

Appendix

This appendix contains all of the additional tables and robustness checks referred to in the text of the article, descriptions of how the variables used in the multivariate analysis were coded, alternative codings, and additional tests of potential alternative explanations.

Coding and Robustness checks

Table A.1 lists all new international borders included in the analysis and whether they are characterized by a dyadic MID or war. Bold entries are those with homeland claims to land on the other side of the border. As noted in the article, some cases of decolonization occurred over a period of (sometimes many) years (e.g., France-Comoros, France-Tunisia, Netherlands-Indonesia, United Kingdom-Malaysia, Spain-Morocco, South Africa-Namibia, United-Kingdom-Mauritius). In such cases, only the final decolonization is counted as a case of “decolonization” and excluded. The intermediate drawings of borders between the metropole and the former colony are counted as new borders between independent states. Where one state becomes independent, but its neighbor remains a colony, the latter is labeled with the name of the state it will become. The year of the international border is the year of the independence of the first state. The list also excludes the transfer of colonies (e.g., the transfer of Taiwan from Japan to China). The identification of new borders relied on a number of reference works, including Biger (1995), the Correlates of War Territorial Change Dataset version 4.01 by Tir et al. (1998), Berkovitch and Jackson (1997), and Allcock et al. (1992).

Table A.2 provides summary statistics for all of the main variables used in the paper and Table A.3 shows the correlation matrix for these variables. The coding of these variables is described below.

The main dependent variables in the analysis are dyadic militarized interstate disputes

(MIDs), violent MIDs, and wars. MIDs are cases in which “the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state.”¹ Disputes range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat that falls short of the threshold for war. Violent MIDs are those MIDs in which force was actually used rather than just displayed (coded as “4” or “5” by Maoz’ Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset, Version 2.0.) Wars are operationalized as conflict involving sustained combat and organized armed forces resulting in a minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths within a twelve month period.² As noted in the text, all three dependent variables are coded based on Maoz’s Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset, Version 2.0.

Tables A.4-A.6 provide the simple bi-variate model and the progressive addition of each independent variable for the full model shown in the article.

To assess the geographical distribution of new borders and homeland claims, and for the purposes of calculating the fixed effects, regional dummies were coded as “1” if both states in a dyad are in the same region, and “0” otherwise. This coding procedure follows the convention in the international relations literature so as to avoid creating collinearity between the regional dummies. Regional definitions are based on UN and World Bank definitions of region. Malta, Russia/USSR, and Turkey are defined as part of Europe, and Sudan is defined as part of MENA. The results are robust to coding Malta and Turkey as part of MENA, Sudan as part of Africa, and Russia/USSR as part of Asia (see column 10 in Tables A.11 - A.13 below).

As noted in the text of the paper, the primary measure of the existence of prior conflict is the identification of a dyadic MID by Maoz’s Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset, Version 2.0 on or before the year in which the new border was drawn. Columns 1-4

¹Jones et al. 1996, 168.

²Sarkees and Wayman 2010.

of Tables A.7-A.9 present the results with alternative operationalizations of prior conflict as the involvement of the state in a prior civil war (as coded by version 4.0 of the Correlates of War Intra-State War data set (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010)), the existence of any territorial transfer before 1945 (as coded by version 4.01 of the Correlates of War Territorial Change dataset (Tir et al., 1998)), a violent territorial transfer (as coded by Carter and Goemans (2011)), or a border that was drawn in the course of a war for each of the three main dependent variables. The latter is a categorical variable coded as follows: 1=Treaty, 2=no formal agreement, 3=colonial boundaries, 4=ICJ judgment, 5=war, 6=Noncontiguous borders (most often decolonization). Data on the origin of borders was based on Anderson (2003) and the International Boundary Studies produced by the US State Department, Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.³

The main control for the presence of co-ethnics on both sides of the border was coded based on the identification of ethnic groups in about 190 countries by Alesina et al. (2003) and Alesina et al. (2011). Missing data for the presence of co-ethnics and cases in which the ethnic categories used in one state were incongruent with the categories used in the neighboring state (e.g., ethnic groups in one state were coded by tribe while the ethnic groups in the other state were coded by broader racial or ethnic categories (e.g. “blacks” or “other Slavs”)) were filled in from census and reference data for the particular cases where possible. Sourced data was unavailable to the Burkina Faso-Togo dyad, the Yemen People’s Republic-Yemen Arab Republic dyad, and all cases involving Zanzibar.

Column 5 in Tables A.7 and A.9 replaces the binary co-ethnicity variable that describes the presence or absence of co-ethnics on the other side of the border with a measure of the percentage of the main group in the losing state that is present on the other side of the border. The coding of this variable is also based on Alesina et al. (2011). Total population data used to calculate the proportionally largest group is taken from Gleditsch and Ward

³<http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/numericalibs-template.html>.

(1999). Column 6 repeats the analysis, but instead of the contemporary presence of co-ethnics captured in the variables based on Alesina et al.'s analysis, uses the identification of co-ethnics of a ruling ethnic group on the other side of the border in ethnographic maps created before the border was drawn. See below for a more detailed description of this variable.

Alliances are coded as a binary variable where any alliance is “1” and no alliance is “0”. The alliance measure is based on the Correlates of War Formal Alliance data version 4.1 (Gibler, 2009). The main results are robust to using a categorical variable, which identified the presence of a defense pact, neutrality, non-aggression treaty, or no alliance between all dyads in the international system. See column 7 of Tables A.7-A.9.

As noted in the text, relative material capabilities were calculated from the CINC scores (composite capabilities score, ranging from 0-1) as calculated by the Correlates of War database, version 4.0 (Singer, 1987). The variable is defined as the ratio of the capabilities of “State A” to the total capabilities in the dyad, where power parity is 0.5 and the most unequal dyad is 1.0. CINC values are from the year of the territorial division; where no CINC scores were available from that year, scores were taken from the closest available year after the drawing of the new border. Where the new border divided between a new state and a colony, the CINC of the imperial state is used for the latter.

Joint democracy is defined as a dyad in which both states have a 7 or higher polity2 score as coded by PolityIV.⁴ The number of cases drops when this variable is added because there are a number of states with new borders that are excluded from Polity.⁵ Colonies and occupied states with no polity score (but otherwise in PolityIV) were coded as non-democratic (“-10”) since their populations effectively had no control over their foreign and

⁴Marshall, Monty G. and Jaggers, Keith and Gurr, Ted Robert. 2004. *Polity IV dataset*. Computer file.

⁵These are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, the Marshall islands, Micronesia, Palau, the Seychelles, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Vanuatu, West Samoa, and Zanzibar.

military policy. Where states are independent but polity scores for that year are unavailable, the first subsequently available score is used. The results are robust to changing the definition of democratic dyads to include cases with a polity2 score greater than 6, and to using a dummy variable for a non-democratic dyad (either mixed or both authoritarian). See columns 8 and 9, respectively, of Tables A.7-A.9.

The main proxy for the economic value of territory, the presence of oil or natural gas reserves, was coded as “1” if Anderson (2003) identified the presence of oil or gas reserves in the border region or if the PRIO Petroleum Dataset (version 1.2) identified the presence of petroleum reserves within 50km of the border.⁶ Distance between the coordinates of the petroleum reserves and the border were measured using Google Earth. This proxy importantly, also captures aspects of militarily valuable territory not captured by the distance and accessibility proxies used for that purpose.

The main proxy for the military value of territory is the distance between the capital city and the border. Distance between the capital city and the border was measured from the coordinates of the capital city to the nearest part of the international border using Google Earth. Where states are composed of islands, the distance is measured to the largest island or mainland border of that state, whichever is nearest. While this measure is blunter than Huth’s (1996) nuanced measure of the strategic value of territory, Huth’s measure is available for only a non-random portion of new borders drawn since 1945.

The results are also robust to using an alternative proxy for the military value of territory that is based on the physical characteristics of the border (see column 10 of Tables A.7-A.9). Other things being equal, borders that are relatively inaccessible (because crossing them involves crossing significant natural barriers like mountains or large rivers) can be thought of as more strategically valuable than borders that are easily crossed. This variable is coded based on the index of geographical accessibility of land boundaries calculated by

⁶Lujala et al. 2007.

Anderson (2003, 2). This index is composed of a 5-point scale that takes into account the length of the border, the presence of limiting topographical features, altitude, relief, and existing communication network across the boundary. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with “1” being inaccessible and “5” being accessible. Analysis using this measure excludes all new borders that render states no longer contiguous (e.g., Pakistan and Bangladesh), as well as all maritime boundaries.

Column 11 of Tables A.7-A.9 repeats the basic model, using fixed effects for every pair of region and five-year period.

Finally, since it is reasonable to assume that observations having to do with a single border may not be independent of one another column 12 of these tables repeats the basic model but clusters the errors by the border in question rather than the dyad.

Table A.10 shows that the logit functional form is not substantively different from the linear models reported in the text. Note that using the logit models does lead to some changes (not reported) in the robustness checks. These include rendering as nonsignificant the effect of homeland status on the presence of war when cases of state entry are excluded or when likely instrumental claims are recoded as no claims. However, this is likely a product of the fact that fixed-effects logit models are only defined over cells with variation and over half of the observations in models containing fixed effects for the interaction of every decade and region do not have variation in the presence of war. Running these models with a slightly relaxed set of fixed effects that still includes fixed effects for region and decade, but not for their interaction, shows results that are highly significant and generally consistent with the other models. As such, the differences between functional form of linear and logit models do not appear to be meaningful.

Tables A.11-A.13 show that the results of the main analysis for MIDAs and wars, respectively, are robust to a number of other alternative codings and theoretically relevant sample restrictions. Column 1 shows that the results are robust to recoding instances where home-

land claims are made exclusively by non-state actors as non-claims. Column 2 excludes cases where the states entered the international system with the drawing of the new border. Columns 3 and 4 include claims to the ‘Arab Homeland’ and to Palestine by other Arab states as homeland claims. The results are also robust to excluding cases of incomplete decolonization and to including all cases of decolonization entirely. When cases of decolonization are included, the overall proportion of new borders that experience a dyadic MID drops to 40%. The proportion of new borders that divide homelands that and experience dyadic MIDs is basically unchanged. The main results, however, are robust to including cases of decolonization. See columns 5 and 6 in Tables A.11-A.13 in the appendix. Column 7 shows that the results are robust to excluding cases where reciprocal homeland claims are made and that we might think are especially violent. Column 8 shows that the results are also robust to the exclusion of outlier cases, defined as cases where any of the independent variables has a $dfbeta$ greater than 1. Column 9 excludes all European cases. As noted above, column 10 uses an alternative coding of region in which Malta and Turkey are coded as part of MENA, Sudan as part of Africa, and Russia/USSR as part of Asia. Column 11 shows that the results are robust to recoding likely instrumental claims as non-claims. Finally, the identification of new borders is not always straight forward. Germany poses an especially difficult case to code in this context depending on whether one codes a German state as existing between the end of WWII and the formal creation of the West and East German states. The main analysis includes Germany, East Germany, and West Germany as distinct entities. The results are robust to including just post-WWII Germany, just the GDR and FRG, and excluding the German case entirely. See columns 12-14 in Tables A.11-A.13.

Table A.14 shows that the results for all three dependent variables is robust to controlling for the way the border was drawn, serially excluding borders drawn as a result of bilateral treaties, ICJ decisions, borders originating from old administrative borders, borders originating from old intra-colonial borders, and those originating from war. The tally of the reasons

for the drawing of new borders is as follows: bilateral treaty (23), prior administrative border (63), prior intra-colonial border (124), ICJ decision (6), war outcome (108), other (mainly incomplete decolonization) (24).

As noted in the paper, results are clustered by dyad because the observation of conflict for each member of the dyad is not independent of the observations for the other member of the dyad. It would also be reasonable to assume that observations that have to do with a particular border may not be independent of one another. Clustering by the border does not change the substantive results. See column 12 in Tables A.7-A.9.

The directed dyad structure of the data used in the paper allows for a nuanced consideration of control variables whose values differ for each member of the dyad. This structure, however, raises a concern about the estimation of the standard errors which could, conceivably, lead to an overestimation of the effect. To check for this possibility, the data was converted into a non-directed dyad form in which the unit of analysis was each new border rather than border-side. Reorienting the data in this way required recoding some of the variables to fit the non-directed dyad structure. Thus, homeland claims takes on a value of “0” if no claims are made, “1” if one state makes a claim, and “2” if both states make a claim to the land on the other side of the borders. Similarly coethnicity is coded as “0” if neither has coethnics on the other side of the border, “1” if one state does, and “2” if both states do. The economic value of territory takes on “0” if there is no oil or gas within 50km of the border in either direction, “1” if there is oil or gas in one direction, and “2” if there is oil or gas within 50km in both directions. The strategic value of territory is coded as the distance between the border and the nearest of the two capitals. The relative capabilities of the states are accounted for by taking the difference between the stronger and the weaker state instead of the ratio. Other variables are coded as in the paper. As table A.15 shows, the results of this analysis are not substantively different.

Tables A.16 and A.17 show that the results of the subsample analysis used to argue that

homeland claims are unlikely to be endogenous to prior conflict is robust to alternative ways of operationalizing prior conflict.

Additional endogeneity tests

While the discourse-based measure of the homeland status of territory has the advantage of being consistent with the dominant constructivist theories of nationalism and with political geography’s understanding of territoriality, it does suffer from a concern about endogeneity. This concern can be, at least partially, addressed by the use of a proxy based on the prior existence of co-ethnics in a particular territory. While less consistent with theories of nationalism and territoriality, because the identification of the presence of co-ethnics on a territory before the border is drawn takes place prior to the drawing of the border and subsequent politics, it cannot be influenced by the border itself or by contemporary politicians (though it could still be endogenous to the nationalist enterprise). In other words, the presence of coethnics in a territory, *noted before the border was drawn* makes it possible to use Gellner (1992)’s “potato principle” as an alternative proxy for the homeland status of territory that can complement the discourse based measure.

Following this logic, an alternative measure of the homeland status of territory was coded “1” if an ethnographic map compiled *before* the border identified the presence of co-ethnics of what would be the ruling ethnic groups on the other side of what would be the border in each case, and “0” otherwise. I focused on the presence of ruling ethnic groups because those are the ones most likely to be in a position to drive international conflict. The identification of ruling ethnic groups largely followed the coding in the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset (Wimmer et al., 2009, EPR-ETH). Where EPR-ETH does not list any groups, I used the largest group listed by the CIA World Factbook. The main sources for the past presence of coethnics on other other side of what would eventually become the border were the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira (ANM) (Bruk and Apenchenko, 1964), (De

Agostini’s Geographical Institute, 1917, Ronai, 1993/1945, OSS, 1945b, Murdock, 1959, OSS, 1945a, Service Geographique de l’Indochine, 1928, Cvijic, 1918, Central Intelligence Agency, 1983, Weidmann et al., 2010). The Atlas Narodov Mira was the primary source for borders drawn in much of the world. While published in the early 1960s, it was based on the work of Soviet ethnographers in the late 1950s. Coethnics were coded as being on the other side of the border if the geocoding of the ANM by the Geo-referencing of ethnic groups (GREG) dataset listed both groups in adjacent polygons that were on either side of what would be the border.⁷

While widely used, the ANM is not an unproblematic source. In many cases, its identification of what counts as an ethnic group is clearly driven by the state in question and is thus likely endogenous to the nationalist project. This is evident, for example, in the identification of a “Peruvian” ethnic group in Peru and a “Honduran” ethnic group in Honduras. It is also seen in the labeling of Arabs as belonging to different groups with the line between the groups neatly following the state border. The ANM is also, unsurprisingly, particularly problematic in identifying the presence and location of ethnic groups within the Soviet Union as these were influenced by a variety of political factors.⁸ As a result, some cases were re-coded by hand. Broadly speaking, these included aggregating Arabs into a single ethnic group and the spread of ethnic groups in the former territories of the Soviet Union. The particular ethnographic map and the groups identified as ruling groups used to code each case are listed in the replication dataset.

An important caveat is in order. While this measure helps address concerns about the endogeneity of homeland claims, in addition to its incongruence with the dominant theories of nationalism and territoriality, there are also questions about its internal validity. Ideally, a measure based on the presence of co-ethnics on the other side of the border would be based

⁷Weidmann et al. 2010.

⁸On the role of extra-scientific factors influencing the work of Soviet scientists in another context, see Herrera 2010.

on pre-modern ethnographic maps. Unfortunately, these do not exist. Indeed, as Branch (2011) reviews, the technological ability to create such maps is relatively recent. Perhaps for this reason, major works that use this proxy either do not disclose exactly which sources they use to identify the location of co-ethnics on a particular territory or use contemporary sources to do so.

Ethnographic maps that have been produced in the last two hundred years are contemporaneous with the rise of nationalism and it is impossible to determine the extent to which their decisions about what to call groups in particular locations is influenced by an acceptance of nationalist claims.⁹ Older ethnographic maps that are available, for their part, often use categories of groups that are no longer relevant. For example, a prominent pre-modern ethnographic map of Europe identifies three major groups: Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterraneans.¹⁰ While it might be possible to link some of these to ethnic groups that exist today, doing so runs the danger of falling into the nationalist trap of peopling the past by unproblematically linking a contemporary group to one of these prior groups.¹¹ Ethnographic maps of Africa exist only for the period since colonization. While offering some advantages in terms of reducing concerns about endogeneity, the use of ethnographic maps to assess the extent of the homeland runs into many of the problems of using ethnicity as a variable that were identified by Posner (2004). For example, using maps of religious brethren draws a very different picture of the presence of coethnics across a border than maps based on tribal or linguistic groups (which also differ from each other). There is also some concern about the level of aggregation of tribes and language groups that is chosen and its applicability in an unbiased way. In much of the world populations simultaneously belong to multiple, often nested, ethnic groups (e.g., there are roughly 250 distinct groups that all speak a mutually

⁹These political biases in maps has been widely discussed by geographers. See, e.g., Black 2002, Agnew 1994, Wood and Fels 1992.

¹⁰Grant 1922.

¹¹For more on this danger see, Kohl 1998.

intelligible versions of Bantu, yet these belong to different tribes and religious groups that cover the vast majority of sub-Saharan Africa). There is no theoretically coherent way of deciding which of these “levels” of ethnicity is the relevant one across the board. These are not simply issues of measurement error, but fundamental concerns about what it is that we are measuring and the possibility that contemporary notions about links between groups could bias our results.

The paper’s conclusion that homeland claims are unlikely to be endogenous to elite machinations is also reinforced by a number of other empirically observable expectations of the possibility that homeland claims reflect primarily the strategic machinations of state leaders rather than sincere societal preferences that are not borne out by the empirical record. First, this argument would expect that, at equilibrium, all states would couch a territorial claim in homeland terms regardless of the reason they seek that territory. Since, in this story, homeland claims are an effective way of signaling commitment to controlling a particular territory, we would expect state leaders to deploy homeland claims as a signal of resolve that would deter the state on the other side of the border from engaging in conflict. At the very least, even if it does not deter the neighboring state, staking out very strong initial claims could reduce the price one pays in a compromise. Second, since both sides can be expected to engage in similar strategic behavior, at equilibrium, once one side laid claim to a territory as part of their homeland, we would expect the other side to respond in kind.

The empirical record, however, is not consistent with either of these expectations. While claims to land on the other side of the border as part of the homeland are common, they are far from universal. Given the opportunity to lament the loss of territory by the drawing of new international borders, land on the other side of the border was identified as part of the homeland 29% of the time. Even if some of these claims are purely instrumental, this still suggests that concerns that homeland claims are simply cheap talk may be overstated. If the claims of a particular territory as the homeland were mainly cheap talk intended to

mobilize domestic publics or to improve one's bargaining position in international negotiations, presumably they would have been used considerably more frequently. The relatively infrequent use of homeland claims means either that they are sincere or, at the very least, that there is some cost to claiming territory as part of the homeland.¹² In any case, this finding is consistent with the theoretical distinction between homeland and non-homeland territory and the implication that not all territory, even not all territory that actors would like to include in their state for material reasons, is automatically categorized as part of the homeland. Likewise, even when we restrict our examination to cases where we know that there are disputes about the border (as coded by Huth and Allee (2002)) and therefore there are clearly incentives to claim the territory on the other side of the border as homeland territory for those involved, homeland discourse is deployed only 37% of the time.

The possibility that homeland claims do not reflect primarily the strategic machinations of state leaders is also reinforced by the relatively small proportion of dyads in which homeland claims are reciprocal. If homeland claims are mainly instrumentally useful to mobilize domestic support, undermine domestic opponents, and signal resolve to international adversaries, we would expect them to be used in a tit-for-tat fashion as both sides seek to take advantage of this useful tool. However, this does not seem to be the case. Of the 78 dyads that experienced at least one new border and in which one side articulated a homeland claim to the land on the other side of the border, 17 (22%) are characterized by reciprocal homeland claims by the other side of the dyad. Reciprocal claims, rather than characterizing all such cases, occur about one quarter of the time.

Of course, some of the claims to land on the other side of new borders in homeland terms are likely to be instrumental in nature. For example, the occasional claims by Morocco's Istiqlal party to Bechar and Tindouf in Algeria are barely disguised reactions to the Algerian

¹²This could be the case because of the existence of audience costs to claiming territory as the homeland and not including it within the state or that extending homeland claims beyond their socially accepted boundaries damages a leader's credibility.

support for Western Sahara. Similarly, Idi Amin’s sudden declaration that Uganda’s “natural borders” extend all the way to the Kagera River clearly fit this category as well. However, we might be relatively more confident that homeland claims that repeat in multiple years and those that are detected relatively soon after the new border is drawn are less likely to be claims that are not widely shared by the population than those that are infrequent or that appear relatively late. To examine whether likely instrumental claims were responsible for the relationship between homeland stats and conflict, I recoded the cases in which homeland claims were made only in a single calendar year and never again, or in which claims first appear more than 5 years after the territorial division (31 in total) as not marking the homeland status of territory on the other side of the border. Doing so does not change the magnitude or significance of the underlying relationship between homeland claims and international conflict.¹³

Along with the analysis in the paper, these results make us relatively more confident that homeland claims do not simply reflect the short-term tactical positioning of state leaders.

In addition to the endogeneity concerns addressed in the paper, we might also be concerned about the results if there was an unobserved variable that caused both the drawing of new international borders (and hence selection into the dataset) and conflict that was correlated with the existence of homeland claims. Perhaps the most likely of these is the strength of independence movements prior to receiving independence. As recent studies have argued, not all would-be claimants to states actually become recognized by the international community. Coggins (2011) shows, for example, that those with Great Power support are much more likely to be recognized than those without.¹⁴ Similarly, it may also be the case that would-be independence movements that are stronger are better able to force the drawing of new borders, and their relative strength might also make conflict a more attractive

¹³See column 11 in Tables A.11-A.13.

¹⁴Coggins 2011.

strategy. To the extent that this is the case, the existence of homeland claims would just be proxying this prior strength.

To control for the possibility that there was something about the pre-independence context that drove both the existence of conflict and drawing of the border in the first place, the exploration of the role of homeland discourse was rerun excluding all cases where borders were drawn as states entered the international system.¹⁵ As column 2 of tables A.11-A.13 shows, the substantive results are unaffected.

Finally, one might want to see a model that uses homeland claims as the dependent variable, and the other controls as independent variables. In the absence of a clearly exogenous instrument, such a model would not control for endogeneity as well as the alternative measure for homeland status used in the article. Nonetheless, Table A.18 reports the results of a logit regression with fixed effects for every pair of region and decade. It shows that none of the variables that might raise concerns about endogeneity, such as the military or economic value of territory, are significantly related to the presence of homeland claims. Importantly, the strong association between the presence of coethnics of the ruling group on a territory (noted before the border was drawn) reinforces the use of this proxy as an alternative measure for the homeland status of territory.

¹⁵Data on state entry was taken from the State System Membership List, v.2011, <http://correlatesofwar.org>. In cases where states entered the international system multiple times, the most recent state entry date prior (or equal) to the date of territorial division was used.

Table A.1: New Borders (excluding decolonization) 1945-1996, bold entries are those with homeland claims to territory on the other side of the border.

Dyad (border year)	MID	Violent MID	War
Algeria-Mali (1960)	No	No	No
Algeria-Mauritania (1960)	Yes	No	No
Algeria- Morocco (1956)	Yes	Yes	No
Algeria-Niger (1960)	No	No	No
Algeria-Tunisia (1956)	No	No	No
Armenia-Azerbaijan (1991)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Armenia -Georgia (1991)	No	No	No
Armenia- Russia (1991)	No	No	No
Austria-Germany, FRG, GDR (1947)	No	No	No
Azerbaijan-Georgia (1991)	Yes	No	No
Azerbaijan- Russia (1991)	Yes	Yes	No
Bahrain-Qatar (1971)	Yes	Yes	No
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia (1971)	No	No	No
Bangladesh- Pakistan (1971)	No	No	No
Belarus-Latvia (1991)	No	No	No
Belarus -Lithuania (1991)	Yes	No	No
Belarus- Russia (1991)	No	No	No
Ukraine -Belarus (1991)	No	No	No
Benin-Burkina Faso (1960)	No	No	No
Benin-Niger (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Benin-Togo (1960)	No	No	No
Bosnia- Croatia (1992)	Yes	Yes	No
Bosnia- Yugoslavia (1992)	Yes	Yes	No
Botswana-Zimbabwe (1964)	Yes	Yes	No
Brunei-Malaysia (1957)	No	No	No
Bulgaria -Greece (1947)	Yes	Yes	No
Bulgaria -Yugoslavia (1947)	Yes	Yes	No
Burkina Faso-Ivory Coast (1960)	No	No	No
Burkina Faso-Mali (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Burkina Faso-Mali (1986)	No	No	No
Burkina Faso-Niger (1960)	No	No	No
Burkina Faso-Togo (1960)	No	No	No
Burundi-DRC (1960)	No	No	No
Burundi-Rwanda (1962)	Yes	Yes	No
Cambodia- Laos (1953)	Yes	Yes	No
Cambodia -N. Vietnam (1953)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam (1954)	Yes	Yes	No
Cameroon-Nigeria (1961)	Yes	Yes	No
Cameroon-Central African Republic (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Cameroon-Chad (1960)	No	No	No
Cameroon-Gabon (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Cape Verde- Guinea Bissau (1974)	No	No	No
Central African Republic-Chad (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Central African Republic-Congo (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Chad-Libya (1955)	Yes	Yes	No

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Dyad (border year)	MID	Violent MID	War
Chad-Libya (1973)	Yes	Yes	No
Chad-Niger (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
China-Myanmar (1961)	Yes	Yes	No
China-Pakistan (1963)	No	No	No
China-Taiwan (1949)	Yes	Yes	No
Congo-Gabon (1960)	No	No	No
Croatia- Yugoslavia (1991)	Yes	Yes	No
Croatia-Slovenia (1991)	No	No	No
Cyprus-Turkey (1974)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Czech Republic-Slovakia (1993)	No	No	No
Czechoslovakia- Germany, FRG, GDR (1945)	Yes	Yes	No
Czechoslovakia-USSR (1945)	No	No	No
Czechoslovakia- Hungary (1945)	Yes	Yes	No
DRC-Rwanda (1960)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Denmark-Germany (1945)	No	No	No
Egypt- Israel (1949)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Egypt-Israel (1967)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Egypt- Israel (1979)	Yes	Yes	No
Egypt- Syria (1961)	No	No	No
El Salvador-Honduras (1992)	Yes	No	No
Estonia-Latvia (1991)	No	No	No
Estonia-Russia (1991)	Yes	Yes	No
Finland-USSR (1947)	Yes	Yes	No
France- Comoros (1975)	Yes	Yes	No
France- Germany, FRG, GDR (Alsace) (1947)	Yes	Yes	No
France- Germany, FRG, GDR (Saar) (1947)	Yes	Yes	No
France-German Federal Republic (Saar) (1957)	No	No	No
France-Italy (1947)	No	No	No
France- Tunisia (1956)	Yes	Yes	No
Georgia- Russia (1991)	Yes	Yes	No
GDR-FRG (1949)	Yes	Yes	No
Germany, FRG, GDR-Poland (1945)	Yes	Yes	No
Germany, FRG, GDR-USSR (1945)	Yes	Yes	No
Greece-Italy (1947)	No	No	No
Guinea-Ivory Coast (1958)	Yes	Yes	No
Guinea-Mali (1958)	No	No	No
Guinea-Senegal (1958)	No	No	No
Hungary-Romania (1945)	Yes	No	No
Hungary-USSR (1945)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hungary-Yugoslavia (1945)	Yes	Yes	No
India-Myanmar (1947)	Yes	No	No
India-Pakistan (1947)	Yes	Yes	Yes
India-Pakistan (1949)	Yes	Yes	Yes
India-Pakistan (1968)	Yes	Yes	Yes
India-Sri Lanka (1948)	Yes	Yes	No
Indonesia-Netherlands (1949)	Yes	Yes	No
Iraq-Saudi Arabia (1975)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iraq-Saudi Arabia (1981)	Yes	Yes	Yes

Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

Dyad (border year)	MID	Violent MID	War
Israel-Jordan (1949)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Israel- Jordan (1967)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Israel-Jordan (1995)	No	No	No
Israel- Syria (1967)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Italy-Yugoslavia (1947)	Yes	Yes	No
Ivory Coast-Mali (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Japan-United States (1945)	No	No	No
Japan-United States (1947)	No	No	No
Japan-United States (1968)	No	No	No
Japan-USSR (1945)	Yes	Yes	No
Jordan-Saudi Arabia (1965)	No	No	No
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan (1991)	No	No	No
Kazakhstan- Russia (1991)	No	No	No
Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan (1991)	No	No	No
Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan (1991)	No	No	No
Kenya- Somalia (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Kenya-Sudan (1956)	No	No	No
Kenya-Tanzania (1961)	Yes	Yes	No
Kenya- Uganda (1962)	Yes	Yes	No
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia (1969)	No	No	No
Kyrgyzstan- Russia (1991)	No	No	No
Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan (1991)	No	No	No
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (1991)	Yes	Yes	No
Laos-Vietnam (1953)	Yes	Yes	No
Laos-Republic of Vietnam (1953)	No	No	No
Latvia-Lithuania (1991)	No	No	No
Latvia-Russia (1991)	Yes	No	No
Lithuania- Russia (1991)	Yes	No	No
Macedonia- Yugoslavia (1993)	Yes	No	No
Madagascar-France (1960)	No	No	No
Malawi-Tanzania (1961)	No	No	No
Malawi-Zambia (1964)	Yes	No	No
Malaysia- Philippines (1946)	Yes	Yes	No
Malaysia-Singapore (1965)	Yes	Yes	No
Malaysia-United Kingdom (1957)	No	No	No
Mali-Mauritania (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Mali-Niger (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Mali-Senegal (1960)	No	No	No
Mauritania-Morocco (1956)	Yes	Yes	No
Mauritania-Senegal (1960)	Yes	Yes	No
Mauritius-United Kingdom (1968)	No	No	No
Moldova- Russia (1991)	Yes	Yes	No
Moldova-Ukraine (1991)	No	No	No
Morocco-Spain (1956)	Yes	Yes	No
Morocco-Spain (1958)	Yes	Yes	No
Morocco-Spain (1969)	Yes	Yes	No
South Africa-Namibia (1990)	No	No	No
North Korea-South Korea (1945)	Yes	Yes	Yes

Continued on next page

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

Dyad (border year)	MID	Violent MID	War
North Vietnam-South Vietnam (1954)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Norway-USSR (1947)	Yes	Yes	No
Oman-Pakistan (1958)	No	No	No
Oman- Saudi Arabia (1954)	Yes	No	No
Oman-UAE (1960)	No	No	No
Oman-Yemen (1992)	No	No	No
Poland- USSR (1945)	Yes	Yes	No
Poland-USSR (1951)	Yes	Yes	No
Romania-USSR (1947)	Yes	No	No
Russia-Tajikistan (1991)	No	No	No
Russia-Turkmenistan (1991)	No	No	No
Russia-Ukraine (1991)	Yes	No	No
Russia-Uzbekistan (1991)	No	No	No
Slovenia- Yugoslavia (1991)	Yes	No	No
Sudan- Uganda (1956)	Yes	Yes	No
Tajikistan-Uzbekistan (1991)	Yes	Yes	No
Tanzania- Uganda (1961)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tanzania-Zambia (1961)	No	No	No
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan (1991)	No	No	No
Yemen A.R.-Yemen P.R. (1967)	Yes	Yes	No
Zimbabwe-Zambia (1964)	Yes	Yes	No

Table A.2: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Any MID	0.563	0.497	0	1	348
Violent MID	0.483	0.5	0	1	348
Any war	0.103	0.305	0	1	348
Homeland status	0.287	0.453	0	1	348
Prior conflict	0.408	0.492	0	1	348
Coethnics beyond border	0.666	0.472	0	1	344
Econ. valuable	0.388	0.488	0	1	348
Militarily valuable	5.782	1.428	0	9.323	348
Joint democracy	0.083	0.277	0	1	348
Alliance	0.187	0.39	0	1	348
Capabilities ratio	0.493	0.336	0.001	0.999	348

Table A.3: Cross-correlation table

Variables	Homeland status	Prior conflict	Coethnics beyond border	Econ. valuable	Militarily valuable	Joint democracy	Alliance	Capabilities ratio
Homeland status	1.00							
Prior conflict	0.10	1.00						
Coethnics beyond border	-0.01	-0.10	1.00					
Econ. valuable	0.09	0.18	0.06	1.00				
Militarily valuable	0.02	-0.11	-0.37	0.14	1.00			
Joint democracy	-0.04	0.00	-0.05	-0.03	0.11	1.00		
Alliance	-0.07	0.24	-0.21	0.07	0.24	0.13	1.00	
Capabilities ratio	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.03	0.15	0.01	-0.00	1.00

Table A.4: Dyadic MIDs between states on either side of a new international border

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Homeland status	.244*** (.0529)	.2319*** (.0541)	.2152*** (.0535)	.2133*** (.0532)	.2136*** (.0532)	.1807*** (.0514)	.1826*** (.0516)	.1827*** (.0517)
Prior conflict		.2476** (.112)	.254** (.113)	.256** (.113)	.2534** (.112)	.222** (.107)	.2097* (.11)	.2097* (.11)
Coethnics beyond border			-.1274 (.0865)	-.1268 (.0866)	-.1306 (.0855)	-.1257 (.0819)	-.1253 (.0824)	-.1245 (.0826)
Econ. valuable				-.1286* (.0776)	-.1245 (.0808)	-.1473* (.079)	-.1495* (.0794)	-.1499* (.0794)
Militarily valuable					-.006079 (.0246)	.005061 (.0239)	.000792 (.0242)	.002093 (.0249)
Joint democracy						-.4271*** (.0966)	-.4364*** (.0959)	-.4369*** (.096)
Alliance							.1131 (.104)	.1124 (.105)
Capabilities ratio								-.02008 (.0319)
N	348	348	344	344	344	344	344	344

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.5: Dyadic violent MIDs between states on either side of a new international border

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Homeland status	.2424*** (.0525)	.2331*** (.0542)	.2183*** (.0537)	.2166*** (.0541)	.217*** (.0538)	.1855*** (.0517)	.1894*** (.0513)	.1894*** (.0514)
Prior conflict		.1916 (.125)	.2103 (.127)	.2121* (.127)	.2083* (.124)	.1783 (.118)	.1532 (.119)	.1532 (.119)
Coethnics beyond border			-.01441 (.0928)	-.01388 (.0927)	-.01924 (.0923)	-.01457 (.0876)	-.01381 (.0888)	-.01391 (.089)
Econ. valuable				-.1159 (.0798)	-.1101 (.084)	-.1319 (.0828)	-.1365 (.0833)	-.1365 (.0834)
Militarily valuable					-.008616 (.0256)	.002044 (.0247)	-.006671 (.0249)	-.006817 (.0258)
Joint democracy						-.4087*** (.088)	-.4277*** (.0862)	-.4276*** (.0864)
Alliance							.2308** (.11)	.2309** (.11)
Capabilities ratio								.002259 (.0373)
N	348	348	344	344	344	344	344	344

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.6: Dyadic wars between states on either side of a new international border

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Homeland status	.1224*** (.0428)	.1155*** (.0418)	.1249*** (.0416)	.1238*** (.0409)	.124*** (.0409)	.1198*** (.0399)	.1179*** (.04)	.1179*** (.0401)
Prior conflict		.1401* (.0718)	.1157* (.0677)	.1169* (.0678)	.1151* (.0673)	.1111* (.0663)	.1234* (.0662)	.1234* (.0664)
Coethnics beyond border			-.06644 (.0589)	-.0661 (.0583)	-.06867 (.0597)	-.06805 (.0596)	-.06842 (.0592)	-.06795 (.0591)
Econ. valuable				-.07577* (.04)	-.07297* (.0414)	-.07588* (.0414)	-.0736* (.0406)	-.07382* (.0407)
Militarily valuable					-.004133 (.0113)	-.002711 (.0111)	.001557 (.011)	.002275 (.0115)
Joint democracy						-.05452 (.0502)	-.04523 (.0519)	-.04553 (.0519)
Alliance							-.1131** (.0464)	-.1135** (.0466)
Capabilities ratio								-.01108 (.0193)
N	348	348	344	344	344	344	344	344

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.7: Robustness checks for different operationalizations of independent variables for Dyadic MIDs between states on either side of a new international border

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Homeland status	.184*** (.0495)	.1922*** (.0507)	.1482*** (.0511)	.1605*** (.0466)	.1705** (.0711)	.2097*** (.0618)	.1807*** (.0515)
Prior civil war	.07807 (.0798)						
Coethnics beyond border	-.1366* (.0819)	-.142* (.0817)	-.1303 (.0829)	-.149* (.0787)			-.126 (.0834)
Econ. valuable	-.1503* (.0814)	-.1525* (.0832)	-.1243 (.0795)	-.1412* (.0796)	-.1138 (.0889)	-.1768* (.0919)	-.1481* (.0793)
Militarily valuable	-.006921 (.0264)	-.004424 (.0258)	.00777 (.0257)	.004418 (.0252)	.01461 (.0296)	.02054 (.0277)	.005426 (.025)
Joint democracy	-.4552*** (.092)	-.45*** (.094)	-.4518*** (.101)	-.4715*** (.0966)	-.3201*** (.115)	-.5323*** (.108)	-.4325*** (.1)
Alliance	.1173 (.118)	.1256 (.114)	.1931* (.1)	.05461 (.109)	.1392 (.108)	-.02865 (.117)	
Capabilities ratio	-.04253 (.0404)	-.02017 (.0332)	-.02724 (.0316)	-.02115 (.0313)	-.03487 (.0572)	-.05408 (.0381)	-.02213 (.0322)
Territorial change before 1945		.08325 (.111)					
Violent terr. transfer			.3072*** (.0939)				
Violent border origin				.1093*** (.0305)			
Prior conflict					.2511** (.109)	.2659** (.124)	.2206** (.109)
Largest group beyond border					-.00775** (.00333)		
Prior ethnographic homeland						.1184* (.0679)	
Alliance, non-dummy							-.009 (.0384)
N	344	344	344	344	257	310	344

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of decade and region.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.7, cont.: Robustness checks for different operationalizations of independent variables for Dyadic MIDs between states on either side of a new international border, continued

	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Homeland status	.1711*** (.0511)	.1827*** (.0517)	.2022*** (.0601)	.1729*** (.052)	.1827*** (.055)
Prior conflict	.1924* (.11)	.2097* (.11)	.4439*** (.111)	.1435 (.124)	.2097* (.106)
Coethnics beyond border	-.1253 (.0825)	-.1245 (.0826)	-.2057** (.0933)	-.08989 (.0844)	-.1245 (.0785)
Econ. valuable	-.1478* (.0784)	-.1499* (.0794)	-.2524*** (.0891)	-.1505* (.0814)	-.1499* (.0877)
Militarily valuable	.001614 (.0248)	.002093 (.0249)		.01203 (.0253)	.002093 (.0211)
Joint democracy (>6)	-.4812*** (.0908)				
Alliance	.1131 (.105)	.1124 (.105)	.02495 (.122)	.1469 (.114)	.1124 (.103)
Capabilities ratio	-.01996 (.0316)	-.02008 (.0319)	.006242 (.0324)	-.02831 (.0318)	-.02008 (.0331)
Non-democratic dyad		.4369*** (.096)			
Terr. accessibility index			-.09031 (.0547)		
Joint democracy			-.3749** (.148)	-.4586*** (.107)	-.4369*** (.0945)
N	344	344	265	344	344

Models 8-11: Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

Model 12 clusters robust standard errors by border.

Models 8-10 and 12 contain fixed effects for every pair of decade and region.

Model 11 contains fixed effects for every 5-year period and region.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.8: Robustness checks for different operationalizations of independent variables for Dyadic Violent MIDs between states on either side of a new international border

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Homeland status	.1942*** (.0505)	.1975*** (.05)	.1555*** (.0514)	.1603*** (.0466)	.2142*** (.0707)	.2046*** (.0588)	.1851*** (.0523)
Prior civil war	.0284 (.0798)						
Coethnics beyond border	-.02545 (.0884)	-.02777 (.0883)	-.01556 (.0873)	-.03377 (.0855)			-.01954 (.0893)
Econ. valuable	-.1348 (.0839)	-.1342 (.0855)	-.1139 (.0838)	-.1286 (.0817)	-.09341 (.094)	-.182* (.0971)	-.1335 (.0833)
Militarily valuable	-.01288 (.0272)	-.01218 (.0266)	-.000183 (.0269)	-.00135 (.0253)	-.01583 (.0292)	.007073 (.0279)	-.00221 (.0259)
Joint democracy	-.4449*** (.088)	-.4461*** (.0897)	-.4358*** (.0931)	-.4549*** (.0906)	-.3535*** (.101)	-.4622*** (.0941)	-.4283*** (.0908)
Alliance	.2427** (.123)	.2484** (.118)	.2999*** (.102)	.1565 (.108)	.2974*** (.106)	.05497 (.133)	
Capabilities ratio	-.005746 (.0447)	.002491 (.0375)	-.0044 (.0361)	.000899 (.0354)	.03456 (.0595)	-.02907 (.0411)	-.000227 (.0376)
Territorial change before 1945		.01449 (.121)					
Violent terr. transfer			.2819*** (.0974)				
Violent border origin				.1213*** (.0342)			
Prior conflict					.1085 (.118)	.1274 (.14)	.1727 (.122)
Largest group beyond border					-.006276* (.00344)		
Prior ethnographic homeland						.07753 (.0668)	
Alliance, non-dummy							-.03698 (.0408)
N	344	344	344	344	257	310	344

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of decade and region.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.8, cont.: Robustness checks for different operationalizations of independent variables for Dyadic Violent MIDs between states on either side of a new international border, continued

	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Homeland status	.1818*** (.0512)	.1894*** (.0514)	.2412*** (.0588)	.1809*** (.0513)	.1894*** (.0529)
Prior conflict	.1406 (.12)	.1532 (.119)	.2746** (.138)	.07154 (.132)	.1532 (.115)
Coethnics beyond border	-.01504 (.089)	-.01391 (.089)	-.05439 (.101)	.006613 (.0883)	-.01391 (.0829)
Econ. valuable	-.1326 (.083)	-.1365 (.0834)	-.2284** (.0937)	-.1289 (.0838)	-.1365 (.0895)
Militarily valuable	-.008151 (.0258)	-.006817 (.0258)		.003027 (.0257)	-.006817 (.0216)
Joint democracy (>6)	-.4305*** (.0874)				
Alliance	.2295** (.11)	.2309** (.11)	.1166 (.129)	.2541** (.116)	.2309** (.102)
Capabilities ratio	.00285 (.037)	.002259 (.0373)	.01903 (.0404)	-.006391 (.0368)	.002259 (.0382)
Non-democratic dyad		.4276*** (.0864)			
Terr. accessibility index			-.0886 (.0574)		
Joint democracy			-.4543*** (.115)	-.4724*** (.1)	-.4276*** (.0846)
N	344	344	265	344	344

Models 8-11: Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

Model 12 clusters robust standard errors by border.

Models 8-10 and 12 contain fixed effects for every pair of decade and region.

Model 11 contains fixed effects for every 5-year period and region.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.9: Robustness checks for different operationalizations of independent variables for Dyadic wars between states on either side of a new international border

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Homeland status	.1194*** (.0407)	.1249*** (.0405)	.1076*** (.0385)	.09401*** (.0322)	.1012** (.0488)	.09687* (.0497)	.1202*** (.0403)
Prior civil war	.04058 (.0594)						
Coethnics beyond border	-.07559 (.0641)	-.07944 (.0621)	-.07428 (.0602)	-.08403 (.062)		-.06238 (.0592)	
Econ. valuable	-.07367* (.0425)	-.07077* (.0395)	-.06322 (.044)	-.0674* (.0364)	-.07431* (.0439)	-.09443* (.0494)	-.07444* (.0408)
Militarily valuable	-.002932 (.0115)	-.002233 (.0115)	.002763 (.0107)	.006834 (.0119)	-.00729 (.0137)	.01887* (.0111)	.002463 (.0118)
Joint democracy	-.057 (.0586)	-.0631 (.0577)	-.05732 (.0543)	-.06761 (.0571)	-.06665 (.0584)	-.01241 (.0364)	-.03455 (.0542)
Alliance	-.109** (.0441)	-.09699** (.0489)	-.07744* (.0441)	-.1748*** (.0414)	-.08698* (.0509)	-.1471** (.0628)	
Capabilities ratio	-.02272 (.0272)	-.0108 (.0192)	-.01366 (.0182)	-.0122 (.0183)	.02656 (.025)	-.03321 (.0234)	-.01176 (.0193)
Territorial change before 1945		-.002527 (.0751)					
Violent terr. transfer			.1148 (.0774)				
Violent border origin				.09941*** (.0245)			
Prior conflict					.1343 (.0869)	.1435** (.0616)	.1169* (.0663)
Largest group beyond border					-.000341 (.00242)		
Prior ethnographic homeland						-.02577 (.0428)	
Alliance, non-dummy							.03836** (.019)
N	344	344	344	344	257	310	344

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of decade and region.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.9, cont.: Robustness checks for different operationalizations of independent variables for Dyadic wars between states on either side of a new international border, cont.

	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Homeland status	.1188*** (.0403)	.1179*** (.0401)	.1421*** (.0538)	.1135*** (.04)	.1179*** (.0405)
Prior conflict	.124* (.0667)	.1234* (.0664)	.08967 (.0697)	.06397 (.0651)	.1234** (.0571)
Coethnics beyond border	-.06824 (.0592)	-.06795 (.0591)	-.05886 (.079)	-.06126 (.0684)	-.06795 (.0591)
Econ. valuable	-.0726* (.0407)	-.07382* (.0407)	-.08075* (.0487)	-.0763* (.0398)	-.07382* (.0426)
Militarily valuable	.001753 (.0115)	.002275 (.0115)		.007746 (.0109)	.002275 (.0115)
Joint democracy (>6)	-.02807 (.0471)				
Alliance	-.1145** (.0466)	-.1135** (.0466)	-.1252 (.0794)	-.08079 (.0535)	-.1135** (.0558)
Capabilities ratio	-.01081 (.0193)	-.01108 (.0193)	-.01848 (.0229)	-.0159 (.0189)	-.01108 (.0195)
Non-democratic dyad		.04553 (.0519)			
Terr. accessibility index			.03845 (.0316)		
Joint democracy			-.09262 (.0783)	-.07815 (.0608)	-.04553 (.0527)
N	344	344	265	344	344

Models 8-11: Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

Model 12 clusters robust standard errors by border.

Models 8-10 and 12 contain fixed effects for every pair of decade and region.

Model 11 contains fixed effects for every 5-year period and region.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.10: Dyadic MIDs, Violent MIDs and Wars between states on either side of a new international border, alternative functional forms

	MID, logit	MID, linear	Violent MID, logit	Violent MID, linear	War, logit	War, linear
Homeland status	1.248*** (.319)	.1827*** (.0517)	1.095*** (.286)	.1894*** (.0514)	2.067** (.825)	.1179*** (.0401)
Prior conflict	1.476** (.699)	.2097* (.11)	.8507 (.669)	.1532 (.119)	2.584*** (.969)	.1234* (.0664)
Coethnics beyond border	-.7579* (.442)	-.1245 (.0826)	-.05248 (.466)	-.01391 (.089)	-.9472 (.993)	-.06795 (.0591)
Econ. valuable	-.7165 (.439)	-.1499* (.0794)	-.6884 (.46)	-.1365 (.0834)	-3.311** (1.54)	-.07382* (.0407)
Militarily valuable	-.03534 (.131)	.002093 (.0249)	-.0464 (.13)	-.006817 (.0258)	.4077* (.232)	.002275 (.0115)
Joint democracy	-3.644*** (1.13)	-.4369*** (.096)	-28.58*** (1.44)	-.4276*** (.0864)	0 (.)	-.04553 (.0519)
Alliance	.5547 (.575)	.1124 (.105)	1.213* (.624)	.2309** (.11)	-1.177 (1.21)	-.1135** (.0466)
Capabilities ratio	-.1626 (.198)	-.02008 (.0319)	.02761 (.212)	.002259 (.0373)	-.00944 (.455)	-.01108 (.0193)
N	308	344	324	344	200	344

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.11: MID robustness to sample restrictions and coding decisions

	(1) Excl. non- state claims	(2) Excl. state entry	(3) Incl. 'Arab Homeland'	(4) Incl. Arab claim to Palestine	(5) Incl. decolonization	(6) Excl. incomplete decolonization	(7) Excl. reciprocal claim	(8) Excl. high DFBETA
Homeland status	.1958*** (.0667)	.2826*** (.0843)	.1526*** (.0566)	.1916*** (.0534)	.2037*** (.0508)	.1961*** (.0539)	.1817*** (.0439)	.1827*** (.0517)
Prior conflict	.2218** (.11)	.1429 (.136)	.2152* (.11)	.2109* (.11)	.3426*** (.0993)	.1897 (.116)	.3011** (.125)	.2097* (.11)
Coethnics beyond border	-.1178 (.0832)	-.1009 (.0992)	-.1273 (.0842)	-.1236 (.0822)	-.08999 (.0678)	-.1101 (.0856)	-.1531* (.0838)	-.1245 (.0826)
Econ. valuable	-.1584* (.0803)	-.1678* (.0988)	-.145* (.0805)	-.152* (.0791)	-.06118 (.0551)	-.1901** (.0876)	-.1671* (.0921)	-.1499* (.0794)
Militarily valuable	.004843 (.0251)	.04248 (.0387)	.001166 (.0251)	.000258 (.0251)	-.0309 (.0251)	.01695 (.0255)	-.002874 (.0269)	.002093 (.0249)
Joint democracy	-.4349*** (.098)	-.5428*** (.111)	-.4442*** (.0978)	-.4341*** (.0965)	-.1667** (.0666)	-.4419*** (.117)	-.5045*** (.0907)	-.4369*** (.096)
Alliance	.1125 (.106)	.08394 (.13)	.1058 (.107)	.115 (.104)	.06829 (.0966)	.08227 (.118)	.1126 (.104)	.1124 (.105)
Capabilities ratio	.008462 (.0329)	-.1659* (.0867)	-.02034 (.031)	-.02251 (.0323)	-.005044 (.0185)	-.04778 (.0341)	-.02959 (.0324)	-.02008 (.0319)
N	344	190	344	344	516	322	312	344

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.11, cont.: MID robustness to sample restrictions and coding decisions, cont.

	(9) Excl. Europe	(10) Alt. region coding	(11) Recode likely instrumental claims as no claim	(12) Excl. united Germany	(13) Excl. divided Germany	(14) Excl. all Germany
Homeland status	.2124*** (.0657)	.1697*** (.05)	.1925*** (.0599)	.1784*** (.0522)	.1585*** (.0518)	.1407*** (.0524)
Prior conflict	.1952 (.137)	.2122** (.104)	.2085* (.106)	.2333** (.107)	.2527** (.109)	.2877*** (.109)
Coethnics beyond border	-.1147 (.0999)	-.07425 (.0857)	-.1307 (.0834)	-.08881 (.0844)	-.1289 (.087)	-.06073 (.0866)
Econ. valuable	-.1452 (.0983)	-.1291 (.0785)	-.1637** (.0796)	-.1124 (.0781)	-.1696** (.0802)	-.0835 (.0797)
Militarily valuable	-.04337 (.0303)	-.03115 (.0257)	.002414 (.0249)	-.007752 (.0265)	.002096 (.0245)	-.01664 (.0247)
Joint democracy	-.1322 (.162)	-.3335*** (.0966)	-.4487*** (.0946)	-.4545*** (.103)	-.3991*** (.106)	-.4232*** (.12)
Alliance	.1133 (.126)	.04817 (.107)	.1322 (.104)	.08556 (.105)	.1136 (.104)	.05343 (.105)
Capabilities ratio	.02601 (.0343)	.002329 (.0334)	-.04587 (.0319)	-.005913 (.0326)	-.002628 (.0294)	.009224 (.0294)
N	230	344	344	330	316	302

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.12: Violent MID robustness to sample restrictions and coding decisions

	(1) Excl. non- state claims	(2) Excl. state entry	(3) Incl. 'Arab Homeland'	(4) Incl. Arab claim to Palestine	(5) Incl. decolonization	(6) Excl. incomplete decolonization	(7) Excl. reciprocal claim	(8) Excl. high DFBETA
Homeland status	.1958*** (.0667)	.2826*** (.0843)	.1526*** (.0566)	.1916*** (.0534)	.2037*** (.0508)	.1961*** (.0539)	.1817*** (.0439)	.1827*** (.0517)
Prior conflict	.2218** (.11)	.1429 (.136)	.2152* (.11)	.2109* (.11)	.3426*** (.0993)	.1897 (.116)	.3011** (.125)	.2097* (.11)
Coethnics beyond border	-.1178 (.0832)	-.1009 (.0992)	-.1273 (.0842)	-.1236 (.0822)	-.08999 (.0678)	-.1101 (.0856)	-.1531* (.0838)	-.1245 (.0826)
Econ. valuable	-.1584* (.0803)	-.1678* (.0988)	-.145* (.0805)	-.152* (.0791)	-.06118 (.0551)	-.1901** (.0876)	-.1671* (.0921)	-.1499* (.0794)
Militarily valuable	.004843 (.0251)	.04248 (.0387)	.001166 (.0251)	.000258 (.0251)	-.0309 (.0251)	.01695 (.0255)	-.002874 (.0269)	.002093 (.0249)
Joint democracy	-.4349*** (.098)	-.5428*** (.111)	-.4442*** (.0978)	-.4341*** (.0965)	-.1667** (.0666)	-.4419*** (.117)	-.5045*** (.0907)	-.4369*** (.096)
Alliance	.1125 (.106)	.08394 (.13)	.1058 (.107)	.115 (.104)	.06829 (.0966)	.08227 (.118)	.1126 (.104)	.1124 (.105)
Capabilities ratio	.008462 (.0329)	-.1659* (.0867)	-.02034 (.031)	-.02251 (.0323)	-.005044 (.0185)	-.04778 (.0341)	-.02959 (.0324)	-.02008 (.0319)
N	344	190	344	344	516	322	312	344

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.12, cont.: Violent MID robustness to sample restrictions and coding decisions, cont.

	(9) Excl. Europe	(10) Alt. region coding	(11) Recode likely instrumental claims as no claim	(12) Excl. united Germany	(13) Excl. divided Germany	(14) Excl. all Germany
Homeland status	.2124*** (.0657)	.1697*** (.05)	.1925*** (.0599)	.1784*** (.0522)	.1585*** (.0518)	.1407*** (.0524)
Prior conflict	.1952 (.137)	.2122** (.104)	.2085* (.106)	.2333** (.107)	.2527** (.109)	.2877*** (.109)
Coethnics beyond border	-.1147 (.0999)	-.07425 (.0857)	-.1307 (.0834)	-.08881 (.0844)	-.1289 (.087)	-.06073 (.0866)
Econ. valuable	-.1452 (.0983)	-.1291 (.0785)	-.1637** (.0796)	-.1124 (.0781)	-.1696** (.0802)	-.0835 (.0797)
Militarily valuable	-.04337 (.0303)	-.03115 (.0257)	.002414 (.0249)	-.007752 (.0265)	.002096 (.0245)	-.01664 (.0247)
Joint democracy	-.1322 (.162)	-.3335*** (.0966)	-.4487*** (.0946)	-.4545*** (.103)	-.3991*** (.106)	-.4232*** (.12)
Alliance	.1133 (.126)	.04817 (.107)	.1322 (.104)	.08556 (.105)	.1136 (.104)	.05343 (.105)
Capabilities ratio	.02601 (.0343)	.002329 (.0334)	-.04587 (.0319)	-.005913 (.0326)	-.002628 (.0294)	.009224 (.0294)
N	230	344	344	330	316	302

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.13: War robustness to sample restrictions and coding decisions

	(1) Excl. non- state claims	(2) Excl. state entry	(3) Incl. 'Arab Homeland'	(4) Incl. Arab claim to Palestine	(5) Incl. decolonization	(6) Excl. incomplete decolonization	(7) Excl. reciprocal claim	(8) Excl. high DFBETA
Homeland status	.1516*** (.0568)	.08166** (.0383)	.1062** (.043)	.1986*** (.0541)	.1215*** (.0401)	.1196*** (.0428)	.05804** (.0284)	.1179*** (.0401)
Prior conflict	.1305** (.0659)	.1328 (.0827)	.1263* (.0663)	.1543 (.12)	.1012** (.0504)	.1207 (.0761)	.1508** (.0589)	.1234* (.0664)
Coethnics beyond border	-.06276 (.0593)	-.08132 (.0676)	-.06992 (.0597)	-.01299 (.0885)	-.04697 (.0462)	-.07933 (.0624)	-.05603 (.0543)	-.06795 (.0591)
Econ. valuable	-.07965* (.0409)	-.09314* (.0517)	-.0701* (.0409)	-.1386* (.0832)	-.06113** (.0256)	-.09732** (.0474)	-.07183* (.0375)	-.07382* (.0407)
Militarily valuable	.00407 (.0114)	-.01625 (.0186)	.001499 (.0115)	-.008718 (.0259)	-.001306 (.0105)	-.00079 (.0126)	.01678 (.0102)	.002275 (.0115)
Joint democracy	-.03853 (.0513)	-.08093 (.0722)	-.04847 (.0534)	-.4247*** (.0869)	.000313 (.0205)	-.108 (.0662)	.001353 (.0348)	-.04553 (.0519)
Alliance	-.1125** (.0463)	-.1269 (.0808)	-.1177** (.0472)	.2336** (.109)	-.0747* (.039)	-.15** (.0602)	-.1352*** (.0485)	-.1135** (.0466)
Capabilities ratio	.01088 (.0194)	-.001952 (.0393)	-.01132 (.0188)	-.000266 (.0376)	-.01014 (.0111)	-.01849 (.0219)	-.02573 (.0179)	-.01108 (.0193)
N	344	190	344	344	516	322	312	344

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.13, cont.: War robustness to sample restrictions and coding decisions, cont.

	(9) Excl. Europe	(10) Alt. region coding	(11) Recode likely instrumental claims as no claim	(12) Excl. united Germany	(13) Excl. divided Germany	(14) Excl. all Germany
Homeland status	.2096*** (.0735)	.1241*** (.0389)	.1181** (.0516)	.1267*** (.043)	.1264*** (.0452)	.1351*** (.0483)
Prior conflict	.2082* (.108)	.1467** (.0704)	.1274* (.0648)	.1261* (.0656)	.1295* (.0695)	.1297* (.0703)
Coethnics beyond border	-.02135 (.0786)	-.03851 (.0623)	-.06986 (.0587)	-.06781 (.0595)	-.07035 (.0625)	-.07032 (.0656)
Econ. valuable	-.108 (.0683)	-.06734 (.0416)	-.08358** (.0416)	-.07577* (.0421)	-.08216* (.044)	-.08112* (.0468)
Militarily valuable	.01058 (.0168)	-.01853 (.0133)	.002491 (.012)	.002689 (.0122)	.004763 (.0135)	.005079 (.0144)
Joint democracy	-.05576 (.122)	.01477 (.0605)	-.04726 (.0548)	-.04045 (.0506)	-.04567 (.0573)	-.0451 (.0582)
Alliance	-.1327* (.067)	-.1548*** (.0588)	-.1043** (.0477)	-.1164** (.0477)	-.1168** (.0484)	-.1195** (.05)
Capabilities ratio	-.003244 (.0316)	-.000278 (.0218)	-.02802 (.0209)	-.01218 (.0208)	-.01426 (.0209)	-.01273 (.0223)
N	228	344	344	330	316	302

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.14: Robustness to controlling for border origin, excluding each reason progressively.

	Excl. treaty origin			Excl. ICJ origin			Excl. old administrative border origin		
	All MIDs	Violent MIDs	Wars	All MIDs	Violent MIDs	Wars	All MIDs	Violent MIDs	Wars
Homeland status	.1686*** (.0485)	.1655*** (.0495)	.08802*** (.0334)	.1692*** (.0474)	.1663*** (.0475)	.08857*** (.0328)	.1625*** (.0485)	.1591*** (.0502)	.08477** (.033)
Prior conflict	.1827 (.118)	.1126 (.128)	.07993 (.0839)	.1727 (.113)	.1007 (.119)	.07161 (.0795)	.1866 (.118)	.1154 (.126)	.07942 (.0818)
Coethnics beyond border	-.1376 (.0832)	-.03035 (.0904)	-.08687 (.0577)	-.1325 (.0822)	-.02434 (.0895)	-.08266 (.0571)	-.1445* (.0828)	-.03711 (.0901)	-.08943 (.0579)
Econ. valuable	-.09611 (.0807)	-.09244 (.0835)	-.04666 (.0373)	-.1074 (.0801)	-.1059 (.0835)	-.05607 (.0363)	-.1064 (.081)	-.1048 (.0839)	-.05548 (.0374)
Militarily valuable	.009367 (.0254)	-.000282 (.0264)	.006433 (.0114)	.01272 (.0245)	.003716 (.0251)	.00923 (.0115)	.007768 (.0255)	-.001544 (.0262)	.006443 (.0113)
Joint democracy	-.3839*** (.0994)	-.3819*** (.0988)	-.008095 (.0553)	-.4152*** (.1)	-.4192*** (.101)	-.0342 (.0572)	-.3751*** (.108)	-.3766*** (.0988)	-.01163 (.0581)
Alliance	.1956* (.113)	.2913** (.116)	-.07522 (.0571)	.12 (.117)	.2013* (.121)	-.1382*** (.0509)	.1953* (.11)	.2812** (.112)	-.09586* (.0529)
Capabilities ratio	-.02631 (.0334)	-.000096 (.0386)	-.007782 (.0195)	-.03058 (.0327)	-.005178 (.0369)	-.01134 (.0192)	-.01998 (.0328)	.006075 (.0385)	-.005375 (.0195)
Old admin. origin	-.1113 (.15)	-.06929 (.153)	.03944 (.117)	-.4881** (.231)	-.5179** (.241)	-.2744 (.172)			
Colonial origin	.3356** (.156)	.2176 (.16)	.09772 (.146)	.06258 (.227)	-.1074 (.221)	-.1296 (.0998)	.2937* (.16)	.1378 (.157)	.000271 (.134)
ICJ origin	.4389* (.246)	-.5211** (.212)	.0674 (.138)				.4935** (.239)	-.5025** (.202)	.01585 (.109)
War origin	.3177** (.158)	.3394** (.157)	.3363** (.138)	-.01241 (.233)	-.05353 (.219)	.06138 (.167)	.3319*** (.121)	.3118** (.147)	.255** (.123)
Treaty origin				-.4673** (.218)	-.5563*** (.21)	-.3892** (.15)	-.1576 (.157)	-.2277 (.144)	-.2151* (.112)
N	344	344	344	344	344	344	344	344	344

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of decade and region.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.14, cont.: Robustness to controlling for border origin, excluding each reason progressively, cont.

	Excl. Colonial origin			Excl. War origin		
	All MIDs	Violent MIDs	Wars	All MIDs	Violent MIDs	Wars
Homeland status	.1684*** (.0475)	.1676*** (.0476)	.09024*** (.0326)	.1688*** (.0471)	.1642*** (.0484)	.09095*** (.0315)
Prior conflict	.1692 (.112)	.1067 (.122)	.07884 (.0764)	.1724 (.113)	.09964 (.12)	.07282 (.0775)
Coethnics beyond border	-.1315 (.0819)	-.02607 (.0899)	-.08475 (.0568)	-.133 (.0818)	-.02635 (.089)	-.08035 (.0588)
Econ. valuable	-.1111 (.0796)	-.09957 (.0828)	-.04844 (.0357)	-.1069 (.0796)	-.1038 (.0822)	-.05845 (.0358)
Militarily valuable	.01301 (.0244)	.003226 (.0253)	.008638 (.0115)	.01268 (.0245)	.003503 (.0252)	.009474 (.0116)
Joint democracy	-.4229*** (.0963)	-.4061*** (.0935)	-.01841 (.0574)	-.4139*** (.095)	-.4133*** (.0945)	-.04101 (.0562)
Alliance	.1037 (.105)	.2293** (.107)	-.1043** (.0453)	.1224 (.107)	.2114* (.109)	-.1497*** (.0518)
Capabilities ratio	-.03087 (.0324)	-.004686 (.0374)	-.01074 (.0197)	-.03035 (.0328)	-.004167 (.0373)	-.0125 (.019)
Old admin. origin	-.5386*** (.153)	-.4313*** (.159)	-.1699 (.197)	-.477*** (.104)	-.4699*** (.158)	-.3294*** (.126)
Colonial origin				.0699 (.146)	-.07575 (.14)	-.1659 (.156)
ICJ origin	.1021 (.245)	-.826*** (.216)	-.1172 (.218)	.1439 (.229)	-.8449*** (.202)	-.2289* (.137)
War origin	-.06196 (.142)	.03149 (.131)	.164 (.202)			
Treaty origin	-.5163*** (.144)	-.4723*** (.144)	-.2877 (.176)	-.4586*** (.141)	-.5185*** (.146)	-.4325*** (.121)
N	344	344	344	344	344	344

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of decade and region.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.15: Dyadic conflict between states on either side of a new international border, non-directed dyads

	All MIDs	Violent MIDs	Wars
Homeland status	.2294*** (.0643)	.1942*** (.0706)	.1163* (.0591)
Prior conflict	.1735 (.109)	.1062 (.128)	.1585** (.0679)
Coethnics beyond border	-.02772 (.0364)	.01682 (.0361)	-.01027 (.0236)
Econ. valuable	-.0888*** (.031)	-.0879*** (.0325)	-.03134 (.0196)
Militarily valuable	-.000012 (.000032)	-7.2e-06 (.00003)	.000021 (.000016)
Joint democracy	-.3605** (.176)	-.4164*** (.13)	-.0487 (.0739)
Alliance	.09143 (.118)	.2239* (.129)	-.1559** (.0755)
Relative capability	-.3364 (1.12)	-.3552 (1.16)	-.3826 (.482)
N	162	162	162

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade and robust standard errors.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.16: Homeland status and conflict, given no conflict between 1816 and 1945

	All MIDs	Violent MIDs	Wars
Homeland status	.1562** (.0695)	.2225*** (.0647)	.1809** (.0721)
Coethnics beyond border	-.1139 (.115)	.009145 (.118)	-.01607 (.0798)
Materially valuable	.09747 (.1)	.1247 (.0977)	-.03796 (.0471)
Joint democracy	-.2712** (.13)	-.3103** (.122)	-.04831 (.0797)
Alliance	.008091 (.193)	.08929 (.173)	-.03733 (.0316)
Capabilities ratio	-.01754 (.0333)	-.01302 (.0421)	-.04273 (.0308)
N	204	204	204

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.17: Robustness of relationship between homeland status and international conflict given no prior conflict, alternative definitions of prior conflict

	All MIDs			Violent MIDs			Wars		
	Excl. prior terr. transfer	Excl. prior violent transfer	Excl. prior civil war	Excl. prior terr. transfer	Excl. prior violent transfer	Excl. prior civil war	Excl. prior terr. transfer	Excl. prior violent transfer	Excl. prior civil war
Homeland status	.2112*** (.0663)	.1966*** (.0694)	.1977** (.0897)	.2448*** (.0587)	.1973*** (.068)	.2972*** (.076)	.2051*** (.0647)	.1194** (.0552)	.2193*** (.0788)
Coethnics beyond border	-.1159 (.1)	-.1804* (.0979)	-.08621 (.106)	.04217 (.103)	.006488 (.105)	.03783 (.11)	-.05981 (.0802)	-.05386 (.0676)	-.05462 (.0838)
Econ. valuable	-.1615 (.109)	-.133 (.109)	-.1971 (.119)	-.1794* (.104)	-.15 (.107)	-.1886* (.107)	-.1341* (.0709)	-.1131** (.0542)	-.03777 (.0598)
Militarily valuable	-.006041 (.0301)	-.02705 (.0332)	-.01512 (.0361)	-.00355 (.0288)	-.02616 (.0334)	-.01249 (.0334)	.00792 (.0163)	.009879 (.0147)	-.002715 (.0171)
Joint democracy	-.3576*** (.13)	-.3046** (.123)	-.2701* (.146)	-.4004*** (.124)	-.3346*** (.123)	-.2001* (.112)	-.1092 (.0912)	-.04427 (.0597)	-.114 (.105)
Alliance	.07896 (.135)	.2368 (.155)	-.03315 (.17)	.1419 (.148)	.3975*** (.151)	-.01383 (.167)	-.08884 (.0723)	-.02136 (.0359)	-.1607** (.0799)
Capabilities ratio	-.01948 (.0349)	.001226 (.036)	.001204 (.063)	-.01115 (.0373)	.01481 (.039)	.008186 (.0631)	-.01572 (.0283)	-.01359 (.0237)	.008003 (.0448)
N	240	238	191	240	238	191	240	238	191

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.18: Predictors of homeland claims

	Homeland status
Prior conflict	.05492 (.0913)
Prior ethnographic homeland	.3292*** (.0498)
Econ. valuable	-.05328 (.0719)
Militarily valuable	.02038 (.0189)
Joint democracy	-.1001 (.151)
Alliance	-.1344* (.0736)
Capabilities ratio	.08225 (.0748)
N	310

All models contain fixed effects for every pair of region and decade.

Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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