

## BOOK REVIEWS

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YEHUDA D. NEVO AND JUDITH KOREN, *Crossroads to Islam: The Origins of the Arab Religion and the Arab State* (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2003). Pp. 470. \$32.00 cloth.

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The appearance of this book owes a great deal to the commitment of Judith Koren, an information specialist, who brought to its final form the thesis laid down by archaeologist Yehuda D. Nevo, whose death of cancer in 1992 left the project unfinished. The book joins the revisionist historiography of early Islam, attempting to accomplish a feat that seemed beyond the reach of the revisionist approach thus far. Not content with rejecting the traditional narrative, the authors reconstruct the rise of Islam with virtually no use of traditional Islamic sources.

Typical of the revisionist approach, the authors discard all Islamic sources as unreliable, including classical histories, *sīra*, and the Qur'an, all of which are regarded to be later inventions. Nevo's work, which forms the basis of this book, highlights material remains, and the authors flatly assert the superiority of archaeological and numismatic evidence above all kinds of textual evidence. (Yet, they freely make use of textual evidence whenever it supports their thesis—notably from Byzantine and church sources.)

The thesis set forth in the book is quite bold. There were no Islamic conquests into Syria; Byzantium had already abandoned its Eastern provinces, and Arab tribes began to move in. The Arabs at that time (corresponding in the traditional narrative to the Rashidi and early Umayyad periods) were largely pagans, not Muslims. Islamic descriptions of pagan life derive from cult practices in the Negev, not Hijaz. The elites of the new Arab populations in Syria, still clients of Byzantium, adopted an indeterminate form of monotheism that had its basis in Judeo-Christian trends in Syria, not Arabia. Muhammad is not a historical figure, nor are any of the early caliphs. Mu'awiya is in effect the first caliph, having won an inner-Arab struggle to form a unified national leadership. Still, Mu'awiya's religion was indeterminate monotheism, and the first verifiable physical references to Muhammad do not occur until the reign of 'Abd al-Malik, around 692. Even then, the authors argue that those references are not to a historical person. Rather, "Muhammad" was used as an adjective, referring to an *idea* of a desired, chosen prophet. At a later stage, when the Arabs realized their lack of pedigree among the more established civilizations they came to rule and the need of their new state for an official religion, they felt the need for a unifying, glorious national myth. Hence, the later composition of the *sīra*, the traditional narrative, and the Qur'an.

Typical of the revisionist historians, Nevo and Koren see their approach as scientific, hard-nosed, and source critical, accepting only what can be proved beyond any doubt. Also typical of the same school, they freely interpret any source in order to arrive at a foregone conclusion. The authors here go a step further in this supposed positivism, yet their focus on material remains fails to support their thesis, and in some cases their evidence seems to validate the traditional narrative. For example, Mu'awiya's dam inscription near Ta'if, dated to 677, is classified as an example of indeterminate monotheism rather than Islam, even though, while the

inscription does not contain the word “Muhammad,” it is self-dated according to an obviously *hijra* calendar. Similarly, little other than readers’ sheer goodwill may compel them to accept the tortuous logic explaining why physical references to Muhammad from the early 690s must be read as adjectives rather than nouns. Likewise is the case with their (quick, convenient, unexplained) dismissal of the reference to Muhammad in the 7th century account of Sebeos as a later insertion by a copyist. (They uncritically accept all else in that rather textual evidence.)

The authors’ method of classifying their rock inscription (pp. 301–5, 365–425) does not readily support their thesis because many clearly Islamic inscriptions are classified as “undated.” Even archaeology itself as a primary source appears suspect, because in fact many of the crucial sites, notably in Mecca and Medina, are off the excavation list, and the entire archaeological evidence is too scant for any major theory. The authors themselves acknowledge this in a passing statement that, methodologically remarkable as it is, apparently leaves them untroubled: “But even the *little information* discovered so far cannot be reconciled with the traditional Muslim account” (p. 67, emphasis added).

Apart from that, treating rock inscriptions (in the desert no less, and mostly in the Negev) as illustrations of “popular beliefs” is hardly persuasive. Neither does the existence of a desert pagan cult presume governmental tolerance (p. 202). It may just as well, and in fact more likely, signify governmental intolerance, especially if no comparable and contemporaneous urban cult centers have been found. More generally, the analysis of Bedouin roles and relations with sedentary peoples would have benefited from better grounding in the sociology of Bedouin life, and such unfortunate references as “predatory Muslim hordes” (p. 108) do not help. The authors prefer to rely for their sociological description of Bedouin life on mere guesses, buttressed only by discredited Zionist fabrications of social life in 18th century Palestine (pp. 95–96).

It is of little help that the massive voids in this reconstruction are filled in not by any evidence but rather by conspiracy theories and wild guesses. This is most clearly illustrated in the authors’ account of why and how the Byzantine empire decided to abandon its Eastern provinces, thereby setting off a dynamic that unwittingly resulted in Islam. With no evidence (strangely for science), the authors assert that it was Byzantine policy to foster heresy in Syria because that would make it easier for the empire to abandon responsibility for the Christian population there. Just for the same reason, it harshly persecuted heresy in Egypt because it could thereby harden local opposition such that it would be easier to transfer local power to Arab tribes (pp. 51–65). Similarly, because some construction projects continued after the Arab takeover, the empire must have continued to make secret payments to its new clients, the Arab rulers—even though the authors confess that because these were secret, no evidence could be found (p. 96). Are there no better explanations?

In this book, there is evidence of immense erudition. There is also evidence that it unfortunately does not protect against single mindedness.

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EVA ORTHMANN, *Stamm und Macht: Die arabischen Stämme im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert der Hijra, Nomaden und Sesshafte*, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden, Germany: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 2002). Pp. 551. €52.00 cloth.

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Although the importance of tribal organization for medieval Islamic societies is a truism, attempts to explore this more closely have led to scholarly disputes concerning its patterns,

impact on state conduct, and the overlapping of tribalism and nomadism. These issues received an impetus in the 1980s and 1990s, when Ernest Gellner, Patricia Crone, and others started to include contemporary anthropological perspectives on tribe and state in historical research. Particular attention was given to the formative period of Islam and therein to the problem of the binary opposition between the Qays and the Yaman confederations. Since then, the debate has somewhat ebbed away. The doctoral thesis of the now Zurich-based Orientalist Eva Orthmann, *Tribe and Power: The Arab Tribes in the 2nd and 3rd Centuries of the Hijra*, submitted to the University of Halle, Germany, adds fresh vigor to the discussion of this conflict and Islamic tribal affairs in general. By shifting the focus away from the earliest period of Islam, her book is the first extensive study to reconstruct tribalism in early 'Abbasid times.

The author argues that confederations had much less practical influence on tribal activities than is suggested by the sources at hand, with the consequence that emphasis on the Qays versus Yaman polarity is a simplistic misrepresentation. Instead, she undertakes the reassessment of the sources so as to conceive the complexity and the real-life activities of the tribes.

Although the author addresses a specific period of history (little material refers to times posterior to al-Ma'mun), she starts from a source-critical analysis (ch. B): Arab genealogists, lexicographers, historians, and geographers present stereotypical views of tribal action which contain only a very modest amount of socioeconomic data; moreover, information is unevenly distributed over time and space. Because these shortcomings forbid focusing strictly on diachronic history, she adopts instead a systematic approach in that she combines anthropological positions with historical hermeneutics and literary criticism. As accounts of political crisis and revolt provide the bulk of the documentation, they become anchor points for the discussion (among these, the revolts of al-Nafs al-Zakiyya in 762-63 and Abu al-Haidham al-Murri in 792-93 figure most prominently).

In the run of the sociogeographical analysis (ch. C), Orthmann demonstrates that tribal groups were embedded in regions with an urban center like the *ghūta* of Damascus and the *hawf* of Mosul (or, less significantly in the countryside) in very dissimilar ways. Further variations derive from their plural economic, that is, occupational, activities as nomads, peasants, great land owners, or military personnel (ch. D). By following up exemplary events, Orthmann quickly makes clear that the Qays-Yaman conflict formed an ideology that was not as effective by far in local practice as the sources suggest. This also shows that the alleged weakening of tribal ideology by the 'Abbasid revolution does not signify a major turn in either intertribal or tribe-state relations. As the book's professed core subject is largely settled at this early stage, Orthmann expands the discussion to the whole of tribal phenomena in an almost encyclopedic way (ch. E). On the one hand, the importance of structural elements like kinship, *ʿaṣabīyya* (both tribal esprit de corps and intertribal hostility), alliance, and blood feud is validated in a plethora of cases. On the other hand, the genealogical system and tribal nomenclature are of limited relevance as optional arguments, whereas the economic self-interest of tribal groups and leaders within local contexts is found predominant throughout. When finally tribe and state get examined (ch. F), attention to the lesser tribal groupings pays off in that their flexibility to use or to ignore tribal patterns becomes evident during the whole period of study. Tribal affiliation is welcome as one potential lever to obtain power, status, subsidies, or booty, and weakness of the central government regularly triggers the surfacing of tribes as political actors. However, apart from this logic, tribal activities vis-à-vis states and rulers generally lack a common strategic denominator, and vice versa.

Orthmann concludes convincingly that the tribal system, including the idiomatic Qays-Yaman opposition, persisted in both urban and rural contexts until the early 9th century A.D. without suffering a major blow from the rise of the 'Abbasids. At the same time, tribal affiliation alone could not be held responsible for collective action when it would have intersected with more powerful forces such as socioeconomic or territorial interests. Consequently,

rejecting Crone's view, Orthmann states that behind tribal names there were genuine tribal organizations, not just military contingents or some kind of factions seeking state positions. Skepticism is justified insofar as tribes were indeed perceived by members and outsiders as genealogical groups, but, in fact, they functioned as political associations along the lines of specific group interests.

Although the main line of argument is characterized by admirable consideration and methodical clarity, a few points stand out. The author makes clear in the beginning that the imprecision and overlapping of the terms '*arab*', '*a'rāb*', and '*bādiya*' must not mislead the observer to identify tribalism with nomadism, yet she does not stay the course but mixes up empirical findings on Bedouin groups with statements on tribes in general (e.g., with regard to the refusal of tax payment). In such places the so-called inductive approach turns out to be deductive. Another inconsistency is due to the all too straightforward treatment of the caliphal houses as tribes (e.g., in the sections on kinship), as if monarchical dynasties were not very special cases. Finally, some deliberation on the notion of power would have been helpful. Speaking of the effectiveness of tribal structures is hardly a substitute.

Moreover, presenting the evidence by repeated leaps in time and space results in a partly cumbersome reading because it necessitates many arguments of (im)probability and presumptive generalizations on the author's side before she can sum up a paragraph. For this we are fully rewarded by an impressive series of results of what is an authentic account of tribal action. Among these accounts are valuable notes on the limits of historical reconstruction, for example, with regard to the overall spatial distribution of the tribes. In this way she also contributes to the history of medieval Arabic historiography by positioning herself between the two extremes: those historians who widely trust the sources and those treating them with utter skepticism.

Through her careful and thorough analysis of the available sources, Orthmann has exhausted the material on early Islamic tribes for some time to come. She has set new parameters for further research in this particular period and provided a stimulus for Orientalists, historical anthropologists, and historical sociologists who are concerned with the subsequent periods. Systematic arrangement of the material, a clear structure, a name index, and an elaborate two-tiered subject index make this volume an indispensable and easy to use vademecum for studies in medieval Islamic tribalism, societal organization, and power relations.

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HIROYUKI YANAGIHASHI, *A History of the Early Islamic Law of Property: Reconstructing the Legal Development, 7th–9th Centuries* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2004), Pp. 329. \$142.00.

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In this book, Hiroyuki Yanagihashi professes two goals. The first is to explain the development of the legal concepts of civil liability, direct agency, and the prohibition against *ribh* (interest) in Islamic legal thought during the formative and early classical Islamic period with special attention to the Iraqi/Hanafi and Medinan/Maliki traditions. The second is to advance a theory that explains "why and how the doctrine of Abu Hanifa in Iraq and that of Malik b. Anas in Medina were transformed into the Hanafi and Maliki schools respectively" (p. 5).

The book is divided into three main parts. In part one, the author analyzes transformations in the concept of civil liability as exemplified in legal discussions about pledges, rent, the sale of specific objects, and unauthorized agency. Yanagihashi shows that rules governing civil liability in the context of these diverse discussions were later synthesized by Hanafi scholars

“to form the cluster of . . . rules governing usurpation, which, as a legal concept, seems to have been introduced for the first time in the first half of the eighth century” (p. 121). The author argues that the Medinan scholars, led by Malik, generally adopted the Iraqi doctrine of civil liability, albeit with modifications.

In part two, the author demonstrates that the legal concept of direct agency originated in an early doctrine that was later dubbed *murābaḥa/tawliya* (trust sale) or *ishrāk* and in the early notion of a *salam/salaf* sale, a transaction in which payment precedes delivery. The author argues that the original rules that defined these transactions were later modified in ways that ultimately led scholars to formulate the concept of direct agency. Specifically, the author shows that scholars devised direct agency in response to the introduction of new legal restrictions such as the prohibition against selling an object that one does not own and the prohibition against profiting from an object for which one does not assume legal risk.

In part three, the author shows how prohibitions against certain types of transactions “were put together to form a set of rules that collectively constitute the prohibition of *ribḥ*” (p. 212). The main argument is that the prohibition against levying interest on loans did not derive from the Qur’an, as early Muslim jurists thought, but rather originated in the prohibition of *ribḥ* of delay in an exchange between two objects that are equal in utility (according to Medinan jurists) or between two objects of the same kind (according to Iraqi jurists).

Although sometimes cumbersome, this book is an erudite, well-documented, and pioneering study that contributes to existing scholarship in important ways. It sheds new light on the emergence of important legal institutions that lie at the foundation of the Islamic law of property. Furthermore, it advances a new approach, adopted by very few academic scholars hitherto, of extrapolating the legal principles that guided early Islamic jurists through analysis of the rules they promulgated. In doing so, it reveals that early Muslim jurists engaged in consistent legal reasoning even before the four jurisprudential principles (*usūl al-fiqh*) were introduced and universally recognized.

It shows that early jurists did not simply introduce ad hoc solutions to legal problems but rather were guided by legal principles that they applied systematically. In addition, the book furthers our understanding of the relations between law and society by illuminating not only the legal constraints that led to doctrinal changes but also, in some cases, the particular sociopolitical circumstances that triggered them. Finally, the evidence presented here sheds light on the notion (advanced by Schacht and refuted by Hallaq and Hurvitz) of “regional schools” (or “ancient schools”). The author demonstrates that, around the 7th and early 8th centuries, it was not unusual to see *relative* uniformity of legal opinions along geographical lines. Thus, for example, Hijazi (and sometimes only Medinan) scholars often disagreed with Iraqi (and sometimes only Kufan or Basran) scholars. This fact raises many interesting questions that merit further attention. For example, are particular regions more likely to produce legal uniformity than others? Is such uniformity a result of local customs or do other social, political, or ideological factors better account for these local legal uniformities? Is uniformity of opinion in a specific region more likely to develop around particular types of legal issues?

Although the book generally achieves its goal of clarifying the development of certain legal concepts, it falls somewhat short of its aim of explaining “why and how the doctrine of Abu Hanifa in Iraq and that of Malik b. Anas in Medina were transformed into the Hanafi and Maliki schools respectively” (p. 5). Clearly, the evidence presented suggests that significant systemization of legal thinking among Iraqi and Medinan scholars with regard to civil liability, agency, and the prohibition of *ribḥ* occurred around the time of Abu Hanifa and Malik. What this evidence does not prove, however, is the author’s assertion that Abu Hanifa and Malik were the exclusive or even the principal doctrinal sources for and systematizers of the legal thinking of their respective regions. The evidence, especially in the Hanafi case, is

circumstantial and does not rule out the possibility that Abu Hanifa's contemporaries, such as Hammad b. Abi Sulayman (d. 120/737), are equally responsible for this systemization. Scholars interested in the development of Islamic legal thought and the relations between law and society will find the book most informative—well researched, well argued, and groundbreaking.

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DINA LE GALL, *A Culture of Sufism: Naqshbandis in the Ottoman World, 1450–1700* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2005). Pp. 299. \$45.00 cloth.

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This well-researched and engaging study convincingly demonstrates the degree to which our present scholarly understanding of the early Naqshbandiyya (before the 17th-century Mujaddidiyya) has been due to scholars' overemphasis on 19th century Mujaddidi and Khalidi sources that have been projected uncritically into the past. The author, using mostly Arabic and Ottoman sources spanning a 250-year period, also corrects the still all too common perception of well-organized and politicized Sufi lineages. Le Gall shows how early Ottoman Naqshbandi self-promotion as a shari'a-minded lineage with a superior mystical practice is balanced with open veneration of Shi'i imams. Nor were the early Naqshbandis as anti-Shi'i as 19th-century sources would have us believe. In short, the author has not only refocused scholarly perception of the early Ottoman Naqshbandiyya, but she has retuned scholarly approaches to the study of Sufism.

The book discusses Sufi organization through an insightful presentation of lineage identity, genealogy, and modes that Naqshbandis have used to expand their geographical range—from Khwaja Ahrar to the Safavid period and the establishment of the Naqshbandiyya in Ottoman Istanbul. Particularly useful is the author's inquiry into nonhereditary succession, an analysis of lineal continuity (why some subbranches of lineages end and others continue for centuries), and the factors promoting such (rare) continuity in the Ottoman context. Le Gall convincingly shows how a shaykh's influence has little relationship to the number of disciples or government patronage. Indeed, even the number of Naqshbandi Sufi lodges in Istanbul at any given time does not correlate with Naqshbandi influence (for most of the period studied the Khalwatiyya were the most "politically popular" lineage). Nor do the Naqshbandiyya overwhelm the ranks of the ulema in Istanbul, despite their professed shari'a mindedness. Scholarly arguments based upon the quantitative data found in biographical treatises have been further compromised.

After a two-chapter overview of the Naqshbandiyya in the Balkans, Anatolia, and Arabia, the study concentrates on spiritual practice and its relationship to Naqshbandi constructions of orthodoxy. Le Gall outlines the complexity of practice, ranging from silent *dhikr* and forty-day solitary retreats to an explicitly ascetic practice—the common thread being a mode of sobriety. Many Naqshbandi shaykhs of this period were avid Ibn al-'Arabi advocates which, combined with Persian literary culture, could explain why the early Naqshbandiyya had many admirers in the non-Arab Ottoman lands but were significantly less popular in the Arab world.

The author has consulted a wide range of sources ranging from *waqf* documents to devotional manuals, including an array of relevant manuscripts. The end result is a nuanced, pioneering account of early Ottoman Naqshbandi Sufism. *A Culture of Sufism* could be used in an upper level course in Sufism, especially with the useful ten-page glossary, which—in addition to the writing style—makes the book accessible to nonspecialists. There are few English works on Sufism that effectively address the confluence of Central Asian, Indian, and

Ottoman spheres, making this study a valuable contribution to Sufi studies in general, both analytically and geographically. It should be in every university library.

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LESLIE PEIRCE, *Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2003). Pp. 480. \$29.95 paper.

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*Morality Tales* is an invigorating attempt to unravel two court registers of 16th century Aintab in relation to contemporary legal and administrative texts (i.e., books of jurisprudence popular at the time, relevant *kanunames*, tax surveys, etc.), important events of the period, as well as social, political, and religious dynamics of the local society. The result of this exercise is a stimulating account of legal practice that recognizes and brings into discussion many factors (legal and nonlegal) that influenced the court's operations.

The two registers that this book relies upon are the earliest ones available to researchers. They were compiled between 1540 and 1541, soon after Aintab, a significant urban center located approximately fifty miles north of Aleppo in southeast Anatolia, was captured by Ottoman forces. In these sources, Peirce recognizes Ottoman attempts to incorporate Aintab into the Ottoman legal and administrative system. One of the most important and frequently iterated suggestions in the book is that the arrival of a new qadi, Hüsameddin Efendi, in 1541 signaled the intention of Ottoman authorities to better control the financial resources of Aintab as well as keep an eye on the political and religious currents in the region. Peirce also claims that the ability of the "new" court to satisfy local expectations was instrumental in legitimizing Ottoman rule in Aintab. In fact, Peirce interprets the increasing workload of the court after the arrival of Hüsameddin Efendi, as well as the greater number of those cases in *sicils* that relate to social order and security, as evidence that after 1541 the court began to play a greater role in local society.

Peirce makes important observations with regard to the court's operations. One such observation is that the court was popular in general and attracted individuals from both sexes and all segments of the community. Admittedly, women had certain disadvantages in court. Their testimony was not regarded as valuable as that of men, they were not allowed to introduce female witnesses to corroborate their claims, and, unlike men, they were not allowed to take oaths to prove their allegations. At the same time, all individuals were given opportunities to voice their opinions in court, present their sides of the story, and justify their actions. Thus, the court functioned as more than a legal forum. According to Peirce, many people, including women and the marginalized, approached the court not necessarily to win their legal disputes but primarily to proclaim their honor, demonstrate their morality, or defend their good names (more on this later).

Also interesting in this discussion is the revelation that, particularly in those cases that involved sexual assault or the ones in which one's reputation was questioned, it was common for male and female litigants to adopt different discursive strategies. Peirce calls the angry, aggressive attitude toward one's opponents in court the "male idiom," whereas the "female idiom" aimed to explain, justify, and, occasionally, demonstrate regret. Although the adoption of either of these discursive strategies was not always a direct result of one's biological sex, their very existence displays the highly gendered nature of the court process.

*Morality Tales* brings together not only different kinds of historical sources but also attempts to synthesize a variety of different disciplines. Hence, readers from different fields might react

to this book differently. For example, there are statements that might make specialists of Islamic law feel uneasy. It is simply not true that in court “the burden of proof lay with the plaintiff” (p. 102), nor would the phrase “*hul* divorce” receive much favor by legal experts (p. 132). Moreover, at times Peirce seems to use the term *shari’a* in place of *fiqh* or jurisprudence (p. 114).

From a historian’s perspective, it is surprising that *Morality Tales* has not created much debate, given its ambitious approach to sources and history writing. In this book, the author attempts to construct a “thick description” that relates the court of Aintab to its people and its cultural, political, and religious world. As exciting as the end result is, Peirce’s narrative is susceptible to similar kinds of doubts that Geertz and his followers generated in the past. Indeed, one might justifiably argue that in her boldness to “contextualize” her sources, to selectively “connect” different *sicil* entries to one another, and to make assumptions and speculations regarding the real intentions of her subjects, Peirce imposes her own thoughts, expectations, and, perhaps, desires upon her sources a bit daringly. For example, a woman’s calling a male opponent a “pimp” in the heat of an argument does not necessarily amount to “intentionally casting that person’s wife an adulteress” or portraying him as being “complicit in his own wife’s sexual immorality” (p. 173). This cannot be considered, if not supported by other sources, as “a calculated move to have herself [the woman who does the cursing] written into the court record, to create a legal space alongside that reserved for the males involved in the case” (p. 173).

Furthermore, any unrestrained interpretive attempt comes with the danger of blindness to what we do not expect to see in our sources. One case in point is Ine’s story, in which a young woman accused her father-in-law of raping her. Peirce’s objective in presenting this story is to demonstrate that, although the court did not legally recognize the validity of Ine’s claim against her father-in-law, it favored her by granting her the chance to be heard by the community and to explain her reasoning for seeking a divorce from her husband. As original as the idea of “separate justices for individuals in conflict” (p. 130 and *passim*) may sound in evaluating the court’s motives, the author’s reading of Ine’s *sicil* seems rather charitable to this reviewer. Peirce’s own translation of the entry indicates that Ine appeared in court as the plaintiff and her father-in-law as the defendant. Because the latter denied Ine’s allegation, according to established procedures, the “burden of proof” was supposed to be placed on Ine’s shoulders. Instead, and contrary to “normal” procedures, we notice in the document that Ine was not given a chance to substantiate her allegation by possibly introducing her witnesses. Subsequently, her father-in-law exonerated himself with the help of those who proclaimed his good reputation. Of interest, Peirce does not comment on this procedural irregularity, nor does she indicate whether or not the “principal of separate justices” may have involved the court’s willingness to discriminate against a party to this extent, that is, at a level that exceeded even what the law called for. Perhaps, the author would have been less generous toward the court had she noticed this irregularity; or, arguably, it is her discursive construction of the court’s benevolent motives that is responsible for this lack of recognition.

Other such examples of “overinterpretation” also exist in the text. Yet, it should be also emphasized that, with *Morality Tales*, Leslie Peirce has made an important methodological intervention to *sicil* studies. Although one may take issue with many points in this book, Peirce’s work represents a fresh attempt to reconsider the relationship between the text and its context. It is an effort to demonstrate the possibilities and limitations of a microhistorical orientation in Ottoman studies at a level that has not been attempted thus far. It seems certain that *Morality Tales* will lead us Ottomanists to rethink and question many of the methodological choices that we advertently or inadvertently make in our attempts to decipher our sources.



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FARUK BİLİCİ, *XIV. Louis ve İstanbul’u fetih tasarısı. Louis XIV ve son projet de conquête d’Istanbul* (Ankara: Türk Tarihi Kurumu, 2004). Pp. 386. €66.00.

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For anyone who unquestioningly accepts the seamlessness of the long alliance between France and the Ottoman Empire, Faruk Bilici’s fascinating new book will come as a surprise. Historians less than well-versed in the twists and turns of the “special relationship” between sultan and king will discover that it was animated by forces a great deal more intricate than merely the shared interest of the two states in neutralizing the Habsburg Empire.

Known as the closest European ally of the Ottomans for over two and a half centuries, from the time when Süleyman I and François I corresponded during François’ captivity in the hands of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V after the battle of Pavia in 1525, France soon gained diplomatic and trading privileges from the Ottomans. Yet, long before Napoleon Bonaparte’s peremptory seizure of a large chunk of the sultan’s domains in 1798, the vague claims of the French kings to the inheritance of Byzantium gained stark definition with the scheme in 1618 of a former French ambassador in Istanbul, François Savary de Brèves, to conquer the city as part of a wider ambition to destroy Islam. In 1581, England had been granted privileges such as France enjoyed, but as the activities of the Levant Company curtailed the long-term commercial benefits that France had hoped for, the economic argument for maintaining good relations with the Ottomans was weakened. Savary de Brèves proposed a land and sea attack by European forces, supported by an uprising of Ottoman Christians.

This plan came to naught, of course. The next test came in the latter years of the long Ottoman–Venetian war over Crete (1645–69). Cardinal Mazarin, Louis XIV’s chief minister, found it hard to support an alliance with the Ottoman Empire when it was fighting Venice, and France took a covert role in the war, assisting Venice financially at first and then militarily.

Bilici writes that Mazarin failed to appreciate that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha wanted to end hostilities when he became grand vizier in 1656 after a debilitating blockade of the Dardanelles by Venetian ships. However, Mazarin’s death in 1661 permitted the competing vision of the relationship to take root once more, identified this time with Jean-Baptiste Colbert, controller of France’s finances from 1665, who saw good relations with the Ottoman Empire as essential to French commercial well-being. This view won out once peace was agreed, but in the early 1670s, the German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Leibniz, in a bid to divert the Sun King’s attention beyond the confines of Europe, concocted a detailed proposal for the French conquest of Egypt. Friendly relations between France and the Ottoman Empire remained elusive: diplomatic contacts were fraught with misunderstandings, French ships bombarded Chios in 1681, and in the same year the autonomous Ottoman province of Algiers declared war on France, provoking bombardments, which, suggests Bilici, “*annonceront la colonisation du XIXe siècle*” (p. 36).

The most elaborate designs to take part of the Ottoman Empire came after the failed siege of Vienna in 1683. Louis XIV secretly hoped for the fall of the Habsburg capital and is reported to have flown into a rage when Kara Mustafa Pasha’s army was routed. He imagined that, with Vienna lost, his position in continental Europe would be enhanced, and the throne of Charlemagne might be his. Instead, he was cast as accomplice of the infidel, a perception that for a monarch who wanted above all to be seen as protector of the Catholic Church in Europe and the Ottoman Empire clearly needed dispelling. In 1685, then, he took the initiative and sent to the Mediterranean Etienne Gravier, Marquis d’Ortières, an engineer and mariner, for the ostensible purpose of improving commerce by collecting information of use to merchants

and correcting Ottoman infringements of trade agreements. The true intent of the mission, however, was to study Ottoman coasts and coastal defenses. Gravier d'Ortières was ordered to observe winds and currents and depths of anchorage and strength of fortifications, as were the several other agents sent by Louis XIV at this time. Accuracy of description was of the essence, and their covert operations produced reports and detailed maps, plans, and sketches in abundance, many of which handsomely illustrate Bilici's study.

Bilici publishes, for the first time, a memoir written by Gravier d'Ortières that is effectively a primer for the capture of the Ottoman capital and its environs. This publication includes, in addition to a detailed description of Istanbul (largely based on the well-known account of Guillaume-Joseph Grelot, published in 1680), an estimate of the forces required to burn the city. This burning was one of the strategies for capturing it (!), the other being first to secure the Yedikule fortress as a base of operations for an invasion. The memoir includes his thoughts on how to reestablish peace with the Ottomans once the French had achieved their aim, and a proposal for how the empire might be partitioned, with France having the major share as the new imperial power in the East.

There is no evidence that these schemes were ever publicly discussed. In any case, the dreams Louis XIV nurtured were soon overtaken by events as much of Europe united against him, and the utility of the Ottoman Empire as an ally against the Habsburgs again became manifest. Capturing Istanbul was surely the last thing on the king's mind. Bilici's book, in a parallel Turkish and French text, reveals the full dimensions of Louis XIV's "Ostpolitik" and makes it impossible for historians any longer to forget that the Ottoman–French alliance was driven by a strong undercurrent of double-dealing and mutual hostility.

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JUDITH MENDELSON ROOD, *Sacred Law in the Holy City: The Khedival Challenge to the Ottomans as Seen from Jerusalem, 1829–1831* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2004). Pp. 276. \$124.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY ADEL MANNA, Professor and Director, Center for the Study of Arab Society in Israel, Jerusalem Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem, Israel; e-mail: amanna@vanleer.org.il

This book is a study of Jerusalem during the 1830s. It intends to clarify and analyze the social, political, and legal setting of Jerusalem during that period of Egyptian rule in Greater Syria (Bilad al-Sham). The local archives of the Islamic Court (Jerusalem's Sijjil) are the main source of this study. The book looks at the application of law by the Ottomans and by Muhammad Ali's regime as reflected in these archives. The focus of the study, therefore, is the relationship of the Muslim community of Jerusalem with the Ottomans and then with the Egyptian regime.

The book includes seven chapters and appendices. After the introduction, the second chapter attempts to illustrate Jerusalem's society and administration until 1831. Chapter three is devoted to the military invasion of Bilad al-Sham and the reaction. The remaining four chapters deal with the policies of Muhammad Ali's regime in Jerusalem and its hinterland. A special chapter (five) is rightly devoted to the events of the 1834 rebellion and its repercussions.

The importance of Muhammad Ali's rule over Bilad al-Sham has drawn many scholars to delve into studying khedival policies and systems of administration. The first and foremost among them is Asad Rustum, whose pioneering and monumental works include his unpublished PhD dissertation, *Syria under Muhammad Ali* (Chicago, 1923). Since that time, many others have treated this subject: suffice it to mention the Ph.D. dissertations of Y. Hofman (unpublished, 1963), Latifa Salim (published, Cairo, 1983, 1999), and William

Polk (published, Cambridge, 1963). Others have published articles or chapters of books dealing with different aspects of Bilad al-Sham during the 1830s. Rood's detailed account is one of very few published studies in English that address the nature of Muhammad Ali's regime in Palestine.

Appropriate primary and secondary sources were used thoroughly in the preparation for writing this book. In addition to the sources consulted for producing her Ph.D. dissertation in 1993, the author read newly published works in English from the past decade. However, it seems that not enough effort has been made to benefit from similar publications in Arabic. It is adequate here to name a few of them for illustration. One example is the abovementioned book by Latifa Salim. Another is my book, *History of Palestine during the late Ottoman Period, 1700–1918*, published in Arabic in Beirut (1999). A third is the four-volume series by al-Tabbaʿ, *Ithaf al-A'izzah*, published in Gaza (1999). These and other studies in Arabic could have provided relevant data and insights to the author no less than some of the English sources upon which the book relies.

The main thesis of this study is that Muhammad Ali introduced revolutionary changes in the system of administration and control during the 1830s. His regime brought, according to the author, a fundamental change in the traditional social and political systems that were long established under the Ottomans. There is almost no field in which the author does not find great transformations, including demography. Furthermore, the different aspects of change were neither temporary nor confined to Jerusalem and Palestine: "It is undeniable," she states, "[that] Muhammad Ali introduced a new kind of military regime in the Arab world" (p. 197). According to the author's conclusions, the imposition of khedival control in Palestine *irreversibly* changed the nature of local politics in Jerusalem and Ottoman Bilad al-Sham. This and other overarching conclusions, however, are made without sufficient substantiation.

It is unfortunate to note that the book contains several factual errors, inaccurate uses of terminology and concepts, as well as speculative statements. The study focuses on the Muslim community in the city of Jerusalem, but sometimes it refers to the rural shaykhs of the Nawahi (subdistricts) of Jerusalem and Nablus. More than once, those shaykhs are mistakenly referred to in the book as *umarāʾ* (princes). No differentiation is made between the military elite (*aghāwāt* and *bekāt*) of the city and the rural shaykhs. Two of them, Abu-Ghush and al-ʿAmru (Hebron), are labeled mistakenly as Bedouins (pp. 61, 124). The Samhans who led the Qays faction north of Jerusalem are defined as allies of Abu-Ghush, the leaders of the Yemen faction (p. 124), when in fact they were rivals. In addition, when the rebellion of 1929 in the Nablus region is mentioned, the leaders, according to the author, were the Tuqans from their citadel of "Sanur" instead of the Jarrar family.

Speaking of citadels outside the walls of Jerusalem, the author labels the summer houses of notable families (*qusūr*) as citadels (p. 111). The Nahiya (subdistrict) of Hebron is mislabeled on more than one occasion as the Sanjak (district) of Hebron. The same mistake is repeated with other *nahiyās* or cities (p. 44). Lastly, whereas transliteration of Arabic names and terms is generally done well, it is not difficult to find mistakes in this area, too. For example, the chief architect (*miʾmarbashi*) is erroneously transliterated as *miʾmarpasha*, and on the same page (p. 58) the bailiff (*muhdirbashi*) is erroneously transliterated as *muhdirbasha*. These small but irritating inaccuracies mar what could otherwise have been a more solid volume.

The rebellion of 1834 is the most interesting and challenging single event about which the author could have contributed more to our present knowledge of the subject. However, the fifth chapter, which deals with this rebellion, does not add much to our knowledge of this historical event and its implications. To begin with, this chapter suffers from poor organization of the material and speculative statements. Moreover, mistakes and inaccurate use of information and terms are not infrequent throughout its pages. One has to wonder, for example, why the author

titled the chapter “The Rebellion: Summer 1834,” when according to her own chronology it erupted in late April. More disturbing is the choice of sources on which this chapter relies. The author relies heavily on Western and secondary sources such as Abir, Gihon, and the *Missionary Herald*, while neglecting the documents of the Sijjil in Jerusalem and the Egyptian Royal Archives in Cairo. Closer consultation of the documents that Asad Rustum published in his four-volume series *al-Mahfuzat al-malakiya* (which is listed in the book’s bibliography) would have helped greatly. Altogether, this is a timely book that addresses a very important theme. It could have filled a very important vacuum for English readers, but it suffers from unsystematic use of the existing original sources.

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CAMILLA DAWLETSCHEIN-LINDER, *Diener seines Staates: Celal Bayar (1883–1986) und die Entwicklung der modernen Türkei* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag, Turkologie und Türkeikunde, herausgegeben von Klaus Kreiser, Band 6, 2003). Pp. 293. €48.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY CEMIL KOÇAK, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabanci University, Istanbul; e-mail: ckocak@sabanciuniv.edu

Writing biography is already difficult, but as the author notes in her foreword, it is more difficult and sometimes even impossible in the Middle East. The respect that must be shown to the subject, the belief that secrets should not be revealed, the tradition of not leaving any documents behind, and the subjective narrations of acquaintances are all hindrances. Academic biographies, which in Turkey generally have been limited to politicians, are penned usually to either defend or criticize the subject. Their quality and objectivity is debatable, and most are poorly written.

Celal Bayar, the second prime minister and third president of the Republic of Turkey, is a politician whose career spanned the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic. He has been the subject of many studies, but few of high academic standard. Nurşen Mazici’s *Celal Bayar: Başbakanlık Dönemi* (1996) is one, but it deals only with the years when Bayar served as prime minister.

Politicians in Turkey generally neither write their memoirs nor keep diaries. The exception to the rule is İsmet İnönü, the second president of Turkey. Bayar wrote memoirs, but only a small collection has been published (*Ben de Yazdim*, 8 volumes, 1965–72), and it treats only his early years, through the beginning of the National Independence War. He probably wrote these memoirs after his term as prime minister, when he was not politically active. His later political adventures must have prevented him from continuing. His other memoir is his journal about life in prison with the legendary prime minister Adnan Menderes after the military coup of 27 May 1960 (*Kayseri Cezaevi Günlüğü*, 1999).

Dawletschin-Linder is the first academic to undertake Celal Bayar’s biography. The author reconciles Bayar’s life with the socioeconomic, political, and cultural phases of the late Ottoman and Republican eras, utilizing all possible sources. She makes use of not only Turkish archives but also German and British archives, all of which are being used in this manner for the first time.

The author begins by describing the milieu into which Bayar was born and his childhood. Bayar was introduced to political activity at an early age. He joined the Committee of Union and Progress while employed in a German Bank in Bursa and rose through party ranks. Right after the Committee of Union and Progress seized power in the summer of 1908 with a coup, he went to Izmir, a rather different city from Bursa.

Bayar's devotion to Unionist belief and policies during the World War I years led him to be at the very front of Turkey's subsequent struggle for independence under Kemalist leadership in Ankara. Bayar's major leap during the republican era was his gaining Atatürk's trust and becoming the general director of *İş Bankası*; in this capacity and later as a government minister, he became the brains of Turkey's economy. Prime Minister İnönü, who looked askance at Bayar's quick rise under Atatürk, was unable to stop this appointment. Despite their different economic views, İnönü and Bayar wound up having to work together for many years. Atatürk finally defined Bayar as the second most important politician of the country as a consequence of his disputes with İnönü and appointed him as prime minister.

Due to Atatürk's death, Bayar held this position only a short time, and his competition with İnönü continued. At the end of World War II, Bayar again found a place in the foreground of politics as chairman of the opposition Democratic Party. Unfortunately, the author only briefly mentions these short-lived but very difficult opposition years.

Bayar, who became the third president of Turkey in 1950, is the symbol of the ten-year Democratic rule. Much has been written about the ruling period of the Bayar and Menderes duo, and Dawletschin-Linder treats this era in detail. Internal and external political developments of the period, and Bayar's role in them, cover a large part of the book.

Like many members of the Democratic Party, which fell from power after the May 1960 military coup, Bayar was tried by a special tribunal and sentenced to death. He served time, was pardoned, and, through the efforts of his longtime nemesis, İnönü, had his political rights restored. He remained a prestigious figure in the Democratic Party until his death, although his impact in politics eventually diminished as new actors came to dominate Turkish politics.

The author highlights Bayar's political role "at the service of his state" both in power and opposition. The "spirit of the Unionist tradition"—from his early days as member of a secret revolutionary committee—formed the basic core of Bayar's political identity. His unbowed stand before the court after the military coup, in contrast to Menderes, exemplifies this. This attitude of putting the state first affected the spirit of the Democratic Party that he founded. Unfortunately, the author does not dwell on these issues enough.

Dawletschin-Linder presents the material in a very matter of fact manner. She has utilized all the major sources, however limited they may be, and places Bayar's life within the overall political history of Turkey. Her critical approach to Bayar is satisfactory. The long life story, one that spans the last era of the Ottoman Empire throughout much of the republican era, is balanced in coverage. The book presents little information that will be new to a reader familiar with the subject but blends existing information into a synthesis of high academic quality.

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JOHN FRANCIS WILSON, *Caesarea Philippi: Baniyas, The Lost City of Pan* (New York: Palgrave, 2004). Pp. 272. \$39.50 cloth.

REVIEWED BY RAMI ARAV, Department of History and International Studies and Programs, University of Nebraska at Omaha; e-mail: rarav@mail.unomaha.edu

This book is a major undertaking that surveys most of the documented history of the city of Baniyas from antiquity through the second half of the 20th century. Known in antiquity as Paneion, Paneas, Caesarea Paneas, or Caesarea Philippi, Baniyas is situated on the slopes of Mount Hermon at the springs of the Baniyas River, a tributary of the Jordan. Wilson suggests that originally it was a site protected by Ba'al and his son Aliyan, the god of sources.

Sometime after the conquest of Alexander the Great, the Canaanite god merged with the Greek god Pan, and it served as a local center for pilgrimage and worship. A change in this pastoral ambiance occurred in 200 B.C., when the Seleucid king, Antiochus III, conquered the entire southern Levant from the Ptolemies.

In 20–19 B.C., Herod the Great erected a temple, according to Josephus “at the sources of the Jordan; the place is called Paneion” and “near the place called Paneion” (p. 10), and dedicated it to the worship of his patron, Augustus, and perhaps also to the goddess Roma. The temple of Augusteum was one of the earliest prototypes of a Roman imperial cult temple. Wilson’s presumption that Herod settled this place with Jews and built a palace for himself to reinforce his economy and quell the Iturean insurgences has neither archaeological nor historical foundations.

Approximately 17 years later, presumably a year after his ascension to power, Philip Herod, son of Herod the Great, expanded the project, founding a city near the Augusteum named Caesarea Paneas, known in the New Testament as Caesarea Philippi. Today, after decades of thorough excavations by four different teams, much about the city and the specific location of the Augusteum remain a mystery. In the 1970s, Ehud Netzer suggested the remains of a structure overlooking the cave from the west and built in a technique known as *opus reticulatum*, the hallmark of Herodian structures. In the early 1990s, Zvi Uri Ma’oz proposed remains of a 1st-century structure at the entrance of the cave. Wilson and Vasilous Tzaferis suggested locating the temple below the remains of a large basilica 250 meters southwest of the cave; more recently Andrew Overman proposed the remains of a temple located a few kilometers south of the cave. Netzer’s suggestion seems most reasonable, because he places the temple on the promontory lining up above the main street of the city, which would accord with the aesthetic ideals of the 1st-century A.D. Roman town planning. Yet, Wilson places equal weight on all contending sites without taking a definitive position.

As a result of the Herodian endeavor, Caesarea Paneas/Philippi became a center of the Roman imperial cult, and this played a major role in the life of the city for the next generations. In this cult Augustus became the “prince of peace” reigning over the *Pax Romana*, and his wife Livia (later known also as Julia) was identified with the Greco–Roman goddesses, Keres/Demeter/Proserpina/Persephone. She was worshiped as the goddess of revival, prosperity, bounty, and fruit bearing. Wilson fails to see that coins minted at the city during the time of Philip (4 B.C.–33 A.D.) and Agrippa I (37–44 A.D.), such as the one showing a hand holding ears of grain and the legend “fruit bearing” (*carpophoros*) propagated the symbols of the imperial cult. Countering recent scholarship, he asserts that it “may be a reference to the prosperity of the capital city and of the kingdom in general” and that “it further strengthens the theory that the city was founded in 3 BC” (p. 20).

Wilson also dismisses the common interpretation that a coin minted by Philip dating to 30 A.D. that bears the attribute “founder” indicates the foundation of Bethsaida and surmises instead that Philip must have founded Caesarea Philippi twice. His treatment of the subject is selective, speculative, and unacceptable to most scholars.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the Roman period during the 2nd to the 4th centuries A.D. when the city reached its “golden age of pagan Baniās” (p. 43). In chapter 5, “Jews and Christians in Pagan Baniās,” Wilson deals with the visit of Jesus. Peculiarly, this is found under the title “Christians in Baniās” (p. 78) instead of Jews in Baniās. His conclusion that “the district of Baniās (and perhaps the city itself) appears to have been a major center in the development of Christianity—its structure, its theology, and its literature” (p. 83)—is highly exaggerated.

In chapters 6 and 7, dealing with Byzantine Baniās, Wilson devotes a long discussion to the mystery of a “statue of Christ” that was visible at Baniās and perhaps is correct in assuming that it might have been the Roman free-standing statue of Hadrian that was wrongly interpreted as depicting Jesus and the woman cured of the issue of blood. The statue,

however, disappeared in the Byzantine period, and it is doubtful whether it had any historical impact.

Chapters 8 to 11 survey a long history from the Arab conquest to the end of World War I. Wilson recounts stories of individuals associated with Banias and outlines the general political history of the Middle East. After the Ottoman conquest in the 16th century, the town rapidly declined into negligence and poverty. European travelers who started to arrive at Banias in the 19th century preferred to pitch their camps outside the pitiful village. Wilson mostly reads documents in translation and refers to secondary works, not all of which are scholarly.

The epilogue surveys the site from the British conquest to the 1967 Six Day War, during which villagers fled and their poor dwellings were razed to the ground. Banias is today a national park within which his (and Tzaferis') team operated.

Wilson works in the old style of a city historian, writing merely about the political history of the city. He employs only literary documents and makes surprisingly little use of the vast archaeological data that was compiled on the city. However, archaeologists have long ceased to be merely reporters of architectural remains; they now consider data from the hard sciences, including social and anthropological studies. Hopefully, the next volume will cover these issues. However, Wilson's book is written with great love and passion for Banias and its history, even if the picture is slightly distorted.

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ERIC ENGEL TUTEN, *Between Capital and Land: The Jewish National Fund's Finances and Land-Purchase Priorities in Palestine, 1939–45* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005). Pp. 248. £65.00 cloth.

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Eric Engel Tuten's *Between Capital and Land* is one of the few academic works to focus on the operations of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) in pre-1948 Palestine. The JNF was established in 1901 by the World Zionist Organization to purchase land for Jewish settlement in *Eretz Israel* in the name of the Jewish people, and during the British Mandate, it became the dominant force in Jewish land acquisition in the country. Because of the inalienability clause in the Fund's by-laws (which prohibited it from selling any of the land it purchased), Zionist officials regarded land purchased by the JNF from Palestinian Arabs as "redeemed." From the mid-1930s onward, JNF land purchases were aimed specifically at shaping the territory and borders of the future Jewish state. For this reason, JNF operations during the Mandate period are a crucial piece in the puzzle of understanding the success of Jewish nation building during this period.

As Tuten points out, despite the profound impact of the historical events of the late 1930s and 1940s on the country in general and on JNF operations in particular, most scholarship on Jewish land acquisition in Palestine has steered clear of this period. *Between Capital and Land* looks at JNF operations between 1939 and 1945, and for this reason, it is an important book. The stage is set with the publication of the 1937 Peel Commission partition plan, which sparked Zionist officials to expand their land-purchasing goals to include certain parts of the country with little or no Jewish land ownership to ensure the inclusion of these areas in the future Jewish state. However, this new approach was almost immediately challenged by two other factors. One was the loss of traditional JNF income from European Jewish communities at the outbreak of World War II. The other was the British-imposed restrictions on Jewish land purchases in most of the country that were proclaimed by the White Paper of 1939 and

institutionalized by the Land Transfer Regulations of 1940. How did the JNF overcome these financial and legal obstacles to continue and actually expand its land purchasing operations, not just in the small zone of the country where Jewish purchases remained unrestricted but in the rest of the country as well? This is the major question addressed in *Between Capital and Land*.

The thrust of Tuten's argument is that the JNF flexibly and effectively modified its financial and land acquisition policies to overcome these challenges. On the financial front, JNF officials developed new programs to raise capital by cooperating with private investors while simultaneously identifying new sources of more traditional types of Jewish "national" income (such as donations, wills, and "living legacies") in non-European English-speaking countries, most notably the United States. On the legal front, they developed sophisticated methods of circumventing the Land Transfer Regulations by taking full advantage of its loopholes.

Tuten classifies the book as an "institutional history" and limits himself from the outset to a discussion of JNF policies and internal developments. For this purpose, his sources, which include archival documents from the Central Zionist Archives and an extensive bibliography of Hebrew and English secondary sources and reports, appear to be sufficient. Limiting himself to a close analysis of internal JNF developments also allows him to steer clear of controversial issues that often make it difficult to write a balanced account of land issues in pre-1948 Palestine, and his treatment of the material is fair and well substantiated.

The book's primary weakness is its structure. Aside from an introduction, a conclusion, and a chapter presenting the challenges facing the JNF at the outbreak of World War II, there are three chapters that make up the book's body. Each focuses on a short chronological period of two years (1940–41, 1942–43, and 1944–45). Each chronological chapter, in turn, consists of two sections, the first of which examines JNF income, expenditures, and land purchases. Breaking down this information into two-year periods makes sense, and, although the text is burdened with details and figures, the first part of each chapter effectively illustrates the gradual yet dramatic improvement of the JNF's financial situation during the war and its resulting ability to expand land purchases according to the new geographical priorities of the time.

The problem comes in the second part of each of the three main chapters, where Tuten presents chronological installments of four "case studies": the joint land purchase scheme, the farm city scheme, the Huleh region, and the Negev. The first two case studies examine the evolution of two unique land purchasing projects aimed at mobilizing capital from private investors. The last two document JNF land acquisition in specific geographical regions. Simply put, it is difficult to follow the detailed descriptions provided in the four case studies when each is broken up into two-year segments spread throughout the book. The case studies might have worked better had they been presented as whole units, perhaps grouped together into two separate chapters (one containing the case studies on private capital mobilization and the other containing the case studies on regional land acquisition) and placed after the chronological chapters on finances and land acquisition.

This problem may be largely an editing mishap. *Between Capital and Land* is for the most part a reproduction of Tuten's 2000 Ph.D. dissertation, which bears the same title and the same structural flaw. Although the dissertation clearly underwent copy editing and some other minor changes before being published as a book, the editors should also have paid attention to flow, organization, and structure.

Finally, although this book is currently the only English language source on JNF operations in Palestine during World War II, it soon will be joined by Yossi Katz's *The Battle for the Land: the Jewish National Fund before the Establishment of the State of Israel*, which was published in Hebrew in 2001 and which will soon appear in English. The Hebrew version of Katz's book is better structured and more comprehensive than Tuten's book, and we can expect that the English version will be too. Nonetheless, as one of the few archive-based



studies of the JNF, *Between Capital and Land* should be carried by libraries and consulted by interested specialists and students.

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RACHEL FELDHAY BRENNER, *Inextricably Bonded: Israeli Arab and Jewish Writers Re-Visioning Culture*, Studies on Israel (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003). Pp. 349. \$35.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY SHALOM GOLDMAN, Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga.; e-mail: slgoldm@emory.edu

The great majority of literary criticism on modern Hebrew literature is written within the well-defined bounds of the Israeli political and cultural consensus. Histories of Hebrew literature acknowledge the formative roles of fiction and poetry in defining and encouraging Jewish nationalism, and studies of contemporary fiction specify the degree to which today's writers fall within, or challenge, the national consensus. In the dominant Israeli consensus, the actions of the state and its army are permanently justified. These institutions can do no wrong, and responsibility for the constant state of war between Israel and Arab states—and between Israelis and Palestinians—lies with “the Arab aggressors.” According to this view, Israeli Arabs constitute a potential fifth column within the Jewish state.

In her path-breaking new study, *Inextricably Bonded*, Rachel Feldhay Brenner uses the tools of literary theory and psychology to challenge this nationalist reading and presents the reader with an in-depth picture of Israeli literary culture against the backdrop of the first intifada (1987–93) and the beginning of the second (2000).

In the first section, Brenner surveys and expands upon the work of Israeli post-Zionist historians—a body of work she is in sympathy with. Her useful survey of post-Zionism defends those historians who are “able to do what any researcher is supposed to do, namely, distance themselves from the object of research and look at it from a different perspective” (p. 21). The view that emerges from their more objective reading of Israeli history is that Israel shares the burden of responsibility for war and that its literature has often been critical of the state. The author takes issue with the term post-Zionist, which originated as a term of derision: “in fact, the term ‘post-Zionism’ often signifies the derogatory, if not hateful, attitude of establishment Zionists towards revisionist scholars” (p. 21).

In her survey of both Israeli history and Hebrew literature, Brenner offers the English-language reader an all too rare alternative set of readings and interpretations. She demonstrates that challenges to the dominant Zionist narrative, challenges that are today deemed post-Zionist, were posed very early in Zionist history. Two well-known examples are Ahad Ha'am's essay “The Truth from the Land of Israel” (1889) and Yitzhak Epstein's “The Hidden Question” (1907). These two articles warned the Zionist movement that it ignored the Palestinian Arabs at its own peril. As Epstein wrote: “When we come to our homeland, we must uproot all thoughts of conquest or expropriation.” Brenner reminds us that “literature foresaw the conflict at its embryonic stage” (p. 25).

In parts two and three, Brenner moves from historical to literary issues. We learn that dissent has long been a feature of Israeli literature, presaging the work of the post-Zionist historians. The author provides thoughtful analyses of works by Israeli Jewish writers Amos Oz, A. B. Yehoshua, and David Grossman and demonstrates that much of their work calls into question the values of the Israeli consensus. How is it then that these writers' works have become canonical and are widely read, taught in schools, and translated into foreign languages? Brenner uncovers the strategies behind “the canonical reception of Jewish Israeli fiction that demonstrates quite a radical attitude of dissent” (p. 89). The Israeli literary establishment

often reads dissenting works as a “metonymic representation of an idea or situation that transcends the particular Israeli circumstances” (p. 94). Brenner compares this acceptance to the South African acceptance of J.M. Coetzee’s work. In contrast to these establishment understandings of Arab characters “as an embodiment of Israeli existentialist concerns,” Brenner understands the portrayal of Arabs in Israeli fiction as realistic: “I approached the Arab as a *character* rather than as an allegorization of a psychological component of the Israeli character. I showed that in these texts the Arab character acts as a *subject* in his interaction with the Jewish *subject*” (p. 207).

Brenner then moves the discussion to the work of Israeli Arab writers, among them Atallah Mansour, Emile Habiby, and Anton Shammas. Mansour’s 1966 novel *In a New Light* was the first Hebrew language novel written by an Israeli Arab. Emile Habiby, whose books were translated into Hebrew in the 1980s, wrote in Arabic. His novels were translated into Hebrew by Anton Shammas, who later wrote what is perhaps the most widely read and critically praised Arab Israeli novel, *Arabesques*.

Arab novelists whose work appears in Hebrew pose a challenge to the national consensus and to the concept of a Jewish revival of Hebrew language and literature. As the readership of these writers grows and their work attracts popular and critical attention, historians and interpreters of Israeli culture are challenged to explicate the writings of Israeli Arabs and situate them in the history of Israeli culture, a culture whose self-presentation and self-understandings are assertively Zionist. Brenner’s perceptive reading of Shammas’ *Arabesques* astutely identifies that novel as “an audacious text both in terms of form and content. . . . The taboos of ethnic purity and state security that Shammas’s narrator so openly addresses and transgresses represent the complicity of the issues that the Arab minority faces in the Jewish State” (p. 120–21).

In the writings of Shammas and other Israeli Arab authors, and in the fact that they have achieved high literary status in Israel and abroad, Brenner sees hope for a better Israeli–Palestinian future. “The willingness to listen to the other may yet transform the negative bonding of mistrust and hatred between Arabs and Jews” (p. 285). Brenner sees Israeli literature of dissent as a form of prophecy and reminds us of its “potential to transform bonds of fear into bonds of peace” (p. 287). An author’s epilogue, written after the September 2000 outbreak of the second intifada further contextualizes the relationship between Israeli–Palestinian literature and history.

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ISRAEL GERSHONI AND JAMES JANKOWSKI, *Commemorating the Nation: Collective Memory, Public Commemoration, and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Egypt*, Chicago Studies on the Middle East (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2004). Pp. 350. \$59.95.

REVIEWED BY VERNON EGGER, Department of History, Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, Ga.; e-mail: voegger@georgiasouthern.edu

For almost 20 years, Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski have been collaborating on the theme of nationalism. They have cowritten two books on the development of Egyptian nationalism and coedited a book on Arab nationalism. Their latest joint endeavor is yet another exploration of modern Egyptian history. This time they employ the lens of memory studies, the field that explores how historical memory is continually reshaped for each generation by such forces as holidays, museums, state funerals, works of art, academic analysis, and newspapers.

The problem that Gershoni and Jankowski set for themselves is the analysis of how the meaning and significance of several icons of the Egyptian nationalist movement have been

reinterpreted over time. They examine the evolution of the public commemoration of six major symbols of Egyptian nationalism: three of Mahmud Mukhtar's monumental sculptures, the nationalist heroes Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid, and the July Revolution.

The results of the study are illuminating. The authors demonstrate that, from the very beginning, deep controversy embroiled the unveiling of all three of Mukhtar's most famous sculptures—Nahdat Misr and the statues of Sa'd Zaghlul in Alexandria and Cairo—and that their significance is still in dispute among Egyptians. The most intriguing section is their exploration of the eventual fate of Nahdat Misr. By the end of World War II, a consensus had emerged among intellectuals of various political persuasions that the statue was no longer an adequate expression of the Egyptian national revival. The revolution of 1952 sealed this verdict, and in 1955 the new government moved the statue from its high-profile location in Railway Station Square to its present site near the campus of Cairo University. It was replaced by the gigantic statue of Ramses II that still stands there, and the square was renamed Maydan Ramsis. The action continues to perplex analysts: a regime that sought popular support replaced a statue that exalted the nation as a whole with one that would have served well as the inspiration for Shelley's "Ozymandias."

Kamil (1874–1908) and Farid (1868–1919) were among Egypt's best known and most revered public figures in the early 20th century. Their huge, public funerals were the prototypes for future memorials to fallen national heroes. Their followers' attempts to erect memorials in their memory, however, were stymied for decades due to British repression and jealousies among Egyptian political parties. Gershoni and Jankowski demonstrate how quickly Kamil and Farid disappeared from public awareness until 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i almost single-handedly rehabilitated their image during the 1930s through his series on modern Egyptian history. In 1953, the Free Officers sponsored two huge funerals to rebury both men in the mausoleum that had been built for the purpose by the despised ancien regime. By doing so, the new government deflected attention away from the monarchy that it would soon abolish, and it simultaneously associated itself with the spirit of these heroes' nationalist struggle. The authors also shed considerable light on the evolution of the Egyptian national holiday. During Nasser's presidency, 23 July was the occasion for the government to inspire and instruct the nation on the meaning of its past and its vision for the future. Even in the Nasser period, however, the holiday took on different meanings. The period of the union with Syria, the malaise of the early 1960s, and the aftermath of the 1967 military debacle caused both the regime and the public to alter their interpretations of the holiday. After the October War, Sadat audaciously shifted the importance once given to 23 July to 6 October. Ignoring the loss of a war and focusing on an opening-day victory, he transformed the entire set of values that the Nasser regime had stood for.

*Commemorating the Nation* is a book that any historian of modern Egypt can read with profit, and, if it is ever issued in paperback, it would be an outstanding choice for courses in historiography.

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MAYE KASSEM, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). Pp. 212. \$49.95 cloth. \$19.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY DEBRA SHULMAN, Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; [debra.shulman@yale.edu](mailto:debra.shulman@yale.edu)

Although written and published before Egypt's unprecedented 7 September 2005 presidential elections, *Egyptian Politics* is a vital tool to understanding the background to that contest and why Egyptian elections are not (and have never been) an indicator of democratization.

Indeed, for those interested in enhancing their knowledge of what goes on inside the black box of Egyptian domestic politics, Maye Kassem's book will prove an indispensable resource. Thorough enough to teach the seasoned student of the Cairo scene a thing or two, *Egyptian Politics*, with its concise style and colorful case studies, takes pains to remain accessible to the layperson as well.

An assistant professor of political science at the American University in Cairo, Kassem is also author of *In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt* (1999). In her more recent volume, Kassem explains the resilience of authoritarian rule in contemporary Egypt. She identifies the following puzzle: whereas the formal political structure in Egypt has changed since the military coup that ended the reign of the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952, the reality of personal authoritarian rule has remained constant. Specifically, across the presidencies of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak—and despite formidable shifts, such as from Nasser's socialist single-party system to Sadat's open-door economic policy and multiparty political system—Egypt's leaders have managed to forestall democratization. How has this occurred? According to Kassem, although the United States has helped to shield Egypt and other Middle Eastern client states from the pressure to democratize, the main factors in sustaining authoritarianism in Egypt are local. She argues that three tactics have been key: the use of patronage and cooptation, the adoption of a legal-constitutional framework that allows the regime to exercise extraordinary powers, and the employment of the state's coercive apparatus.

To reinforce her argument, Kassem examines politics under Egypt's three presidents, with emphasis on the recent period under Mubarak. The book begins with a short introductory chapter in which Kassem identifies the main question of the work and sketches out the three factors (mentioned above) that she believes are most significant in sustaining authoritarian rule in Egypt. In chapter two, she provides brief histories of politics under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, showing how Nasser consolidated personal authoritarian rule in the wake of the 1952 Free Officers' coup. Since Nasser's death in 1970, and with it the passing of Pan-Arabism and the socialist-populist ideology he propagated, Kassem claims that Egypt has fallen into the category coined by Juan Linz of a "neosultanistic regime," held together by patronage and fear. In chapter three, she details the development of political parties and the history of legislative elections, from single-party rule under Nasser to the implementation of a multiparty system under Sadat. Kassem postulates that Sadat's move to liberalize the party system was aimed at securing Western aid while enabling him to marginalize Nasserist and socialist forces. Chapter four provides an analysis of Egypt's weak civil society, illustrating how it has been hindered from development as a consequence of the repressive state's interference. As a stand-in for civil society, she examines the activities of trade unions and professional associations, broadening her analysis to include human-rights groups in the Mubarak era. In chapter five, Kassem turns her attention to Egypt's Islamists, providing readers with provocative arguments. For example, she posits that the state's "rejectionist" approach is largely responsible for the exercise of militant ideology on the part of Islamists, which in turn is responsible for international terrorism by forcing Egyptian Islamists like Ayman al-Zawahiri to circumvent the domestic arena in favor of the international sphere.

In the concluding chapter, Kassem reflects on the broader questions surrounding contemporary Egyptian politics, producing the book's most controversial moments. Although she prognosticates that the Egyptian regime is secure for the "foreseeable future," she seems to be concerned in the longer term that republican Egypt could go the way of Iran under the Pahlavi monarchy, falling victim to the "unpredictable transformations of dissent" (p. 186). To avoid such an unwelcome outcome (as well as the scourge of future terrorist attacks), she urges the United States to pressure Egypt into genuine political reform. In encouraging the United States to push Egypt to forego repression, however, she does not attempt to reconcile

her position with Jason Brownlee's argument, which she cites earlier (p. 7), that authoritarian regimes like the Shah's fall if they are prevented by international actors from using force to quell internal dissent.

In addition, Kassem addresses the important question of why a regime as secure in its power as that of Hosni Mubarak would become ever more repressive. She answers that it is in the nature of authoritarian states that there is *never* enough security for their leaders, who constantly fear dangers on the horizon that may cost them their rule and even their lives. Surely, however, this answer is incomplete. Were it sufficient, we would expect authoritarian regimes always to be maximally repressive, inhibited only by their capabilities. In practice, however, we have witnessed the liberalization of nondemocratic states, whether it be Egypt under Sadat in the mid-1970s or Jordan under King Hussein in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Why do such leaders sometimes choose repression while at other times aim to secure their rule through popular liberalization measures? Kassem struggles to provide a sufficient answer.

The biggest weakness of *Egyptian Politics* is its scant engagement with theoretical debates concerning authoritarianism and democratization. Indeed, while she mentions theoreticians such as Adam Przeworski and Juan Linz, Kassem avoids staking a position within the theoretical literature, as well as placing Egypt on the continuum of authoritarian states. This finding is unfortunate due to the disjuncture between Middle Eastern studies and political science that has been noted by area experts. Kassem bypasses an opportunity to compare her arguments about authoritarianism to those advanced by others and to test whether her postulates regarding Egypt can travel to other countries within the region and outside it.

That said, there is much to recommend this book for what it is: an authoritative account of authoritarian politics in modern Egypt. Particularly where Mubarak's regime is concerned, Kassem provides one of the most thorough accounts of how politics works, from how electoral laws have changed over the years to recent legislative elections to government tactics in dealing with Islamists. Moreover, if this encyclopedic account at times risks verging on the prosaic, Kassem makes sure to avert that fate by including illuminating examples, drawn from her own interviews or from Cairo's increasingly lively English-language press. Satisfying though it is, *Egyptian Politics* does leave a lingering question. How authoritarian can Egypt be if Kassem has the freedom to write such a scathing indictment of her government? In the end, perhaps the most significant challenge to Kassem's no holds barred characterization of Egypt as a maximally repressive, neosultanistic, authoritarian regime lies in her ability to tell the tale.

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MAHA M. ABDELRAHMAN, *Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2004). Pp. 235. \$27.50 paper.

REVIEWED BY PAMELA J. STUMPO, Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, Wa.; e-mail: pstumpo@u.washington.edu

In *Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt*, Maha Abdelrahman makes an important contribution to the literature on NGOs, civil society, and Egypt. Scholars who study the developing world, and those working with (or thinking about working with) NGOs that claim to be spreading democracy, will find her research useful. Based on an analysis of Egypt, Abdelrahman examines whether or not NGOs can be a source of political transformation.

Abdelrahman's literature review does a good job of encapsulating major scholars such as Weber, Skocpol, Marx, Hegel, and Gramsci. She demonstrates how scholars have mistakenly assumed that an increase in activity in civil society will necessarily bring democratization. Abdelrahman goes on to divide the history of NGOs into three time periods (1920–50,

1950–70, and the “neo-liberal age”). Much of Abdelrahman’s answer to why NGOs have failed to “bring democratization” rests on the fact that they are not nonpolitical entities but are “necessarily political [so] their work cannot be isolated from the wider political context in which they work” (p. 67).

Using Egypt as a case study, Abdelrahman illustrates this point, beginning with a useful history of Egyptian society. As far back as Muhammad Ali, the state did away with civil-society organizations. Along with Nasser’s industrialization and nationalization policies, there was an expansion of state bureaucracy and the growth of a new ruling class. Nasser’s regime “used the discourse of nationalism and of building a strong country to silence any independent social force and deny civil society any form of autonomy” (p. 93). *Civil Society Exposed* describes how in 1964 the Law of Associations gave power to the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), permitting it to regulate the work of NGOs. It still holds that power today.

Abdelrahman’s argument is nuanced enough to acknowledge that, although most NGOs in Egypt submit to the “State’s rules of the game,” Egypt’s civil society reflects how social forces are “struggling for a larger share of political power” (p. 136). Scholars interested in learning more about social forces at work in Egypt will find her analysis useful. She provides good descriptions of a range of NGOs, including businessmen’s associations (which have the most influence because of the connections between their members and the state bureaucracy) and Islamic NGOs (which, unlike other nonprofits, have not had to rely on regime-approved funding).

The real strength of *Civil Society Exposed* lies in the analysis of a sample of sixty diverse NGOs in Egypt. By conducting freeform interviews in villages where respondents did not have to directly comment on the work that NGOs were doing, Abdelrahman found a way of highlighting the disconnect between the needs of these people and the programs pursued by NGOs. In many cases, interviewees expressed interest in a new sewage system while NGOs were offering sewing classes.

Foreign aid is limited in its impact, she argues, because the regime, through the MOSA, controls where it can be used. NGOs have to develop projects that meet both the regime’s and the funding agencies’ needs with the small amounts of funding they are given. “NGOs in Egypt are tightly controlled by the State, represented by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), which not only limits the autonomy of NGOs but also undermines the very essence of their identity as ‘non-governmental’...” (p. 120). The book clearly demonstrates that MOSA is used as a way for the regime to extend its power into the NGO sector, thereby demonstrating her conclusion that civil society is in no way free from regime control and, therefore, cannot serve as a field for democratic change.

Although Abdelrahman begins her book by saying, “the boundaries between the domains of State and civil society are not clearly demarcated and are hence in a state of flux” (p. 29), at times she appears to be treating the state as a fixed entity (referring to it with a capital S) and conflating it with MOSA. I am left wondering whether regime power is the same as state power and whether or not other organs of the state are working against MOSA’s interests.

In addition, much of Abdelrahman’s argument revolves around the fact that existing social stratifications (e.g., class, gender, and other power hierarchies) are reproduced in NGOs, thereby limiting real change. We learn a great deal from her descriptions of these hierarchies—MOSA officials even go so far as to tell Abdelrahman that their relationship with NGOs is one of a “father and his children” (p. 166). Her own research, however, shows that, although progress seems to be limited to upper class women in Cairo, some of society’s gender hierarchies are not reproduced in NGOs. She writes, “Women’s representation on boards of directors, although not high...is different and more genuine” (p. 165). One concern with the

analysis is that she may have overlooked what positive changes have come along with NGO activity, however small those changes might be.

However, these issues do not undermine her main point, that in general NGOs both reflect and reproduce the larger political context in Egypt. Scholars who have naively assumed that “civil society” (because it has become a popular buzzword) can solve the problem of democratization in the developing world should pay close attention to Abdelrahman’s argument.

Although *Civil Society Exposed* contains an extensive bibliography that scholars interested in civil society or Egypt would find useful, the reader would have been better served with a bibliography organized by categories with Arabic-language texts listed separately.

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SABA MAHMOOD, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005). Pp. 249. \$55.00 cloth. \$17.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY JOYCE BURKHALTER FLUECKIGER, Department of Religion, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga.; e-mail: reljbf@emory.edu

Saba Mahmood begins this book about the women’s mosque movement in Cairo, Egypt, with the question many Western feminists ask of women who support Islamist movements: “why would such a large number of women across the Muslim world actively support a movement that seems inimical to their ‘own interests and agendas’?” (p. 2) Mahmood begins by challenging the very frameworks within which such a question is asked. Her ethnographic study exposes assumptions of both feminist theory and “secular-liberal thought” about the nature of the self, agency, and politics, as well as assumptions about the relationship between interiority and performance. Mahmood’s goal in exposing these assumptions is to make room for other ways of conceptualizing the self, authority, and tradition—most particularly, to identify multiple forms of agency beyond that of subversive agency.

The women’s mosque movement, which began to emerge in the 1970s as part of the larger Islamist revival and piety (*da’wa*) movements, developed in response to what participants experience as a marginalization of religious knowledge, ethics, and piety in an increasingly secular society. Participants gather at local mosques to study religious texts and to receive teachings from female preachers about how to cultivate piety. The emphasis of the mosque movement is on what Mahmood calls “outward markers of religiosity”: ritual practices, how one conducts oneself in public and in the family, dress, choice of entertainment, and so forth. Whereas many critics identify these markers as potentially mechanical and a substitute for a more “sincere and personal connection with God” (p. 146), movement participants maintain that these bodily practices actually shape and create piety, ethics, and morality.

Throughout the book, Mahmood tacks back and forth between ethnographic analysis of the mosque movement and discussions of Western feminist and liberal political intellectual history and theory. In the first chapter, she lays out the assumptions that many of her readers will bring to the terms “agency” and “resistance.” She concludes that agency has come to be understood in feminist thought as coterminous with “resistance,” “subversion,” and a particular “politically prescriptive project” [emphasis in original] (p. 10), thus precluding many scholars from seeing other forms of agency, which she defines as “ability to effect change in the world and in oneself” (p. 14).

Mahmood argues that mosque movement participants’ primary mode of agency is through the construction of a pious self through cultivation of bodily practice. She builds here on Judith Butler’s discussion of the significance and creative potential of performativity as a theory of agency (Butler, 1999, xxiv). Whereas Butler is interested primarily in the subversive

potential of performativity, Mahmood analyzes ways in which performance creates when it is *not* subversive.

This site of agency is further complicated by the religious authority to which mosque movement participants resort, authority located outside of the individual. Mahmood asks, "How do we conceive of individual freedom in a context where the distinction between the subject's own desires and socially prescribed performances cannot be easily presumed, and where submission to certain forms of (external) authority is a condition for achieving the subject's potentiality?" (p. 31). A mosque movement participant arguing with her husband about her participation in the *da'wa*, possibly even defying him in her insistence to live by rigorous standards of piety, does so not out of an assumption of equal rights for women but out of "certain . . . moral orientations" based on scriptural authorities that she shares with her husband. Women's participation in the mosque movement and their increased literacy in religious texts and ethics give them the authority to engage in such discussions within frameworks traditionally limited to male religious specialists.

The ethnographic portions of *Politics of Piety* focus on the mosque movement's "pedagogies of persuasion"—teaching of textual traditions and modes of interpretation (chapter 3)—and the embodied character of Islamic knowledge as practiced by the mosque movement (chapter 4). Mahmood introduces female preachers (*dā'iyyāt*, literally, those who perform *da'wa*) from several different kinds of mosques, whose preaching/teaching styles vary widely. One *dā'iya* trains her audience in modes of interpretation within the bounds of the four authoritative legal schools. Mahmood gives a wonderful description and analysis of how this kind of choice "works" when the *dā'iya* is confronted with the question of whether a woman should lead prayer when a capable male is present. The preacher "does not ground her justification for leading women in prayer rituals in an argument for gender equality, or women's equal capacity to perform such a task. Instead, she locates it within the space of disagreement among Muslim jurists about the conditions under which women may lead the prayer ritual" (p. 88).

The strongest contribution of the book is the analysis of ritual and bodily performance of piety and indigenous interpretations of such performance. Bodily practice such as veiling has often been interpreted by both scholars and secular-liberal Muslims as a "sign" of Muslim or nationalist identity. Mahmood argues that such interpretations are drawn from a post-Enlightenment tradition that assumes the existence of an abstract ethical system that is only enacted through external ritual and practice. In contrast, participants in a *da'wa* movement understand practice not simply as reflective of interior piety (and hence perhaps not ultimately necessary), but as transformative and creative of the (pious) self. Mahmood gives several examples of the ways in which this "work" of bodily and argumentative practices is understood, including practices of veiling and modesty, ritual prayer and weeping, and mosque lessons. The body is a site of moral training; it "constitutes both the potentiality and the means through which interiority is realized" (p. 159).

Through close ethnographic analysis of rhetorical teaching and bodily practice, Mahmood successfully articulates alternative forms of agency. However, she realizes that many feminist readers may still not be able to fully step into this alternative framework; and so she concludes by encouraging a mode of analysis that, rather than being singularly authoritative, minimally enters a conversation—a conversation that enables respectful coexistence of difference.

*Politics of Piety* is an excellent ethnographic study of an Islamist movement that takes the movement's own terms of engagement and practice seriously; it is an important (and corrective) contribution to feminist and religious studies for its emphasis on indigenous terminologies and alternative interpretive frameworks and to anthropology for its analysis of religious authority and the performative creation of ethics. The heavy theoretical engagement of the book will make this a difficult text for most undergraduate classes, but makes it particularly useful for graduate seminars.



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LESLEY LABABIDI IN COLLABORATION WITH NADIA EL-ARABI, *Silent No More: Special Needs People in Egypt* (New York: American University in Cairo Press, 2002). Pp. 214. \$24.50 cloth.

REVIEWED BY NANCY Y. REYNOLDS, Department of History, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo.; e-mail: nreynolds@wustl.edu

Lesley Lababidi and Nadia El-Arabi have written one of the first English-language studies of disability in the Middle East. The authors note that between 2 and 6 percent of the Egyptian population have disabling conditions, whereas only 5 to 7 percent of them "receive support services" (p. 22). As the book testifies, Egyptian society is moving toward better reaching its disabled members, although the larger and more radical project of reforming society remains elusive. Dr. Alaa Shukrallah, a leading advocate for special needs people in Egypt, declares in the early pages of the book, "The focus of rehabilitation has been on the individual and how the individual must 'fit into' normal society: in other words, on making the disabled normal enough to fit into normal society. And I think this is a great failure, because I personally believe the focus should be more on changing society to accept diversity and difference than on changing the individual to fit into society" (p. 16). In their book, Lababidi and El-Arabi provide rich documentation of the range of efforts both to rehabilitate and support individuals with special needs as well as to alter social thinking and institutions to accommodate disability.

*Silent No More* begins by outlining some historical trends in social attitudes toward disability in Egypt. The authors stress, for example, that before 1970, society had little concern for those with physical and mental disabilities (p. 2), and that families tended to hide their disabled members to protect the marriage prospects of siblings (pp. 2, 23). Prior to 1950, the majority of services available to disabled people came through private and religious charitable organizations, many run by the upper classes or expatriates in urban areas. Along with much of the private sector and civil society, these groups were nationalized after the 1952 revolution. According to the book, decentralized care only expanded again after the United Nations began awareness-raising campaigns in the 1970s (these U.N. declarations are usefully included in the appendices of the book), international research emerged on the importance of early detection and intervention and normalization, and President Hosni Mubarak and his wife, Suzanne, began advocating for children with disabilities in the 1980s. Lababidi and El-Arabi do note that Egypt has a long institutional history of serving people with disabilities (i.e., the 13th century Qalawun hospital's section for the insane, or the section for the blind at al-Azhar which began in the 8th century), and they also detail several important histories of more recent institutions. In light of the expanding field of social and cultural histories of insanity and disability (including a broad range of scholars, such as Michel Foucault, Paul K. Longmore, Gelya Frank, Mark Priestley, Marian Corker, Tom Shakespeare), one wonders what this history of Egyptian disabilities might contribute to broader conversations about the social model of disability, the disability rights movement, gender and disability, postmodern disability, disability in global contexts, and so forth. A number of scholars have also recently begun working specifically on disability in colonial and postcolonial contexts, such as Anita Ghai on India, Sandra Sufian on the Middle East, and Mark Priestley on the global context.

Although *Silent No More* works to raise community awareness of the prevalence, treatment, and political issues of disability, this book is largely a compendium of resources in Egypt for people with disabilities, their families, and educators. The authors write that "[t]his volume is a blueprint for Egypt's work and a testimony to tireless community leaders. Ultimately, it is a tribute to Egyptian families . . . who strive to assure the disabled of their right to a better

quality of life" (p. xv). The authors have identified and conducted interviews at more than forty schools and associations in Egypt (run by the government, NGOs, and private associations) as well as with a number of individuals. Organized by institution or program serving different disabilities (deafness, blindness, mental retardation, and physical disability), much of the text represents largely transcribed interviews with school or association administrators, teachers, and occasional students. The subjects explain the available facilities, the program's history and mission, its targeted population, current strengths and challenges, and future plans. Perhaps as a way to extend the model of self-empowerment, the authors' "vision was that the story would be told primarily by the people involved—people with special needs and their caregivers and friends within the community at large" (p. xiii).

Some of these listings open broad questions about the social and political relations of disability in Egypt: the need for unification of rights for the mentally retarded among different governorates in Egypt, the lack of resources for the multiply disabled, the problem of accessibility and movement in Cairo, the need for more programs to serve rural and lower income communities, and the desire to create residential communities for disabled people whose parents or caregivers die. Many of the transcribed interviews make for quite engaging reading, demonstrating the richness of the interview encounter with the authors (especially the organizations involved in community-based rehabilitation, the Right to Live Association in Heliopolis, and the pediatricians working with learning disabilities). A number of the entries demonstrate that the various organizations and schools are in dialogue with each other. Other entries provide a public forum for groups to voice their specific needs and concerns (i.e., a bus to transport students, improved dental care, more stable funding, higher teacher salaries, more Braille printers or computers). Overall, the interviews, often rich in detail, raise many important issues. One hopes that the book has been also published in Arabic.

*Silent No More* initiates a social and academic conversation about important issues of special needs, social support, accessibility, and the definition of "normal" that represents an original contribution to the study of Egypt, disability, and civil society, as well as an essential directory for people with special needs and their advocates. Making disability a visible category of study and society is an important step in ensuring social enfranchisement.

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GILLES DORRONSORO, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Translated from the French by John King. Pp. 393. \$29.50 cloth.

CHRIS JOHNSON AND JOLYON LESLIE, *Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace* (London: Zed Books, 2004). Pp. 251. \$22.50 paper.

PAUL ROGERS, *A War on Terror: Afghanistan and After* (New York: Pluto Press, 2004). Pp. 216. \$24.95 paper. \$75.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY JOHN F. SHRODER, JR., Department of Geography and Geology, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, Neb.; e-mail: jshroder@mail.unomaha.edu

A plethora of books continues to result from the decades of crises in Afghanistan. Three new offerings from European sources (two British and one French) provide new observations and some cogent analyses, albeit also some pessimistic viewpoints of the unfolding tragedies and political missteps from all sides in that benighted country. It seems that as soon as one problem in Afghanistan is overcome, yet others emerge to fill the void. G. Dorronsoro (*Revolution Unending*), C. Johnson and J. Leslie (*Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace*), and P. Rogers (*A War on Terror*) have given us fresh perspectives on seminal world events, based either upon

their extensive travels and interviews and/or upon assessments of the layers of complexity that surround the turmoil. It is perhaps too much to hope that parts of these books can provide insights that, if recognized by decision makers, could help reduce tensions in the region.

G. Dorronsoro, a political scientist from the University of Paris, originally prepared *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present* as an academic thesis based upon his extensive travels and researches in Afghanistan since 1988. His first two chapters in part I on the origins of the Afghan revolution set the stage with a fairly thorough and useful historical summary, especially for those who need background context. Part II on mobilizations details the commanders and the many mujahideen or *jihadi* parties that developed after the Communist coup in Kabul in 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 1979. Part III focuses on the dynamics of confrontation between the Kabul regime and the guerillas, and part IV is on the Taliban. Part V, the last section in the book, concerns the American invasion after 9/11 and the return of political fragmentation to present-day Afghanistan. In the concluding chapters, the author presents useful observations on the pragmatic changes in policy of Pakistan in response to the changes in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan's important ongoing role as an uncontrollable haven for the remnants al-Qa'ida and the pro-Taliban movements. The perhaps critical ongoing crossborder movements of people and commerce are also featured. If one wishes at least a minimal understanding of the complexity of the events leading up to the manifold changes in Afghanistan for the past three decades, this is the book to read.

It was not ethnic differences that produced the conflict, Dorronsoro argues; true ethnic cleansing was never carried out, despite some brief outbursts of such barbarity. Instead, class structure and competition for education and employment, coupled with differences between urban and rural sensibilities, and political organizations with ideological objectives so polarized Afghanistan that the two-decade war became inevitable.

The discussion of the difficult period of Taliban rule is especially good. Much about the Taliban will be forever unknown because of their own disorganization, opaque decision making, and lack of records, but Dorronsoro has well captured and interpreted much of what is known of them. The association and education of many Taliban as Afghan refugees in the madrasas of Pakistan has been recognized by others before but is presented well here. The author presents excellent information on the status of women throughout time in Afghanistan, especially as it varied among different ethnic groups and under Taliban misrule.

In his concluding remarks, Dorronsoro suggests that, despite its overwhelming technological superiority, there is nothing to suggest that the United States will achieve stabilization in the short term. As has been noted by a number of other authors elsewhere as well, failure in Afghanistan will have serious consequences for America as a power; thus, the issues involved extend far beyond the destiny of Afghanistan itself. This is an essential concept that seems slowly to be achieving some recognition by decision makers in Washington.

Dorronsoro presents to the uninitiated a somewhat overwhelming plethora of names of people and movements critical to understanding the complexities of recent Afghan history, but the book is marred by a less than comprehensive index that would enable everything to be found with ease. A comprehensive glossary explains the meaning of many of the most common words. Transliteration of names is, however, a bit eccentric and may reflect transcription differences of uncommon names from French to English. The book has a wide variety of tables and small-scale maps that list and depict various ethnicities, political allegiances, and factional territory control, and other geographically useful information; all this adds to understanding and enables the reader to envision parts of exceptionally fluid historical situations.

In *Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace*, Johnson and Leslie have drawn on their experience of a decade and a half of living and working for Oxfam and the United Nations throughout Afghanistan. Their unusual NGO perspective is reinforced by the authentic voices of the many Afghan people they interviewed. The resulting book is a refreshingly different view of

the myriad problems of the country, although the assessment is marred by their noncritical view or failure to address the many problems caused by the Afghans themselves. Instead, the authors have expended most of their criticism, admittedly well placed, on the policies and machinations of the external powers that have so long played out their rivalries or aspirations on the Afghan body politic. This critical bias is, however, too much one way, almost an apologia for the Taliban, with little recognition of the culpability that so many Afghans share for destroying their own country or of the willful backwardness of so many people who wished to return to an imagined past that never existed. The authors have also made a few outright gaffes in their weak political analyses. That said, the book still presents valuable insights that could be considered where appropriate by the international intervention forces in Afghanistan.

To begin with, the authors note that, rather than engaging in hardheaded thinking about what was necessary and possible at the immediate postwar stage of Afghanistan's history, the international community went on a fantasy tour in imagining a participatory democracy that could not possibly exist, with full representation, gender sensitivity, and other trappings of the Western democratic rule of law. Cultural and political change at the point of a gun did not work for the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, nor do the authors think that it will work for the United States or the International Security Assistance Forces, who now nominally control only parts of Afghanistan. As a result, the authors note that the country has been slipping back into a familiar anarchic pattern, with the new state in effective control of only the capital and a few other towns, and with tenuous negotiated control over the roads that link them. This book was written, however, in the perhaps overly pessimistic times before Hamid Karzai was elected president, and before parliamentary elections in which at least 27 percent of the seats are constitutionally reserved for women. The optimist might predict that the future of Afghanistan in the next few years may be a very different situation than that which Johnson and Leslie were able to foresee when they wrote this book.

The book is not only a strong critique of U.S. policies in Afghanistan but also, surprisingly, of Johnson's and Leslie's U.N. employer. The authors believe that the United Nations has failed in Afghanistan because it is not structurally adapted for the role in nation building it has been called upon to play. The authors, because they have operated from within the U.N. for a considerable time, have been able to make observations of staff incompetence, obeisance to U.S. desires, misguided pursuit of a failed-state model, and its being "singularly ill-equipped to meet the challenges presented by a radically different political landscape" (p. 213).

Johnson and Leslie present good assessments of the perhaps ultimately flawed remaking of Afghanistan into an American puppet state, or of a Shura-e Nazar (Northern Alliance) state in which the former Pushtun political dominance has been unwisely suppressed. They note increasing unrest and lack of control in the Pushtun heartland of the south and east, although the obvious connections between Pushtun suppression and loss of control are not well made by the authors. They also note that Afghanistan has been made into a sort of corporate grab bag wherein the profusion of contractors and all too often incompetent NGOs are more in it for themselves and their profits than for any possible good for the Afghans. The oilmen in power in Washington are seen by Johnson and Leslie as not only molding the Middle East to maintain the flow of oil to the West, but also remaking Afghanistan to encourage access to hydrocarbons in Central Asia. Private sector economic growth in Afghanistan, seemingly to the exclusion of all else, was seen by the authors to be chosen as the main engine of beneficial change, whether or not it will take root in a country where it hardly ever has before. Nonetheless, it should be noted in opposition to Johnson and Leslie's thesis that private Afghan corporate interests have been suppressed by state monopolies for a very long time, and it may be that the natural instincts of Afghans as traders in an ancient traveler's

crossroads will ultimately be reasserted in a major beneficial way. It is too soon to tell and too soon to agree with Johnson and Leslie's pessimism.

This book also makes several important assertions that do have a ring of unpleasant truth about them, given the haste with which so much seems to have been done in attempting to reconstruct postwar Afghanistan. Especially striking to me, who was asked several years ago to provide topographic information on the location of mass graves, was that Johnson and Leslie noted any recognition of past atrocities has been suppressed so as not to embarrass some of those in the present government. This apparent expediency in the squelching of what in most other countries has been a valuable healing process, as well as important justice done to help ensure a more equitable future, is not good news for this country. Johnson and Leslie can be commended for pointing out this unfortunate factor.

Conversely, although problems with rebuilding schools and providing adequate books and educational supplies are mentioned briefly by Johnson and Leslie, too little attention was paid by them to the all important refurbishment of the educational system in Afghanistan. Probably because they had no experience with the rather limited but improving prewar educational system in the country, they did not recognize that the two-decade hiatus in elementary, non-religious education in the country has left such a vacuum of school resources that substantive improvement will take time.

An important chapter is devoted to the great problem of the dramatic increase in opium production in Afghanistan, in some case into areas (Hazarajat) where it was rarely ever seen before. Johnson and Leslie point out that this cash crop represents a means by which a desperately poor people can achieve some minimal measure of self-sufficiency in troubled times. If realistic crop replacements and internal peace and security are ever to increase beyond mere tokenism in the country, then perhaps this scourge can be overcome and Afghanistan can cease to be the narcostate that it now is. The authors wryly note, however, that many Afghans rightly see the West as responsible for sending the weapons that caused the country so much misery; opiates are thus seen as a fair export payback.

Finally, the book, *Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace*, has a useful who's who of important figures in the past and present of Afghanistan, a list of a few of the important political parties of the past few decades, and a chronology of some of the more important historical events since 1839. Overall, the book presents just enough history of the recent years so that the newcomer to Afghan affairs can make sense of it. In addition, the book is a useful introduction to a difficult subject, with enough clever anecdotes and valuable insights to offset the overt pessimism.

*A War on Terror: Afghanistan and After* by P. Rogers is a somewhat tedious recitation of events in the Middle East and Southwest Asia between 15 October 2001 and 4 December 2002. Published in 2004, much of the book is dated in apparent "dispatch" form from the "front" and written in the present tense. This is probably meant to provide a sense of immediacy or excitement, but all it really does is jar the reader and produce a sense of true datedness. It seems very old news now and could have benefited from severe editing and updating.

In addition to this current-events approach, the book is conflated with many other newsworthy events that occurred isochronously elsewhere in the Middle East, especially Israel and Iraq, which the author wanted to make somehow relevant. Whatever limited analysis is available in the book is sprinkled throughout in this dated, "be-here-now" approach that Rogers has taken. The collateral current events presented here may assist some scholars in relating events in Afghanistan to the greater regional contexts of the time, but it is unlikely that many will appreciate this. The book has no glossary, illustrations, footnotes, or references and does not present very well as a scholarly book. Although I did not attempt to validate any of the historical references, I found no reason to suspect inaccuracies in any of the events

portrayed. Instead, it appears more as a slim volume of op-ed pieces that are linked into a current-events genre by the author.

In the triptych of books reviewed here, none of the authors paid much attention to some of the other important problems or explanations of why events in Afghanistan have played out as they have. In particular, they ignored the problem of rampant illiteracy in the local languages, as well as in the Arabic of the Qur'an, that has allowed so much vicious interpretation and prejudice to be promulgated among Afghans. In addition, another of the unaddressed problems is a better understanding of past events and attempting to predict at least part of the future. The overarching controlling factors can be quite masked from the authors as events play out. For example, for several decades my Muslim students have carefully and privately brought up notions of a difficult Islamic reformation under way. The works of the authors reviewed here have given us much useful new material and understandings, but perhaps others in the future will be better able to put the events into a truer causative focus. Other such seminal events in the Middle East and Southwest Asia may yet be put into a more analytical context encompassing the ongoing discord within Islam. These books do not do that, but they do provide some useful background that scholars may wish to use for their own syntheses.

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STEVE COLL, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 11, 2001, Updated with New Documents from the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Penguin, 2004). Pp. 712. \$16.00 paper.

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It is hardest to mount a major effort when a problem still seems minor. Once the danger has fully materialized, evident to all, mobilizing action is easier—but by then it may be too late.

*The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 350

The 9/11 Commission's seemingly anodyne comment sums up the failure of American policy in South Asia brilliantly chronicled by Steve Coll in *Ghost Wars*. From 15 February 1989, when the Soviet Union withdrew the last of its forces from Afghanistan, until the 11 September 2001 catastrophe, the U.S. government could not reach a consensus about the extent to which the turmoil in Afghanistan threatened American interests. Washington was, therefore, incapable of devising and carrying out policies that might have averted the disaster.

The Commission viewed American incapacity as a failure of imagination, but Coll makes it clear that the problem was much larger than that. At the heart of the matter lay the conflicts among the agendas of three of the principal outside actors in Afghanistan—the governments of the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—and the conflicted nature of each of those agendas. All three agreed that peace should be restored in Afghanistan and were prepared for a measure of cooperation among themselves in pursuing this objective. Beyond this, however, the three differed sharply in their view of the Taliban, on how to approach al-Qa'ida and Osama bin Laden, and on the nature and extent of the threat posed by Islamic extremism. In each capital, there were divisions of opinion, and differing, often hidden, agendas in play. Policymaking was further complicated by dissembling in interstate communication and by the withholding of access to essential information among and within the governments involved.

Coll's meticulous research and 200 interviews put ample flesh on the bare bones of the foregoing generalizations. He highlights the ambiguous position of Saudi Arabia, particularly that both Prince Turki al-Faisal, the kingdom's former intelligence chief and principal Saudi

liaison with Pakistan, and the United States in supporting the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation. Prince Turki and his deputy, Ahmed Badeeb, had later financed the Taliban, and for this reason, the sincerity of the Prince's 1998 effort to get Taliban leader Mullah Omar to surrender Bin Laden has been questioned. The Prince nonetheless managed to maintain close working relations with the CIA while other elements of the Saudi establishment, notably Turki's uncle, Interior Minister Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz, were suspicious of the United States and rebuffed American requests for intelligence cooperation. Like everyone else involved in Afghanistan, the Saudis seemed to speak with more than one voice.

The Pakistani dimension of the problem was also complex. Whereas Saudi-American relations rested on the bedrock of American interest in Saudi oil, the central facts of Pakistan's relationship with the United States once the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan were the Pakistani nuclear program and the sanctions imposed by Washington on Pakistan as a result. Many in the Pakistani military, particularly in the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), were deeply committed to the Taliban, and in the hostile climate of U.S.-Pakistan relations in the 1990s, it was easy and natural for those officers to maintain an arms-length relationship with the United States and their erstwhile CIA collaborators and to continue supporting the Taliban. The country's political leadership, by contrast, feared the rise of Islamic radicalism in Pakistan and sought to mend fences with the United States. This effort continued even after the military gained ascendancy over the civilians by having Benazir Bhutto replaced as Prime Minister, but the Pakistan government did not pursue the American interest in the capture of Bin Laden as vigorously as Washington thought it could and should.

However, it is the American foreign policy process in all its complexity that is the main focus of *Ghost Wars*, with the CIA and its in-house and interagency battles receiving the most attention. The agency's Counterterrorist Center advocated using the intelligence network and forces of the Afghan Tajik resistance leader and post-Soviet Defense Minister Ahmed Shah Massoud in an effort to capture or kill Bin Laden, and supported a small group of Massoud's agents assigned to the task. Within the agency, the center's activism was countered by the Directorate of Operations, which was more sensitive to the concerns of its erstwhile ISI partners. The ISI had supported Massoud's ethnic and political rival Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during and immediately after the Soviet occupation and later backed the Taliban in their successful campaign to oust Massoud and his forces from Kabul. At the interagency level, the CIA fought against State Department proposals for broadening the Afghan government beyond the resistance leaders who had fought the Soviets. Later, as Massoud became the most viable opponent of the Taliban and Bin Laden, the State Department argued that the United States should not take sides in the Afghan civil war. Meanwhile, the Defense Department opposed engagement in South Asia, and the Clinton White House, with the Iran-Contra debacle and its own controversial air strikes on Afghanistan and the Sudan in mind, tended to view most of the covert actions proposed with a jaundiced eye.

Coll's fluent account of these bureaucratic wars leads inexorably to the conclusion that before 9/11, the United States government was not capable of devoting the amount of effort and resources needed to counter the threat posed by Bin Laden and Islamic radicalism. The al-Qa'ida attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Tanzania, and Yemen were not enough to overcome American reluctance in the post-Cold War era to reengage seriously in South Asia and the Middle East. President Clinton's national security advisor believed that terrorism and al-Qa'ida should be the number one issue on President Bush's agenda. However, while in George Tenet's words, "the system was blinking red" in the summer of 2001, with intelligence pointing to an impending al-Qa'ida attack, that system was unable to marshal the evidence it was receiving into a case for pursuing any of the unattractive courses of action available. That case would be "evident to all" only after 9/11.

Coll's book is thus a "must-read" for scholars, diplomats, and others with a professional interest in the Middle East and South Asia, for students of U.S. foreign policy, and for

anyone seeking to understand a remarkably important bit of world history. For those seeking to understand the region and the American interest, the book provides a wealth of historical material and insights into the personalities involved in the events leading to 11 September 2001. Equally important, it is the mother of all case studies of American foreign policy, showing both how difficult it is for those directly charged with making policy to decide on the best course of action and how the temper of the times and the concerns of other actors in and on the policy process can prevent such action from being taken until, to quote the 9/11 Commission, "the danger has fully materialized." That happened on 11 September 2001, and by then, it was too late.

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MARIAM ABOU ZAHAB AND OLIVER ROY, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan–Pakistan Connection* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Pp. 97. \$49.50 cloth.

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A glance at the title and its coauthor—Olivier Roy, an established authority on transnational radical and militant Islamism—raises the expectation of the reader. The brevity of the book, however, immediately becomes a cause of concern. A cursory reading of the book not only confirms fears that it is incapable of doing justice to the vast subject matter but also reveals major shortcomings. These include factual inaccuracies, contradictions, spelling mistakes, few references, incorrect translations, and so forth.

Structurally, the book consists of six chapters, which include the introduction and conclusion. Chapter 2 examines radical Islamism in Central Asia. Afghanistan and the emergence of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida in the aftermath of the Islamist insurgency in the 1980s are addressed in chapter 3. The fourth chapter discusses the radicalization of Pakistani Islamists and other religious conservatives. Chapter 5 talks about the connections between the transnational al-Qa'ida and the nation-states-based militant Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The central role played by Islamabad and Pakistani Islamist groups in the making of the Islamist militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir is the topic in chapter 5. The book seeks to explain the Afghan–Pakistani link in the making of transnational radical and militant Islamism, and how Pakistan was and remains the hub of international Islamist militancy. The book does not even come close to doing justice to the authors' stated approach of highlighting the various moving parts that came together and allowed for the emergence of the global al-Qa'ida network and its allies.

The narrative—a compilation of a lot of information—is highly descriptive. An absence of a clear structure has the reader jumping from topic to topic. The account wanders with sundry points scattered throughout the volume, with abrupt mentioning of issues and actors, some of whom are not properly identified, with only a surname used on first reference. Former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani is referred to as Rabbani only (p. 1). The name of the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Yusuf, is flip-flopped as Yusuf Ramzi. In parenthesis, Yusuf is referred to as Wali Khan, which is the name of the terrorist architect's top aide. Three terms in the glossary are defined incorrectly—*sahabah*, *tabligh*, and *zakat*. Elsewhere, acronyms such as ISI (p. 14) and MEI (p. 17) are used without providing their full form. The distinct terms *Islamic* and *Islamist* are used interchangeably.

On pages 51 and 68, the authors claim that Lashkar-e-Tayyibah and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen—two Kashmiri militant groups—joined Osama bin Laden's World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, although these groups did not appear in the original press release issued by the front in 1998 at the time of its founding. There is a contradiction



on page 23, where the authors claim that the militant Sunni sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahabah Pakistan (SSP) was founded with the backing of the then military government, interested in containing the rise of Shi'ism. In the same paragraph—two sentences later—they write that the SSP was founded in part because the Pakistani regime was repressing Sunnis to appease Iran. The Afghan Jamiat-ul-Ansar is translated on page 27 as Society of Partisans when it actually means Association of Supporters.

The authors also engage in certain sweeping assertions but do not offer evidence to substantiate the claims. In chapter 1, they assert that “avowed religious ideology does not have, or no longer has a direct relationship with activism” (p. 2) but do not offer proof for this inference. There are noteworthy analytical observations, but without any elaboration; for example, the September 11 hijackers are characterized as “second generation of Muslims who threw themselves abruptly into radicalization without passing through the intermediate stages of religious or political militancy” (p. 50). Several arguments, if further developed, could have compensated for other shortcomings in the research, which appears to be Web based as opposed to grounded in works of bona fide scholarship.

What is even more perplexing is that the book not only made it through peer review but also was published by Columbia University Press, a highly reputable publisher. The contents of the book suggest that the authors are not familiar with Pakistan, even though the junior author Abou Zahab is billed as “a specialist on Pakistan.” Moreover, disregard for the differences in core ideas, objectives, and modus operandi of various groups has the authors ignoring the major differences between radical and militant Islamists. Superficial reading of certain broad similarities such as the common goal of establishing an Islamic polity leads them to see similarities among diverse groups such al-Qa’ida, Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), and even the apolitical Tablighi Jama’at.

Because of a lack of a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the origins, trajectories, and evolution of the various Islamist organizations, the authors appear confused by different groups, various branches of the same group, and the factionalization of a given group. Roy and Abou Zahab discount deep theological, ideological, and political differences between HT and al-Qa’ida, which would explain their claim that the two organizations champion “the same ideas” with the exception “that the term jihad is absent from” HT’s “vocabulary” (p. 10)—another gross factual error. Although arguing that the curriculum of the Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan took on a Wahhabi cast under Saudi influence and that the Taliban ideology exhibited a Saudi character, the authors ignore the theological and juridical differences between the Taliban (Deobandi-Hanafi in terms of jurisprudence and Maturidi with regards to theology) and al-Qa’ida (Wahhabi/Salafi as far as creed is concerned and Hanbali with respect to law).

Given the multiple problems associated with this work, it seems that the bulk of it has been written by the junior coauthor. This notwithstanding, one wonders why Olivier Roy, a scholar of great caliber—whose 1994 publication *The Failure of Political Islam* was a masterpiece—approved and signed on to such below the mark research.

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ADRIENNE LYNN EDGAR, *Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004). Pp. 312. \$37.50.

REVIEWED BY ROBERT D. CREWS, Department of History, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.; e-mail: rcrews@stanford.edu

In 1900, tribes claiming descent from the Turkic warrior Oghuz-khan and calling themselves “Turkmen” were dispersed throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. The Teke, Yomut, Gökleng, and other tribes stretched from Anatolia to Iraq and Russian Turkestan. Despite a

common genealogy, a dizzying array of factors shaped very distinctive identities among them. They spoke a variety of dialects, inhabited at least five states, occupied different positions on a continuum between nomadic and sedentary life, and adhered to descent groups that often clashed with one another.

Within three turbulent decades, the Soviet Union had dramatically reshaped this landscape. However, socialism was not the sole instrument of transformation. Along with the Red Army and the brutal discipline of the collective farm, the Soviets introduced a 19th-century European understanding of nationhood. Out of a tsarist colony inhabited by a heterogeneous population marked by fluid identities, the Soviets sought to forge a homogenous and clearly demarcated "Turkmen nation," alongside Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and other nations. By 1936, a Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic—with a fixed territory and borders, a standardized language, an official flag, and a national elite—stretched from the Caspian Sea to the borders of Iran, Afghanistan, and the neighboring Soviet republics.

The remarkable story of Soviet attempts to make Central Asians "modern," by which they meant socialist and nationalist minded, is the subject of this brilliant book. In elegant prose and rich detail, Adrienne Edgar presents a highly original reinterpretation of the Soviet impact on the region. Her research affirms an interpretive shift, born in the early 1990s, that views the Soviet state not as the "breaker" but the "maker" of nations and challenges the Cold War notion that the Soviets created the Central Asian republics as part of a strategy of "divide and rule." This is where her agreement with this new scholarship largely ends, however. Drawing on recently declassified archives in Russia as well as Turkmen-language printed sources, Edgar's case study goes well beyond the Moscow-based party functionaries, state planners, and ethnographers whom others have identified as the actors most responsible for Soviet nation making.

*Tribal Nation* breaks from this top-down approach and focuses instead on interactions between Moscow and local elites. It shows how Turkmen intellectuals and communists, many of whom had received secular educations under the tsars or had been exposed to Muslim reformism and nationalism elsewhere, embraced the proposition that Turkmen formed a nation defined by a common territory and language. Unlike other scholars who have highlighted the invented or imagined character of nationhood, Edgar remains attentive to the inherited cultural and social material that elites struggled to mold into nations. The Soviets did not invent a sense of "Turkmen-ness" out of nothing. A genealogical basis for Turkmen identity had preceded the revolution. Combined with the Soviet strategy of "nativizing" institutions and the drawing of republican boundaries, such indigenous concepts quickly gave rise to entrepreneurs who engaged the Bolsheviks and their linguistic and territorial understanding of nationhood. They adopted the Soviet view that Turkmen should reside in a "national" republic ruled by a Turkmen elite, and they promoted themselves to fill these positions of authority. However, this is not simply a story of collaboration. Edgar convincingly shows how Turkmen elites not only participated in the process of nation making but shaped it in fundamental ways—for example, by insisting on the location of boundaries, laying claim to territory and assets, and constructing a "supratribal" literary language.

In telling the story of nation building, Edgar never loses sight of the Soviet commitment to socialism. The Bolsheviks waged war against the "backwardness" of the tsarist empire and sought to foster progress—and loyalty to the Soviet system—by transforming the Tsar's colonized peoples into modern, socialist nations. Edgar eloquently brings out the contradictions that haunted this project. Russians protested ethnic preferences designed to indigenize the party and state apparatus as reverse discrimination, while disappointed Turkmen protested the regime's failure to live up to its promise of equality among nationalities. Seeking to mobilize Turkmen and supplant tribal identities through land reform, promotion of class conflict, and emancipation of women, the party-state only reinforced the importance of descent groups.

Turkmen villagers manipulated official categories such as “class” to pursue clan rivalries and reasserted patriarchal controls. Elites produced by Moscow’s policies chafed under its increasingly centralized and repressive control. In the early 1930s, the radical pursuit of socialism through forced collectivization prompted rebellions and emigration but also undermined national construction: “The Soviet assault on ‘backwardness,’” Edgar writes, “targeted the practices that most clearly defined Turkmen identity, including their distinctive genealogical structures and practices relating to marriage and the family” (pp. 13–14).

Edgar’s masterful reconstruction of the tensions that burdened these contradictory projects and her careful attention to the power of Turkmen actors to shape their local outcomes make this book a landmark achievement in the study not only of the USSR and Central Asia but of the phenomenon of nationalism as well. Beautifully written and tightly argued, it is a model for scholars interested in similar themes in the Middle East and Eurasia. Finally, *Tribal Nation* stands out as an indispensable guide to contemporary Central Asian politics. Although the glow of the red star of communism has faded over the deserts and oases of the region, the hammer (if not the sickle) of Soviet-style nationhood lives on.

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EDWARD SCHATZ, *Modern Clan Politics: The Power of “Blood” in Kazakhstan and Beyond* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 2004). Pp. 276. \$50.00 cloth. \$22.50 paper.

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The well-known Asian specialist Owen Lattimore once wrote that, in understanding Central Asian sociopolitical systems, outside observers must take into account an “appreciation of the dynamics of social groups.” Although not referring to Lattimore specifically, Edward Schatz has applied this dictum successfully in his research of clan politics in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. His book, *Modern Clan Politics: The Power of “Blood” in Kazakhstan and Beyond*, asks a central, yet modest, question: “What is the place of subethnic identities in modern politics?” (p. 3). Fundamental to this question is the notion that, in Kazakhstan, the clan (*ru* or *taipa* in Kazakh) and its larger social unit, the horde (*zhuz*, which the author refers to as “umbrella clans”), will influence the course and function of political, social, and economic transition in this new era.

The value of Schatz’s work is not only the methodological approaches taken to uncover an extremely complex subject, but also the empirical applications he employed in his research. Schatz conducted focus groups, interviewed individuals, and carefully gauged the extent to which indiscernible forces determined the role that seemingly myopic clans operate in political, social, and economic relations during the period of transition. He also understands the limits to the methodological structure by arguing throughout that clan divisions persist, but do not hinge, on “identifiable mechanisms of identity reproduction” (p. 13). The mechanisms that sustained group identity, however, can be undermined by a state that deems them an obstacle to progress, but without appropriate substitutes, these identity forms will endure. That was, Schatz argues, what occurred during the Soviet era and to a considerable extent what is occurring in post-Soviet Kazakhstan today. The “shortage economy” that was endemic to the Soviet system unwittingly reinforced access networks and clans that bolstered the opportunity for unsanctioned forms to proliferate rather than dissipate. The Soviet authorities rejected clan identity and identified members by socioeconomic class or ethnic group. As Schatz writes, “if the intention of Soviet state-construction efforts was to provide an institutional order that

would marginalize subethnic divisions as politically unimportant, in fact they made them more politically salient by increasing the stakes involved in competition" (p. 40). Clans, therefore, became a resource used by individuals, not groups, in their political and economic dealings. Removing clan identity from the public realm "lent clans import in private matters" (p. 53). The "concealable" nature of clans meant they became an appropriate means for "access seekers and access providers" to operate undetected by authorities who were determined to eradicate them.

In the post-Soviet era, clan identities did not reemerge in a positive sense. In fact, the Kazakhstani state stigmatized clan identities in much the same way as the Soviet state. There was not, Schatz argues, a radical rupture with the Soviet past. The multinational demographics in Kazakhstan was one reason, but so too was the desire to promote civic identity based upon the Eurasian concept that could more easily embrace and engage non-Kazakhs such as Russians, Germans, Uzbeks, and Uighurs. Kazakh language, culture, and history were promoted, but the new state was receptive to the notion that clan identity was inherently retrogressive.

The work is divided into three main parts, each containing subsections: "The Reproduction of Clans," "The Political Dynamics of Informal Ties," and "Managing Clans." Schatz carefully reconstructs the role and influence of clans during the tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet era. The latter period is what interests the author, but revealing such an elusive form of identity was a difficult undertaking. Nonetheless, the author has uncovered strategies and tactics used by Kazakhs that are ostensibly reviled yet consistently exercised.

In addition, the work contains an excellent bibliography, and the author has included in the appendix the methods and strategies used in this work. Especially valuable are the questionnaire and information regarding the time, place, and duration of interviews and focus groups. Schatz' prose is accessible to a multidisciplinary audience, easy to read without being simplistic.

One hopes that the author will continue to trace the role and influence of clans to determine the possible durable nature of blood and kinship relations in Kazakhstan. It would be fascinating to discover in another decade if these relations have lasting value or were used ephemerally only as a coping mechanism during an uncertain transitional period. To some extent Schatz anticipates this question by arguing that more political and economic transparency would defuse the necessity for concealable networks based on kin and blood, but this is unlikely at present. The current regime in Kazakhstan has shown a reluctance to relinquish its grip on political and economic control, meaning that, for the foreseeable future, clan networks will continue to function and remain subtle forms and devices of identity and survival.

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W. H. McLEOD, *Sikhs and Sikhism* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004). Pp. 890. Rs 635.00 paper.

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This omnibus edition of four books by the New Zealand scholar W. H. McLeod of Sikh studies first appeared in hardback in 1999. Its welcome reissue as an Oxford India paperback is itself striking testimony to the unique position that he has come to occupy in the field of studies relating to the Sikhs and to Sikhism. As a result of the numerous scholarly publications on the subject, which he has produced with sustained industry over a remarkably productive scholarly life, McLeod has done more than anyone to shape Sikh studies in the West and to

give these studies a wider academic prominence than might otherwise have been guaranteed by their relative size within South Asian studies as a whole.

Although widely admired for its clear presentation of Guru Nanak's teachings, the author's 1965 London PhD dissertation, *Gurū Nānak and the Sikh Religion* (1968), caused great controversy through its dismissal, after careful examination, of most of the claims of the early hagiographical accounts or *janamsakhis* to provide solid historical evidence for the details of the first Sikh guru's life. If there is a criticism to be made of this pioneering study, though, it is less to do with its scholarly challenge to cherished beliefs than with the somewhat unsophisticated way in which the book itself gave evidence of a rather naive understanding of the relationship between hagiography and historical biography. This weakness was recognized by McLeod himself, who provided a powerful revision of his argument in *Early Sikh Tradition*, a detailed textual study of the various *janamsakhis*. Although written in 1971, it unfortunately was not published until 1980, when Sikh affairs were overtaken by the crisis in the Punjab, and so this book, rightly rated as his best by McLeod himself in the short preface to this edition, never quite received the attention it certainly continues to deserve.

The other two books included in this collection range more widely in theme. Both are collections of essays first given as lectures in British universities. Based on lectures given in Cambridge in 1969–70, *The Evolution of the Sikh Community* (1976) again attracted controversy through touching on a particular sensitive issue in Sikh sacred history, in this case through its cautious approach to the historicity of the traditional account of Guru Gobind Singh's institution of the Khalsa at Anandpur. The focus of the collection as a whole, however, is in accordance with its title on broader issues of historical development. These issues are taken up and explored more systematically in the volume's fourth book, *Who is a Sikh?* (1989), prepared as Radhakrishnan Lectures to be given in Oxford 1987.

The hardback edition of this omnibus volume has already established itself as a standard work of reference, and its reissue in this economical formation should help secure these classic studies the continuing readership that they collectively deserve to attract amongst a new generation of students. Those whose particular interest lies in the questions relating to the historical basis of Sikh identity raised in the last two books reprinted in the omnibus will then certainly need to turn to McLeod's latest word on the subject, his substantial monograph *Sikhs of the Khalsa: A History of the Khalsa Rahit* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), which presents the relevant evidence, principally the codes of conduct called *rahitnama*, with his usual carefulness and close attention to textual detail. Yet another recent title is now available for those who would like to know how he first got into the field and how it has since shaped his career. Readers will gain much from the characteristically understated account presented in *Discovering the Sikhs: Autobiography of a Historian* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004).

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ROBERT J. BLYTH, *The Empire of the Raj India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East, 1858–1947*, Cambridge Imperial and Postcolonial Studies (Basingstoke, Hants, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Pp. 280. \$149.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY DEV MOODLEY, School of Humanities, University of Greenwich, Greenwich, London; e-mail: d.moodley@gre.ac.uk

The author intends by "empire of the Raj" the Indian subimperial sphere in the western Indian Ocean. His account is an administrative/diplomatic history of the demarcation of authority over this sphere of influence. The interested parties are the Government of Bombay; the viceroy in

Calcutta, supervised by the India Office; and the Foreign and Colonial Offices in Whitehall. This book is very much an imperial history, illuminating the role of the Raj in this region and only a minor addition to general histories of East Africa and the Middle East in this period. Blyth writes clearly, and his revised thesis is scholarly and well organized. It is not, however, a book for undergraduates looking for a guide to the imperial and Indian history of this region, although scholars might wish to pursue its references. Several archives in London (Oriental and India Office Collection, British Library, National Archives at Kew, even the House of Lords) and the National Archives of India in New Delhi were consulted. An impressively wide range of secondary sources is used to serve the very technical and specialist focus of this author.

A good example of this is the treatment of Persia before 1890 as a footnote to the "Great Game" with Russia. A characteristic quotation from George Nathaniel Curzon preserves the imperial mindset: beyond India's sea and land frontiers extended "a glaxis of varying breadth and dimension. We do not want to occupy it, but also we cannot afford to see it occupied by our foes" (p. 25). Yet the chapter on Persia and the Persian Gulf shows that imperial interests eventually predominated over Indian ones. A similar tale is told of the consular arrangement at Zanzibar: an Indian agency was taken over by the Foreign Office (FO). Here, there was an initial involvement because of the abolitionist remit of the FO, although this was to cease after the Sultan of Zanzibar ended the slave trade. The Bombay "forward policy" of the 1860s and early 1870s was subimperial and annexationist, following earlier intervention in dynastic politics in 1870, but it stopped. The Omani dynasty, which ruled Zanzibar and Muscat, needed subsidizing. The fiscal wrangling between the treasury, which accepted the Muscat subsidy, and India meant India continued to pay for many years, although the consulate at Zanzibar was transferred in 1883 through the efforts of the acting consul, John Kirk. His role in the "scramble for Africa" is known; this story is not.

Somaliland became involved after the 1890s. It had been part of the Indian sphere from the time of the occupation of Aden (1839). "Fortress Aden," a hub of naval strategy, was dependent on the Somali coast for its meat supplies. Aden was underpinned not only by the government of India during this period but also by Indian settlement and capital. The opening of the Suez Canal and the accompanying upsurge of imperial rivalry was complicated by Egypt's own drive to the Somali coast. The Red Sea coast and the Horn of Africa became unstable. The result was that the Somali coast was transferred to imperial control only in 1898, but Aden remained an Indian dependency until the imminent threat of losing India forced the British to accept it into the empire of Whitehall in 1937.

Despite the thrust of his title, Blyth shows how little force there was in the "empire of the Raj" and how constrained it was by Whitehall imperatives and not the needs of its subjects, findings which pace those who argue that colonial states must represent the latter. The government of India (and still more the Secretary of State and India Office in London) was a poor servant of the Indian people and their diasporas. The East African story is a good example retold here. The Indians were the dominant settler community numerically before World War I. Sir Harry Johnson saw East Africa as the "America of the Hindu." White settlers opposed this. Indian forces won the East Africa campaign but not the peace. M. A. Desai, a leading Indian politician in Kenya, first suggested to the duke of Devonshire that African interests should be preminent (p. 125). Devonshire took the cue. However, "native paramountcy" (p. 127) in 1923 did not undermine white privilege, Indian government objections to anti-Indian discrimination notwithstanding. In every case, imperial interests won out. Consider Iraq, where there was also an Indian colonization scheme mooted (p. 136). The Middle East stayed outside the Raj after 1918, despite viceregal ambitions. Long historical ties were sundered. There is no doubt where real power lay, despite Blyth's story of "departmentalism" and interdepartmental wrangling.

Flagrant examples occur of policy positions shifting after a change in post—and not only in Curzon's case. Not even the rise of responsible government in India during the interwar period quite dented the pattern, although it did allow the viceroy the useful alibi of needing to consult the local assemblies in India. Equating administrative division with subimperialism is exaggerated, although Blyth has added footnotes to Robinson and Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians*. After centuries of trade, migration, and cultural contact (which are what excite me about the area), the western Indian Ocean and its hinterland became part of Britain's moment in the Middle East because India was always subordinated to British interests.

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MARTIN RIEXINGER, *Sana'ullah Amritsari (1868–1948) und die Ahl-i Hadis im Punjab unter britischer Herrschaft*, Mitteilungen zur Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte der Islamischen Welt, Band 13 (Würzburg, Germany: Ergon Verlag, 2004). Pp. 739. EU 82.00.

JAN-PETER HARTUNG, *Viele Wege und ein Ziel: Leben und Wirken von Sayyid Abul-Hasan 'Ali al-Nadwi (1914–1999)*, Kultur, Recht und Politik in muslimischen Gesellschaften, Band 6 (Würzburg, Germany: Ergon Verlag, 2004). Pp. 521. EU 59.00.

REVIEWED BY MARKUS DAECHSEL, School of History and Classics, University of Edinburgh, Scotland; e-mail: m.daechsel@ed.ac.uk

Riexinger's and Hartung's books are two recent German doctoral studies on key thinkers in 19th and 20th century South Asian Islam. The Ahl-i Hadis were a loose community of *taqlid*-critical scholars whose members played an important role in Urdu publishing, political agitation, and religious controversy throughout the late colonial period. Although they were never united enough to constitute a strong organizational structure or movement, the reverberations of their ways of thinking can be traced all the way down to contemporary Islamic radicalism in Pakistan. Abul Hasan 'Ali Nadwi was in many ways the personification—if such a thing is possible—of the ulama experience of Indian Islam. Always attempting to bridge differences between opposing strands of South Asian Sunni Muslim “orthodoxy” and to tie it firmly to a Pan-Islamic ideal, Nadwi was a figure who participated or remained in contact with almost all religious formations of his time, from various Sufic orders to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tablighi Jama'at.

Both books advance our understanding of South Asian Islam and will be a gold mine of information for any German-reading scholar. Their purchase for any research library with a strong South Asia interest should be essential. This said, the specific format that both books seek to satisfy imposes certain limitations on their effectiveness. It is compulsory in Germany to publish doctoral dissertations in an unrevised—or as is the case here, minorly revised—form, which somewhat impedes the focused and streamlined articulation arguments. Particularly in a discipline like *Islamwissenschaft*—from which the two titles originate—doctoral candidates are first and foremost expected to demonstrate complete familiarity with the wider secondary literature, as well as their ability to deal thoroughly and exhaustively with texts in original languages. In consequence, Hartung and Riexinger have made a conscious effort to include much of the general development of Islamic Indian thought from the late 18th century onward, and both appear to have tried to present *all* information gathered in field research, often in a relatively raw form. This accounts for the excessive length of both books and explains why neither is able to come up with a truly memorable conclusion in the end.

In Hartung's case, there is strong evidence that he seeks to go beyond the formal restrictions of the German doctoral dissertation, however. He elaborates a useful theoretical roadmap, based on a combination of network and discourse analysis, that helps him to present Nadwi's

life and thought within a larger narrative framework. He begins by posing three key questions as the reference points of Islamic debate in South Asia: the role of reason in religious knowledge between the traditions of *ma'qulat* and *manqulat*, the interpretation of Sufism between *wahdat al-wujūd* and *wahdat al-shuhūd*, and finally the question of religious activism (*iqamat al-din*) between what he calls a "conformist activist paradigm" and a "nonconformist activist paradigm." Nadwi's concerns within these parameters were twofold: he sought to develop modes of thought and action that would enable the community of Indian Muslims to defend a strong sense of religious identity that was independent of access to political power, and he firmly believed in the ideal of a united world community of believers bound together by a common cultural and religious ideal. The overall aim in Nadwi's life was *da'wa*, the peaceful propagation of personal religious rectitude on a global scale. This led him to adopt orthodox but conciliatory positions on many matters of doctrine, but also necessitated an increasingly sharp demarcation against state-centered forms of religious radicalism, for instance Abul A'la Mawdudi's Jama'at-i-Islami (which Nadwi nevertheless chose to join for a couple of years in the 1940s). Nadwi's role in several South Asian and worldwide umbrella organizations was the practical side of his life project. He served as the head of the Indian Nadwat ul-'Ulama (conceived as a federation of all strands of the Sunni religious establishment) for much of the 20th century; later he also became involved in the Saudi-sponsored Islamic World League, as well as with the Moroccan-supported World League of Islamic Universities. He gave guest lectures all over the world, took a leading role in the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, and was closely associated with leading contemporary scholars such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi.

The great strength and special contribution of Hartung's book lies in its detailed analysis of the personal relationships that bound Nadwi to a great number of important individuals who often disagreed with his own views. Following the veritable tradition of *'ilm al-rijāl*, Hartung traces the biographies of Nadwi's family of scholars, his teachers, Sufi masters, disciples, friends, and political companions. The appendix lists impressive tables of cross-connections that demonstrate that there was considerable overlap in the various forms of personal loyalties that dominated Nadwi's life. Hartung's great insight is that personal obligations to men were of an equal if not greater importance for the formulation of religious positions than the autonomous logic of discourse. Although it is not always clearly elaborated how the distinction between "open," "half-open," "transparent," and "closed" fields advances the course of interpretation, it is convincingly argued that Nadwi's eventual decline into political irrelevance was the result of his desire to give every one of his many patrons and clients their due.

Although it is easy to see how Hartung's book could be shortened and revised into a punchy monograph (hopefully in English), no such possibilities present themselves in Riexinger's thesis. Not by default but quite deliberately, his exposition of the thought and organization of the Ahl-i Hadis is as scholarly impressive as it is "intellectually anorexic"—to borrow Tariq Ali's somewhat unkind phrase. Riexinger makes it absolutely clear that he does not think very highly of "theory-building" or of the adoption of social science models into Islamic studies. The thorough study of "texts" alone can help us to understand the sociocultural "context," he affirms. This is, of course, a perfectly legitimate form of scholarly approach, but one would like to see it grounded in some form of engagement with textual strategies and literary theory. Beyond an invocation of philological exactitude, Riexinger does not reflect on what precisely a text is, not even at the fairly elementary level of offering a formal analysis of the different textual genres he uses as sources.

The basic problem is that Riexinger remains caught up in the very historical and sociological mode of enquiry that he rejects, but without any willingness to propose any arguments of his own. The lack of any narrative aim is already apparent in the structure of the book: it simply lays out several thematic aspects of Ahl-i Hadis history—their formation in response to the thought of Shah Wali'ullah Dihlawi and the Yemeni Hadis scholar Muhammad b.



‘Ali al-Shaukani, the historical context of British Punjab, the life histories of leading personalities, the contents of all accessible writings by the central character Sana’ullah Amritsari, and so on—but without ever telling us what exactly we should learn from this exposition and how the different parts hang together. It is significant that clear arguments emerge only when it comes to a rejection of the existing body of literature on the grounds of empirical detail. Barbara Metcalf saw the movement as an elite formation; Riexinger retorts that there were also peasants involved. Jamal Malik speaks of the articulation of an urban and modernizing commercial consciousness; Riexinger points out that there is much in Ahl-i Hadis’ writing that is not in conformity with such an assumption, and there were also artisan and small-town members.

Some of this criticism appears well taken; some is unnecessarily vindictive and smacks of point scoring, particularly in the engagement with Malik or the German historian/Arabist Reinhard Schulze. However, the overall line of critique remains simplistic in the eyes of more theory-minded readers. Anybody who takes the interface between grand theory and history seriously knows that the “modernity,” class orientation, or sociocultural stance of any movement or mode of thought can never be positively deduced from a laundry list of necessary “facts.” The presence of contradictions, diachronic moments, and ideological transpositions challenge the historian into developing sophisticated theoretical models in the light of empirical evidence. Riexinger does not take up this challenge, and to criticize him for this is only commensurate with the cutting language he employs against others. All this is a pity, because Riexinger’s book succeeds brilliantly in opening up Ahl-i Hadis’ writings as an interesting body of material. The new demand to preach in local vernaculars, the persistence of “traditional” cosmologies, the advancement of certain women’s rights on one hand and the emphasis on a very conservative patriarchal morality on the other, the advocacy of Western learning, the return to texts and the rejection of *taqlid*—all this is evidence, which, if handled well, can significantly advance our understanding of what it means to be “modern” the South Asian Muslim way.

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OSKAR VERKAAIK, *Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan*, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004). Pp. 228. \$55.00 cloth. \$17.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY SHAHNAZ ROUSE, Sociology Department, Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, N.Y.; e-mail: srouse@slc.edu.

In this book, Oskar Verkaaik examines the Muhajir Quami Mahaz (MQM), later known as the Muttehidah Quami Mahaz, a highly charged and significant political movement and party in southern Pakistan during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Verkaaik’s assertion is that a close reading of this movement reveals the multiplicity and difference not only in politics in the Muslim world but also in the articulations and understandings of Islam and “Muslimness.” Thus, the MQM separates itself from a straightforward, universalistic reading of Islam and bases its politics on a combination of the universal and the particular, the latter being grounded in a politics of ethnicity. Verkaaik argues that this development is predicated on the historical context in Pakistan and is incomprehensible without taking local factors into account. Insofar as the MQM hopes to capture power, it initially adopts its own particular version of a mystic Islam, at odds with mainstream Islamic parties and the state, both of which favor a universalist Islam as a mechanism designed to negate challenges to their respective hegemonies.

The author does not, however, see either the state or the MQM as fixed and unchanging but, rather, as evolving institutions, acting and reacting to a variety of forces on the ground. This

helps the reader understand the MQM's collaboration with the state as well as its opposition to it. It is in tracing a politics of difference that Verkaaik makes his most significant contribution: like the state, the MQM is constantly shifting and heterogeneous. This aspect constitutes the real strength of the work. Through a close examination of a neighborhood in Hyderabad, the second largest city in the southern province of Sindh, he points to both the urban character of this movement (in opposition to the rural base of the Sindhi ethnic movement) and to the dominant role played in it by urban male youth. Through this prism, Verkaaik is able to demonstrate that it is these youth's exuberance and irreverence—what he calls *fun*—that form the basis of their participation and involvement, rather than any a priori ideology. Such an emphasis on fun constitutes a radical departure not only from the mainstream Islamic parties (which frown on fun), but also from the older generation within the party itself. Verkaaik links this emphasis on an ethnography of emotions with a class analysis wherein he suggests that fun represents a politics of the underclass, the displaced, and the dispossessed within the migrant community. However, this fun slides over into violence at key junctures, which Verkaaik discusses at length, and enables its proponents to displace their opponents within the party, who belong to a more privileged strata of the immigrant community (the “salarial” in Hamza Alavi's terms, i.e., the educated middle class). This class difference is articulated through the body and hypermasculinity, both of which are recast in *modern* forms attendant upon globalization and not on conventionally available body practices (an example being karate instead of *kushti*, the streamlined athletic body instead of the heavy wrestler).

In reading this text, I found myself fascinated by the nuanced tracing out of the process by which the MQM is transformed into a potent political force, which is reliant on violence. The sources the author uses—historical materials (including biographies, texts by various political figures, and newspaper accounts) and the close ethnographic exposure to Pakka Qila, the neighborhood where Verkaaik conducted his ethnography—provide the reader with a sophisticated understanding of this movement that to many outside observers has been marked and noted simply in terms of its flagrant violence and coercive tactics. Without condoning its excesses, Verkaaik enables us to see beyond this surface impression, in the best ethnographic tradition.

Thus, this book furthers our understanding of the complexity—indeed the “vexity”—of politics in the Muslim world. It calls into question a singular reading of Islam and Muslim politics and illustrates the variegated forms that emerge through a process that is informed by local and global forces. It also makes a very important link between sentiments and class, showing that the material and ideational are inextricably linked—and that politics itself need not be guided by political ideology but rather by a sense of irreverence and transgression, which is generative of a politics not already constituted by leaders, party platforms, and the like. The links among the MQM, its internal differentiation, and its relation to the state again enable us as readers to see the state and politics not as givens but in terms of process, as being “performed,” thereby emphasizing agency and the possibility for change. By emphasizing the space of gender in this process, Verkaaik makes a fresh theoretical and empirical contribution to the now considerable literature on gender and violence. Finally, for students of the Pakistani political scene, the author provides rich insights into the multifaceted character of a political movement that has had a devastating impact on urban life in the major cities of the southern part of the country and allows us to think beyond the sensational coverage of the violence itself.