**Online Appendix**

**Counterfactuals: Who Are These Missing Proliferators?**

If the argument advanced in the paper is correct, there must be states that would have pursued nuclear weapons in the absence of a U.S. sanctions policy. While it is impossible to definitively identify the “dogs that do not bark,” as the literature on deterrence suggests, [[1]](#footnote-1) it is possible to use the statistical models to generate educated guesses. In order to identify these countries, I compare predicted probabilities from two models: a “no sanctions model” that includes the control variables but omits the dependence score, post-1976 dummy, and their interaction—simulating a world where the U.S. did not impose a sanctions regime after 1976—as well as the “sanctions model” that includes all controls along with the dependence score variable, post-1976 dummy, and associated interaction. I then isolated the country-years in the post-1976 era where the “no sanctions model” predicted at least a 2.5% probability of pursuing nuclear weapons (the median probability for states that *did* pursue nuclear weapons) and narrowed this list down to country-years where the “sanctions model” predicted at least a 25% lower risk of proliferation. These country-years are summarized in Table A1 below. The point is not that all of these countries would have pursued nuclear weapons in the absence of a sanctions policy—indeed, the absolute probability in all cases is still relatively low since proliferation is a rare event, and such counterfactuals can never be fully verified. However, supporting the theoretical argument, there is suggestive evidence that several of these countries had an interest in nuclear weapons and that several may have been deterred by the prospect of U.S sanctions.

For example, although the U.S. had initially encouraged Iranian nuclear development, providing a small research reactor and hot cells in the 1960s,[[2]](#footnote-2) the change in U.S. nonproliferation policy in the 1970s led to a change in the nuclear relationship with Iran. In 1977, when the model predicts a significant risk of proliferation in the absence of a sanctions policy, the Shah of Iran was in fact exploring nuclear weapons and attempting to acquire an independent nuclear reprocessing capability.[[3]](#footnote-3) However, the U.S. persuaded Iran to forsake this option; according to Burr, the Shah conceded because of his desire for continued peaceful nuclear trade with the U.S. as well as more general “good relations with Washington.”[[4]](#footnote-4)

While Egypt’s *pursuit* of nuclear weapons was over by 1974,[[5]](#footnote-5) there is evidence of continued interest in nuclear weapons by at least some Egyptian military officials through the 1980s, which apparently included a short-lived, unauthorized covert military program.[[6]](#footnote-6) Notably, Egypt only signed the NPT in 1980, after the U.S. made continued peaceful nuclear trade conditional on NPT ratification.[[7]](#footnote-7) Moreover, in the wake of the 1979 Camp David Accords, the U.S. was a provider of massive economic and military aid to Egypt—according to Einhorn, “Strong bilateral relations between Egypt and the United States are a critical factor in Egypt continued renunciation of nuclear weapons…[T]hey create strong disincentives against reversing course because Egyptians know that the United States would strongly oppose an Egyptian decision to go nuclear and that such a decision would put those benefits in jeopardy.”[[8]](#footnote-8)

As is discussed in greater detail in the paper, South Korea in fact began pursuing nuclear weapons prior to the U.S. sanctions policy and was only convinced to halt its program under intense U.S. pressure and threats of sanctions.[[9]](#footnote-9) There is also suggestive evidence that Chile was exploring the nuclear weapons option starting in the 1960s and continuing into the 1990s, when it finally signed the NPT.[[10]](#footnote-10) Muller and Schmidt similarly code Spain in engaging in nuclear weapons exploration in the time period predicted by the model; Spain only signed the NPT in 1987.[[11]](#footnote-11)

Turkey is another country that may have been considering a nuclear weapons effort in the time period predicted by the “no sanctions model,” helping to export sensitive materials to Pakistan, reportedly receiving technical nuclear training from Pakistan in return, and signing a large nuclear deal with Argentina; notably, U.S. pressure ultimately convinced Turkey to terminate all of these activities.[[12]](#footnote-12) According to Fuerth, dependence on the U.S. is a crucial factor in Turkey’s nuclear decisions: “Even the suggestion that Turkey might be thinking of reversing itself on nuclear weapons would precipitate a severe crisis in relations with the United States. The United States would be virtually certain to confront Turkey as it has done repeatedly in the past. In this confrontation, the United States would employ the full weight of its economic influence, bearing on the critical needs of the Turkish government for credit and especially for relative leniency from the International Monetary Fund.”[[13]](#footnote-13)

Finally, in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus (along with Kazakhstan and Ukraine) in fact *acquired* nuclear weapons from the Soviet arsenal and was convinced to give them up largely through American and Russian carrots and pressure.[[14]](#footnote-14) While acquiring and then giving up nuclear weapons is a different phenomenon than foregoing the pursuit of nuclear weapons in the first place, the fact that Belarus (as well as Kazakhstan and Ukraine) gave up their inherited nuclear arsenals largely due the desire for positive economic and security relations with U.S. and Russia is nonetheless consistent with the theoretical logic. By 1993, when Belarus ratified the NPT, the U.S. and Belarus had “signed more than twenty agreements for military cooperation and economic assistance.”[[15]](#footnote-15) Reiss concludes that, “financial inducements…played an important role in the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, in their accession to the NPT, and in their acceptance of comprehensive IAEA safeguards.”[[16]](#footnote-16) According to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who assumed power shortly after the agreements to denuclearize were signed and oversaw the removal of nuclear weapons from the country, the decision was a “major mistake” but “I had to ink the document because there was no other way out: both Russia and the USA pressured me to remove the weapons because we had made the promise.”[[17]](#footnote-17)

**Sources for Sanctions Data**

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South Korea, Early 1975: Reardon 2010

South Korea, Late 1975: Reardon 2010

Taiwan, 1976: Morgan et al 2009

Taiwan, 1977: US Department of State 1977

Pakistan, 1976: Morgan et al 2009

Pakistan, 1977-1978: Morgan et al 2009

Argentina, 1978: Cirincione et al 2005

Argentina, 1978-1982: Hufbauer et al 2008

Brazil, 1977: New York Times 1977

Brazil, 1978-1982: Hufbauer et al 2008

Pakistan, 1979: Ahmed 1999

Pakistan, 1979-1980: Ahmed 1999

Iran, 1992-present: Cirincione et al 2005

North Korea, 1993-1994: Reiss 1995

Libya, 1996-2004: Cirincione et al 2005

North Korea, 2002: New York Times 2002

North Korea, 2002-Present: Hufbauer et al 2008

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Table A1

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country-Years | Avg.Dependence Score | Avg. Yearly Probability of Pursuit (“No Sanctions Model”) | Avg. Yearly Probability of Pursuit (“Sanctions Model”) |
| Belarus (1996-1998) | 2.67 | 2.74% | 0.31% |
| Chile (1977) | 3 | 2.66% | 0.44% |
| Egypt (1977; 1979; 1981) | 3.33 | 3.26% | 0.31% |
| Iran (1977) | 2 | 2.89% | 1.95% |
| South Korea (1978-1987) | 3.4 | 6.46% | 0.52% |
| Peru (1998) | 4 | 2.74% | 0.43% |
| Spain (1987-1988) | 4 | 6.10% | 0.75% |
| Thailand (1986-1991) | 4 | 2.92% | 0.41% |
| Turkey (1980-1984; 1987-1991; 1993-1997) | 3 | 7.84% | 1.85% |

**Robustness Checks**

Robustness Checks, Part 1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | ReLogit | Probit | LPM | LPM + Country Fixed Effects | Controlling for Past MIDs with China and USSR |
|  Dependence Score | 0.481 | 0.232 | 0.001 |  0.001 | 0.629 |
|  | (0.301) | (0.109)\* | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.313)\* |
| Post-1976 Dummy | 2.572 | 1.027 | 0.009 | 0.007 | 3.668 |
|  | (1.509) | (0.493)\* | (0.005) | (0.008) | (1.657)\* |
| Dependence Score \* Post 76 | -1.426 | -0.642 | -0.004 | -0.005 | -2.047 |
|  | (0.573)\* | (0.213)\*\* | (0.002)\* | (0.002)\* | (0.601)\*\* |
| NCA | 0.066 | 0.011 | -0.000 | -0.000 | 0.043 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.015) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.051) |
| NCA \* Past MIDs | 0.036 | 0.020 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.053 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.007)\*\* | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.032) |
| Past MIDs | 0.308 | 0.158 | 0.009 | 0.005 | 0.556 |
|  | (0.089)\*\* | (0.033)\*\* | (0.002)\*\* | (0.003) | (0.233)\* |
| GDP per Capita | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000)\* | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000)\*\* |
| Industrial Capacity Threshold | 1.544 | 0.706 | 0.010 | 0.011 | 1.326 |
|  | (0.667)\* | (0.252)\*\* | (0.004)\* | (0.006) | (0.699) |
| GDP per Capita Squared | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000)\* | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000)\*\* |
|  Polity Score | 0.007 | -0.004 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.017 |
|  | (0.048) | (0.017) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.044) |
| Nuclear Ally | -0.210 | 0.062 | 0.002 | 0.006 | 0.473 |
|  | (0.698) | (0.224) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.719) |
| Interstate Rivalry | 1.544 | 0.491 | -0.000 | 0.003 | 1.379 |
|  | (0.864) | (0.275) | (0.002) | (0.006) | (0.898) |
| Trade Openness | 0.001 | -0.001 | 0.000 | -0.000 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.004) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.016) |
| Change in Polity Score  | -0.101 | -0.030 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.127 |
|  | (0.080) | (0.028) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.076) |
| Change in Trade Openness  | 0.032 | 0.007 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.029 |
|  | (0.013)\* | (0.005) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.019) |
| Past MIDs with China |  |  |  |  | 1.018 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.351)\*\* |
| Past MIDs with USSR |  |  |  |  | -0.871 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.389)\* |
| No Proliferation Years | -0.008 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.003 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.008) | (0.000) | (0.000)\*\* | (0.029) |
| Constant | -8.851 | -4.497 | -0.007 | -0.009 | -12.329 |
|  | (1.368)\*\* | (0.512)\*\* | (0.003)\* | (0.006) | (1.893)\*\* |
| N | 5,156 | 5,156 | 5,156 | 5,156 | 4,786 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

\* *p*<0.05; \*\* *p*<0.01

Robustness Checks, Part 2

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Economic Dependence | Military Dependence | Dependence Score + US Alliance |  |
| Economic Dependence | 0.627 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.471) |  |  |  |
| Post-1976 Dummy | 0.991 | 1.841 | 1.630 |  |
|  | (1.320) | (1.325) | (1.412) |  |
| Economic Dependence \* Post-76 | -2.273 |  |  |  |
|  | (1.038)\* |  |  |  |
| Military Dependence |  | 0.745 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.554) |  |  |
| Military Dependence \* Post-76 |  | -2.373 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.908)\*\* |  |  |
| Dependence Score (+Alliance) |  |  | 0.292 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.219) |  |
| Dependence (+Alliance) \* Post-76 |  |  | -1.010 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.438)\* |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| NCA | 0.035 | 0.047 | 0.042 |  |
|  | (0.045) | (0.041) | (0.043) |  |
| NCA \* Past MIDs | 0.049 | 0.046 | 0.047 |  |
|  | (0.018)\*\* | (0.019)\* | (0.019)\* |  |
| Past MIDs | 0.277 | 0.334 | 0.305 |  |
|  | (0.075)\*\* | (0.090)\*\* | (0.079)\*\* |  |
| GDP per Capita | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 |  |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000)\* | (0.000) |  |
| Industrial Capacity Threshold | 1.739 | 1.472 | 1.562 |  |
|  | (0.736)\* | (0.675)\* | (0.680)\* |  |
| GDP per Capita Squared | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |  |
|  | (0.000)\* | (0.000)\*\* | (0.000)\* |  |
| Polity Score | -0.007 | 0.007 | 0.003 |  |
|  | (0.047) | (0.044) | (0.047) |  |
| Nuclear Ally | 0.043 | -0.033 | -0.072 |  |
|  | (0.675) | (0.684) | (0.667) |  |
| Interstate Rivalry | 1.755 | 1.666 | 1.756 |  |
|  | (0.861)\* | (0.869) | (0.879)\* |  |
| Trade Openness | -0.006 | -0.004 | -0.004 |  |
|  | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.012) |  |
| Change in Polity Score  | -0.091 | -0.103 | -0.103 |  |
|  | (0.073) | (0.081) | (0.085) |  |
| Change in Trade Openness  | 0.026 | 0.023 | 0.023 |  |
|  | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.013) |  |
| No Proliferation Years | -0.001 | 0.004 | 0.001 |  |
|  | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.022) |  |
| Constant | -9.134(1.340)\*\* | -9.699(1.041)\*\*  | -9.369(1.172)\*\* |  |
| *N* |  |  5,156 |  5,300 |  5,156 |  |

* *p*<0.05; \*\* *p*<0.01

Robustness Checks, Part 3

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1973 Cutoff | 1970 Cutoff | 1964 Cutoff | 1978 Cutoff |
| Dependence Score | 0.542 | 0.782 | 0.115 | 0.360 |
|  | (0.311) | (0.400) | (0.251) | (0.264) |
| Post-1973 Dummy | 1.860 |  |  |  |
|  | (1.508) |  |  |  |
| Dependence Score \* Post-73 | -1.614 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.589)\*\* |  |  |  |
| Post-1970 Dummy |  | 3.020 |  |  |
|  |  | (1.370)\* |  |  |
| Dependence Score \* Post-70 |  | -1.442 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.568)\* |  |  |
| Post-1964 Dummy |  |  | 0.611 |  |
|  |  |  | (1.057) |  |
| Dependence Score \* Post-64 |  |  | -0.262 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.379) |  |
| Post-1978 Dummy |  |  |  | 1.433 |
|  |  |  |  | (1.726) |
| Dependence Score \* Post-78 |  |  |  | -2.429 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.786)\*\* |
| NCA | 0.055 | 0.035 | 0.008 | 0.055 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.065) |
| NCA \* Past MIDs | 0.037 | 0.039 | 0.059 | 0.039 |
|  | (0.019)\* | (0.020)\* | (0.019)\*\* | (0.022) |
| Past MIDs | 0.342 | 0.383 | 0.264 | 0.326 |
|  | (0.092)\*\* | (0.121)\*\* | (0.093)\*\* | (0.071)\*\* |
| GDP per Capita | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Industrial Capacity Threshold | 1.624 | 1.530 | 1.367 | 1.740 |
|  | (0.670)\* | (0.729)\* | (0.744) | (0.645)\*\* |
| GDP per Capita Squared | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000)\* | (0.000)\* | (0.000)\* | (0.000) |
| Polity Score | -0.002 | -0.019 | -0.012 | 0.031 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.048) | (0.044) | (0.046) |
| Nuclear Ally | -0.102 | 0.074 | 0.322 | -0.322 |
|  | (0.664) | (0.658) | (0.657) | (0.711) |
| Interstate Rivalry | 1.714 | 1.608 | 1.709 | 1.663 |
|  | (0.923) | (0.874) | (0.827)\* | (0.880) |
| Trade Openness | -0.000 | -0.005 | -0.013 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.010) |
| Change in Polity Score  | -0.099 | -0.101 | -0.097 | -0.107 |
|  | (0.088) | (0.077) | (0.072) | (0.078) |
| Change in Trade Openness  | 0.022 | 0.024 | 0.027 | 0.026 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012)\* | (0.014) | (0.013)\* |
| No Proliferation Years | 0.020 | -0.003 | -0.017 | 0.043 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.020) | (0.017) | (0.033) |
| Constant | -10.296 | -10.780 | -8.405 | -9.903 |
|  | (1.499)\*\* | (2.047)\*\* | (1.368)\*\* | (1.199)\*\* |
| *N* | 5,156 | 5,156 | 5,156 | 5,156 |

\* *p*<0.05; \*\* *p*<0.01

Robustness Checks, Part 4

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  Exploration  DV | Jo and Gartzke DV | Ongoing Nuclear Program DV | Way 2012 DV |
| Dependence Score | -0.085 | 0.557 | 0.203 | 0.568 |
|  | (0.297) | (0.488) | (0.170) | (0.292) |
| Post-1976 Dummy | 0.544 | 2.435 | 2.391 | 1.618 |
|  | (1.202) | (1.931) | (0.810)\*\* | (1.462) |
| Dependence Score \* Post 76 | -1.302 | -2.000 | -1.794 | -1.223 |
|  | (0.587)\* | (0.747)\*\* | (0.421)\*\* | (0.492)\* |
| NCA | 0.077 | 0.127 | 0.072 | 0.038 |
|  | (0.044) | (0.054)\* | (0.018)\*\* | (0.045) |
| NCA \* Past MIDs | 0.044 | 0.006 | 0.076 | 0.032 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.023) | (0.020)\*\* | (0.021) |
| Past MIDs | 0.156 | 0.345 | 0.187 | 0.367 |
|  | (0.101) | (0.111)\*\* | (0.079)\* | (0.099)\*\* |
| GDP per Capita | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.000)\*\* | (0.000) | (0.000)\* | (0.000) |
| Industrial Capacity Threshold | 0.571 | 1.733 | 1.623 | 1.456 |
|  | (0.874) | (0.806)\* | (0.690)\* | (0.738)\* |
| GDP per Capita Squared | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000)\*\* | (0.000)\*\* | (0.000) | (0.000)\* |
| Polity Score | -0.053 | -0.020 | -0.104 | -0.017 |
|  | (0.051) | (0.060) | (0.050)\* | (0.051) |
| Nuclear Ally | -0.460 | -0.374 | 0.947 | 0.059 |
|  | (0.737) | (0.802) | (0.533) | (0.688) |
| Interstate Rivalry | 1.698 | 3.019 | 1.516 | 1.635 |
|  | (0.754)\* | (1.071)\*\* | (0.594)\* | (0.858) |
| Trade Openness | 0.003 | -0.017 | 0.010 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.010) | (0.022) | (0.005)\* | (0.012) |
| Change in Polity Score  | 0.011 | 0.116 | -0.037 | -0.021 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.053)\* | (0.052) | (0.056) |
| Change in Trade Openness  | -0.009 | 0.045 | -0.008 | 0.019 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.022)\* | (0.009) | (0.013) |
| No Proliferation Years | -0.022 | 0.025 | -0.344 | 0.017 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.033) | (0.055)\*\* | (0.024) |
| Constant | -7.609 | -11.774 | -5.861 | -10.364 |
|  | (1.491)\*\* | (1.814)\*\* | (0.852)\*\* | (1.591)\*\* |
| *N* | 4,950 | 5,162 | 5,356 | 5,160 |

\* *p*<0.05; \*\* *p*<0.01

Robustness Checks, Part 5

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 100 Troop Threshold | 1000 Troop Threshold | Dependence Score w/o Troops measure | Adding t, t2, t3 |
| Dependence Score | 0.329 | 0.341 | 0.522 | 0.500 |
|  | (0.375) | (0.395) | (0.348) | (0.287) |
| Post-1976 Dummy | 1.514 | 1.467 | 1.402 | 3.315 |
|  | (1.372) | (1.363) | (1.342) | (1.408)\* |
| Dependence Score \* Post 76 | -1.572 | -1.581 | -1.709 | -1.401 |
|  | (0.595)\*\* | (0.588)\*\* | (0.686)\* | (0.526)\*\* |
| NCA | 0.039 | 0.041 | 0.038 | 0.043 |
|  | (0.047) | (0.046) | (0.045) | (0.049) |
| NCA \* Past MIDs | 0.051 | 0.052 | 0.050 | 0.043 |
|  | (0.018)\*\* | (0.018)\*\* | (0.017)\*\* | (0.015)\*\* |
| Past MIDs | 0.293 | 0.291 | 0.301 | 0.410 |
|  | (0.085)\*\* | (0.090)\*\* | (0.081)\*\* | (0.111)\*\* |
| GDP per Capita | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Industrial Capacity Threshold | 1.510 | 1.505 | 1.665 | 1.630 |
|  | (0.699)\* | (0.708)\* | (0.704)\* | (0.700)\* |
| GDP per Capita Squared | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000)\* | (0.000)\* | (0.000)\* | (0.000)\* |
| Polity Score | 0.012 | 0.010 | -0.000 | 0.029 |
|  | (0.051) | (0.052) | (0.048) | (0.055) |
| Nuclear Ally | -0.128 | -0.117 | -0.081 | -0.099 |
|  | (0.686) | (0.653) | (0.673) | (0.749) |
| Interstate Rivalry | 1.812 | 1.770 | 1.690 | 1.609 |
|  | (0.913)\* | (0.923) | (0.881) | (0.892) |
| Trade Openness | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.014) |
| Change in Polity Score  | -0.109 | -0.110 | -0.098 | -0.104 |
|  | (0.077) | (0.077) | (0.078) | (0.078) |
| Change in Trade Openness  | 0.024 | 0.024 | 0.024 | 0.035 |
|  | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.018)\* |
| No Proliferation Years | 0.003 | 0.001 | -0.002 | 0.131 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.278) |
| No Proliferation Years2 |  |  |  | 0.003 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.014) |
| No Proliferation Years3 |  |  |  | -0.000 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.000) |
| Constant | -9.210 | -9.143 | -9.356 | -12.069 |
|  | (1.395)\*\* | (1.410)\*\* | (1.227)\*\* | (2.565)\*\* |
| N | 5,156 | 5,156 | 5,156 | 5,156 |

\* *p*<0.05; \*\* *p*<0.01

Robustness Checks, Part 6

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | COW Trade Data | Average of COW + Gleditsch Trade Data | Singh and Way 2004 DV |
| Dependence Score | 0.479 | 0.542 | 0.451 |
|  | (0.357) | (0.299) | (0.396) |
| Post-1976 Dummy | 2.147 | 2.808 | 2.893 |
|  | (1.740) | (1.502) | (1.641) |
| Dependence Score \* Post 76 | -1.596 | -1.873 | -1.284 |
|  | (0.709)\* | (0.693)\*\* | (0.579)\* |
| NCA | 0.050 | 0.052 | 0.071 |
|  | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.030)\* |
| NCA \* Past MIDs | 0.047 | 0.034 | 0.020 |
|  | (0.015)\*\* | (0.020) | (0.024) |
| Past MIDs | 0.307 | 0.338 | 0.312 |
|  | (0.079)\*\* | (0.088)\*\* | (0.092)\*\* |
| GDP per Capita | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.000)\*\* | (0.000)\* | (0.000) |
| Industrial Capacity Threshold | 1.522 | 1.676 | 1.853 |
|  | (0.614)\* | (0.664)\* | (0.700)\*\* |
| GDP per Capita Squared | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000)\*\* | (0.000)\* | (0.000)\*\* |
| Polity Score | 0.017 | 0.009 | 0.007 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.049) | (0.054) |
| Nuclear Ally | -0.527 | -0.117 | -0.237 |
|  | (0.772) | (0.702) | (0.709) |
| Interstate Rivalry | 1.711 | 1.692 | 2.583 |
|  | (0.968) | (0.856)\* | (1.165)\* |
| Trade Openness | -0.019 | -0.003 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.013) | (0.011) | (0.019) |
| Change in Polity Score  | -0.114 | -0.103 | -0.044 |
|  | (0.098) | (0.082) | (0.070) |
| Change in Trade Openness  | 0.041 | 0.026 | 0.026 |
|  | (0.013)\*\* | (0.013) | (0.021) |
| No Proliferation Years | 0.003 | 0.003 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.021) |
| Constant | -9.242 | -10.003 | -10.366 |
|  | (1.390)\*\* | (1.319)\*\* | (1.514)\*\* |
| N | 4,748 | 5,281 | 5,193 |

\* *p*<0.05; \*\* *p*<0.01

1. See, for example, Huth and Russett 1984; and Lebow and Stein 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Solingen 2007, 164; Simon 1996, 370. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Burr 2009; Way 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Burr 2009, 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Way 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Walsh 2001, 181-188; Eihorn 2004, 55-56. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Einhorn 2004, 48-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Ibid, 66-67. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. For a good overview, see Pollack and Reiss 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Muller and Schmidt 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Fuerth 2004, 160-165. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Ibid, 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Reiss 1995, 89-149. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Reiss 1995, 136. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid, 327. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. http://english.pravda.ru/world/ussr/16-04-2010/113043-lukashenko-0/ [↑](#footnote-ref-17)