

The Rebels' Credibility Dilemma

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Online Appendix

Data Description

Table 1: Variable Definitions

Variable	Concept	Measurement
Outcome Variable		
Any Government/Self-Determination Demand	Broad demands related to self-determination or changes in government personnel or policies	Dichotomous variable measuring whether rebels issued any demand related to changes in the government or self-determination, regardless of size, in a given month
Maximalist Demand for Government or Self-Determination	Absolutist, Maximalist or Total Demands	Dichotomous variable measuring whether rebels issued any demands for either the complete resignation of the regime or leadership in power, or for complete secession or independence from the state in question.
Any Demand	Any rebel demands	Dichotomous variable measuring whether rebels issued at least one demand, of any type or size, in a given month. This measure captures rebels' decisions to make any demands of the government
Number of Demands	Number of monthly rebel demands	Count of the number of demands rebels issued in a given month. This variable ranges from 0 to 21 in this sample.
Explanatory Variables		
Rebel Troop Size	Rebel capability	Count of rebel troops using the best estimate of rebel group size from the Cunningham et al (2009) NSA dataset divided by 1000. This variable ranges from 0.165 to 70 in the sample.
Rebel Troop Size ²	Polynomial of rebel troop size	Square term of <i>Rebel Troop Size</i> .
Rebel Relative Strength	Dyadic military capability	Ordinal variable measuring rebels' strength vis a vis their government opponent. This variable ranges from 1 to 5 corresponding to the categories <i>much weaker</i> , <i>weaker</i> , <i>at parity</i> , <i>stronger</i> and <i>much stronger</i> coded in the NSA dataset.
Government Military Personnel	Government capabilities	Component of the composite COW CINC score, military personnel in thousands, which captures government troop size.
Main Group	Alternative measure of rebel capabilities	Binary measure coded "1" if a rebel group inflicts the greatest number of casualties on the government relative to other groups in a multi-party conflict, and "0" otherwise. If the rebel group is the only group fighting the state, it is automatically coded the main group. To generate a number of casualties, we consult the number of battle-related deaths listed in the UCDP conflict encyclopedia.
Number of Rebel Groups in the State	Number of groups fighting the state	Count variable measuring the number of disparate rebel groups that challenge the state in a given month. This variable ranges from 1 to 4.
Number of Rebel Groups in the Conflict	Number of rebel groups fighting within the same conflict	Count variable measuring the number of disparate rebel groups that challenge the state over the same issue, within the same conflict in a given month. This variable ranges from 1 to 4.
External Support	Explicit External Support to Rebels	Binary indicator capturing whether rebels have explicit outside support. These data were coded using the rebel support variable in the NSA dataset.
Number of Conflict Episodes	Number of episodes of fighting between the dyad	Count of conflict episodes (as coded by UCDP) ranging from 1 to 6.
Length of Conflict Episode	Duration of fighting spell	Count of conflict duration in months.
Polity2	Regime Type	Continuous measure of regime type from the Polity IV project. This variable ranges from -8 (more autocratic) to 8 (more democratic) in our sample.
Autocratic Party Based Regime, Autocratic Personalist Regime, Autocratic Military Regime	Autocratic regime type	Dichotomous variables measuring the institution structure of an authoritarian regime. These data are drawn from Geddes, Wright and Frantz's (2014) <i>Authoritarian Regimes</i> dataset.
Leadership Turnover	State Leadership Transition	Dichotomous variable measuring transitions in the state leadership in a given month. These data come from Mattes, Leeds and Carroll (2014).
Elections	Elections in Month	Dichotomous variable constructed using data from Hyde and Marinov (2014), which measures whether executive or legislative elections were held in the state, in a given month.

Robustness Checks

Tables 2, 3 and 5 show the robustness of our main results when we utilize different operationalizations of different control variables, including an aggregated measure for *autocracy*, disaggregated and lagged measures for state *elections* and disaggregated and lagged measures for state *leadershipturnover*.

In Table 4 lagged dependent variables (LDV) are included to alleviate concerns about temporal dependence, or more specifically that the values of the dependent variable are determined by its prior values. Particularly, if lagged dependent variables are part of the data generating process such that demands at time t are a function of demands at $t-1$, for example, our results are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias¹. To address this concern, and to show that our results are robust to the inclusion of LDV's, we respecify all of our models to include past values of rebels demands up to three months prior. In all of these models our results remain consistent.

Figure 1 plots the number of demands issued by the different organizations in our sample over the course of their conflicts. The x-axis represents the number of months in a given conflict, which corresponds to a different temporal domain for each group. Since rebels can fight a minimum of one month, and the maximum duration of a conflict in this sample is 192 months, the x-axis spans 0-200 months. For example, month "1" would be coded in September 1990 if a rebel group started a 24-month conflict that month. Accordingly, the value "24" would correspond to the month the conflict ended, September 1992.

As reflected in Figure 1, rebels' demands change frequently in our sample. The figure also demonstrates that once rebels do make an initial demand, or overcome the "hurdle" of making demands, they are likely to continue doing so. Additionally, we observe in the data that substantively large demands often come bundled together such that the number of demands is often correlated with the substantive scope of the claims within that bundle. As a result, examining the number of demands is a reasonable way to conceptualize demand size. To demonstrate this, it is helpful to examine the sets of demands issued by the same group at different times. Consider the following examples:

- In August 2006, the LRA made 15 demands of the government of Uganda. Among these were demands for a new constitution, a new federal system of government, a 22 percent cut of state revenue for the North, decrease in the size of the military from 100,000 to 20,000 troops and 40 percent representation in the new reduced military. They also demanded rehabilitation of many economic sectors, a unilateral government ceasefire along with a list of government stockpile locations. We can compare this bundle of demands to those made by the same group in July 2001. In that month, the LRA made 3 demands for security provisions, payments for attending peace talks and the return of all individuals rescued from LRA camps. The former bundle surely contained more consequential demands than the latter.
- In July 2006, the Palipehutu-FNL demanded 16 concessions including the dissolution of the current army and the position of army chief in the reformed army. In addition, the group demanded their forces make up 60 percent of the new military while

¹Keele and Kelly 2006

the government share the remaining 40 percent of seats with the six other groups already integrated into the army. The group also demanded the reform of other state security organizations and the reconfiguration of the judiciary. Smaller demand bundles made by the Palipehutu-FNL contained less substantively important demands for that group. In May 2000, the group demanded the return of the government to the barracks and the dismantling of pro-government militias. In February 2002, they again made two demands for the return to an older version of the state's constitution and the release of political prisoners. Neither of these sets of demands were as large in scope as the set of demands from 2006.

- The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) demanded 18 concessions in February 2002. In addition to demanding the destruction of "the government's anti-people institutions" and their replacement with a parliament (Shengo) of representatives elected at the village level, the EPRDF also demanded the right to self-determination for oppressed nations within Ethiopia, a democratic economy, abolishing and replacement of the national army, a federal system, the closure of foreign military bases as well as separation of church and state.
- The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) issued 21 demands in December 1993 including those for key government positions, like minister of foreign affairs or informations, a new transitional government with the vice president position going to the group's leader, Jonas Savimbi, and a new constitution. In addition, they demanded that their forces constitute half of the new army, and that they be integrated into the police force. The group also claimed their leaders should be accorded special privileges, and the entire group should receive immunity and financial assistance from the government.

Table 2: Regression Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Troops Size on the Size of Rebel Demands: Aggregated Autocracy Variables

	Model 1 Any Government Self Determination Demand	Model 2 Maximalist Demand	Model 3 Number of Demands Hurdle Model:	
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Negative Binomial
Rebel Troops (in Thousands)	0.08613 0.03 0.01	-0.09101 0.05 0.09	0.09075 0.03 0.01	-0.02739 0.02 0.22
Rebel Troops ²	-0.0009852 0.00 0.03	0.001460 0.00 0.03	-0.001121 0.00 0.02	0.0006122 0.00 0.06
Rebel Relative Strength	0.1900 0.24 0.42	0.1877 0.27 0.48	0.4249 0.16 0.01	0.2287 0.11 0.04
Main Group	0.4631 0.21 0.03	0.1722 0.58 0.77	0.4018 0.17 0.02	-0.0989 0.19 0.60
Number of Rebel groups in State	0.2239 0.21 0.28	-0.3691 0.23 0.11	0.3423 0.20 0.08	-0.01544 0.14 0.91
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.2410 0.24 0.32	-0.2559 0.32 0.42	-0.1324 0.13 0.30	-0.01099 0.10 0.91
Length of Conflict Episode	0.002352 0.00 0.43	-0.01046 0.01 0.09	0.005222 0.00 0.11	0.003603 0.00 0.16
Explicit Support to Rebels	0.3888 0.32 0.23	-0.3980 0.53 0.45	0.3670 0.31 0.24	-0.07439 0.22 0.73
Polity2	-0.04625 0.05 0.38	-0.04161 0.06 0.50	0.03156 0.04 0.39	-0.02906 0.03 0.37
Autocracy	-0.7490 0.35 0.03	2.0797 0.53 0.00	-0.8320 0.24 0.00	-0.2259 0.24 0.34
Leadership Turnover	0.4504 0.31 0.15	0.2813 0.43 0.52	0.3588 0.39 0.36	0.07593 0.22 0.73
Election Month	-0.04058 0.69 0.95	-0.4033 1.00 0.69	-0.3375 0.43 0.43	-0.2564 0.41 0.53
Constant	-3.0276 0.99 0.00	-1.7494 0.93 0.06	-2.7613 0.64 0.00	-0.01360 0.68 0.98
lnalpha				1.1227 0.48 0.02
Observations	2410	728		2410

Note: Coefficients, standard errors, and p-values are presented in the first, second, and third rows. Errors clustered on conflict.

Table 3: Regression Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Troops Size on the Size of Rebel Demands: Disaggregated & Lagged Election Variables

	Model 1 Govt/ Self-Det.	Model 2 Govt/ Self-Det.	Model 3 Max.	Model 4 Max.	Model 5 Hurdle: Logit	Model 6 Num. Dem. Hurdle: Logit	Model 6 Num. Dem. Neg Bin	
Rebel Troops (in Thousands)	0.09248 0.03 0.01	0.09183 0.03 0.01	-0.1384 0.04 0.00	-0.1392 0.04 0.00	0.1083 0.03 0.00	-0.05630 0.03 0.10	0.1082 0.03 0.00	-0.05861 0.03 0.08
Rebel Troops ²	-0.001040 0.00 0.03	-0.001021 0.00 0.03	0.002373 0.00 0.00	0.002404 0.00 0.00	-0.001328 0.00 0.00	0.0009760 0.00 0.02	-0.001324 0.00 0.00	0.001010 0.00 0.02
Rebel Relative Strength	0.1769 0.24 0.46	0.1854 0.24 0.43	0.2595 0.33 0.43	0.2389 0.34 0.48	0.3400 0.16 0.04	0.3698 0.12 0.00	0.3602 0.15 0.01	0.3658 0.12 0.00
Main Group	0.6544 0.21 0.00	0.6779 0.22 0.00	0.6517 0.59 0.27	0.6427 0.59 0.28	0.5037 0.24 0.03	0.01267 0.19 0.95	0.5198 0.25 0.04	0.0004837 0.20 1.00
Number of Rebel groups in State	0.2155 0.17 0.22	0.2140 0.18 0.23	-0.7190 0.24 0.00	-0.7237 0.26 0.01	0.3224 0.16 0.04	0.01189 0.13 0.92	0.3157 0.17 0.06	0.01340 0.12 0.91
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.3489 0.40 0.39	-0.3570 0.41 0.38	-0.3005 0.48 0.53	-0.2735 0.46 0.55	0.008453 0.27 0.98	-0.4496 0.34 0.18	-0.001651 0.27 1.00	-0.4655 0.33 0.16
Length of Conflict Episode	0.0008870 0.00 0.78	0.0009804 0.00 0.75	-0.01133 0.00 0.01	-0.01045 0.00 0.01	0.004528 0.00 0.16	0.005502 0.00 0.02	0.004407 0.00 0.17	0.005317 0.00 0.03
Explicit Support to Rebels	0.1602 0.32 0.62	0.1175 0.33 0.72	-0.9001 0.64 0.16	-0.9448 0.67 0.16	0.2854 0.33 0.38	-0.2236 0.25 0.36	0.2523 0.34 0.46	-0.2213 0.26 0.40
Polity2	-0.05999 0.06 0.34	-0.06913 0.06 0.24	-0.07863 0.05 0.12	-0.08815 0.05 0.06	0.04701 0.05 0.30	-0.04612 0.03 0.10	0.04359 0.05 0.33	-0.04863 0.03 0.07
Autocratic Party Based Regime	-0.3675 0.63 0.56	0.3611 0.64 0.57	-1.4097 0.96 0.14	-0.7532 0.98 0.44	-1.2898 0.62 0.04	0.4053 0.50 0.42	-0.9857 0.63 0.12	0.8709 0.49 0.08
Autocratic Personalist Regime	0.2639 0.41 0.52	0.9629 0.42 0.02	0.2763 0.44 0.53	0.8813 0.42 0.03	-0.7476 0.46 0.10	0.2225 0.23 0.33	-0.4435 0.48 0.35	0.6951 0.22 0.00
Autocratic Military Regime	-0.2971 0.35 0.39	0.3924 0.34 0.25	-1.5282 0.62 0.01	-0.9741 0.64 0.13	-0.8425 0.30 0.01	0.1703 0.24 0.48	-0.5356 0.32 0.09	0.6359 0.24 0.01
Leadership Turnover	0.7727 0.36 0.03	0.8026 0.37 0.03	0.6495 0.41 0.11	0.7794 0.44 0.08	0.5487 0.45 0.22	0.05328 0.18 0.76	0.5548 0.47 0.24	0.04163 0.17 0.81
Executive Elections	1.1242 0.79 0.16		0.3784 0.81 0.64	-1.452382 0.48 0.00	0.7247 0.53 0.17	-0.3682 0.14 0.01		
Legislative Elections	-0.8713 0.70 0.21		.	.		0.7571 0.57 0.18		
Executive Elections (t-1)		1.2571 0.63 0.04		0.8058 0.89 0.36			0.05280 0.56 0.93	0.2522 0.45 0.57
Legislative Elections (t-1)		-0.5167 0.59 0.38		0.07624 1.14 0.95			0.07865 0.48 0.87	0.4765 0.43 0.27
Constant	-3.7268 1.12 0.00	-4.4777 1.11 0.00	1.3120 1.09 0.23	0.6269 1.12 0.57	-2.8040 0.86 0.00	-0.05028 0.72 0.94	-3.1266 0.83 0.00	-0.4435 0.74 0.55
Inalpha						0.9368 0.47 0.05		0.9058 0.48 0.06
Observations	2178	2127	631	622		2178		2127

Note: Coefficients, standard errors, and p-values are presented in the first, second, and third rows. Errors clustered on conflict.

Table 4: Regression Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Troops Size on the Size of Rebel Demands: Lagged Dependent Variables


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Hurdle		Hurdle		Hurdle	
	b/se/p	b/se/p	b/se/p	b/se/p		b/se/p		b/se/p	
Maximalist Demand (t-1)	1.4905	1.0565	0.3281						
	0.44	0.38	0.54						
	0.00	0.01	0.55						
Maximalist Demand (t-2)		1.4688	1.2889						
		0.46	0.52						
		0.00	0.01						
Maximalist Demand (t-3)			0.8879						
			0.82						
			0.28						
Number of Demands (t-1)				0.3179	0.1290	0.2514	0.1173	0.2313	0.1122
				0.06	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.01
				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Number of Demands (t-2)						0.1698	0.03080	0.1353	0.01742
						0.03	0.01	0.04	0.01
						0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Number of Demands (t-3)								0.1095	0.2996
								0.03	0.09
								0.00	0.00
Rebel Troops (in Thousands)	-0.1565	-0.1743	-0.3419	0.1016	-0.03942	0.09896	-0.03855	0.09553	-0.03640
	0.05	0.06	0.21	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	0.00	0.01	0.10	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.09
Rebel Troops ²	0.002726	0.003108	0.006926	-0.001298	0.0007891	-0.001306	0.0007741	-0.001285	0.0007361
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Rebel Relative Strength	0.4172	0.3251	0.6370	0.2318	0.1859	0.2003	0.1758	0.2014	0.1798
	0.31	0.39	0.52	0.11	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.11	0.07
	0.18	0.40	0.22	0.04	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.07	0.01
Main Group	0.7320	1.975	.	0.4700	-0.06148	0.4305	-0.07350	0.4395	-0.04825
	0.58	0.58	.	0.22	0.17	0.22	0.16	0.22	0.16
	0.21	0.00	.	0.03	0.71	0.05	0.65	0.04	0.77
Number of Rebel Groups in State	-0.9178	-1.0189	-1.1040	0.2376	-0.1032	0.2325	-0.1161	0.2267	-0.1187
	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.10	0.09
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.20	0.02	0.16	0.02	0.17
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.7506	-0.7091	.	0.01947	-0.1738	0.01834	-0.1341	0.007447	-0.1455
	1.45	0.61	.	0.23	0.28	0.22	0.29	0.21	0.27
	0.60	0.25	.	0.93	0.53	0.93	0.64	0.97	0.59
Length of Conflict Episode	-0.006283	-0.01262	-0.01135	0.002493	0.002724	0.002352	0.002453	0.002206	0.001953
	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.37	0.11	0.37	0.16	0.41	0.22
Explicit Support to Rebels	-1.0918	-1.838	-3.2190	0.2390	-0.1272	0.2309	-0.08920	0.2382	-0.08121
	0.58	0.65	0.82	0.27	0.20	0.25	0.20	0.23	0.19
	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.37	0.52	0.35	0.65	0.30	0.66
Polity2	-0.09814	-0.08565	-0.02802	0.04885	-0.01956	0.04823	-0.01733	0.04608	-0.01627
	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
	0.05	0.17	0.68	0.17	0.26	0.14	0.33	0.15	0.32
Autocratic Party Based Regime	-1.9163	-1.5767	-4.9592	-0.8333	0.4185	-0.4043	0.2282	-0.6015	0.2079
	1.33	1.33	1.30	0.50	0.31	0.47	0.31	0.45	0.29
	0.15	0.24	0.00	0.10	0.17	0.39	0.46	0.18	0.47
Autocratic Personalist Regime	0.7160	1.982	1.6381	-0.2864	0.5430	0.04946	0.3660	-0.2063	0.3772
	0.46	0.63	0.69	0.37	0.16	0.37	0.17	0.35	0.14
	0.12	0.00	0.02	0.44	0.00	0.89	0.03	0.55	0.01
Autocratic Military Regime	-0.9197	.	.	-0.3723	0.6695	-0.005637	0.5338	-0.2399	0.5403
	0.50	.	.	0.27	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.25	0.22
	0.07	.	.	0.16	0.00	0.98	0.01	0.34	0.01
Leadership Turnover	0.4782	-0.4936	-0.8881	0.5131	0.006170	0.5034	0.003778	0.5310	0.01180
	0.39	0.48	0.60	0.36	0.15	0.34	0.16	0.34	0.15
	0.22	0.30	0.14	0.15	0.97	0.14	0.98	0.11	0.94
Election Month	-0.1545	.	.	-0.2302	-0.1438	-0.08794	0.1343	-0.0879	0.1560
	0.91	.	.	0.36	0.37	0.46	0.45	0.37	0.50
	0.87	.	.	0.52	0.68	0.75	0.77	0.812	0.999
Constant	0.9836	-0.0591	3.3878	-3.0162	-0.1221	-3.3426	0.01675	-3.1248	-0.0008118
	1.63	1.09	1.19	0.63	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.57	0.50
	0.55	0.96	0.00	0.00	0.81	0.00	0.97	0.00	1.00
Inalpha				7	0.3194		0.2888		0.2587
					0.45		0.45		0.46
					0.47		0.53		0.57
Observations	354	233	151		2127		2076		2028

Table 5: Regression Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Troops Size on the Size of Rebel Demands: Disaggregated and Lagged Leadership Transition Variables

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3 Hurdle:		Model 4	Model 5	Model 6 Hurdle:	
	Govt/ Self-Det b/se/p	Max. Demand b/se/p	Any Demand b/se/p	Num Demand	Govt/ Self-Det b/se/p	Max. Demand b/se/p	Any Demand b/se/p	Num Demand
Rebel Troops (in Thousands)	0.09708 0.03 0.00	-0.1270 0.05 0.01	0.1062 0.03 0.00	-0.05860 0.03 0.08	0.09425 0.03 0.00	-0.1258 0.05 0.01	0.1055 0.03 0.00	-0.06066 0.03 0.06
Rebel Troops ²	-0.001108 0.00 0.01	0.002190 0.00 0.00	-0.001294 0.00 0.00	0.001016 0.00 0.02	-0.001058 0.00 0.02	0.002188 0.00 0.00	-0.001280 0.00 0.00	0.001051 0.00 0.01
Rebel Relative Strength	0.1615 0.25 0.51	0.2206 0.34 0.52	0.3529 0.17 0.04	0.3619 0.11 0.00	0.1882 0.24 0.42	0.2109 0.33 0.52	0.3921 0.15 0.01	0.3569 0.11 0.00
Main Group	0.5974 0.21 0.00	0.6137 0.60 0.30	0.5385 0.23 0.02	0.04164 0.20 0.83	0.6501 0.23 0.00	0.6274 0.60 0.30	0.5607 0.24 0.02	0.05312 0.21 0.80
Number of Rebel groups in State	0.2035 0.18 0.25	-0.6966 0.25 0.01	0.3279 0.16 0.04	0.008238 0.12 0.95	0.2100 0.18 0.24	-0.6964 0.26 0.01	0.3261 0.17 0.06	0.01994 0.12 0.86
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.3253 0.40 0.42	-0.2819 0.46 0.54	0.002363 0.27 0.99	-0.4570 0.33 0.17	-0.3195 0.39 0.41	-0.1966 0.45 0.66	0.01660 0.27 0.95	-0.4513 0.32 0.16
Length of Conflict Episode	0.0006049 0.00 0.84	-0.01236 0.00 0.01	0.004624 0.00 0.13	0.005675 0.00 0.02	0.0008178 0.00 0.78	-0.01143 0.00 0.00	0.004540 0.00 0.14	0.005592 0.00 0.02
Explicit Support to Rebels	0.1437 0.33 0.66	-0.9686 0.67 0.15	0.2952 0.32 0.36	-0.1765 0.26 0.50	0.1400 0.34 0.68	-0.9619 0.67 0.15	0.2891 0.34 0.39	-0.1521 0.26 0.02
Polity2	-0.06951 0.07 0.29	-0.09238 0.05 0.07	0.05438 0.05 0.25	-0.03723 0.04 0.31	-0.06734 0.06 0.29	-0.09265 0.04 0.03	0.05548 0.05 0.22	-0.03851 0.04 0.31
Autocratic Party Based Regime	-0.3667 0.61 0.55	-1.3905 0.96 0.15	-1.3067 0.63 0.04	0.3893 0.50 0.43	0.3469 0.63 0.58	-0.7602 0.98 0.44	-1.0198 0.64 0.09	0.8609 0.51
Autocratic Personalist Regime	0.2952 0.40 0.46	0.3148 0.43 0.46	-0.7735 0.47 0.10	0.2065 0.24 0.38	0.9769 0.42 0.02	0.9126 0.42 0.03	-0.4682 0.49 0.34	0.6522 0.22 0.00
Autocratic Military Regime	-0.2310 0.34 0.50	-1.3958 0.56 0.01	-0.8824 0.34 0.01	0.1388 0.27 0.60	0.4498 0.35 0.20	-0.8154 0.54 0.13	-0.5811 0.36 0.11	0.4951 0.21 0.02
Leadership Δ w/ Δ in Support Base	1.0991 0.48 0.02	0.9447 0.62 0.13	0.3827 0.33 0.25	-0.1066 0.29 0.72				
Leadership Δ w/ no Δ in Support Base	0.2159 0.68 0.75	0.1602 0.46 0.72	0.8697 0.85 0.31	0.2264 0.31 0.46				
Election Month	0.2115 0.72 0.77	-0.2731 0.78 0.73	-0.3532 0.47 0.45	0.02159 0.41 0.96	0.2282 0.73 0.76	-0.2434 0.80 0.76	-0.3260 0.49 0.51	0.04741 0.40 0.90
Leadership Δ w/ Δ in Support Base (t-1)					0.9381 0.49 0.06	1.0274 0.62 0.10	0.2739 0.29 0.34	0.002054 0.33 0.99
Leadership Δ w/ no Δ in Support Base (t-1)					0.3256 0.84 0.70	0.3049 0.49 0.53	0.9399 0.84 0.26	0.5885 0.27 0.03
Constant	-3.7479 1.13 0.00	1.2534 1.08 0.25	-2.7981 0.85 0.00	-0.003816 0.71 1.00	-4.5167 1.11 0.00	0.4674 1.06 0.66	-3.1805 0.84 0.00	-0.4439 0.73 0.54
lnalpha				0.9268 0.47 0.05				0.8595 0.44 0.05
Observations	2178	633		2178	2132	624		2132

Note: Coefficients, standard errors, and p-values are presented in the first, second, and third rows. Errors clustered on conflict.

Figure 1: Distribution of Rebel Demands by Time



References

Keele, Luke and Nathan Kelly. 2006. "Dynamic Models for Dynamic Theories: The Ins and Outs of Lagged Dependent Variables." *Political Analysis* 14(2):186–205.