Appendix to "Dangerous Contenders"

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Overview of Appendix

The appendix includes summary statistics, robustness checks, additional figures and other information that were not included in the main text due to space constraints. Specifically, we present the following:

- Omitting one election or one country at-a-time does not weaken our results.

- Our results are robust to using the 3-level *Election Quality* as the dependent variable and the Ordered Logit estimator to analyze it.

- Differences in the estimate of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* between Western and non-Western organizations are statistically significant.

- Differences in the estimate of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* between pre- and post-9/11 periods are statistically significant.

- Our results are robust to limiting our analysis to countries where at least 30% of the population is Muslim.

- Our results are robust to limiting our analysis to elections that are at least minimally competitive.

- Our results are robust to omitting observations with very high levels of Islamic terrorism.

- Our results are robust to additional tests of ensuring that donors care about stability in a country.

- Our results are robust to the inclusion of monitoring organization fixed effects.

- Our results are robust to omitting SADC, CIS and the Commonwealth from the sample.

- Our results are robust to using a Heckman model to account for selective monitoring by election observers.

- Our results are robust to clustering errors at the election level.

- Our results are robust in a smaller sample where, for each election, we randomly choose one Western and one non-Western monitoring organization and discard the other organizations that observed that election. This is a test to mitigate bias introduced by bandwagoning behavior among monitors.

- Our results are generally robust to extending our analysis to the pre-1990 period.

- Our results are robust to using an alternative measure of *Islamic Opposition*.

- The effect of the interaction term is linear; it gets stronger as the level of Islamist terrorism increases.

- IGO and NGO monitors do not seem to differ in terms of their evaluations of elections where Islamic opposition parties and Islamist terrorism are jointly present.

- Our results continue to hold if we extend our analysis to 2012 using alternative data sources.

- Our results are robust recoding *Islamic Opposition* as 0 in cases where Islamists are banned or boycott the election.

- Our results are robust to using the number of attacks (as opposed to killings) as our measure of the level of terrorism in a country.

- If we limit our analysis to Western monitors, we again find that the effect of *Islamist Terrorism times Islamic Opposition* becomes stronger after 9/11.

- The last two tables show the full versions of Tables 1 and 2 in the paper including the control variables.

Summary Statistics

Table A.1: This table reports summary statistics for the observations used in Table 1.

List of Western and Non-Western Monitoring Organizations

Table A.2: We provide a list of Western and non-Western monitoring organizations. We distinguish between Western and non-Western organizations based on their membership (for IGOs) or the location of their headquarters (NGOs).

List of Cases with Islamic Opposition Parties and Islamist Terrorism and Islamic Opposition but no Islamic Terrorism

Table A.3 lists the cases with an Islamic opposition party and Islamist terrorism. **Table A.4** lists the cases with an Islamic opposition party but no Islamist terrorism.

Marginal Effects Based on Logit Model

Figure A.1: This figure plots the marginal effect of Islamic opposition parties on election observer endorsements. The calculations are based on the Logit estimates in Table 2 model 7. We also provide 95% confidence intervals around estimates. We create this plot by varying *Islamic Opposition*, *Islamist Terrorism* and *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition*;

all other variables are held at their observed values. This figure shows that both Islamic opposition and Islamist terrorist campaigns must be present for monitors to overlook election fraud. Elections that include Islamic opposition parties without an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign are not more likely to be endorsed by international monitors. However, as the level of Islamist terrorism increases, so does the marginal effect Islamic opposition parties. The substantive effects are comparable to those based on the OLS model. In a country that suffered 10 killings by Islamist terrorists, the marginal effect of an Islamic party in elections is about 20 percentage points.

Omitting One Country/Election at-a-time From the Analysis

Figures A.2 and A.3: To test whether a few observations (elections or countries) are driving our results we conduct the following sensitivity analyses. We focus on how much the estimate of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* changes across these analyses. First, we re-run our analyses omitting one election at a time (255 regressions) and then one country at a time (93 regressions). We display the findings graphically. Figure A.2 shows the distribution of coefficients when we exclude one election at a time. Figure A.3 shows the distribution of coefficients when we exclude one country at a time.

The coefficient of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* is 0.18 in the original analysis. Figures A.2 and A.3 show that omitting particular elections or countries does not make the coefficient much smaller. In other words, the estimated effect size is not sensitive to omitting particular observations.

Figures A.4 and A.5: In these figures we display how much the *t*-values of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* changes when we omit from the sample one election or one country at a time. These figures show that the *t*-values do not fall below 2.4, which is further evidence that the estimated effect is not sensitive to omitting particular observations.

Using Alternative Dependent Variable: 3-level *Election Quality*

Table A.5: Our main dependent variable, *Acceptable*, is a dichotomous version of the three-level *Election Quality* variable in the Dataset on International Election Monitoring.[1] This table shows that our results in Table 1 are robust to using the three-level *Election Quality* as the dependent variable and the Ordered Logit estimator to analyze it.

Differences Between Western and Non-Western Monitors

Table A.6: In Table 1 we present split-sample analyses to highlight differences between Western and non-Western monitors. Although the coefficients for *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* differ quite substantively between subsamples, we still need to show that

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[1] Kelley 2012

the differences are statistically significant.[2] For this purpose we now show estimates from a model where we interact our main variables with a *Western* indicator, which is coded 1 for Western monitors and 0 otherwise. We analyze this model using OLS, Logit and Ordered Logit estimators. Our claim is that Western monitors, relative to non-Western monitors, are more likely to express an anti-Islamist bias captured by our *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* variable. Our data support this claim; the interaction of *Western* and *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* (which is in bold in Table A.6) is always positive and statistically significant in Logit and Ordered Logit estimates.

Differences Between Pre- and Post-9/11 Eras

Table A.7: This table, similar to Table A.6, aims to show that the split-sample comparisons we report in Table 1 between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 periods are statistically significant. Here we show estimates from a model where we interact our main variables with a *Post-9/11 Era* indicator, which is coded 1 for elections after 2001 and 0 otherwise. We analyze this model using OLS, Logit and Ordered Logit estimators. Our claim is that anti-Islamic bias (captured by our *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* variable) is stronger after the 9/11 attacks. Our data support this claim; the interaction of *Post-9/11 Era* and *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* (which is in bold in Table A.7) is always positive and statistically significant in OLS and Ordered Logit estimates.

Restrict Sample to Countries where Muslim Population > 30%

Table A.8: Here we limit our analysis to countries where at least 30% of the population is Muslim. We choose the 30% threshold, because the smallest Muslim population percentage of a country with an Islamic opposition party is 31%. When we analyze this sample with the terrorism variables measured in the 1-year window we have problems: OLS results are positive but not significant and Logit and Ordered Logit cannot estimate this coefficient due to multicollinearity. When we use the terrorism variables with the 5-year window, which were introduced in Table 2, we find that *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* is both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for all three estimators.

Restrict Sample to Minimally Competitive Elections

Table A.9: Here we limit our analysis to elections that are at least somewhat competitive or the result was not decided before the election. We conduct this robustness check, because our theory says that election monitors tolerate fraud against Islamic parties to prevent a more preferable incumbent's fall from power. If an incumbent does not even pretend to run a fair contest then the public is already sure about the quality of elections and whether monitors endorse an election will not influence the public's decision to protest or not. If a monitor's announcement cannot influence the public's decision to protest, then the monitor does not have an incentive to lie to protect the incumbent. For this reason,

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[2]Gelman and Stern 2006

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our findings should be robust in an analysis that includes only those elections that are at least minimally competitive. According to Hyde and Marinov we can consider an election (minimally) competitive if (a) opposition was allowed, and (b) more than one party was legal, and (c) there was a choice of candidates on the ballot.[3] Using their NELDA dataset[4] we code which countries ran competitive elections for the years in our dataset and then re-run our analysis in the subsample of those countries. Table A.9 shows that our finding is robust regardless of which estimator we use.

Omit Observations with Extreme Levels of Islamist Terrorism

Table A.10: Here we test whether observations with high levels of Islamist terrorism are driving our findings. We first drop the observation with the highest number of killings by Islamists in the preceding year (model 1) and then we omit the three observations that suffered more than 100 killings by Islamists in the preceding year (model 2). In both cases our main results are robust, which raises our confidence that observations with particularly high levels of Islamist terrorism are not driving our results.

Additional Tests Regarding Donor Preference for Stability

Table A.11: Our theory assumes that international actors see Islamic opposition groups, especially in the context of an ongoing Islamic terrorist campaign, as a threat to stability. However, if outsiders' relations with an incumbent are sufficiently bad, then outsiders may prefer even an Islamic group to the current government and refuse to overlook electoral irregularities.[5] So far we have included four measures (*Oil Production, Colony Indicator, Total Trade* and *Total GDP*) that aim to capture the importance of stability in a country for the outside world. Here we follow a different strategy and exclude from our sample countries that have poor relations with international monitors' donors. It is difficult to determine the influential donors for most non-Western monitoring organizations and especially larger ones such as the United Nations. However, for Western monitors we can assume that a good measure of relations between their sponsors and an incumbent in an election is the relations between the incumbent and the US. We run two tests in which we analyze the evaluations of Western monitors but exclude from the sample countries that have poor relations with the US. First, we exclude countries that are under security-related economic sanctions by the US. Second, we exclude countries whose UN voting similarity to the US is below the sample average (-0.2). In both tests our estimates are similar to our baseline estimate in Table 1 model 4, which increases our confidence that our findings are driven by cases in which donors actually value the stability they enjoy under an incumbent.

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[3]Hyde and Marinov 2012

[4]Ibid.

[5]Bubeck and Marinov 2017

Table A.12: Here we include additional measures of donor interest in a country. As further robustness checks we focus on the verdicts of Western monitoring organizations and add to our analysis two more time-varying indicators of Western alignment. These indicators are UN Voting Similarity with the USA and Aid per Capita Given by OECD Donors (logged, constant USD). Our results remain robust after controlling for these factors.

Monitoring Organization Fixed Effects

Table A.13: In this table we show what happens if we include monitoring organization dummies to our model. The purpose of this test is to control for "between-organization" variation and rely only on "within-organization" variation to estimate our model. The coefficient of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* is statistically significant and quite similar to its estimate in Table 1 Model 1, which implies that our results are not due to different types of organizations visiting different types of countries.

Exclude Monitoring Organizations that Generally Endorse Election Outcomes

Table A.14: Here we show that our results are robust to excluding the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Commonwealth, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) from our sample. These organizations are sometimes considered particularly tolerant to problematic elections. Excluding these organizations from the sample individually or jointly does not change our findings.

Heckman Selection Models

Table A.15: Here we investigate whether selective monitoring by observers can explain our findings. As explained in the main text, one possibility is observers prefer to skip problematic elections in friendly regimes in order to avoid criticizing a favored incumbent. This kind of selective monitoring would make it more difficult for us to find a pattern of discrepancy between observers' summary evaluations and the longer list of irregularities in their full report.

Nevertheless, observers may be unable to select which elections to monitor because of strategic or logistical reasons. Since there are no reports for observer missions that did not take place, analysis based on this nonrandom sample may be misleading. We deal with this problem by running a Heckman selection model, which separately estimates the probability of an organization observing an election (selection stage) and, if the election is observed, the evaluation of its quality (outcome equation).[6] To satisfy the identification requirement of the estimator, we include in the first stage, in addition to our standard set of independent variables, a *Global Election Count* variable that is the number of elections held in countries

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[6]Heckman 1979

that are not full democracies in a given year.[7] Since election monitoring is costly in terms of money and time and observer organizations have limited resources, we expect an organization to be less likely to observe a particular election in a more crowded year. Therefore we expect, controlling for other factors, this variable to have a negative effect at the selection stage.

In addition to running this analysis on the whole sample (columns 1 and 2), we explore differences between non-Western (columns 3 and 4) and Western organizations (columns 5 and 6). We cannot explore differences between the pre- and post-9/11 periods, because the model does not converge on the post-9/11 sample. Results from the Heckman model confirm our expectation and show that the selection and outcome stages are significantly related. *Global Election Count* is negative and significant at the selection stage in all three analyses.

Turning to our main variable, *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* does not seem to have an effect at the selection stage in any of the three samples (columns 2, 4 and 6). It increases the likelihood of endorsement in the whole sample, which supports our main prediction (column 1). We also find support for our prediction regarding the difference between Western and non-Western organizations. *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* increases the likelihood of endorsement by Western organizations, but not non-Western organizations.

Clustering Standard Errors at Election Level

Table A.16: Here we cluster standard errors at the election level and find that our results do not change. The goal of this test is to take into account possible bandwagoning among monitoring organizations, which would violate the assumption that election observer verdicts from an election are independent.

Restrict Sample to One Western and Non-Western Observer Per Election

Table A.17: Here we conduct another test against the possibility that election monitors bandwagon and take into account other monitors' verdicts before announcing their own. If monitoring organizations bandwagon, we expect Western organizations and Non-Western organizations to be influenced primarily among themselves. Based on this intuition, we take a subset of our sample that includes, for each election, only 1 monitoring organization from each bloc (Western and non-Western). If there are multiple organizations from one bloc in a given election, then we randomly pick one of them. If there were no monitors from a given bloc, then our subset includes only one organization for that election and this organization comes from the other bloc. This procedure reduces our sample size from 511 to 324. We then re-run our analysis on this subset. Since this subset includes only 1 organization from each bloc, tendency to bandwagon should not bias our results. Since we select these organizations randomly within each bloc, we do not believe we are introducing

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[7]We follow convention and categorize countries that have a *Polity2* score of greater than 6 as full democracies.

other biases into the analysis. Results from this test are generally similar to our original ones, which suggests that bandwagoning between organizations is not the main driver of our findings.

Extend Analysis to Pre-1990 Observations

Table A.18: Here we extend our analysis to the pre-1990 period. Our theory mainly applies to the Post-Cold War era when the importance of major power rivalry and stability declined and Western governments began to promote democracy. Nevertheless since Kelley's dataset[8] starts from 1984 we explore what happens if we include the pre-1990 observations in our sample. Expanding our sample does not change the results if we measure terrorist activity by the number of attacks. Our results are also robust when we measure terrorist activity by the number of killings conditional on omitting one observation, the October 1990 legislative election in Pakistan monitored by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), from the sample. As explained below, we believe that dropping the October 1990 election in Pakistan is justified and our results continue to hold if we extend the analysis to the period before 1990.

The NDI endorsed the election results despite moderate problems in election quality. The outcome in this observation is not predicted well by our statistical model, because there was an Islamic opposition party, but no recent attacks by Islamist terrorist groups. In addition, the election is not coded as a first multiparty election, a transitional election, or a post-conflict election by Kelley. In short, neither we, nor Kelley expect election monitors to tolerate electoral irregularities in this case. We read the NDI's report on the 1990 election to understand how it justified its decision to endorse the election outcome. Firstly, the NDI argues that "notwithstanding serious irregularities in certain constituencies ... the results in most constituencies reflect the will of the electorate" (NDI, v). Secondly, the NDI highlights in the executive summary section that the 1990 election occurred "less than two years after elections in 1988, which were viewed at the time as signifying an important step in Pakistans transition to democracy" (NDI, iv). The NDI considered Pakistan as an "emerging democracy", which faces "enormous political and economic challenges" (NDI, ix). In its report, the NDI urged the international community to "contribute, where appropriate, to strengthen democratic processes and political pluralism in Pakistan." (NDI, ix). Our impression is that the NDI's favorable report reflects the logic explained by Kelley in her 2009 *International Organization* article, that international organizations sometimes may endorse an election despite its flaws in order to reward relative progress and not cause democratic gains to unravel. However, the quantitative indicators we borrow from Kelley (transitional election, post-conflict election, first MP election) do not capture the NDI's concerns in the case of Pakistan in 1990.

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[8] Kelley 2012

Alternative Measure of *Islamic Opposition*

Table A.19: Here we use an alternative measure of *Islamic Opposition* based on the Database of Political Institutions.[9] This database includes a variable named *OPP1REL*, which reports whether religious issues are a key component of the largest opposition party in a country and, if so, which specific religion (Christian, Catholic, Muslim or Hindu) this party promotes. Our alternative *Islamic Opposition* is coded 1 for any country-year for which *OPP1REL* is "Muslim", and 0 otherwise. This variable is more restricted than our original variable, because the Database of Political Institutions does not take into account banned political parties and, among existing parties, it codes the religious ideology of only the largest opposition party. Nevertheless, our main variable *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* remains positive and statistically significant.

Linear Effect of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition*

Tables A.20, A.21 and A.22: According to our theory outsiders' bias against Islamic opposition parties will increase with the level of Islamist terrorism in a country. Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu show that even if the interaction term is positive, the effect may not be linear.[10] Their diagnostic tools are not suitable for our analysis, because we have a binary dependent variable. To check the linearity assumption we create a categorical version of our *Islamist Terrorism* variable and use that in our model.[11] This new variable has three categories: 0-"none", 1-"low" and 2-"high". It is coded 0 if there is no Islamist terrorism in a given country-year; 1 if the level of Islamist killings is greater than 0 and less than 25, which is the mean for countries struck by Islamist terrorism; 2 if the level of Islamist killings is greater than 25. Results confirm that the interaction effect gets stronger as the level of Islamist terrorism goes from none to low to high.[12] A second advantage of this test is to show that our model has enough observations even at high levels of terrorism.[13]

Comparison of IGO and NGO Monitors

Table A.23: Here we explore whether IGO and NGO monitors evaluate elections with Islamic parties differently. We first split the sample and run separate regressions on IGO

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[9]Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016

[10]Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2018

[11]We do the same for the *Non-Islamist Terrorism*.

[12]According to Wald tests the coefficient of "high" is significantly greater at the 5% level relative to "low" when we use Logit (p-value = 0.03) but not when we use OLS (p-value = 0.14).

[13]When calculating the marginal effects in Table A.22, other variables are held at their observed values in the sample.

monitors (model 1) and NGO monitors (model 2). *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* is positive and significant at the 10% level in the IGO sample whereas in the NGO sample the coefficent estimate is three times larger but statistically insignificant. The lack of significance may be due to the smaller sample of NGO monitors. In model 3 we explore the difference between IGO and NGO monitors by interacting our main variables with an *IGO* indicator variable that is coded 1 for IGO monitors and 0 otherwise. *IGO × Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* is positive but the coefficient is much smaller than the standard error, which tells us that there is not a meaningful difference between IGO and NGOs. Finally, in model 4, we re-run this model only for Western monitors and we again fail to find any significant differences. We conclude that there is not any evidence that IGO and NGO monitors differ in their evaluations.

Extend Analysis to 2012

Table A.24: We wanted to see if our findings hold beyond 2004, which is when the detailed dataset on election monitors (DIEM) compiled by Kelley ends.[14] For this purpose we conduct the following analysis, which uses a dataset reaching up to 2012. Importantly, extending the analysis to this period requires us to accept some data limitations (explained below). As a result, we see this additional analysis as a plausibility test rather than a strict test of our hypotheses. Despite these limitations, we find that our main result continues to hold in this extended dataset.

To conduct this analysis we use the NELDA dataset[15], which includes elections held between 1945-2012. The NELDA dataset differs from DIEM in three important aspects relevant to our analysis. First, DIEM provides information on the endorsements and criticisms of both Western and non-Western election observers, but NELDA has information on only criticisms made by Western organizations. From NELDA we can find out whether non-Western observers were present at an election, but we do not know if they critized election quality or endorsed the outcome. Second, DIEM is an observer-election level dataset, while NELDA is an election-level dataset. When multiple organizations monitor an election, DIEM provides information about their evaluations separately, whereas in NELDA there is one variable coding whether there were allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western observers present. Third, DIEM provides information about an observer organization's summary statement (endorsement decision) and list of electoral irregularities separately. NELDA, on the other hand, only provides the aforementioned variable about the existence of fraud allegations (by any Western observer group).

While we are lucky to have the NELDA dataset and expand our analysis to a more recent period, these differences between DIEM and NELDA require a few changes to our analysis. First, because NELDA provides information on criticisms by Western observers only, we

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[14]Kelley 2012

[15]Hyde and Marinov 2012

cannot test for differences between Western and non-Western observers. Second, because NELDA is an election-level dataset and codes criticisms by "any" Western observers, we cannot observe cases where multiple Western observers were present and some of them did not criticize the election quality. As a result, we have fewer observations (one) per election even though we have more observations in total because more elections take place in the longer time period. Third, because NELDA does not separately code Western observers' endorsement of election outcome and list of election irregularities, we need to construct these variables ourselves. As an indicator of non-endorsement, we use "significant vote-fraud allegations". As a measure of general election quality, we use information on government harassment against the opposition in general and opposition leaders more specifically. This substitute is appropriate since we already used it as a robustness check in our main analysis.

Our dependent variable is whether there were significant vote-fraud allegations by any Western observers present at an election. Since this is the opposite of an endorsement, we expect the joint presence of Islamic opposition parties and terrorists to lower the likelihood of fraud allegations by Western observers. Our main control variable (*Problems*) is a sum of two binary indicators of election fraud: whether the government harassed the opposition and whether the government prevented opposition candidates from running. These two variables are good indicators of election irregularity and they are non-missing for most observations in NELDA. This variable varies between 0 and 2.[16]

Our main explanatory variables, *Islamic Opposition* and *Islamist Terrorism*, are measured as follows. Data sources used in our original analysis do not reach 2012 and for that reason we use two new sources. We measure the presence of Islamic opposition using the Database of Political Institutions (DPI).[17] We also used this variable as a robustness check on our original measure of Islamic opposition. Its main drawback is that it codes only whether the biggest opposition party in a country is Islamic or not.[18]

To measure Islamist (and non-Islamist) terrorism until 2012 we to turn to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)[19], which covers a more recent period than our original our data

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[16]Observations where both variables are missing we code as 0. Coding these observations as 2 does not change our results.

[17]Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016

[18]When we extend our time frame there are more Islamic incumbents in the data. Our theory does not make a clear prediction about the effect of having an Islamic incumbent, because whether they raise concerns in the eyes of foreign observers will be influenced by their policies in office. Islamic incumbents are outside the scope of our analysis and we exclude those cases from the sample.

[19]START 2018

source, the RAND database.[20] Its main drawback is that, unlike RAND, GTD does not code the ideology (Islamist or not) of the terrorist group. There are 1461 terrorist groups in the GTD database between 1985 and 2017, so coding their ideologies by hand is not feasible. We overcome this limitation in the following way. First, we create a list of word-stems that differentiate the names of Islamist terrorist groups from others. These words are "islam, jihad, jama(at), sharia, mojah(hid), muja(hid), muslim, allah, qaida, salafi". We code terrorist groups that have these word stems in their name as Islamist.[21] Next, we look at a list of "highly deadly" groups in the GTD (defined as groups that killed more than 100 people in total) and we add to our list of Islamist terrorists any highly deadly Islamist groups that were not captured with the word-stem method.[22] In total we code 236 groups as Islamist and 1225 groups as non-Islamist. Using this classification we create measures of the (logged) number of people killed by Islamist and non-Islamist groups in every country-year. As a quality check we compare these new measures of Islamist and non-Islamist terrorism with the numbers we got from the RAND database and they are highly correlated.[23] As in our original analysis we measure terrorism in the last 1 year, and alternatively, in the last 5 years.

Our list of controls is the same as in the original analysis. Information on Muslim population percentage, level of democracy, change in democracy, infant mortality rate, former colony status, oil production, total trade and total GDP comes from the sources cited in the main text. Of the control variables we took from DIEM, information on election violence, the type of election (legislative or not) and whether this is the first multi-party election is found in NELDA. NELDA does not code information on transitional election, post-civil war and post-coup elections. We create new measures of post-civil war and post-coup elections using data from Powell and Thyne and Themnér and Wallensteen.[24] If the country holding the election experienced a civil war in the last 5 years, we code it as a post-civil war election; otherwise that variable is coded 0. The post-coup variable is created in a similar way. We do not have an indicator of transitional elections here, but we do not believe this is an important omission, because this variable is rarely estimated to have a significant effect in our original analysis.

Our estimator, as in the original analysis, is the OLS. We also report regressions with

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[20]RAND 2015

[21]We also check that groups coded as Islamist this way do not include non-Islamist groups.

[22]These groups are Al-Shaabab, Taliban, Al-Nusrah Front, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Abu Sayyaf Group, and Allied Democratic Forces.

[23]The correlation of "Islamist terrorism" measures is about 0.8 and the correlation of "non-Islamist terrorism" measures is about 0.7.

[24]Powell and Thyne 2011; Themnér and Wallensteen 2011

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country-fixed effects. In all models standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A.24 presents the results. In Models 1 and 2, where we measure terrorism by the number of killings in the last 1 year, the results are not very stable. Model 1, where control variables are not included, shows a negative effect of *Islamic Opposition* × *Islamist Terror* on Western criticism ($p = 0.103$), which is consistent with our main hypothesis. However, this effect becomes (statistically and substantively) insignificant when we include controls. The results are much more robust in Models 3 to 6, where we measure terrorism by the number of killings in the last 5 years. In models 3 to 5 we find that the joint presence of *Islamist Terrorism* and *Islamic Opposition* makes Western criticism less likely. Model 3 is the sparse model; in Models 4 and 5 we include the control variables and country-fixed effects. These results show that our main finding regarding the effect of Islamic movements and Western election monitoring continues to hold when we extend the analysis to 2012. In model 6 we test whether this effect becomes stronger after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Model 6, which interacts our key independent variables with a post-2001 indicators, shows that the negative effect of *Islamic Opposition* × *Islamist Terror* on Western observer criticism is stronger in the post-9/11 era. Interestingly, in Model 6, the variable *Islamic Opposition* × *Islamist Terror* becomes insignificant, but given the limitations in data, this divergence from the original results is not surprising.

Figure A.6 shows the estimated effect of joint presence of Islamic opposition participation and Islamist terrorism, based on Model 3. Note that in this figure we see that these two factors *lower* the probability of criticism by Western observers and in figure 1 we see that these two factors *increase* the probability of observers endorsing an election outcome; therefore these two graphs show similar effects. Moreover, the graphs indicate similar effect sizes. As we move from zero Islamist killings to the 90th percentile in our sample, the probability of Western observers criticizing the election falls about 70%.

To summarize, in this section we reported a plausibility test on whether our main result, that the joint presence of Islamic opposition groups and terrorists makes Western observers less likely to criticize election outcomes, holds in a sample extending to 2012. We find that the results are broadly similar to our analysis in the main text. This consistency raises our confidence in our main findings.

Code *Islamic Opposition* Zero if Islamists are Banned or Boycott the Election

Table A.25: In our main analysis we include Islamic parties as long as they exist in a country. However, in some cases these parties boycott an election or they are banned from participating. In this table we show that our results are mostly robust to excluding these cases and coding *Islamic Opposition* as zero if an Islamic party is banned or boycotts the election.

Measuring Terrorism by the Number of Attacks

Table A.26: In our main analysis our measure of the level of terrorism is the number of people killed by (Islamist or non-Islamist) terrorists. In this table we use the number of attacks as our measure of terrorism and our results are broadly similar.

Differences in Pre- and Post-9/11 Eras Among Western Monitors

Table A.27: Here we limit our analysis to the subsample of Western monitoring organizations and show that, among this group, we continue to find that the effect of *Islamic Opposition × Islamist Terror* is greater after 9/11.

Full Versions of Tables 1 and 2

Table A.28: Table 1 in the main text omits the controls due to space constraints. Here we present the full regression table, which includes all the controls.

Table A.29: Table 2 in the main text omits the controls due to space constraints. Here we present the full regression table, which includes all the controls.

Table A.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Acceptable	0.648	0.478	0	1
Problems	1.521	0.716	0	3
Islamic Opposition	0.074	0.263	0	1
Islamist Terrorism (logged)	0.161	0.698	0	5.257
Non-Islamist Terrorism (logged)	0.570	1.223	0	6.275
Muslim Population %	0.179	0.266	0	0.989
Level of Democracy	4.145	4.823	-9	10
Change in Democracy	1.037	3.251	-14	15
Infant Mortality Rate (logged)	3.506	0.769	1.411	5.047
First Multiparty Election	0.157	0.364	0	1
Transitional Election	0.092	0.289	0	1
Post-Conflict Election	0.104	0.305	0	1
Post-Coup Election	0.023	0.152	0	1
Pre-Election Violence	1.215	1.170	0	3
Legislative Election	0.773	0.419	0	1
Oil Production (logged)	4.039	3.964	0	12.420
Total Trade (logged)	8.283	2.343	0	13.387
Total GDP (logged)	23.106	1.652	19.450	27.941
Former Colony	0.286	0.452	0	1

N =511

Table A.2: Western and Non-Western Monitoring Organizations

Western	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Parliament, Norwegian Helsinki Committee, the Council of Europe, the European Union (Commission), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Carter Center, and the International Human Rights Law Group
Non-Western	The United Nations, the South African Development Community, the Electoral Institute of South Africa, the Organization of American States, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Asian Network for Free Elections, and the Commonwealth of Independent States

Table A.3: Cases with Islamic Opposition Parties and Islamist Terrorism

Country	Year	Monitoring Organization	Election Type	Islamic Opposition Party
Algeria	1997	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	Harakat al-Nahda al-Islamiyya
				Harakat Mujtama' al-Salim
Uzbekistan	1999	OSCE	Legislative	Shura-i-Islam (banned)
				Shura-i-Ulema (banned)
Pakistan	1997	The Commonwealth Secretariat	Legislative	Jamaat-e-Islami
				Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam
Pakistan	2002	The European Union	Legislative	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
Pakistan	2002	The Asian Network for Free Elections	Legislative	see above
Pakistan	2002	The European Parliament	Legislative	see above
Pakistan	2002	The Commonwealth Secretariat	Legislative	see above
Indonesia	2004	The European Parliament	Legislative	Partai Amanat Nasional
				Partai Bintang Reformasi
				Partai Bulan Bintang
				Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
				Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
				Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia
				Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Indonesia	2004	The Asian Network for Free Elections	Legislative	see above
Indonesia	2004	The European Union	Legislative	see above
Indonesia	2004	The Carter Center	Executive	Hamzah Haz, Leader of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Indonesia	2004	The European Union	Executive	see above
Indonesia	2004	The Asian Network for Free Elections	Executive	see above

Table A.4: Cases with Islamic Opposition Parties but No Islamist Terrorism

Country	Year	Monitoring Organization	Election Type	Islamic Opposition Party
Mali	2002	The Carter Center	Executive	Islamic parties banned
Senegal	1993	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	Islamic parties banned
Tanzania	1995	The Commonwealth Secretariat	General	Chama cha Wananchi & ban
Tanzania	1995	IFES	General	see above
Tanzania	2000	South African Development Community	General	Chama cha Wananchi & ban
Tanzania	2000	The Commonwealth Secretariat	General	see above
Tanzania	2000	IFES	General	see above
Tanzania	2000	Electoral Commission Forum of SADC	General	see above
Morocco	1993	IFES	Legislative	Proto-PJD was denied participation
Turkey	2002	Norwegian Helsinki Center	Legislative	Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi
Turkey	2002	OSCE	Legislative	Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi
Yemen	1993	The International Republican Institute	Legislative	Tajammu' al-Yamani li'l-Islah
Yemen	1997	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	Tajammu' al-Yamani li'l-Islah
Yemen	2003	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	Tajammu' al-Yamani li'l-Islah
Tajikistan	2000	OSCE	Legislative	Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
Uzbekistan	1994	OSCE	Legislative	Islamic groups banned by regime
Pakistan	1993	The Commonwealth Secretariat	Legislative	Islamic Jamhoori Mahaz Jamaat-e-Islami Mutahida Deeni Mahaz
Pakistan	1993	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	see above
Bangladesh	1991	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	Islami Oikkya Jote Jamaat-e-Islami
Bangladesh	1991	The Commonwealth Secretariat	Legislative	see above
Malaysia	1999	The Asian Network for Free Elections	Legislative	Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
Indonesia	1999	The Asian Network for Free Elections	Legislative	Partai Amanat Nasional Partai Bulan Bintang Partai Keadilan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Indonesia	1999	The European Union	Legislative	see above
Indonesia	1999	IFES	Legislative	see above
Indonesia	1999	The National Democratic Institute	Legislative	see above

Figure A.1: Marginal Effect of Islamic Opposition Participation on Endorsement Probability from Logit Model (Table 2 Model 7)

Figure shows the marginal effect of Islamic opposition participation (and the 95% confidence interval around it) on the probability of election monitors endorsing an election outcome given different levels of Islamist terrorist killings. We use the estimates from the Logit model (Table 2 Model 7). Other variables are held at their observed values in the sample.

Figure A.2: Distribution of **Coefficients** of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* When We Exclude Elections One at a Time

Figure shows the distribution of **coefficients** of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* when we re-run our main model while leaving out one election at a time (255 regressions). The black vertical line (dashed) marks 0.182, which is the estimate for *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* in the main model.

Figure A.3: Distribution of **Coefficients** of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* When We Exclude Countries One at a Time

Figure shows the distribution of *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* when we re-run our main model while leaving out one country at a time (93 regressions). The black vertical line (dashed) marks 0.182, which is the estimate for *Islamist Terrorism* × *Islamic Opposition* in the main model.

Figure A.4: Distribution of *t*-**values** of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* When We Exclude Elections One at a Time

Figure shows the distribution of *t*-values for *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* when we re-run our main model while leaving out one election at a time (255 regressions).

Figure A.5: Distribution of *t*-**values** of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* When We Exclude Countries One at a Time

Figure shows the distribution of *Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition* when we re-run our main model while leaving out one country at a time (93 regressions).

Figure A.6: Marginal Effects of Islamic Opposition Participation on Western Criticism

Figure shows the change in the probability of Western observers making allegation of significant vote-fraud (with 95% CI's) as a result of Islamic opposition party participation, conditional on different levels of Islamist terrorism. Results are based on Model 3 in Table A.24.

Table A.5: Ordered Logit Analysis of Three-Category Dependent Variable

	All Countries	Non-Western Monitors	Western Monitors	Pre-9/11	Post-9/11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.491	−1.469*	−0.486	−0.119	−1.265
	(0.527)	(0.877)	(0.536)	(0.690)	(2.625)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.179	−0.468	−0.152	−0.102	−0.338*
	(0.161)	(0.324)	(0.171)	(0.486)	(0.187)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.113	0.335	0.102	0.296	−0.079
	(0.107)	(0.209)	(0.099)	(0.282)	(0.181)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	1.062**	−4.048*	1.497**	0.856	6.307**
	(0.437)	(2.099)	(0.595)	(0.682)	(2.352)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.859**	2.409	−0.886**	−1.318	−4.214*
	(0.343)	(1.501)	(0.398)	(0.992)	(2.157)
Problems	−2.859**	−2.950**	−3.096**	−2.807**	−3.331**
	(0.242)	(0.467)	(0.314)	(0.308)	(0.564)
Muslim Population %	1.079	2.714	1.959**	0.448	5.542**
	(0.672)	(2.076)	(0.788)	(0.702)	(2.148)
Level of Democracy	0.127**	0.254**	0.124**	0.124**	0.301**
	(0.035)	(0.070)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.104)
Change in Democracy	0.074*	−0.140	0.126**	0.074*	0.045
	(0.041)	(0.126)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.154)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.441	0.881	−0.906**	−0.850**	0.697
	(0.356)	(0.668)	(0.336)	(0.296)	(0.838)
First Multiparty Election	0.445	1.775	0.585	0.671*	0.680
	(0.400)	(1.118)	(0.486)	(0.389)	(2.156)
Transitional Election	−0.024	0.385	−0.064	0.223	−3.760**
	(0.492)	(1.129)	(0.421)	(0.597)	(1.805)
Post-Conflict Election	0.239	−0.463	0.746	−0.007	−0.056
	(0.455)	(0.916)	(0.574)	(0.556)	(1.184)
Pre-Election Violence	0.048	−0.200	0.123	0.134	−0.042
	(0.125)	(0.424)	(0.115)	(0.164)	(0.243)
Oil Production	−0.097	−0.136	−0.153*	−0.133	−0.019
	(0.078)	(0.148)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.174)
Total Trade	0.004	0.255*	0.036	0.008	−0.002
	(0.131)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.180)	(0.191)
Former Colony	0.732	1.194	0.319	0.811	0.905
	(0.478)	(1.013)	(0.502)	(0.498)	(1.041)
Post-Coup Election	0.530	1.811	−0.546	0.501	−3.234
	(0.907)	(1.169)	(0.911)	(1.179)	(3.217)
Total GDP	0.160	−0.146	0.271	0.136	0.575
	(0.209)	(0.333)	(0.241)	(0.249)	(0.567)
Legislative Election	0.535*	0.869	0.350	0.447	0.328
	(0.304)	(0.956)	(0.311)	(0.424)	(0.442)
Cut 1	−4.008	−4.672	−3.220	−6.200	9.908
	(4.649)	(8.304)	(5.162)	(5.252)	(13.806)
Cut 2	−2.062	−2.330	−1.145	−4.105	11.973
	(4.651)	(8.330)	(5.158)	(5.269)	(13.864)
N	511	140	371	354	157
Log-Likelihood	−291.163	−52.161	−218.125	−183.928	−94.507

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Table A.6: Differences Between Western and Non-Western Monitors are Statistically Significant

	OLS (1)	Logit (2)	Ord. Logit (3)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.192	−1.675*	−1.608
	(0.125)	(1.006)	(1.272)
× Western Monitors	0.086	0.707	1.113
	(0.149)	(1.135)	(1.314)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.041	−0.534	−0.426
	(0.059)	(0.437)	(0.422)
× Western Monitors	0.002	0.320	0.266
	(0.060)	(0.438)	(0.414)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	−0.017	−0.119	−0.139
	(0.019)	(0.140)	(0.140)
× Western Monitors	0.041**	0.234*	0.275**
	(0.018)	(0.121)	(0.118)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.124	−1.167	−1.395
	(0.267)	(1.115)	(1.359)
× **Western Monitors**	0.345	2.854**	2.666*
	(0.297)	(1.249)	(1.478)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.095	1.034	1.084
	(0.131)	(0.672)	(0.911)
× Western Monitors	−0.239*	−2.191**	−1.981**
	(0.122)	(0.740)	(0.909)
Problems	−0.316**	−2.482**	−2.842**
	(0.030)	(0.262)	(0.239)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	511	511	511
R^2	0.416		

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.7: Differences Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Eras are Statistically Significant

	OLS (1)	Logit (2)	Ord. Logit (3)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.117	−0.864	−0.582
	(0.094)	(0.691)	(0.711)
× Post-9/11 Era	0.360	1.629	2.117
	(0.259)	(1.568)	(1.335)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.029	−0.236	−0.173
	(0.037)	(0.425)	(0.408)
× Post-9/11 Era	−0.017	−0.080	−0.012
	(0.047)	(0.503)	(0.436)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.050	0.285	0.280
	(0.032)	(0.278)	(0.275)
× Post-9/11 Era	−0.058	−0.300	−0.223
	(0.040)	(0.299)	(0.279)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.161**	1.303**	0.792
	(0.070)	(0.602)	(0.628)
× Post-9/11 Era	0.291*	1.547	1.950*
	(0.163)	(1.108)	(1.036)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.138	−1.023	−1.278
	(0.124)	(1.573)	(1.111)
× Post-9/11 Era	−0.237	−1.235	−1.166
	(0.212)	(1.878)	(1.406)
Problems	−0.331**	−2.473**	−2.812**
	(0.028)	(0.259)	(0.243)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	511	511	511
R^2	0.410		

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.8: Sample of Countries Where Muslim Population > 30%

	Terrorism in Last 1 Year	Terrorism in Last 5 Years		
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	Logit (3)	Ord. Logit (4)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.009 (0.122)	−0.000 (0.129)	−0.588 (1.189)	1.540 (1.196)
Islamist Terrorism	0.109 (0.070)	−0.025 (0.039)	−0.718** (0.352)	−0.671** (0.335)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.008 (0.055)	−0.032 (0.035)	−0.127 (0.295)	1.020** (0.472)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.041 (0.124)	0.122** (0.053)	2.261** (0.703)	1.704** (0.625)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.193* (0.097)	−0.132** (0.035)	−1.835** (0.573)	−2.353** (0.567)
Problems	−0.338** (0.046)	−0.344** (0.042)	−2.979** (0.814)	−3.802** (1.034)
Muslim Population %	0.113 (0.191)	0.496** (0.221)	6.298** (2.466)	2.281 (2.801)
Level of Democracy	0.021* (0.010)	0.039** (0.010)	0.382** (0.104)	0.372** (0.099)
Change in Democracy	0.016 (0.011)	0.006 (0.012)	0.295* (0.160)	0.149 (0.138)
Infant Mortality Rate	0.097 (0.148)	0.180 (0.155)	2.614** (1.047)	3.238** (1.301)
First Multiparty Election	−0.175 (0.176)	−0.118 (0.098)	−0.946 (1.117)	−1.885** (0.629)
Transitional Election	−0.071 (0.187)	−0.319* (0.160)	−5.295** (1.291)	−3.393** (1.374)
Post-Conflict Election	0.187 (0.160)	0.314* (0.154)	0.039 (1.060)	0.053 (1.117)
Pre-Election Violence	0.015 (0.030)	0.044 (0.038)	−0.578 (0.490)	−0.720 (0.493)
Oil Production	−0.034** (0.016)	−0.015 (0.018)	0.146 (0.148)	0.282 (0.182)
Total Trade	0.109 (0.094)	0.191* (0.102)	0.455 (0.972)	0.111 (0.858)
Former Colony	−0.184 (0.129)	−0.279 (0.180)	−1.160 (0.996)	−1.039 (1.006)
Post-Coup Election	0.437 (0.265)	0.490** (0.196)	1.583 (1.631)	2.030 (1.377)
Total GDP	−0.047 (0.081)	−0.095 (0.089)	0.498 (0.938)	0.081 (0.826)
Legislative Election	−0.085 (0.107)	0.015 (0.052)	0.221 (0.337)	0.530 (0.345)
Constant	1.102 (1.124)	0.862 (1.522)	−22.523 (15.876)	
Cut 1				8.756 (13.807)
Cut 2				11.049 (13.785)
N	108	99	99	99
Log-Likelihood			−34.941	−57.038
R^2	0.444	0.495		

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

Table A.9: Sample of Competitive Elections

	OLS (1)	Logit (2)	Ord. Logit (3)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.084	−0.780	−0.750
	(0.094)	(0.598)	(0.676)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.041	−0.284	−0.219
	(0.026)	(0.218)	(0.153)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.026*	0.188**	0.203**
	(0.014)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.208**	1.366**	1.401**
	(0.077)	(0.693)	(0.632)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.170**	−1.196**	−1.242**
	(0.067)	(0.543)	(0.532)
Problems	−0.347**	−2.719**	−3.039**
	(0.028)	(0.275)	(0.260)
Muslim Population %	0.128	1.318*	1.172*
	(0.101)	(0.758)	(0.684)
Level of Democracy	0.015**	0.098**	0.095**
	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.034)
Change in Democracy	0.011*	0.096*	0.084**
	(0.006)	(0.050)	(0.043)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.025	−0.239	−0.298
	(0.048)	(0.378)	(0.369)
First Multiparty Election	0.056	0.536	0.315
	(0.055)	(0.423)	(0.395)
Transitional Election	−0.009	−0.015	0.133
	(0.062)	(0.556)	(0.524)
Post-Conflict Election	0.005	0.012	0.022
	(0.075)	(0.516)	(0.482)
Pre-Election Violence	0.007	0.033	−0.001
	(0.017)	(0.133)	(0.129)
Oil Production	−0.018*	−0.161*	−0.148*
	(0.010)	(0.083)	(0.088)
Total Trade	−0.003	−0.035	−0.046
	(0.010)	(0.179)	(0.175)
Former Colony	0.063	0.536	0.597
	(0.079)	(0.577)	(0.565)
Post-Coup Election	0.119	1.123*	1.131*
	(0.083)	(0.632)	(0.659)
Total GDP	0.028	0.323	0.333
	(0.028)	(0.262)	(0.258)
Legislative Election	0.092**	0.645*	0.501*
	(0.046)	(0.330)	(0.296)
Constant	0.499	−1.950	
	(0.660)	(5.615)	
Cut 1			−0.707
			(5.475)
Cut 2			1.209
			(5.489)
N	486	486	486
R^2	0.406		
Log-Likelihood		−188.757	−271.669

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

Table A.10: Exclude Extreme Values of Terrorism

	Drop observation with max killing by Islamists (1)	Drop observations with 100+ killings by Islamists (2)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.095	−0.080
	(0.083)	(0.082)
Islamic Terrorism	−0.030	0.004
	(0.032)	(0.029)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.013	0.015
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.174**	0.138**
	(0.067)	(0.067)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.134**	−0.134**
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Problems	−0.337**	−0.334**
	(0.028)	(0.029)
N	510	508
R^2	0.401	0.400

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.11: Excluding Incumbents Hostile to the US from Analysis of Western Monitors

	Excl. targets of US sanctions	Excl. countries that vote unlike US at UN
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.349** (0.115)	−0.154 (0.252)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.041 (0.036)	−0.097** (0.031)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.003 (0.026)	0.042** (0.020)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.245** (0.075)	0.191** (0.067)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.046 (0.073)	−0.228 (0.183)
Problems	−0.369** (0.045)	−0.323** (0.044)
Muslim Population %	0.419** (0.130)	0.274 (0.240)
Level of Democracy	0.016** (0.008)	0.006 (0.010)
Change in Democracy	0.026** (0.008)	0.028** (0.011)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.085 (0.057)	−0.165** (0.053)
First Multiparty Election	0.120* (0.065)	0.168** (0.067)
Transitional Election	0.041 (0.073)	0.060 (0.101)
Post-Conflict Election	0.102 (0.108)	0.351** (0.118)
Pre-Election Violence	0.011 (0.024)	0.021 (0.024)
Oil Production	−0.024* (0.014)	−0.036** (0.016)
Total Trade	0.008 (0.017)	0.038 (0.024)
Former Colony	0.049 (0.095)	0.140 (0.123)
Post-Coup Election	−0.531** (0.151)	−
Total GDP	0.038 (0.038)	0.025 (0.044)
Legislative Election	0.068 (0.061)	0.018 (0.077)
Constant	0.374 (0.902)	0.709 (0.957)
N	280	194
R^2	0.427	0.482

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

In model 2 *Post-Coup Election* drops due to collinearity.

Table A.12: Additional Indicators of Western Donor Interest: Aid from OECD DAC and Voting Similarity with the US at the UNGA

	Only Western Monitors			
	Whole Period (1)	Pre-9/11 (2)	Post-9/11 (3)	Interaction (4)
Problems	−0.357** (0.037)	−0.319** (0.045)	−0.422** (0.078)	−0.349** (0.039)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.225** (0.110)	−0.207 (0.134)	−0.030 (0.337)	−0.299** (0.116)
$\times$ Post-9/11 Era				0.752** (0.193)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.046 (0.028)	−0.006 (0.036)	−0.076* (0.038)	−0.042 (0.032)
$\times$ Post-9/11 Era				0.002 (0.044)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.011 (0.016)	0.046 (0.032)	−0.031 (0.033)	0.050 (0.031)
$\times$ Post-9/11 Era				−0.078** (0.039)
Islamist Terrorism $\times$ Islamic Opposition	0.281** (0.081)	0.210* (0.110)	0.746** (0.321)	0.287** (0.110)
$\times$ Post-9/11 Era				0.379** (0.167)
Non-Islamist Terrorism $\times$ Islamic Opposition	−0.150** (0.073)	−0.137 (0.118)	−0.502** (0.205)	−0.103 (0.099)
$\times$ Post-9/11 Era				−0.460** (0.143)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	361	254	107	361
R^2	0.451	0.499	0.525	0.467

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade, total GDP, aid from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors and voting similarity with the US at the UN General Assembly.

Table A.13: Include Monitor Fixed Effects

	OLS (1)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.114
	(0.087)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.033
	(0.026)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.015
	(0.013)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.158**
	(0.068)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.123**
	(0.057)
Problems	−0.323**
	(0.034)
Muslim Population %	0.266**
	(0.108)
Level of Democracy	0.017**
	(0.005)
Change in Democracy	0.014**
	(0.006)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.112**
	(0.049)
First Multiparty Election	0.090
	(0.059)
Transitional Election	0.032
	(0.054)
Post-Conflict Election	0.083
	(0.075)
Pre-Election Violence	0.014
	(0.016)
Oil Production	−0.013
	(0.009)
Total Trade	0.010
	(0.012)
Former Colony	0.020
	(0.073)
Post-Coup Election	0.047
	(0.091)
Total GDP	0.004
	(0.023)
Legislative Election	0.084*
	(0.045)
Constant	1.061*
	(0.557)
N	511
R^2	0.454

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

Table A.14: Exclude SADC, CIS and the Commonwealth

	Exclude SADC missions (1)	Exclude Commonwealth missions (2)	Exclude CIS missions (3)	Exclude missions w/ any of the 3 (4)
Problems	−0.336**	−0.343**	−0.336**	−0.343**
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.136	−0.016	−0.087	−0.051
	(0.087)	(0.100)	(0.084)	(0.099)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.039	−0.037	−0.039	−0.038
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.015	0.015	0.017	0.018
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.185**	0.176**	0.184**	0.182**
	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.127**	−0.174**	−0.138**	−0.170**
	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.059)
N	501	470	497	446
R^2	0.405	0.406	0.403	0.410

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

In column 4, any mission sent by SADC, CIS or the Commonwealth is excluded from the sample.

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade, total GDP, and post-coup election indicator.

Table A.15: Heckman Analyses

	All Monitors		Non-Western Org's		Western Org's	
	Outcome (1)	Selection (2)	Outcome (3)	Selection (4)	Outcome (5)	Selection (6)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.083	0.152	−0.141	0.539*	−0.142	0.048
	(0.088)	(0.191)	(0.120)	(0.304)	(0.107)	(0.181)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.032	0.033	−0.032	0.013	−0.040	0.044
	(0.034)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.083)	(0.033)	(0.059)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.020	0.015	0.019	0.018	0.025	0.020
	(0.016)	(0.047)	(0.018)	(0.056)	(0.016)	(0.054)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.209**	0.176	−0.263	0.240	0.312**	0.151
	(0.079)	(0.125)	(0.435)	(0.158)	(0.115)	(0.131)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.136**	−0.027	0.166	−0.032	−0.159*	−0.045
	(0.063)	(0.095)	(0.266)	(0.110)	(0.096)	(0.105)
Problems	−0.336**	−	−0.226**	−	−0.352**	−
	(0.028)		(0.043)		(0.035)	
Muslim Population %	0.062	−0.496**	0.167	−1.251**	0.246**	−0.223
	(0.109)	(0.237)	(0.152)	(0.329)	(0.117)	(0.261)
Oil Production	−0.010	0.021	−0.008	0.001	−0.019*	0.028
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.020)
Level of Democracy	0.020**	0.001	0.025**	0.007	0.018**	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.012)
Change in Democracy	0.015**	0.026**	−0.010	0.029**	0.026**	0.029**
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Infant Mortality	−0.032	0.151**	0.100	0.396**	−0.098**	0.074
	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.050)	(0.071)
First Multiparty Election	0.056	0.019	0.101	−0.367**	0.122*	0.131
	(0.056)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.129)	(0.069)	(0.128)
Transitional Election	−0.018	−0.041	−0.049	−0.112	0.009	0.033
	(0.057)	(0.167)	(0.061)	(0.169)	(0.062)	(0.194)
Post-Conflict Election	0.060	0.127	−0.012	0.134	0.139	0.146
	(0.072)	(0.100)	(0.084)	(0.103)	(0.094)	(0.127)
Pre-Election Violence	0.027	0.090**	0.001	0.068	0.030	0.101**
	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.036)
Total Trade	0.000	−0.003	0.007	−0.047**	0.019	0.044
	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.039)
Colony Indicator	0.022	−0.399**	0.053	−0.004	−0.044	−0.617**
	(0.082)	(0.104)	(0.068)	(0.136)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Post-Coup Election	0.038	−0.202	0.133*	0.235	−0.358	−0.501**
	(0.102)	(0.164)	(0.078)	(0.235)	(0.261)	(0.234)
Total GDP	0.001	−0.066	−0.022	0.028	0.008	−0.128**
	(0.026)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.032)	(0.054)
Legislative Election	0.108**	0.074	0.168*	0.185*	0.075	0.045
	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.048)	(0.071)
Global Election Count		−0.014**		−0.013**		−0.014**
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.005)
Constant	0.664	−0.265	0.529	−3.221**	0.622	1.118
	(0.662)	(1.065)	(0.829)	(1.387)	(0.698)	(1.220)
ρ	0.485**		0.536**		0.454	
	(0.205)		(0.228)		(0.315)	
N	12276		5018		7258	
Log-Likelihood	-2230.961		-605.824		-1515.490	

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

Table A.16: Cluster Standard Errors by Election

	All Countries (1)	Non-Western Monitors (2)	Western Monitors (3)	Pre-9/11 Era (4)	Post-9/11 Era (5)
Problems	−0.336**	−0.225**	−0.354**	−0.312**	−0.341**
	(0.025)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.042)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.096	−0.215	−0.138	−0.056	0.070
	(0.105)	(0.205)	(0.129)	(0.119)	(0.299)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.038	−0.037	−0.047	−0.016	−0.049
	(0.028)	(0.058)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.030)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.015	0.013	0.020	0.042*	−0.010
	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.182**	−0.309	0.289**	0.151*	0.684**
	(0.066)	(0.480)	(0.101)	(0.077)	(0.234)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.135**	0.178	−0.154*	−0.121	−0.476**
	(0.052)	(0.348)	(0.087)	(0.115)	(0.200)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	511	140	371	354	157
R^2	0.402	0.356	0.444	0.418	0.431

Election-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity),
change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war
election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator,
country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.17: Randomly Select 1 Western and 1 Non-Western Observer per Election

	All Countries	Country Fixed-Effects	Non-Western Monitors	Western Monitors	Pre-9/11	Post-9/11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Problems	−0.317**	−0.286**	−0.225**	−0.355**	−0.311**	−0.306**
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.166*	−0.099	−0.230	−0.163	−0.147	0.330
	(0.087)	(0.127)	(0.147)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.236)
Islamic Terrorism	−0.034	−0.032	−0.031	−0.046**	−0.035	−0.034
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.061)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.032)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	−0.001	0.047**	0.008	−0.003	0.034	−0.026
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.026)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.230**	0.196*	−0.160	0.316**	0.182**	1.076**
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.503)	(0.151)	(0.090)	(0.259)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.200**	−0.269**	−0.003	−0.167	−0.146	−0.933**
	(0.082)	(0.106)	(0.330)	(0.121)	(0.146)	(0.205)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	324	324	116	208	230	94
R^2	0.426	0.313	0.363	0.484	0.435	0.494

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity),

change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war

election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator,

country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.18: All Observations Post-1984 (Except Pakistan 1990)

	Whole Sample (1)	Non-Western Monitors (2)	Western Monitors (3)	Pre-9/11 Era (4)	Post-9/11 Era (5)
Problems	−0.326**	−0.226**	−0.337**	−0.299**	−0.341**
	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.083	−0.183**	−0.117	−0.050	0.070
	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.103)	(0.081)	(0.320)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.038	−0.035	−0.045	−0.017	−0.049
	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.033)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.017	0.014	0.022	0.047	−0.010
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.023)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.109*	−0.297	0.186**	0.124**	0.684**
	(0.058)	(0.429)	(0.080)	(0.056)	(0.273)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.078*	0.159	−0.088*	−0.054	−0.476**
	(0.042)	(0.258)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.223)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	541	145	396	384	157
R^2	0.402	0.355	0.436	0.419	0.431

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy
(Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator,
transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged
oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.19: Alternative Measure of *Islamic Opposition* from the Database of Political Institutions

	OLS (1)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.190 (0.152)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.036 (0.023)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.011 (0.015)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.131** (0.057)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.061 (0.095)
Problems	−0.336** (0.029)
Muslim Population %	0.066 (0.097)
Level of Democracy	0.019** (0.006)
Change in Democracy	0.011* (0.006)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.051 (0.049)
First Multiparty Election	0.062 (0.056)
Transitional Election	−0.024 (0.057)
Post-Conflict Election	0.037 (0.072)
Pre-Election Violence	0.017 (0.017)
Oil Production	−0.010 (0.010)
Total Trade	−0.001 (0.010)
Former Colony	0.080 (0.073)
Post-Coup Election	0.071 (0.100)
Total GDP	0.006 (0.026)
Legislative Election	0.092* (0.047)
Constant	1.017 (0.616)
N	511
R²	0.398

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Table A.20: Test of the Linear Interaction Effect Assumption

	OLS (1)	Logit (2)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.091 (0.095)	−0.572 (0.651)
Islamist Terrorism (Low)	−0.035 (0.067)	−0.418 (0.621)
Islamist Terrorism (High)	−0.487** (0.075)	−4.206** (0.962)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (Low)	−0.008 (0.050)	−0.173 (0.340)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (High)	0.139* (0.074)	1.045** (0.506)
Islamist Terrorism (Low) × Islamic Opposition	0.354** (0.126)	2.955** (1.203)
Islamist Terrorism (High) × Islamic Opposition	0.621** (0.196)	6.644** (2.164)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (Low) × Islamic Opposition	−0.128 (0.189)	−0.970 (1.316)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (High) × Islamic Opposition	−0.430** (0.149)	−4.021** (1.145)
Problems	−0.335** (0.029)	−2.563** (0.267)
Controls	Yes	Yes
N	511	511
R^2	0.407	
Log-Likelihood		-201.466

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage,
level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party
election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup
election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator,
country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.21: Marginal Effect of *Islamic Opposition* Based on Table A.20 Model 1 (OLS)

Level of Islamist Terrorism	Marginal Effect	90% Confidence Interval
None	-0.09	[-0.25, 0.07]
Low	0.29	[0.05, 0.47]
High	0.52	[0.16, 0.90]

Table A.22: Marginal Effect of *Islamic Opposition* Based on Table A.20 Model 2 (Logit)

Level of Islamist Terrorism	Marginal Effect	90% Confidence Interval
None	-0.07	[-0.22, 0.07]
Low	0.25	[0.09, 0.42]
High	0.71	[0.44, 0.98]

Table A.23: Studying Differences Between IGO and NGO Monitors

	Only IGO Monitors (1)	Only NGO Monitors (2)	IGO Interaction (3)	Western Monitors (4)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.164*	−0.039	0.018	−0.038
	(0.088)	(0.131)	(0.118)	(0.152)
Islamist Terrorism	0.004	−0.065	−0.045	−0.066**
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.030)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.012	0.011	0.011	0.033
	(0.017)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.045)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.156*	0.237	0.094	0.545*
	(0.082)	(0.268)	(0.297)	(0.324)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.084	−0.235	−0.134	−0.262
	(0.067)	(0.201)	(0.228)	(0.277)
IGO Indicator			0.107**	0.059
			(0.048)	(0.051)
IGO × Islamist Terrorism			0.034	0.047
			(0.052)	(0.059)
IGO × Non-Islamist Terrorism			0.001	−0.014
			(0.063)	(0.048)
IGO × Islamic Opposition			−0.236*	−0.340*
			(0.125)	(0.203)
IGO × Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition			0.102	−0.291
			(0.348)	(0.389)
IGO × Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition			0.025	0.176
			(0.262)	(0.318)
Problems	−0.343**	−0.292**	−0.328**	−0.351**
	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.028)	(0.036)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	340	171	511	371
R^2	0.428	0.407	0.415	0.452

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy
(Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator,
transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged
oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.24: Extend Analysis to 2012 Using NELDA, GTD and DPI datasets

	Terrorism in Last 1 Year		Terrorism in Last 5 Years			
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	OLS (3)	OLS (4)	OLS-FE (5)	OLS-FE (6)
Islamic Opposition=1	−0.0597 (0.119)	−0.283 (0.211)	−0.173** (0.0728)	−0.495* (0.265)	−0.645** (0.140)	−0.724** (0.142)
Islamist Terror	0.0265 (0.0277)	−0.00547 (0.0358)	0.0303* (0.0179)	0.00596 (0.0197)	−0.0422 (0.0296)	−0.0123 (0.0401)
Non-Islamist Terror	0.0403** (0.0152)	0.0257 (0.0179)	0.0288** (0.0104)	0.0315** (0.0109)	0.0288** (0.0137)	0.0193 (0.0140)
Islamic Opposition=1 × Islamist Terror	−0.0658 (0.0427)	−0.0111 (0.0447)	−0.145** (0.0440)	−0.133* (0.0731)	−0.0970* (0.0495)	0.0740 (0.328)
Islamic Opposition=1 × Non-Islamist Terror	0.0401 (0.0537)	0.0356 (0.0883)	0.102** (0.0501)	0.146 (0.105)	0.189** (0.0510)	0.120 (0.166)
Post-9/11						−0.0402 (0.0440)
Islamic Opposition × Post-9/11						−2.471** (0.431)
Post-9/11 × Islamist Terror						−0.0548 (0.0349)
Post-9/11 × Non-Islamist Terror						0.0253 (0.0187)
Islamic Opposition × Post-9/11 × Islamist Terror						−2.518** (0.561)
Islamic Opposition × Post-9/11 × Non-Islamist Terror						2.946** (0.500)
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
N	827	693	782	693	693	693
R²	0.03	0.38	0.05	0.39	0.15	0.16

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05

Controls include the Problems Index, Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, post-civil war election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.25: Code *Islamic Opposition* zero if Islamic parties are banned or boycott the election

	All Countries	Country Fixed-Effects	Non-Western Monitors	Western Monitors	Pre-9/11	Post-9/11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Problems	−0.335**	−0.269**	−0.351**	−0.239**	−0.311**	−0.342**
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.072	−0.189	0.067	−0.464**	−0.013	−0.750*
	(0.133)	(0.153)	(0.137)	(0.207)	(0.190)	(0.448)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.032	−0.020	−0.038	−0.040	0.001	−0.047
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.056)	(0.035)	(0.032)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.015	0.007	0.023	0.016	0.043	−0.012
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.023)
Islamist Terrorism * Islamic Opposition	0.278**	0.575	0.592**	−1.995**	0.475**	0.285
	(0.122)	(0.641)	(0.142)	(0.385)	(0.203)	(0.358)
Non-Islamist Terrorism * Islamic Opposition	−0.207**	−0.465	−0.394**	1.444**	−0.161	0.070
	(0.101)	(0.508)	(0.120)	(0.325)	(0.227)	(0.383)
N	511.000	511.000	371.000	140.000	354.000	157.000
r2	0.402	0.241	0.449	0.384	0.419	0.434

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy
(Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator,
transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged
oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.26: Measure terrorism by the number of attacks.

	All Countries	Country Fixed-Effects	Non-Western Monitors	Western Monitors	Pre-9/11	Post-9/11
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Islamist Attacks	−0.111	−0.145*	−0.104	−0.192	−0.104	−0.134
	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.088)	(0.222)	(0.178)	(0.120)
Non-Islamist Attacks	−0.024	0.005	−0.027	−0.011	−0.005	−0.040
	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.035)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.123	−0.096	−0.125	−0.259	−0.192*	−0.009
	(0.090)	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.173)	(0.103)	(0.325)
Islamist Attacks * Islamic Opposition	0.225**	0.126	0.357**	0.337	0.409*	1.016**
	(0.104)	(0.191)	(0.112)	(0.483)	(0.217)	(0.438)
Non-Islamist Attacks * Islamic Opposition	−0.023	0.072	−0.042	−0.062	0.041	−0.181*
	(0.038)	(0.128)	(0.051)	(0.210)	(0.053)	(0.098)
Problems	−0.336**	−0.273**	−0.352**	−0.218**	−0.317**	−0.336**
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.037)
N	511.000	511.000	371.000	140.000	354.000	157.000
R^2	0.402	0.239	0.442	0.350	0.417	0.436

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy
(Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator,
transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged
oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.27: Pre vs post-9/11 effects among Western observers.

	All Countries (1)	Country Fixed-Effects (2)	Non-Western Monitors (3)
Problems	−0.319**	−0.454**	−0.343**
	(0.041)	(0.072)	(0.039)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.077	−0.028	−0.144
	(0.166)	(0.432)	(0.140)
Islamist Terrorism	0.001	−0.036	−0.018
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.058**	−0.006	0.061**
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Islamist Terrorism * Islamic Opposition	0.166	0.595*	0.208*
	(0.103)	(0.313)	(0.112)
Non-Islamist Terrorism * Islamic Opposition	−0.224	−0.373	−0.242
	(0.176)	(0.251)	(0.172)
Islamist Terrorism * Post-9/11			−0.032
			(0.045)
Non-Islamist Terrorism * Post-9/11			−0.084**
			(0.036)
Islamic Opposition Party * Post-9/11			0.515*
			(0.281)
Islamist Terrorism * Islamic Opposition * Post-9/11			0.483**
			(0.177)
Non-Islamist Terrorism * Islamic Opposition * Post-9/11			−0.281
			(0.250)
N	261	110	371
R^2	0.494	0.486	0.459

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country's logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.

Table A.28: Table 1 with All Controls Displayed

	All Countries (1)	Country Fixed-Effects (2)	Non-Western Monitors (3)	Western Monitors (4)	Pre-9/11 (5)	Post-9/11 (6)
Problems	−0.336**	−0.273**	−0.225**	−0.354**	−0.312**	−0.341**
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.096	−0.179	−0.215**	−0.138	−0.056	0.070
	(0.083)	(0.137)	(0.107)	(0.110)	(0.095)	(0.320)
Islamist Terrorism	−0.038	−0.031	−0.037	−0.047*	−0.016	−0.049
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.033)
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.015	0.009	0.013	0.020	0.042	−0.010
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.023)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	0.182**	0.173*	−0.309	0.289**	0.151**	0.684**
	(0.065)	(0.098)	(0.466)	(0.101)	(0.070)	(0.273)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−0.135**	−0.140	0.178	−0.154*	−0.121	−0.476**
	(0.056)	(0.091)	(0.285)	(0.089)	(0.126)	(0.223)
Muslim Population %	0.129	–	0.362**	0.261**	0.030	0.392
	(0.101)		(0.136)	(0.121)	(0.110)	(0.256)
Level of Democracy	0.019**	0.017**	0.024**	0.017**	0.020**	0.023**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Change in Democracy	0.011*	0.012*	−0.015*	0.021**	0.009	0.017
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.017)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.052	0.277	0.044	−0.106**	−0.088**	0.034
	(0.049)	(0.240)	(0.070)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.120)
First Multiparty Election	0.058	0.007	0.172	0.104	0.083	−0.365
	(0.056)	(0.074)	(0.103)	(0.068)	(0.054)	(0.256)
Transitional Election	−0.007	0.065	−0.039	0.009	−0.012	−0.245
	(0.064)	(0.110)	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.226)
Post-Conflict Election	0.045	0.125	−0.029	0.120	0.017	0.097
	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.084)	(0.124)
Pre-Election Violence	0.015	0.044*	−0.008	0.018	0.028	−0.020
	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.038)
Oil Production	−0.013	−0.009	−0.008	−0.022*	−0.014	−0.011
	(0.010)	(0.048)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.022)
Total Trade	0.000	−0.001	0.014	0.010	0.006	−0.005
	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Former Colony	0.079	–	0.049	0.040	0.109	0.004
	(0.074)		(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.072)	(0.166)
Post-Coup Election	0.076	0.149	0.098	−0.275	0.103	−0.306
	(0.104)	(0.125)	(0.086)	(0.257)	(0.119)	(0.404)
Total GDP	0.012	0.254	−0.025	0.028	0.006	0.035
	(0.026)	(0.222)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.075)
Legislative Election	0.095**	0.020	0.140	0.066	0.064	0.106
	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.110)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.085)
Constant	0.872	−5.905	1.147	0.622	1.086	0.080
	(0.627)	(5.836)	(0.771)	(0.694)	(0.655)	(1.908)
N	511	511	140	371	354	157
R^2	0.402	0.239	0.356	0.444	0.418	0.431

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$

Table A.29: Table 2 with All Controls Displayed

	Logit Estimator (7)	Alternative Problem Definition (8)	Terrorism in Last 5 Years (9)
Problems	−2.525**	−0.137**	−0.337**
	(0.261)	(0.050)	(0.029)
Islamic Opposition Party	−0.737	−0.179*	−0.065
	(0.539)	(0.107)	(0.119
Islamist Terrorism	−0.245	−0.024	−0.01
	(0.221)	(0.043)	(0.020
Non-Islamist Terrorism	0.096	−0.002	−0.02
	(0.105)	(0.018)	(0.018
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	1.451**	0.170**	0.076**
	(0.489)	(0.085)	(0.031)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition	−1.077**	−0.121*	−0.045*
	(0.372)	(0.066)	(0.025)
Muslim Population %	1.288*	0.169	0.136
	(0.738)	(0.129)	(0.110)
Level of Democracy	0.131**	0.028**	0.021**
	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Change in Democracy	0.086*	0.009	0.010
	(0.050)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Infant Mortality Rate	−0.407	−0.014	−0.066
	(0.369)	(0.054)	(0.055)
First Multiparty Election	0.561	0.046	0.099
	(0.407)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Transitional Election	−0.051	−0.073	−0.054
	(0.540)	(0.098)	(0.074)
Post-Conflict Election	0.291	−0.001	0.090
	(0.492)	(0.095)	(0.067)
Pre-Election Violence	0.091	−0.031	0.017
	(0.133)	(0.027)	(0.019)
Oil Production	−0.121	−0.021	−0.004
	(0.076)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Total Trade	0.014	−0.001	0.001
	(0.137)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Former Colony	0.611	0.015	0.092
	(0.508)	(0.083)	(0.075)
Post-Coup Election	0.486	0.230*	0.104
	(0.869)	(0.128)	(0.100)
Total GDP	0.172	0.062**	0.007
	(0.215)	(0.030)	(0.027)
Legislative Election	0.697**	0.151**	0.112**
	(0.326)	(0.063)	(0.047)
Constant	0.943	−0.852	1.011
	(4.836)	(0.818)	(0.680)
N	511	428	472
Log-Likelihood	−203.336		
R^2		0.241	0.415

Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$