Online Appendix
for The Suffragist Peace

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Part A: Data and Summary Statistics

1. Suffrage Data

Table 1 below provides data on the stages of women's suffrage. Column 1 in the table lists the year that any women were granted the vote in national elections. Column 2 lists the year in which we estimate that women constituted at least 40% of the eligible voters. Column 3 lists the year in which women achieved universal suffrage in national elections. The primary analysis within the paper uses the data in Column 1 to create the binary $SUFF_L$ variable. Analyses in section B.3 below assess the effect of both universal suffrage and the 40% threshold.

The table includes information on women's suffrage in 198 countries. All but five countries – Brunei, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and The UAE – legalized women's suffrage by the year 1999, even if national elections were not held in the state. In 180 countries, suffrage was extended to all women above the national voting age within one legislative act. For the vast majority of cases, therefore, the year in each column in Table 1 is the same. Within 13 countries, marked by an * within the table, suffrage was granted to women in stages. The restrictions imposed by these states are presented in Table 2 below. The data on male suffrage included within the table is taken from Przeworski (2009).

As the middle column of the Table 2 shows, the first wave of female suffrage in these 13 countries was most commonly extended on the basis of educational, age-based, ethnic or geographic qualifications. Within seven cases, equivalent voting restrictions were applied to men during the period of restricted female voting. We estimate, therefore, that women constituted at least 40% of all eligible voters after the first wave of suffrage in these cases.

Within six other cases, Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Nigeria, Romania and the United Kingdom, men experienced fewer or no restrictions beyond the typical age requirements during the period of restricted female voting. In these cases, we estimate that women did not constitute 40% of eligible voters until the second wave of suffrage in which all women were granted the vote. Within the case of Nigeria, for instance, women within southern states were prohibited from voting until 1978. We estimate that between 1958 and 1978, women constituted only 27.7% of eligible voters. This is based on census data from 1952 in which the population of the northern states was 55.4% and the population of the south was 44.6%. Within the first stage of suffrage within Belgium, war widows, female political prisoners and the mothers of those killed were granted the right to vote in national elections. It is estimated that Belgium suffered roughly 38,170 military deaths, most presumably men, over the course of World War I. The population of the country leading up to the war was roughly 7,662,000. The segment of Belgian women granted suffrage in the first wave represented, therefore, a small minority of all eligible voters. Similar calculations led us to the same conclusion for Iceland, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom.

TABLE 1: THE TIMELINE OF SUFFRAGE WORLDWIDE.

Country	*First Wave*	*40% of Vote*	*Univ Vote*	*Country*	*First Wave*	*40% of Vote*	*Univ Vote*
Afghanistan	1964	1964	1964	Congo	1963	1963	1963
Albania	1920	1920	1920	Costa Rica	1949	1949	1949
Algeria	1962	1962	1962	Croatia	1945	1945	1945
Andorra	1970	1970	1970	Cuba	1934	1934	1934
Angola	1975	1975	1975	Cyprus	1960	1960	1960
Antigua & Barbuda	1951	1951	1951	Czech Republic	1991	1991	1991
Argentina	1947	1947	1947	Czechoslovakia	1920	1920	1920
Armenia	1921	1921	1921	DR of Congo	1967	1967	1967
*Australia	1902	1902	1962	Denmark	1915	1915	1915
Austria	1918	1918	1918	Djibouti	1946	1946	1946
Azerbaijan	1921	1921	1921	Dominica	1951	1951	1951
Bahamas	1961	1961	1961	Dominican Rep.	1942	1942	1942
Bahrain	1973	1973	1973	Ecuador	1929	1929	1929
Bangladesh	1972	1972	1972	Egypt	1956	1956	1956
Barbados	1950	1950	1950	El Salvador	1939	1939	1939
Belarus	1919	1919	1919	Equat. Guinea	1963	1963	1963
*Belgium	1919	1948	1948	Eritrea	1955	1955	1955
Belize	1954	1954	1954	Estonia	1918	1918	1918
Benin	1956	1956	1956	Ethiopia	1955	1955	1955
Bhutan	1953	1953	1953	Fed. Micronesia	1979	1979	1979
*Bolivia	1938	1938	1952	Fiji	1963	1963	1963
Bosnia Herzegovina	1949	1949	1949	Finland	1906	1906	1906
Botswana	1965	1965	1965	France	1944	1944	1944
Brazil	1934	1934	1934	Gabon	1956	1956	1956
Brunei	-	-	-	Gambia	1960	1960	1960
Bulgaria	1944	1944	1944	Georgia	1918	1918	1918
Burkina Faso	1958	1958	1958	Germany	1918	1918	1918
Burundi	1961	1961	1961	Ghana	1954	1954	1954
Cambodia	1955	1955	1955	Greece	1952	1952	1952
Cameroon	1946	1946	1946	Grenada	1951	1951	1951
*Canada	1917	1917	1960	Guatemala	1946	1946	1946
Cape Verde	1975	1975	1975	Guinea	1958	1958	1958
C. African. Republic	1986	1986	1986	Guinea-Bissau	1977	1977	1977
Chad	1958	1958	1958	Guyana	1953	1953	1953
Chile	1949	1949	1949	Haiti	1950	1950	1950
China	1949	1949	1949	Honduras	1955	1955	1955
Colombia	1954	1954	1954	Hungary	1918	1918	1918

*Iceland	1915	1920	1920	Morocco	1963	1963	1963
India	1950	1950	1950	Mozambique	1975	1975	1975
Indonesia	1945	1945	1945	Myanmar	1935	1935	1935
Iran	1963	1963	1963	Namibia	1989	1989	1989
Iraq	1980	1980	1980	Nauru	1968	1968	1968
*Ireland	1918	1922	1922	Nepal	1951	1951	1951
Israel	1948	1948	1948	Netherlands	1919	1919	1919
Italy	1945	1945	1945	New Zealand	1893	1893	1893
Ivory Coast	1952	1952	1952	Nicaragua	1955	1955	1955
Jamaica	1944	1944	1944	Niger	1948	1948	1948
Japan	1946	1946	1946	*Nigeria	1958	1978	1978
Jordan	1974	1974	1974	North Korea	1946	1946	1946
Kazakhstan	1924	1993	1993	Norway	1913	1913	1913
Kenya	1963	1963	1963	Oman	-	-	-
Kiribati	1967	1967	1967	Pakistan	1947	1947	1947
Korea	1946	1946	1946	Palau	1979	1979	1979
Kuwait	2005	2005	2005	Panama	1946	1946	1946
Kyrgyzstan	1918	1918	1918	Pap. New Guinea	1964	1964	1964
Laos	1958	1958	1958	Paraguay	1961	1961	1961
Latvia	1918	1918	1918	Peru	1955	1955	1955
Lebanon	1952	1952	1952	Philippines	1937	1937	1937
Lesotho	1965	1965	1965	Poland	1918	1918	1918
Liberia	1946	1946	1946	*Portugal	1931	1931	1976
Libya	1964	1964	1964	Qatar	-	-	-
Liechtenstein	1984	1984	1984	Rep of Vietnam	1946	1946	1946
Lithuania	1919	1919	1919	*Romania	1938	1946	1946
Luxembourg	1919	1919	1919	Russia	1918	1918	1918
Macedonia	1946	1946	1946	Rwanda	1961	1961	1961
Madagascar	1959	1959	1959	Samoa	1991	1990	1990
Malawi	1961	1961	1961	Sao Tome Principe	1975	1975	1975
Malaysia	1957	1957	1957	Saudi Arabia	-	-	-
Maldives	1932	1932	1932	Senegal	1945	1945	1945
Mali	1956	1956	1956	Seychelles	1948	1948	1948
Malta	1947	1947	1947	Sierra Leone	1961	1961	1961
Marshall Isl.	1979	1979	1979	Singapore	1947	1947	1947
Mauritania	1961	1961	1961	Slovakia	1920	1920	1920
Mauritius	1956	1956	1956	Slovenia	1945	1945	1945
Mexico	1953	1953	1953	Solomon Islands	1974	1974	1974
Moldova	1939	1939	1939	Somalia	1956	1956	1956
Monaco	1962	1962	1962	*South Africa	1930	1930	1994
Mongolia	1924	1924	1924	South Korea	1948	1948	1948

South Sudan	2011	2011	2011	Tunisia	1959	1959	1959
Spain	1931	1931	1931	Turkey	1930	1930	1930
Sri Lanka	1931	1931	1931	Turkmenistan	1927	1927	1927
St. Kitts and Nevis	1951	1951	1951	Tuvalu	1967	1967	1967
St. Lucia	1951	1951	1951	Uganda	1962	1962	1962
St. Vincent & Grenadines	1951	1951	1951	Ukraine	1919	1919	1919
Sudan	1964	1964	1964	UAE	-	-	-
Suriname	1948	1948	1948	*UK	1918	1929	1929
Swaziland	1968	1968	1968	United States	1920	1920	1920
Sweden	1919	1919	1919	Uruguay	1932	1932	1932
Switzerland	1971	1971	1971	Uzbekistan	1938	1938	1938
Syria	1949	1949	1953	Vanuatu	1975	1980	1980
Taiwan	1947	1947	1947	Venezuela	1946	1946	1946
Tajikistan	1924	1924	1924	Vietnam	1946	1946	1946
Tanzania	1959	1959	1959	Yemen	1967	1970	1970
Thailand	1932	1932	1932	Yemen Arab Republic	1967	1967	1967
Togo	1945	1945	1945	Yemen People's Republic	1967	1967	1967
Tonga	1960	1960	1960	Yugoslavia	1946	1946	1946
*Trinidad and Tobago	1925	1925	1945	Zambia	1962	1962	1962
				*Zimbabwe	1919	1919	1957

* Those states that granted women's suffrage in stages.

Data on Women's Suffrage from:

Data from Women in Parliaments 1945 – 1995; InterParliamentary Union, 1995; Progress of the World's Women: In Pursuit of Justice; UN Women

Table 2: All States Granting Suffrage in Waves.

Country	*First Wave*	*Female Extension*	*Second Wave*	*Male Restrictions*
Australia	1902	All but indigenous women.	1962	Same as women.
Belgium	1918	War widows; Mothers of those killed; Political Prisoners.	1948	Age 25.
Bolivia	1938	Literate women over 20.	1952	Same as women.
Canada	1917	All but aboriginal and Chinese Canadian women.	1960	Same as women.
Iceland	1915	Women over 40.	1920	Age 25.
Ireland	1918	Women over 30.	1922	Age 21.
Nigeria	1958	Women within the northern provinces.	1978	Age 18.
Portugal	1931	Literate women only over 21.	1976	Same as women.
Romania	1938	Literate women over 30 with property.	1946	Property; Age 21.
South Africa	1930	European white women over 18.	1994	Same as women.
Trinidad and Tobago	1925	Women over 30 with property.	1945	Same as women.
United Kingdom	1918	Women over 30 with property or a degree.	1929	Age 21.
Zimbabwe	1919	European white women only over 21.	1957	Same as women.

2. Relationship Between Suffrage and Democracy Measures

The primary analysis in the paper interacts the binary suffrage variables described above with the country's annual Polity score. As Russett and Oneal (1999) notes, measures of democracy within the Polity IV data do not always correspond with extensions of suffrage. Also, it is possible for states without women's suffrage to receive a Polity score of 10. This incongruity between women's suffrage and Polity score is represented in Figure 1 below. The figure shows that of those country-years in which states receive polity scores of 10, in only around 89% have been women granted the vote. In roughly 85% of country-years in which states receive a polity score of 7 or higher are women granted the vote. The column on the right indicates the countries and years in which states with polity scores or 8, 9 or 10 did not granted women the vote.

FIGURE 1: THE POLITY SCORES OF ALL STATES WITH FEMALE SUFFRAGE.

States with polity scores of 10 but no suffrage:
Australia 1901
Costa Rica 1890 – 1948
France 1930 – 1939
Greece 1880 – 1933
New Zealand 1857 – 1875
Norway 1898 – 1912
Netherlands 1917 – 1918
Sweden 1917 – 1918
Switzerland 1848 – 1970
United States 1845 – 1849; 1871-1919

States with polity scores of 9 but no suffrage:
Canada 1888 – 1919
Denmark 1914
France 1919- 1929
Greece 1870 – 1879
Montenegro 2006 – 2015
New Zealand 1877 – 1892
Sweden 1916
United States 1809 – 1853

States with polity scores of 8 but no suffrage:
Colombia 1867 – 1885
Denmark 1913
Estonia 1917
East Timor 2012 – 2015
France 1898 – 1918
Greece 1934 – 1935; 1944 – 1948
Pakistan 1956 – 1957
Serbia 2007 – 2015
Sudan 1956 – 1957
Sweden 1915
United Kingdom 1901 – 1917
United States 1854 - 1870

Figure 2 shows the distribution of country-year data for states with and without suffrage and with polity scores over 0. The graph on the left indicates that the median polity score of states without suffrage is 5 and the data broadly spans the whole range between 1 and 10. The graph on the right shows the distribution of polity scores for states with suffrage. The median polity score for these states is 9, though this median is highly skewed by the significant number of cases with polity scores of 10. While much of the data is concentrated in the upper range of the polity score, as we might expect, we also see that there are roughly 200 cases in which states with suffrage are assigned polity scores of 1 or 2.

FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF POLITY SCORE AS A FUNCTION OF SUFFRAGE,



The plots at the bottom of the graph show that the median polity score of states without suffrage is 5. The median is 9 for states with suffrage. States within the 25% to 75% percentile are represented by the graph bar and states between the 5% and 95% percentiles are represented by the thin, black line.

Part B. Tests of Robustness
Monadic Analyses

1. Temporal Fixed Effects Models

Within the primary monadic models within the paper, we included dyad fixed effects within the dichotomous and continuous analyses. This section presents dichotomous models including dyad-fifty, dyad-forty year, dyad-thirty year, dyad-twenty year and dyad-decade fixed effects. The inclusion of fixed effects of varying periods within these models enables us to speak to the question of how quickly the adoption of women's suffrage by democracies affects a state's conflict propensity. The models in Table 3 present results of these models both with and without the variable accounting for women's civil liberties within the state.

Model 9 in Table 3 strongly suggests that the pacifying effects of suffrage occur within a decade of when a state transitions from a male-suffrage democracy to one in which women can also vote. The models suggest that the pacifying effects of women's suffrage may take longer to arise when a state is transitioning from an autocracy to a democracy in which women can vote, which seems reasonable given the extent of the institutional change required for such a transition. Model 7 suggests that the effects of such a transition can be detected within a twenty-year window, though this transition appears to have less effect within autocracies in which women already experience more extensive civil liberties.

Table 3: Fixed Effects Models by Varying Durations, 1816 - 2010

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*	*Model 9*	*Model 10*
Male-Suffrage	.649**	.512**	.973***	.914***	.373	.162	.847*	.573†	1.06*	.276
	(.19)	(.19)	(.22)	(.22)	(.25)	(.25)	(.33)	(.33)	(.45)	(.41)
Democracy	.417***	.132	.312**	.171	.430***	.089	.370**	-.096	.309†	-.061
	(.10)	(.11)	(.12)	(.13)	(.11)	(.13)	(.13)	(.14)	(.19)	(.21)
Autocracy		-1.20***		-.787*		-1.77***		-2.65***		-1.30*
		(.25)		(.32)		(.30)		(.38)		(.56)
Civil-Liberties$_L$	.152*	.147*	.187*	.188*	.190*	.201**	.318***	.291***	.401***	.339**
	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.10)	(.10)
Capability Ratio	-.291**	-.317**	-.251*	-.261*	-.251*	-.291**	-.237*	-.259*	-.375*	-.331
	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)	(.10)	(.11)	(.10)	(.11)	(.12)	(.16)	(.17)
Alliance	-.479**	-.536**	-1.28***	-1.37***	-.426*	-.448*	.165	.053	-.691*	-.806**
	(.16)	(.17)	(.24)	(.25)	(.19)	(.20)	(.24)	(.25)	(.29)	(.30)
Minor Powers	-.020***	-.020**	-.007	-.007	.002	.001	.048***	-.049***	.177***	.176***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)
Peace Years										
Fixed Effects	Dyad-50 Year	Dyad-50 Year	Dyad-40 Year	Dyad-40 Year	Dyad-30 Year	Dyad-30 Year	Dyad-20 Years	Dyad-20 Year	Dyad-Decade	Dyad-Decade
N =	40,227	38,811	33,098	31,986	31,086	30,056	23,608	22,832	14,014	13,549

Coefficients estimate difference with likelihood of initiation by democracies with women's suffrage.

†= Coefficients at the .1 level. * = .05 level. ** =.01 level. *** =.001 level.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

2. The Monadic Peace Over Time

This section provides further analysis of the effects of democracy and suffrage on the likelihood of initiation over different time periods. Table 4, which assesses the dichotomous models over a range of time periods, and Table 5, which assesses the continuous models of suffrage and democracy over the same time periods, both provide evidence that the inverse relationship between women's suffrage democracies and initiation propensity holds over a variety of time periods.

The Effects of Democracy without Women's Suffrage: 1816 - 1892
Model 1 within Table 4 analyzes the likelihood of initiation in the period of the 19th century before which any democracies had adopted female suffrage. Because women could not vote within democracies during this period, the coefficient for *Autocracy* estimates the difference with male-suffrage democracies during this period. The coefficient indicates that autocracies were significantly less likely to initiate disputes. Marginal effects indicate that male-suffrage democracies were 172% more likely to initiate disputes than autocracies.

Model 1 within Table 5 assesses the effects of increasing democracy levels in the era prior to women's suffrage. The positive and significant coefficient suggests that more democratic countries in the pre-suffrage era were more likely to initiate disputes than less democratic countries.

The Effects of Suffrage: 1816 - 1930
Model 2 in Table 4 analyzes the effects of suffrage up through 1930, when relatively few democracies allowed women's suffrage. Within the period, the variables measuring the difference between male-suffrage democracies and autocracies and women's suffrage democracies are positive and significant, indicating that both the former regime types have a higher probability of initiation than the latter. Model 6 illustrates that the relationship between male and women's suffrage democracies is robust to the inclusion of dyadic fixed effects.

The results in Models 2 and 6 in Table 5 provide added support for these findings. During this period, a state with a polity score of 10 but which does not have suffrage is 33% *more* likely to initiate a conflict than a state with a polity score of 5 which doesn't allow women to vote. Conversely, a state with women's suffrage and a polity score of 10 is 401% *less* likely to initiate conflict than a state with women's suffrage and a polity score 5.

The Effects of Suffrage in the Interwar Period: 1920 - 1938
The relationship between autocracies and women's suffrage democracies holds during the interwar period, as represented within Model 3. We also see a a positive relationship between male-suffrage democracies and women's suffrage democracies, though the coefficient is not significant at standard level. Model 7, which includes dyadic fixed effects, indicates that both male suffrage democracies and autocracies are significantly more likely to initiate disputes. These results are also reflected within Models 3 and 7 in Table 5.

The Effects of Suffrage in the Pre and Post War Periods: 1816 - 1920 and 1945 - 2010
To ensure that the unusual behavior of states between the wars was not driving results, we estimated the models excluding this time period. Model 4 strongly suggests that this is not the case for the relationship between male-suffrage democracies and women's suffrage democracies. The relationship between autocracies and women's suffrage democracies is not significant within this model, though the same model including dyadic fixed effects (Model 8) shows a significant difference in the likelihood of initiation between these regime types. These results are also bolstered by the results within Models 4 and 8 in Table 5.

The Effects of Suffrage in the Pre and Post Cold War Periods: 1816 - 1945 and 1990 - 2010
We also wanted to ensure that the unusual behavior of states during the Cold War was not driving results. Models 5 and 9 strongly suggest that this is not the case. Model 5 includes all years excluding the Cold War period and Model 9 includes dyad fixed effects within this specification. Within both, autocracies and male-suffrage democracies are significantly more likely to initiate conflict than women's suffrage democracies. These results are also reflected within the results within Models 5 and 9 in Table 5.

Table 4: Dichotomous Models of the Monadic Effects of Suffrage, by Time Period

Variables	*Model 1 1816-1893*	*Model 2 1816-1930*	*Model 3 1920-1938*	*Model 4 Interwar Excl.*	*Model 5 Cold War Excl.*	*Model 6 1816-1930*	*Model 7 1920-1938*	*Model 8 Interwar Excl.*	*Model 9 Cold War Excl.*
Democracy w/o Women's Suff.		1.78***	.473	1.14***	1.27***	.582*	1.258	.524***	1.05***
		(.27)	(.30)	(.18)	(.17)	(.29)	(.72)	(.11)	(.14)
Autocracy	-1.02***	1.12***	1.29***	.121	.413**	.547	1.47**	.896	1.08***
	(.27)	(.28)	(.23)	(.12)	(.15)	(.29)	(.13)	(.14)	(.16)
Civil Liberties				-.951***	-.971***			-1.17***	-.978***
				(.19)	(.24)			(.22)	(.26)
Contiguity	2.03***	1.99***	1.52***	2.51***	2.09***				
	(.28)	(.19)	(.27)	(.17)	(.18)				
Capability Ratio	.075*	.098***	.104	.019	.025*	-.057	.672*	.023	-.024
	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.01)	(.01)	(.08)	(.32)	(.04)	(.05)
Alliance	-.492	-.473*	-.078	-.056	-.110	-.522*	-.680*	-.394***	-.334**
	(.33)	(.21)	(.25)	(.10)	(.12)	(.25)	(.27)	(.08)	(.11)
Minor Powers	-1.10***	-1.24***	-1.83***	-1.65***	-1.69***	.524*	1.12*	-.735***	.004
	(.20)	(.15)	(.21)	(.10)	(.11)	(.22)	(.52)	(.15)	(.15)
Year	.011**	.002*	.003	.004***	-.110	.002	.022	.006***	.009***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)	(.12)	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-5.64***	-1.48***	-1.96*	-1.34**	-1.25**				
	(1.29)	(.36)	(.98)	(.38)	(.45)				
Peace Years	-.075**	-.101***	-.105***	-.101***	-.078***	-.006	.035	-.041***	-.014*
	(.03)	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)	(.00)	(.00)
Fixed Effects						Dyad	Dyad	Dyad	Dyad
N =	75,123	347,123	76,681	1,173,711	647,367	16,513	2,176	61,665	38,002

Coefficients estimate difference with likelihood of initiation by democracies with women's suffrage.

* = Coefficients at the .05 level. ** =.01 level. *** =.001 level.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

TABLE 5: CONTINUOUS MODELS OF THE MONADIC EFFECTS OF SUFFRAGE, BY TIME PERIOD

Variables	*Model 1 1816-1893*	*Model 2 1816-1930*	*Model 3 1920-1938*	*Model 4 Interwar Excl.*	*Model 5 Cold War Excl.*	*Model 6 1816-1930*	*Model 7 1920-1938*	*Model 8 Interwar Excl.*	*Model 9 Cold War Excl.*
Polity	.096***	.083***	.016	.081***	.076***	.013	.035	.016	-.020*
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)	(.01)	(.01)
Women's Suffrage		1.76*	-.437	-.159	-.019	1.26	4.81**	.207	.785**
		(.79)	(.91)	(.18)	(.24)	(1.18)	(1.63)	(.18)	(.14)
*Polity * Suffrage*		-.411***	-.043	-.113***	-.139***	-.230†	-.627*	-.119***	-.203***
		(.10)	(.11)	(.02)	(.03)	(.14)	(.26)	(.02)	(.03)
Civil Liberties		-.735*	-1.35*	-1.34***	-1.44***	.739	-7.19***	-1.16***	-.731*
		(.31)	(.53)	(.20)	(.24)	(.55)	(1.81)	(.24)	(.29)
Contiguity	2.09***	1.96***	1.67***	2.44***	2.06***				
	(.29)	(.22)	(.28)	(.17)	(.19)				
Capability Ratio	.071*	.084***	.056	.022*	.029*	-.078	.298	.007	-.042
	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.01)	(.01)	(.08)	(.38)	(.04)	(.05)
Alliance	-.352	-.404*	-.112	-.023	-.078	-.557*	-.849**	-.385***	-.361**
	(.32)	(.21)	(.27)	(.11)	(.12)	(.25)	(.29)	(.08)	(.11)
Minor Powers	-1.18***	-1.33***	-1.93***	-1.73***	-1.77***	.403	1.18	-.711***	.029
	(.18)	(.14)	(.23)	(.10)	(.11)	(.23)	(.71)	(.15)	(.15)
Year	.008*	.004	.043	.004***	.004***	-.003	.063**	.006***	.009***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-5.69***	-3.76***	-2.43*	-1.20**	-1.26**				
	(1.22)	(.76)	(1.19)	(.38)	(.45)				
Peace Years	-.075**	-.063***	-.090**	-.098***	-.077***	-.011	.074*	-.041***	-.014*
	(.03)	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)	(.00)	(.00)
Fixed Effects						Dyad	Dyad	Dyad	Dyad
N =	75,123	146,181	71,372	1,181,195	647,367	16,327	1,781	61,665	38,002

Coefficients estimate difference with likelihood of initiation by democracies with women's suffrage.

†= Coefficients at the .1 level * = Coefficients at the .05 level. ** =.01 level. *** =.001 level.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

3. Monadic Analysis Using Country-Year Data

To assess the robustness of the directed-dyad findings in the manuscript, we conducted similar analyses using country-year data. Within the country-year data spanning from 1816 to 2010, in which there are a total of 14,393 observations, 12,405 observations have been assigned a Polity score. Of these observations, 3,934 have a Polity score of 6 or higher. Of these democratic observations, women's suffrage is allowed within 3,339 and is prohibited within 595.

First, we created the two binary variables described in the manuscript. The first, *Autocracy*, is coded 1 if the polity score of the state is 5 or less and 0 otherwise. The second, *Male-Suffrage Democracy*, is coded 1 if the state has a polity score greater than 5 and has not granted women the vote and is otherwise coded as 0. These variables were included within a model along with a measure of the women's civil liberties, capability of the state, as measured by its CINC score drawn from the Correlates of War dataset, and a variable accounting for whether the state was a major power in a given year. These variables were used to predict the likelihood of dispute initiation, as coded and described within the monadic section of the manuscript. As within the manuscript, the baseline likelihood of initiation used for comparison within these models is the likelihood of initiation amongst women's suffrage democracies.

Table 6 presents the results of this country-year analysis. The table shows that the relationship between male-suffrage democracies and women's suffrage democracies reported in the manuscript is highly robust, including to the addition of women's civil liberties, the inclusion of various fixed effects and over truncated periods, as illustrated within Model 3. The predicted probability of initiation by male-suffrage democracies during the period 1890 to 1934 was, for instance, 73% (p = .000) higher than that for women's suffrage democracies. This general relationship holds across models including country and country-twenty year and country-thirty year fixed effects.

The coefficients in the first row estimate the difference between autocracies and democracies with women's suffrage. The models indicate that the finding that autocracies are significantly more likely to initiate disputes than women's suffrage democracies is robust. The predicted probability of initiation amongst autocracies during the period 1890 to 1935 was, for instance, 85% higher (p = .000) than that for women's suffrage democracies during the same period.[1] The models do provide evidence that this relationship may be sensitive to the inclusion of women's civil liberties.

We also conducted the continuous analysis reported in Models 5 - 7 in Table 4 in the manuscript using country-year data and found highly similar results to those originally reported.

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[1]We confirmed that this relationship is also robust over the periods 1890 to 1930, 1890 to 1940 and 1890 to 1950. Autocracies during the same period were, in contrast, only 45% (p = .000) more likely to initiate conflict than male-suffrage democracies.

Table 6: Results from Country-Year Models, 1816 - 2010

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3 1890-1935*	*Model 4 1920-1938*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*	*Model 9*	*Model 10*
Autocracy	.228**	-.053	1.06***	1.31**	.416**	.426**	.266	.335*	.156	.117
	(.06)	(.09)	(.29)	(.38)	(.13)	(.15)	(.17)	(.17)	(.19)	(.23)
Male-Suffrage	.309*	.249*	.891**	.567	.755***	.913**	.793*	1.13**	1.02*	.217
Democracy	(.12)	(.12)	(.32)	(.56)	(.17)	(.32)	(.32)	(.39)	(.39)	(.58)
Civil Liberties		-.665***			1.36***		-.827		-1.03	
		(.14)			(.25)		(.43)		(.57)	
Capabilities	4.14***	3.48***	5.91***	7.22*	-.210	4.03	3.97	4.76	4.87	.126
	(.78)	(.78)	(1.64)	(3.05)	(1.08)	(2.86)	(2.86)	(3.92)	(3.93)	(5.25)
Major Power	1.23***	1.27***	1.79***	1.61***	1.32***	.435	.441	.522	.479	.042
	(.11)	(.11)	(.22)	(.40)	(.20)	(.41)	(.40)	(.51)	(.52)	(.61)
Fixed Effects	-	-	-	-	Country	Country 30 Year	Country 30 Year	Country 20 Year	Country 20 Year	Country Decade
N =	12,248	11,372	2,089	1,068	9,810	8,420	8,019	7,253	6,914	5,767

* = Coefficient at .05 level. ** = Coefficient at .01 level. *** = Coefficient at .001 level.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.

4. Within-Country Analysis

According to Przeworski (2009), 348 extensions of suffrage have been granted over democracy's lifespan. Prior to 1914, only 4 of these extensions involved women. After 1914, suffrage was extended within existing democracies to include either women or to include additional men on the basis of class. Seventy of these extensions were based solely on gender, 185 were based on class only and 93 included extensions along both gender and class lines.

As a test of robustness, we compared the average rate of dispute involvement in the years leading up to the first extension of suffrage to women with the average rate of dispute involvement in the equivalent number of years following the granting of female suffrage. A similar comparison was assessed before and after the year in which universal suffrage was granted to women. Finally, similar before and after comparisons were made for extensions of suffrage amongst men only along class lines. These extensions have involved the elimination of voting barriers on the basis of education, wealth and / or age. Within the analysis of the effects of increasing the population of eligible male voters, only those extensions along class lines that did not occur within 5 years of an extension along gender lines were included. Each analysis only includes those cases in which states were members of the international system for the full ten or twenty-year periods before and after suffrage extension.

Table 7 below illustrates these temporal within-country comparisons. The percentages in the graph represent the percentage change in the average rate of dispute involvement when comparing three different time spans before and after the extension of suffrage: 10 years before and after suffrage extension, 20 years before and after suffrage extension and the period 10 to 20 years before and after extension. The number of cases considered within each analysis are listed underneath the table. The first number represents the number of cases analyzed over the 10-year period; the second represents those cases analyzed over twenty-year periods.

The table generally shows that increasing the proportion of women amongst eligible voters is associated with a significant decline in subsequent aggression while increasing the number of men that can vote is associated with a significant increase in aggression over a 20 year period. More specifically, we see that granting some women the vote, which in all but two countries involved an extension of suffrage in which women would constitute at least 40% of eligible voters, is associated with a 14% decline in dispute involvement over the subsequent 20-year period. Adopting universal female suffrage is associated within a 20% decline in aggression over the subsequent 20 years when compared with the 20 years leading up to the granting of universal female suffrage. Both of these declines are statistically significant at conventional levels. Conversely, increasing the proportion of men eligible to vote increases dispute involvement by 27.1%.

We can also be sure that the substantial shifts in aggression reported in Table 7 are not explained by any correlation in time between periods of war and the extension of suffrage. One

Table 7: Percentage Change in Frequency of Disputes.

Time Span	*Female* First Wave	*Female* Universal	*Male* Second Wave
+ / - 10 Years	**-8.41%** *(p=.19)*	**-19.7%** *(p =.01)*	**+10.1%** *(p=.28)*
+ / - 10 – 20 Years	**-17.8%** *(p =.03)*	**-14%** *(p=.07)*	**+22.6%** *(p=.16)*
+ / - 20 Years	**-14%** *(p=.02)*	**-20%** *(p=.002)*	**+27.1%** (p=.008)
	N= 49, 40	N = 50, 41	N = 16, 12

hypothesis, attributed to Ticchi and Vindigni, is that suffrage is more likely to be extended to men in the years leading up to war. The data clearly indicates that any such correlation is not driving the increase in aggression following waves of men's suffrage. In only 2 cases examined in this analysis - Italy (1913) and Japan (1925) - was an extension of suffrage followed by war within five years. Furthermore, Przeworski (2009) finds little empirical support for the Ticchi and Vindigni theory. In his analysis of the causes of suffrage extensions, Przeworski finds that of the 226 extensions of suffrage that are covered by the Correlates of War dataset, only 20 occurred in the 5 years prior to war.

Przeworski (2009) also notes that female suffrage has in a number of European cases been granted following large-scale conflict. To ensure that the significant decline we find above following suffrage extension by gender is not merely reflecting declines in aggression following war, we also compared rates of aggression in the 10 and 20 years before the granting of suffrage with the average rate 10 to 20 years following the extension of suffrage. As the middle row of Table 7 shows, the correlation between female suffrage and diminished aggression remains both substantively and statistically significant.

Finally, it is unlikely that the results of the within-country analysis are picking up on a general trend of pacification over time. The finding that average rates of initiation are actually higher for men in the years after the expansion of male suffrage than in the same period before belies this proposition. Moreover, many of the cases of female suffrage expansion included in the analysis take place prior to World War II and the period of extended postwar peace.

5. Suffrage and the Use of Force

The monadic analysis within the manuscript assesses the relationship between women's suffrage and the likelihood of initiation of a dispute. Such initiation could involve the threat, demonstration or use of force against another state. This is the standard variable used within analyses of the democratic peace. Clearly, the implications of the actual use of force are typically far more grave than threats or demonstrations of force. This section therefore analyzes solely the likelihood of initiation which involves the use of force as a function of women's suffrage. The primary dependent variable is coded 1 if the state is coded as the initiator and the level of hostility used by the initiating state is a 4 or 5 in the standard Correlates of War scale.

Table 8 presents the same dichotomous models as presented in the monadic results section of the manuscript, but using the alternative use of force dependent variable. The table shows that male-suffrage democracies are significantly less likely to initiate a conflict using force in the pre-women's suffrage era, as shown in Model 1. The models present strong evidence for the hypothesis that autocracies are more likely than women's suffrage democracies not only to initiate conflict but to do so with the use of force. While the coefficients for male-suffrage democracy are not significant in Models 2 and 3, we do find strong support for a difference between male-suffrage and women's suffrage democracies between 1890 and 1935, a period of significant variation in democracy type. The results of a model extending this period from 1890 to 1955, the point at which women in nearly all democracies voted, are very similar to those presented in Model 4. Moreover, we find evidence that male-suffrage democracies are more likely than women's suffrage democracies to initiate with the use of force when including dyad fixed effects over the full time period and when excluding the Cold War and interwar periods from the analysis.

Table 9 presents the results of models estimating the relationship between initiation with the use of force, women's suffrage and increasing levels of democracy. Model 1 within the table echoes the results discussed within the manuscript – as levels of democracy increase in the era prior to women's suffrage, the likelihood of initiation with use of force significantly increased. The results suggest that suffrage has an increasingly pacifying effect as levels of democracy increase. The table suggests this is true between 1893 and 1955, during the interwar period, when excluding the interwar period and when excluding the Cold War. Predicted probabilities generated using Model 4 indicate, for instance, that the likelihood of initiation using force is 46% lower amongst states with women's suffrage and with polity scores of 10 than it is among states with women's suffrage but polity scores of 5 ($p < .01$). In contrast, the likelihood of initiation with force amongst states with polity scores of 10 but no women's suffrage can not be confidently distinguished from states without women's suffrage and with polity scores of 5.

Table 8: Dichotomous Models of Initiation with Use of Force, 1816 - 2010.

Variables	*Model 1 1816 - 1893*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 3 1890-1955*	*Model 4*	*Model 5 No Interwar*	*Model 6 No Cold War*	*Model 7*
Autocracy		.829***	.300*	1.10***	.683***	.631***	1.22***	.370*
		(.11)	(.14)	(.25)	(.14)	(.14)	(.19)	(.15)
Male-Suffrage	.287	.827***	.714**	1.02***	.852***	.864***	1.00***	.712**
Democracy	(.41)	(.24)	(.22)	(.23)	(.18)	(.19)	(.21)	(.26)
Women's Civil Liberties			-1.23***	-.956**	-1.65***	-1.85***	-1.61***	-2.35***
			(.23)	(.33)	(.26)	(.27)	(.33)	(.33)
Contiguity	2.34***	2.63***	2.50***	1.38***				
	(.35)	(.17)	(.17)	(.19)				
Capability Ratio	.030	.004	-.003	.024	-.060	-.082	-.091	.089
	(.04)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.07)
Alliance	-1.07*	-.135	-.148	-.747***	-.305**	-.362**	-.295*	-.318
	(.42)	(.12)	(.12)	(.19)	(.10)	(.11)	(.13)	(.07)
Minor Powers	-.868**	-1.61***	-1.62***	-2.27***	-.647***	-.802***	-.047	-.373
	(.25)	(.11)	(.11)	(.15)	(.17)	(.18)	(.19)	(.21)
Year	.012*	.004*	.004***	.021***	.005***	.004***	.008***	.012***
	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-6.49**	-1.07**	-.772	.365				
	(1.91)	(.39)	(.39)	(.54)				
Peace Years	-.044	-.104***	-.101***	-.052***	-.050***	-.053***	-.017*	-.025**
	(.03)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Fixed Effects					Dyad	Dyad	Dyad	Dyad 50-Year
N =	74,834	1,339,174	1,242,532	176,571	55,634	48,629	30,397	28,137

*** = Coefficients significant at the .000 level.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

Table 9: Continuous Models of Initiation with Use of Force, 1816 - 2010.

Variables	*Model 1 1816 - 1893*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4 1893 - 1955*	*Model 5*	*Model 6 1893- 1955*	*Model 7 Interwar*	*Model 8 No Interwar*	*Model 9 No Cold War*
Polity	.067***	.023*	.058***	-.003	.013	.014	.118	.015	-.024
	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.06)	(.01)	(.01)
Women's Suffrage		.072	-.145	-.019	.075	.908	4.33*	.031	.303
		(.21)	(.21)	(.51)	(.24)	(.61)	(2.12)	(.24)	(.37)
*Polity * Suffrage*		-.140***	-.093**	-.122*	-.110***	-.213**	-.782*	-.108**	-.156***
		(.03)	(.03)	(.06)	(.03)	(.07)	(.35)	(.03)	(.04)
Women's Civil Liberties			-1.62***	-.893**	-1.71***	-2.03**	-14.67**	-1.86***	-1.32***
			(.23)	(.33)	(.28)	(.59)	(4.41)	(.29)	(.37)
Contiguity	2.40***	2.63***	2.48***	1.40***					
	(.41)	(.17)	(.18)	(.19)					
Capability Ratio	.021	.006	-.001	.022	-.074	.032	.644	-.098*	-.102
	(.04)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.05)	(.12)	(.47)	(.05)	(.06)
Alliance	-.907*	-.095	-.105	-.716***	-.290**	-1.25***	-1.38**	-.346**	-.316*
	(.43)	(.12)	(.12)	(.19)	(.10)	(.22)	(.48)	(.11)	(.14)
Minor Powers	-.969***	-1.62***	-1.66***	-2.25***	-.644***	-.207	1.58	-.785***	-.045
	(.24)	(.11)	(.11)	(.15)	(.16)	(.25)	(1.21)	(.18)	(.19)
Year	.007	.004***	.005***	.020***	.006***	.031***	.089**	.005***	.008***
	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.03)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-8.06***	-1.09**	-.771	.378					
	(2.04)	(.39)	(.40)	(.52)					
Peace Years	-.050	-.101***	-.097***	-.052***	-.050***	.011	.162**	-.053***	-.017*
	(.04)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.05)	(.01)	(.01)
Fixed Effects					Dyad	Dyad	Dyad	Dyad	Dyad
N =	75,123	1,341,832	1,245,083	178,967	55,634	12,587	1,414	48,629	30,397

*** = Coefficients significant at the .000 level.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

6. Monadic Models Accounting for Capability of Initiator

To account for the possibility that more powerful states were also the most likely to adopt women's suffrage early on and to initiate conflict, the variable *Capabilities* was included within all models within Table 4 of the manuscript. This variable is coded as a the state's percentage of global capabilities within a given year. The results of these models are presented in Table 10 below.

The models show that all of the findings of primary interest within the manuscript hold when including the variable measuring the capabilities of the state. This includes all decade-dyad fixed effects models, including the model restricted to the time period of 1890 - 1945, strongly suggesting that more pacifying trends in state behavior more broadly are driving results. We also see that the variable accounting for women's civil liberties is actually positively associated with conflict initiation within two of the fixed effects models, suggesting that democratic institutions themselves, and not feminist norms more broadly, are responsible for the more pacific behavior of states.

TABLE 10: MODELS OF THE MONADIC EFFECTS OF SUFFRAGE, INCL. CAPABILITIES

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3 1893-1955*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*
Polity					.007	.023	.0123
					(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Women's Suffrage					.730*	.552	.283
					(.29)	(.29)	(.18)
Polity x Women's Suffrage					-.180***	-.143***	-.123***
					(.04)	(.04)	(.02)
Dem w/o Women's Suffrage (0/1)	1.06**	.935**	1.07***	.895***			
	(.32)	(.32)	(.19)	(.13)			
Autocracy (0/1)	.744***	.350	1.26***	.559***			
	(.19)	(.18)	(.22)	(.10)			
Civil-Liberties		-.918**	-.429**	-.936***		-.906*	-.941***
		(.34)	(.29)	(.21)		(.36)	(.23)
Capabilities	8.26**	6.79**	6.65***	2.27*	8.50	7.10**	1.54
	(.2.42)	(.2,54)	(.99)	(.90)	(.03)	(2.50)	(.89)
Contiguity	3.07***	3.24***	1.43***		3.02***	3.03***	
	(.28)	(.27)	(.17)		(.28)	(.29)	
Capability Ratio	-.021	-.014	-.033***	-.026	-.091	-.014	-.018
	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.04)	(.03)	(.02)	(.04)
Alliance	.318	.302	-.375*	-.331***	.342	.324	-.343***
	(.19)	(.19)	(.16)	(.08)	(.19)	(.19)	(.08)
Minor Powers	-.064	-.041	-1.83***	-.551***	-.097	-.082*	-.598***
	(.26)	(.27)	(.14)	(.14)	(.26)	(.26)	(.13)
At Least One Nuclear Power	.737**	.703**		-.164	.711**	.675**	-.173
	(.22)	(.23)		(.11)	(.22)	(.23)	(.11)
Joint Nuclear	.426	.469		.139	.436	.470	-.002
	(.63)	(.66)		(.21)	(.64)	(.67)	(.21)
Trade	-25.67	-18.24			-22.02	-16.20	
	(17.99)	(16.41)			(16.53)	(14.91)	
Interest Similarity	-1.00***	-1.14***			-1.09***	-1.22***	
	(.28)	(.27)			(.28)	(.27)	
Year	-.001	-.001	.010**	.007***	-.000	-.001	.008***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-2.25**	-2.37**	-.226		-2.33***	-2.43**	
	(.73)	(.73)	(.49)		(.72)	(.72)	
Peace Years	-.121***	-.117***	-.064***	-.041***	-.120***	-.114***	-.041***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)
Fixed Effects				Dyad			Dyad
N =	347,235	325,701	178,967	69,792	347,235	325,701	69,792

Coefficients for binary variables estimate difference with democracies with women's suffrage.
* = Coefficients at the .05 level. ** =.01 level. *** =.001 level. Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

Part B. Tests of Robustness
Dyadic Analysis

7. Temporal Fixed Effects Models

Models 3 through 7 in Table 5 of the manuscript explore the effect of increasing polity scores in dyads with and without women's suffrage. This section presents further analysis of this relationship that includes fixed effects accounting for dyad and a range of temporal periods. Inclusion of dyad-twenty year fixed effects, for instance, means that the coefficients are identifying off of within dyad-twenty year variation only and are not dependent upon cross-country confounding.

The models within Table 11 proceed with decreasing periods of time, with Model 1 including dyad-50 year fixed effects and Model 5 estimating the likelihood of conflict propensity when including decade-dyad fixed effects. We see that the primary interaction Dem_L * *Joint Suffrage* is negative and significant at standard levels within the dyad 40-year, dyad 30-year and dyad 20-year fixed effects models, each of which includes the dyadic measure of women's civil liberties. The coefficient within the decade-dyad model is negative and has a p-value of .11. Model 6 in the table includes dyad twenty-year fixed effects when analyzing the time period 1893 to 1955. We see that the negative correlation between suffrage and democratization is robust to this constrained specification.

TABLE 11: FIXED EFFECTS MODELS OF CONFLICT PROPENSITY.

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6 1893- 1955*
Dem_L	-.019	.010	-.003	.056*	-.024	.059
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Joint Suffrage	.290	.345	.366	.381	-.059	1.81
	(.27)	(.29)	(.29)	(.35)	(.42)	(1.09)
Dem_L * *Joint Suffrage*	-.065	-.161**	-.101*	-.228***	-.114	-.421*
	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.08)	(.19)
Dem_H	-.014	-.010	-.011	.009	.034	-.024
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
At Least 1 Women's Suffrage Democracy	-.304	-.092	-.233	-.358	-.134	3.15*
	(.23)	(.25)	(.25)	(.31)	(.39)	(1.41)
Suffrage-Democracy$_H$	.060	.029	.073	.052	-.067	-.355*
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.07)	(.15)
Civil-Liberties$_L$	-2.41***	-.815	-2.37***	-2.00**	-2.48**	-3.81**
	(.35)	(.44)	(.41)	(.59)	(.77)	(1.46)
Capability Ratio	-.007	.031	.128	.033	.071	-.184
	(.08)	(.10)	(.11)	(.13)	(.16)	(.27)
Alliance	-.277*	-.399*	-.381*	-.343	-.857***	-.906**
	(.13)	(.16)	(.15)	(.19)	(.24)	(.32)
Minor Powers	-1.14***	-.756*	-.779*	-.555***	.483	-.344***
	(.29)	(.38)	(.35)	(.36)	(.56)	(.42)
At Least One Nuclear Power	.046	-.645**	-.498*	-.017	-.546	
	(.23)	(.18)	(.20)	(.24)	(.35)	
Joint Nuclear	-.524	-.842*	-.646	-.938	-1.31*	
	(.41)	(.35)	(.38)	(.51)	(.62)	
Year	.006*	.002	.001	-.004	.014	.016
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)
Fixed Effects	Dyad-50 Year	Dyad-40 Year	Dyad-30 Year	Dyad-20 Year	Dyad-Decade	Dyad-20 Year
N =	19,923	16,214	15,795	11,484	8,099	2,569

Coefficients for primary variables of interest are not directly interpretable.

* = Coefficients at the .05 level. ** =.01 level. *** =.001 level.

åRobust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

8. The Dyadic Peace Over Time

This section provides further analysis of the effects of democracy and suffrage over different time periods. Across each of the examined time periods, the negative relationship between dyadic suffrage democracies and conflict remains robust.

Democratization Without Female Suffrage: 1816 - 1893
Models 1 and 3 within Table 12 analyze the standard model of the democratic peace in the period of the 19th century before which any democracies had adopted female suffrage. Within this period, during which all democracies allowed male suffrage only, we find no evidence of a pacifying effect of dyadic democracy. Rather, we see that joint autocratic dyads were significantly less likely to engage in conflict than joint male-suffrage democracies and mixed dyads within one male-suffrage democracy. The results also suggest that increasing the lower democracy score correlates with a small but positive increase in dyadic dispute propensity. This stands in stark contrast to the standard finding of the democratic peace.

Democratization During a Period of Transition: 1816 - 1930
Models 2 and 4 in Table 12 examine the effects of dyadic democracy and suffrage between 1816 and 1930.[2] By 1930, more than two-thirds allowed women to vote in national elections. The analysis finds further support for the robustness of the relationship between dyadic suffrage democracy and dispute propensity. Joint autocratic and joint democratic dyads without women's suffrage were significantly more likely to engage in disputes than women's suffrage democracies during this period. Moreover, increasing levels of democracy within suffrage states are negatively and significantly correlated during this period. Substantive analysis of Model 2 finds that the predicted probability of conflict during this period between joint women's suffrage democracies was 88% less likely to engage in disputes than joint autocratic dyads and 85% less likely than joint democratic dyads without women's suffrage. Substantive analysis of Model 4 indicates that increasing the lowest democracy score from 5 to 10 amongst states without women's suffrage is associated with a 5% decrease while the same increase amongst states with women's suffrage is associated with an 87% decline in conflict propensity.

Democratization in the Interwar Period: 1920 -1938
The relationship between dyadic suffrage and conflict holds during the interwar period as well, as represented within Model 5 within Table 12. The change in the predicted probability associated with the adoption of women's suffrage during the interwar period is presented in fig:interwar. The graph shows that as the dyadic polity score increases, the effects of adopting joint suffrage increases as well. Within democratic dyads in which both states have polity scores of 5, the adoption of joint suffrage is associated with a 21% decline in the likelihood of conflict propensity, though this difference is not significant at standard levels.[3] Within

[2]The measure for women's civil liberties is excluded from models 1 - 4 because of limited data availability.

[3]Given the relatively sparse data during this time period, it is not surprising that the standard errors would

Figure 3: Effects of Women's Suffrage, 1919 - 1938



democratic dyads in which both states have polity scores of 10, however, the adoption of joint suffrage is associated with a 57% decline in the likelihood of conflict propensity (p = .012).

Democratization in the Pre and Post War Periods: 1816 -1914 and 1939 - 2015
It is possible that the interwar period itself is unique and that unusual state behavior between the wars is driving results. Model 6 in Table 12 strongly suggests this is not the case. The model assesses the effects of democratization and suffrage in the collective periods before World War I and after World War II. The substantive results show that the statistically and substantively significant relationship between the adoption of suffrage within increasingly democratic dyads and the likelihood of conflict is robust in this divided period. Within democratic dyads in which both states have polity scores of 5, the adoption of joint suffrage is associated with a 39% decline in the likelihood of conflict propensity ($p < .001$). Within democratic dyads in which both states have polity scores of 10, however, the adoption of joint suffrage is associated with a 81% decline in the likelihood of conflict propensity ($p < .001$).

Democratization in the Pre and Post Cold War Periods: 1816 -1945 and 1990 - 2015
Finally, it is possible that the behavior of states during the Cold War is a significant driver of results. To test this, we estimated the models omitting the years of the Cold War. The results are presented in Model 7. Substantive analysis illustrates that the effects of suffrage as dyadic democracy scores increase is highly similar within this period to the effects when the interwar period is excluded.

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be so large.

TABLE 12: THE DYADIC EFFECTS OF SUFFRAGE BY TIME PERIOD

Variables	*Model 1 1816-1893*	*Model 2 1816-1930*	*Model 3 1816-1893*	*Model 4 1816-1930*	*Model 5 1920-1938*	*Model 6 No Interwar*	*Model 7 No Cold War*
Dem_L			.034*	-.011	.000	-.056***	-.052***
			(.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)
Joint Suffrage				2.47*	1.66	.825***	1.16***
				(1.03)	(.89)	(.17)	(.21)
Dem_L * *Joint Suffrage*				-.421**	-.328**	-.141***	-.161***
				(.15)	(.12)	(.02)	(.03)
Dem_H			.079***	.003	.008	.035**	.032*
			(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)
At Least 1 Women's Suffrage Democracy				.861	.567	-.225	-.031
				(.99)	(.82)	(.14)	(.19)
Suffrage-Democracy$_H$				-.136	-.066	.049*	.016
				(.11)	(.09)	(.02)	(.02)
Joint Autocracy (0/1)	-.785**	1.52***					
	(.15)	(.39)					
Joint Democracy w/o Women's Suff (0/1)		1.40**					
		(.48)					
Dem. w/o Women's Suff / Autocracy (0/1)		2.13***					
		(.39)					
Dem. w/o Women's Suff / Dem. w. Women's Suff		-.155					
		(.68)					
Dem w. Women's Suff / Autocracy (0/1)		.741					
		(.43)					
Civil-Liberties$_L$					-1.73**	-1.02***	-1.57***
					(.55)	(.15)	(.23)
Contiguity	1.38***	1.48***	1.29***	1.22***	.936*	2.12***	1.88***
	(.24)	(.18)	(.25)	(.32)	(.40)	(.14)	(.18)
Capability Ratio	-.031	.001	-.034	-.002	.021	-.008	.000
	(.02)	(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.01)	(.00)
Alliance	-.031	-.162	.008	-.163**	-.357	.192***	.219*
	(.29)	(.21)	(.29)	(.33)	(.32)	(.07)	(.11)
Minor Powers	-.942***	-1.23***	-1.00***	-1.62***	-1.93***	-1.45***	-1.60***
	(.13)	(.10)	(.12)	(.17)	(.20)	(.09)	(.11)
At Least One Nuclear Power						.445***	.116
						(.09)	(.14)
Joint Nuclear						.013	.447
						(.29)	(.32)
Year	.008**	.002	.003	-.029**	.071*	-.000	.002
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-.000	-.000***	-.001***	-.000*	-.001*	-.000***	-.000***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
N =	30,161	63,013	30,161	63,013	28,986	463,067	234,404

Coefficients for primary variables of interest are not directly interpretable.

* = Coefficients at the .05 level. ** =.01 level. *** =.001 level. Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

9. Women's Suffrage and The Use of Force

The dependent variable used within the analysis in the manuscript and within other analyses within this appendix is *Dispute*. This dispute variable is coded 1 if either country in the dispute engages in the threat, display or use of force, ie. if the highest hostility level by either state is a 2, 3, 4 or 5 according to the MID dataset. To ensure, however, that low level threats that involve only rhetorical posturing are not driving the results, we also ran all models within Table 4 in the manuscript on the dependent variable *Use of Force*. This variable is coded 1 if a dyad experienced a dispute within a year and if the highest level of hostility reached by either state is 4 or 5 on the hostility scale in the Correlates of War dataset. The results of these models are presented in Table 13.

The results of these models are largely consistent with the primary results within Table 4 within the manuscript. Substantive interpretation of these models also largely mimics those reported within the manuscript. In each of the models, the variable Dem_L * *Joint Suffrage* is negatively and significantly correlated with the use of force. This suggests that as the level of democratization increases within democratic dyads with suffrage, the likelihood that these states engage in the use of force declines. This finding is robust to the inclusion of standard controls for trade and interest similarity as well as variables accounting for levels of female political participation and civil liberties as well as to the incorporation of dyad-decade fixed effects. The predicted probability the democratic dyads with women's suffrage will engage in the use of force is 74% lower than the probability among democratic dyads without women's suffrage.

As within the primary analysis in the manuscript, and the majority of those models examined within this appendix, we find little evidence that a similar negative relationship exists between the use of force and levels of dyadic democratization when women are not included within the voting population.

Table 13: Use of Force Dispute Models

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2 1893-1955*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5 1893-1955*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*
Dem_L			-.071***	-.047**	-.048**	-.005	.039
			(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)
Joint Suffrage			.870**	.836**	.732	.657*	.289
			(.31)	(.31)	(.71)	(.28)	(.41)
Dem_L * *Joint Suffrage*			-.192***	-.172**	-.195†	-.15***	-.143*
			(.05)	(.05)	(.11)	(.04)	(.07)
Dem_H			.039**	.025	.029*	-.020	.009
			(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
At Least 1 Women's Suffrage Democracy			-.251	-.304	-.115	-.192	.161
			(.24)	(.25)	(.47)	(.24)	(.36)
Suffrage-Democracy$_H$			.006	.056	.021	.060	.004
			(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.06)
Joint Autocracy (0/1)	1.53***	2.32***					
	(.25)	(.41)					
Joint Democracy w/o Women's Suff (0/1)	1.01*	1.05†					
	(.49)	(.61)					
Dem. w/o Women's Suff / Autocracy (0/1)	1.74***	2.32***					
	(.28)	(.42)					
Dem. w/o Women's Suff / Dem. w. Women's Suff	-.301	.142					
	(.59)	(.68)					
Dem w. Women's Suff / Autocracy (0/1)	1.69***	2.27***					
	(.24)	(.40)					
Civil-Liberties$_L$				-1.41***	-1.64***	-2.19***	-2.59***
				(.25)	(.36)	(.35)	(.68)
Contiguity	2.15***	1.92***	2.17***	2.17***	1.93***		
	(.20)	(.23)	(.21)	(.22)	(.27)		
$Depend_L$	-22.48		-16.46	2.55			
	(14.78)		(14.07)	(12.70)			
Interest Similarity	-.951***		-.773**	-1.15***			
	(.25)		(.26)	(.27)			
Capability Ratio	.005	.016	.008	-.008	-.000	-.028	.158
	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.07)	(.16)
Alliance	.138	-.578**	.169	.211	-.449*	-.201	-.492*
	(.11)	(.21)	(.11)	(.11)	(.21)	(.12)	(.23)
Minor Powers	-1.35***	-1.96***	-1.35***	-1.26***	-1.92***	-1.02**	-.567
	(.14)	(.13)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.31)	(.42)
At Least One Nuclear Power	.538***		.535***	.497**		-.312*	-.428
	(.15)		(.14)	(.15)		(.15)	(.27)
Joint Nuclear	-.076		-.071	-.195		-.450	-.149
	(.57)		(.58)	(.58)		(.31)	(.58)
Year	.003	.012**	.003	.005	.012*	.003	-.004
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)
Distance	-.000***	.000	-.001***	-.000***	-.001*		
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)		
Fixed Effects						Dyad	Dyad-20 Year
N =	302,889	67,497	302,889	277,213	59,218	22,597	8,456

† = Coefficients at the .1 level. * = .05 level. ** =.01 level. *** =.001 level. Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

10. Democratization without Women's Suffrage

Table 14 presents the effect of democratization amongst states without female suffrage within different time periods. In none of the time periods tested was democratization associated with declines in conflict. In contrast, the likelihood conflict initiation was actually higher within more democratic dyads during the interwar period between 1919 and 1939.

Table 14: Democratization in States Without Female Suffrage Across Time

Variables	*Model 1* *1816 - 2000*	*Model 2* *1816 – 1914*	*Model 3* *1919 - 1939*	*Model 4* *1945 - 2000*
Dem_L	.008	.008	.075*	-.005
	(.01)	(.01)	(.03)	(.02)
Dem_H	.053***	.106***	-.039	.011
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)
Noncontiguity	-2.05***	-1.77***	-1.87***	-2.69***
	(.15)	(.20)	(.46)	(.26)
Capability Ratio	-.011	-.016	.014	.011
	(.01)	(.02)	(.05)	(.02)
Alliance	.064	.136	-.466	-.210*
	(.09)	(.27)	(.37)	(.10)
Minor Powers	-1.20***	-.963***	-1.81***	-.767**
	(.11)	(.12)	(.26)	(.27)
Year	.001	-.000	-.000	.009**
	(.009)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-.000***	-.000	-.001***	-.000**
	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)
N=	243,305	42,239	16,893	183,406

11. Models with Alternative Measures of Suffrage

The primary variable for suffrage is based on the year in which any women within a state received the right to vote in national elections. As stated above, women's suffrage occurred in waves in thirteen countries. Moreover, in 70 of the 198 countries coded, the year in which rules were changed to allow any women to vote was not the same as the year of a national election in which women were actually allowed to vote. To assess the degree to which dispute likelihood varies as a function of these alternative timelines of women's suffrage, generated two novel suffrage variables which are constructed exactly like our primary variable *Suffrage-Democracy*$_L$, as described within the manuscript, though the first is based on the year in which all women over a national age were granted the vote and the second is based on the year in which the first national election was held in which women could vote. Within each model, the *Suffrage*$_L$ and *Suffrage*$_H$ variables are also altered based on the alternative measures of suffrage.

These alternative suffrage variables were independently included within Model 2 from the manuscript. Table 15 below presents the results of this analysis. Column 1 reports the correlation between conflict and the low democracy score within dyads in which both states have universal suffrage. Column 2 includes dyad-decade fixed effects within this analysis. We see that in both of these models, the correlation reported in the manuscript holds. The coefficients of the variables constructed using universal suffrage are close in value to those for the suffrage variable reported in Table 4 within the manuscript. This is as would be expected given the small number of states that adopted suffrage within two waves and given the significant correlation between the point at which suffrage is granted and the first vote which is held. The predicted probabilities generated by these models are similar in all important ways to those reported in the manuscript. Including additional control variables for trade and interest similarity does not significantly affect these findings.

Column 3 in Table 15 reports the results of this model when instead including the suffrage variable that relies upon the first election in which females could vote. Again, the key variable *Suffrage-Democracy*$_L$ is significant and negatively correlated with dyadic dispute propensity. This relations holds when including dyad-decade fixed effects within the model. Again, including additional control variables for trade and interest similarity does not significantly affect these findings.

TABLE 15: DISPUTE MODELS WITH ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF SUFFRAGE

Variables	*Universal Suffrage*	*Universal Suffrage*	*First Vote*	*First Vote*
Dem_L	-.058***	-.019	-.061***	-.014
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
$Suffrage_L$	.461	.698**	.850**	.804***
	(.29)	(.22)	(.26)	(.21)
$Suffrage\text{-}Democracy_L$	-.131**	-.171***	-.175***	-.201***
	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Dem_H	.041***	.001	.038***	-.000
	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)
$Suffrage_H$	-.031	-.013	-.002	.011
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
At Least One Universal Suffrage	-.070	-.031	-.301	-.226
	(.18)	(.18)	(.19)	(.19)
Contiguity	2.04***		2.04***	
	(.18)		(.18)	
Capability Ratio	.001	-.139**	.001	-.139**
	(.01)	(.04)	(.01)	(.04)
Trade	-17.36		-14.95	
	(10.68)		(10.29)	
Interest Similarity	-.872***		-.863***	
	(.22)		(.22)	
Alliance	.281**	-.284**	.279**	-.284**
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Minor Powers	-1.39***	-.528**	-1.40***	-.521**
	(.11)	(.16)	(.11)	(.16)
At Least One Nuclear Power	.683***	-.213	.677***	-.216
	(.12)	(.11)	(.12)	(.11)
Joint Nuclear	-.335	-.686**	-.308	-.702**
	(.54)	(.24)	(.54)	(.24)
Year	.001	.004***	-.000	.004***
	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-.001***		-.000***	
	(.00)		(.00)	
Dyad Fixed Effects		Yes		Yes
N =	302,889	41,900	302,889	41,900

*** = Coefficients significant at the .000 level.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

12. Models with Alternative Measures of Democracy

The primary suffrage variable is coded 1 if the state has granted women suffrage and if the state is deemed more democratic than autocratic (polity > 0). As the Polity codebook suggests, we seek to treat regime type and democracy as variables and do not seek define necessary institutional conditions for democracy or the point at which suffrage would initially begin to affect foreign policy within an increasingly democratic state. We want to ensure, however, our results are not specific to this particular coding of democracy. We therefore conducted both the monadic and dyadic analyses with two alternative, more constrained measures of suffrage.

Monadic:
The first alternative coding uses a more truncated range of the polity score to derive the suffrage variable. Within the directed dyad data, 638,501 out of 1,573,036 states have polity scores of 1 or higher. Of those, 576,818 have also granted suffrage. Of those states with polity scores greater than 0, only 21% have polity scores between 1 and 4. Thus, roughly 80% of states with polity scores greater than 0 have polity scores greater than 5. To ensure that the inclusion of these states with polity scores between 1 and 4 were not driving results, we constructed the variable *Constrained Suffrage 1* coded 1 if the state grants women suffrage and if the state's polity score is 6 or higher and used this variable to run the primary monadic models reported in Table 4 of the manuscript. The results of this analysis are presented in Models 1 - 3 in Table 16. We see that the direction and size of the coefficients are highly similar to the coefficients presented in Models 5 - 7 in the primary coefficient table within the manuscript. Models 2 and 5 suggest that the relationship between polity score and suffrage is more sensitive to the inclusion of the women's civil liberties variable, as we would expect given the strong collinearity between measures of suffrage, democracy and civil liberties when the state's polity score is greater than 5.

We then estimated the same set of models using a measure of suffrage *Constrained Suffrage 2* that is coded 1 if the state has granted women suffrage and if the measure of democratic institutions not subtracting the state's autocratic features is 6 or greater. The polity score used within the primary analysis is a composite measure acquired through subtracting all autocratic features of the state from a measure of its total democratic features. Within the variable that measures only democratic features, a value of 6 or higher would equate to a state with open, fair and competitive elections (+2 for holding elections, + 1 for holding open elections, and + 3 for competitiveness of elections). Roughly 85% of states that have polity scores of 1 or higher measure 6 or higher on the scale of democratic features. Models 4 through 6 in Table 16 illustrate that the effect of including this even more constrained measure of suffrage within our primary interaction with polity score also does not lead to dramatically different results than those presented within the manuscript.

Figure 4 illustrates the percentage difference in the predicted probability of conflict initiation between states with and without women's suffrage. The graph on the left is derived using

Table 16: Monadic Suffrage Models, Constrained Suffrage Measure.

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*
Polity	.06	.028	.009	.011	.033*	.006
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)
Suffrage	.74	.379	.393	.549	.209	.683*
	(.65)	(.29)	(.35)	(.53)	(.47)	(.28)
Polity x Suffrage	-.165*	-.107†	-.133**	-.157*	-.101†	-.162***
	(.07)	(.07)	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.03)
Civil-Liberties		-1.20**	-.966***		-1.20***	-.968***
		(.34)	(.23)		(.34)	(.23)
Contiguity	3.20***	3.14***		3.20***	3.14***	
	(.27)	(.28)		(.27)	(.28)	
Capability Ratio	.032	.025	.019	.033	.027	.011
	(.02)	(.02)	(.04)	(.02)	(.02)	(.04)
Alliance	.355	.342	-.345***	.365	.350	-.327***
	(.19)	(.20)	(.08)	(.19)	(.20)	(.08)
Minor Powers	-.574**	-.504*	-.642***	-.568**	-.495*	-.595***
	(.21)	(.22)	(.14)	(.21)	(.22)	(.13)
At Least One	.827***	.779**	-.204	.847***	.791**	-.226*
Nuclear Power	(.22)	(.22)	(.11)	(.22)	(.23)	(.11)
Joint Nuclear	.787	.752	-.003	.776	.743	.102
	(.64)	(.68)	(.21)	(.65)	(.69)	(.21)
Trade	-24.52	-16.53		-24.53	-16.73	
	(16.92)	(14.66)		(16.94)	(14.64)	
Interest Similarity	-1.14***	-1.27***		-1.15***	-1.28***	
	(.27)	(.26)		(.27)	(.26)	
Year	-.003	-.003	.008***	-.003	-.003	.007***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-2.47***	-2.53***		-2.47***	-2.53***	
	(.70)	(.70)		(.69)	(.69)	
Peace Years	-.120***	-.114***	-.041***	-.120***	-.114***	-.041***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)
Fixed Effects			Dyad			Dyad
N =	347,235	325,701	69,792	347,235	325,701	69,792

†=Coefficients at .1 level. * = .05 level. ** =.01 level. *** =.001 level.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

Figure 4: Difference in Initiation with Alternative Monadic Suffrage Measures.



Model 2 in Table 16 while the table on the right is estimated using Table 5. In both graphs, suffrage is seen to correspond to very similar declines in the likelihood of initiation as the polity score of the state increases.

These same constrained versions of the suffrage variable were used within the interactions to assess our dyadic hypothesis as well. As with the monadic results presented and discussed here, the results of models with these constrained suffrage variables do not differ in any significant way from those reported within Table 5 of the manuscript.

Dyadic Analysis:
Versions of these same two constrained suffrage variables were also used to assess robustness of the continuous dyadic models. The variable *Joint Constrained Suffrage 1* is coded 1 if women in both states can vote in national elections and $Dem_L >= 6$ and otherwise 0. This variable was included within the primary interaction as described on page 30 of the manuscript. The results of this analysis are in Models 1 - 3 in Table 17. Again, we see that the primary interaction coefficient is negative and significant when including measures for the women's civil liberties and when including dyad fixed effects. This pattern is reflected within the left graph in Figure 17.

TABLE 17: DYADIC SUFFRAGE MODELS, CONSTRAINED SUFFRAGE MEASURE.

	Constrained Suffrage 1			*Constrained Suffrage 2*		
Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*
Dem_L	-.052***	-.030**	-.000	-.052***	-.032**	.002
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Joint Suffrage	1.42	1.52	1.42*	1.28**	1.33**	1.19**
	(.75)	(.80)	(.57)	(.47)	(.48)	(.45)
Dem_L *x Joint Suffrage*	-.263**	-.270**	-.294***	-.251***	-.248***	-.272***
	(.09)	(.10)	(.07)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Dem_H	.036***	.021	-.013	.036***	.021	-.014
	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
At Least 1 Suffrage	-.376	-.465*	-.371	-.384	-.478*	-.365
Democracy	(.20)	(.21)	(.21)	(.20)	(.21)	(.21)
High Suffrage Dem	.009	.063*	.060*	.011	.064*	.060*
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Civil-Liberties		-1.16***	-1.53***		-1.14***	-1.52***
		(.21)	(.29)		(.21)	(.29)
Contiguity	2.04***	2.01***		2.04***	2.011***	
	(.18)	(.19)		(.18)	(.19)	
Capability Ratio	.001	-.017	-.071	.001	-.018	-.072
	(.01)	(.01)	(.06)	(.01)	(.01)	(.06)
Alliance	.276**	.305**	-.268*	.277**	.308**	-.267*
	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Minor Powers	-1.38***	-1.33***	-1.33***	-1.39***	-1.34***	-1.34***
	(.11)	(.12)	(.26)	(.11)	(.12)	(.26)
At Least One	.684***	.638***	-.209	.683***	.637***	-.210
Nuclear Power	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)
Joint Nuclear	-.312	-.463	-.735**	-.312	-.463	-.737**
	(.53)	(.54)	(.25)	(.53)	(.53)	(.25)
Trade	-15.13	1.48		-14.82	1.59	
	(10.39)	(10.98)		(10.34)	(10.88)	
Interest Similarity	-.871***	-1.21***		-.875***	-1.21***	
	(.22)	(.23)		(.22)	(.23)	
Year	-.003	.003	.008***	-.000	.002	.008***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-.000***	-.001***		-.000***	-.000***	
	(.00)	(.00)		(.00)	(.69)	
Peace Years	-.305***	-.308***	-.141***	-.306***	-.309***	-.141***
	(.01)	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)
Fixed Effects			Dyad			Dyad
N =	302,889	277,213	28,922	302,889	277,213	28,922

†=Coefficients at .1 level. * = .05 level. ** =.01 level. *** =.001 level.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

Figure 5: Difference in Conflict Propensity with Alternative Dyadic Suffrage Measures.



We also created the variable *Constrained Joint Suffrage 2*, coded 1 if women in both states have the right to vote in national elections and if the total democratic features of each state (regardless of autocratic features) is 6 or higher. The variable is otherwise coded 0. The results of models which include this measure of suffrage within the primary interaction are presented in Models 4 - 6 of Table 17. As the graphs in Figure 5 illustrate, these more constrained codings have little substantive effect on our results. As the lowest polity score in the dyad increases from 6 to 10, the pacifying effect associated with women's suffrage increases.

A More Constrained Polity Score without Representation

To ensure that collinearity between the Polity score and suffrage was not driving results, we assessed the effect of the *Regulation of Participation* component of the Polity Score. This component measures, in part, the extent to which there are binding rules on whose political preferences are expressed. Thus, if restrictions of the ability of women to vote are incorporated into the state's overall Polity score, it would be through this particular component of the composite measure. We therefore analyzed the core models within the manuscript on data which omitted all cases in which the *Regulation of Participation* variable is coded as "Restricted," or when "significant groups, issues, and/ or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process."[4] This equates to a value of '4' within the variable and as 2 additional points within a state's autocracy score or 2 fewer points within the state's Polity score, which is found by subtracting the composite measure of autocratic features from the measure of democratic features.

As conveyed at the bottom of Table 18, omission of any dyad in which either state has restricted political participation significantly reduces the sample size by over 60%. The results of models run on this restricted dataset show that the core results in the paper hold and therefore that our inclusion of the women's suffrage component is not simply accounting for variation largely explained by the Polity score itself. Within each of the models, the primary continuous variable of interest $Suffrage\text{-}Democracy_L$ corresponds with a significant decline in dispute propensity. This finding holds within decade-dyad fixed effects models. The dichotomous measures correspond to conflict in the same ways as in the manuscript, except for dyads in which one state is a democracy and the other is not. The results of the core Russett and Oneal model are also as we would expect given that we are removing states with less democratic features from the dataset. The size of the negative coefficient for Dem_L is larger than within the manuscript's model.

[4]See p. 26 of the Polity IV Dataset codebook for further description.

TABLE 18: SUFFRAGE MODELS, CONSTRAINED POLITY MEASURE.

Variables	*Model 1*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*
Dem_L		-.095***	-.062***	-.059**	.009
		(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)
Joint Women's Suffrage			.582	.562	.526
			(.32)	(.34)	(.29)
Dem_L * *Joint Women's Suffrage*			-.142**	-.112*	-.234***
			(.04)	(.05)	(.04)
Dem_H		.023	.049*	.061*	-.022
		(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
At Least 1 Women's Suffrage Democracy			.061	-.117	-.082
			(.38)	(.39)	(.34)
Suffrage-Democracy$_H$			-.056	.000	.023
			(.05)	(.05)	(.04)
Joint Autocracy (0/1)	1.35***				
	(.24)				
Joint Democracy w/o Women's. Suff (0/1)	.917*				
	(.40)				
Dem w/o Women's Suff / Autocracy (0/1)	1.19***				
	(.27)				
Dem w/o Women's Suff / Dem w. Women's Suff	-.607				
	(.52)				
Dem w. Women's Suff / Autocracy (0/1)	1.28***				
	(.19)				
Civil-Liberties$_L$				-1.46***	-.532
				(.38)	(.52)
Contiguity	1.95***	2.07***	2.02***	2.26***	
	(.32)	(.33)	(.34)	(.40)	
Capability Ratio	.009	.006	.012	-.042	-.200*
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.10)
Alliance	.303	.363*	.403*	.307	-.793***
	(.17)	(.17)	(.17)	(.19)	(.16)
Minor Powers	-1.35***	-1.28***	-1.25***	-1.56***	-.534
	(.19)	(.18)	(.19)	(.21)	(.38)
At Least One Nuclear Power	.767**	.854***	.931***	.751**	-.237
	(.22)	(.21)	(.22)	(.22)	(.21)
Joint Nuclear	-.458	-.323	-.301	-.203	-.629
	(1.06)	(1.05)	(1.05)	(1.07)	(.38)
Trade	-23.93	-22.35	-19.72	-11.51	
	(12.61)	(11.96)	(12.04)	(13.74)	
Interest Similarity	-.211	-.059	-.072	-.497	
	(.44)	(.44)	(.45)	(.19)	
Year	-.009**	-.012***	-.007*	-.000	.012***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Distance	-.000***	-.001***	-.001***	-.000**	
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	
Fixed Effects					Dyad
N =	82,755	82,755	82,755	74,740	9,978

* = .05 level. ** =.01 level. *** =.001 level. Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses below.

13. Models of Interstate Disputes Using Gibler (2016)

Variables	*Model 1 Binary Model*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4 Fixed Effects*	*Model 5*	*Model 6 Male Suffrage*
Dem_L		-.083***	-.042***	.007	-.013	-.012
		(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
$Suffrage_L$			.313**	.656***	.346*	
			(.09)	(.13)	(.14)	
$Suffrage\text{-}Democracy_L$			-.126***	-.168***	-.095**	
			(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	
Dem_H		.042***	.062***	.018	.017	.039***
		(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
$Suffrage_H$			-.367**	.254	-.340	
			(.12)	(.18)	(.26)	
$Suffrage\text{-}Democracy_H$			-.051***	-.051*	.045	
			(.01)	(.02)	(.03)	
Joint Democracy (0/1)	-.843*					
	(.32)					
Joint Suffrage Democracy (0/1)	-.547					
	(.35)					
At Least One Democracy (0/1)	.416*					
	(.16)					
At Least One Suffrage Democracy (0/1)	-.378*					
	(.16)					
$Civil\text{-}Liberties_L$					-1.23***	
					(.24)	
Political-Participation$_L$					-1.17***	
					(.27)	
Noncontiguity	-2.03***	-1.83***	-1.77***	-.412	-2.14***	-1.73***
	(.17)	(.12)	(.12)	(.38)	(.23)	(.15)
Capability Ratio	-.006	-.011	-.006	-.038	-.025	.001
	(.01)	(.00)	(.01)	(.05)	(.01)	(.01)
Alliance	.202*	.111	.181*	-.357**	.233	.080
	(.09)	(.07)	(.07)	(.11)	(.12)	(.08)
Minor Powers	-1.27***	-1.36***	-1.36***	-.985***	-1.23***	-1.47***
	(.11)	(.07)	(.07)	(.23)	(.14)	(.10)
At Least One Nuclear Power	.638***	.480***	.552***	-.706***	.495**	-.667***
	(.12)	(.08)	(.09)	(.15)	(.14)	(.18)
Joint Nuclear	.286	.314	.322	-1.35**	.516	-.013
	(.46)	(.34)	(.36)	(.41)	(.48)	(.82)
Trade	-25.11*				-3.50	
	(12.05)				(13.34)	
Interest Similarity	-1.25***				-1.51***	
	(.21)				(.26)	
Year	.002	.000	.003*	-.000	-.010**	.003***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.07)	(.00)	(.00)	(.009)
Distance	-.000***	-.001***	-.000***	-.000	-.001	-.000***
	(.00)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
N =	303,085	470,016	470,016	28,929	210,994	246,791

The table above uses data on Militarized Interstate Disputes from Gibler (2016). This data draws upon the original MID dataset used within the manuscript but makes significant changes to the data based on updated historical findings and reassessment of the validity of the original data. Roughly 65% of the disputes within the original MID dataset are altered within the Gibler, et al. data, though most of the changes relate to what occurred within a dispute and not whether or not a dispute occurred. The findings in these models do not differ substantively from the models reported within the manuscript.

The same models were also run on data on interstate disputes described in Maoz (2018). The results are significantly similar to the results reported in both the manuscript and within the table above, indicating that the findings are highly robust to various codings of the dependent variable.

Part C. Analysis of Alternative Hypotheses

1. The Effect of Time

One might argue that the timeline of women's suffrage is merely picking up on the increasingly pacific nature of the international system over time. Analysis of the relationship between time and women's suffrage indicates, however, that women's suffrage is not an artifact of historical time period. The following pieces of evidence underscore this point.

First, the evidence presented in Table 12 above provides strong evidence that the correlation between suffrage and conflict is robust and relatively equivalent across time periods. During the period between 1890 to 1930, a period which precedes the postwar era of great power peace and during which international institutions were few and relatively powerless, dyads with democracies with female suffrage were 94% less likely to experience conflict than dyadic non-suffrage democracies. Across all time periods, increasing levels of dyadic democracy when all eligible voters are male did not significantly correlate with a decline in dispute propensity.

Second, we analyzed the effects of suffrage across time by including the variable *year* within our primary variable *Suffrage-Democracy*$_L$ within Model 3 within the manuscript. This approach allows for us to assess the effect of women's suffrage by year across the analyzed time period. We then analyzed the substantive effects of suffrage by year within many different years. Figure 6 below presents the percentage change in the predicted probability of dispute involvement as a function of including women as eligible voters across polity scores for three different years – 1910, 1930 and 1950. These years were selected because they span the inter-war period and offer insight into the effects of suffrage leading up to and in the years following major world war. We see that in all three years, the effects of women's suffrage follow a similar trend. In all cases, dyadic women's suffrage significantly decreased the likelihood of dispute involvement and this decline was most significant as levels of democracy within states increased. Furthermore, we see that the most pronounced estimated effect of women's suffrage took place before 1930, prior to the point at which many believe a more pacific period of international history to have begun. As time has gone on, the pacifying effects of women's suffrage have decreased, but only very moderately.

Figure 6: The Difference Between Democracies by Year



2. The Strategic Context and Women's Suffrage - Maybe Peace Leads to Suffrage

Another possible explanation for the results we find is that state's with fewer security concerns are more likely to adopt women's suffrage and that therefore the causal arrow should be reversed. A number of facts speak against this explanation.

First, the within-country analysis described in detail in section B.1 above compares the likelihood of conflict in the ten and twenty years before and after the adoption of women's suffrage. As shown in Table 19 below, the likelihood of conflict in the years following suffrage is significantly reduced when compared with the years leading up to women's suffrage. The periods of 10 to 20 years before and after suffrage were also compared and a similar decline following suffrage was found.

Second, we compared the average rate of dispute involvement in the five years leading up to suffrage with states' average rate of dispute involvement in different five-year intervals in the decades before women's suffrage. The rate of dispute involvement is, for instance, 55.6% (p=.000) higher in the five years before than in the 15 to 20 years before suffrage. The average rate of dispute involvement in years *t - 5* to *t - 10* was also 16% higher than the average over years *t - 15* to *t - 20* (p=.10).

Table 19: Percentage Change in Frequency of Disputes

	Female	
Time Span	First Wave	Universal
+ / - 10 Years	**-8.41%** *(p=.19)*	**-19.7%** *(p =.01)*
+ / - 10 – 20 Years	**-17.8%** *(p =.03)*	**-14%** *(p=.07)*
+ / - 20 Years	**-14%** *(p=.02)*	**-20%** *(p=.002)*
	N= 49, 40	N = 50, 41

3. The Strategic Context and Women's Suffrage - Maybe War Leads to Suffrage

The prior section assessed whether or not countries' with less threatening strategic context are more likely to adopt women's suffrage. It is also possible that states that have recently experienced war may be more likely to adopt suffrage. Some have argued that suffrage was made more likely by the entrance of women into the workforce during both world wars.[5] The effects of women's suffrage that we find might, in such a case, simply be capturing war weariness on the part of recent adopters. Many pieces of evidence speak against this explanation.

First, as we stated in the manuscript, only 3 of the 40 states examined over a twenty-year time frame before and after suffrage adopted suffrage within 5 years of the end of a war. Dropping these cases from the analysis, we see a 20.4%** decrease in the twenty years following the first wave of suffrage.

Second, we analyzed Model 4 presented in the manuscript but excluded those dyads in which one or both of the states first adopted women's suffrage in the years 1919 - 1921 or 1945 - 1948. Truncating the data in this way excludes all dyads involving the United States, Belgium, France, Albania, the Netherlands, Italy and Czechoslovakia, among others, leaving a sample of 277,673. Figure 7 presents the substantive results of this analysis. As we see, the results hold even on this narrower sample of the population. States with women's suffrage are less likely to be involved in disputes than are states without women's suffrage, even in states that did not adopt suffrage shortly after conflict. This negative effect of women's suffrage increases with the level of democracy of the state.

Analysis of particular key cases in which suffrage was adopted shortly after war also shows that the effects of war were if anything indirect. Teele (2014) demonstrates that women gained the vote in Britain in 1918 because they pursued successful electoral strategies aimed at granting women the vote. War led to a mulitpolar Cabinet that enabled their particular electoral strategy to succeed. Teele notes that the adoption of suffrage was not a product of the rise of the liberal government in 1906. Suffrage was achieved through a process of what she calls "ordinary electoral strategy."

[5] Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).

Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Women's Suffrage, Excluding Postwar Cases



4. Maybe Its the Extension of Suffrage More Generally

One might also surmise that the pacifying effects of extended suffrage has little to do with gender but is rather a reflection of expanding the voting population to men as well. Przeworski (2009) relies on data on extensions of male suffrage by class. This data does not include information about how much the eligible number of voters grew within each suffrage extension. The within-country analysis, described in section B.1 in more detail, analyzed the effects of extending the vote amongst men on the basis of class, finances or education. Those instances of male suffrage extension which took place within 5 years prior to or after extension by gender were excluded from the analysis. Once democratic states which were not consistent members of the state system for the ten and twenty-year periods before and after the suffrage extension, 16 cases remained within the ten-year sample and 12 cases remained within the 20-year sample. In contrast to the expectations of the alternative hypothesis, we see that increasing the proportion of men eligible to vote is associated with a 27.1% increase in dispute involvement when comparing the twenty years before and after suffrage extensions.

As discussed above, one might assume that male suffrage would be extended in periods leading up to war, potentially explaining this finding. Przeworski (2009) finds little empirical support for this common theory. In his analysis of the causes of suffrage extensions, Przeworski finds that of the 226 extensions of suffrage that are covered by the Correlates of War dataset, only 20 occurred in the 5 years prior to war. Within our within-country analysis, only 2 of the cases of suffrage extension by class - Italy (1913) and Japan (1925) - took place within states which saw war within the subsequent 5-year period.

Table 20: Percentage Change in Frequency of Disputes

	Female			*Male*
Time Span	First Wave	Universal		Second Wave
+ / - 10 Years	**-8.41%** *(p=.19)*	**-19.7%** *(p =.01)*		**+10.1%** *(p=.28)*
+ / - 10 – 20 Years	**-17.8%** *(p =.03)*	**-14%** *(p=.07)*		**+22.6%** *(p=.16)*
+ / - 20 Years	**-14%** *(p=.02)*	**-20%** *(p=.002)*		**+27.1%** (p=.008)
	N= 49, 40	N = 50, 41		N = 16, 12

Part D. Variable Descriptions for Statistical Models

The models within the paper includes the following variables:

- *Noncontiguity* is coded 1 if the countries share a land boundary or are separated by less than 150 miles of water and 0 otherwise.
- *Distance* is a measure of the natural log of the distance in miles between the countries. We also include the variables *Distance x 2* and *Distance x 3* within the models.
- *Minor Powers* is coded as 0 if either of the states within the dyad is listed as a great power according to the Correlates of War dataset.
- *Cap Ratio* measures the natural logarithm of the ratio of the stronger state's military capability to the military capability of the weaker state in the dyad, lagged by one year. Capabilities are measured using the CINC scores of each state from the COW National Capabilities Data.
- *Ally* is a binary variable coded as 1 for dyads that hold any type of alliance, as indicated by the COW Military Alliance data, and are 0 otherwise. It is lagged by one year.
- *Either Nuclear* is coded 1 if either state in the dyad possesses nuclear weapons. *Joint Nuclear* is coded 1 if both states in the dyad possess nuclear weapons and 0 otherwise.
- $Depend_L$ is a measure of economic interdependence which quantifies the bilateral trade-to-GDP ratio of the state that is least dependent upon trading with its dyadic partner. The variable is lagged by one year. The trade data was taken from Russett and Oneal (1999).
- *Interest Similarity* lists the dyadic S score as compiled by Signorino (1999) and lagged by one year. The variable ranges between -1 and 1 and measures the degree of similarity in policy portfolios between the states.
- *Year* is included in all models so that we can assess the possibility that the probability of conflict has followed a consistently negative pattern over the time period in question.
- *Peace Years* is a variable which counts the number of years since a dispute within the dyad. Following Carter and Signorino (2010), we also include $Peace\ Years^2$ and $Peace\ Years^3$.

Part E. Analysis of Game Theoretic Models

We use two models to understand the strategic implications of suffrage democracy in a strategic context. As the article text indicates, we conceptualize suffrage democracy as increasing the costs to conflict relative to the benefits of a negotiated solution. The first model we analyze here is a simple incomplete information model. The second is a trust model similar to those analyzed in Kydd (2005).

1. Increasing Costs Due to Suffrage Democracy With Incomplete Information About Resolve

The structure of the game is as follows: a challenger, C, makes a demand $x \in [0,1]$ of a target, T, and then the target decides whether to fight or accept the demand. If the demand is accepted, payoffs are x and $1-x$, respectively. If the target fights, expected payoffs are $p-c_c$ and $1-p-c_t$ where $c_i > 0$ for all i and $p \in [0,1]$. c_t is private information of the target and is drawn from a uniform distribution on $[\underline{c}_t, \overline{c}_t]$.

Note that in an equilibrium, the probability that the target chooses to fight is $\frac{x-(p+\underline{c}_t)}{\overline{c}_t-\underline{c}_t}$ because the challenger never chooses $x < p+\underline{c}_t$ or an x such that the expression is greater than or equal to one. Thus, the challenger's problem is

$$\max_x (\frac{\overline{c}_t - x + p}{\overline{c}_t - \underline{c}_t})x + (\frac{x-(p+\underline{c}_t)}{\overline{c}_t - \underline{c}_t})(p-c_c) \tag{1}$$

Finding the first order condition and solving for x yields $x^* = p + \overline{c}_t/2 - \overline{c}_c/2$ for an interior solution or a choice of x of at least $p+\underline{c}_t$ if this is less than 1 and 1 otherwise.

We are now in a position to analyze how changes in costs influence the game outcomes. Note that increases in the challenger's costs decrease x^* (or leave it unchanged in the absence of an interior solution). Thus, increases in the challenger's costs decrease the probability of war as well as decreasing the incentive for the challenger to choose $x > p+\underline{c}_t$, which can be interpreted as initiating a crisis, or interstate dispute, because it involves a positive probability of war. Thus, increasing political costs from suffrage democracy decrease the incentive for potential challengers to attempt to force a change in the status quo through initiating a crisis.

Increases in the target's expected costs are somewhat more complicated. If we interpret increasing costs as shifting the range of costs (or target types) upward, then increasing target costs decreases the probability of war. This can be seen by substituting the expression for x^* into the expression given above for the probability that the target chooses war. Although the increase in target costs causes the challenger to make a larger demand, this factor is outweighed by the decreased willingness of the target to go to war and the overall effect on the probability of war is negative.

On the other hand, if we conceive of a cost increase as increasing only $\overline{c}_t$ and not $\underline{c}_t$, such that the range of uncertainty about the target's preferences is increased, then the probability of war also increases. This can be seen by taking the partial derivative of the expression for the probability of war with respect to $\overline{c}_t$. Thus, an increase in the target's costs of conflict, through the adoption of suffrage democracy or some other factor, might increase the likelihood of conflict in some cases, depending on whether the cost increase also increases the scope of uncertainty about resolve in the model.

When costs of conflict increase on both sides, however, this can only decrease the likelihood of conflict. This can be seen by examining the expression for x^*, which remains unchanged when $\overline{c}_t$ and c_c shift the same amount. On the one hand, the challenger is tempted to exploit the higher costs of the target but on the other, the challenger is unwilling to risk it because of its own higher costs of conflict. Since the target is less likely to fight for a given x and since the challenger's choice of x is unchanged, the probability of conflict decreases. The dyadic increase in conflict costs that results from dyadic suffrage democracy decreases the probability of conflict.

2. The Effects of Suffrage Democracy on Trust Dynamics

We now turn to the framework of trust models in which actors do not know whether the other prefers to reciprocate cooperation or not. The model described here is closely related to the models described in Kydd (2005). We show that shifts in state preferences are consistent with monadic and dyadic shifts in political outcomes.

There are two states $1, 2$, indexed by i, and the probability that State 1 wins in a conflict is p and the probability that the other state does is $1 - p$. States have a binary choice to engage in conflict or cooperate and make the choice simultaneously. A conflict is fought if either side elects to begin one and we normalize the value of winning and losing the conflict to 1 and 0 respectively. If a conflict is fought, each side pays a cost c and if one state chooses conflict when the other does not, the state that chooses conflict receives some advantage in the conflict which we represent by the parameter α in the payoff function. If players choose to cooperate, they each receive their cooperation payoff k_i, which is the private information of each state. The game is represented in the accompanying figure.

		State 2	
		Cooperate	Conflict
State 1	Cooperate	k_1, k_2	$p - \alpha - c$, $1 - p + \alpha - c$
	Conflict	$p + \alpha - c$, $1 - p - \alpha - c$	$p - c$, $1 - p - c$

Conflict or Cooperation Game.

For simplicity, we assume there are two types of each player, $\overline{k}_i$ and $\underline{k}_i$, one that wishes to reciprocate cooperation and one that does not. Thus, $\overline{k}_1 > p + \alpha - c$, $\overline{k}_2 > 1 - p + \alpha - c$, $\underline{k}_1 < p + \alpha - c$, $\underline{k}_2 < 1 - p + \alpha - c$. Let μ_i be the probability that $k_i = \overline{k}_i$; μ_1 and μ_2 are independent. We can think of suffrage and democracy as influencing μ_i - the likelihood that a state values peace highly enough that it would prefer choosing peace to choosing conflict so long as its adversary does the same. Thus, according to the theory described in the paper, suffrage-democracy in state i increases μ_i.

In a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the uncooperative types ($\underline{k}_i$) would never choose to cooperate. A cutpoint equilibrium exists in which the cooperative type of State 1 ($\overline{k}_1$) chooses to cooperate if and only if:

$$\mu_2 \geq \frac{\alpha}{k_1 - p + c} \tag{2}$$

The cooperative type of State 2 ($\overline{k}_2$) chooses to cooperate if and only if:

$$\mu_1 \geq \frac{\alpha}{k_2 - 1 + p + c} \tag{3}$$

These equations imply the probabilities of conflict represented in Figure 5 when $p = .5$, $\overline{k}_i = .7$, $\alpha = .125$, and $c = .1$. μ_1 and μ_2 are on the horizontal axes of the figure. Note that although suffrage democracy increases the likelihood that a state has high costs of conflict, this does not necessarily reduce the probability of conflict. That may require an increase in the likelihood of being a high cost type (trustworthy) on both sides - i.e. in our application, for both to adopt suffrage democracy.



FIGURE 8: IMPLICATIONS OF MONADIC PREFERENCE SHIFTS.

Part F. Experimental Results

1. Attitudes Towards the Use of Force Across Cultures and Regions

Across cultural contexts and regions, women are less approving of the use of force vis-à-vis a peaceful alternative. In every region we examined - North America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia - the difference in preferences is statistically significant, often at extreme levels. The results of the meta-analysis also suggest differences across regions. The effect appears largest in Japan and smallest in Israel, for instance.

Cultural factors certainly influence the construction of gender preferences, and we believe international conflict preferences are no exception. Nevertheless, we must be cautious in drawing conclusions about cultural difference from this data. Many of the studies ask different questions, and even where they ask the same questions, the differing contexts mean that the questions will be interpreted differently. In spite of this important caveat, we did test whether the gender divide in Israel was less than in the other two countries, Egypt and Turkey, who were asked exactly the same questions. To do this, we ran a simple linear regression of approval on the sex variable and a dummy variable coded 1 for Israelis and 0 otherwise and the interaction of these two. The populations have very different conflict preferences overall, but the interaction of the sex and Israel variables is not significant at conventional levels. We conclude that the data are consistent with differently constructed gender divides, but the evidence is far from conclusive.

2. Attitudes Towards Fighting Versus Backing Down

We examined sex differences at each stage of the canonical crisis bargaining game tree. We turn first to decisions at the final stage of the game tree: using force versus backing down. Only two studies examine popular reactions to this crucial leadership decision. We pooled experimental conditions that describe a use of force without describing the result with those that describe a successful use of force; only one study included an unsuccessful use of force condition. The results are shown in Table 21 below. In spite of the relatively small numbers of respondents, the differences between the sexes are striking and highly statistically significant. Well over half of men approve of a successful or an unsuccessful war whereas only 39% of women approve of a use of force that is successful or whose outcome is not described. 29% of women approve of the unsuccessful use of force treatment condition.

Most telling is to compare how men and women weigh the choice between backing down and conflict. Women are nearly indifferent between an unsuccessful use of force in which nothing is gained and their country's leader backs down after threatening force. Men, by contrast, would much rather see force used unsuccessfully than see the country's reputation endangered through backing down. Approval among men is fully 36% higher for a use of force that achieves nothing and in which over $4,000$ U.S. soldiers die than when the U.S. president backs down and the same objective outcome is achieved without loss of life. The difference between backing down and engaging in an unsuccessful war for men versus women is significant at the $p < .001$ level. We find similar results when we compare backing down to successful uses of force. Thus, on average, while women do not approve of backing down relative to simply staying out of conflicts in the first place, they are much more willing than men to see their states back down rather than engage in violent conflict.

Study	Approval: Back Down	Approval: Engage Mil. / Successf. War	Approval: Unsuccessf. War	War - Backdown	Unsucc. War - Backdown	N†
Men						
Brutger and Kertzer (2016)	30%	46%	-	16%	-	384
Trager and Vavreck (2011)§	18%	70%	54%	52%	36%	231
Overall Average (Weighted)	25%	55%	54%	30%	36%	
Women						
Brutger and Kertzer (2016)	26%	38%	-	12%	-	334
Trager and Vavreck (2011)§	27%	40%	29%	13%	2%	279
Overall Average (Weighted)	27%	39%	29%	13%	2%	
Difference in Male Versus Female Averages	**-1%**	**16% *****	**25% *****	**17% *****	**34% *****	

** p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.*

† Indicates the number of respondents given the Back Down or War treatments. § Data from Study 2 because only that study contains both Back Down and War treatments.

TABLE 21: SEX DIFFERENCES IN FIGHTING VERSUS BACKING DOWN.

3. Cross-Country Analysis in Gottfried and Trager (2016)

We now turn to an evaluation of sex differences in the evaluation of compromise outcomes. To do so, we use the four original experiments conducted in Egypt, Israel, Turkey and the United States, alongside data from Gottfried and Trager (2016), which all collected data on respondent approval at shares of negotiated outcomes. We hypothesized that women would be more accepting of lower shares of a negotiated outcome and less approving of higher shares. We theorize that pacific preferences lead people to be more accepting of lower shares, but also less approving of higher shares because "greedy" foreign policy incurs a greater risk of war. In spite of interesting cross cultural differences in approval, the effects of sex differences in each country are consistent with this hypothesis.

This can be seen graphically in Figure 9, which shows predicted effects from linear regressions of approval of negotiated outcomes in terms of differences from country-gender-means. Each country regression included the first three terms of the Taylor series of the country share in the negotiated outcome, a dummy variable for a 50% share, respondent sex and respondent sex interacted with the 50% dummy and the country share variables. The figure shows the predicted effects on approval of switching from a man to a woman at levels of the negotiated share variable. In all four countries, women are estimated to have higher approval at lower shares of the negotiated outcome (relative to the country-gender-mean) and lower approval at high shares of the negotiated outcome. The effects of gender are strongest in the United States and Israel, where more data was also available, but the effect of sex in the other two countries was consistent with the same overall pattern. Women also show consistently higher approval levels at a 50% share.

We conduct two formal tests of the hypothesis. We first compare the difference in female approval at 0% and 100% shares to the same difference in male approval. We then perform the same test on the differences in approval between a 50/50 split of the disputed resources and a 100% share. Pooling data from the four countries, both tests are significant at the .0001 level.

In tests on each representative country sample, all differences between men and women are in the predicted direction and at least one of the two tests was significant at conventional levels. While the effect is strongest in Israel and the United States, we do not have sufficient data to detect a systematic difference between those countries and the other two.



Note: Approval of Egyptian, Israeli, Turkish and U.S. preferences measured on a 10-point scale to avoid direct "disapproval" of government policy. Graphs represent predicted values from linear regressions on approval levels in terms of distance from gender means. The regression equation included the first three terms of the Taylor series of the country share, a dummy variable for a 50% share, respondent sex and respondent sex interacted with the 50% dummy and the country share variables.

FIGURE 9: SEX DIFFERENCES IN PREFERENCES FOR NEGOTIATED OUTCOMES.

4. Analysis of Kertzer and Brutger (2016) by Gender

Replication of Kertzer and Brutger (2016) By Gender

	(1) Audience Cost	(2) Force Cost	(3) Inconsistency Cost	(4) Force Fraction	(5) Inconsistency Fraction
Male	-1.117***	-0.079	-1.038***	0.051	0.949
Female	-1.645***	-0.865***	-0.780*	0.526	0.474

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Experiments, Gender, and the Use of Force

Citation	Topic/Synopsis	Analyze/Discuss Gender?	Data link or availability	Type of Force	Country surveyed	Was a peace condition included? Y/N and details	Vignettes
Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." International Organization 61 (4): 821–40.	Public opinion and audience costs	Mention gender on page 826 as something that does not seriously affect the results	In folder. Link.	Warfare	USA	No in the first experiment, yes in the second. The president would stay out altogether. Nothing about engaging allies.	A country invades a neighbor and the President (1) does nothing or (2) threatens to intervene and steps down. Varying regime, motive, power and interests as well as danger to the US.
Abrahms, Max. 2013. "The Credibility Paradox: Violence as a Double-Edged Sword in International Politics." International Studies Quarterly 57 (4): 660–71. doi:10.1111/isqu.12098.	Bargaining Theory and Credibility of Non-state Actors	No mention	Not found in ISQ Replication data.	Terrorism, implications for warfare.	USA, brief anecdote about Israel.	No nonviolent treatment.	A group takes hostages, demanding the release of their leaders. In the control, they do not hurt anyone, in the treatment they kill civilians.
Berinsky, Adam J. 2007. "Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict." The	Elite cue theory instead of event response in determining	Controlled for, but not discussed.	Not found in dataverse, AB's	Warfare	USA (in Iraq)	No nonviolent treatment.	Respondents were asked how many war deaths there had been in Iraq to date. The treatment group was corrected before being

Journal of Politics 69 (4): 975–97. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00602.x.	war approval		site or JOP's site				asked about war support.
Chaudoin, Stephen. 2014. "Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions." *International Organization* 68 (1): 235–56. doi:http://dx.doi.org.proxygw.wrlc.org/10.1017/S00208183130003086.	Public Opinion, Audience Costs and Voter preference	Mentioned on 244, sample statistics 242	In Folder. Link.	Survey example NOT force related, implication for warfare	USA	Not applicable.	Respondents were treated with different information about the president's international agreements or economic policy.
Chilton, Adam. 2014. "The Laws of War and Public Opinion: An Experimental Study." *Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics*, May. http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/684.	Public Opinion on Laws of war and targeting civilians	Controlled for.	Unavailable. Link.	Warfare, war crimes	USA		Respondents were told that a bombing campaign would/would not result in serious loss of life. Characteristics of the enemy were varied, such as if they had committed war crimes.
Corstange, Daniel, and Nikolay Marinov. 2012. "Taking Sides in Other People's Elections: The	Interference of foreign powers in domestic elections	Respondents were interviewed by a member of the same	In folder. Link.	Coercion.	Lebanon	Yes, there was a baseline.	After getting a baseline opinion, respondents were told either the US or Iran supported one of the two political

Polarizing Effect of Foreign Intervention." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (3): 655–70.		gender and sect. No discussion of gender elsewhere.					parties (creating 4 treatment groups plus the control) in the most recent election.
Croco, Sarah E. 2016. "The Flipside of Flip-Flopping: Leader Inconsistency, Citizen Preferences, and the War in Iraq." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, April, orw006. doi:10.1093/fpa/orw006.	Voter preferences and politician consistency.	Gender was controlled for and discussed in footnotes briefly. When quoting free response questions, the gender of the respondent was identified.	In folder. Link. Sex is not available as variable in replication data.	War Support	USA	No, but it is unclear what such a treatment would look like in this situation.	Respondents were told about one of eight fictional senators (Republican/Democrat; did/did not support Iraq war at beginning; does/does not support the war now) and asked if they would vote for him.
Croco, Sarah E., and Scott Sigmund Gartner. 2014. "Flip-Flops and High Heels: An Experimental Analysis of Elite Position Change and Gender on Wartime Public Support." *International Interactions* 40 (1): 1–24. doi:10.1080/03050629.2013.863195.	Gender bias in voter preferences on politician consistency	Gender is one of the focuses on the paper.	In folder. Link.	War Support	USA	No, but it is unclear what such a treatment would look like in this situation.	Respondents were told about one of eight fictional senators (male/female; did/did not support Iraq war at beginning; does/does not support the war now) and asked if they would vote for her/him now.
Davies, Graeme A. M., and Robert Johns. 2013. "Audience Costs	Public Opinion and Audience	Gender is noted as not playing a moderating	In folder. Link.	Warfare, war support.	UK	Yes, the PM did not bluff in one treatment.	Respondents were given one of three treatments asking

among the British Public: The Impact of Escalation, Crisis Type, and Prime Ministerial Rhetoric." *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (4): 725–37. doi:10.1111/isqu.12045.	Costs (patterned off of Tomz 2007)	role. The prime minister is always male.	(Search "Davies")				about support for the PM bluffing or not in talks with Iran and then backing down or not. They explicitly patterned their experiment off of Tomz 2007
Fletcher, Joseph F., and Jennifer Hove. 2012. "Emotional Determinants of Support for the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan: A View from the Bridge." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 45 (1): 33–62. doi:http://dx.doi.org.proxygw.wrlc.org/10.1017/S0008423911000916.	Public Opinion and Emotions	Gender is always controlled for. 2 sentences on page 48 are devoted to how gender affected the emotional responses. "Interestingly, gender's effects are primarily indirect, via the emotions. Specifically, women report greater sadness and less pride and anger than men."	Not found.	War support	Canada	No, all photos were related to soldiers. There were, however, some that suggested international cooperation.	Questions about war support, emotions, and the economy were unvaried. All respondents saw a photo of a Canadian soldier in Afghanistan followed by a randomly selected photo, one of which was a coffin draped in a Canadian flag.
Flores-Macías, Gustavo A., and Sarah E. Kreps. 2015. "Borrowing Support	Public Opinions and War financing	Gender is not mentioned, but it controlled for and is highly	Not found. JCR's	War Financing	USA, UK	No, all treatments involve war and nothing engages with	The control group is asked about support for a war paid for by debt, the treatment is

for War The Effect of War Finance on Public Attitudes toward Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, August, 0022002715600762. doi:10.1177/0022002715600762.	(taxes v. debt)	statistically significant.	site suggests that it has been published online, but not in print, which is when data is posted to JCR's site.			international cooperation.	asked about support for a war financed through some debt and a special tax.
Gelpi, Christopher. 2010. "Performing on Cue? The Formation of Public Opinion Toward War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54 (1): 88–116. doi:10.1177/0022002709352845.	Public Opinion and Elite Cues	Gender is mentioned as an unnoted control at the end of the Appendix; replication data do not include gender.	In folder. Link.	War Support	USA	Yes, there is a peace treatment in the 3x3.	A 3x3 treatment, with no/positive/negative presidential cue and no/negative/positive event cue. It is related to the surge in Iraq.
Grieco, Joseph M., Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, and Peter D. Feaver. 2011.	Public support for war and internation	Gender is always controlled for and women are	In folder. Link (searc	War support	USA	Yes, the experiment engaged with the approval of international actors.	Respondents were told about a fictional invasion of East Timor by Indonesia. The

"Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War1." *International Studies Quarterly* 55 (2): 563–83. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00660.x.	al institutions.	found to be less supportive of conflict than men.	h "Gelpi")				approval of congress and on NATO/UN was varied.
Gubler, Joshua R., and Nathan P. Kalmoe. 2015. "Violent Rhetoric in Protracted Group Conflicts Experimental Evidence from Israel and India." *Political Research Quarterly* 68 (4): 651–64. doi:10.1177/1065912915608947.	Public opinion and elite rhetoric	Gender is mentioned in the descriptive statistics	A note on Kalmoe's website links to Gubler's site, which has been suspended.	Violent rhetoric	Israel, India	Yes, there were nonviolent substitutes	In both countries some respondents were treated with violent rhetoric against an out group while the other received non-violent substitutes. Their anger against the outgroup was then measured.
Hoffman, Aaron M., Christopher R. Agnew, Laura E. VanderDrift, and Robert Kulzick. 2015. "Norms, Diplomatic	War support and alternatives t war.	Gender is controlled for and briefly discussed in the literature review. Gender was significant	In folder. Link.	War support	USA	No, the extension did not have a peace treatment.	.) Replicated Fever and Gelpi 2004, but included alternatives to war. Replicated Fever, Gelpi, and Reifier 2009 with a 3 (Yemeni government

Alternatives, and the Social Psychology of War Support." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (1): 3–28. doi:10.1177/0022002713498706.		at the .05 level in the second two experiments, but not the first.					scenarios: threatening oil shipments through the Persian Gulf vs. engaging in ethnic cleansing and forced slavery vs. providing terrorist bases to al Qaeda)x3 (alternatives: good vs. poor vs. no information) 3) Again replicated F, G, and R 2009 with added a 3 (confidence in military success: extremely vs. somewhat vs. not very)x3 (estimatednumberofcasualties:50vs.500vs.5,000)x3(alternatives:good vs.poor vs. no information)
Ikeda, Maki, and Atsushi Tago. 2014. "Winning over Foreign Domestic Support for Use of Force: Power of Diplomatic and Operational Multilateralism." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, April,	Public opinion and Diplomatic v. Operational Multilateral support for war	Gender is mentioned as not impacting the results.	In folder . Link.	War support	Japan	Yes (and no). There were discussions of international support, but that was the focus of the experiment. There was no treatment in which no one acted.	Respondents were told the US acted unilaterally, with diplomatic multilateral support, operational multilateral support or both in either a regime change mission in the Middle East or an anti-piracy in the gulf of another country.

lcu003. doi:10.1093/irap/lcu003.							
Kertzer, Joshua D., and Ryan Brutger. 2016. "Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (1): 234–49. doi:10.1111/ajps.12201.	Public opinion with regards to audience costs versus approval of the use of force	President is referred to as she on 242. Gender is tested in a robustness test in the appendix and is not significant. Appendix also in folder.	In folder. Link.	War support	USA	Yes, the president stayed out in a treatment.	Three scenarios in which the president either stays out or threatens the use of force. If she threatens the use of force, she either engages or backs down.
Kreps, Sarah. 2014. "Flying under the Radar: A Study of Public Attitudes towards Unmanned Aerial Vehicles." *Research & Politics* 1 (1): 2053168014536533. doi:10.1177/2053168014536533.	Public opinion on the use of drones	Gender is controlled for and weighted based on discrepancies between the online survey and national demographics	In folder. Link.	Drones, counterterrorism	USA	No, all involved the continued use of drones.	A control using the typical wording of surveys about drones plus eight treatments about humanitarian law, legal authorization, or combinations.
Kriner, Douglas L. 2014. "The Contemporary Presidency: Obama's Authorization Paradox: Syria and	Public opinion on the Congressional approval	Gender is always controlled for with differing levels of	Not found.	War support	USA	No, Obama's paragraphs were always given.	Respondents were given two paragraphs of Obama's speech detailing his decision to seek congressional approval from Congress

Congress's Continued Relevance in Military Affairs." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 44 (2): 309–27.	of military action	significance, but is not discussed.					for a strike against Assad. Treatments were then given a supporting comment by McConnell or a detracting one by McCain. Further hypotheses were tested on other data not collected via a survey experiment.
Kriner, Douglas L., and Francis X. Shen. 2014. "Reassessing American Casualty Sensitivity The Mediating Influence of Inequality." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58 (7): 1174–1201. doi:10.1177/0022002713492638.	Public opinion regarding acceptable casualties based on socioeconomic inequality	Gender is controlled for and insignificant except for scenarios regarding Iran	In folder. Link.	War support, intervention support	USA	No peace treatment.	Respondents were told either nothing, that casualties were disproportionately poorer Americans, or that casualties were "shared" across economic classes. They were then asked what acceptable casualties would be for each of four uses of force selected based on type. A follow up experiment asked about specific numbers as 15% of the fist survey felt uncomfortable creating their own. They were also asked about a new scenario involving pushing Russia out of Ukraine.

Lacina, Bethany, and Charlotte Lee. 2013. "Culture Clash or Democratic Peace?: Results of a Survey Experiment on the Effect of Religious Culture and Regime Type on Foreign Policy Opinion Formation." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9 (2): 143–70. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00183.x.	Role of religion v. Regime in the democratic peace.	Gender is mentioned as normally distributed among samples, but does not appear to be controlled for.	In folder. Link.	Warfare	USA	No peace treatments	In two scenarios, one with a state harboring terrorists and one with a state obtaining nuclear power, respondents were put into one of four treatments in which the state was a democracy or not and Christian or Islamic.
Leep, Matthew, and Alise Coen. 2016. "Civilian Casualty Inequity, Partisanship, and American Public Support for Israel." *Global Change, Peace & Security* 28 (2): 157–76. doi:10.1080/14781158.2016.1140637.	Public Opinion of external conflicts (Gaza) and casualty inequity	Always controls for gender. The sample was 39% women. A sentence on page 172 notes that studies have shown casualty aversion varies based on gender, but does not cite it.	Not found.	Warfare	USA, with a focus on Israel, Gaza	No, but it may not have made sense in this context.	A control was asked about the Israel-Gaza conflict. The first statement had an extra statement about casualty inequity. Two further treatments had criticisms from a Democrat or Republican to mirror the role party politics often plays.
Kriner, Douglas L., and Francis X. Shen. 2015. "Conscription, Inequality, and Partisan Support for War." *Journal of*	Public Opinion and Conscription	Gender is controlled for and not statistically significant	In folder. Link.	Wartime Conscription	USA	Yes, there was a no draft option. There was still military action, however, so this may not have been a true peace treatment.	In the first experiment, respondents were asked about a deployment to stop a North Korean attack on South Korea. The

Conflict Resolution, July, 0022002715590877. doi:10.1177/0022002715590877.							treatments were no draft, no draft with continued inequity of servive, draft, draft that decreases inequity, draft the continues inequity. In the second, they were asked about an unnamed state sponsor of terrorism in Asia and treatments were draft, no draft, and draft the reduced inequity.
Levendusky, Matthew S., and Michael C. Horowitz. 2012. "When Backing Down Is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs." *The Journal of Politics* 74 (2): 323–38. doi:10.1017/s002238161100154x.	Public Opinion and audience costs (focus on partisanship and elite reaction)	Gender is controlled for in one of four models and is not significant.	In folder. Link.	War, intervention	USA	Yes, a never enter treatment was included.	Starting with a president choosing to use military force and backing down, the treatment conditions are: never enter, new info, no new info, no elite reaction, president's party supports, both parties support, no presidential partisanship, opposite party president, same party president.
Levy, Jack S., Michael K. McKoy, Paul Poast, and Geoffrey P.R. Wallace. 2015.	Audience Costs and public opinion	Men are mentioned as forming a disproportionat	In folder. Link.	Warfare	USA	Yes	Stays as close to Tomz 2007 as possible, except this time the president promises not

"Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (4): 988–1001. doi:10.1111/ajps.12197		e part of the sample					to use force and then does.
Press, Daryl G., Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino. 2013. "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons." *The American Political Science Review* 107 (1): 188–206. doi:http://dx.doi.org.proxygw.wrlc.org/10.1017/S0003055412000597.	Public Opinion, Nuclear weapons, and norms	Gender was controlled for a mentioned briefly.	Link.	Nuclear strikes	USA	No treatment with no attack exists.	In one experiment, respondents were told about an al-Qaeda facility in Syria. The control was told a nuclear strike had the same chance of destroying the facility as a conventional one (both 90%). The two treatments were 90% nuclear and 70% conventional and 45% conventional respectively. In another experiment, respondents were told a nuclear strike or conventional strike had taken place and asked about their approval.
Tago, Atsushi, and Maki Ikeda. 2013.	Public Opinion and	Mentioned that additional	Not yet	Intervention	Japan	Yes (and no). There were discussions of	Respondents were given one of four

"An 'A' for Effort: Experimental Evidence on UN Security Council Engagement and Support for US Military Action in Japan." *British Journal of Political Science* 45 (2): 391–410. doi:http://dx.doi.org.proxygw.wrlc.org/10.1017/S0007123413000343.	IO (specifically UNSC) approval of use of force	questions about gender were asked in the survey to compare to a national sample.	posted on this Link.			international support, but that was the focus of the experiment. There was no treatment in which no one acted.	scenarios: Unanimous UNSC approval; Japan, China, and a few non permanent members abstaining; disapproval; and the US withdrawing foreseeing an unfavorable decision and proceeding unilaterally.
Tomz, Michael R., and Jessica L. P. Weeks. 2013. "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace." *The American Political Science Review* 107 (4): 849–65. doi:http://dx.doi.org.proxygw.wrlc.org/10.1017/S0003055413000488.	Democratic Peace and Public Opinion	Gender was controlled for.	Does not appear on Tomz's website.	Warfare, nuclear weapons	USA, UK	The scenario was not about intervention.	Both countries were told another state is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. In the UK, scenarios varied regime type, military alliances, and power. In the US, information about trade was also varied.
Trager, Robert F., and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. "The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining:	Audience Costs, public opinion,	Does not mention gender	See folder	Warfare	USA	Yes, a stay out option was included.	Vignettes varied the party of the president, the president's language (will stay out, will not tolerate, will

Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party." *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (3): 526–45. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00521.x.	and elite cues.						protect), Congress opposition, and the outcome (stay out, foreign gov concession, back down, successful war, unsuccessful war).
Wallace, Geoffrey P. R. 2013. "International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An Experimental Study." *International Organization* 67 (1): 105–40. doi:http://dx.doi.org.proxygw.wrlc.org/10.1017/S0020818312000343.	Public opinion, torture, and internation al law	Gender is controlled for and significant at p<.01	In folder. Link.	Torture	USA	No, torture was involved in each of the treatments.	In the first experiment, respondents were told a prisoner might have information that could be obtained through torture. Extra information about intl law, the identity of the prisoner as a combatant or insurgent and the torture practices of the enemy were varied. The second experiment focused on the degree of legalization and varied obligation, precision, and delegation.
Wallace, Geoffrey P.R. 2014. "Martial Law? Military Experience, International Law, and Support for Torture."	Veteran opinion, internation al law, and torture	Gender is controlled for and significant at the p<.01.	In folder. Link.	Torture	USA	No, torture was involved in each of the treatments.	Same as Wallace 2013, but the dichotomous variable veteran is used to compare types of responses.

International Studies Quarterly 58 (3): 501–14. doi:10.1111/isqu.12092.							
Walsh, James Igoe. 2015. "Precision Weapons, Civilian Casualties, and Support for the Use of Force." *Political Psychology* 36 (5): 507–23. doi:10.1111/pops.12175.	Public opinion, drones, and civilian casualties	Gender was measured, but not discussed.	Not found on his website or the dataverse.	Drone Strikes	USA	No peace treatment, there is always a type of strike.	In the first, Walsh asks about support for a strike against al-Qaeda militants, varying military casualties, civilian casualties and greater likelihood of success or failure, making 9 cases. In the second, respondents were told of a strike by a high precision drone, high precision manned plane, moderate precision plane and low precision plane. They were then told that the attack did incur casualties.
Zeitzoff, Thomas. 2014. "Anger, Exposure to Violence, and Intragroup Conflict: A 'Lab in the Field' Experiment in Southern Israel." *Political Psychology* 35 (3): 309–35.	Missile strikes, anger, and reciprocity.	Gender was mentioned in the descriptive statistics.	Not found on his website.	Strikes against civilians	Israel.	Yes, one location was not hit by rockets.	Respondents from two areas of Israel, one often hit by rockets from Gaza and the other not, were randomly primed for anger or not and then given the opportunity to punish their partner

doi:10.1111/pops.12065.							in the situation at some cost to themselves.
New Additions Below This Line							
Baum, Matthew A., and Tim Groeling. 2008. "Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public Opinion Regarding National Security and War." *Political Behavior* 31 (2): 157–86. doi:10.1007/s11109-008-9074-9.	Audience costs and elite disagreement	Gender was controlled for and not significant	Not found on either website or on the dataverse		USA	Not applicable	A media exposure test in which the party of an elected official, their stance on an issue (NSA domestic spying scandal) and the network (FOX or CNN) are varied.
Gartner, Scott Sigmund. "The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach." *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 1 (February 2008): 95–106. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080027.	Public opinion and casualty numbers	Gender was considered in every case and found to be significant in some models.		Warfare, casualty tolerance	USA	Yes, in the panel study there were treatments where the military intervention was stopped.	First, an experiment where future casualties in Iraq were varied. Second, panel experiments asked about a hypothetical intervention.
Mintz, Alex, and Nehemia Geva. "Why Don't Democracies Fight Each Other? An	Public Opinion and Democratic Peace	Gender was not mentioned		Democratic Peace	USA, Israel	Yes, some treatments asked about not using force.	The experiments asked about a hypothetical use of force and varied the regime type.

Experimental Study." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no. 3 (September 1, 1993): 484–503. doi:10.1177/0022002793037003004.							

6. Original Experiments in Egypt, Israel, Turkey and the U.S

We conducted four original survey experiments on representative samples of the populations of Egypt, Israel, Turkey and the United States during the month of July, 2016. The numbers of respondents from each country were, respectively, 1,029, 1,382, 1,141 and 2,003. All experiments were administered over the internet in the language of the country. In Egypt and Turkey, the polls were conducted by local firms affiliated with the Cint network of panels. The Israel experiment was conducted by the Sarid Institute for Research Services. Survey Sampling International administered the survey in the United States.

The surveys were designed so that responses would be as comparable as possible. The surveys administered in Egypt, Israel and Turkey were identical and described a conflict over resources in the seabed under the Mediterranean Sea. Respondents were told their country (Egypt, Israel or Turkey) and another country had made contradictory claims under international law and that both wished to extract "oil, gas and gas-hydrates, which scientists believe will become the worlds next alternative energy source." Respondents were then told that their country (Egypt/Israel/Turkey) "and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area's resources until a further determination by the United Nations."

They were then randomly shown one of four treatments or assigned to a control group. These treatments relate to a separate project and therefore we shall not describe them in detail here. They relate to the relate power of the conflict participants and the nature of the *status quo* for resource extraction. Following the treatments, respondents were asked a series of questions about their approval of differing shares for the two countries in a settlement, as well as the drivers of these responses. Respondents were also given attention and manipulation checks. Finally, all respondents were assigned one of two additional treatments. They were told to "suppose that instead of a deal being signed, negotiations ended abruptly" and that a conflict ensued in which 1,100 Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish troops and a similar number of troops from the opposing country died. We randomly varied which side emerged victorious. Half of respondents were told that "the Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish government decided to withdraw its forces and the other country took complete control of the resource-rich region," and the other half were told reverse. This design allowed for pairwise comparisons of treatment effects on approval of settlements and conflict, thereby allowing for more precise estimates of effects.

The U.S. experiment was similar, but of course could not revolve around a claim to resources in the Mediterranean Sea. Instead, it a similar dispute was described in the Arctic and Russia was named as the U.S. adversary. The decision to name Russia was made for realism in the power manipulation treatment: only Russia might reasonably be expected to defeat the U.S. in a local conflict in the Arctic. To make it clear that the dispute was a significant economic interest of a country the size of the United States, participants were told that "Over 25% of the world's undiscovered oil and gas are beneath the Arctic seabed, and portions of the ice contain gas-hydrates, which scientists believe will become the worlds next alter-

native energy source." Participants were also given information about the competing U.S. and Russian claims to the resources under international law and told that the United Nations had ruled that the evidence presented by each country in favor of its claim was "inconclusive."

Below, we provide the survey texts in English for the Egypt/Israel/Turkey experiments as well as a comparison of survey demographics to a national census standard. In all countries except the United States, the sample skews somewhat towards young, educated males.

Survey Experiment Text in English

Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish Foreign Policy

The following questions are about Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish foreign policy. You will read about a situation similar to those the country has faced in the past and may face again in the future. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. We will describe one approach Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish leaders have taken and ask for your thoughts on that approach.

The Situation

Egypt/Israel/Turkey and another country have a longstanding dispute over a resource-rich area in the seabed under the Mediterranean Sea. Both countries claim the right to extract oil, gas and gas-hydrates, which scientists believe will become the world's next alternative energy source. Both countries have made contradictory claims to the area under international law.

[Treatment 1]

(Respondents are put into one of the following treatment groups at random – Transgr. Treatment)

Treatment 1a	Egypt/Israel/Turkey and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area's resources until a further determination by the United Nations.
Treatment 1b	Egypt/Israel/Turkey and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area's resources until a further determination by the United Nations. In the past, Egypt/Israel/Turkey has regularly enabled Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish firms to extract resources from the area, while the other country was not engaged in the area.
Treatment 1c	Egypt/Israel/Turkey and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area's resources until a further determination by the United Nations. In the past, the other country has regularly enabled its country's firms to extract resources from the area, while Egypt/Israel/Turkey was not engaged in the area.
Treatment 1d	Egypt/Israel/Turkey and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area's resources until a further determination by the United Nations. However, the other country has enabled its country's firms to violate this agreement, and they have begun extracting the resources on a massive scale.
Treatment 1e	Egypt/Israel/Turkey and the other country agreed to postpone exploitation of the area's resources until a further determination by the United Nations. However, Egypt/Israel/Turkey has enabled Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish firms to violate this agreement, and they have begun extracting the resources on a massive scale.

[Treatment 2]

(Respondents are put into one of the following treatment groups at random – Power Treatment)

Treatment 2a	Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish military capabilities in the region far exceed those of the other country. Military officials were confident that any resulting conflict would be quickly settled in favor of Egypt/Israel/Turkey.
Treatment 2b	The capabilities of the two countries are relatively evenly matched. Military officials believed that any resulting conflict would involve significant casualties on both sides.

Following several months of negotiations, Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish leaders announced that a deal had been reached between the sides. Some groups were critical of the government's actions, while others argued that the government had been firm but prudent.

1. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 indicates maximum approval, how much would you approve of the way the government handled the situation if, according to the deal,

    a. The other country will receive rights to *all* of the disputed resource-rich area.
    b. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to 30% of the disputed resource-rich area and the other country will receive 70%.
    c. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to 40% of the disputed resource-rich area and the other country will receive 60%.
    d. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to 50% of the disputed resource-rich area and the other country will receive 50%.
    e. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to 60% of the disputed resource-rich area and the other country will receive 40%.
    f. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to 70% of the disputed resource-rich area and the other country will receive 30%.
    g. Egypt/Israel/Turkey will receive rights to *all* of the disputed resource-rich area.

2. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 indicates total agreement, how much do you agree with each of the following statements?

    a. The other country should be punished for its conduct.
    b. The most important thing is for Egypt/Israel/Turkey to avoid a bloody conflict with the other country.
    c. Negotiation of a fair agreement is one of the most important considerations.
    d. A substantial compromise with the other country is likely the best deal that can be negotiated.
    e. A negotiated compromise that is favorable to the other country will cause Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish enemies to challenge Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish interests and Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish allies to question Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish reliability.
    f. A negotiated compromise is in the interests of both sides. Please mark that you Neither Agree Nor Disagree to ensure you are paying attention.
    g. A country should ***not*** have the right to use military force for political purposes without U.N. approval.

3. In situations like this, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 indicates total agreement, how much do you approve of the use of force by Egypt/Israel/Turkey when necessary?

Now suppose that instead of a deal being signed, **[Treatment 3]**

Treatment 3a	negotiations ended abruptly. Following a tense standoff between Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish forces and the military of the other country, the sides exchanged fire. Over 1,100 Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish troops, and a similar number of the other country's troops, died in the conflict, but militarily the other country had the upper hand in the dispute. The Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish government decided to withdraw its forces and the other country took complete control of the resource-rich region.
Treatment 3b	negotiations ended abruptly. Following a tense standoff between Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish forces and the military of the other country, the sides exchanged fire. Over 1,100 Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish troops, and a similar number of the other country's troops, died in the conflict, but militarily Egypt/Israel/Turkey had the upper hand in the dispute. The other country decided to withdraw its forces and Egypt/Israel/Turkey took complete control of the resource-rich region.

1. In this case, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 indicates maximum approval, how much would you approve of the way the government handled the situation?

2. On a scale of 1 to 10, which 10 indicates maximum approval, how much do you agree with each of the following statements?

    - The Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish government was too moderate in the conduct of foreign policy.
    - The Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish government was too aggressive in the conduct of foreign policy.
    - The other country deserved this outcome because of its conduct.
    - Egypt/Israel/Turkey deserved this outcome because of its conduct.
    - Egyptian/Israeli/Turkish actions were appropriate due to its economic interest in the outcome.
    - The other country's actions were appropriate due to its economic interest in the outcome.

3. In the scenarios described above, which country was described as violating an agreement by enabling companies to extract resources from the region?
    a. Egypt/Israel/Turkey
    b. The other country
    c. Neither Egypt/Israel/Turkey nor the other country.
4. In the scenarios described above, military officials were confident that any local conflict would be quickly settled in favor of which state?
    a. Egypt/Israel/Turkey
    b. Neither Egypt/Israel/Turkey nor the other country.

Survey Demographics

Egypt

Gender:

Gender	Sample	Population
Male	77%	48%
Female	23%	52%

Age:

Range	Sample	Population
18-24	27%	17%
25-34	43%	28%
35-44	22%	19%
45-54	6%	16%
55+	1.6%	20%

Region:

Area	Sample	Population
Cairo	36%	11%
Alexandria	10%	5%
Port Said	2%	1%
Suez	1%	1%
Damietta	3%	2%
Dakahlia	4%	7%
Eastern	4%	7%
Qaliubiya	2%	6%
Kafr El Sheikh	2%	4%
Western	5%	5%
Monoufia	3%	4%
The lake	3%	7%
Ismailia	1%	1%
Giza	9%	9%

Area	Sample	Population
Bani Sweif	1%	3%
Fayoum	1%	4%
Minya	2%	6%
Asyut	3%	5%
Sohag	3%	5%
Qena	1%	3%
Aswan	1%	2%
The palace	1%	1%
The Red Sea	1%	0%
The new Valley	0%	0%
Matrouh	0%	1%
North Sinai	0%	0%
South of Sinaa	0%	0%

Sources: The central agency for publish mobilization and statistics (CAPMAS): http://www.msrintranet.capmas.gov.eg/pdf/EgyptinFigures2015/EgyptinFigures/Tables/PDF/1-%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86/pop.pdf. Demographic and health surveys by Ministry of Health and Population and USAID (see http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR302/FR302.pdf).

Israel

Gender:

Gender	Sample	Population
Male	47%	49%
Female	53%	51%

Age:

Range	Sample	Population
18-24	14%	11%
25-34	23%	21%
35-44	20%	19%
45-54	16%	15%
55-64	14%	13%
65-74	11%	9%
75+	2%	7%

Region:

Code	Area	Sample	Population
1	North and Haifa	27%	21%
2	"Sharon" and Samaria	13%	11%
3	Jerusalem	10%	11%
4	Center and the Dan	31%	42%
5	"Shfela" and South	18%	15%

Source: www.cbs.gov.il. Jewish population only.

Turkey

Gender:

Gender	Sample	Population
Male	56%	51%
Female	44%	49%

Age (18-80):

Range	Sample	Population
18-22	15%	12%
23-35	41%	32%
36-55	38%	37%
56-80	4%	19%

Region:

Area	Area (EN)	Sample	Population	tuik symb
Akdeniz Bölgesi	The Mediterranean region	12%	13%	TR6
Doğu Anadolu Bölgesi	East Anatolia Region	3%	4%	TRA
Ege Bölgesi	Aegean Region	17%	13%	TR3
İç Anadolu Bölgesi	Central Anatolia Region	20%	19%	TRB;TR7
Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi	Southeastern Anatolia Region	4%	10%	TRC
Karadeniz Bölgesi	Black Sea region	6%	12%	TR8; TR9
Marmara Bölgesi	Marmara Region	38%	28%	TR1;TR2; TR4

Source: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr; biruni.tuik.gov.tr, Cint's data for the age groups, and census data available at: https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/bolgeselistatistik

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