration of Banyoro land as well as reparations for sufferings under colonial rule. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification for the second phase.

Sources:


**Batoro**

*Summary:* A gradual decrease of the Toro kingdom’s autonomy gave way to a Toro national movement. The first evidence for organized activity we found is in 1953, when the Toro royal government demanded federal status (Minahan 2002: 1912). Toro nationalism intensified as Ugandan independence neared, with nationalists claiming that the Toro king is granted increased powers (Minahan 2002: 1912). Toro nationalism paralleled the growing nationalism of the Ruwenzoris, who sought to separate from the Toro kingdom (see Ruwenzoris). At Ugandan independence in 1962, the Toros accepted a semifederal status within newly independent Uganda. This appears to have mollified the Toro nationalists at least somewhat, who in subsequent years were busy fighting the Ruwenzoris’ attempt at separation (Minahan 2002: 1912-1913). Nevertheless, Minahan (2002: 1913) suggests that a Toro secessionist movement continued to operate. In 1967, the Ugandan government abolished all kingdoms. Minahan (1996: 578) notes that the Toro secessionist movement ended in 1972 with the murder or disappearance of the majority of the Toro’s leadership. The end date of the first phase of the movement has been therefore pegged at 1972. The start date is coded as 1953 (see above), though we do not code the movement before Uganda’s independence in 1962. We found no separatist violence before 1962 and thus note prior non-violent activity. We code this period as NVIOLSD as we found no casualties besides the assassinations of the Toro’s leadership during this time (in other words, the 1972 events appear best described as one-sided violence). In 1993 the Toro kingdom was reestablished. Though Minahan (2002: 1913-1914) suggests that there has been separatist (or at least federalist) sentiment in recent years, we found no clear evidence of organized self-determination activity.

Sources:

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 23, 2002].


**Ruwenzoris**

*Summary:* Ruwenzururu is a mountainous region in western Uganda inhabited by the Bakonzo (or Bakonjo) and Baamba peoples. Before the arrival of the British, the Bakonzo and Baamba peoples were self-governing (Rubongoya 1995: 77). Between 1891 and 1900 Ruwenzururu was incorporated into the Toro kingdom following a number of treaties signed by the Toro king and the British, implying a loss of autonomy (Rubongoya 1995: 81-82). Centralization, discrimination in particular with regard to the assignment of government posts and assimilation pressure gave way to a Ruwenzori rebellion in 1919, which was brutally suppressed (Rubongoya 1995: 83). The 1919 incident proved vital for the subsequent emergence of the Ruwenzuru national movement. The Ruwenzuru movement emerged in the 1950s, initially as an attempt at cultural revitalization (Rubongoya 1995: 86). To this purpose, in 1954, the Bakonzo Life History Research Society was formed to promote the cultural identity of the Bakonzo (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 259; Peterson 2012). With independence approaching, nationalist conflicts intensified in Uganda. According to Rubongoya (1995: 80), “[o]f all these struggles […] it was the Bakonjo-Baamba mobilization, which came to be known as the Ruwenzurururu Movement, that most explicitly and actively called for secession and resisted integration and assimilation (ethnocide) through actual armed struggle with the postcolonial regime.” With independence approaching, the Ruwenzuru
movement began to demand separation from the Toro kingdom and the creation of a separate (federal) district within Uganda (Rubongoya 1995: 86). The Ruwenzoris’ demand for a separate district was not met. Furthermore, the new Toro constitution did not recognize the Ruwenzori but continued to espouse the ethnocentric view that the Batoro were the only legitimate inhabitants of Toro. In response, the Ruwenzoris escalated their demand shortly before independence, now aspiring at a merger with neighboring Congo (shortly before independence) and an independent Ruwenzururu kingdom (since independence). According to Rubongoya (1995: 86-87), when the demand for a separate district was not met in the run-up to independence, Ruwenzori leaders “informed the central government that, short of a separate district, “we are prepared to join the province of Kivu in the Congo where we have the backing of twelve members of our tribes in the Congo National Assembly.”" However, “[n]either the Congo government nor the Banande ethnic group in the Congo […] responded to Bakonjo-Baamba appeals with statements of support.” Rubongoya does not give an exact date when demands were first made. Nor does Minahan (2002: 1620). However, both suggest that calls for Ruwenzuru were first made in the early 1960s. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 259) suggest that the first separatist calls were made in 1962, thus very shortly before Uganda’s independence in November 1962. Based on this, 1962 is coded as start date. Immediately after independence, Ruwenzori leaders began to set up their own structures. According to Rubongoya (1995: 87), “[o]ne month after Uganda’s independence in November 1962, the Bakonjo-Baamba secessionist leaders appointed chiefs, printed their own tax receipts, collected taxes, proceeded to establish their own tax receipts, collected taxes, proceeded to establish their own administrative structure in the Ruwenzori Mountains, and the movement adopted Rwenzururu national songs and a flag. Mukirane, who had declared himself king and leader of the Rwenzururu Secessionist Movement, wrote to Prime Minister Milton Obote declaring the Ruwenzori Mountains independent from Uganda; copies of this document were sent to UN Secretary General U Thant and to the Organization of African Unit (OAU) Chairman […] By December 1962, law and order had completely broken down.” According to Minahan (2002: 1620-1621) and Horowitz (1985: 236), independence was declared on February 13, 1963. A number of sources cite a rebellion in 1963-1964, but evidence is scarce and we did not come across casualty estimates. In particular, Rubongoya (1995: 87) reports that the central government imposed a state of emergency over the Ruwenzori mountains in February 1963 and dispatched the Ugandan army “in full force”. The Ruwenzoris attempted to resist, but “wielded only spears and bows and arrows”. Thus the lower slopes of the mountain region were quickly lost. The self-declared Ruwenzori king retreated higher up to the mountains. The Ugandan central government then installed direct rule over the lower slopes, effectively taking away the administration from the discriminatory Toro kingdom (Rubongoya 1995: 87-88). Those higher up in the mountains continued to defy the state, but in the lower slopes the movement lost support (Rubongoya 1995: 88). Minahan, too, reports a Ruwenzori rebellion in 1963, arguing that “violence spread across the kingdom”, and adds that there were also fights in 1964, when “the Ugandan army attacked the Ruwenzori rebels, but they held out in their mountain strongholds.” Forrest (2004: 222) also makes reference to battles in 1963-1964 “between the Konjo and the Amba on the one hand, and Toro and Ugandan army units on the other; the latter effectively suppressed the rebels.” Despite the lack of casualty estimates, we code 1963-1964 as LVIOLSD; the above-cited narratives make it quite likely that the LVIOLSD threshold was met. According to Rubongoya (1995: 88), the Ugandan government had effectively crushed the rebellion by 1965: “[r]ealizing that it had broken the back of the Baamba, the government embarked on the process of co option: agents formerly engaged in Rwenzururu resistance replaced Batoro administrators; the government promised a 100 bed hospital in Bwaamba; and in late 1965 granted amnesty for Rwenzururu fighters, further weakening the secessionist movement.” Still, some fighting continued (Rubongoya 1995: 88), as “a number of Bakonjo fighters held out against continued military attacks”, “helped by the difficult mountain terrain and their well-developed knowledge of how to evade government forces.” According to Rubongoya (1995: 89) the rebellion “has flared up and faded out in irregular cycles.” Forrest (2004: 222) argues that the Ruwenzoris reconsolidated their movement after the defeat in 1964, but were only able to mount a significant threat again “in the wake of the power vacuum left by the collapse of Idi Amin’s regime in 1979.” In short, violence appears to have continued at a lower level until
at least the end of the 1970s. In accordance with this, the Minorities at Risk rebellion score of the Konjo and Amba (the two groups making up the Ruwenzoris, see above) is six from 1965-1979. We follow MAR and extend the LVIOLSD code until 1979. Note that Minahan’s (2002: 1621) account differs somewhat as he argues that the rebellion was defeated in 1970, but this contradicts the above-cited more detailed accounts as well as MAR. There are some indications that the secessionist movement ended in the early 1980s. Minahan (2002: 1621) notes that the last Ruwenzori king, Charles Iremangoma, surrendered in 1983. Whether or not Iremangoma indeed surrendered is not fully clear, as Rubongoya (1995: 90-91) suggests that Charles Iremangoma died in 1983, but it is possible that he died after surrendering. However, Rubongoya appears to agree that the secessionist movement effectively ended in 1983. He does not make mention of organized separatist demands after 1983, though arguing that “nationalist sentiments that sparked the Rwenzururu Movement must still persist.” According to Forrest (2004: 222), “[t]he second Obote administration pursued negotiations with Rwenzururu leaders and reached a settlement in 1982 according to which Konjo and Amba elites agreed to abandon outright secession in return for “a degree of local autonomy”; the appointment of Konjo and Amba to administrative posts; and the provision of economic benefits, such as motorized vehicles, shops, and student scholarships, that would be assigned for distribution by traditional leaders of these two groups.” Still we do not code an end to the movement because it is not fully clear whether the movement indeed ended and because it we found evidence that relatively soon claims for autonomy (though no longer outright secession) were made. Forrest (2004: 222) argues that the movement was revived in the 1990s in reaction to the restoration of a number of kingdoms. Minahan (2002: 1621-1622) even suggests that the Ruwenzoris began to make demands for autonomy already in the 1980s, but concurs with Forrest that there were autonomy demands in the 1990s. In addition, Minahan (2002: 1622) suggests that the Ruwenzoris have played a major role in the multi-ethnic Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group that was formed in 1996 and that the Ruwenzoris under the ADF umbrella have engaged in separatist violence. In partial agreement, UCDP reports that the ADF was a conglomerate of three groups, including the remnants of the Ruwenzori separatist movement. However, the ADF’s main goal does not appear to be Ruwenzori separatism (Titeca and Vlassenroot 2012). UCDP argues that “most analysts agree that ADF’s was really a rebellion without a political cause. Like LRA, ADF attacked indiscriminately, killing and abducting large numbers of civilians.” Thus, we do not code LVIOLSD. Agitation for a separate kingdom appears to have continued in the 2000s. In 2008 a Ruwenzori kingdom was established as a cultural institution (All Africa 2008). Even if the kingdom was not given political or regional autonomy and its activities limited to “cultural” matters, this appears to have ended the movement as we found no evidence of separatist claims beyond 2008. Thus 2008 is coded as the end date. All years other than 1963-1979 are coded with NVIOLSD as we found no other reports of separatist violence. Note: In 1966 (1967 according to Minahan 2002: 1621), Uganda abandoned its federal structure; Ugandan nationalists installed a system of direct rule, taking away the autonomy of kingdoms such as the Toro one (Rubongoya 1995: 79, 88). In 1970 authority over parts of the Ruwenzururu mountains was given back to the Toros. “The government also established another district specifically for the Bakonjo-Baamba, separate from the Toro, and some evidence suggests that after that point they were better able to manage local government” (Rubongoya 1995: 88). Note as well: Florea (2014) regards Ruwenzururu as a de-facto state from 1963-1982, but after 1963/1964 the Ruwenzururu movement had lost control over most of the Ruwenzururu region, hiding out in the mountainous region.

Sources:


UKRAINE

Bulgarians

Summary: When Ukraine was about to gain independence, ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Gagauz (both compactly settled in the Bolhrad raion in Odessa and combined under the header of the Bulgarians) began to make claims for autonomy (Solchanyk 1994: 65; Goode 2011: 141). Local authorities organized a referendum on autonomy held simultaneously with Ukraine’s independence referendum on December 1. According to Solchanyk (1994: 65), the referendum has to be seen in the context of Ukraine’s 1990 ‘Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities in Ukraine’ which stated that “the language of any national group that is compactly settled in an administrative-territorial unit to function ‘on a level equal to the state [Ukrainian] language’.” 83% of voters purportedly agreed to autonomy. We code the movement from 1991. The movement is not coded under the header of the USSR since the claim appears to have surfaced with Ukraine’s independence. The call for autonomy has remained unsuccessful, and we did not find much further activity. Thus, we code an end to this movement in 2001 in accordance with the ten-years inactivity rule. We found no evidence for separatist violence. Thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Crimean Russians

Summary: In Crimea, irredentism is strong among the Russians due to the large numbers of Russians living there and the relatively strong historical link between Crimea and Russia. The first calls for autonomy among Crimean Russians emerged in the summer and autumn of 1989 (Solchanyk 1994: 50) and intensified in 1990 (Sasse 2001: 87). In January 1991 a referendum was held in the Crimea on restoring autonomy to the region. Over 80% of the electorate participated, of which 93% supported the “restoration of the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR and as a party to the Union Treaty.” In August 1991 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared Ukraine’s independence and on the same day, the Republican Movement of Crimea (which later became the Republican Party of Crimea) was established. In September 1991 the Crimean parliament declared the state sovereignty of Crimea as a constituent part of the Ukraine. While this initial period of separatist activity occurred when Ukraine still belonged to the Soviet Union, we only code the Crimean Russians in Ukraine since the initial activity was primarily directed against Ukraine’s independence movement. However, the movement remained active after Ukraine gained independence later in 1991. We code the movement as active in Ukraine as of 1991, but note prior nonviolent activity. Non-zero protest scores until 2006 indicate an ongoing movement. After the Crimean Parliament declared sovereignty, the Crimean Russians have protested for cultural and language rights as well as autonomy separate from the Crimean Tatars. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.
Crimean Tatars

Summary: Collectively accused of treason by Stalin, the Crimean Tatars were deported to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia in 1944. The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was abolished in 1945, and the area was russified. In the second part of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the Crimean Tatars launched a campaign for the full restoration of their rights, including in particular the right to return to Crimea and the re-establishment of their autonomous status. The campaign involved repeated petitions to Moscow and demonstrations (Minahan 2002: 502-503). The earliest evidence of activity we found is in 1957, when a petition campaign began and several thousands of signatures were collected asking for the full rehabilitation and repatriation. Hence, we code 1957 as the start date. The movement was severely repressed, but non-zero MAR protest scores indicate that the movement continued to be active throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In 1967 the Crimean Tatars were absolved from mass treason, but still denied the right to return. After 1967, some Crimean Tatars attempted to return, but most were re-deported. There were plans to an autonomous entity for the Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan, but the Tatars rejected this plan. After almost 50 years of deportation, the Crimean Tatars were finally granted the right to return in 1990. Thousands of Crimean Tatars took the opportunity and returned to Crimea. The movement remained active when Ukraine became independent in 1991. We code the movement as of 1991, but indicate that it was active and nonviolent prior to independence. In 1992 the Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OCNM) formed out of the National Movement of Crimean Tatars (NMCT), which had been formed in 1989, largely with the same goals, but with the resolution to adopt more organized forms of political struggle. Since 1993 the organization that primarily represents their demands is the Crimean Tatar Majilis, the self-styled parliament of the Crimean Tatars. In 1997-2000 the political activity of the Crimean Tatars, including large-scale organized protest and building tent camps to
advocate their demands, has significantly increased. In 1997, Crimean Tatars presented a list of demands to President Kuchma which included: change of electoral laws; recognition of the Crimean Tatars as a population native to the peninsula; recognition of the Crimean Tatar language as one of the main languages in Crimea; reimbursement of the moral and material damage caused by the deportation; recognition of the Majlis as the official body of the Crimean Tatars; introduction of 30% quota of Tatar employment in all state bodies; and the establishment of national Crimean Tatar autonomy. Non-zero protest scores until 2006 indicate an ongoing movement. We found no evidence of LVIOLSD, though in June 1995 at least two people were killed and nine injured in clashes between ethnic Tatars and riot police in the autonomous republic of Crimea. Thus, we classify the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Donbas Russians

Summary: The Donetsk and the Luhansk Oblasts border Russia, and almost half of the population is ethnically Russian. Moreover, many Ukrainians in the region are Russian-speakers. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a regionalist movement emerged with the formation of the Intermovement in 1990. Initially, the Intermovement campaigned primarily against Ukraine’s independence and for Ukraine signing a revised Union Treaty, though it did threaten a campaign for autonomy if Ukraine leaves the USSR. After the August Coup and Ukraine’s declaration of independence, the Intermovement and the Democratic Movement (a similar organization in Luhansk Oblast) began to campaign for a referendum on autonomy in Eastern Ukraine and against Ukrainian independence. With the dissolution of the Union, the Intermovement and other movements, including the Democratic Movement, advocated incorporation into Russia. The radical demand for outright secession appears to have been a minority view. More moderate regional elites were pressing for increased autonomy, particularly in the economic realm. In 1992, the Movement for the Rebirth of Donbas was formed, with the aim of creating a free economic zone in the region and, eventually, a federal Ukraine (Solchanyk 1994: 59-61). Since demands prior to Ukraine’s independence process, which started in late August 1991, were primarily focused on remaining within the Union, and only after on autonomy within Ukraine or even secession, we code the movement as of 1991 and under the header of Ukraine only. In repeated strikes of miners in 1993, regional autonomy was demanded (Sasse 2001: 84). In 1994 a series of local referendums were held in the Donbas region, asking whether Russian should be made the second official language alongside Ukrainian, whether Russian should be made the official language of administration in the region, on Ukraine’s full membership in the CIS, and on the federalization of Ukraine (the latter question was included only in the Donetsk Oblast). Wide majorities approved all four measures. However, after the referendum the movement appears to
have died down (see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 83); we found no evidence of much subsequent activity until 2014, when the movement re-emerged after Russia’s annexation of Crimea (with significant Russian support). Following the ten-year rule, we code an end to the movement in 2004. We found no evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:


**Hungarians**

*Summary:* Ethnic Hungarians, who inhabit the Sub-Carpathian region of western Ukraine, have been pressing for greater autonomy in Ukraine since 1991, when a referendum on autonomy was organized in the Berehove district simultaneously with the Ukrainian independence referendum (Batt 2002: 168). Hence, we code 1991 as the start date (the movement is not coded under the header of the USSR since the claim appears to have surfaced with Ukraine’s independence). The autonomy demand has been repeated, by the Cultural Association of Sub-Carpathian Hungarians (KMKSZ) throughout the 2000s, most recently in 2013. Thus, the movement is coded as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


**Romanians**

*Summary:* When Ukraine was about to gain independence, ethnic Romanians and Moldovans (both concentrated in the Bukovina region in Chernivtsi Oblast and combined under the header of the Romanians) began to make claims for autonomy (Goode 2012: 98; Bugajski 2000: 178). We code the movement from 1991. The movement is not coded under the header of the USSR since the claim appears to have surfaced with Ukraine’s independence. The call for autonomy has remained unsuccessful, and we did not find much further activity. Thus, we code an end to this movement in 2001 in accordance with the ten-years inactivity rule. The entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.
Sources:


Rusyns

Summary: The movement was active already before Ukraine’s independence (see Rusyns under Russia). We code movement activity as of 1991, but note prior nonviolent activity. In 1992 the Soviet of the Trans-Carpathian Region has asked the Ukrainian Parliament to consider a bill on making Ruthenia a “special self-governing administrative territory.” In May 1993 radical Rusyns set up a provisional autonomous government, appealed for Russian support, and declared their intention to join the Commonwealth of Independent States independently of Ukraine (Batt 2002: 160). Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 257) suggest that the movement has been ongoing as of 2000, but we found little evidence for significant activity beyond 1993 (see e.g. Ash 1999 who describes the movement as fringe). Following the ten-years of inactivity rule, we code an end to the movement in 2003. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Western Ukrainians

Summary: The Western Ukrainian movement is active since 1989 (see Western Ukrainians under Russia). We code the movement as of 1991 and indicate that this movement was both active and nonviolent prior to Ukraine’s independence. Mass demonstrations have been common and there are several political organizations promoting the interests of Western Ukrainians as of 2012. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.
Sources:


Catholics in Northern Ireland

Summary: The unification of Northern Ireland with Ireland was on the agenda of the Irish Republican Army already before 1945, the first year we cover in this data set. English (2002: 58) quotes the IRA manifesto of 1942 which states that the consent of the Irish people has “not been obtained for the present occupation of north-east Ireland by British and allied forces” and that “the IRA reserves the right to use whatever measure present themselves to clear this territory of such forces”. However, according to Atkins (2004: 142): “Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Irish Republican Army was in a state of flux, unable to define its mission…Only toward the end of the 1940s did new leadership decide to reorient the IRA. In 1948, the new chief of staff, Tony Magan, decided to direct the energies of the IRA toward freeing the six counties that constitute Northern Ireland.” Encyclopedia Britannica notes that at the IRA’s inception, “[t]he IRA’s purpose was to use armed force to render British rule in Ireland ineffective and thus to assist in achieving the broader objective of an independent republic.” However, “[a]fter the withdrawal of Ireland from the British Commonwealth in 1949, the IRA turned its attention to agitating for the unification of the predominantly Roman Catholic Irish republic with predominantly Protestant Northern Ireland.” Since the incorporation of the six Northern Irish counties effectively was on the IRA’s agenda only since 1948, we peg the start date to 1948. IRA realigned with Sinn Fein and began operations in 1951. Initially, IRA received very little active support. Still, the IRA attracted significant attention when it initiated a series of attacks in the Border Campaign between 1956 and 1962. Support increased dramatically in the late 1960s, when Catholics in Northern Ireland began a civil rights campaign. The “troubles” began in summer 1968 with demonstrations on behalf of Catholic rights that were organized by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, which had been formed the previous year. Catholic political action has taken every conceivable form, from conventional politics to rallies, campaigns of civil disobedience, hunger strikes (especially in 1980-81), and riotous attacks on army and police. The movement is ongoing. From 1948-1968, we code NVIOLSD because violence does not reach LVIOLSD levels based on Lexis Nexis. The Border Campaign from 1956-1962 resulted in eight deaths altogether (O’Neill 2010: 226). The LVIOLSD coding for 1969-70 follows Marshall & Gurr (2003). The HVIOLSD coding for 1971-98 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The movement has used conventional politics since the Good Friday agreement in 1998, hence a NVIOLSD coding for 1999 onward.

Sources:

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crits/pdfs/csj85.pdf [March 3, 2014].


Encyclopedia Britannica, “Irish Republican Army (IRA).


Cornish

Summary: Mebyon Kernow (Sons of Cornwall), a Cornish organization rooted in a cultural revival, was founded in 1951. At the beginning it was not a political party, but rather a pressure group whose main objective was to have Cornish difference accepted and to promote the Cornish language, cultural traditions and flag. By maintaining a non-party and neutral identity, the MK hoped to gain the support of the traditional political parties. However, in the 1960s the MK decided to change its strategy. After a century of out-migration, the population in Cornwall started to expand as Cornwall became a popular place to settle by people who wanted to get away from the over-populated and industrialized areas of other parts of the UK. These changes created a “direct threat” to Cornwall and led to the transformation in 1964 of the MK into a political party, which then entered local elections. We did not, however, come across evidence that self-determination as we define it was at the agenda yet. Minahan (2002: 483) notes that Cornish nationalists began to make autonomy demands in 1973, when the United Kingdom entered the European Community (EC). Hence, 1973 is coded as the start date. Cornish nationalists appear to have continued to demand an autonomous status similar to neighboring Wales and Scotland (Minahan 2002: 484). MK remains an active part of politics as of 2012, advocating Cornish autonomy. Thus the movement is coded as ongoing. We found no evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


**Summary**

In 1974, the former New Freedom Party changed its name to the English National Party (ENP). The ENP made claims for a devolved English parliament. We found no evidence that the ENP’s predecessor, the New Freedom Party, had also made separatist claims, thus 1974 is coded as start date. The ENP ran in the 1974 and 1979 General Elections, but got limited support. In 1976 it had an MP (John Stonehouse) during a short interlude, a former Labour MP that was excluded from Labour due to criminal charges (he had faked his own death!). The ENP did not stand a candidate in the by-election that followed when Stonehouse had to step back. According to Inman (2007), the English Nationalist Party was dissolved in 1981. We code an end to the first phase in 1981. There were some activities in the rest of the 1980s and until the mid-1990s, but support was very limited. Specifically, in 1984 Edwin Shenton, who associated himself with the defunct English National Party, ran in a by-election for the English National Party and in 1991 the ENP was refounded and contested a couple of elections, but does not appear to have had any substantial support. Only in the late 1990s significant contention re-emerged. In 1998 the Campaign for an English Parliament (CEP) was formed, thus 1998 is coded as the second start date. The CEP is not a political party but a pressure group that favors devolution and lobbies for the establishment of an English Parliament. The group emerged in response to the program for asymmetrical devolution by the Labour government that devolved power to assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (Bryant 2008: 665). The CEP is supported by the English Democrats (ED), a political party that was founded in 1999 (under the name of the English National Party) and renamed the English Democrats in 2002, and the England First Party, another English nationalist party that had been formed in 2004 (Hazell 2006: 54). ED proposed a devolved English Parliament, but also made claims for an independent England. Together with the CEP, the party launched the English Constitutional Convention (ECC) in 2004. The convention demanded English parity as a distinct nation within the UK, the recognition of statehood for England, equality as a culturally and historically distinct nation and fair funding in comparison with other parts of the United Kingdom (Bryant 2008: 671). ED has a very small number of members (1,036 in February 2007), little visibility in British public life and polled a total of a mere 15,149 votes in the 2005 General Election (Mellows-Facer 2005: 91). The demand for a devolved English government has gained renewed relevance in the context of Scotland’s 2014 independence referendum (e.g. The Economist 2014). The England First Party was de-registered in 2012, but both the ED and the CEP continue to be active. Note that the CEP is significantly more relevant than the ED/England First have ever been, given the latters’ poor electoral performance and the fact that parts of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) have begun to support the CEP (e.g. MEP Paul Nuttall, see paulnuttallmep.com 2014). Note as well that parts of the Tories now promote the English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) idea by which non-English MPs would be stopped voting on English matters in Westminster. Based on this, we code the movement as ongoing. No separatist violence was found; hence the entire movement is coded with NVIOLSD.
Sources:


Orkney Islanders

Summary: Minahan (2002: 1465) notes that nationalist organizations demanding autonomy began to mobilize during the 1970s. Since we were unable to find a more specific date when nationalist organizations were founded, we (somewhat arbitrarily) code 1975 as the start date. The Orkneys are rich in oil; increased local control over natural resources is at the core of the movement’s demands. Also, Orkney islanders have opposed coming under Scottish control in the context of the first Scottish devolution referendum in 1979, as well as the second in 1997. According to Minahan (2002: 1467), the movement has been ongoing as of his writing; hence, we code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


**Scots**

**Summary:** Scotland voluntarily entered into a union with the United Kingdom in 1707. But the decision to unionize did not go unopposed; some Highland clans, in particular, were against and rose in support of the Stuart in rebellions in 1708, 1715, and 1745-1746. Following the unsuccessful 1745/1746 rebellion, the British government began assimilationist policies; in particular, the Gaelic language was banned (Minahan 2002: 1689). What continues to be the main vehicle of Scottish nationalism, the Scottish National Party (SNP), was formed in 1934 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 265). Note: according to Minahan (2002: 1690), the SNP was formed in 1928, which is not correct. However, there were Scottish nationalist organizations that predate the SNP. In 1886, the Scottish Home Rule Association was formed, the first organization we found. The Scottish Home Rule movement continued to be active until WWI, when the idea was dropped (BBC; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 309). But soon after WWI, Scottish nationalist agitation resumed. In 1921, the Scots National League was formed, and in 1927 the Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association. In 1928 they combined to form the National Party of Scotland. In 1934 the National Party merged with the Scottish Party (formed in 1934) and formed the SNP (see SNP website; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 265). All these organizations made claims for increased Scottish self-determination in one or the other way. According to Minahan (2002: 1690), the nationalist cause was briefly put aside during WWII, but agitation continued seamlessly after the war. The SNP remained a fringe party until the 1970s. Its popularity increased after the discovery of oil off Scotland’s coast in 1971 according to Minahan (2002: 1690). The SNP, of course, continues to exist and has become the major player in the Scottish devolved government that exists since 2000. Non-zero MAR protest scores for 1945-2006 also indicate that the movement has been consistently active since 1945. In the 2014 independence referendum, Scots voted against independence, but the SNP has received a major boost and now looks stronger than ever. Based on this, we code movement activity from 1945, the earliest possible date in the data set, and note prior activity. The first evidence for organized agitation we found was in 1886, and there has been continuous activity since then with the exception of the two World Wars (see above). Since the interruptions were shorter than ten years, these are covered by our ten years rule and we peg the start date to 1886. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification; we also indicate that prior activity was non-violent.

**Sources:**

BBC. “Early Scottish History and the Union.” [April 29, 2015].


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [April 11, 2002].

Lexis Nexis. [December 10, 2013].


Shetland Islanders

**Summary:** The discovery of oil in the North Sea off the coast of the islands spurred the formation of the self-determination movement, which has demanded autonomy and separate legal status. According to Minahan (2002: 1706), the idea of autonomous government emerged in the early 1960s, but only in the 1970s began the Shetlanders to mobilize for autonomy. Minahan does not provide an exact date, hence and somewhat arbitrarily, we peg the start date to 1975. In 1979 Shetlanders threatened secession. However, no formal organized movement was found in the early 2000s, but with the Scottish independence referendum of 2013 approaching, Shetland leaders again put forward their demands for more self-determination (Guardian 2012). We hence code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

**Sources:**


**Welsh**

**Summary:** In 1536 England formally annexed Wales (Act of Union). The Welsh language was banned from official proceedings and English made the official language. Welsh laws were replaced by English laws in the Laws in Wales Acts of 1535 and 1542 (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002: 2049). After a long period of dormancy, organized Welsh nationalism emerged in the mid-1880s when Cymru Fydd (Young Wales) was formed. However, the Welsh national movement collapsed in 1896, and another period of relative dormancy followed (BBC; Morgan 1981: 118). Some activity continued until WWI, but
“[I]ong before 1914, it was obvious that Welsh political separatism, in such striking contrast to the vitality of cultural nationalism, was quite moribund” (Morgan 1981: 119). Welsh separatism re-emerged in the 1920s. In 1924, two Welsh organizations were formed, Byddin Ymreolwyr Cymru (the Army of Welsh Home Rulers, a party that favored home rule for Wales) and Y Mudiad Cymreig (The Welsh Movement, focused on language) (Morgan 1981: 206). In 1925, they combined to form Plaid Cymru, the party that continues to be the major vehicle of Welsh nationalism to date (Minahan 2002: 2049-2051). Plaid Cymru remained a marginal force in the immediate post-WWII phase, but it has contested all elections to the Westminster parliament since 1945 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 237, 317). In 1966 Plaid Cymru gained its first seat in Westminster (Minahan 2000: 2050). In 1979 Welsh voters rejected a home rule proposal. After a 1997 referendum, Wales was finally granted a devolved government. Based on this, we code movement activity from 1945, the earliest possible date in our data set, but note prior activity. The start date we peg to 1924 in line with the above narrative. We found no reports of separatist violence above the low-level violence threshold (there were some terrorist acts in the late 1960s but the threshold is not crossed, see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 318-319), hence we classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD and also note prior non-violent activity.

Sources:


UNITED STATES

Africans

Summary: The Republic of New Africa (RNA), an African-American separatist group, was founded in 1968, hence the start date of the movement. It called for an independent black nation to be carved out of the states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina and Mississippi. In 1971, 150 members of the group purchased twenty acres of farmland in Mississippi and declared it the capital of the Republic of New Africa. The Africans-Americans’ MAR quinquennial rebellion score is 4 from 1965-1969. According to the MAR group notes: “[p]olitical protests by the group began in the 1950s (PROT50X = 3), escalated during the civil rights debates, and eventually lead to more militant activity during the late 1960s and early 1970s by groups such as the Black Panthers (REBEL65X = 3).” This would suggest a LVIOLSD code; however, case study evidence suggests that while RNA members were involved in a series of shootouts with police and FBI agents, the violence does not appear to qualify as LVIOLSD, hence the classification of the movement as NVIOLSD. We do not find evidence of separatist activity beyond 1974, and hence code the end of the movement as 1984 in accordance with the ten-year rule.

Sources:

Alaskans

Summary: The Alaskan Independence Party was formed in 1984, hence the start date of the movement. The Alaskan Independence Party’s goal is to have what they claim is the vote Alaskans were entitled to in 1958, a choice among the following four alternatives: remain a territory, become a separate and independent nation, accept commonwealth status, or become a state. While some separatist movements in US states are not political organizations, in 1990 Alaskans elected a governor who campaigned on a secessionist platform. The party continues to operate in Alaska as of 2012. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
**American Virgin Islanders**

*Summary:* The U.S. bought the American Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917. In 1927 the American Virgin Islanders gained U.S. citizenship. In 1948 American Virgin Islanders voted on a range of constitutional changes, including the introduction of a locally elected executive (which was rejected). In 1953 American Virgin Islanders again voted on a series of constitutional changes, including the introduction of a locally elected executive and a non-voting delegate to Congress (this time both proposals passed). In 1954 the American Virgin Islands were granted some more autonomy (Minahan 2002: 508), however, local gubernatorial elections were introduced only in 1969. In 1972 they were granted a non-voting delegate to Congress. Between 1988 and 1993, the U.S. Congress amended the American Virgin Islands’ Organic Act’ so that the regional authorities can organize a vote on the Islands’ future status. Originally scheduled for 1989, the vote was postponed several times and finally held in 1993. The vote offered the following options: complete integration with the U.S. (statehood or incorporated territory), continued (i.e. status quo) or enhanced territorial status with the United States, and independence (free association or independence). More than 80% opted for continued or enhanced territorial status and only 5% for independence or free association upon a low turnout. In order for the vote to be binding, more than 50% would have needed to turn out. Thus the vote remained without direct consequences. Also, a planned run-off between the two winning options became obsolete (c2d 2011). The American Virgin Islands have one of the region’s highest per capita incomes, stemming mainly from tourism and off-shore banking. According to Minahan (2002: 509), this has effectively precluded widespread support for independence or any other change in the islands’ status due to the higher tax rates this would entail and potential negative knock-on effects on the local tourism industry. However, even if a majority rejects any change to the status quo there is a small self-determination movement in the American Virgin Islands (Minahan 2002: 509). The first evidence for organized activity we found is in 1968, when the Independent Citizens Movement was formed, a party calling for increased autonomy for the American Virgin Islanders. Minahan (2002: 509) reports that approximately a third of voters opted for the Independent Citizens Movement in the 1986 elections, “which questioned present ties to the U.S. government and tapped into black discontent at not sharing in the prosperity of the white and mulatto populations.” The Independent Citizens Movement has remained active to date; from 1975-1987 the movement supplied the Islands’ governor, from 1995-1997 it supplied the Islands’ delegate to Congress and in the 2014 regional parliamentary elections it won one of fifteen seats. Based on this we code the start date in 1968. Note that the movement is coded only from 1972 in the data set as 1972 is the year the American Virgin Islands gained a non-voting delegate to Congress and thus ceased to be a colony according to our definition. We note prior non-violent activity. We found no separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


**Chamorros**

*Summary:* The Chamorros mainly live in the Marianas Islands (Guam and Northern Mariana Islands). Guam became part of the U.S. in 1898 and the Northern Mariana Islands after the Second World War, initially as a UN-mandated territory and, as of 1978, as a U.S. Commonwealth. Minahan (2002: 422) suggests that the Chamorros self-determination movement emerged only in the 1970s when he notes that the Chamorros were affected “by the nationalism sweeping the Pacific in the 1970s and 1980s” and
thus “began a concerted effort to revive their flagging culture and began to demand greater self-government, including political and economic autonomy.” While this suggests a start date in the 1970s, there is some grounds to code the start date already in the 1940s. The status question is looming in the Marianas for a long time. Until about the 1970s, the main motive of Chamorros activity was closer association and integration into the U.S. – which we do not code. However, gaining a higher extent of autonomy has also played a role. Guampedia, a relatively rich source, notes that Guam’s status has been an issue ever since the 1898 annexation. Already in the early 20th century, Guam leaders according to this source had petitioned the U.S. government for increased autonomy and civil rights. According to Guampedia, these efforts were again taken up after the Second World War, when in the late 1940s the reopened Guam Congress petitioned the U.S. Congress for an Organic Act, which would give Guamanians limited self-government and U.S. citizenship. In 1950, the U.S. indeed granted Guam an Organic Act. In the 1950s, the Northern Marians also petitioned for an Organic Act. In 1958, the Northern Marianas voted on unification with Guam, implying incorporation into the U.S. and a higher extent of self-government, in what was an unofficial referendum. Similar unofficial referendums were held in 1961, 1963, and 1969. The Northern Marianas’ demand was rejected. Note: In 1969 Guam also voted on reunification. However, the Guamanians rejected reunification. Given Guam’s rejection, the Northern Marianas now aimed at a separate status with maximal self-government, though keeping the aim of a close association with the U.S. In 1972, the Northern Marianas created a status commission tasked to negotiate with the U.S. In 1973 also Guam established a status commission; Guamanians were unhappy that the Northern Marians were offered a better political status that involved both a higher extent of integration with the U.S. and more autonomy. In 1976 Northern Marianas was offered Commonwealth status; implementation followed in 1978. Despite multiple attempts at finding a solution, Guam’s status question has remained unresolved to this date. In 1973 the United Nations had called on the United States to organize a vote on Guam’s future status. A majority voted for an “improved status quo”, which appears to mean increased autonomy but continued union with the U.S. In a 1982 referendum, a majority of Guamanians opted for Commonwealth status as well and thus for a status similar to Puerto Rico or the Northern Marianas (Minahan 2002: 422). According to Minahan (2002: 423) the Guamanians repeated their pledge for commonwealth status when President Clinton visited the island in 1998. In 2001 nationalists again reiterated their demands for the return of traditional islands. Furthermore, he notes that demands for commonwealth status, possibly in union with the Northern Marianas, are gaining support in the early 2000s. In 2007, “[r]epresentatives from the group, Nation Chamorro, and other activists appeared before the UN Committee on Decolonisation last week pushing for the U.S. to address Guam's self-determination aspirations” (Radionz.co.nz 2007). In sum, there is activity that can be interpreted as (partially) involving self-determination since the late 1940s. In the initial years, the focus was more on closer ties with the U.S., though increased self-government also played a role. In recent years, self-determination claims appear to originate mainly from the Chamorros in Guam, though Minahan (2002: 423) reports that the Chamorros in the Northern Marianas Islands have also protested for increased autonomy. Based on this, we code the start date in 1948 (we lack a clearer indication but the above narrative suggests an onset after WWII and in the late 1940s). Note: we consider Guam a colony until 1972 and the Northern Marianas Islands until 1978 (or possibly 1986): i) the Guamanians gained citizenship in 1950 and a (non-voting) delegate to congress in 1972 (Minahan 2002: 422) while ii) the Northern Marianas, formerly a mandated territory, gained a status similar to Puerto Rico in 1978 and are thus an integral part of the U.S. beyond that (though Minahan 2002: 422 reports that the Northern Marianas gained citizenship only in 1986). Since we do not include anti-colonial movements in our data set, we only code the movement from 1972. It is pegged as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, and thus classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD and note prior non-violent activity.

Sources:
Cherokee

Summary: The main Cherokee organization advocating increased self-government was formed in 1948. Thus we peg the start date to 1948. Given evidence of continued separatist activity we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. We find no evidence of violent activity, and thus we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Chicanos

Summary: At a 1969 Chicano Youth Liberation Conference attended by more than 1,500 Chicano militants, the demand was made that most of the southwestern United States become the independent country of “Aztlan”. Since this appears to have been the first instance of separatist activity, we peg the start date of the movement at 1969. The document defined Aztlan to include most of the territory lost to Mexico through the Treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo in 1848 and before (i.e. Colorado, New Mexico, California, Arizona and parts of Texas). Several organizations continue to voice this demand: the Alianza Federal de Pueblas Libres and the Movimento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlan. These movements have continued to be active at least up to 2012. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
**Dine (Navajo)**

*Summary:* The Coalition for Dine Liberation was formed in 1977, hence the start date of the movement. Based on Minahan (2002), the Navajo lost legal appeals to retain lands in 2001. There have been subsequent protests over land rights and water rights almost every year, thus the movement is coded as ongoing. There have been no fatalities, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 25, 2002].


**Hawaiians**

*Summary:* The origin of Hawaiian nationalist movement is in the cultural revival of the 1960s and 1970s. There are many groups representing the Hawaiians and their many demands, which range from more autonomy in certain areas to complete independence. The main groups include: The Ohana Council, Ka Lahui Hawaii, Ha Hawaii, Ka Pakaukau, and the Native Hawaiian Advisory Council. News reports indicate that the first separatist activity appears to have occurred in 1974, when there were various strikes on sugar plantations. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1974. In 1987 a separatist organization, Ka Lahui Hawaii’I, was established. The movement makes claims for the return of land and the encouragement of the Hawaiian language (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 122). In 1991 nationalists asserted that the Hawaiians are citizens of a sovereign nation, subverted and annexed illegally by the US and in 1997, on the anniversary of the US annexation of Hawaii, the state governor called upon Hawaiians to “advance a plan for Hawaiian sovereignty.” The Hawaiian Kingdom Government continues to claim that Hawaii is under occupation, and aims for secession as of 2012. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.
Iroquois

Summary: A growing demand for Native American rights and for redress of past injustices merged with the liberation philosophy of the 1960s to produce Red Power. Specifically, in 1977 Iroquois representatives presented a petition to the seeking that the Iroquois Confederacy, a political unit that predates both Canada and the US, be recognized as a sovereign nation. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1977. Passports issued by representative of the Haudenosaunee government have been honored by dozens of nations as of 2012. We found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:
**Lakota (Sioux)**

*Summary:* In 1964 a small group of Sioux demonstrated on Alcatraz, demanding that the island be returned to the Sioux. This is the first incidence of organized separatist activity we found, thus 1964 is coded as the movement’s start date. In 1969 a larger group of Sioux occupied Alcatraz. The occupation lasted for 19 months and was forcibly ended by the U.S. government, though without casualties. In 1973 hundreds of Lakota activists occupied Wounded Knee and held out for seventy days. In 1991 the Lakota Sioux Nation declared its independence from the United States and in 1994 it became part of the Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization. In 2007 and in 2012, the Lakota Sioux Nation declared its independence from the United States once again. The MAR quinquennial rebellion score of the Native Americans is 3 in 1970-1974. From the MAR coding notes it is not clear to which group(s) this should be attributed: “[t]he group [i.e., the Native Americans] began protesting their condition in the late 1940s (PROT45X = 1). During the 1970s the protests took on militant tones (REBEL70X = 3), but recently this type of protest has not been seen (REB01-06 = 0).” However, MAR likely refers to the 1973 Wounded Knee incident (a protest joined mostly by Sioux) and some of its follow-ups. Both sides were armed in the Wounded Knee incident and it involved frequent shootings, but violence was too limited to warrant a LVIOLSD code. Two persons, a Lakota and a Cherokee were killed. In addition, a civil rights activist has gone missing. After the incident, more than 60 opponents of the local tribal government’s were reportedly murdered, but this is not violence over self-determination. Furthermore, in 1975 Pine Ridge (the site of the 1973 incident) became the site of a shootout in which two FBI officers and one Indian rights activist were killed. Again, this is too limited to warrant a LVIOLSD code. We find no other evidence of violent activity, and thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 25, 2002].


**Pueblos**

*Summary:* First evidence of the All Indian Pueblo Council (AIPC) dates back to 1598, when there were still more than seventy-five Pueblo villages, inhabited by around 248,000 people, occupying 87,000
square miles in New Mexico and Arizona. In the twentieth century, the AIPC (called All Pueblo Council APC before 1965) pushed for land rights and managed to get the favorable Pueblo Land Act passed in 1924. According to Walden (2011: 6), “there are many moments that can be pointed to as the beginning of the AIPC” but it was only in the 1920s when the APC “formalized itself as the official representative confederate council of all of the New Mexico Pueblos” (Walden 2011: 17). A formative moment was the struggle against the Bursum Bill of 1922 which would have authorized the acquisition of Pueblo lands. Based on this, we code 1922 as the start date of the movement. Since our data set starts only in 1945, we code the movement from 1945. We found no separatist violence before 1945, and thus code prior non-violent activity. Land rights continued to be the primary purpose of the organization and in 1975, after a 30-year struggle, the AIPC succeeded in regaining its sacred Blue Lake and 55,000 acres of surrounding land. The autonomous pueblos, which have shrunk to nineteen, adopted a formal constitution in 1970 (Sandercock 1998: 213). In addition to land rights and in the light of a resurgence of Pueblo culture and religion in the 1980s and 1990s, the pueblos also demanded “greater autonomy and the recognition of their historical sovereignty” (Minahan 2002: 1528). This demand is confirmed by Walden (2011: 78), who also states that the pueblos push for more self-determination. The AIPC continues to be active, thus we code the movement as ongoing. No separatist violence was found; hence the entire movement is coded with NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Puerto Ricans

Summary: Puerto Rico had been a Spanish colony until 1898, when it was ceded to the U.S. In the early 19th century, independence movements mushroomed across Latin America; Puerto Rico, where no independence movement (yet) developed, was the exception to the rule (Encyclopedia Britannica). The first stirrings of an independence movement came only somewhat later. The first evidence of organized activity we found is in 1867, when the Revolutionary Committee was formed, a group committed to Puerto Rican and Cuban independence. In 1868 the Committee declared the independence of Puerto Rico. The poorly planned revolt was quickly suppressed (Encyclopedia Britannica). The movement re-emerged in the 1880s and has since been active more or less constantly: Encyclopedia Britannica reports that Román Baldorioty de Castro led a movement for Puerto Rican autonomy during the 1880s. In 1887 de Castro co-founded the Autonomist Party, which supported autonomy from the Spanish government (the party’s date of formation is 1897 according to Encyclopedia Britannica, but this appears to be wrong; most other sources note 1887; moreover, de Castro died in 1889 and he is said to have co-founded the party according to multiple sources, including Britannica). As this is the earliest evidence for (continued and uninterrupted) organized separatist activity we found (that carried over to the post-WWII phase), 1887 is coded as start date. The movement has continued to be active since. Independence for Puerto Rico ranged among the aims of the insurgents in the 1895-1898 Cuban War of Independence, though we found
no evidence that the Puerto Ricans also participated in the Cuban War (see Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 270-271). In 1899 the Federal Party was formed, which supported greater autonomy from the U.S. In 1904, the Union Party was formed, an advocate of greater self-government for the island. Shortly before the turnover, there had been a local uprising against Spanish rule. The 1900 Foraker Act gave Puerto Rico a certain degree of autonomy, including a popularly elected House of Representatives. In 1914 the Puerto Rican parliament voted unanimously for independence, but this was rejected. In 1917 Puerto Ricans were granted U.S. citizenship. In 1922 the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party was formed (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 20). A number of other pro-independence or pro-autonomy parties were formed in subsequent years, including the Liberal Party of Puerto Rico (founded in 1932). Among the most notable is the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP), which was founded in 1946 with the purpose of seeking and obtaining independence for Puerto Rico (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 240). The PIP is committed to achieving Puerto Rico’s national freedom and laying the foundation for a sound, responsible transition from the present-day “colonial” government to full-fledged independence. Note: in the our data set, we begin to code the Puerto Ricans in 1952, when the Puerto Ricans were given a delegate to Congress (who can vote in committees but not in the House). Before, we consider the Puerto Rican movement a decolonization movement. UCDP/PRIO notes a low-level armed conflict between the U.S. government and the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party in 1950. However, we found no violence in 1951 and thus note prior non-violent activity. The PIP continues to be active as of 2012. There was a Puerto Rican terrorist group called the Macheteros which in 1979 killed two U.S. sailors and staged a number of bombing attacks (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 179-180), but the LVIOLSD threshold was not crossed in any year. Hence a NVIOLSD classification for the entire movement.

Sources:
Southerners

Summary: The League of the South is a separatist organization with chapters in all states of the ex-Confederacy and a membership of over 6,000. It was founded in 1994, hence the start of the movement. The League wants to secede from the United States and in its “New Dixie Manifesto” claims that “America is only a geographical expression.” The movement continues to be active as of 2012 and does not appear to have engaged in any separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

St. Croix

Summary: American Virgin Islands consists of three main islands, St. John, St. Thomas, and St. Croix. In the latter a movement has emerged in recent years that aims to separate the island from American Virgin Islands and gain a separate status. According to Roopnarine (2011), the movement emerged after the turn of the millennium. In 2003 a local newspaper launched a petition drive for St. Croix to separate from American Virgin Islands. This is the earliest evidence for organized separatist activity we found, thus 2003 is coded as the start date. Within a few days, more than 260 people had signed the petition, according to the organizers. The American Virgin Island government was opposed to St. Croix’s proposed separate status. The local governor said that the petition is “divisive and will not get off the ground anyway”, but that he would support a constitutional reform that would give St. Croix limited self-governance within the framework of American Virgin Islands (Cole 2003; Associated Press State & Local Wire 2003). In 2005 activists presented their proposal to Washington D.C. officials. The American Virgin Islanders’ delegate to Congress, Donna Christian-Christensen, supported the move, while the local governor, Charles Turnbull, was opposed (Buchanan 2005). In 2008 a round table was organized in Puerto Rico on St. Croix’s secession movement. We found no reports of organized activity beyond 2008, but code an ongoing movement based on the ten-years inactivity rule. We found no separatist violence and thus code the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
Texans

Summary: The Republic of Texas Interim Government was established in 1995, hence the start date of the movement. Subsequently, the Texas Nationalist Movement (TNM) evolved from the Republic of Texas Interim Government and it remains active in 2013. Thus, the movement is coded as ongoing. The Republic of Texas Movement, which also claims that Texas was illegally annexed by the United States in 1845, was involved shootout between state police and members of the group occurred in 1997 when the group took two hostages and demanded that arrested members of the group be released. One person was killed in the shootout, but as that does not meet our criteria of LVIOLSD, we classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:

Vermont

Summary: The Second Vermont Republic was founded in 2003. The movement's name harks back to the first Vermont Republic, which existed from 1777 to 1791 (when Vermont joined the Union). It has termed itself a “nonviolent citizens’ movement” for the independence of the state of Vermont. Based on this, the start date is pegged at 2003. The movement is not very well known outside of Vermont’s borders, but at least nine candidates in the 2010 state elections spoke out in favor of Vermont’s secession, and can thus be attributed to the movement. Peter Garritano, who ran for Lieutenant Governor as an independent candidate on a secession platform, garnered 8,267 votes (3.7%). The Vermont movement’s monthly newspaper has a circulation of around 10,000. In 2007 a statewide poll found that 13% of Vermont’s population support secession. The Washington Times calls the Vermont movement the most active and strongest secessionist movement in the US. The Second Vermont Republic held a statewide convention in 2012. The movement remains ongoing in 2012. We find no evidence of violent activity, and thus we code the movement as NVIOLSD.

Sources:
Karakalpaks

Summary: Karakalpak nationalists advocating autonomy began to organize in 1989 (thus still under Soviet rule) and in 1990 the Karakalpak government declared the republic an independent state (see Karakalpaks under Russia). The Karakalpak movement remained active when Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991. We code the Karakalpak self-determination movement as of 1991, but note prior nonviolent activity. Karakalpak was given autonomous status in 1993. Since then, “[m]ore nationalistic Karakalpaks demanded that the republic be given full independence, but such demands have been restrained by the fact that Uzbeks control the flow of water to Karakalpakstan” (Minority Rights Group International). The Free Karakalpakstan National Revival Party continues to advocate separatism, although the government denies such allegations. The movement is coded as ongoing. No violence arose from this organization. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:

Uzbek Tajiks

Summary: The Tajik movement in Uzbekistan emerged when Uzbekistan was still part of the Soviet Union (see Uzbek Tajiks under Russia). The first report of separatist activity by Tajiks in Uzbekistan we found is in 1988, when in demonstrations in Samarakand and Bukhara (two mainly Tajik cities in Uzbekistan) demands were raised that majority Tajik regions be united with Tajikistan (Melvin 2000: 50). In November 1989, a meeting was organized by citizens of the Tajik region of Samarkand, where claims were raised for the autonomy of Tajiks in Uzbekistan, for the removal of borders between Bukhara and Samarkand, and for the establishment of an autonomous republic by the name of Sogdiana. The movement remained active in independent Uzbekistan. However, in 1992, the movement began to disintegrate when its leaders were arrested, and little has been heard from the movement ever since (MAR). We code the Tajiks in Uzbekistan as of 1991 but note prior nonviolent activity. As the last noted separatist activity was in 1992, the end of the movement is coded as 2002 following our ten-year rule (we apply the ten-year rule since the movement appears to have continued for some time after the 1992 crackdown, but with limited visibility). We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.
Sources:


VANUATU

Vemerans

Summary: The term “Vemerans” refers to Melanesians located in the northern islands of Vanuatu (Minahan 2002: 1981). Already before Vanuatu’s independence in 1980, Na-Griamel was formed by Jimmy (Moli) Stevens, a party advocating autonomy for Vanuatu’s north and land rights. The exact date of formation is not known. The earliest evidence of existence is in 1965 when the movement was officialized (Tabani 2008: 336). Thus 1965 is coded as start date. December 27, 1975, Vemeran separatists declared the independence of the Na-Griamel Federation (Minahan 2002: 1984; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 313). According to Minahan (2002: 1984), “[t]he breakaway state was ended by colonial troops, and the region was reintegrated into the New Hebrides in 1977.” The 1979 constitution recognized French language rights (many Vemerans speak French as their secondary language). In November 1979, Na-Griamel lost its majority in the Espiritu Santo Regional Assembly, which led to riots (Minahan 2002: 1984). Na-Griamel supporters attacked government offices and took the British district commissioner hostage. Vanuatu attained independence in late June 1980, thus we code the movement from 1980. We found no casualty estimates for the 1975-1977 and 1979 incidents. It appears unlikely that the death toll exceeded 25, however (see Tabani 2008: 344). Thus we note prior non-violent activity. Shortly before independence, in early 1980, Vemeran leaders again declared independence (Minahan 2002: 1984 dates the declaration to May 25, while Tabani 2008: 342 dates it to January). Both Minahan and Tabani indicate that the revolt was financed by a U.S.-based company (Phoenix Corporation) that aimed to set up a tax-free haven. The secessionist challenge was met with brute force. According to Minahan (2002: 1984), “[t]he new prime minister appealed to the United Nations for help in maintaining Vanuatu’s territorial integrity. Other Pacific states, fearing secessionist groups in their own countries, sent troops to aid the new Vanuatu government. Nearby Papua-New Guinea sent 150 troops, the British sent Royal Marines, and the French provided a contingent of policy. In July 1980 the British and French forces were withdrawn amid increasing violence and several clashes with the Vemeran rebels […] Jimmy Stevens and other Vemerans were captured by Papuan troops in late July 1980, and the rebellion was effectively ended. Over 700 rebels fled to French New Caledonia, and some 1,000 people were eventually arrested. Stevens was tried and sentenced to 14 years in prison. Other Vemeran leaders were imprisoned and deported.” We could not find evidence for the 1980 episode, but again it appears unlikely that the 25 deaths threshold was met (Tabani 2008: 342-344). Subsequently Na-Griamel was turned into a regional political party which represented the interests of the francophone northern islands. According to Minahan (2002: 1985), Ni-Griamel “fielded candidates in regional and national elections from 1983, winning considerable support with demands for regional autonomy and greater control of cultural and economic aspects.” In the late 1980s, Vanuatu installed a federal system of government “to preempt renewed support for separatism in the northern islands” (Minahan 2002: 1985). However, in the 1980s and the 1990s, Na-Griamel “continued to represent the Vemeran secessionist sentiment against the increasingly left-leaning government of Vanuatu […] the Vemeran demands for greater autonomy were repeated in the mid-1990s” (Minahan 2002: 1985). Tabani (2008) confirms that Na-Griamel remained active as a political party but adds that the party had very little success. Na-Griamel continues to be active as of 2012; in the 2011 general elections Na-Griamel scored two seats. We found no evidence of separatist violence except for the 1975-1977, 1979 and 1980 episodes, which appear not to have crossed the LVIOLD threshold. Thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


*Note: Vanuatu’s population is less than 500,000. Movements in countries with a population of less than 500,000 are not included in the random draw.*
**VENEZUELA**

**Indigenous Peoples**

*Summary:* Venezuela’s Indigenous Peoples refers to around 28 groups mainly living in the southern state of Amazonas and in the western state of Zulia. According to the 2001 census, 2.1 per cent of the population belongs to indigenous groups which, among others, include the Wayuú, Yekuana, Anu, Yanomami, Warao, Karina, Pemon, Bari and Yukpa (Minority Rights Group International). Only four of these groups have more than 10,000 members (Minorities at Risk Project). In the early 1970s indigenous groups started to mobilize. In 1972 meetings and conferences took place and they started the process of setting up indigenous organizations in different parts of the country (Laboratorio de Paz 2014: 4). The first indigenous organization was the Indigenous Federation of Bolivar (FIB), founded in 1973 (Van Cott 2011b: 5; Laboratorio de Paz 2014: 5). These organizations made a number of claims, ranging from the socio-economic over the cultural to the political, including “self-determination” and local control of natural resources (Laboratorio de Paz 2014: 5). 1972 is coded as start date because, as noted above, the first meeting and conferences took place in that year 1972. Initially, mobilization was confined to the regional level. In 1989 the first national indigenous organization (Consejo Nacional Indio de Venezuela, CONIVE) was founded. Apart from political participation (proportional representation, ethnic quotas), land rights and protection of indigenous culture, CONIVE also claims „politico-territorial autonomy” (Van Cott 2001a) and has “focused on greater implementation of their constitutional rights of self-determination by strengthening economic and political autonomy” (Minorities at Risk Project). The claim for autonomy is confirmed by the Minorities at Risk Project which codes the indigenous peoples in Venezuela with SEPX=3, indicating an active movement. In 1992, the Amazonian region – formerly a Federal Territory – became an “independent” state with a 43% indigenous population – the largest proportion of any state (Van Cott 2001b: 6). The movement is ongoing. Minorities at Risk, for instance, notes that “[l]and disputes still exist” despite a generally more accommodative stance of the Venezuelan government since the 1990s. MAR furthermore notes that “[i]n recent years, indigenous groups have focused on greater implementation of their constitutional rights of self-determination by strengthening economic and political autonomy.” In 2010, CONIVE won a seat in the national parliamentary elections. We found no evidence for separatist violence above the LVIOLSD threshold, thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. Note: Laboratorio de Paz (2014: 6) reports two Guaranis being killed by army troops in 1993.

*Sources:*


Zulians

Summary: Zulia is one of Venezuela’s states, located in Venezuela’s north-west. Zulia has considerable oil wealth and is one of the areas where opposition against Chavez’s leftist regime has been strongest. Zulia was incorporated into colonial Venezuela in 1777 (Minahan 2002: 2110). Zulian leaders advocated a separate Zulian entity already under colonial rule. According to Minahan (2002: 2110), “[a] Zulian leader, José Domingo de Rus, attempted to persuade the Spanish authorities to form a separate captaincy-general of Maracaibo [the capital of Zulia], which would include parts of modern Venezuela and Colombia.” Furthermore, “[t]he first attempt to form an independent Zulian republic began with a revolt against the Spanish authorities during the Venezuelan war of independence. On 28 January 1821, Zulian leaders in Maracaibo declared the region free and independent of the Spanish government and created a democratic, sovereign republic.” The self-declared Zulian republic opted for inclusion in the new Venezuelan state in 1830. Other parts of the Zulian homeland were merged with Colombia. Minahan (2002: 2111) reports two more secessionist attempts in the context of the Federal War (1858-1863) and another in 1916 after the discovery of oil in 1912-1913. According to Minahan (2002: 2111) separatist sentiment continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s. He notes that the threat of secession was often used to elicit concessions from Caracas. In the 1940s and 1950s, Zulia’s autonomy was eroded by two centralizing governments (Minahan 2002: 2112). Minahan (2002: 2112) reports that Zulian identity was rediscovered in the 1970s, but he does not give evidence of any organized separatist activity. Minahan (2002: 2112) also reports that nationalist feelings rose in the 1990s, but again Minahan does not report any organized separatist activity. The 1999 constitution pushed for by Hugo Chavez eroded provincial autonomy. Furthermore Chavez proposed to include Zulia in a new, expanded Falcon (another Venezuelan state), but this proposal has not been implemented. Under Chavez, a Zulian autonomy movement evolved. Petras (2009: 122), for instance, reports that “[t]he success of the secessionist regional ruling class in Bolivia has encouraged similar “autonomy movements” in Ecuador and Venezuela, led by the mayor of Guayaquil (Ecuador) and Governor of Zulia (Venezuela).” El Universal (2006) reports an autonomy proposal by the Zulian state. Suggett (2008) reports that Zulia’s state legislature proposed an autonomy regime in 2008, inspired by the unilateral autonomy referendums in Bolivia’s media luna, another oil-rich region opposed to a left-wing regime. Suggett mentions a number of “autonomy advocacy groups”, including Zulia’s Own Course (Rumbo Propio Para Zulia) and also notes that Zulia’s governor, Manuel Rosales, is a strong advocate of regional autonomy. The autonomy movement met the strong opposition of the Chavez regime, which depicted it at an attempt to destabilize the country. Whitney (2008) reports that Zulia’s separatist aspirations were pioneered by a group called Rumbo Propio Para Zulia (Own Path for Zulia) and that Manual Rosales, who was elected Zulia’s governor in 2000, has long been a supporter of the autonomy cause. We could not establish Rumbo Propio’s date of formation. A 2006 U.S. cable reports about Rumbo Propio and its campaign for a referendum on autonomy, but notes that the group “seems to have come out of nowhere” and goes as far as suggesting that it is an invention by the Chavez regime (“the timing and focus of the group’s activities dovetail suspiciously well with Bolivarian propaganda”). It does not appear that Rumbo Propio was an invention by Chavez, however, and there are other Zulian autonomist organizations, including Pais Zuliano. Pais Zuliano’s date of formation is also unclear, but they formed a Yahoo group in 2000. Writing in 2002, Minahan (2002: 2113) notes a small but growing nationalist movement that wants increased autonomy and in particular greater control over Zulia’s oil. Based on this, we code the start date in 2000, the earliest evidence we found, which appears to make sense as well because as noted above a primary motive for the autonomist aspirations was opposition against Chavez, who had become president in 1999. While Rosales went into Peruvian exile in 2009, Rumbo Propio appears to be active (they have a Facebook page) but its activities appear much more limited compared to
the mid-2000s. Pais Zuliano appears to be active too. We found no evidence of separatist violence, thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


VIETNAM

Chams

Summary: With the unification of Vietnam and South Vietnam the Chams became part of the unified Vietnam. The Chams’ movement for self-determination, which was active since 1944 (see Chams under South Vietnam), continued to be active in the unified Vietnam until FULRO officially disbanded in 1984. No subsequent Cham movements were found, and thus the end of the movement is coded as 1984. From 1964 onward, the Chams were involved with FULRO. Hence, we code 1975-1979 as LVIOLSD (see Montagnards below) and NVIOLSD from 1980-1984. Note: The movement was involved in LVIOLSD before 1975 (1964-1965), but not immediately prior to 1975. Thus we indicate that prior activity was non-violent.

Sources:

Khmer Krom

Summary: With the unification of Vietnam and South Vietnam the Khmer Krom became part of the unified Vietnam. The Khmer Kroms’ movement for self-determination, which was active since 1955 (see Khmer Krom under South Vietnam), remained active in the unified Vietnam. We code activity from 1975 onwards, the year North and South Vietnam merged. Though the umbrella organization of which the Khmer Krom were part (FULRO) disbanded in 1984, the Khmer Kroms movement remains ongoing as of today. In 1985, the Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation (KKF) was founded as a peaceful organization aiming for the “right to self-determination for the Indigenous Khmer-Krom Peoples in Kampuchea-Krom (Mekong Delta region)”, and continues to be active as of today. From 1964 onward, the Khmer Krom were involved with FULRO. Hence, we code 1975-1979 as LVIOLSD and NVIOLSD from 1980 onward (see Montagnards below). Note: The movement was involved in LVIOLSD before 1975 (1964-1965), but not immediately prior to 1975. Thus we indicate that prior activity was non-violent.

Sources:


Montagnards

Summary: With the unification of Vietnam and South Vietnam the Montagnards became part of the unified Vietnam. The Montagnards’ movement for self-determination, which was active at least since 1958 (see Montagnards under South Vietnam), continued to be active in Vietnam until FULRO officially disbanded in 1984. Thus we begin to code the Montagnards movement in Vietnam as of 1975, though noting that the movement was active already prior to the unification of the two Vietnams. Note: The movement was involved in LVIOLSD before 1975 (1964-1965), but not immediately prior to 1975. Thus we indicate that prior activity was non-violent. We found no subsequent activity after FULRO’s disbandment in 1984, thus the end of the movement is coded as 1984. During the Vietnam War, the Montagnards fought with the United States against the communist north. Despite the fall of Saigon and the withdrawal of US troops in 1975, the Montagnards continued their rebellion against the communist regime, as seen in their MAR anti-government rebellion score of 4 for 1975-79. By 1979 this rebellion subsided to low-level sporadic armed attacks against state authorities. Hence we code 1975-79 as LVIOLSD. The Montagnards movement resumed in 2001 as protests took place in 2001 and 2004 over issues of autonomy, cultural and religious freedom, and land rights. A subsequent protest took place in 2008 allegedly under the orders of the exiled FULRO. No fatalities were found from these protests, and thus the second period is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [April 28, 2002].


Minorities at Risk Project (2009), College Park, MD: University of Maryland.


Yemen

South Yemen

Summary: North and South Yemen were united in May 1990 and immediately there were disputes between the Northern and Southern Yemeni political parties with the more subordinate Southerners demanding more political autonomy. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990. The inter-party dispute from 1990 to early 1994 was nonviolent and involved several issues. The main Southern party, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), wanted a decentralized state that would grant considerable powers to its regional components. But even though the YSP did not advocate secession until May 1994, the Northern parties were adamant about maintaining Yemen’s unity and objected to any form of autonomy for the South. The HVIOLSD coding for 1994 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Although defeated by the Northern military, Southern separatists remain a potent force in the region and the YSP has remained active as of 2012. The movement is coded NVIOLSD until 2010. From 2011, the movement is coded LVIOLSD based on the information reported in the Critical Threats tracker. Lexis Nexis news reports indicate an LVIOLSD coding for those two years as well.

Sources:
Keesing’s Record of World Events. [June 23, 2003].
Lexis Nexis. [December 10, 2013].
**YUGOSLAVIA**

**Bosniaks**

*Summary*: Although nationalist sentiment was present beforehand, the various Bosniak nationalist parties were formed in 1990, hence the start date of the movement. In particular, the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA) was formed on May 26, 1990. The SDA advocated a “sovereign and united Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multiethnic democratic state, region, nation and equal citizens” (Stranka Demokratske Acije 2012). The SDA won the most seats in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first multi-party elections in November 1990. Bosnia became independent in 1992 (according to Correlates of War), Bosnia’s date of independence is in early April 1992 while Gleditsch & Ward (1999) peg the date of independence to late April 1992). Hence we code an end to the movement in 1992. Fighting had erupted in Bosnia already before independence, but it appears to mainly concern the Bosnian state-Serb dyad and not the Bosniaks-Yugoslavia dyad. UCDP/PRIO, for instance, reports that: “Already by March 1992, violent clashes between different armed formations in Bosnia became increasingly frequent. On 3 March, fighting between Serbian militia and Bosnian police in the northern Bosnia-Herzegovina town of Bosanski Brod resulted in several deaths. The violence escalated by April-May, with killings occurring regularly in Sarajevo and in other parts of Bosnia.” Thus, we code the Bosniaks as NVIOLSD throughout (also see Meier 1999).

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [July 4, 2003].


Croats

Summary: In 1967, a multisided movement among Croatian politicians, independent intellectuals, church groups, and cultural associations – merging into what became identified as a nationalist mass movement (MASPOK – the “Croatian Spring”) – pressured for more autonomy, specifically for Croatian rights and greater control of its economic resources and foreign affairs. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1967. The movement was suppressed in early 1972 (Radan 2002: 174; Cohen 1993: 81; Stojanovic 1995: 344; Silber and Little 1995: 82). We thus code the end of the first (non-violent) phase as 1972. As a result of the Croatian Spring, Yugoslavia was decentralized with the 1971 and 1974 constitutional reforms, which gave the federal republics and regions increased autonomy. In 1989, when independence-minded Franjo Tudjman founded the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Croatian movement re-erupted. (HDZ 2013; Silber & Little 1995: 83). In 1991 Croatia was recognized as an international state, hence the end of the movement. 1989-1990 is coded as NVIOLSD; 1991 is coded as HVIOLSD following Doyle & Sambanis (2006). Self-determination movements in Croatia after this date are listed under the country label of “Croatia,” and HVIOLSD ends in 1991.

Sources:

Hungarians

Summary: The vast majority of Hungarians in Yugoslavia are concentrated in the north of the Vojvodina region, which was part of Hungary until 1920. The Hungarians in Vojvodina are represented by both cultural organizations and political parties. The main organization, which has been consistently active throughout the 1990s and at present, is the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina (DCHV), founded in 1989. The DCHV first proposed wide-ranging autonomy for Vojvodina in 1992, hence the start date of the movement. Other groups include the Hungarians for the Fatherland, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, the political party the Democratic Alliance for Reform of Vojvodina, and the Vojvodina Movement (see Vojvodina Serbs). The group also relies on both the Hungarian government and external Hungarian organizations, such as the World Congress of Hungarians, to pressure the Yugoslav government on their behalf. The majority of the organizations representing the Hungarians have
been calling for greater autonomy for the Vojvodina region, while others have advocated a Hungarian-only region in northern Vojvodina. In recent years, the Yugoslav government has given additional powers to the Vojvodina region in areas such as education, there has been little enthusiasm for granting the region the level of autonomy wanted by the Hungarians. Still there is evidence of continued activity, and we code the movement as ongoing. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Istrians

Summary: The Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) was formed in 1990, one year before Croatian independence. According to Ashbrook (2006: 638), the IDS advocated “increased autonomy for Istria”. The autonomy claim is confirmed by Minahan (2002), Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 139) and Beovic (2013). Although the party did not participate in the first multi-party elections of 1990, it seems there was some separatist activity prior to Croatian independence. 1990 is thus coded as start date. The Istrian movement remained active when Croatia gained independence in 1991 (see Istrians under Croatia). There is no evidence of separatist violence. Hence, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Kosovar Albanians

Summary: From about 1200 to 1455 Kosovo was part of the Serbian kingdom. In 1455 Kosovo fell to the Ottomans. Kosovo had been under Ottoman since 1455, when, in 1912/1913, Kosovo was conquered and divided between Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria; the largest part went to Serbia and became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia) after WWI. Kosovar resistance against Serbian rule emerged. In 1918, the Committee for the National Defense of Kosovo was formed and subsequently
launched an armed struggle against Serbia. Self-government for Kosovo ranged among the aims of the committee. By the mid-1920s, the insurgency had been suppressed and given strong repression, organized activity for self-determination remained impossible until WWII (Elsie 2012: 93, 230; Clark 2000: 28-29). In 1941, the Axis powers invaded Yugoslavia. Kosovo was united with neighboring Albania under Italian control. Kosovar Albanians began to drive out and kill Serbs. Resistance against the occupation was relatively weak in Kosovo (Clark 2000: 29). In 1942, Balli Kombetar (BK) was formed. Initially, it was an Albanian resistance movement against the Italian unification of Italy, but the BK became openly collaborationist in 1943. In 1943 the Second League of Prizren was formed, a Kosovar offshoot of the BK. “[I]ts [the BK’s] activity in Kosovo was directed against Serbs with the goal of the Second League being to maintain the unification of Kosovo with Albania” (Clark 2000: 29). In 1944 Nazi Germany left. A national movement, combining BK members and Albanian partisans, began to violently resist (re-)incorporation into Yugoslavia in December 1944 (Encyclopedia Britannica; Clark 2000: 30). We code the Kosovar Albanians from 1945 onwards, the first year we cover. However, we note prior violent activity. The start date is pegged to 1944, the year the insurrection against the incoming Yugoslav partisans began. MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score is 3 from 1945-1949. However, Minahan (2002: 1031) suggests that the Kosovar Albanians’ insurrection had ended already in 1946. Based on this, 1945-1946 are coded with LVIOLSD. Throughout the ensuing decades, illegal Kosovar independence movements continued to operate, generally clandestinely due to Serbian oppression, but with occasional uprisings. The MAR quinquennial rebellion score is again 3 from 1980-1984. This is likely related to the events in 1981, when there were large-scale demonstrations in Kosovo over autonomy that were violently repressed. We found 12 deaths in 1981. 1981 was by far the most violent year; we found only 3 deaths in 1982, 2 deaths in 1983, and 4 deaths in 1987. We code 1981 LVIOLSD based on the MAR rebellion score, though noting that it looks like there were fewer than 25 deaths in 1981. 1947-1980 and 1982-1988 are coded as NVIOLSD. Keesing’s reports that separatist clashes led to 29 deaths in 1989 and 26 deaths in 1990, hence a LVIOLSD coding for those two years. 1991-1997 are again NVIOLSD. According to Pavkovic & Radan (2007: 153), a clandestine group called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started a campaign of bombing and assassinations against Serb targets in early 1996, but we found no evidence suggesting that the LVIOLSD threshold was met. The HVIOLSD coding for 1998-99 follows Doyle & Sambanis (2006). There were a few violent episodes in the 2000s but casualty estimates do not warrant a LVIOLSD code except for 2000-2001: in 2000 ethnic-Albanian rebels begin an offensive against Yugoslav security forces in the Presevo Valley bordering Kosovo. Marshall & Gurr (2003: 58, 2005: 85) code armed conflict involving the Albanians in the Presevo Valley in 2000-2001. We subsume this under the header of the Kosovar Albanians. In 2008, Kosovo declared unilateral independence. This was recognized by 98 states. Yet a small Albanian population has remained in Serbia, concentrated in the Presevo Valley, and there has been contention for a merger with Kosovo. For instance, in March 2014 the president of the Movement for Democratic Progress (PDP), an ethnic Albanian party, and simultaneously mayor of Bujanovac (a town in the Presevo Valley), argued that the Presevo Valley had always been part of Kosovo and that it had declared its wish to join Kosovo in an (unofficial) March 1992 referendum (Independent 2014; Novinite 2014; Civil War in Europe 2014). There is also talk about a potential land swap with Kosovo, whereby Serbia would give Kosovo the Presevo Valley in return for Serb-inhabited North Kosovo (Radio Free Europe 2010). Thus, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2012. 2002-2012 are coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [April 28, 2002].

Lexis Nexis. [December 10, 2013].


**Macedonian Albanians**

*Summary:* In the 1980s, there was increasing repression against Macedonian Albanians and increasing tensions between Macedonian Albanians and the local authorities (Koppa 2001: 43). For instance, in 1983, Albanian teachers in Tetova were disciplined and dismissed from the League of Communists for not observing certain regulations concerning the use of Macedonian in official paperwork. In December 1986, a registrar in Tetova was dismissed for registering names “which stimulated nationalist sentiment” (Poulton 1993: 80). In 1988, a ban was introduced on restricting the selling of land to ethnic Albanians in western Macedonia. This was to prevent ethnic Albanians buying land, thereby creating ethnically pure areas (Poulton 1993; Bennett 1994). “The Albanian language was removed from public sight, Albanian families were prohibited from naming their children with Albanian names and, to lower the significantly high birth rate of the Albanian population, Albanian families were prohibited from having more than two children” (Milosavlevski and Tomovski 1997). Furthermore, in 1990 the Macedonian Republic was redefined from “a state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish nationalities” to a “national state of the Macedonian people” (Poulton 2000). The first political parties claiming to speak for the Albanian minority in Macedonia appeared as soon as communism made its way out. The first evidence of organized agitation towards self-determination we found is in February 1990, when there was a demonstration for autonomy, if not independence and attachment to Albania, of Albanian-inhabited districts of Macedonia (Lund 2005: 232). Thus, we code 1990 as the start date of the Macedonian Albanian movement. In April 1990, the PPD (Party of Democratic Prosperity) was founded, the first ethnic-Albanian party. In June, another Albanian party was founded, the PDP (Democratic Party of Albanians) (Rexhepi 2008). The Macedonian Albanians movement continued to be active when Macedonia became independent in 1991 (see Albanians under Macedonia). We found no reports of separatist violence for the period when Macedonia was still part of Yugoslavia, hence a NVIOLSD classification for 1990-1991.

*Sources:*


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com) [April 6, 2002].


Macedonians

Summary: In November 1989, the old pro-Serbian party leadership was dismissed at the Congress of Communists of Macedonia. This opened the way for reforms in Macedonia (Meier 1999: 175-176), such as the introduction of multiparty politics (Babuna 2000: 80). Several amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia were introduced in 1990, for example the „manner and the procedure of using the right to self-determination, including the separation from the federation“ (Cvetkovski 1999). In spring 1990, several Macedonian parties were founded and on November 11, 1990, the first multiparty elections were held in Macedonia. The main topic of the parties that competed in these elections was the status of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and whether it should remain within Yugoslavia with greater autonomy or become fully independent. VMRO-DPMNE, an advocate of independence, gained most votes (Balkan Insight 2011). 1990 is coded as start date (also see Woodward 1995). Macedonia became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD coding.

Sources:

Balkan Insight (2011). “Past Election Results in Macedonia.”


Montenegrins

Summary: In 1988 and 1989 there were mass demonstrations in Montenegro’s capital (then called Titograd). The protests were over economic grievances and the Communist government and not over autonomy or independence (T 1988; Hayden 1992). On January 26, 1990, the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni Savez Crne Gore (LSCG)) was founded (CDM 2011). One of the main goals of the party was the independence of Montenegro from Yugoslavia (Morrison 2009: 159). Thus, 1990 is coded as start date. The LSCG was particularly active as of 1992, when it was the main promoter of Montenegro’s independence in the 1992 referendum (CDM 2011). The LSCG was dissolved in 2005 (CDM 2011), but at this point in time Montenegro’s self-determination was on the political agenda of many other parties too. The movement ends with Montenegro’s independence in 2006. We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Keesing’s Record of World Events. [April 28, 2002].

Lexis Nexis. [July 4, 2003].

Sandzak Muslims

Summary: The collapse of Communism in 1989 stirred the long-dormant Sanjaki nationalism. In 1990 the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was formed to represent the interests of Serbia’s Muslims, primarily those in the Sandzak region. We therefore peg the start date of the movement to 1990. Other political parties representing the interests of the group include: the Sandzak Coalition, List for Sandzak, People’s Movement of Sandzak and a union of five small parties created in 2000 called the National Movement of Sandzak. While the various parties each have their own agenda, there are several Sandzak wide issues, important to all. There is a belief that the region needs to be recognized by the government of Yugoslavia. While this is a call for autonomy, the group has made it clear that they are not interested in full independence, just recognition as an autonomous region in order to provide equal rights, protection of their religion, and to provide the group a greater say in the policies of the state government. Many Muslims believe that the current election laws discriminate against them in that they prevent them from gaining an appropriate level of representation. Additionally, they want all political parties to be allowed to operate without being repressed. While the violence against the Muslims has been less severe recently, protection from the Serbs is also a key demand of the group. In recent years, the Sandzak wing of the Bosniak Party for Democratic Action (SDA) has continued to press for an autonomous Sandzak region (International Crisis Group 2005), hence the movement is coded as ongoing. After Montenegro’s secession in 2006, Sandzak Muslims are active in both Serbia and Montenegro (see Sandzak Muslims under Montenegro). We found only minimal evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification.

Sources:


Slovenes

Summary: The first overt stirrings of Slovenian nationalism in the post-WWII phase came in the mid- and late 1960s, when the “national question” became one of the central themes of Slovene journalism and cultural discussion. Slovenia’s political elite began to make reformist claims in the direction of increased autonomy for Slovenia and economic reform. The first clear-cut evidence for something that can be interpreted as organized activity we found is in 1968, when a number of speakers at the Slovenian Congress of the League of Communists spoke of Slovenian statehood and sovereignty. Unlike in the case of Croatia, the Slovenian reform movement did not develop into a mass movement. It was led and limited to parts of Slovenia’s Communist elite, in particular Stane Kavcic who was president of Slovenia from 1967-1972 and aimed for a more independent position for Slovenia within Yugoslavia. In 1972, Kavcic was forced to resign and the Slovenian reform movement was suppressed (Vodopivec 1992: 233-236; Radan 2002: 167). Based on this, we code a first non-violent phase of activity from 1968-1972. Calls for Slovenian sovereignty resurfaced in the mid-1980s (Mastnak 1990; Woodward 1995; Cohen 1993; Ramet 1993; Stokes et. al 1996; Vankovska 2002). The (re-)awakening of Slovene nationalism is commonly referred to as the “Slovenian Spring”. By 1986 Slovene nationalists were criticizing the Yugoslav People’s Army and requesting greater autonomy (Vankovska 2002: 4). In line with this, Ramet (1993: 870) notes that „Slovenia’s drive toward independence must be dated to 1986, when the liberal wing within the League of Communists of Slovenia triumphed over the conservative wing and ousted the conservatives from the party leadership.” Hence, we peg the start date of the second phase at 1986. In January 1987 the New Review published 16 articles of intellectuals and dissidents claiming the “introduction of political pluralism, democracy, a market economy, and independence for Slovenia“ (Nova Revija 1987; Suligoj 1999). The critical journal New Review had been founded already in 1980 (Rupel 2005: 45), but had not published radical or contentious articles in the earlier years. As a reaction to the 1987 issue of the New Review, in 1988 four journalists were arrested and put before military trial (the ‘Ljubljana trials’, see Rupel 2005: 45). Following the trials, the Slovenian Spring became a mass movement with large demonstrations. The Yugoslav leadership under Slobodan Milosevic unsuccessfully tried to restrict the independence movements in Yugoslavia by organizing pro-government mass demonstrations (the so-called “meetings of truth”). However, although planned, such events did not take place in Slovenia. Slovene police forces had stopped Serb demonstrators at the Slovenian border (Suligoj 1999: 4). In September 1989, the Slovenian parliament passed a series of constitutional amendments, which underlined Slovenian sovereignty and declared that only the Slovenian parliament itself could authorize the declaration of a state of emergency in Slovenia, or the movement of Yugoslav military forces into the republic (Hayden 1992: 658; Ramet 1993: 871). In 1990, the Slovenian delegation, headed by Milan Kucan, prompted the dissolution of the Yugoslav Communist Party when they left the Party Congress due to disagreement with Milosevic’s politics (Stojanovic 1995: 343). On March 7, 1990 the Slovenian Assembly changed the official name of the state to the “Republic of Slovenia”. In April 1990, the first democratic elections in Slovenia took place. In 1991, Slovenia became independent, hence the end of the movement. The LVIOLSD coding for 1991 follows UCDP/PRIO and Marshall & Gurr (2003).

Sources:


**Vojvodina Serbs**

**Summary:** Serbs in the Vojvodina, a region in northern Serbia, have campaigned for increased autonomy since the early 1990s (also the Hungarians have campaigned for increased autonomy for the Vojvodina). Vojvodina became an autonomous province of Serbia in 1945 but at first only enjoyed a small level of autonomy. With the Serbian constitution of 1974 the Vojvodina was guaranteed a high level of autonomy. Fuelled by nationalist sentiments in other constituent republics Vojvodine nationalisms emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to Minahan (2002: 2003), “Vojvodine activists joined the region’s Hungarians in demanding republican status for Vojvodina.” However, it was only after the autonomy of
Vojvodina was revoked by Milošević’s regime in 1989 that a movement for autonomy emanated. In 1996, the Vojvodina Coalition, an association of seventeen parties and organizations, signed the Manifesto for Vojvodina Autonomy (Minahan 2002: 2004). The coalition’s main components, the Reformists of Vojvodina and the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, had already been formed in 1990. It appears that these parties have advocated autonomy since their foundation. 1990 is coded as start date. There is evidence of continued activity. For instance, in 1998 the leader of Vojvodina’s coalition of opposition parties demanded autonomy (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 314). Thus, we consider the movement ongoing as of 2012. We find no evidence of separatist violence, hence the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources:


Lozi (Barotse)

Summary: The Lozi enjoyed autonomy under British rule, but at the cost of losing their resources and much of the power of the king. In 1961, the Lozi sent representatives to Britain to petition for the independence of Barotseland, but the petition was denied. On the eve of Zambian independence in 1964, the Lozi signed an agreement which made Barotseland part of Zambia. However, all of the traditional privileges of the kingdom were to be maintained. Legislation in 1969 rescinded this agreement and Barotseland became nothing more than another province. The Lozi were relatively quiet until 1988 when they began agitating for autonomy for their region. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1988. Prior to 1988, Kaunda, the president of Zambia since independence, had been able to placate the Lozi by including their traditional ruler in the Central Committee of his United National Independence Party (UNIP) party. However, when other political movements began agitating for a multi-party system, the Lozi took this opportunity to bring up once again their wish for autonomy. In the first multi-party elections in 1991, the Lozi voted overwhelmingly for the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), the main opposition party, in the hopes that it would grant them autonomy. The MMD won and Chiluba was elected president. However, MMD has been just as unresponsive to Lozi claims as UNIP was. In 1992, the Barotse Cultural Association (BCA) was founded. In 1994, Lozi leaders ordered their lawyers to seek legal arbitration for settlement of the issue, possibly through the International Court of Justice. In 1995, the pro-secession Agenda for Zambia was formed. Subsequently, the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF) was founded in 1996. Also in 1996, Agenda for Zambia was founded as a separatist party. In 1998, the BPF threatened armed conflict in Barotseland was not granted independence; however, the leader was arrested soon after (Englebert 2005: 35-36). Englebert notes that secessionist sentiments had petered out around 2001. However, beginning in 1988, the BRE had fought against the Zambian government over land rights and cultural rights despite its refusal to champion secession. Therefore, the movement is coded as ongoing after 2001 due to the BRE’s continued activity. Recently in 2012, the people of Barotseland formally declared a movement towards self-determination. The MAR rebellion score is 3 in 1994, but MAR also notes that “little violence has taken place”. From Minahan (2002: 1119) it does not appear as if there was violence in 1994, though he notes that “[a]bout 3,000 Lozis took up arms after rumors that the litunga was being sought by government forces in March 1994.” Rather, it appears that MAR gave a rebellion score of three in 1994 due to a ‘declaration of sovereignty’: “In 1994, Lozi leaders ordered their lawyers to seek legal arbitration for settlement of the issue, possibly through the International Court of Justice” (MAR Group Assessment), an event also noted by Minahan (2002: 2002: 1119). 1994 is coded NVIOLS. We found two casualties in 2012 resulting from secessionist violence (this is insufficient for a LVIOLS code). Thus, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLS.

Sources:


Ndebele

Summary: Nationalism first began in 1914 with the Matabele National Home Society, but eventually petered out. It was revived from 1957-1962 but once again subsided. Nationalist organizations were formed from 1987 onward, and “tried to pick up from where such other earlier organizations as Ndebele National Movement, Matabele Home Society, and Mzilikazi Family Association left off” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 185). The emergence of an Ndebele self-determination movement was at least in part motivated by the Matabeleland massacres. Organizations associated with the Ndebele self-determination movement include the Vukani Mahlabezulu, Imbovane YaMahlabezulu, ZAPU 2000, Matabeleland Development Society, and the Mthwakazi People’s Congress. While some, such as Vukani Mahlabezulu focused on cultural autonomy, others, including ZAPU 2000 (which was formed in 1999), advocate a federal Ndebele state within Matabeleland while the Mthwakazi People’s Congress called for an independent state called the United Mthwakazi Republic. The Mathwakazi People’s Congress has continued to call for an independent state since its formation. The Mthwakazi Liberation Front (MLF) was founded in 2010 and aims to establish an independent Ndebele state (VOA 12/30/2012). Based on this information, we code 1987 as the start date, and code the movement as ongoing. The MAR rebellion score is three in 1987. However, this does not relate to violence over self-determination but to the above-mentioned Matabeleland massacres, which is coded as a civil war over government in Doyle & Sambanis (2006) and Fearon & Laitin (2003), among others. Moreover, according to Doyle & Sambanis’ coding notes, “[a]fter 1984, depending on the degree of effective resistance, this case may be less of a civil war and more of a case of government repression and politicide, also including inter-communal killing.“ As the conflict was over government and mainly involved one-sided violence, we do not code violence over self-determination in 1987. We found no indications of separatist violence in other years, thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD.

Sources: