Web Appendix for

What Is Litigation in the World Trade Organization Worth?*

forthcoming in *International Organization*

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A Coding of Conflicts and Country Status

The WTO Dispute Settlement Online Gateway lists the disputes we analyze (`http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm`, see also Horn and Mavroidis (2008)).

For each dispute, one or multiple complainants initiated a dispute against a single defendant. To code the set of interested third countries that are not formal complainants in a dispute, we identify the countries that officially participated as third party in a dispute for which a panel was established. This information is available from the WTO DS Gateway.

Several WTO disputes are related, i.e., the same or different complainants initiate multiple disputes that address the same or very similar trade barriers imposed by the same defendant. This entails several complications. First, a country may appear multiple times as a complainant in related disputes because it initiated two different disputes on the same matter, but only pursues one of the two further. Thus, a particular dispute may *de iure* have ended after consultations, but *de facto* the conflict escalated to the panel stage via a second dispute on the same matter.[1] Second, a country can be a third party (and not a formal complainant) in one dispute, but simultaneously file a dispute against the same defendant on the same issue.[2] Thus, a country can be a third party and a formal complainant in two related disputes with the same defendant. This means that we would treat a country as non-complainant, although it is a de facto complainant (because it participates as complainant in a different, related dispute). It is important for our research to distinguish between those third parties that remain observers and those that initiate their own dispute.

To address this problem, we code whether disputes are related, i.e., if different disputes listed by the WTO address the same disputed trade measure by a defendant. The dispute descriptions on the WTO Dispute Settlement Gateway explicitly note which conflicts are related conflicts.[3] Disputes that, according to the Gateway information, are identified as related generally have

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[1]There are 23 pairs of disputes that represent such multiple initiations. For a detailed list, see below.

[2]Examples are disputes DS248, DS249, DS251, DS252, DS253, DS254, DS258 and DS259.

[3]As an example, Venezuela and Brazil filed formally separate complaints against the United States in early 1995 (DS2 and DS4). But the Gateway descriptions for the two disputes indicates that "Venezuela requested consultations on 24 January 1995 and Brazil on 10 April 1995" (`http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds2_e.htm`), which allows us to infer that DS2 and DS4 are related despite being formally different disputes. The same applies to other related disputes.

the same defendant (as we would expect), except 11 pairs of related disputes.[4] For a fair amount of those, the two different defendants are the European Union and an EU country.[5] We treat those as a single dispute with the EU as defendant. In other cases, the defendant initiated a dispute against one of the principal complainants in a previous dispute.[6] We treat those as separate conflicts. In other words, if some of the multiple, related disputes have the same defendant, we treat them as related. If they have different defendants, we treat them as unrelated.[7]

The data show that there is considerable overlap between our coding of related disputes and the establishment of a common (cross-dispute) panel (if a panel was requested). 20 pairs of related disputes with a total of 52 dyads have a common panel. 10 pairs of disputes with a total of 24 dyads have separate panels although the disputes are coded as being related.[8] We re-checked all of them, but the re-analysis shows that they are all closely related despite separate panels.[9]

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[4](DS16; DS27; DS158; DS165), (DS26; DS39; DS48; DS320; DS321), (DS62; DS67; DS68), (DS82; DS115), (DS99; DS296; DS299; DS336), (DS124; DS125), (DS166; DS223), (DS172; DS173), (DS248; DS249; DS251; DS252; DS253; DS254; DS258; DS259; DS260; DS274), (DS273; DS301; DS307) and (DS316; DS317).

[5](DS62; DS67; DS68), (DS82; DS115), (DS124; DS125) and (DS172; DS173)

[6](DS158; DS165), (DS166; DS223), (DS273; DS301) and (DS316; DS317)

[7]In two instances, there is a mix of the two cases described in this paragraph: (DS26; DS39; DS48; DS320; DS321) are officially related, but (DS26; DS48) are by the United States and Canada against the EU (the 'hormones' case), while (DS39; DS320; DS321) are by the EU against the U.S. and Canada to remove retaliatory measures in the 'hormones' case. We treat the first two disputes as related and the latter three as distinct disputes. Similarly, (DS248; DS249; DS251; DS252; DS253; DS254; DS258; DS259; DS260; DS274) are related, with (DS248; DS249; DS251; DS252; DS253; DS254; DS258; DS259, DS274) being initiated by different countries against the United States (the 'steel' case) and DS260 being initiated by the United States against the EU, which is one of the previous complainants against the U.S. (DS248). We treat all of the related except DS260, which is the only one not against the United States. In one instance, the same complainant initiated a series of related disputes against different defendants (DS99; DS296; DS299; DS336). We treat these are separate (unrelated) disputes.

[8]This is the case for the following disputes: (DS7; DS12; DS14), (DS18; DS21), (DS26; DS48), (DS32; DS33), (DS50; DS79), (DS56; DS77), (DS106; DS126), (DS121; DS164), (DS138; DS212; DS213) and (DS236; DS257; DS264; DS277)

[9]As an example, the WTO Gateway reports that DS7, DS12 and DS14 are related ("Complaints by Canada, Peru and Chile"). Nonetheless, two separate panels were established:

Once we identified the related disputes, we examine whether countries appear multiple times as third parties in related disputes. If countries appear multiple times, we always code the highest possible status that a country reached in these related disputes. Specifically, if a country appears multiple times in related disputes because it is a third party in one dispute, but a formal complainant in another related dispute, we treat this country as a formal complainant in this conflict.[10]

For a considerable number of cases, there exist multiple dispute initiations by the same complainant against the same defendant on related issues.[11] This is because countries sometimes filed two disputes against the same defendant on (almost) the same case, but only one was pursued further, for different reasons.[12] As before, we code the highest status that a complainant reaches for all related disputes. For instance, if no panel was requested for the first dispute, but for the second, we only consider the dispute with the panel. If no ruling occurs for the first dispute, but for the second, we only consider the dispute with the ruling.

We use the date when the dispute that reached the highest status was initiated as the start

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"A panel was established at the request of Canada on 19 July 1995. A joint panel was established on 11 October 1995 at the request of Peru and Chile on the same subject." See `http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds7_e.htm`. The same for (DS26; DS48), (DS32; DS33), (DS50; DS79), (DS56; DS77), (DS106; DS126) and (DS121; DS164).

[10]I.e. we erase the observation in which the country is a third party in a related dispute and only keep the one where it is a complainant.

[11](DS3; DS41), (DS16; DS27), (DS32; DS33), (DS44; DS45), (DS55; DS64), (DS60; DS156); (DS74; DS102), (DS85; DS151), (DS87; DS110), (DS101; DS132), (DS106; DS126), (DS140; DS141), (DS149; DS279), (DS171; DS196), (DS182; DS191), (DS185; DS187), (DS212; DS213), (DS228; DS230), (DS236; DS247; DS257; DS264; DS277; DS311), (DS270; DS271), (DS300; DS302), (DS314; DS341), (DS324; DS343) and (DS325; DS344).

[12]For instance, it happened that the complainants refiled the case to include a country that joined the WTO in the meantime, e.g. in the 'banana case' (DS16; DS27) when Ecuador only joined the WTO after the initial dispute was filed. Sometimes, the allegations show minor differences in the argumentation, but only one dispute (presumably the one with the argumentation that looked more promising) was then pursued further, e.g. (DS44; DS45), (DS140; DS141), (DS270; DS271) and (DS300; DS302). In other cases, the first dispute was initiated against a provisional trade barrier by the defendant, and the second dispute was initiated against the definite adoption of the same trade barrier, e.g. (DS314; DS341), (DS101; DS132) and (DS324; DS343).

date. If both disputes reach the same escalation level, we use the dispute that started later. A re-analysis of all multiple initiations shows that all of them in fact deal with the same issue. With a few exceptions, all of them were initiated closely to each other (6 months or less). Two addressed the same issue, but for explicitly different time periods. We therefore treat them as separate conflicts.[13]

Following Busch and Pelc (2010) we also code whether a third party takes sides with the complainant or the defendant party or whether it remains neutral. This information is taken from the official panel reports which also records whether third parties have filed written submissions or made oral statements in which they support one of the conflict parties' legal arguments. We coded a third party as pro-complainant if it supported the position of the principal complainant party. Similarly, a third party was coded as pro-defendant if it supported the position of the principal defendant. If a third party did not support any conflict party or provided arguments in favor of or against both parties, we coded it as neutral.[14]

B   Predictors for Propensity Matching

Against the background of the theoretical literature we estimated a series of models to identify predictors for estimating the propensity score. For transparency reasons we report the results in tables A-1 and A-2. Table A-1 reports models which predict whether a country requests consultations, i.e., becomes a formal complainant at the WTO, or requests the status of a third

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[13]DS149 and DS279 were initiated with considerable temporal distance (October 1998 and December 2001), and the second concerned the new Indian trade policy as of 2002. Therefore, we treat the as separate. The same applies to DS60 and DS156. Note that the block of disputes (DS236; DS247; DS257; DS264; DS277; DS311) also are distributed over a fairly long period of time (August 2001 - April 2004). However, in the end, they were all resolved at once through a mutually agreed solution between Canada and the United States in September 2006.

[14]As an example, consider DS 27, in which Japan was a third party. We code Japan as a pro-defendant third parties because, according to the panel report, "[...] Japan believed that the Licensing Agreement was not applicable to tariff quota systems. Japan therefore requested that the Panel find that the tariff quota system at dispute was not covered by the Licensing Agreement and thereby did not cause any consistency problems to the Licensing Agreement."

party in a particular conflict. Table A-2 presents models that assess which variables predict whether a country requests a ruling, given that it has requested formal consultations. The choice of predictors follows from previous research on dispute initiations and escalation. For the choice to (co-)initiate a dispute at the WTO or to participate as an observers (joining or third party) only, power and capacity should play an important role. Similarly, democratic rule is likely to affect the probability of dispute initiation.

The specification in the first column of Table A-1 presents the most useful baseline specification to explain the request of consultations. Larger countries tend to participate as formal complainant more often than smaller countries. Similarly, countries are less likely to formally participate in a dispute, the larger the defendant country. In other words, stronger countries tend to litigate more and weaker countries observe more, and strong violators of WTO regulations face fewer formal litigants and more observers instead. Using more explicit power variables that measure dyadic power relations (the relative power as measure by the difference between complainant and defendant size and power asymmetries as measured by the absolute value of relative power) also show statistically significant effects if used separately. However, their effects are less robust than the effect of separate country sizes. We therefore include the latter.[15]

The specifications also include the legal capacity of the potential complainant as measured by the size of the country's delegation in the WTO mission in Geneva. The coefficient on this variable shows that countries with less legal capacity are less likely to initiate formal complaints, and are more likely to participate as observers instead. We also tested whether the legal capacity of the defendant predicts assignment to treatment, but the results did not confirm this. This appears plausible since theoretically, one would expect the legal capacity of the potential dispute initiator to matter the most. Finally, countries are more likely to participate as formal litigants, the more democratic they are. Again, the democracy level

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[15]It is not possible to include both GPD of C and D and their difference into the same model because of perfect collinearity. Power asymmetry is not robust to the inclusion of other variables.

of the defendant did not show a statistically significant impact. As additional or alternative relevant variables, we used countries' GDP per capita, their dependence from trade with the potential opponent and retaliatory power of the potential litigant. The impact of these variables was small and/or not robust.[16]

The disproportionate appearance of the EU and the U.S. in WTO dispute as Defendants, Complainants and joining/third parties may have a significant impact on the results. We therefore re-estimate the results and gradually drop the EU and the U.S. as actor in the WTO DSB. The second column presents the results for the basic specification for a dataset without the EU and U.S. as observers (Joining/third parties). As we can infer, the results hold and become considerably stronger. This is because the EU and the U.S. often participate as observers although, contrary to the average joining/third party, they are strong and have a highly sophisticated legal machinery. For the specification in the third column, we drop the EU and the U.S. as observers and as formal complainants. For the fourth column, we also drop the EU and the U.S. as defendants. The results are robust to these changes and, with some differences, are quite similar to those in the first column. Finally, we examined if the economic sector or the disputed trade barrier affect the probability of formal litigation, but this is not the case. The excluded category for the sector dummies is simple manufacturing. The excluded category for trade barrier dummies is tariffs and quota.

The specification in the first column of Table A-2 presents the basic specification to explain the request of a panel ruling given that a country participates as formal complainant in the WTO. The results show that conflicts that attract a greater number of formal complainants are also more likely to proceed to the panel stage. And as before, the sizes of the disputants have a large effect on dispute escalation to the panel stage, but different than before. Among the set of countries that are able and willing to litigate, complainant and defendant size have a positive effect on the probability of a ruling. This means that large countries are less likely to give up after consultations and request a ruling if the outcome of consultations is not satisfactory.

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[16]Trade dependence and retaliatory power is highly correlated with country size, which we include in our models.

Similarly, larger defendants are less likely to give in on the consultation stage, which forces the complainant to ask for support from a panel.

The second and third columns again examine the sensitivity of the results with respect to EU/U.S. participation. Without these actors as complainants and defendants, we get largely similar results. We again examined the effect of other variables reflecting power, legal capacity etc., but they did not have a statistically significant or robust effect. Finally, we examined the role of economic sectors and disputed trade barriers. While the sector does not play a major role, we find that the probability of escalation to the panel stage differs significantly with the type of trade barrier used by the defendant. The excluded category for the sector dummies is simple manufacturing. We exclude the indicator variable for tariffs and quotas.

C   Nearest-neighbor Matching

In the main paper we reported results based on a propensity score matching approach to estimate the effects of third party status on trade gains. We now explore the robustness of our results by re-estimating the effects using a nearest-neighbor matching approach in which we directly condition on the most relevant covariates that help predicting third party status. We start by examining the pre- and post-matching balance of the potentially confounding factors identified above. Figure A-3 displays the standardized means of the potentially confounding variables prior to matching for treatment (black dots) and control units (grey dots). We find that third party disputes systematically differ from principal party disputes with respect to these potentially confounding factors. Before matching, the set of potential control cases have less exports from the complainant to the defendant prior to the ruling (Pre-ruling sect. trade) than the treated disputes (third party disputes). Second, conflict intensity is slightly higher for principal party disputes than for third party disputes. While the defendant country's level of wealth (GDP(D)) in third party disputes almost equals the level we observe in principal party disputes, we find a pronounced differences between the complaint country's level of GDP.

The right panel in Figure A-3 shows the standardized means after matching. We find that the matching algorithm considerably reduced the covariate imbalance between treatment and control disputes. This increases our confidence that differences between sectoral trade flows for principal versus third party disputes do not merely reflect covariate imbalances.

Figure A-5 plots the results based on our nearest-neighbor matching approach. Again, we do not find a significant difference between exports to the defendant if we compare third parties and principal parties.

To again explore the potential heterogeneity in the effects of third party status across different types of third parties, we repeat our analysis for pro-complainant and pro-defendant third parties separately. We first explore the pre-matching imbalances between treatment and control groups. The left panels in Figure A-4 in the Appendix report these pre-matching imbalances. We find systematic differences between both pro-complainant as compared to neutral third party dispute dyads and pro-defendant as compared to neutral third party dispute dyads. These differences are most pronounced with respect to conflict intensity and countries' levels of GDP. The right panels in Figure A-4 show that matching on these covariates reduces the imbalance considerably. Therefore, estimating the effect based on the matched data appears justified.

We now examine whether we can replicate our result of pro-complainant third parties gaining more than neutral third parties if we use nearest-neighbor matching. The left panel in Figure A-6 shows the treatment effects. Again, we find that pro-complainant third parties enjoy significant increases in exports to the defendant in the four years after a ruling. The results are very similar to those we reported above. Exports increase by about $2.2 billion in the first year after a ruling if compared with exports of neutral third parties that are observably similar with respect to potentially confounding variables. This constitutes a 7% increase if compared to average sectoral trade flows in the four years prior to a ruling. In the second year, the treatment effect is slightly larger, estimated at about $3 billion, which equals a 9% increase over exports in the four years pre-ruling period. The effect on sectoral trading volume

equals $1.4 and $1 billion in the third and fourth year, respectively. All these point estimates are significantly different from zero. Thus, in the four years following a ruling, pro-complainant third parties experience a noteworthy increase in sectoral exports to the defendant country that exceeds those of neutral third parties by about $8 billion. This represents a 25% increase relative to sectoral exports in the four years preceding a ruling. As the right panel in Figure A-6 shows, also our initial results for pro-defendant third parties remain unchanged: Almost all point estimates are insignificant and substantively small suggesting that pro-defendant third parties do not gain more than neutral third parties.

Overall, these results do not only lend support to the view that third parties enjoy the same benefits from WTO litigation as principal parties. The findings also suggest that WTO litigation has pronounced distributive effects, since pro-complainant third parties gain considerably more than neutral third parties. This is consistent with the argument that pro-complainant third party countries enjoy positive externalities produced by the legal efforts of principal party countries.

D   The Trade Effects of WTO Litigation Across Policy Instruments

We now further examine the distribution of the economic gains from third party status in WTO litigation. In particular, we are interested in the whether the gains in trade are distributed equally across principal and third parties once we account for the type of protectionist policy instrument (e.g., anti-dumping measures or subsidies) being challenged? For example, do principal and third party countries benefit to the same extent from WTO panel verdicts on anti-dumping measures or are the gains distributed unequally? One might argue that anti-dumping cases typically aim at reducing import competition from large producers in a few specific countries while subsidies tend to protect domestic companies from a more diverse and larger set of mostly smaller competitors located in many different countries. This suggests that

for anti-dumping cases the export gains in the aftermath of a WTO panel ruling should be more concentrated, i.e., less equally distributed, while the removal of subsidies should result in benefits that are largely equally distributed between principal and third parties.

To explore the empirical merit of this argument we re-estimate the results by policy instrument. We distinguish between anti-dumping measures, subsidies, and a residual category.[17] Figure A-7 reports the results. The results reported in the left panel in Figure A-7 suggests that the economic gains are indeed less equally distributed in the case of anti-dumping measures, as third parties tend to experience a stronger increase in exports to the defendant country on average than principal parties. The middle panel of Figure A-7 suggests that in the first two years after a ruling third party countries and principal parties benefit equally, on average, from a verdict that declares subsidies as illegal. While we find significant trade increases for third parties in years three and four after a ruling, we interpret these with great caution, since there are only few observations of dispute dyads that involve subsidies (69, see Table A-3 in the Appendix). Due to missing data on outcome and matching variables we are eventually left with only 21 observations to estimate these effects.[18] Finally, as the right panel in Figure A-7 shows, when considering policy instruments other than anti-dumping measures or subsidies, third and principal parties do not gain systematically more or less. This results seems particularly relevant since more than half of the country dyads we examine have disputes over protectionist policy instruments that fall in this category (287 out of 508).

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[17]Anti-dumping measures and subsidies also are the two empirically most frequent instruments in our data (Table A-3 in the Appendix reports the distribution of policy instruments in detail).

[18]Moreover, when examining the covariate balance for this subgroup, we find that the balance remains unsatisfactory.

Appendix Figures

Figure A-1: Distribution of Propensity Score: Pro Complainant versus Pro Defendant Third Parties

Graphs by Pro complainant third party (vs pro defendant)

Figure A-2: Covariate Balance Before and After Matching: WTO Dyads with Ruling versus All WTO Dyads

*Note:* Left panels show the means of the variables in the treatment and control groups prior to matching (bootstrapped with 1,000 repetitions), the right panels show the same quantities after matching. The treatment group are all country dyad-sector observations that experienced a WTO panel ruling. The control group consists of all WTO member country dyad-sector observations that did not experience a trade dispute and ruling.

Figure A-3: Covariate Balance Before and After Matching: Third versus Principal Parties


Note: The left panel shows the standardized means of the variables in the treatment (third party status) and control groups (principal party status) prior to matching, the right panel show the same quantities after matching. Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A-4: Covariate Balance Before and After Matching: Pro Complainant Third Parties and Pro Defendant Third Parties versus Neutral Third Parties

(a) Pro-complainant third parties vs. neutral third parties

(b) Pro-defendant third parties vs. neutral third parties

Note: Left panels show the standardized means of the variables in the treatment and control groups prior to matching, the right panels show the same quantities after matching. The upper two panels (a) show the results for pro complainant third parties (treated) versus neutral third parties (control), the lower two panels (b) shows the results for pro defendant third parties (treated) and neutral third parties (control). The control group consists of neutral third party observations.

Figure A-5: WTO Panel Rulings: The Effect of Third Party Status (Third Parties vs. Principal Parties – Nearest-neighbor Matching)

Note: Average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) on trading volume in the sector under dispute in the years after a ruling based on nearest-neighbor covariate matching. Matching variables: Pre-ruling sectoral trade, conflict intensity (number of complainants), GDP of complainant country, GDP of defendant country). Vertical lines depict 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A-6: WTO Panel Rulings: Pro Complainant and Pro Defendant versus Neutral Third Parties (Nearest-neighbor Matching)

*Note:* Average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) on trading volume in the sector under dispute in the four years after a ruling based on nearest-neighbor covariate matching. Matching variables: Pre-ruling sectoral trade, conflict intensity (number of complainants), GDP of complainant country, GDP of defendant country). Vertical lines depict 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A-7: WTO Panel Rulings: The Effect of Third Party Status (Third Parties vs. Principal Parties) by Policy Instruments

Note: Average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) on trading volume in the sector under dispute in the years after a ruling by challenged policy instrument. Results based on propensity score matching using the following set covariates: Pre-ruling sectoral exports from the complainant to the defendant, *GDP* of complainant country, *GDP* of defendant country, joint democracy, conflict intensity, safeguards, subsidies, and sector dummy variables that distinguish between agriculture, resource processing and simple manufacturing, complex manufacturing, and services. Vertical lines depict 95% confidence intervals.

Appendix Tables

Table A-1: The Correlates of WTO Consultations

	Basic	No EU/U.S. Non-Comp.	No EU/U.S. Comp.	No EU/U.S. Defendants	Sectors	Barriers
GDP C	0.131	0.365	0.121	0.165	0.132	0.129
	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.072)	(0.032)	(0.032)
GDP D	-0.052	-0.105	-0.082	-0.268	-0.052	-0.050
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.079)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Capacity C	-0.045	-0.078	-0.043	-0.051	-0.046	-0.044
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Democracy C	0.053	0.087	0.050	0.056	0.053	0.052
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Agriculture					0.002	
					(0.117)	
Manufacture					0.006	
					(0.137)	
Services					-0.229	
					(0.272)	
AD/CVD						-0.100
						(0.164)
Regulations						-0.089
						(0.167)
Safeguards						0.175
						(0.194)
Subsidies						-0.462
						(0.217)
Various						-0.213
						(0.184)
Constant	-1.546	-3.674	-0.994	0.793	-1.566	-1.459
	(0.592)	(0.678)	(0.735)	(1.219)	(0.611)	(0.617)
Chi2	45.13	141.48	27.14	25.55	45.94	55.34
Pseudo R^2	0.047	0.162	0.040	0.085	0.048	0.058
LL	-455.18	-365.93	-324.05	-138.36	-454.77	-450.07
N	786	679	597	259	786	786

Coefficients from probit regressions. Standard errors in parantheses

Table A-2: The Correlates of WTO Panel Rulings

	Basic	No EU/U.S. Complainants	No EU/U.S. Defendants	Sectors	Barriers
Conflict Intensity	0.185	0.149	0.382	0.183	0.171
	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.168)	(0.058)	(0.064)
GDP C	0.082	0.042	0.112	0.082	0.090
	(0.048)	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.049)	(0.050)
GDP D	0.146	0.198	0.209	0.147	0.154
	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.112)	(0.053)	(0.057)
Agriculture				-0.143	
				(0.208)	
Manufacture				-0.114	
				(0.245)	
Services				-0.447	
				(0.461)	
AD/CVD					0.587
					(0.292)
Regulations					0.335
					(0.292)
Safeguards					0.517
					(0.343)
Subsidies					1.482
					(0.487)
Various					1.097
					(0.346)
Constant	-3.664	-3.841	-5.140	-3.558	-4.397
	(1.014)	(1.295)	(1.401)	(1.042)	(1.106)
Chi2	29.82	26.42	21.60	30.98	47.89
Pseudo R^2	0.093	0.126	0.122	0.096	0.149
LL	-145.76	-91.68	-77.44	-145.18	-136.73
N	232	152	130	232	232

Coefficients from probit regressions. Standard errors in parantheses

Table A-3: Distribution of Policy Instruments across Dispute Dyads

Policy Instrument	Frequency	Percent
Anti-dumping/CVD	152	29.9
Health/Safety Regulations	13	2.5
Outright Bans	26	5.1
Product Classification	17	3.3
Prohibitive Law	42	8.2
Quotas	4	0.7
Safeguards	50	9.8
Subsidies	69	13.5
Tariffs	29	5.7
Various	106	20.8
Total	508	100

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