The Promise of Peacekeeping: Protecting Civilians in Civil Wars

Appendix of Supporting Information
(Not for publication)

Case study: UN peacekeepers in Ituri district, DRC (2003-6)

The case of UN peacekeeping in Ituri in the Eastern DRC offers the opportunity for a controlled comparison of the effect of a large increase in the number of blue helmets in the area in the fall of 2003 on civilian casualties inflicted by the rebels and the government, respectively. We focus on events unfolding over a single period of the Congolese civil war (from 2003 to 2006) in one of the DRC's 26 districts so we can compare the effect of an influx of blue helmets on abuses committed by each side in the same location at the same point in time. Ituri is roughly the size of Ireland and has four million inhabitants; it is located in Orientale province in the North East of the DRC at the border between the DRC and Uganda. The conflict in Ituri was ongoing throughout the period of investigation, and it cost some 60,000 lives by 2006 (Allen, 2006). The first UN peacekeepers arrived in Ituri in the spring of 2003 and a much larger UN force was deployed in the fall of the same year as part of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Before turning to the effect of UN peacekeeping on the plight of civilians during the conflict in Ituri, we analyze the establishment of the UN peace operation and the role of African Security Council members therein.

The Influence of Countries with Temporary Power on Peacekeeping

Both the rotating council presidents and non-permanent Council members that were from the Congo's region in Africa exercised influence over the peacekeeping mission. After an initial period of disinterest in the mission, states from the region pushed for increased UN support. We first detail the lack of interest before exploring the impact of specific states on the Council.

According to a senior diplomat posted at the United Nations, "The Congo file started in Africa, not in the United Nations. The Lusaka Agreement called for UN forces....The UN wasn't there. The UN came in with a framework that wasn't theirs" (cited in Bernath and Edgerton, 2003, p. 5). Similarly, the former UN Under-Secretary-General in charge of UN peacekeeping recalls that "[f]rom the outset, the international community had no grand design for Congo ... The July 1999

agreement, which had been negotiated by African leaders and not by the UN, nevertheless called on the United Nations for its implementation" (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 116-7). A recent analysis of the history of peacekeeping in the Congo concurs with this assessment, noting that "[e]ven though MONUC....ha[s] been the largest peace operation to date, the UN Security Council [i.e., its non-African majority] at first strongly resisted peacekeeping in the DRC. The Council had to be convinced by the region that external intervention was necessary" (Carayannis, 2013, p. 197).

The Lusaka peace process, which preceded the establishment of a UN peace operation, was a regional initiative launched by Zambia as chair of the Southern African Development Community's summit in September 1998 in response to the outbreak of the second Congo War a month earlier. In July 1999, the parties to the conflict in the DRC convened in Lusaka to sign a peace accord that was mediated by Zambia. The United Nations was absent from the mediation process (Lanotte, 2003, p. 132-4) and was caught off guard by the warring parties' call for a robust UN peace operation expressed in the agreement (Holt and Berkman, 2006, p. 158). The Congolese government "pushed hard for this resolution and lobbied African Security Council members and other non-permanent members through the Non-Aligned Movement" (Carayannis, 2013, p. 191).

In 1998 and 1999, Gabon represented Central Africa on the Security Council. It spoke out in favor of active Security Council support of African regional initiatives to end the conflict in the DRC (United Nations, 1999*a*,*c*), and it frequently criticized the UN for neglecting African conflicts (Mandjouhou Yolla, 2003, p. 215). Moreover, it adopted a pro-Western position when it held the presidency of the UN Security Council in May 1999 during NATO's air war against the FR Yugoslavia over Kosovo.[1] In the absence of Gabonese interests in the Balkans one may wonder about its motive for introducing a pro-Western draft resolution on Kosovo; Gabon's president at the time had a history of "exchanging services" with France by mediating foreign crises

[1]The day before acceding to the presidency, Gabon submitted a draft resolution on humanitarian aid to Kosovar refugees in the name of 113 members of the Non-Aligned Movement (Réseau Voltaire, 1999), and the Council adopted a revised draft two weeks into Gabon's Security Council presidency. The resolution's focus on the humanitarian needs of Kosovo-Albanian refugees conflicted with China and Russia's emphasis on the illegality under international law of NATO's airstrikes against the FR Yugoslavia and on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 8. One month later Gabon became the only developing country on the Security Council to co-submit the draft for resolution 1244, which ended the Kosovo War by placing it under UN administration (United Nations, 1999*b*, p. 2-3).

(Mandjouhou Yolla, 2003, p. 216, authors' translation). Despite the United States' skepticism about the merits of UN peacekeeping in the DRC[2] the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of UN observers within a month from the conclusion of the Lusaka accord. In November 1999, Security Council resolution 1279 established a regular UN observer mission and asked the Secretary-General to prepare for the deployment of a much larger force.

After Gabon's departure from the Security Council at the end of 1999, the Security Council seat that is alternately held by a Central and a North African country was held by Tunisia in 2000 and 2001; contrary to Gabon, Tunisia did not prioritize the settlement of the conflict in the DRC. Central African countries continued to plead for a robust and large UN peace operation in the DRC, but now the Security Council was less responsive than it was in 1999. Resolution 1291 of February 2001 was "largely symbolic" (Willame, 2007); it increased the number of UN peacekeepers to 5,000, but no UN troops were deployed until March 2001. Delays were partly due to troop contributors' hesitations to provide blue helmets to MONUC, the blocking of funds for MONUC by the United States Congress, and lack of progress in the peace process. Two observers concluded that "[t]he more violent the fighting became, the more urgently needed were peacekeepers, but the less likely their deployment became" (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006). In the summer of 2000 the UN Secretary-General considered aborting the entire peace operation (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006). The succession of Laurent Kabila as president of the DRC by his son in January 2001 removed a major obstacle to a speedy deployment of MONUC. Even so, the Security Council endorsed a new peacekeeping plan that reduced the planned number of UN troops to protect civilians and UN military observers from 3,400 to 1,900 (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009). In October 2001, the Security Council endorsed the start of a new phase of the peace operation – without approving additional troops (*Ibid.*).

[2]In March 1999, the United States' representative on the Security Council reiterated a statement by President Clinton according to which his country would consider supporting a peacekeeping operation if there were a comprehensive agreement among the belligerents to end the conflict and to observe a ceasefire (United Nations, 1999*a*, p. 12); this condition was not fulfilled when the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of UN monitors since several parties had not even signed the agreement. According to an anonymous State Department official interviewed in early November 1999, the United States also did not view the DRC as an urgent crisis that required a massive intervention when the Security Council established a regular UN observer mission (cited in Willame, 2007, p. 21).

In January 2002, Cameroon joined the Security Council as Central Africa's representative. As an "economic locomotive" of Central Africa, Cameroon repeatedly experienced an intense influx of refugees from its region (Chouala, 2014, p. 236-7), and it therefore had a keen interest in restoring peace in its own region. In June 2002, a summit of Central African countries provided the venue for a meeting between the presidents of the DRC and Rwanda, which led to the signing of the protocol of a peace accord in July (Willame, 2007, p. 78). According to the head of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the time, this agreement was the political turning point for the DRC (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 124). In pursuit of the agreement, Rwanda withdrew its troops from the DRC in September 2002. During the same month, Angola facilitated an agreement between Uganda and the DRC on Ugandan withdrawal and convinced the DRC's ally Zimbabwe to repatriate its troops.

The UN Security Council responded to these developments by expanding MONUC to 8,700 personnel (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006). While the United States was still reluctant to increase the size of MONUC due to the financial implications (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006, p. 256), it was simultaneously engaged in an intense campaign to secure the votes of Cameroon and Angola on a Security Council resolution authorizing a United States-led invasion of Iraq (de La Sablière, 2013); Angola had joined the Council at the end of 2002 when a seat for Southern Africa opened up, thereby becoming the second state with a vital interest in the DRC to serve on the Council in 2003.

The Effect of Peacekeepers on Civilian Casualties

On the ground in the DRC, the influx of additional UN peacekeepers authorized in late 2002 made a major difference. Back in 2000, a senior UN official complained about the insufficient size and mandate of the peace operation in the DRC: "This is Bosnia all over again. These guys are not going to be able to protect anyone" (cited in Lynch, 2000). The head of UN peacekeeping concurs that MONUC did not have much capacity to protect civilians in 2000 and 2001 (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 119-120). Cognizant of the mission's limitations, "early reports of the Secretary-General to

the Security Council did not reflect protection of civilians as a central planning objective for the mission" (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009). The Secretary-General's June 2002 report cautioned that "[w]hile MONUC will do its utmost, it does not have the means to provide broader protection to civilians at large ... MONUC troops currently deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not equipped, trained or configured to intervene rapidly to assist those in need of protection" (United Nations, 2002).

In Ituri, less than ten UN observers monitored an area with four million inhabitants between 1999 and April 2003 (Human Rights Watch, 2003*b*, p. 2). With such a small presence on the ground, the UN was manifestly incapable of protecting civilians. When it became clear in mid-April 2003 that the last remaining Ugandan forces would depart shortly, the UN Under-Secretary-General in charge of peacekeeping decided to redeploy a reserve contingent of Uruguayan blue helmets to Bunia, the capital of Ituri, in order to stabilize the situation (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 250). By the time the last Ugandan soldiers left Ituri on May 6, 411 MONUC troops were stationed in Bunia, and 200 more arrived a few days later (IRIN, 2003). Various primary sources agree that the force was largely incapable of protecting ethnic Hema civilians who were victimized by ethnic Hema, Lendu, and Ngiti militias, which fought over control of Bunia and exploited the climate of lawlessness to harass its civilian population.

A report produced by the UN Secretariat detailing the lessons learned offers the following assessment of MONUC's performance in late April and May of 2003: "Given that URUBATT [i.e., the Uruguayan battalion of blue helmets] was principally ready for static guard duty and was not trained, configured or equipped for the kind of emergency robust deployment that was required for Bunia, it was clear from the start that there was little more it could do than provide security to MONUC and other international staff as well as the local civilians who sought refuge at the headquarters and airport base" (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2004, p. 7). The International Crisis Group (2003, p. 12), an independent think tank, reached a similar conclusion: "MONUC had initially attempted to set up roadblocks, restore order, conduct patrols, and protect civilians, but these were quickly overwhelmed, and the mandate 'to protect civilians under immi-

nent threat of physical violence' was abandoned."[3] In an internal report, the Force Commander of MONUC blamed the timidity of the contingent itself, which was presumably a function of the fact that it was greatly outnumbered by fighting militas (cited in Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 252). In conclusion, the small UN peacekeeping contingent deployed to Bunia in the spring of 2003 was largely unable to protect civilians from harm inflicted by warring factions.

In mid-May 2003, the apparent failure of MONUC in Ituri led the UN Secretary-General to call on France to deploy a temporary emergency force to Bunia (de La Sablière, 2013, p. 110-1). France responded favorably and insisted on deploying a European Union-led force, which received the UN Security Council's authorization at the end of May and deployed immediately. With some 5,000 troops, the force quickly pacified the situation in Bunia. At the same time, the European Union insisted on withdrawing its force after three months and rejected the UN Secretariat's proposal of maintaining an over-the-horizon force that might return in case of an emergency after September 1; European countries that contributed troops to the EU force also declined to remain in Bunia as part of MONUC (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 139-40). The complete withdrawal of the EU left MONUC with the responsibility to maintain order and civilian security after September 1, and the UN Secretariat anticipated that "spoilers would challenge the UN force as soon as the multinational force had left" (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 139).

Still bitter about the refusal of the majority of UN Security Council members to vote to authorize the Iraq War, the United States was at first reluctant to approve a reinforcement for MONUC that deployed to Ituri in the wake of the EU interim force's withdrawal (Guéhenno, 2015); if past discord over Iraq was on the mind of American diplomats, so was their desire to secure the unanimity in the Council on the endorsement of the Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority and on the process for transferring control to Iraqi authorities, which the United States obtained despite misgivings by several Security Council members (Ryan, 2003, p. 22). In the end, the UN Security Council approved an enlargement of MONUC to 10,800 staff at the end of July. According to the head of the UN's peacekeeping department, this reinforcement was "highly significant," and

[3] See Human Rights Watch, 2003*a* for an additional assessment.

turned MONUC into "a completely different mission" (Guéhenno, 2015, p. 140). In particular, 5,000 troops deployed to Ituri. While the EU force had only been located in Ituri's capital, the UN's new Ituri brigade would cover the entire district. 2,400 troops from Uruguay, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia arrived in Bunia by September 1 when the EU withdrew; in the following two months the number of UN troops in Ituri reached 4,500, and these forces were equipped with attack helicopters and armored personnel carriers (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 254). By November, the UN force was deployed to Ituri's capital and seven additional locations in Ituri where no EU forces had been stationed (United Nations, 2004, para. 23).

As soon as the EU interim force was gone, local rebel militias tested the resolve of MONUC's new Ituri brigade; in early October a rebel militia killed 65 civilians (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 256). Whereas the small MONUC contingent had failed to react to similar atrocities committed in the spring, the much larger Ituri brigade responded by accelerating its deployment across Ituri and by intervening to prevent fighting between two rebel milita (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009, p. 256). When militias attacked MONUC staff twenty times in two months, MONUC did not withdraw to the safety of its bases like it did several months earlier, but it stepped up patrols, checkpoint controls, and cordon and search operations (United Nations, 2004, para. 25). Throughout the winter of 2003-4, MONUC succeeded in maintaining security in Bunia, and its deployment was associated with the return of stability of many parts of Ituri where no other international peacekeepers had previously been based (United Nations, 2004, para. 25). In short, MONUC transitioned into a new phase when its capacity increased in the late summer and fall of 2003, and "it was not until this [new] stage that MONUC had the means to take seriously its mandate to protect civilians under the imminent threat of attack" (Roessler and Prendergast, 2006, p. 260).

At the end of 2004, fighting between various rebel groups in Ituri escalated once again despite MONUC's strong presence on the ground. MONUC responded to attacks on the civilian population by dismantling militia camps, and increasing the protection of sensitive sites (e.g., camps for internally displaced persons and premises of humanitarian aid providers) (United Nations, 2005, para. 15). In February, a militia launched a coordinated ambush on a MONUC foot patrol that

killed nine UN troops. In response, MONUC carried out a large cordon-and-search operation and successfully dismantled a headquarters of the militia; during the exchange of fire between 50 and 60 militia members were killed (*Ibid*., para. 19). MONUC issued an ultimatum for all militias to disarm by April 1, and the acting political director of its Ituri office vowed that those who failed to disarm would be considered outlaws, prosecuted by the Congolese authorities, and forcefully disarmed by MONUC (IRIN, 2005). According to the UN's Under-Secretary-General who was in charge of peacekeeping, MONUC averted further harm to its military credibility by acting on its ultimatum, eventually leading 15,000 militia members in Ituri to disarm (Guéhenno, 2015).

Conclusion

Several key findings emerge from this case study of MONUC's response to the victimization of civilians in Ituri district between 2003 and 2006. First, the small UN contingent of some 700 Uruguayan troops deployed to Bunia in the spring of 2003 was incapable of fulfilling its mandate to protect civilians. Vastly outnumbered by rival militias that fought over control of the town, it adopted a passive posture and largely failed to improve the plight of civilians. In contrast, the much larger UN force deployed in the fall of 2003, which numbered 4,500 by November, fared much better. It maintained stability in Bunia, where an EU interim force had been deployed for three months over the summer, and restored order in other parts of Ituri where no international peacekeepers had previously been deployed. When militias tested its resolve, the reinforced MONUC responded by dismantling their headquarters, disrupting their military activities, and by issuing and enforcing an ultimatum for their disarmament. Ultimately, changes in the size of the MONUC contingent in Ituri at least partly account for variation in violence against civilians: initially the UN blue helmets simply lacked the capability to effectively protect civilians; a sixfold increase in the number of blue helmets in late 2003 enabled them to change their posture and to adopt tactics that deterred violence against civilians.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	*N*	Mean	St.dev.	Min.	Max.
Dependent variable					
Civilian deaths	2,894	44.84243	368.7449	0	13087
Instrumental variables					
UNSC representation	2,894	.5072564	.5000337	0	1
UNSC presidency	2,894	.1565308	.3634206	0	1
Independent variables					
UNPO size	2,894	1694.216	5417.67	0	33558
Authorize new UNPO	2,894	.4035936	.8006657	0	2
Mandated UNPO size	2,894	2299.103	7124.775	0	40952
Gap betw. mandated and actual UNPO size	2,894	595.1264	2563.055	-1431	26644
PKO	2,894	.0418106	.2001908	0	1
Conflict duration	2,894	9.909468	10.04446	1	42
Simultaneous conflicts	2,894	1.978922	1.698265	0	11
Political rights	2,810	6.058363	.8692419	3	7
Forest cover (%)	2,894	.1852194	.1917494	.0004872	.6991226
Mil. expenditure per cap. (ln.)	2,498	37.10587	73.07883	.59375	627.2888
UN sanctions	2,690	.2598513	.4386344	0	1
UN mediation	2,444	.0466448	.2109201	0	1
New peace agreement	2,894	.0297167	.1698339	0	1
Peace agreement collapse	2,894	.0069109	.0828581	0	1
Year	2,894	2001.035	7.466588	1989	2014

Note: A country-month dataset on UN sanctions was coded for this study from the data presented in Biersteker (2015). The binary UN sanctions variable takes a positive value if sanctions were in place against any actor in the civil-war country at the end of the month. Data on mediation was compiled by DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011). The binary UN mediation takes a positive value for when a mediation episode was ongoing at the end of the month if the UN or a UN representative were identified as a third-party mediator in DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna (2011); the mediation measure captures whether any mediation episode was unfolding at the end of the month. The binary foreign troop support variable takes a positive value when a foreign state or non-state actor provides troops that fight alongside governments or rebels in civil conflicts. The data is presented in Hogbladh, Pettersson and Themner (2011). Data on the authorized (mandated) size of UN peace operations, on the gap between the authorized and the actual mission size, and on the establishment of new peace operations was compiled by (Mikulaschek, 2019) from UN Security Council resolutions and reports by the UN Secretary-General.

Table 2: Number of civilian deaths in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa by country

Country	Total number of civilian deaths	Share of civilian deaths in %
Algeria	1,994	1.5
Angola	3,990	3.1
Burundi	8,270	6.4
Cameroon	0	0.0
Central African Republic	3,096	2.4
Chad	1,965	1.5
Comoros	0	0.0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	55,052	42.4
Djibouti	2	0.0
Egypt	246	0.2
Eritrea	0	0.0
Ethiopia	3,209	2.5
Lesotho	0	0.0
Mauritania	1	0.0
Morocco (Western Sahara)	0	0.0
Mozambique	1,575	1.2
Republic of Congo	1,569	1.2
Rwanda	12,570	9.7
Somalia	6,074	4.7
South Sudan	1,887	1.5
Sudan	22,374	17.2
Uganda	5,528	4.3
Sum	129,774	100

Note: The table shows the number of civilian casualties during ongoing civil conflicts in Central, Eastern, Southern, and North Africa between 1989 and 2014. Note that the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for a large share of all civilian casualties; to ensure that the results of this study are not driven solely by this conflict some of our robustness checks exclude the Congolese observations. The figures exclude the 497,229 casualties of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, because this event is an extreme outlier; it accounts for more civilian fatalities than all other 2,894 civil-conflict-month observations combined. Data source: Sundberg and Melander (2013).

Table 3: Names and size of UNPOs in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa

Country	Names of UNPOs	UNPO size mean	UNPO size max.
Angola	UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, MONUA	1,125.4	7,302
Burundi	ONUB	658.1	5,665
Central African Republic	MINURCAT, MINUSCA	31.9	292
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	MONUC, MONUSCO	10,483.6	21,485
Chad	MINURCAT	241.9	3,518
Rwanda	UNAMIR	193.9	5,645
Somalia	UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, UNSOA	1,136.3	24,566
South Sudan	UNMISS	7,517.7	11,451
Sudan	UNMIS, UNAMID	7,290.8	33,558
Uganda	UNOMUR	2.146	81
Total		1,694.2	33,558

Note: The table indicates the names and size of the eighteen UN peace operations deployed in response to ongoing civil conflicts in Central, Eastern, Southern, and North Africa between 1989 and 2014. The average (maximal) size represents the mean (maximal) number of troops, military observers, and civilian police deployed as part of the peace operation while the conflict was ongoing. For each country, the minimal number of UN peace operation staff deployed while the conflict was ongoing was zero. Two additional peace operations were established in the aftermath of conflicts in Morocco and Mozambique. Moreover, two additional peace operations were deployed on the borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and in the border region between South Sudan and Sudan in response to interstate wars between these countries and not in the context of a civil conflict. Peace operations in Western Africa are not included in the table, because Western Africa is outside the scope of the natural experiment of seats on the Security Council that rotate between the four other African regions.

Table 4: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares and OLS models with country and year fixed effects

	Number of civilian casualties			
	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.010	-0.077**	-0.062*	-0.071**
	(0.008)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.028)
Constant	28.814			
	(37.115)			
	Number of UNPO personnel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)		428.070		359.057
		(282.837)		(290.130)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)			379.143**	606.601**
			(158.826)	(285.317)
Observations	2894	2894	2894	2894
R-squared	0.066	-0.586	-0.362	-0.497
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic		6.23	3.05	3.67
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)				0.462

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 5: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares and OLS models with country and year fixed effects

	Number of civilian casualties			
	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.009	-0.118	-0.059*	-0.084**
	(0.008)	(0.077)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Constant	138.809*			
	(76.671)			
	Number of UNPO personnel			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)		288.282		210.743
		(285.741)		(300.348)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)			339.734**	488.358*
			(156.353)	(272.570)
Observations	2306	2306	2306	2306
R-squared	0.068	-1.474	-0.313	-0.701
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic		1.55	1.65	1.26
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)				0.275

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 6: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and year fixed effects

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.876**	-0.914**
	(0.393)	(0.446)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	469.355	431.649
	(373.840)	(395.852)
Observations	241	192
R-squared	-2.933	-3.228
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	0.52	0.23

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 7: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares models with country and time fixed effects and with SEs clustered by region and year-month

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.049***	-0.034***	-0.044***
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.014)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	603.427***		491.296***
	(171.113)		(160.030)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		608.472***	864.185***
		(126.179)	(188.193)
Observations	2894	2894	2894
R-squared	-0.189	-0.069	-0.079
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	15.23	8.30	8.890
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.141

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by region and year-month in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 8: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models with country and time fixed effects and with SEs clustered by region and year-month

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.044***	-0.030***	-0.040***
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.012)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	763.634***		638.434***
	(42.436)		(40.868)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		727.729***	1,036.494***
		(44.356)	(60.674)
Observations	2306	2306	2306
R-squared	-0.142	-0.046	-0.112
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	16.34	8.24	
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.226

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by region and year-month in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 9: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares models with country and year fixed effects and with SEs clustered by region and year-month

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.077**	-0.062**	-0.071**
	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.030)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	428.070***		359.057***
	(141.106)		(144.840)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		379.143***	606.601***
		(83.144)	(131.896)
Observations	2894	2894	2894
R-squared	-0.586	-0.362	-0.497
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	6.23	3.05	3.67
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.552

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by region and year-month in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 10: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models with country and year fixed effects and with SEs clustered by region and year-month

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.118*	-0.059***	-0.084***
	(0.069)	(0.014)	(0.027)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	288.282		210.743
	(225.427)		(220.935)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		339.734***	488.358 **
		(130.220)	(233.780)
Observations	2306	2306	2306
R-squared	-1.474	-0.313	-0.701
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	1.55	1.65	1.26
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.345

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by region and year-month in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 11: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and time fixed effects and with SEs clustered by region

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.674*	-0.621*
	(0.360)	(0.342)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	537.770***	660.242***
	(146.771)	(124.334)
Observations	241	192
R-squared	-2.685	-5.133
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	0.98	1.02

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by region in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 12: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and year fixed effects and with SEs clustered by region

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.876*	-0.914*
	(0.510)	(0.527)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	469.354**	431.649
	(193.726)	(342.949)
Observations	241	192
R-squared	-2.933	-3.228
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	0.52	0.23

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by region in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 13: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares models with country and time fixed effects and with SEs clustered by country and year-month

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.049**	-0.034**	-0.044**
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.019)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	603.427**		
	(297.965)		
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		608.472***	
		(169.553)	
Observations	2894	2894	2894
R-squared	-0.189	-0.069	-0.143
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	15.23	8.30	
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.092

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country and year-month in parentheses. The first-stage coefficients of Model 3 cannot be reliably estimated; the variance matrix is nonsymmetric or highly singular. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 14: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models with country and time fixed effects and with SEs clustered by country and year-month

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.044**	-0.030**	-0.040**
	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.018)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	763.634**		
	(344.730)		
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		727.729***	
		(179.101)	
Observations	2306	2306	2306
R-squared	-0.142	-0.046	-0.112
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	16.34	8.24	
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.076

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country and year-month in parentheses. The first-stage coefficients of Model 3 cannot be reliably estimated; the variance matrix is nonsymmetric or highly singular. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 15: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares models with country and year fixed effects and with SEs clustered by country and year-month

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.077***	-0.062***	-0.071***
	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.021)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	428.070		
	(265.104)		
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)			
Observations	2894	2894	2894
R-squared	-0.586	-0.362	-0.497
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	6.23		
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country and year-month in parentheses. The first-stage coefficients of Models 2 and 3 cannot be reliably estimated; the variance matrix is nonsymmetric or highly singular. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 16: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and year fixed effects and with SEs clustered by country and year-month

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.876**	-0.914
	(0.439)	(0.654)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	469.355	431.649
	(297.704)	(413.014)
Observations	241	192
R-squared	-2.933	-3.228
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	0.52	0.23

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country and year-month in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 17: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and time fixed effects and with SEs clustered by country and year-month

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.674***	-0.621***
	(0.199)	(0.198)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	537.769***	
	(167.225)	
Observations	241	192
R-squared	-2.933	-3.228
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	0.98	1.02

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country and year-month in parentheses. The first-stage coefficients of Model 2 cannot be reliably estimated. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 18: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares models with country and year fixed effects and with an alternative operationalization of the presidency instrument

	Number of civilian casualties	
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.075*	-0.076**
	(0.041)	(0.030)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)		403.562
		(290.093)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)	297.172**	548.752**
	(130.175)	(264.348)
Observations	2894	2894
R-Squared	-0.564	-0.581
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	1.26	3.25
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)		0.009

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 19: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models with country and year fixed effects and with an alternative operationalization of the presidency instrument

	Number of civilian casualties	
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.076*	-0.111*
	(0.045)	(0.062)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)		258.412
		(293.545)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)	262.907*	439.891
	(142.872)	(268.145)
Observations	2306	2306
R-Squared	-0.557	-1.282
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	0.67	0.93
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)		0.584

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 20: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares models with country and time fixed effects and with an alternative operationalization of the presidency instrument

	Number of civilian casualties	
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.036*	-0.047**
	(0.019)	(0.023)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)		553.459*
		(318.868)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)	547.798***	821.978***
	(244.998)	(371.843)
Observations	2894	2894
R-Squared	-0.085	-0.174
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	4.41	8.09
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)		0.314

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 21: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models with country and time fixed effects and with an alternative operationalization of the presidency instrument

	Number of civilian casualties	
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.033**	-0.043**
	(0.016)	(0.021)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)		706.795*
		(378.441)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)	668.901**	999.083**
	(286.9845)	(433.350)
Observations	2306	2306
R-Squared	-0.060	-0.132
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	4.55	8.56
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)		0.334

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 22: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares models with country and time fixed effects and with control variables

	Number of civilian casualties		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.071***	-0.069*	-0.070***
	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.024)
PKO	8.109	7.530	7.992
	(64.382)	(59.996)	(63.802)
Conflict Duration	4.759	4.582*	4.723
	(3.305)	(2.361)	(3.198)
Simultaneous Conflict	50.718**	50.189**	50.612**
	(20.472)	(23.652)	(20.493)
Political Rights	-26.787	-24.563	-26.338
	(41.005)	(53.242)	(40.810)
Forest Cover	-913.459	-896.237	-909.988
	(1133.095)	(1138.247)	(1122.146)
Military Spending	0.340	0.346	0.341
	(1.065)	(1.075)	(1.060)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	526.840*		500.841
	(307.399)		(322.102)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		330.660*	588.019*
		(190.766)	(304.541)
PKO	278.495	285.296	284.190
	(966.092)	(988.831)	(972.488)
Conflict Duration	80.711	79.054	80.644
	(55.121)	(55.013)	(55.024)
Simultaneous Conflict	258.711**	239.245**	258.358**
	(121.875)	(116.328)	(122.850)
Political Rights	-1015.424	-994.271	-1014.339
	(718.785)	(716.319)	(719.785)
Forest Cover	-7502.934	-7581.302	-7477.515
	(27534.000)	(27379.54)	(27554.31)
Military Spending	-2.925	-2.733	-2.911
	(16.747)	(16.616)	(16.761)
Observations	2450	2450	2450
R-Squared	-0.239	-0.924	-0.245
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	17.79	1.23	9.000
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.116

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 23: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models with country and time fixed effects and with control variables

	Number of civilian casualties		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.055**	-0.053*	-0.055**
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.024)
PKO	2.940	2.559	2.930
	(42.934)	(40.955)	(42.882)
Conflict Duration	5.394	5.106*	5.386
	(3.706)	(2.981)	(3.685)
Simultaneous Conflict	49.532**	48.977**	49.517**
	(19.773)	(21.046)	(19.763)
Political Rights	-26.763	-23.253	-26.670
	(46.440)	(47.217)	(46.238)
Forest Cover	-374.503	-380.389	-374.659
	(879.324)	(798.168)	(877.453)
Military Spending	2.571	2.478	2.568
	(2.542)	(2.203)	(2.535)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	735.910**		725.763**
	(349.767)		(366.851)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		417.945*	758.125**
		(217.655)	(341.302)
PKO	201.982	201.551	204.084
	(826.487)	(863.596)	(827.903)
Conflict Duration	128.706*	126.026	128.671
	(72.871)	(72.508)	(72.794)
Simultaneous Conflict	272.096**	246.183**	271.977**
	(122.824)	(120.269)	(123.522)
Political Rights	-1552.638	-1530.562	-1552.096
	(973.630)	(977.922)	(975.337)
Forest Cover	2945.605	2746.753	2954.325
	(30823.96)	(30599.67)	(30842.13)
Military Spending	41.620	40.861	41.617
	(41.774)	(41.893)	(41.769)
Observations	1958	1958	1958
R-Squared	-0.239	-0.924	-0.008
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	25.40	4.62	12.71
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.759

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 24: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares models with country and year fixed effects and with control variables

	Number of civilian casualties		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.089**	-0.149*	-0.089**
	(0.035)	(0.089)	(0.035)
PKO	41.126	64.960	41.397
	(66.319)	(105.878)	(66.766)
Conflict Duration	4.922	9.111*	4.969
	(3.702)	(4.813)	(3.742)
Simultaneous Conflict	58.961**	77.801	59.175**
	(28.686)	(51.731)	(28.807)
Political Rights	-39.114	-100.141	-39.808
	(54.205)	(139.482)	(54.751)
Forest Cover	-926.907	-1305.214	-931.212
	(1584.364)	(3275.649)	(1602.284)
Military Spending	0.259	-0.082	0.255
	(1.246)	(2.460)	(1.256)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	469.961		470.795
	(296.113)		(313.853)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		189.415	467.815*
		(116.981)	(262.920)
PKO	349.780	401.002	349.622
	(758.52)	(764.678)	(760.458)
Conflict Duration	71.860	45.635	71.861
	(45.488)	(4.813)	(45.468)
Simultaneous Conflict	327.992*	313.392*	328.013*
	(169.146)	(168.575)	(169.496)
Political Rights	-1032.239	-1015.232	-1032.258
	(762.680)	(764.238)	(763.270)
Forest Cover	-6466.883	-6273.193	-6467.513
	(28056.67)	(27868.53)	(28061.81)
Military Spending	-5.660	-5.638	-5.660
	(16.911)	(16.728)	(16.924)
Observations	2450	2450	2450
R-Squared	-0.239	-0.924	-0.245
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	12.61	1.23	6.30
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.757

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 25: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models with country and year fixed effects and with control variables

	Number of civilian casualties		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.057*	-0.083*	-0.057*
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.031)
PKO	27.024	33.003	27.006
	(41.284)	(51.893)	(41.268)
Conflict Duration	5.173*	8.379***	5.163*
	(2.967)	(3.188)	(2.978)
Simultaneous Conflict	50.412**	58.270*	50.387**
	(24.558)	(32.495)	(24.568)
Political Rights	-22.740	-63.284	-22.614
	(49.893)	(84.265)	(50.064)
Forest Cover	-200.764	-27.555	-201.302
	(900.804)	(1627.404)	(898.700)
Military Spending	2.723	3.696	2.720
	(2.361)	(2.818)	(2.363)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	759.846*		765.974*
	(415.701)		(435.845)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		260.406*	744.276**
		(154.305)	(378.530)
PKO	140.972	238.228	139.771
	(636.581)	(668.456)	(635.811)
Conflict Duration	129.046**	124.849**	129.074**
	(62.386)	(61.571)	(62.348)
Simultaneous Conflict	316.272**	305.392*	316.388**
	(156.517)	(163.396)	(156.616)
Political Rights	-1594.278	-1576.742	-1594.536
	(994.565)	(1000.342)	(995.315)
Forest Cover	6792.69	6792.911	6788.643
	31333.44)	(31411.98)	(31336.04)
Military Spending	39.894	38.030	39.897
	(38.799)	(38.585)	(38.799)
Observations	1958	1958	1958
R-Squared	-0.038	-0.163	-0.037
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	19.34	1.71	9.67
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.356

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 26: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and year fixed effects and with control variables

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-1.005**	-0.546*
	(0.487)	(0.327)
PKO	759.464	558.033
	(835.682)	(516.633)
Conflict Duration	74.867	63.382*
	(51.208)	(35.344)
Simultaneous Conflict	275.676	102.844
	(238.813)	(121.289)
Political Rights	-330.128	-43.181
	(627.421)	(456.544)
Forest Cover	-7540.370	1850.185
	(21985.8)	(9436.667)
Military Spending	3.895	31.594
	(16.570)	(24.170)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	614.944	1080.331
	(469.892)	(657.641)
PKO	389.582	165.396
	(850.918)	(716.027)
Conflict Duration	90.369	154.974*
	(60.098)	(82.428)
Simultaneous Conflict	311.727	303.287
	(300.148)	(337.772)
Political Rights	-982.346	-1568.3
	(847.028)	(1139.814)
Forest Cover	-6957.302	7459.601
	(34936.4)	(39528.23)
Military Spending	-5.287	45.540
	(21.220)	(52.256)
Observations	204	163
R-squared	-1.986	-0.428
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	1.13	1.91

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 27: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and time fixed effects and with control variables

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.906***	-0.713**
	(0.345)	(0.331)
PKO	262.210	136.220
	(753.760)	(485.623)
Conflict Duration	73.125	85.671
	(53.950)	(55.737)
Simultaneous Conflict	219.348	201.989
	(188.787)	(148.404)
Political Rights	-335.477	-401.014
	(493.433)	(569.451)
Forest Cover	-7627.738	70.083
	(19850.6)	(15629.8)
Military Spending	4.213	36.895
	(15.417)	(35.779)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	578.995	801.708*
	(417.766)	(480.254)
PKO	317.883	180.737
	(967.799)	(802.635)
Conflict Duration	92.412	145.724
	(67.798)	(90.765)
Simultaneous Conflict	184.129	199.637
	(295.268)	(285.929)
Political Rights	-1002.837	-1573.782
	(767.623)	(1071.489)
Forest Cover	-6074.633	5588.876
	(32389.2)	(36397.0)
Military Spending	-2.765	46.467
	(20.088)	(51.580)
Observations	204	163
R-squared	-1.234	-0.523
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	1.92	1.90

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 28: Effect of instruments on authorization of new UNPOs: OLS models with country and time fixed effects

	Likelihood of new UNPO		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	0.001		-0.001
	(0.003)		(0.003)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		0.006	0.006
		(0.005)	(0.005)
Observations	2315	2315	2315
R-squared	0.109	0.110	0.111

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 29: Effect of instruments on mandated size of UNPOs: OLS models with country and time fixed effects

	Authorized number of UNPO personnel		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	535.934*		429.984
	(265.734)		(260.102)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		545.221**	782.318**
		(218.723)	(310.679)
Observations	2894	2894	2894
R-squared	0.445	0.445	0.446

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 30: Effect of instruments on gap between mandated and actual UNPO size: OLS models with country and time fixed effects

	Diff. between authorized and actual number of UNPO personnel		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	-98.857		-98.605
	(114.317)		(105.563)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		-64.574	-99.446
		(101.773)	(141.298)
Observations	2894	2894	2894
R-squared	0.258	0.258	2894

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 31: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares models with country and time fixed effects: omitting UNSC members that experienced civil conflict

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.051**	-0.031	-0.046**
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.020)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	664.217*		546.162
	(345.068)		(337.339)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		656.412**	931.978**
		(277.778)	(399.919)
Observations	2754	2754	2754
R-squared	-0.215	-0.050	-0.164
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	16.61	8.64	9.51
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.170

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses.

Table 32: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares and OLS models with country and time fixed effects: omitting UNSC members that experienced civil conflict

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.048**	-0.028	-0.044**
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	831.533**		705.335*
	(394.096)		(385.509)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		774.129**	1104.526**
		(312.332)	(452.046)
Observations	2238	2238	2238
R-squared	-0.177	-0.033	-0.141
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	18.52	8.78	10.20
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.126

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 33: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares and OLS models with country and year fixed effects: omitting UNSC members that experienced civil conflict

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.077**	-0.050	-0.069**
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.028)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	401.561		326.359
	(266.785)		(278.635)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		380.342**	591.180**
		(159.956)	(265.616)
Observations	2754	2754	2754
R-squared	-0.590	-0.214	-0.460
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	4.83	2.74	2.98
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.948

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 34: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares and OLS models with country and year fixed effects: omitting UNSC members that experienced civil conflict

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.109	-0.049	-0.091**
	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.044)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	330.500		255.557
	(309.309)		(328.063)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		343.818**	520.22*
		(160.717)	(285.334)
Observations	2238	2238	2238
R-squared	-1.242	-0.200	-0.848
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	1.92	1.58	1.37
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.302

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 35: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and year fixed effects: omitting UNSC members that experienced civil conflict

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.681**	-0.772**
	(0.296)	(0.375)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	514.434	520.691
	(351.332)	(442.341)
Observations	230	187
R-squared	-1.696	-2.205
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	0.54	0.31

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 36: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and time fixed effects: omitting UNSC members that experienced civil conflict

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.544**	-0.516**
	(0.245)	(0.230)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	708.254*	865.796*
	(402.417)	(462.141)
Observations	230	187
R-squared	-0.753	-0.611
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	1.52	1.67

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 37: Covariate balance: Effect of instruments on covariates: OLS models with country and time fixed effects

Variables	UNSC presidency (1)	UNSC representation (2)
PKO	-0.037	-0.080
	(0.149)	(0.068)
Conflict Duration	-0.003	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.001)
Simultaneous Conflict	-0.042***	-0.008
	(0.010)	(0.008)
Political Rights	0.040	-0.001
	(0.043)	(0.017)
Forest Cover	-0.376	-0.362
	(0.973)	(0.459)
Military Spending	0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)
Constant	0.392	0.268
	(0.351)	(0.164)
R-Squared	0.014	0.006
Observations	2450	2450

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and year FEs not shown.

Table 38: Covariate balance: Effect of instruments on potential determinants of civilian casualties: OLS models with country and time fixed effects

	UN sanctions		UN mediation		Mediation	
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	-0.007		0.006		-0.026	
	(0.023)		(0.011)		(0.022)	
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		0.000		-0.014		-0.018
		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.023)
Constant	0.321***	0.317***	0.110	0.116	0.226*	0.216*
	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.129)	(0.123)
R-Squared	0.077	0.077	0.054	0.055	0.031	0.029
Observations	2690	2690	2444	2444	2470	2470

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 39: Covariate balance: Effect of instruments on potential determinants of civilian casualties: OLS models with country and time fixed effects

	Multilateral aid		All aid		Foreign troop support	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	-0.414		12.78		0.051	
	(0.358)		(7.933)		(0.041)	
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		-0.394		10.87		0.039
		(8.233)		(7.369)		(0.029)
Constant	0.625	0.468	15.14	20.18	0.149	0.169
	(0.187)	(0.043)	(4.151)	(1.124)	(0.021)	(0.004)
Observations	2,459	2,459	2,459	2,459	2,327	2,327
R-squared	0.006	0.002	0.007	0.003	0.003	0.003

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 40: Two-stage least squares: First-stage effect of UNSC seats and UNSC presidencies on UNPO size: coefficient of instruments from 69 models that omit all observations from a single civil-war country

Omitted country (*N*)	IV: UNSC seats	Cragg-D. Wald F st.	IV: UNSC pres.	Cragg-D. Wald F st.	Both IVs: UNSC seats	Both IVs: UNSC pres.	Cragg-D. Wald F st.
Algeria	731.9	18.57	695.0	9.23	614.1	994.9	10.42
(288)	(361.0)	*10%*	(292.4)	*15%*	(346.3)	(425.2)	*20%*
Angola	629.1	14.74	641.6	8.24	509.3	907.6	8.67
(180)	(353.8)	*15%*	(282.7)	*20%*	(341.9)	(413.2)	*25%*
Burundi	697.4	17.89	614.2	7.45	600.7	919.9	9.77
(204)	(343.2)	*10%*	(273.4)	*20%*	(327.9)	(403.4)	*20%*
Cameroon	604.2	15.19	608.5	8.27	492.1	864.5	8.86
(12)	(324.4)	*15%*	(267.1)	*20%*	(311.2)	(385.7)	*20%*
Central Afr. Rep.	594.7	14.07	600.4	7.67	484.4	855.6	8.24
(84)	(328.3)	*15%*	(261.9)	*20%*	(317.4)	(383.5)	*25%*
Chad	634.4	14.37	626.9	7.51	520.2	901.2	8.32
(228)	(348.0)	*15%*	(281.1)	*20%*	(337.0)	(407.5)	*25%*
Comoros	605.0	15.15	616.6	8.37	491.1	869.4	8.86
(24)	(324.9)	*15%*	(269.6)	*20%*	(312.0)	(386.6)	*20%*
Dem. Rep. Congo	359.8	6.02	519.9	6.72	236.5	651.7	4.76
(156)	(220.0)	*25%*	(248.4)	*20%*	(182.6)	(326.3)	
Djibouti	619.8	15.53	617.2	8.31	506.7	879.9	9.00
(48)	(327.4)	*15%*	(270.0)	*20%*	(313.7)	(389.6)	*20%*
Egypt	601.5	14.29	606.7	7.85	488.6	862.9	8.37
(84)	(327.4)	*15%*	(264.1)	*20%*	(316.6)	(383.8)	*25%*
Eritrea	614.5	15.15	621.3	8.29	500.6	881.3	8.85
(60)	(329.4)	*15%*	(271.6)	*20%*	(316.1)	(391.9)	*20%*
Ethiopia	646.9	14.63	691.3	9.04	511.1	959.6	8.87
(276)	(352.6)	*15%*	(295.9)	*15%*	(336.7)	(422.2)	*20%*
Lesotho	603.4	15.17	608.5	8.27	491.3	864.2	8.86
(12)	(323.9)	*15%*	(267.1)	*20%*	(310.7)	(385.5)	*20%*
Mauritania	604.3	15.13	608.5	8.24	492.1	864.5	8.83
(24)	(324.4)	*15%*	(267.1)	*20%*	(311.2)	(385.7)	*20%*
Morocco	603.4	15.17	613.2	8.34	490.2	866.7	8.87
(12)	(323.9)	*15%*	(269.1)	*20%*	(310.6)	(386.3)	*20%*
Mozambique	588.3	13.93	586.4	7.41	480.6	841.1	8.12
(60)	(322.3)	*15%*	(255.9)	*20%*	(312.2)	(376.0)	*25%*
Rep. of Congo	599.0	14.42	613.6	8.04	484.6	867.0	8.49
(60)	(324.5)	*15%*	(272.7)	*20%*	(310.3)	(389.7)	*25%*
Rwanda	634.1	14.99	504.3	8.22	514.7	913.7	8.80
(188)	(354.1)	*15%*	(287.6)	*20%*	(338.1)	(422.8)	*20%*
Somalia	490.4	9.94	220.3	5.59	394.7	714.7	5.88
(216)	(320.6)	*15%*	(103.0)	*25%*	(304.4)	(399.0)	*20%*
South Sudan	562.9	12.93	570.4	7.08	456.9	811.8	7.58
(42)	(324.9)	*15%*	(269.8)	*20%*	(311.7)	(388.7)	*25%*
Sudan	519.0	22.95	409.9	7.66	465.9	641.8	12.05
(312)	(336.9)	*10%*	(212.0)	*20%*	(336.0)	(352.3)	*15%*
Uganda	726.6	18.32	746.0	10.28	588.1	1,050.4	10.78
(288)	(360.7)	*10%*	(295.7)	*15%*	(345.3)	(426.9)	*20%*

Note: The specifications of all 69 models are identical to those of Models 2-4 in Table **??**, except that all observations from the civil-war country listed in the table are omitted. *N* indicates the number of observations that are dropped. All coefficients in the Table display the effect of the instruments on UNPO size. All models in column 1 include the rotating UNSC seats as instruments; models in column 3 leverage the rotating UNSC presidency as an instrument; and models in columns 5-6 include both instruments. Columns 2, 4, and 7 indicate the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and the lowest critical value that the test whether the nominal 5% two-stage least-squares t-test for the hypothesis that $\beta = 0$ potentially exceeds 15% passes. The coefficients on the fixed effects and second-stage results are not displayed.

Table 41: Two-stage least squares: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: coefficient of UNPO size from 69 models that omit all observations from a single civil-war country

	Effect on number of civilian casualties		
Omitted country (*N*)	IV: UNSC seats	IV: UNSC pres.	IV: both
Algeria	-0.043**	-0.030*	-0.040**
(288)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Angola	-0.047**	-0.033*	-0.042**
(180)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Burundi	-0.044**	-0.036*	-0.042**
(204)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Cameroon	-0.049**	-0.034*	-0.044**
(12)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Central Afr. Rep.	-0.048*	-0.033	-0.043*
(84)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Chad	-0.052**	-0.038*	-0.047**
(228)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Comoros	-0.049**	-0.033*	-0.044**
(24)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Dem. Rep. Congo	-0.022	-0.014***	-0.019**
(156)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Djibouti	-0.046**	-0.033*	-0.042**
(48)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Egypt	-0.048**	-0.033*	-0.043**
(84)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Eritrea	-0.047**	-0.032*	-0.043**
(60)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Ethiopia	-0.050**	-0.033*	-0.043**
(276)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Lesotho	-0.049**	-0.034*	-0.044**
(12)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Mauritania	-0.049**	-0.033*	-0.044**
(24)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Morocco	-0.049**	-0.034*	-0.044**
(12)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Mozambique	-0.051**	-0.035*	-0.046**
(60)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Rep. of Congo	-0.053**	-0.037*	-0.048**
(60)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Rwanda	-0.053**	-0.035	-0.047**
(188)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Somalia	-0.066***	-0.044	-0.058**
(216)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.024)
South Sudan	-0.055**	-0.036	-0.049**
(42)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Sudan	-0.051	-0.049	-0.050*
(312)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Uganda	-0.044**	-0.031*	-0.039**
(288)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.020)

Note: The specifications of all 69 models are identical to those of Models 2-4, except that all observations from the civil-war country listed in the first column of the table are omitted. *N* indicates the number of observations that are dropped. All coefficients in the Table display the effect of UNPO size on the number of civilians fatalities. All models in column 2 include the rotating UNSC seats as instrument; models in column 3 leverage the rotating UNSC presidency as instrument; and models in column 4 include both instruments. The coefficients of the instruments and fixed effects in the 2SLS models are not displayed.

Table 42: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares and OLS models with country and time fixed effects: peacekeeping contributions from African region's representative on UNSC

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.055**	-0.038*	-0.049**
	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.024)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	531.891*		428.966
	(310.676)		(305.235)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		543.946**	771.238**
		(238.634)	(352.895)
Observations	2894	2894	2894
R-squared	-0.250	-0.091	-0.186
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	12.14	6.81	7.17
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.323

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 43: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares and OLS models with country and time fixed effects: peacekeeping contributions from African region's representative on UNSC

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.050**	-0.034*	-0.045**
	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.022)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	674.685*		559.854
	(368.329)		(364.285)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		651.004**	924.949**
		(277.337)	(411.182)
Observations	2306	2306	2306
R-squared	-0.189	-0.062	-0.146
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	13.07	6.76	7.39
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.326

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by region in parentheses.

Table 44: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties: Two-stage least squares and OLS models with country and year fixed effects: peacekeeping contributions from African region's representative on UNSC

	Number of civilian casualties		
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.087**	-0.071*	-0.081**
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.033)
	Number of UNPO personnel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	377.016		316.211
	(275.873)		(286.434)
UNSC presidency (*t-1*)		331.128**	534.313**
		(142.328)	(267.155)
Observations	2894	2894	2894
R-squared	-0.753	-0.478	-0.640
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	4.97	2.39	2.93
Hansen's J (Chi-sq. p val.)			0.553

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by region in parentheses.

Table 45: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and time fixed effects: omitting UNSC members that experienced civil conflict

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.669**	-0.613**
	(0.300)	(0.268)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	541.257	669.413
	(349.150)	(406.129)
Observations	241	192
R-squared	-1.200	-0.915
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	1.01	1.07

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by country in parentheses. Country and time FEs not shown.

Table 46: Effect of UNPO size on civilian casualties (1) in all cases and (2) in cases with a mission: Two-stage least squares models of country-year data with country and year fixed effects: omitting UNSC members that experienced civil conflict

	Number of civilian casualties	
	2SLS	2SLS
Variables	(1)	(2)
UNPO size (*t-1*)	-0.926**	-1.056*
	(0.415)	(0.615)
	Number of UNPO personnel	
	(1)	(2)
UNSC representation (*t-1*)	444.027	373.295
	(356.934)	(385.221)
Observations	241	192
R-squared	-3.195	-4.289
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	0.48	0.17

Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent s.e. clustered by state in parentheses.

Figure 1: Effect of rotating seats and presidency of UNSC on UN blue helmet deployments in African civil conflict countries, 1989-2014



Figure 1 depicts the effects of rotating UNSC seats (x-axis) and presidencies (y-axis) on UN blue helmet deployments in African civil-conflict countries. Our argument implies that African minor powers use their influence on the UNSC to secure a more active response by the UN to civil conflict in their region. Thus, we expect that the UN deploys more blue helmets to civil-conflict countries when their region is represented on the UNSC (i.e., is in the right half of graph) and when that region's representative presides over the UNSC (i.e., is in the top half of the graph) than at those times when the region is absent from the Council. UN deployments of the seven countries in the top-right quadrant, which account for 96% of UN blue helmet deployments in the four African regions with rotating representation on the UNSC, are in line with this expectation. The sole outliers are two minor UN missions that represent 4% of UN blue helmet deployments in these regions: MINURCAT in Chad and in the Central African Republic and ONUB in Burundi. Note that the effects are large for South Sudan, which only accounts for 6% of UN blue helmets in these four regions. Results are robust to omitting South Sudan (see Tables 40-41).

Figure 1 depicts the effects in standard deviations of the number of UN blue helmets in the respective country. Thus, an effect of 1 indicates that the number of UN blue helmets is one standard deviation higher when the region is represented on the UNSC or when it presides over the Council, respectively, than it is when that region is absent from the Council.

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