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"Human Rights, Geostrategy and EU Foreign Policy, 1989-2008"

International Organization

Supplementary material.

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- 4. S4 replicates Table II in the paper with alternative coding for trade and alliances
- 5. S5 explores the effect of different types of CIRI subcomponents, and the effect of worsening human rights violations in countries where killings, torture, disappearances or political imprisonment at least "occasionally occurred" the preceding year.

S1. EU Economic Intervention

	1		2		3		4		Ę	5	6		7		8		9		10		11	
DV: Economic Intervention onset	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Physical Integrity Score	24	.1																				
One-Sided Violence (ln)			.2	.08	.23	.10	.30	.09	.2	.08	.29	.134	.25	.12	.32	.1	.36	.13	.36	.13	.43	.14
Economic power					.00	.00					.00	.00	00	.00			00	.00	00	.00	00	.00
Military power					04	.07					06	.12	09	.11			11	.12	11	.12	07	.12
Alliance					-1.55	.66					92	.99	-2.02	.71			-1.14	.9	-1.15	.9	83	1.02
Regime type							13	.07			14	.11			16	.07	21	.11	21	.11	18	.11
Regime type (sq)							00	.01			.00	.01			01	.01	00	.02	00	.02	00	.02
Trade							.45	.15			1.19	.71			.14	.27	1.95	1.41	1.97	1.41	1.61	1.46
EU opinion (t-1)									.87	4.51	'79	5.0										
EP elections									01	.51	1.47	1.01										
EU power elections									50	.42	06	1.02										
Year	03	.03	04	.03	03	.04	05	.05	04	.05	.01	.04										
UN action (t-1)																			.12	1.18		
US action (t-1)																					08	1.25
Constant	49.21	62.61	76.12	66.73	56.9	79.49	93.21	102.80	67.42	96.2	-16.97	87.09	-4.82	.73	-5.78	.61	-6.16	1.14	-6.18	1.15	-6.40	1.33
N	2,654		2,7	14	2,1	191	2,2	287	2,6	85	1,8	80	2,1	.91	2,2	287	1,8	881	1,8	880	1,7	714
Random effect Standard deviation													1.21	.61	0.00	.45	0.00	.49	0.00	.49	0.00	.60
Log likelihood													-86	.90	-6.	5.0	-31	.61	-31	1.60	-26	5.32
Data Structure	TS	CS	TS	CS	TS	SCS	TS	SCS	TS	CS	TS	CS	Mult	ilevel								

S2. EU Military Intervention

		1	2		3		4			5	6	*	7		8		9		10		11*	
DV: military intervention onset	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Physical Integrity Score	43	.24																				
One-Sided Violence (ln)			.51	.09	.34	.14	.41	.11	.54	.09			.42	.17	.46	.14	.38	.2	.35	.21		
Economic power					.00	.00							.00	.00			.00	.00	.00	.00		
Military power					.00	.00							.01	.00			.01	.03	.01	.03		
Alliance					1.45	.34							1.27	.96			3.42	3.23	3.41	3.17		
Regime type							04	.09							04	.10	.67	.64	.58	.62		
Regime type (sq)							01	.03							02	.02	15	.12	14	.11		
Trade							.34	.09							.41	.17	.23	1.09	.29	1.11		
EU opinion (t-1)									-9.01	7.12												
EP elections									88	1.08												
EU power elections									-1.45	.82												
Year	.02	.04	.06	.03	03	.06	.03	.05	02	.04												
UN action (t-1)																			1.77	1.5		
US action (t-1)																						
Constant	-50.41	82.81	-132.25	62.89	56.26	118.92	-58.42	99.10	45.17	76.42			-8.83	1.43	-6.88	1.0	-9.29	3.39	-9.63	3.35		
N	2,	794	2,8	359	2,	298	2,3	373	2,	830			2,2	298	2,	373	1,9	934	1,	933		
Random effect Standard deviation													0.00	.88	0.00	.64	0.00	.76	0.00	.69		
Log likelihood													-16.71		-27.32		-13.88		-13.24			
Data Structure	TS	SCS	TS	CS	TS	SCS	TS	SCS	T	SCS			Mult	tilevel	Mul	tilevel	Mult	tilevel	Mul	tilevel		

^{*} Model would not converge.

S3. EU Peace Operation

	1		2		3		4			5	6*	7	,	8		9		10		11	
DV: Peace operation onset	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef. S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Physical Integrity Score	2	.12																			
One-Sided Violence (ln)			.29	.12	.25	.14	.29	.19	.3	.13		.23	.12	.25	.15	.24	.14	.17	.15	.43	.20
Economic power					00	.01						00	.01			00	.00	00	.00	.00	.00
Military power					.06	.12						04	.11			.03	.09	.01	.07	.02	.11
Alliance					6	.61						59	.61			24	.77	15	.77	-1.67	1.26
Regime type							.1	.10						.19	.13	.18	.13	.19	.13	.26	.26
Regime type (sq)							02	.02						03	.02	04	.02	03	.02	03	.03
Trade							.83	.49						42	1.01	84	1.67	36	1.49	96	1.92
EU opinion (t-1)									3.89	4.67											
EP elections									.4	.87											
EU power elections									.08	.51											
Year	.22	.06	.26	.07	.25	.08	.22	.10	.22	.06											
UN action (t-1)																		2.43	.81		
US action (t-1)																				-15.76	2167.7
Constant	-438.68	111.37	-516.57	131.81	-512.0	155.04	-447.9	202.79	-457.58	130.79		-5.16	.60	-5.41	.70	-4.86	.91	-5.74	1.01	-5.52	1.47
N	2,7	771	2,8	39	2,	274	2,3	363	2,8	810		2,2	74	2,3	63	1,9	23	1,9	22	1,	749
Random effect Standard deviation												.72	.48	0.00	.61	0.00	.89	0.00	.82	.00	11.62
Log likelihood												-76.53		-43.59		-42.15		-37.96		-23.5	
Data Structure	TS	SCS	TS	CS	TS	SCS	TS	SCS	TS	SCS		Mult	level	Multi	level	Multi	level	Multi	level	Mult	ilevel

^{*} Model would not converge.

S4. Alternative coding for alliances and trade

	1	a	1b		2a		2	lb		3a	3b		4a			4b
DV	EU	only	EU	plus	EU	only	EU	plus	EU	only	EU	plus	EU only		EU plus	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
One-Sided Violence (ln)	.23	.09	.22	.08	.19	.08	.21	.06	.30	.1	.28	.09	.16	.10	.19	.08
Economic power	00	.00	.00	.00					.00	.00	.00	.00	00	.01	.00	.00
Military power	01	.06	.00	.00					02	.05	.00	.01	07	.10	.00	.00
Alliance (count)													95	.47	85	.43
Alliance (dichotomous)	-1.01	.46	79	.44					55	.62	45	.57				
Regime type					07	.04	05	.03	09	.05	05	.05	06	.04	04	.04
Regime type (sq)					.00	.01	00	.01	00	.01	01	.01	.00	.01	01	.01
Trade (1988)									.7	.37	.08	.21				
Trade (2011)					9.4	13.94	13.02	8.63					33.40	21.37	6.9	15.43
EU opinion (t-1)									12.51	6.75	3.00	5.43	3.15	5.16	3.01	4.83
EP elections									1.47	.71	.59	.67	.65	.62	.39	.52
EU power elections									.35	.68	00	.62	41	.51	3	.43
Year	.09	.04	.04	.03	.06	.03	.05	.03	.19	.07	.08	.06	.12	.05	.06	.04
Constant	-180.79	78.89	-88.64	62.92	-129.62	59.45	-102.97	55.38	-394.86	149.19	-167.76	123.82	-241.27	108.49	-133.74	83.04
N	2,2	11	2,	149	2,5	505	2,445		1,873		1,855		2,020		1,	,963

^{*}significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, significant at 1%. Robust standard errors clustered on country. Estimations performed using Stata 12.

S5. CIRI subcomponents, and sequencing of HR violations

			2		,	3		4		5		5	7			8
DV	EU only	EU plus	EU only	EU plus	EU only	EU plus	EU only	EU plus	EU only	EU plus						
Cases included	All		All		All		All		Subset (Killings <2)		Subset (Torture <2)			(Disap	Subset	(Pol pris
Killings	006***	004***														
	(.001)	(.001)														
Torture			007***	004***												
			(.001)	(.001)												
Disapperances					005***	003***										
					(.001)	(.001)										
Political prisoners							006***	003***								
							(.001)	(.001)								
Worse physint									.34	.14	.62	.52	.55	.44	.74*	.60
									(.48)	(.48)	(.40)	(.40)	(.62)	(.60)	(.41)	(.41)
Year	.05*	.04	.05*	.04	.05*	.04	.05*	.04	.04	.03	.05	.04	.01	.02	.06*	.06*
	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.06)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)
Constant	-106.77*	-81.60	-106.84*	-81.65	-105.36*	-78.78	-106.65*	-81.08	-88.39	-68.46	-100.96	-89.77	-27.1	-39.25 (104.38	-130.69*	-126.05*
	(56.01)	(49.8)	(56.0)	(49.79)	(55.72)	(49.46)	(55.96)	(49.74)	(86.08)	(74.22)	(77.9)	(67.01)	(110.9))	(74.51)	(71.28)
N	2747	2680	2747	2680	2747	2680	2747	2680	1433	1403	2226	2167	653	643	1554	1512

^{*} Worse physint is a dichotomous variable indicating that the physical integrity score for the country indicate less human rights abuse in year t than in t-1