

**Ronald R. Krebs, “How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall: Military Conflict, Politics, and the Cold War Consensus,” *International Organization* 69:4 (fall 2015).**

This online appendix has four parts:

1. detail on the method employed
2. the coding questionnaire
3. additional data on intercoder reliability
4. additional graphical representations from the content analysis

Additional information related to this study is also located in Ronald R. Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of US National Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2015).

## **1. Method**

As I write in the article, to track the Cold War consensus, I undertook a longitudinal content analysis of a relatively stable body of elite discourse: newspaper editorials. Undergraduate research assistants collected an annual sample of editorials on foreign affairs between the end of World War II (1945) and the dissolution of the USSR (1991) from two newspapers representing the leading opposed poles of the ideological spectrum—the *New York Times* and the *Chicago Tribune*. Although the length, style, and daily number of editorials was not stable in the two newspapers selected for study, and neither was the degree to which the papers editorialized on foreign affairs, both continued to run editorials throughout the span on what they saw as the major issues of the day. The justification for the selection of these two newspapers appears in the article itself.

Undergraduate research assistants collected editorials on foreign affairs from every fifth day over the span. If that method failed to generate sufficient editorials from a given newspaper in a given year, editorials were collected from every third day in that year. This method produced a database of nearly 9,100 editorials on foreign affairs.

Based on the secondary literature, I constructed a 14-point questionnaire that includes all elements commonly cited in existing catalogs of Cold War axioms: the editorial’s central concern, its representations of communist powers and superpower competition, its portrait of US allies, its stance on the interconnectedness of global politics (the domino theory), and its position on US leadership. See the next section of this appendix for that questionnaire.

Human coders, mostly Ph.D. candidates in political science, were provided with written guidelines for the coding, including keywords and key-phrases based on my own intensive reading of congressional debates, presidential speeches, official government documents and pronouncements, memoirs, elite and popular publications, and the secondary literature. All coders went through two rounds of group training with me and their fellow coders to harmonize their codings. Once the questionnaires were completed, coders’ markings were translated into quantitative scores and entered into a database.

## 2. Coding Questionnaire

Human coders completed the following questionnaire while reading each editorial in the database. I created the questionnaire based on existing catalogs of Cold War axioms in the secondary literature. The resulting list is inclusive and extensive. I am not familiar with any elements that are commonly viewed as part of the Cold War consensus but do not appear on the questionnaire.

Date:

Newspaper:

Title (if applicable):

### 1. What is the editorial's central concern in international affairs?

- superpower/bipolar competition: \_\_\_\_\_
- something else: \_\_\_\_\_
  - if so, what else?
    - \_\_\_\_\_ Western alliance politics/relations
    - \_\_\_\_\_ Soviet/communist bloc politics/relations
    - \_\_\_\_\_ local/regional instability/conflict
    - \_\_\_\_\_ human rights
    - \_\_\_\_\_ global economy
    - \_\_\_\_\_ energy scarcity/dependence
    - \_\_\_\_\_ global inequality/underdevelopment
    - \_\_\_\_\_ domestic politics of foreign nation (if does not fit into above categories)
    - \_\_\_\_\_ other—specify: \_\_\_\_\_
- is the problem(s) listed above explicitly or implicitly linked to competition with the USSR or global communism? if so, how?
  - \_\_\_\_\_ yes—how: \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_ no \_\_\_\_\_

**2. Representations of communist powers/communism:**

**2a) *Leading* communist powers/global communism are portrayed as having the following character:**

- expansionist/aggressive: \_\_\_\_\_
- both: \_\_\_\_\_
- satisfied/peaceful: \_\_\_\_\_
- unclear/uncertain: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**2b) The threat (to the United States or its allies) from *leading* communist powers/global communism is portrayed as:**

- real: \_\_\_\_\_
- exaggerated/inflated: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**2c) Relations between the United States/the West/etc. and the USSR, the People's Republic of China, or global communism are portrayed as:**

- generally conflictual: \_\_\_\_\_
- cooperative and conflictual: \_\_\_\_\_
- generally cooperative: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**2d) The communist world is represented as:**

- monolithic: \_\_\_\_\_
- both: \_\_\_\_\_
- diverse: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**3. Representations of US allies:**

**3a) US allies are portrayed as:**

- necessary: \_\_\_\_\_
- unnecessary: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**3b) US allies are portrayed as:**

- reliable or unified: \_\_\_\_\_
- potentially either: \_\_\_\_\_
- unreliable or divided: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**4. Global politics and interconnectedness:**

**Should the United States be concerned with other states "going communist" or joining the Soviet bloc?**

- yes: \_\_\_\_\_
- no: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**5. US role in the world:**

**5a) Does the United States have, or should it embrace, special responsibilities/leadership?**

- yes: \_\_\_\_\_
- no: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**5b) With regard to its financial or military commitments abroad, the United States should:**

- expand: \_\_\_\_\_
- maintain: \_\_\_\_\_
- reduce: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**5c) With regard to its diplomatic engagements and commitments abroad, the United States should:**

- expand: \_\_\_\_\_
- maintain: \_\_\_\_\_
- reduce: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**5d) Foreign aid is portrayed as:**

- valuable: \_\_\_\_\_
- not valuable: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**5e) US leadership, and its interventions, in world affairs *in the past* are portrayed as:**

- constructive: \_\_\_\_\_
- destructive: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

**5f) Future US leadership and US interventions in world affairs are portrayed as:**

- constructive: \_\_\_\_\_
- potentially either: \_\_\_\_\_
- destructive: \_\_\_\_\_
- not discussed: \_\_\_\_\_

### 3. Intercoder reliability

Due to the extensiveness of the project, double-blind coding was not conducted for the full run of both newspapers. The first 20 editorials per year from each paper—at least 10 percent and sometimes nearly 50 percent of a given year's editorials—were analyzed by an additional coder. This practice is standard with large data sets.


Moreover, due to the size of even the dataset for intercoder reliability, it was not possible to resolve all disputes between the coders. When the two coders were not in agreement, I accepted for purposes of analysis the judgment of the primary coder, who had coded the full year of a given newspaper's editorials.


Intercoder reliability tests indicate average agreement of 78.04% across all questionnaire items. Cohen's kappa scores on individual items ranged from a low of .2337 to a high of .6656, with an average of .49. Landis and Koch would classify this as a "moderate" level of agreement, though they admit that such a classification is "arbitrary" (Landis and Koch 1977, 165). While these rates of agreement exceed some commonly cited rules of thumb (Stemler and Tsai 2008, 48), many statisticians are skeptical of efforts to interpret the magnitude of kappa statistics and to establish such fixed conventions (Krippendorff 2004; Uebersax 2013). I also calculated other, more complex measures of intercoder reliability, such as Scott's pi and Krippendorff's alpha. These were in the same range as Cohen's kappa, as indicated below.

<b>Intercoder Reliability</b>				
<b>New York Times</b>				
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Percent Agreement</i>	<i>Scott's Pi</i>	<i>Cohen's Kappa</i>	<i>Krippendorff's Alpha</i>
Central concern: superpower/bipolar competition?	86.4	0.613671484	0.613849185	0.613864649
Central concern: linked to superpower/bipolar competition?	72.7	0.5795485	0.580281534	0.579758726
Central concern: superpower/bipolar competition, or linked to it?	84.2	0.659938617	0.660412234	0.660108647
Communist character	78.4	0.588542823	0.588830661	0.588748551
Communist threat	80.6	0.505999307	0.507113821	0.506246308
Bloc relations	70.9	0.473809358	0.478561906	0.474072453
Communist world	75.5	0.541931069	0.542151923	0.542160104
Allies necessary?	75.2	0.426137139	0.430369571	0.426424071
Allies reliable/unified?	69.3	0.38002906	0.391985297	0.380339045
Domino theory	86.6	0.576262477	0.57847054	0.576474346
US leadership role	77.3	0.251906485	0.282240674	0.252280532
US financial/military commitments	79.8	0.433676352	0.433848569	0.433959513
US diplomatic engagements/commitments	77.4	0.316595983	0.317696713	0.316937685
Foreign aid	90.8	0.637015717	0.63736411	0.637197209
US past leadership/interventions	78.7	0.414354904	0.415889452	0.414647726
US future leadership/interventions	71.2	0.428404146	0.431478334	0.428689944
<b>Chicago Tribune</b>				
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Percent Agreement</i>	<i>Scott's Pi</i>	<i>Cohen's Kappa</i>	<i>Krippendorff's Alpha</i>
Central concern: superpower/bipolar competition?	89.4	0.708109037	0.708184916	0.708291698
Central concern: linked to superpower/bipolar competition?	71.8	0.568064525	0.568470955	0.568334823
Central concern: superpower/bipolar competition, or linked to it?	81.7	0.599345374	0.599634827	0.599596096
Communist character	76.3	0.528847414	0.5316588	0.529142253
Communist threat	80.1	0.549856762	0.550508964	0.550138454
Bloc relations	66.0	0.382594417	0.393241927	0.382980779
Communist world	73.8	0.505276349	0.507425881	0.505585938
Allies necessary?	82.7	0.35771143	0.363133332	0.358113363
Allies reliable/unified?	74.3	0.403219724	0.409956124	0.403593179
Domino theory	81.2	0.463970642	0.464857407	0.46430608
US leadership role	77.2	-0.022835097	0.050567043	-0.022195025
US financial/military commitments	79.5	0.457512322	0.461406617	0.457851801
US diplomatic engagements/commitments	80.7	0.29076845	0.303005585	0.291212275
Foreign aid	90.7	0.513808429	0.517700992	0.514112679
US past leadership/interventions	71.3	0.277038787	0.290182797	0.277491204
US future leadership/interventions	62.2	0.162502863	0.185131653	0.163026954


#### 4. Additional content analysis data

The figures below substantiate particular claims made in the article text and/or were promised in the article's notes. For further related data and figures, see also Ronald R. Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of US National Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), chapter 6.






**Figure A.3**  
**Superpower Competition: Central Concern?**  
**Editorial Differences, with Lowess Line**







**Figure A.4**  
**Central Concern Linked to Cold War?**  
**Editorial Differences, with Lowess Line**




**Figure A.5**  
**Unity of Global Communism**




**Figure A.6**  
**Domino Theory**



**Figure A.7**  
**Character of Communist Powers:**  
**Editorial Coverage**



**Figure A.8**  
**West-Communist Relations:**  
**Editorial Coverage**



## References

- Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. Reliability in Content Analysis: Some Common Misconceptions and Recommendations. *Human Communication Research* 30 (3):411-433.
- Landis, J. Richard, and Gary G. Koch. 1977. The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data. *Biometrics* 33 (1):159-174.
- Stemler, Steven E., and Jessica Tsai. 2008. Best Practices in Interrater Reliability: Three Common Approaches. In *Best Practices in Quantitative Methods*, edited by Jason Osborne, 29-49. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Uebersax, John. 2013. "Statistical Methods for Rater and Diagnostic Agreement." <http://www.john-uebersax.com/stat/agree.htm>, accessed on 22 May 2013.