Homo Diplomaticus:
Supplementary Appendix

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Contents

1 Bargaining experiment

1.1 DISPOSITIONAL MEASURES

1.1.1 Need for cognition

We employ a 13 item scale ($\alpha = 0.82$) modified from Cacioppo, Petty and Kao's (1984)'s short-form Need for Cognition scale. Items denoted with an asterisk are reverse-coded.

For each of the statements below, please indicate whether the statement is characteristic of you or of what you believe. For example, if the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you or of what you believe about yourself (not at all like you) please place a "1" on the line to the left of the statement. If the statement is extremely characteristic of you or of what you believe about yourself (very much like you) please place a "5" on the line to the left of the statement. You should use the following scale as you rate each of the statements below.

1. *Extremely uncharacteristic of me*

2. *Somewhat uncharacteristic of me*

3. *Uncertain*

4. *Somewhat characteristic of me*

5. *Extremely characteristic of me*

1. I would prefer complex to simple problems

2. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.*

3. I only think as hard as I have to.*

4. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.*

5. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.

6. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.

7. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.*

8. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.

9. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.

10. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.

11. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.*

12. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works.*

13. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.

1.1.2 Need for cognitive closure

Those who lack epistemic motivation have a greater need for cognitive closure. Disliking ambiguity and uncertainty, they feel an urgency to make up their mind quickly and display a greater resistance to revising their beliefs in the light of disconfirming evidence. They "seize" and "freeze." Those with epistemic motivation, on the other hand are reluctant to commit early to a definite opinion and are more open to considering alternatives after forming their initial judgment (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994; Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). Those who are epistemically motivated are more tolerant of ambiguity, and demonstrate less mental rigidity and closed-mindedness (Jost et al., 2003). Crudely speaking, they think more and longer. The need for cognitive closure is "nonspecific" in nature. Individuals who lack this attribute are not motivated to reach a particular substantive conclusion, just one that resolves the ambiguity and uncertainty they find uncomfortable.

To measure need for closure, we employ the eight item ($\alpha = 0.64$) closed-mindedness subscale of Webster and Kruglanski's (1994) Need for Cognitive Closure scale, for which response options are a five-point scale ranging from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree", after which all items are reverse-coded.

1. Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a different opinion.

2. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.

3. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.

4. When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be right.

5. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as possible.

6. I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own.

7. I always see many possible solutions to problems I face.

8. I do not usually consult many different options before forming my own view.

1.1.3 Social value orientations

We measure social value orientations using the Triple-Dominance Measure of Van Lange et al. (1997).

In this part of the survey we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another person, whom we will refer to simply as the "Other." This other person is someone you do not know and that you will not knowingly meet in the future. Both you and the "Other" person will be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your own choices will produce points for both yourself and the "Other" person. Likewise, the other's choice will produce points for him/her and for you. Every point has value: the more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points the "Other" receives, the better for him/her. Here's an example of how this task works:

	A	B	C
You get	500	500	550
Other gets	100	500	300

In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and the other would receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other 500; and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points and the other 300. So, you see that your choice influences both the number of points you receive and the number of points the other receives.

Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers?choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, remember that the points have value; the more of them you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, from the "other's" point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the better for him/her. Your answers here won't affect any other part of the survey.

For each of the nine choice situations, circle A, B, or C, depending on which column you prefer most:

1.	A	B	C
You get	480	540	480
Other gets	80	280	480

6.	A	B	C
You get	500	500	570
Other gets	500	100	300

2.	A	B	C
You get	560	500	500
Other gets	300	500	100

7.	A	B	C
You get	510	560	510
Other gets	510	300	110

3.	A	B	C
You get	520	520	580
Other gets	520	120	320

8.	A	B	C
You get	550	500	500
Other gets	300	100	500

4.	A	B	C
You get	500	560	490
Other gets	100	300	490

9.	A	B	C
You get	480	490	540
Other gets	100	490	300

5.	A	B	C
You get	560	500	490
Other gets	300	500	90

For each choice situation, one of these response options represents a *prosocial* choice (responses 1c, 2b, 3a, 4c, 5b, 6a, 7a, 8c, and 9b), an *individualistic* choice (responses 1b, 2a, 3c, 4b, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8a, and 9c) and a *competitive* choice (responses 1a, 2c, 3b, 4a, 5c, 6b, 7c, 8b, and 9a). Both individualistic and competitive orientations are forms of proself orientations, but individualistic orientations maximize what political scientists would call "absolute gains", and competitive orientations maximize "relative gains": subjects with a competitive social value orientation would rather receive a smaller payoff (e.g. 500 rather than 570) if it meant their opponent received even less (e.g. 100 rather than 300).[1] Van Lange et al. (1997) classify participants' social value orientations if at least six of their responses are of the same type. We deviate from this approach in two respects. First, following Kuhlman and Marshello (1975), Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976), and McClintock and Liebrand (1988), we lump together competitive and individualistic responses into one proself category, since these two types of proselfs tend to display very similar behavior in distributive games, and we have little theoretical riding on the distinction between absolute and relative gains. Second, to avoid missing data, we classify a participant as prosocial or proself if a simple majority of its response options falls into one of these camps. One might be concerned about adopting a dichotomous measure of social value orientation rather than employing continuous scores (since such an approach treats strong prosocials, for example, as equivalent

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[1]On absolute versus relative gains, see Grieco (1993).

to moderately strong prosocials), but we note two considerations. First, the distribution of each of these social value orientation scores are highly bimodal: most respondents either provided nine proself responses, or zero. Second, we replicate our analyses below using continuous measures of prosocial value orientation (see Figure A4), and find the results hold.

1.2 REGRESSION ANALYSES

Because of space constraints, we present the full regression table for offer size here in Table 1 rather than in the main text. Note that since coefficient estimates in three-way interaction models are often difficult to substantively interpret (the $\beta = 0.646$ estimate for cognition, for example, is the effect of cognition for proselfs in the second half of the matches), they are most easily interpreted visually in Figure A1. The first model estimates the impact of social value orientations and epistemic motivation for the size of the first offer in each match, when the proposer is in a position of weakness. Model 2 replicates its predecessor, but this time for the later offers in each match, where the proposer is in a position of strength. Model 3 in Table 1 merges the previous two sets of analyses by examining the within-subject changes in offer size between the first and later rounds of each match, the results of which are plotted in Figure A2. Figure A2 tells a similar story to Figure A1: in the first half of the matches, the high-cognition proselfs are the ones who most fully take advantage of their increase in bargaining power, and display larger changes in offer size than either their low-cognition ($p < 0.02$), or their prosocial ($p < 0.05$) counterparts, in a manner consistent with H4. Again by the second half of the matches, the low-cognition proselfs have caught on, and play like their high-cognition counterparts.[2]

Table 2 estimates a series of logistic mixed effect models examining the extent to which social value orientation and epistemic motivation predict whether players accept the offer. Models 1 and 2 show the joint effect of social value orientations and epistemic motivation for first round offers, where the recipient is in a position of bargaining strength; models 3 and 4 show the effect of these dispositional characteristics for later round offers. Since the probability of accepting an offer depends on what the offer is, models 2 and 4 control for offer size.

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[2]Changes in offer size calculated using predicted values from model 3 of Table 1, for a 1 unit change in need for cognition.

Table 1: High-cognition proselfs give the most strategic offers

	Offer 1 (Weakness)	Offer 2+ (Strength)	Δ Offer
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cognition	0.646	−0.386	−0.026
	(0.566)	(0.897)	(1.166)
Prosocial	0.076	−0.771	−1.157
	(0.595)	(0.993)	(1.279)
Male	0.346**	−0.457*	−0.645**
	(0.175)	(0.250)	(0.321)
Age	−0.039	0.026	0.032
	(0.045)	(0.066)	(0.087)
White	−0.035	0.043	0.228
	(0.181)	(0.262)	(0.345)
Taken Economics	0.230	0.308	0.388
	(0.177)	(0.255)	(0.329)
Matches 1-7	−1.386***	0.589	2.242***
	(0.259)	(0.525)	(0.712)
Cognition × Prosocial	−0.096	1.875	2.152
	(0.965)	(1.599)	(2.058)
Cognition × Matches 1-7	0.898**	−0.567	−2.509**
	(0.431)	(0.872)	(1.176)
Prosocial × Matches 1-7	0.930**	1.189	1.624
	(0.464)	(0.993)	(1.329)
Cognition × Prosocial × Matches 1-7	−1.213	−1.182	−1.081
	(0.750)	(1.611)	(2.136)
Constant	6.541***	2.341*	−5.123***
	(0.909)	(1.333)	(1.769)
N	1,492	540	371
Log Likelihood	−2,674.62	−985.31	−767.98
AIC.	5,379.24	2,000.63	1,565.95
BIC	5,458.86	2,065.00	1,624.69

Note: Linear mixed effect models with random effects on participant and session, not shown here. To substantively interpret interactions, see Figures A1-A2. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure A1: The joint impact of social value orientation and epistemic motivation on offer size


This figure replicates Figure 1 from the main text, but also including the results for the second half of matches. The first two panels display the impact of social value orientation and cognition on offer size when the proposer has a 30% chance of winning the costly lottery and is thus in a weaker bargaining position; the next two show these dispositional characteristics? effects on offer size when the proposer has a 70% chance of winning the costly lottery and is thus in a stronger bargaining position. The plots show that the impact of social value orientation is moderated by epistemic motivation, in that high-cognition proselfs act strategically in a manner predicted by rational choice theory: when they are in a weaker bargaining position (the left-most panel), they make more generous offers, and act just like prosocials; when they are in a stronger bargaining position (the second panel from the right), they exploit their position of strength and make less generous offers. Age is set to its mean, and gender, race and prior experience in an economics class set to their modes.

Table 2: High-cognition proselfs are the most strategic about which offers to accept

|	Accept Offer 1 (Strength)		Accept Offer 2+ (Weakness)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cognition	0.732	1.631*	2.234**	1.922
	(0.624)	(0.985)	(1.045)	(1.246)
Prosocial	0.250	0.541	1.069	0.679
	(0.682)	(1.054)	(1.037)	(1.220)
Male	−0.559***	−0.911***	0.009	−0.073
	(0.178)	(0.289)	(0.264)	(0.314)
Age	−0.007	−0.009	0.075	0.099
	(0.046)	(0.077)	(0.069)	(0.079)
White	0.111	0.276	−0.368	−0.612**
	(0.181)	(0.301)	(0.263)	(0.307)
Taken Economics	−0.167	−0.173	0.393	0.294
	(0.180)	(0.296)	(0.252)	(0.295)
Matches 1-7	0.593	3.014***	0.242	−0.390
	(0.417)	(0.598)	(0.757)	(0.939)
Offer size		1.665***		0.954***
		(0.099)		(0.099)
Cognition × Prosocial	−0.076	−0.137	−2.244	−1.731
	(1.102)	(1.715)	(1.690)	(1.977)
Cognition × Matches 1-7	−1.683**	−3.403***	−0.889	−0.415
	(0.700)	(0.986)	(1.312)	(1.604)
Prosocial × Matches 1-7	−0.776	−1.559	1.135	2.075
	(0.779)	(1.085)	(1.414)	(1.686)
Cognition × Prosocial × Matches 1-7	1.917	3.046*	−0.932	−2.383
	(1.250)	(1.757)	(2.271)	(2.696)
Constant	−0.058	−11.465***	−2.083	−4.633***
	(0.922)	(1.705)	(1.418)	(1.668)
Observations	1,478	1,478	534	534
Log Likelihood	−968.37	−688.17	−328.78	−256.68
AIC	1,964.73	1,406.34	685.56	543.36
BIC	2,038.91	1,485.81	745.49	607.56

Note: Logistic mixed effect models with random effects on participant and session, not shown here. To substantively interpret interactions, see Figure A3. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure A2: Who adjusts? Changes in offer size between the first and later rounds

The plot shows that in the first half of the matches, high cognition proselfs take advantage of their shift in bargaining power by offering far less attractive offers once the power shift takes place, while low-cognition proselfs play more like prosocials. By the second half of the matches, the low-cognition proselfs have caught on. Age is set to its mean, and gender, race and prior experience in an economics class set to their modes.

Figure A3: The joint impact of social value orientation and epistemic motivation on the probability of acceptance

This figure replicates Figure 2 from the main text, but also including the results for the second half of the matches. The first two panels display the impact of social value orientation and cognition on the predicted probability that the player accepts the offer (controlling for offer size), when the recipient has a 70% chance of winning the costly lottery and is thus in a stronger bargaining position; the next two show these dispositional characteristics' effects on the probability of acceptance (controlling for offer size) when the recipient has a 30% chance of winning the costly lottery and is thus in a weaker bargaining position. The plots show once again that the impact of social value orientation is moderated by epistemic motivation, in that high-cognition proselfs act strategically in a manner predicted by rational choice theory: when they are in a stronger bargaining position (the left-most panel), they tend to exploit their strength and are less likely to accept the offer than their low-cognition counterparts; when they are in a weaker bargaining position (the second panel from the right) they are more likely to accept the offer. Age is set to its mean, and gender, race and prior experience in an economics class set to their modes.

We present a number of analyses below to supplement those found in the main text. First, we test for order effects. Importantly, offer size was not affected by the order manipulation: the average first round offer differed by only -0.09 points between the two versions of the survey in which question order varied (95% clustered bootstrapped CI: $-0.42, 0.27$), and the average later round offer differed by -0.03 points (95% clustered bootstrapped CI: $-0.51, 0.43$). Similarly, the average probability of acceptance in the first round differed by only 1.2% between the two versions of the survey (95% clustered bootstrapped CI: $-6.1\%, 8.0\%$), and the average probability of acceptance in the later rounds differed by only 2.6% (95% clustered bootstrapped CI: $-7.2\%, 12.8\%$). Finally, just as the order manipulation did not affect how participants played the game, it also did not affect the measurement of their dispositional characteristics (clustered bootstrapped 95% CIs around the difference in need for cognition: $-0.07, 0.039$; need for closure: $-0.04, 0.06$; social value orientation: $-0.03, 0.24$).

Second, as an additional test of how social orientation and epistemic motivation predict players' behavior in the bargaining game, we explore how participants with these clusters of orientations ultimately fare in the game. If procedural rationality truly promotes instrumental rationality, we would expect that high-cognition proselfs would accrue more points in the game than their low-cognition counterparts. We thus regress the logged number of points each player received in the game on epistemic motivation, social value orientation, their interaction, and the various demographic characteristics included in the previous analyses, the full regression table for which is shown in Table 3. We then bootstrap the model to produce measures of uncertainty around the predicted number of points for low-cognition proselfs, high-cognition proselfs, low-cognition prosocials, and high-cognition prosocials.[3] The data are noisy — points are allocated as a function of players' decisions, but also by lottery by probabilistic stopping rule — but in general, high cognition players outperform low-cognition ones, and high-cognition proselfs do the best, receiving the highest expected number of logged points: 4.27, which is higher than the expected score for low-cognition proselfs (3.76; bootstrapped p-value for difference: $p < 0.01$) and high-cognition prosocials (4.04; bootstrapped p-value for difference: $p < 0.08$).[4] These results thus offer further evidence that our low-cognition proselfs play suboptimally, failing to respond to the changing incentive structure.

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[3]We use a 1 unit change in need for cognition, which represents the difference from the minimum to the maximum value.

[4]Importantly, the high-EM proselfs outperform low-EM proselfs in both the first and second half of the matches, showing that they

Table 3: High cognition proselfs gain more points than their low-cognition counterparts

	log(payoff)
Prosocial	0.235
	(0.281)
Cognition	0.512*
	(0.264)
Taken Economics	0.054
	(0.089)
Male	0.020
	(0.088)
Age	0.005
	(0.022)
White	−0.157*
	(0.089)
Prosocial x Cognition	−0.463
	(0.455)
Constant	3.605***
	(0.443)
N	197
R^2	0.035

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Third, Table 4 replicates Tables 1-2 from the main text, but using need for closure as a measure of epistemic motivation rather than need for cognition. Need for closure and need for cognition are typically negatively correlated with one another (in our data: $r = -0.49$) so the coefficient estimates estimates differ, but as Figure A5 demonstrates, the substantive effects are similar: proselfs with high epistemic motivation (measured in this case by low need for closure) give more generous offers than their low-EM counterparts when in a position of weakness, and less generous offers than their low-EM counterparts when in a position of strength. Similarly, high-EM proselfs are less likely to accept an offer when in a position of strength, and more-likely to do so when in a position of weakness. Note that need for closure is scaled differently than need for cognition as the former indicates a lower level of epistemic motivation and the latter indicates a higher level of epistemic motivation.

Fourth, one potential interpretation of the results might be that the variation we are capturing with epistemic motivation is a function of capability rather than motivation, such that a lack of epistemic motivation is simply proxying a lack of intelligence. Table 5 thus replicates Tables 1-2 from the main text, but also controlling for participants' SAT scores. Importantly, as Figure A6 shows, the substantive results hold. Relatedly, epistemic motivation is not substantively correlated in our sample with time preferences ($r = 0.125$ for participants' δ parameter, $r = -0.086$ for participants' β parameter, both of which are measured using a series of matching questions used to construct participants' quasi-hyperbolic discounting functions) or risk preferences ($r = 0.016$, measured using a series of lottery tasks used to estimate participants' level of risk aversion). In this sense, it is unlikely that high-EM individuals are playing the game differently because they are more focused on the future, for example, or different preferences with respect to the risks of the costly lottery.

Finally, Figure A4 replicates Figures A1-A3, but employing continuous measures of prosocial value orientations rather than dichotomous ones. As noted above, since the social value orientation measures are heavily bimodal (21% of our participants make purely prosocial choices in the decomposed game, and 51% make strictly proself choices), there are relatively few participants in the middle of the distribution, but the replication is reassuring nonetheless. We still see that in a position of weakness, offer size and the probability of acceptance increase for those who are less prosocial as the need for cognition increases. In a position of strength, it is the opposite.

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maintain their advantage even controlling for learning dynamics.

Figure A4: The joint impact of continuous social value orientation and need for closure on offer size and acceptance


(a) Offer size

(b) Acceptance

15

Table 4: Offer size and acceptance, measuring epistemic motivation via need for closure

| | Offer size | | | Acceptance | |
| | Offer 1 (Weakness) | Offer 2+ (Strength) | Δ Offer | Accept 1 (Strength) | Accept 2+ (Weakness) |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Closure	−1.430**	1.943*	1.947	−1.799	0.889
	(0.691)	(1.041)	(1.362)	(1.195)	(1.434)
Prosocial	−0.928*	2.224***	1.785*	−0.384	−0.225
	(0.531)	(0.771)	(1.013)	(0.929)	(1.113)
Male	0.365**	−0.498**	−0.681**	−0.906***	−0.141
	(0.173)	(0.246)	(0.320)	(0.284)	(0.323)
Age	−0.025	0.009	0.008	0.011	0.105
	(0.044)	(0.065)	(0.087)	(0.075)	(0.080)
White	0.068	−0.042	0.111	0.346	−0.587**
	(0.171)	(0.250)	(0.332)	(0.281)	(0.297)
Taken Economics	0.219	0.321	0.385	−0.214	0.251
	(0.175)	(0.251)	(0.330)	(0.291)	(0.302)
Matches 1-7	−0.514*	0.436	0.679	−0.332	−0.596
	(0.272)	(0.526)	(0.684)	(0.603)	(0.964)
Offer size				1.644***	0.973***
				(0.098)	(0.101)
Closure × Prosocial	2.049*	−4.138***	−3.631*	1.881	−0.107
	(1.068)	(1.591)	(2.106)	(1.847)	(2.281)
Closure × Matches 1-7	−0.764	−0.419	0.213	3.003**	−0.152
	(0.549)	(1.087)	(1.433)	(1.210)	(1.965)
Prosocial × Matches 1-7	0.106	−0.068	0.747	1.546*	0.585
	(0.410)	(0.760)	(1.023)	(0.926)	(1.435)
Closure × Prosocial × Matches 1-7	0.244	1.232	0.396	−3.011	0.066
	(0.832)	(1.547)	(2.101)	(1.860)	(2.959)
Constant	7.280***	1.635	−5.453***	−9.976***	−4.099**
	(0.932)	(1.375)	(1.852)	(1.705)	(1.730)
N	1,492	540	371	1,478	534
Log Likelihood	−2,673.43	−983.16	−770.73	−691.02	−259.14
AIC	5,376.87	1,996.32	1,571.46	1,412.05	548.28
BIC	5,456.48	2,060.69	1,630.20	1,491.52	612.48

Models 1-3 are linear mixed effect models; models 4-5 are logistic mixed effect models. All models include random effects on participants and experimental sessions, not shown. $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Figure A5: The joint impact of social value orientation and need for closure on offer size and acceptance


(a) Offer size

(b) Acceptance

Table 5: Offer size and acceptance, controlling for SAT scores

|	Offer size			Acceptance	
	Offer 1 (Weakness)	Offer 2+ (Strength)	Δ Offer	Accept 1 (Strength)	Accept 2+ (Weakness)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Cognition	0.235	−0.458	−0.406	1.631*	1.922
	(0.620)	(0.945)	(1.249)	(0.985)	(1.246)
Prosocial	0.267	−0.008	−0.257	0.541	0.679
	(0.620)	(1.065)	(1.378)	(1.054)	(1.220)
Male	0.284	−0.436*	−0.564*	−0.911***	−0.073
	(0.177)	(0.249)	(0.323)	(0.289)	(0.314)
Age	−0.061	0.085	0.102	−0.009	0.099
	(0.054)	(0.080)	(0.105)	(0.077)	(0.079)
White	0.070	0.143	0.240	0.276	−0.612**
	(0.191)	(0.268)	(0.359)	(0.301)	(0.307)
Taken Economics	0.108	0.306	0.352	−0.173	0.294
	(0.184)	(0.257)	(0.336)	(0.296)	(0.295)
Matches 1-7	−1.161***	0.495	2.089***	3.014***	−0.390
	(0.263)	(0.534)	(0.721)	(0.598)	(0.939)
SAT	0.512	−0.135	0.393		
	(0.396)	(0.575)	(0.741)		
Offer size				1.665***	0.954***
				(0.099)	(0.099)
Cognition × Prosocial	−0.503	0.755	1.159	−0.137	−1.731
	(1.014)	(1.750)	(2.257)	(1.715)	(1.977)
Cognition × Matches 1-7	0.592	−0.438	−2.234*	−3.403***	−0.415
	(0.434)	(0.887)	(1.189)	(0.986)	(1.604)
Prosocial × Matches 1-7	0.528	0.999	1.391	−1.559	2.075
	(0.475)	(1.057)	(1.411)	(1.085)	(1.686)
Cognition × Prosocial × Matches 1-7	−0.596	−0.730	−0.615	3.046*	−2.383
	(0.770)	(1.731)	(2.286)	(1.757)	(2.696)
Constant	6.977***	1.255	−6.610***	−11.465***	−4.633***
	(1.121)	(1.641)	(2.158)	(1.705)	(1.668)
Observations	1,358	500	339	1,478	534
Log Likelihood	−2,383.91	−908.06	−693.85	−688.17	−256.68
AIC.	4,799.82	1,848.12	1,419.70	1,406.34	543.36
BIC.	4,883.24	1,915.56	1,480.92	1,485.81	607.56

Models 1-3 are linear mixed effect models; models 4-5 are logistic mixed effect models. All models include random effects on participants and experimental sessions, not shown. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure A6: The joint impact of social value orientation and need for cognition on offer size and acceptance, controlling for SAT scores

(a) Offer size

(b) Acceptance

2 Case study

2.1 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: ELECTORAL INTERESTS AND DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCIES

An alternative explanation for the pattern of results we find in the case might center on the different electoral interests and domestic constiuents of Stresemann's center-right German People's Party (DVP) and the DNVP. In this view, there was no difference in epistemic motivation, only variation in what constituted egoistic behavior at a lower level of analysis, the personal fate of politicians. However, during this entire period, we see that the elements of the German right who opposed agreement with Britain and France were working against, rather than with, the core economic interests of their constituencies. German business interests had an acute interest in securing credit from American investors, who had been largely scared off from placing their capital in Europe given the instability of security relations between the two countries.[5] The agricultural and business interests who supported the DNVP were particularly in need of a cash infusion and upset with the line that their party was taking as it prevented the French and Germans from coming to a modus vivendi that was good for business.[6] These groups protested the DNVP's opposition to a pact.[7]

Crass electoral party politics also does not seem to have influenced the process in any meaningful way. There were certainly partisan political considerations. The DNVP struggled to oppose what became the Locarno treaty while simultaneously remaining in the government coalition. To solve this dilemma, they claimed that Stresemann had exceeded his constitutional mandate when approaching the French and British in January 1925 before a cabinet was constituted. The DNVP demanded his resignation, hoping that his policies would depart with him without a wholesale reshuffling of the cabinet. Chancellor Luther, however, took joint responsibility for Stresemann's overtures, depriving the DNVP of a constitutional pretext for getting rid of him.[8] When faced with the choice of remaining in government or backing the pact, the party withdrew from the coalition.

Genuine "policy-seeking" motivations, rather than "office-seeking" motivations, also drove Stresemann.[9] The foreign minister's considerations about the constellation of German party coalitions were based on what he felt gave him the best chance of implementing his plans. It had been largely at Stresemann's insistence that

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[5] Jacobson 1972, 5; Wright 2002, 342; Cohrs 2004, 250; Keeton 1987.
[6] Wright 2002, 279; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 140, 205, 233; Grathwol 1980, 145.
[7] Turner 1963, 215.
[8] Turner 1963, 204-208; Grathwol 1980, 69-72.
[9] Rathbun 2004.

the DNVP was brought into government. The foreign minister, largely on the basis of his experience with the nationalists' parliamentary intransigence during the reparations negotiations over the Dawes Plan, concluded that his policy of rapprochement with the Western allies would be easier to accomplish if the DNVP were in government rather than criticizing from outside. Stresemann believed that the "responsibility" of governing would have the effect of inducing greater recognition of "realist political necessities" on the part of the DNVP.[10] In a sense, Stresemann was working on the basis of the assumption that a change in the situation would induce greater epistemic motivation in the nationalists. He was overly optimistic. Nor did the position of the DNVP differ when the party was in and out of power. Their position was invariably hostile during the entire period. It was not a simple case of opportunistic politics irrespective of substantive policy positions.

The DNVP, while sharing Stresemann's goals, might have had longer time horizons. Perhaps they favored a steady accumulation of military power, at which time Germany could confront the western powers militarily, much as Hitler did a decade later. However, such an argument misses the impatience of the nationalists. Craig explains that Stresemann's goals "were objectives that most people in the rightist parties regarded as desirable. The trouble was that they wanted them to be proclaimed publicly and to be accomplished forthwith. …They would not understand that the realities of the European situation made patience, ambiguity and opportunism requirements of German foreign policy."[11] There was simply no quick path at the time that promised what the German nationalists demanded. The Nazis were in the mid-1920s an insignificant force. Their rise to power, and the unique window they seized to challenge Britain and France following the Great Depression, was not foreseeable at the time. And even then, Hitler's success owes much to Stresemann's achievements, although this was never the foreign minister's intention. Major steps along the way towards WWII, such as the remilitarization of the Rhineland, would likely never occurred had the allies retained their coercive control over German territory. As a result of Stresemann's efforts the Rhineland was evacuated early in 1930 as opposed to the originally scheduled 1935. Hitler came to power in 1933. The strategically rational way to pursue such a long-term course in the mid-1920s would have been to back the foreign minister, instrumentally and disingenuously signing a treaty so as to cause France and Britain to lower their guard. The DNVP did not do so.

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[10]ADAP, A12, No. 28; also Wright 2002, 196, 279; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 26.
[11]Craig 1978, 512.

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