**Supplementary Material for A. Burcu Bayram,** “Due Deference: Cosmopolitan Social Identity and the Psychology of Legal Obligation in International Politics”

**1 Parliamentarian Study**

*1.1 Dispositional Measures*

1.1.1 Legal obligation

I use two different scales to measure legal obligation, as explained in the main text.

| **TABLE A1. Descriptive statistics for the items used to measure legal obligation**  |
| --- |
| *Dimensions of Legal Obligation*  | **Obs.** | **Mean****(Std. Dev.)**  | **Min** | **Max** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Total** | 68 | 0.425 (0.261) | 0 | 1 |
| **Moral importance attached to compliance**How important is it to you personally that Germany complies with its international legal duties?(Extremely important, Very Important, Somewhat important, Not so important, Not important at all)  | 68 | 0.522 (0.247) | 0 | 1 |
| **Belief in international law’s right to rule**There are several reasons why countries obey international law. We are interested how much value you put on upholding international law for its own sake. In other words, how willing are you to support compliance because laws need to be upheld? (A tremendous amount, A lot, Somewhat, Not too much, None at all)  | 68 | 0.393(0.324) | 0 | 1 |
| **Commitment to compliance**Sometimes compliance with international law becomes difficult and hurts a country’s interests. In cases like this, how strongly do you feel that countries must still comply with international law? (Extremely strongly, Very strongly, Strongly, Not so strongly, Not strongly at all)  | 68 | 0.393(0.297) | 0 | 1 |
| **Cognitive dissonanc**eHow uncomfortable would you feel if your country were to break international law?(Extremely uncomfortable, Very uncomfortable, Uncomfortable, Not so Uncomfortable, Not at all) | 68 | 0.363 (0.287) | 0 | 1 |
| **Accountability** How justified would other countries be in their criticism if your country were to break international law?(Extremely justified, Very justified, Justified, Not so much justified, Not justified at all) | 68 | 0.452 (0.340) | 0 | 1 |
| **Cronbach’s alpha for Scale Reliability** |  | 0.713 |  |  |
| ***Tyler Scale***  |  |  |  |  |
| **Total** | 68 | 0.332(0.263) | 0 | 1 |
| How much do you personally think that a country who breaks international law constitutes a threat to the international community? (Extremely strongly, Very strongly, Strongly, Not so strongly, Not strongly at all) | 68 | 0.363(0.278) | 0 | 1 |
| How strongly do you personally agree that breaking international law is seldom justified?(Extremely strongly, Very strongly, Strongly, Not so strongly, Not strongly at all) | 68 | 0.334(0.316) | 0 | 1 |
| How strongly do you personally agree that countries should obey international law even if it goes against their interests?(Extremely strongly, Very strongly, Strongly, Not so strongly, Not strongly at all) | 68 | 0.297(0.287) | 0 | 1 |
| **Cronbach’s alpha for Scale Reliability** | 0.875 | 0.905 |  |  |
| **Inter-Scale Correlation** | 0.848 (p<0.05) |  |  |  |
|  |

1.1.2 Cosmopolitan social identity

| **TABLE A2. Descriptive statistics for the items used to measure cosmopolitan social identity** |
| --- |
| **Dimensions of Cosmopolitan Identity** | **Obs**. | **Mean** **(Std. Dev.)**  | **Min** | **Max** |
| **Total** | 68 | 0.352 (0.261) | 0 | 1 |
| **Self-categorization**How much do you identify with the international community? (Extremely strongly, Very strongly, Strongly, Not so strongly, Not strongly at all) | 68 | 0.323(0.276) | 0 | 1 |
| **Common fate**How much do you feel that what happens to other countries and people around the world in general affects your and your country’s fate as well?(A tremendous amount, A lot, Somewhat, Not too much, None at all)  | 68 | 0.338(0.298) | 0 | 1 |
| **Common future**How strongly do you agree that countries and people around the world, including you and your country, in general share a common future?(Extremely strongly, Very strongly, Strongly, Not so strongly, Not strongly at all) | 68 | 0.419 (0.2813) | 0 | 1 |
| **Common goals**How united do you think are your country and other countries and people around the world in the pursuit of joint purposes and interests? (Extremely united, Very united, United, Not so united, Not united at all) | 68 | 0.330 (0.281) | 0 | 1 |
| **Cronbach’s alpha for Scale Reliability** | 0.91 |  |  |  |

1.1.3. Control variables

| **TABLE A3. Descriptive statistics for the political and demographic control variables**  |
| --- |
|  | **Obs.** | **Mean(Std. Dev.)****or Proportion**  | **Min** | **Max** |
| **Nationalism**When someone says something bad about Germany, how strongly do you feel it is as if they said something bad about you?(Extremely strongly, Very strongly, Strongly, Not so strongly, Not strongly at all) | 68 | 0.33 |  | 0 | 1 |
| **Multilateralism**German interests are usually best served by cooperating with our allies and with international institutions even if this means we cannot do all the things we want to do.(Agree strongly, Agree, Disagree, Disagree strongly) | 68 | 0.520(0.383) |  | 0 | 1 |
| **Ideology**In politics, people sometimes talk about left and right.Where would you place yourself? (Extreme left, left, center left, center, center right, right extreme right) | 68 | 0.478(0.260) |  | 0 | 1 |
| **Authoritarianism**Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn. (Agree strongly, Agree, Disagree, Disagree strongly) | 68 | 1.20(0.407) |  | 0 | 1 |
| **Age**Please indicate your age in years | 68 | 50.7 |  | 31 | 71 |
| **Female**Please indicate your gender | 68 | 0.48 |  | 0 | 1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |

**2 Laboratory Study**

To offset the limitations of the small parliamentarian sample, I test my argument using data from a convenience sample of American college students. One hundred sixty-five (N=165) college students registered in political science classes at a large research university participated in four factorial experiments administered through an interactive computer-based program that presented hypothetical scenarios about international law as stimulus material and recorded responses to multiple-choice questions. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions and the question order was fully randomized. The first two experiments examined the relationship between cosmopolitan identity and legal obligation. The next two focused on the effect of legal obligation on compliance preferences. The experimental manipulations are presented within brackets.

2.1.Experiment 1

2.1.1. Scenario

Nowadays, countries face many different security threats. Imagine that some American experts have proposed developing a new missile system that will increase America’s military security. If implemented, this proposal will violate international law [but OR and] the U.S. will face [no OR a lot of] social criticism or material sanctions from other countries. Some leaders think that [we are all citizens of the global community. We share common problems, objectives, values and futures and our fates are connected. So the U.S. should not go its own way on this issue and should abandon the missile system OR people are citizens of their own countries; in your case it is the U.S., and countries have their own problems, objectives, values and futures, and fates. So, the U.S. should go its own way on this issue and develop the missile system]. [Furthermore OR However], the U.S. has signed on to international treaties, which prohibit the proposed security system.

2.1.2. Discussion and results

The goal of this experiment was to pit the security interests of the U.S. against international law. The manipulated factors were cosmopolitan identification and the risk of facing enforcement in case of violation. The cosmopolitan identity treatment was derived from the theoretical dimensions of cosmopolitan identity discussed in the main text. The risk of enforcement was manipulated by telling participants about the extent of social and material sanctions the U.S. might face in the case of breach. The risk treatment allows me to separate feeling an obligation from feeling obliged due to fear of enforcement. If my argument is correct, those who received the cosmopolitanism treatment should articulate a sense of obligation toward international law independent of the risk of enforcement.

 Once the strategic scene was set, participants were asked about their sense of legal obligation. The items used to measure subjects’ sense of obligation paralleled those explained in the main text and described in the first part of the appendix above. The only difference is that in this laboratory study, the questions referenced the illegal missile system (e.g. To measure cognitive dissonance, participants were asked: “How uncomfortable would you personally feel if the U.S. were to disregard international law and develop this missile system”). A participant’s final legal obligation score is the average of all five measures of legal obligation.

 Results support the cosmopolitan identity hypothesis. The reported sense of legal obligation was significantly higher among those who received the cosmopolitan identity treatment than those who did not (z =-5.551, p=0.021, effect size = 0.43). The identity treatment increased the average sense of legal obligation by about 50 percent (median 0.4 in the low identity and 0.6 in the high identity condition). The effect of the risk of sanctions on legal obligation was significant but not at the 0.5 level (z =-1.768, p= 0.077, effect size = 0.13). The risk treatment increased the average sense of legal obligation by about 10 percent. Table A4 displays the median levels of legal obligation across each of the four experimental conditions. Comparing the responses of high and low cosmopolitan identifiers, especially in the high risk condition, is particularly informative. Consistent with my argument, low identifiers reported a weaker sense of legal obligation than high identifiers in the low and high risk conditions alike. However, their interest in upholding international law increased when the risk of sanctions rose. It appears they felt obliged to support compliance given the risk of enforcement. In stark contrast, changes in the costs of enforcement affected high identifiers only marginally. They expressed a strong sense of legal obligation in both low and high risk of enforcement conditions. These findings indicate that cosmopolitan identity leads to normative respect for international law.

| **TABLE A4. Degree of legal obligation by cosmopolitan identity and enforcement costs** |
| --- |
| Experiment 1: Illegal Missile System |  |  |  |
|  |  | Low Identifiers |  | High Identifiers |
|  |  | Median(Std. Dev.) |  | Median(Std. Dev.) |  |
| Low Risk |  | 0.35(0.19) |  | 0.55(0.16) |  |
| High Risk |  | 0.45(0.22) |  | 0.60(0.18) |  |

2.2.Experiment 2

2.2.1. Scenario

These days, there are many economic challenges countries face. Imagine that some American experts have proposed developing a new economic plan to give a boost to our economy. If implemented, this plan will violate international law [but/and] the U.S. will face [no OR a lot of] reaction from other countries. Some leaders think that [we are all citizens of the global community. We share common problems, objectives, values and futures and our fates are connected. So, the U.S. should not go its own way on this issue and should drop the new plan OR people are citizens of their own countries; in your case it is the U.S., and countries have their own problems, objectives, values and futures, and fates. So the U.S. should go its own way on this issue and develop the plan]. [Furthermore OR However], the U.S. has signed on to international treaties, which prohibit the proposed economic measures.

2.2.2. Discussion and results

Experiment 2 adopted the scenario used in the first study, replacing the missile system with an economic plan that will boost the American economy but violate international law. This set-up created a trade-off between the economic interests of the U.S. and international law. Cosmopolitan identity and risk treatments as well as measures of legal obligation were identical to those used in Experiment 1. Results replicate the previous findings, supporting the cosmopolitan hypothesis and the interaction between identity and costs. High cosmopolitan identifiers expressed a significantly higher degree of legal obligation than low identifiers (z= -2.831, p = 0.0046, effect size = 0.22). The risk of enforcement also had a significant effect (z=-2.394, p = 0.0167, effect size = 0.18). When the risk of enforcement increased, legal obligation rose by 28.5 percent for low identifiers. However, high identifiers’ sense of legal obligation only rose by 11 percent when the cost of sanctions increased. Table A5 reports the detailed group comparisons.

| **TABLE A5. Degree of legal obligation by cosmopolitan identity and enforcement costs** |
| --- |
| Experiment 2: Illegal Economic Plan |
|  |  | Low Identifiers |  | High Identifiers |
|  |  | Median(Std. Dev.) |  | Median(Std. Dev.) |  |
| Low Risk |  | 0.34(0.21) |  | 0.45(0.22) |  |
| High Risk |  | 0.45(0.17) |  | 0.50(0.20) |  |

Overall, these results suggest that individuals manifest different degrees of legal obligation depending on how strongly they attach to the world community. Non-cosmopolitans’ seeming deference to international law is shaped by the fear of enforcement. It is instrumental. In contrast, cosmopolitans defer to international law independent of instrumental considerations. These results show that whether an actor is guided by instrumental or normative reasoning depends on his or her cosmopolitan identification.

2.3.Experiment 3

2.3.1. Scenario

Imagine a new regime comes to power in Saudi Arabia and starts blatantly violating human rights. At the same time, the new regime offers lucrative trade deals to the U.S. that will lower oil prices. International law requires all countries, including the U.S., to punish Saudi Arabia’s violation of human rights and cut trade relations. American leaders [feel strongly about obeying international law OR make many decisions concerning international law]. If the U.S. chooses not to punish Saudi Arabia, it will receive [no OR a lot of] social criticism or material sanctions from the international community.

2.3.2. Discussion and results

The third experiment analyzed the effect of legal obligation on compliance preferences. It created a costly compliance situation by pitting deference to international law against sacrificing the trade benefits offered to the U.S. by a criminal government. The manipulated factors were the risk of enforcement and legal obligation. The risk manipulation was identical to the one introduced above. Legal obligation was manipulated by stating that American leaders either “feel strongly about obeying international law” or “make many decisions concerning international law.” The rationale here was either to evoke a sense of obligation by signaling real-world politicians’ deferential dispositions towards international law or to make a neutral statement about international law.

 After reading the experimental scenario, participants were asked three questions about their compliance preferences. First, I inquired how strongly they feel the U.S. should punish the criminal Saudi regime. Response options ranged from “Extremely Strongly (coded 5)” to “Not Strongly At All (coded 1)”. Next, I presented subjects with four policy choices and asked which best describes the policy they would choose if they were a top-level government official. Response options included “Fully follow international law, punish the Saudi regime, not trade with it (coded 3)”, “Mostly follow international law, somewhat punish the Saudi regime, trade on a limited basis (coded 2)”, “Somewhat follow international, punish the Saudi regime by verbally criticizing it, do not cut trade relations (coded 1)”, and “Do not punish the Saudi regime” (coded 0). Finally, I asked participants if they would change their decision if the lucrative trade deals offered by Saudi Arabia were to reduce gas prices. To gauge participants’ willingness to tolerate compliance costs, the response options presented gradations of price reductions “From $2.09 to $ 1.79 (coded 1)”, “From $2.09 to $ 1.59 (coded 2)”, “From $2.09 to $ 1.05 (coded 3)” as well as the option of “I will not change my mind (coded 4).”

 Results support the legal obligation and cost tolerance hypotheses. As can be seen in Table A6, those who received the legal obligation manipulation were significantly more willing to punish Saudi Arabia to ensure compliance with international law than those who were in the neutral condition (z = -7.159, p= 0.000, effect size =0.56). The legal obligation treatment strengthened support for compliance by 50 percent. The risk of enforcement treatment also exerted a large significant effect on inclinations to comply (z=-1.980, p=0.0477, effect size =0.15). Those who were faced with the risk of sanctions were more supportive of compliance than those who viewed violation as cost free.

 Importantly, those who receive the legal obligation treatment expressed support for compliance in both the low and high risk conditions. In the low risk condition, those who were presented with the legal obligation treatment were twice as more likely to support compliance than those who did not receive the obligation treatment. In the high risk condition, they were 80 percent more likely to support compliance. In contrast, as the costs of violation increased, weak obligation holders’ desire to uphold international law more than doubled. While the introduction of sanctions reinforced all participants’ inclinations to comply, it affected strong obligation holders’ preferences only to a limited degree. Their support for compliance rose only by 20 percent. These findings indicate that legal obligation substantially strengthens preferences for compliance. The influence of costs on compliance willingness lends credence to instrumental models of compliance but results indicate that legal obligation facilitates support for compliance independent of material considerations by reducing an actor’s cost sensitivity. Put differently, legal obligation moderates the effect of costs on support for compliance.

 An examination of participants’ policy choices as shown in the lower part of Table A6 provides further evidence that legal obligation leads to a non-egoistic preference for compliance. Participants in high and low obligation groups differed significantly in their policy preferences (χ2 (1)= 87.04, p= 0.0001). When a sense of legal obligation was evoked, about 80 percent of the respondents opted for punishing the Saudi regime (either fully or moderately) to ensure compliance with international law. They were ready to sacrifice the trade benefits. Conversely, when a sense of legal obligation was not evoked, respondents generally chose to ignore compliance. Among those in the weak legal obligation condition, about 23.5 percent chose ignoring international law and taking the trade deal. About 68 percent opted for verbally criticizing the Saudi regime while accepting the trade benefits.

 Crucially, legal obligation also raised participants’ willingness to tolerate compliance costs, supporting the cost tolerance hypothesis. When legal obligation was activated, participants were more willing to shoulder compliance costs and did not sacrifice upholding international law for the sake of taking the Saudis’ trade deal (χ2 (1)= 91.5, p=. 0.0001). Conversely, when legal obligation was not evoked, even a small reduction in gas prices persuaded participants to change their minds. Among those in the weak legal obligation condition, about 67 percent changed their minds when Saudi Arabia’s trade deals reduced the price of gas from $2.09 to $1.79. Yet only 2.5 percent of those in the strong legal obligation condition were tempted by this reduction. Those in the strong legal obligation condition were roughly evenly split in the cost tolerance test. About half indicated that they would not change their mind no matter how much Saudi’s deals decrease the price of gas. The other half gave up on compliance only when there was a substantial price reduction from $2.09 to $1.09. This finding again implies that compliance costs do matter; yet the effect of costs on compliance preferences varies across individuals as a function of the strength of legal obligation. Costs affect strong obligation holders significantly less than they do weak obligation holders because legal obligation reduces individuals’ sensitivity to costs.

| **TABLE A6. Support for compliance by legal obligation and enforcement costs** |
| --- |
| Experiment 3: Punishing Saudi Arabia |
|  |  | Weak Obligation |  | Strong Obligation |
|  |  | Median(Std. Dev.) |  | Median(Std. Dev.) |  |
| Low Risk |  | 0.11(0.16) |  | 0.75(0.21) |  |
| High Risk |  | 0.50(0.15) |  | 0.90(0.10) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Policy Choices |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Percent Support |  | Percent Support |  |
| Don’t Punish Saudi Arabia  |  | 23.53 |  | 5.00 |  |
| Verbally Criticize Saudi Arabia |  | 68.24 |  | 2.50 |  |
| Partly Punish Saudi Arabia  |  | 7.06 |  | 46.25 |  |
| Punish Saudi Arabia |  | 1.18 |  | 46.25 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tolerance of Compliance Costs |  | Percent Support |  | Percent Support |  |
| Don’t Punish Saudi Arabia  |  | 23.53 |  | 5.00 |  |
| From $2.09 to $1.79  |  | 67.06 |  | 2.53 |  |
| From $2.09 to $1.59 |  | 7.06 |  | 1.27 |  |
| From $2.09 to $1.09 |  | 1.18 |  | 55.47 |  |
| Will Not Change My Mind |  | 1.18 |  | 35.58 |  |

2.4.Experiment 4

2.4.1. Scenario

Imagine that [Iran OR Israel] assassinated the leader of a pro-Palestinian political party who was critical of [Iran’s OR Israel’s] policies while he was conducting talks in Syria and was caught red handed. This act violates Syria’s sovereignty and is a crime under international law. International law requires all countries, including the U.S., to punish [Iran’s OR Israel’s] behavior and asks them to take the necessary measures including imposing economic sanctions. American leaders [feel strongly about obeying international law OR make many decisions concerning international law] and they now have to decide what to do about this situation.

2.4.2. Discussion and results

In this experiment, compliance was conceptualized as support for the proper enactment of international law. A hypothetical scenario manipulated feelings of legal obligation and the identity of the recalcitrant country violating international law. The legal obligation manipulation was the same as before. I asked participants what they think the U.S. should do. The policy options included “full punishment in the form of taking all necessary measures, including imposing economic sanctions (coded 3)”, “partial punishment by taking limited measures but not imposing economic sanctions (coded 2)”, and “protesting diplomatically but not taking other measures (coded 1).”

 If legal obligation results in a preference for upholding international legal rules, as I argue, then it should motivate actors to enact international legal principles consistently across allies and enemies. Results indicate that legal obligation reinforces compliance support and increases cost tolerance even when compliance means punishing an ally. As Table A7 shows, legal obligation holders punished enemies and allies alike for violations of international law. The image of the state breaking international law had a significant effect on participants’ willingness to apply international legal norms and on their specific policy choice replicating results of earlier studies (χ2 (1)= 56.07, p= 0.0001, effect size=0.4). When the recalcitrant actor was Israel, only about 25 percent of the participants chose imposing full-scale sanctions, 20 percent opted for taking limited measures, and over 53 percent favored merely protesting diplomatically. Conversely, when the recalcitrant state was Iran, over 88 percent of participants favored imposing full sanctions, about 10 percent chose limited sanctions, and only about 2 percent opted for diplomatic protests. However, legal obligation exerted a significant effect on policy choices (χ2 (1)= 11.91, p=0.0006, effect size 0.07). Over 60 percent of those in the strong legal obligation condition chose fully punishing the defiant state, about 20 percent supported limited measures, and about 13 percent opted for diplomatic protest.

 Detailed group comparisons further indicate that legal obligation holders responded differently to the image of the violator. When Israel was the violator, 44 percent of those in the strong obligation condition supported imposing sanctions while only 8.7 percent of the participants in the weak obligation condition advocated the same policy. Similarly, 33 percent of legal obligation holders called for punishing Israel short of imposing sanctions whereas only 8 percent of weak obligation holders chose this option. Even when the violator was Iran, legal obligation exerted a substantial effect on policy preferences. True respondents predominantly chose fully punishing Iran. Yet among those who supported imposing sanctions, about 92 percent were legal obligation holders relative to 84 percent of weak obligation holders. This finding suggests that legal obligation holders are more likely to enact international law consistently across enemies and allies. Even though double standards exist in the application of international law, legal obligation moves actors to fairly enact international law even if this means punishing an ally.

| **TABLE A7. Support for compliance by legal obligation and enemy/ally image** |
| --- |
| Experiment 4: Punishing Iran/Israel |  |  |  |
| Policy Choices |  | Weak Obligation |  | Strong Obligation |
|  |  | Percent Support |  | Percent Support |
|  |  | Iran | Israel |  | Iran | Israel |
| Protest Diplomatically |  | 0.00 | 82.61 |  | 2.63 | 23.26 |
| Partly Punish but do not Impose Sanctions |  | 15.79 | 8.71 |  | 5.26 | 32.56 |
| Punish and Impose Sanctions |  | 84.21 | 8.70 |  | 92.11 | 44.19 |

In sum, the findings of laboratory experiments indicate that pessimistic and optimistic claims of instrumental and normative approaches on compliance lack scope conditions. Compliance can be both dutiful and instrumental. It depends on how an individual’s sense of obligation towards international law that shapes his or her interpretation of the payoff structure of compliance.