

What Do We Know about Power Sharing after 50 Years?

Online Appendix

Mahmoud Farag, Hae Ran Jung, Isabella C. Montini, Juliette Bourdeau de Fontenay
and Satveer Ladhar

31 March 2022

A review article published in *Government and Opposition*

1. Search Terms for the Power Sharing Articles Dataset

Search date: 19 January 2020 at 10: 45 am (Access via Humboldt University of Berlin)

International Bibliography of the Social Sciences

<https://www.proquest.com/libraries/academic/databases/ibss-set-c.html>

Search terms:

noft("consociation" OR "consociational" OR "consociationalism" OR "powersharing" OR "power sharing" OR "power-sharing")

>>everything except full text

>>Limits

Peer reviewed

Dates: 1 January 1969 - 31 December 2018

Source type: Scholarly journals

Document type: Articles

Language: English

Number of articles found: 1,076

Political Science Complete

<https://www.elsevier.com/products/research-databases/political-science-complete>

Search terms:

TI Title: "consociation" OR "consociational" OR "consociationalism" OR "powersharing" OR "power sharing" OR "power-sharing"

OR SU Subject Terms: "consociation" OR "consociational" OR "consociationalism" OR "powersharing" OR "power sharing" OR "power-sharing"

OR AB Abstract or Author-Supplied Abstract: "consociation" OR "consociational" OR "consociationalism" OR "powersharing" OR "power sharing" OR "power-sharing"

OR KW Author-Supplied Keywords: "consociation" OR "consociational" OR "consociationalism" OR "powersharing" OR "power sharing" OR "power-sharing"

Search mode: Boolean/Phrase

Limit your results : Scholarly (Peer Reviewed) Journals

Publication date: January 1969 - December 2018

Publication type: Academic journals

Document type: Article

Language: English

Number of articles found: 962

Scopus

<http://www.scopus.com>

Search terms:

TITLE-ABS-KEY ("consociation" OR "consociational" OR "consociationalism" OR "powersharing" OR "power sharing" OR "power-sharing")

Limits:

Year: 1969 - 2018

Subject area: Social sciences

Document type: Article

Source type: Journals

Language: English

Number of articles found: 1,133

2. Growth, Outlets and Research Questions in the Power Sharing Literature


The power sharing literature has been growing steadily over time, with an exponential increase in the last decade as illustrated in Figure A1. In 2018 alone, 36 articles (9.7%) on power sharing were published. In the first three decades between 1969-1998, only 42 articles (11.3%) which more than doubled in the following decade with 99 articles (26.5%) published. The last decade (2009-2018) witnessed an exponential increase of power sharing articles with 232 articles (62.5%) published. Literature in this area reflects a similar notion; citing that ‘the number of articles on consociationalism has never been higher’ (Bogaards 2019: 341). Consociationalism research continues to be a topic of interest gaining popularity in the academic world as a renewed scholarly interest.

The prominence and significance of power sharing are also derived from the journals in which the articles are published. In total, the 373 articles are published in 181 different academic journals. Articles on power sharing have been published in leading generalist political science journals such as the *American Political Science Review* (Lijphart 1996; Lustick et al. 2004; Cederman et al. 2015; Graham et al. 2017), the *American Journal of Political Science* (Hartzell & Hoddie 2003; Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu 2008), *International Organization* (Roessler & Ohls 2018), *World Politics* (Lijphart 1969; Hartzell & Hoddie 2015) and the *British Journal of Political Science* (Horowitz 2002; Tilley et al. 2008; Strøm et al. 2017). Understandably, however, only 10 articles (2.7%) were published in such top-ranked journals.

Power sharing articles also feature highly in European area studies journals such as *West European Politics* (Church 1989; Deschouwer 2006), *Review of Central and East Europe* (Bieber & Keil 2009) and *East European Politics and Society* (Hayden 2005); Arab area studies journals such as *Contemporary Arab Affairs* (Younis 2011; Salamey & Tabar 2012) and the *Arab Studies Journal* (Parker & Zemni 1998); African area studies journals such as *Africa Review* (Omotola 2010; Wight 2017), *Africa Spectrum* (Binningsbø & Dupuy 2009; Jarstad 2009; Sriram & Zahar 2009; Vandeginste 2014), *African Affairs* (Lemarchand 2007; Mehler 2009; Curtis 2013; Zanker et al. 2015) and *African Studies* (Vandeginste 2011; Hoekman 2013; Aeby 2016; Ololajulo 2016; Aeby

2018) among others; and in Asia-focused journals such as *Asian Survey* (Wilkinson 2000) and *Contemporary Southeast Asia* (Collins 1998; Sebastian 2004) among others.

Figure A1: Power sharing articles over time (1969-2018)



Source: Author

Many articles on power sharing are also published in specialized journals. Table A1 reports on the top 10 journals with the highest frequency of publishing power sharing articles. Collectively, these 10 journals published 108 articles (28.95%) of the total 373 included in this review article. While some of these journals focus on issues of ethnicity such as *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, *Nations and Nationalism* and the *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, others are devoted to the study of democracy and autocracy as in the case of *Democratization* or conflict such as *Civil Wars*.

Synthesizing a literature requires reporting on the research questions investigated. This review article, nevertheless, goes beyond grouping articles by topic as Bogaards et al. (2019) do. We disaggregate the research questions by analyzing the independent and dependent variables in the power sharing literature. We first extracted the research questions in all 373 articles after which we identified the independent and dependent variables. Table A2 shows that power sharing is used as an independent variable in around half of the articles (49.60%) included in this review article and is used as a dependent variable in slightly more than one-quarter of the articles (27.88%). In other words, scholars are interested in examining the effects of power sharing more than explaining its origins or causes. An article by Ololajulo (2016) concludes by questioning the notion of zoning and political power rotation in the case of Nigerian power sharing; that is, whether performance and collective success are necessary for nation-building. In Dalle Mulle (2016) – where power sharing is also the independent variable – it is considered whether Belgium’s ability to achieve

non-territorial autonomy is influenced by the territorial dynamics at play. In articles where power sharing is the dependent variable observed, a similar direction for future study is provided in the concluding remarks of the literature. Orlović (2015: 49) asks questions such as ‘how much autonomy is possible within a unitary state’ which seeks to uncover the long-term sustainability of power sharing agreements. Similarly, McEvoy (2018) also ponders the longevity of power-sharing in a divided society by considering how far reaching power sharing referendums are in facilitating space for the voices of different groups through the Dayton Accords.

Table A1: Frequent journals for articles on power sharing

Name of journal	%	Absolute
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics	5.63%	21
Ethnopolitics	3.75%	14
Civil Wars	2.95%	11
Nations and Nationalism	2.68%	10
Democratization	2.68%	10
Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe	2.41%	9
European Journal of Political Research	2.41%	9
Africa Spectrum	2.14%	8
African Affairs	2.14%	8
West European Politics	2.14%	8
Other journals	71.05%	265
Total	100%	373

Source: Author

The favorable factors, which were first introduced by Lijphart (1969), are used as an independent variable in 20 articles (5.36%). Kasapović (2005), for example, investigates the (un)favorable factors of power sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In terms of dependent variables, stability and peace feature highly on the list with 71 articles (19.03%), followed by societal/ethnic cleavages (10.46%), democracy (2.68%) and governance (2.41%).

Some independent variables have been increasingly used in the past decade such as the role of civil society (Guelke 2003; White 2007, 2011; Aeby 2016). Similarly, dependent variables that have received increasing attention recently is the exclusion of non-dominant minorities, known as the ‘exclusion-amid-inclusion’ dilemma (Agarin et al. 2018; Wise 2018) and the inclusion of women and gender rights in general (Byrne & McCulloch 2012; Sriram 2013; Kennedy et al. 2016; Nagle & Fakhoury 2018).

The least frequent dependent and independent variables observed in the literature are ‘governance’ and ‘federal system’, respectively. Peters (2006) utilizes the dependent variable ‘governance’ to probe consociationalism in Belgium and consider areas for future research. In this case, it is recommended that further research be done on this topic to discuss the intersectionality between singular factors for consociationalism success alongside the general multitude of effects at play in Belgium. Using the independent variable of ‘federal system,’ Charron (2009) poses questions surrounding the stability and measured success of ethno-federations; to consider whether these

constitutional designs result in better governance, economic performance, or other desired outcomes.

Table A2: Independent and dependent variables in the power sharing literature

Independent variable	%	Absolute	Dependent variable	%	Absolute
Power sharing	49.34%	188	Power sharing	28.23%	107
None	26.24%	100	Stability and peace	19.26%	73
Favorable factors	5.24%	20	Societal/ethnic cleavages	10.29%	39
External actors	1.83%	7	Democracy	3.16%	12
Federal system	1.31%	5	Governance	2.37%	9
Other	16.01%	61	Other	36.67%	139
Total	100%	381	Total	100%	379

Source: Author

Notes: The total sums more than 373 because some articles include more than one independent or dependent variable.

3. Terms Used to Describe Power Sharing

The three primary terms used to describe power sharing in these articles are ‘consociation’ (including its variants consociational democracy and consociationalism), ‘power sharing’ and ‘consociational power sharing’. Table A3 presents the distribution of the main terms used in the literature. Analysis of the most frequently used terms found that the usage of ‘power sharing’ and ‘consociation’ is evenly distributed (25.2% each). Of the 373 articles, ‘consociational power sharing’ was the least frequently used term to describe power sharing with only 6 articles (1.61%). At the same time, 48.26% of the articles referred to power sharing using the terms ‘consociation’ and ‘power sharing’ interchangeably. This shows that the critique against the interchangeable usage of power sharing and consociationalism (Bogaards 2000; Bogaards et al. 2019) has not found its way to scholars studying power sharing.¹

Table A3: Terms used to describe power sharing

Term	%	Absolute
Consociation	25.20%	94
Power sharing	25.20%	94
Both consociation and power sharing used interchangeably	48.26%	180
Consociational power sharing	1.61%	6
Total	100%	373

Source: Author

¹ This is not unique to the power sharing literature. Dahl’s (1973) suggestion to restrict the use of “democracy” to the ideal type and to use “polyarchy” as the empirical type was largely ignored.

A significant portion of the literature simultaneously uses the terms ‘power sharing’ and ‘consociation’. Mitchell (1991) wrote the earliest article to use both terms to refer to the concept with power-sharing mentioned 16 times and consociation 25 times. Consociation in this article is used interchangeably to refer to a form of government in which the elite are motivated to cooperate across the segmental divide (Mitchell 1991: 68). Although power-sharing is not explicitly defined, it appears throughout the article to refer to the practice of consociation. Nagle (2018b) employs both terms with consociation used 50 times and power-sharing used 77 times throughout the article. The term consociational power-sharing is also introduced to mean ‘a major tool to manage conflict in ethnically divided societies’ (Nagle 2018b: 1370). Power-sharing and consociation are largely used interchangeably to refer to a set of institutions designed to end conflict and a strategy to accommodate the plural character of states through guaranteeing political representation of the different ethnic groups.

Sözen (2004) also uses both terms with consociation appearing 20 times and power-sharing appearing 17 times throughout the article. However, he offers a subtle differentiation between the two terms. Power-sharing is used to refer to the practices and institutions adopted in multiethnic states to create governing coalitions that include all major ethnic groups in society (Sözen 2004: 65). Consociation is used in this article to refer to a model of power-sharing that concerns elite cooperation and the protection of group rights through veto rights and proportional representation in government (Sözen 2004: 69). He also mentions ‘integrative power-sharing’ which is associated with Horowitz’s approach of creating incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation and inter-ethnic coalitions. Similarly, (Spears 2002) uses both terms and refers to consociation as a model of power-sharing. Consociation appears in the text 17 times while power-sharing as a form of managing ethnic divide is mentioned 66 times. Spears (2002: 125) uses the term consociationalism to refer to Lijphart’s model of power sharing that includes grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy. Despite acknowledging the difference between the terms, they are used interchangeably as Spears develops an argument for the limits of power-sharing and consociation in Africa. Some articles that use the terms interchangeably explicitly define consociation as a form or model of power sharing while other articles do not acknowledge the difference between the two terms.

The earliest article on power sharing was Lijphart’s 1969 seminal work *Consociational Democracy* in which he coined the term ‘consociational democracy,’ referring to the cases of Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Lijphart 1969). Following this article, the usage of ‘consociation’ and its variants became common practice in literature with 66% of the 50 articles published between 1969-1999 adopting ‘consociation’ and its variants. The term ‘power sharing’ was exclusively used by only 4 of the articles published between the 1970s and 1990s. Knox (1996) published the earliest article to use power sharing as an exclusive term and it was most frequently used between 2014 and 2015 during which 21 of the 42 articles published used the term.

The terms ‘power sharing’ and consociation are equally adopted in the literature however there is a nuanced difference that separates the two terms. ‘Power sharing’ is more broadly used to refer to a form of government or strategy employed to stabilize divided societies. The term can be used to describe arrangements designed to stabilize states (Ray 2016), or a negotiated deal to ‘provide all parties with access to power, and thereby help to encourage participation, establish legitimate rule, and foster co-operation and reconciliation’ (Hoekman 2013: 905). ‘Consociation’ more specifically refers to the structures that make up a power sharing arrangement. This may include

the institutional features of the arrangement such as grand coalition, proportional representation, cultural autonomy and minority vetoes (Lijphart 1977). ‘Consociational power sharing’ which is the least used term to describe power sharing is described by Nagle (2018a: 396) as ‘the idea that conflict resolution in divided societies is best-achieved through the accommodation of the political élites representing the salient ethnic or ethnonational groups and institutionally anchored by inclusive coalitions and proportionality in public appointments.’

4. Definitions of Power Sharing

Table A4 presents the top five common definitions of power sharing. In general, Lijphart’s definitions are the most cited in the literature on power sharing with 43.16% of the articles (161 out of 373 articles) using his definitions to describe power sharing. The most common definition of power sharing features the four characteristics of consociational democracy which involve government by grand coalition, minority veto, proportional representation and segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977: 25). The second common definition focuses on the role of elites in power sharing (Lijphart 1969). A less frequently used definition is Lijphart (1985b) which also features the institutional dimensions, however, it separates the primary attributes (grand coalition and segmental autonomy) from the secondary attributes (proportionality and minority veto). Of the 373 articles studies, 6 (1.61%) adopted Hartzell & Hoddie's (2003) definition which takes a broader approach that does not specify the characteristics of power sharing. Only three (out of the 373) articles use Horowitz's (1985) integration model to define power sharing. This adds more support to the earlier finding that power sharing has grown over the years to mean only Lijphart’s model of accommodation. Only 13 articles (3.48%) actually can be described as purely integrationist that is they equate integration and power sharing (see for e.g., Fraenkel & Grofman 2004; Kendhammer 2014).

The least frequently used definitions of power sharing included those from authors that used their own definition. For example, Cederman et al. (2015: 353) describe power sharing as ‘any scheme of governance that allows group representatives to engage in shared decision making, either through accommodation within the central executive ... or by granting certain territorially concentrated groups regional autonomy.’ This definition overlaps with Lijphart's (1969) concept of government by elite cartel and the institutional feature of segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977).

McGarry & O’Leary (2006) are frequently cited in the power sharing literature, and although they do not have a consistent and frequently cited definition, they too offer an adapted version of Lijphart’s conception of power sharing. They recognize the four institutions of power sharing but critique the lack of distinctions between polities that are linguistically, ethno-nationally or religiously divided. They also add that durable political settlements require more than consociational institutions (McGarry & O’Leary 2006: 44–45). Another example of an adapted definition is power sharing described as ‘the idea that conflict resolution in divided societies is best-achieved through the accommodation of political élites representing the salient ethnic or ethnonational groups and institutionally anchored by inclusive coalitions and proportionality in public appointments’ (Nagle 2018a: 396). These definitions of power sharing demonstrate that the literature is heavily dependent on the theories and works of Lijphart.

Table A4: Common definitions of power sharing in the literature

Author and year	Definition of power sharing	%	Absolute
Lijphart (1977)	Consociational democracy can be defined in terms of four characteristics. The first and most important element is government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society... The other three basic elements of consociational democracy are (1) the mutual veto or ‘concurrent majority’ rule, which serves as additional protection of vital minority interests, (2) proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds, and (3) a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs (Lijphart 1977, 25).	19.03%	71
Lijphart (1969)	A government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy (Lijphart 1969, 216).	11.80%	44
Lijphart (1968)	Democracies with subcultural cleavages and with tendencies toward immobilism and instability which are deliberately turned into more stable systems by the leaders of the major subcultures may be called <i>consociational</i> democracies (Lijphart 1968, 20).	2.95%	11
Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)	We conceive of power-sharing institutions as those that balance power among groups by specifying not only how groups are to share power but also by dividing power in such a way as to make it exceedingly difficult for any group to threaten the lives and interests of others. Our use of this definition means that we code some cases as instances of civil war settlements employing power-sharing institutions that the traditional literature on power sharing might not have considered as such (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 320).	1.61%	6
Lijphart (1985b)	Consociational democracy can be defined in terms of two primary attributes – grand coalition and segmental autonomy – and two secondary characteristics – proportionality and minority veto (Lijphart 1985, 4).	1.34%	5
Other definitions (including others by Lijphart)		29.5%	110
No definition		28.41%	106
Unclear		5.36%	20
Total		100%	373

Source: Author

Notes: We only include definitions when they are directly quoted or paraphrased in the article. The ‘other definitions’ category counts all articles that did not adopt any of the five common definitions. The ‘unclear’ refers to articles that discuss several definitions but do not adopt a particular one.

5. The Geography of Power Sharing: Countries and World Regions

The earliest articles on power sharing study consociational democracy in plural societies in Europe. Lijphart (1977) and other early authors of power sharing focus on Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland as original cases of consociational democracy. This pattern shifted in the 1990s with the development of literature on power sharing in Northern Ireland leading up to and following the peace negotiations. Northern Ireland has since been the most studied country

in the power sharing literature making up over one-fifth of the literature (21.71%) with 81 of the 373 articles. This adds a strong empirical base for O'Leary's (2013: 411) note that 'in the English-language literature some cases are arguably overstudied (Northern Ireland) whereas many others are radically understudied (particularly in Africa and the Pacific). Academics notably cite the Good Friday Agreement as a major contributor to the increased interest in Northern Ireland; as the focus on this area has become more substantial than ever as noted by Bogaards et al. (2019). Sites of current violence attract inordinate scholarly attention, whereas peace (or nonviolence) is boring.'

The most commonly studied independent variable within the literature on Northern Ireland is power sharing. Stability and peace and conflict regulation are also frequently studied. Byrne (2001) discusses the limitations of the elite negotiation process in Northern Ireland in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Wolff (2004) also studies stability and peace in Northern Ireland and explores the shortcomings of power sharing institutions in delivering sustainable peace. Other topics studied include institutional design and electoral systems and how certain electoral systems such as the Single Transferable Vote can be a useful tool to achieve inter-ethnic vote pooling in divided societies such as Northern Ireland (Mitchell 2014).

Bosnia and Herzegovina follows Northern Ireland as the second most popular country studied in the power sharing literature. The earliest article on power sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina was published in 2002 which examines the Dayton Peace Accord that was established in 1995 (Bieber 2002). Literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina was most frequently published from 2010 onwards. Much like the topics studied on Northern Ireland, most articles study power sharing as an independent variable as well as stability and peace. The topic of ethnic cleavages is also studied in the literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rožić (2013) studies the effects of nationalism in consociational agreements and explores the boundaries that ethnic groups face under the structures of consociationalism.

Our analysis of the countries and world regions below points scholars to cases that require more attention. Tajikistan is one of the least studied countries in the literature with only 1 article published between 1969 and 2018 on power sharing in Tajikistan. Gleason (2001) explores the power sharing agreement established in 1997 between the government and opposition to re-incorporate opposition leaders into central administration. The article takes a critical and cautious approach to power sharing and its effects on peace and stability and suggests that fixed formulae of power sharing that do not consider internal political dynamics may do more harm than good.

In terms of world regions, the region most studied in the literature is the Europe and Central Asia region, comprising over half of the data reviewed as outlined in Table A5. Sub-Saharan Africa region also produced a substantial volume of literature on power sharing, comprising over a quarter of all studies included. Notably, Burundi is the most studied country within this region. Much of the literature on Burundi discusses the relations between the Hutu and Tutsi populations, such as research by Daley (2006: 658) which discusses this tribalism concerning the 'construction of a dominant discourse concerning warfare in Burundi that portray[s] violence as a natural outcome.' Literature on the Burundi region also seeks to build parallels with other Sub-Saharan African countries such as Rwanda. A study by Curtis (2013: 73) seeks to explore 'what peacebuilders can learn from post-conflict governance in Burundi, best known for being Rwanda's southern neighbor and false twin' due to the similarities in ethnic divisions and violent histories.

The Middle East and North Africa region was also represented in the literature – comprising almost 20% of the dataset. Of the numerous countries represented in this region, Lebanon has the highest

number of studies. Consociationalism systems in Lebanon have been argued to ‘maintain a structure of inequality’ (Nagle 2018c: 82). Similarly, Jabbra & Jabbra (2001: 71) argue that Lebanon’s consociational democracy ‘could not be maintained after the prerequisite conditions conducive to its establishment were no longer met.’

Table A5: World regions in the power sharing literature

World region	%	Absolute
Europe and Central Asia	54.55%	204
Sub-Saharan Africa	28.08%	105
Middle East and North Africa	18.72%	70
Cross-regional	14.71%	55
East Asia and the Pacific	10.96%	41
North America	8.56%	13
South Asia	8.82%	33
Latin America and the Caribbean	5.62%	21

Source: Author

Note: Cross-regional studies are double-counted under the other world regions. This classification follows the World Bank’s classification of world regions.

The literature from the East Asia and Pacific region featured most of its studies from Malaysia. Some studies from Malaysia made particular reference to the electoral system, seeking to ‘examine the prospects of ethnic politics and consociationalism’ in peninsular Malaysia (Segawa 2015: 177). Another study on Malaysian power sharing examines the participation of Muslim political parties in the coalition government, and the contribution of a power sharing model to political stability in Malaysia (Thaib 2014). In the South Asia region, the most represented country in the literature is India. The literature seeks to examine the success of coalition governments in India and their effectiveness in resolving issues of democratic governance in plural societies (Chiriyankandath 1997: 17). Further studies also discuss the complexity of power sharing in India due to the ‘complex ethnic heterogeneity where ethnic groups aspiring to territorial self-rule constitute a minority within their territory’ (Bhattacharyya & Mukherjee 2018: 471).

Within the North American region, which represented a smaller subset of the literature, Canada was the country most studied. Kennedy (2004: 500) explored the ‘bi-national vision of Canada’ with respect to the contention experienced with French Canada. Similarly, another study conducted considers whether a compromise exists between the Eastern province of Quebec’s quest for statehood and the state’s quest for uniform nationalism (Bourgeois 2007: 637).

The final region represented in the literature is Latin America and the Caribbean – constituting a small percentage of the total literature reviewed. Within this world region, Colombia is the most studied nation; with Mexico and Suriname closely behind. Daly’s (2014) study aims to discuss Colombia within the context of civil war recurrence to better understand how post-conflict violence is navigated.

In addition to studies of specific and individual regions, there is another category to consider: cross-regional studies. The cross-regional literature makes broad reference to the success of power sharing using compare and contrast methods. For instance, Simonsen (2005) explores a ‘transformative movement towards reconciliation,’ from Bosnia to Kosovo, and from Afghanistan

to Iraq, and how flexible these country's policies are where ethnic divides are concerned. Further studies have provided a critique of consociationalism, arguing that it has become 'increasingly vague, ambiguous, and even contradictory (Dixon 2011: 309)' as this theory has been stretched for relevance in both Northern Ireland and Iraq.

6. Research Strategies, Units of Analysis, Time Periods and Methods

The reviewed literature is classified into four categories: case studies (i.e., a single country, society, or institution), small-N studies (i.e., 2-19 cases), medium-N studies (i.e., 20-49 cases), and large-N studies which consist of 50 or more cases; with a majority of studies in the case study category. An example of a case study is one conducted by Church (1989) where it is argued that consociational debate does little to adapt to new issues that arise in relation to the political culture. This study focused on a single country – Switzerland – and provided a qualitative analysis of the proposed argument.

The literature also produced a number of small-N studies; constituting almost a quarter of the literature reviewed. A small-N study by Matlosa & Shale (2013) explores instances of electoral violence in Africa and the successes of the resultant power sharing arrangements which have been formed within four countries: Burundi, South Africa, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Another small-N study conducted aimed to review the literature surrounding democratic stability in three Middle Eastern States – Lebanon, Cyprus, and Israel (Yiftachel 1992).

The studies which fall into the medium-number category discuss power sharing institutions more broadly, seeking to discuss how these institutions can be better designed to facilitate peace among former adversaries (Hartzell & Hoddie 2003). Hartzel and Hoodie's study draws from examples in 27 countries, including at least one country from each world region, to conduct a quantitative/statistical analysis. Similarly, Sriram (2013) explores power sharing in 23 countries, through qualitative analysis, to consider whether these arrangements facilitate genuine access or voice in society.

Finally, there are the large-N studies in the literature which consist of over 50 countries and offer a macro-level perspective. In a study by Joshi & Mason (2011), data is drawn from 71 countries to conduct a qualitative/ statistical analysis of the composition of governing coalitions that have resulted from conflict termination and power sharing agreements. Another large-N study employs statistical methods to compare and contrast power sharing institutions in 182 countries – with each world region represented in analysis (Strøm et al. 2017).

The research strategies employed in the literature provide further parallels between the type of research strategy and the topics studied; that is, by filtering the dependent and independent variables. The case studies produced a volume of studies that focused on power sharing as the independent variable and stability and peace as the dependent variable. Studies of the effect of power sharing on conflict were also observed frequently amongst case studies. Similarly, the small-number studies and medium-number studies also produced a collection of studies with power sharing as the independent variable and stability and peace as the dependent variable. Further, the large-N studies most commonly produced studies that focused on power sharing as the independent variable and conflict mitigation and conflict resolution as the dependent variables.

As summarized in Table A6, the five most common units of analysis within the literature are: country, peace agreements, region/ state, elections, civil war; additional units of analysis are classified as 'other'. The country unit of analysis is most prevalent in the literature. This unit of analysis varies from country case studies (e.g., Sierra Leone) to medium and large-N studies which provide analysis of several countries (e.g., peace in Africa, broadly). Peace agreements as units of analysis refer to the studies such as Ireland's Good Friday Agreement 1998 and the Lebanese Ta'if Agreement 1989; these agreements are reviewed to determine their usefulness or success and have provided a useful starting point for the advancement of interest in regions such as Northern Ireland (Bogaards et al. 2019).

Table A6: Units of analysis in the power sharing literature

Unit of analysis	%	Absolute
Country	74.80%	279
Peace agreements	4.29%	16
Region/ state	4.02%	15
Civil War	2.14%	8
Elections	1.61%	6
Other	13.14%	49
Total	100%	373

Source: Author

The region/ state unit of analysis is the third most common unit of analysis. Studies that center a region/ state discuss topics such as the paradox between a minority nation's quest for statehood and a state's quest for nationalism (Bourgeois 2007). Another study engaged the region/ state unit of analysis by considering the power sharing dilemma in four Swiss multilingual states (Stojanovic 2008). The civil war unit of analysis includes studies such as Reynal-Querol's (2002) study of the main causes of ethnic civil wars and the respective social and political characteristics at play. A further civil war-focused study contemplates how civil war negotiated settlements that foster stability can be created (Hartzell & Hoddie 2003). Finally, the elections unit of analysis uncovers how electoral processes relate to outcomes such as legitimacy, pluralism and stability (Vandeginste 2011). Another study on elections investigates voting patterns in Bosnian elections to determine the degree to which elections based on ethnicity affect political party outcomes (Hulsey 2010). As mentioned in Bogaards et al. (2019) there is a continued scholarly interest in elections to determine whether electoral processes are reflective of consociational features.

Aside from the five most common units of analysis, other commonly observed units are constitution, court ruling, citizen, and parliament. Mehler's (2013) study employs 'constitution' as the main unit of analysis in seeking to answer why some countries have adopted consociational constitutions, and others have not. With respect to the unit of 'court ruling', a study by McCrudden & O'Leary (2013) addresses how rulings made in Human Rights Courts can have a destabilizing effect on power sharing settlements. At the citizen level, this unit of analysis is leveraged to conduct survey research in divided societies (Salamey & Tabar 2012). Finally, the unit of parliament is observed in a study by Wilford (2000) where the new legislature in Ireland is examined in tandem with the Belfast Agreement.

The time period covered in the literature begins in 1750 and comprehensively extends to the year 2014. Beyond 2014, however, there is a gap in discussion. Panayiotou's (2006) study is both the longest time period observed and the oldest time period in the literature; covering the period of

1750-1980. Through qualitative analysis, this study seeks to explain how socio-cultural reality shapes Cypriots' conflict resolution abilities. The second-longest time period, also the second-oldest time period studied, from 1860-2008, spans 148 years. This qualitative study was conducted to explore recent developments in Lebanon in light of the theory of consociationalism, which acts as a model for governance in deeply divided nations (Haddad 2009). The third longest time period covered in the literature spans 111 years – from 1900 to 2011. This study was conducted through qualitative analysis to describe how South Tyrol with its three official language groups – German, Italian and Ladin – is a successful model of how a minority problem can be resolved (Pallaver 2014). Finally, the third oldest time period in the literature starts at 1867. This qualitative study focuses on the period 1867 to 1912, to dissect the 'bi-national vision of Canada' (Kennedy 2004: 500).

There is a broad distribution of research methods investigating power sharing and consociational arrangements. Table A7 demonstrates that the literature is dominated by qualitative methods (85.3% or 318 articles), encompassing, for instance, qualitative interviews, process tracing, and qualitative case studies. To provide some examples in the qualitative literature, Walsh & Doyle (2018) examine the context after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. Using co-variance and process observations, the authors find that – in contrast to previous literature – external actors can make use of consociational principles to help establish peace in deeply divided societies. Such findings may construct ground for deeper research on the role of third parties intervening in the implementation of peace agreements. Rice et al. (2015) also focus on the consociational pacts in Northern Ireland, investigating the role of Special Advisers in communication issues in newly established democratic societies and how effective they are in increasing participation of the local Northern Ireland Assembly. McCulloch (2018) used the consociational agreements in the region to approach the question of group autonomy and the use (and abuse) of veto rights in power sharing systems, utilizing qualitative interviews.

Even though the vast majority of the literature in our review article employs qualitative methodology, more than 13% (50 articles) use statistical analysis. Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) produced one of the most influential papers in the contemporaneous study of power sharing. The authors examine how governments improve power sharing institutions to secure peace between former civil war adversaries after settlement. By using data on interstate conflicts in the post-World-War II era, they find that two main factors contribute to the non-recurrence of war after signing a peace agreement, namely a high number of consociational provisions, such as a combination of many forms of power sharing agreements and the presence of an external actor.

Table A7: Methods of analysis used to study power sharing

Method of analysis	%	Absolute
Qualitative analysis	85.3%	318
Quantitative/statistical analysis	13.4%	50
Game theory/formal models	0.8%	3
An agent-based model (computer simulation)	0.23%	1
Mixed-methods	0.23%	1
Total	100%	373

Source: Author

Likewise, Cederman et al. (2015) use a quantitative methodology to investigate to what extent the inclusion of different ethnic groups decreases the likelihood of territorial civil war. Using a disaggregated large dataset and an instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity in the treatment variable, the authors find that regional autonomy and power sharing in the federal executive branch have a robust conflict-preventing effect. Nonetheless, those factors are less effective in mitigating war recurrence. In line with previous research on how power sharing agreements should be designed to improve democratic stability and peace duration, Graham et al. (2017) investigate whether power sharing agreements promote democratic survival. The authors differentiate between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power sharing institutions and analyze their effects on democratic survival from 1975 to 2015 using a global dataset. They find that consociational negotiations that constrain leaders such as, for example, an independent judiciary and a constitution ensuring civil rights, are more effective than simply federalist power sharing in consolidating democratic transition.

Despite the few articles using game theory and formal modeling to study power sharing, they are crucial to creating simple models of perfect game equilibrium to provide insights into the rational behavior of actors prior, during, and after violent internal conflict. Wantchekon (2000) examines the rationality behind consociational settlements and the trade-offs made by political actors in the context of democratic transitions. Later, Tangerås & Lagerlöf (2009) investigated not only the rationality behind those agreements but how the number of ethnic groups in society affects the likelihood of civil war occurrence. The authors use the game-theoretic framework to show how the existence of an equilibrium of peace depends on the degree of ethnic diversity – with intermediate levels of diversity leading to the highest risk scenario for civil war (Tangerås & Lagerlöf 2009: 20). In addition to those findings, Tridimas (2011) argues that the success of power sharing agreements also depends on how risk-averse or risk-neutral the situation and the parties in conflict are. Political groups will choose to divide the gains of the office and agree to end conflict when power sharing can offer a better payoff than the likelihood and the consequences of military victory.

Despite having the vast majority of the articles in our dataset within qualitative, quantitative, and game-theoretical articles, other methods such as computer simulations with agent-based modeling can provide many insights to the study of power sharing. Lustick et al. (2004) investigate whether power sharing encourages or prevents secession and civil war. The authors find that by increasing the number of power sharing provisions, one can decrease the frequency of secession.

7. Power Sharing Institutions

Proportionality and grand coalition are almost equally studied as the most common features of power sharing (57.90 and 58.17% respectively) as illustrated in Table A8. To provide one example, Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) characterize proportionality as one of the crucial features of political power sharing that can be easily measured. The authors operationalized the concept as a feature of the political power sharing proportional provision by coding the frequency of representation of ethnic groups in electoral systems and how accurate is the division of ethnic groups in civil service or other institutions.

Table A8: Four most common institutions analyzed in the power sharing literature

Power-sharing institution	%	Absolute
Proportionality (e.g., proportional representation electoral systems, proportionality in civil service, or others)	57.90%	216
Grand coalition (e.g., a government that includes representatives of main social groups)	58.17%	217
Minority veto (e.g., a constitutional or legal mandate that allows groups to veto decisions)	36.46%	136
Cultural autonomy (e.g., freedom of groups to manage their own cultural or religious affairs)	35.12%	131

Source: Author

Notes: Some articles study more than one institution leading to a sum of more than 373 articles.

The analysis of grand coalitions is present in almost 58.17% of the academic studies in our dataset. Haass & Ottmann (2017), for example, argue that political power sharing institutions, characterized mainly by coalition governments are the main cause for post-conflict corruption in divided societies. Because coalitions grant access to state resources, they tend to motivate leaders to engage in rent-seeking behavior. When analyzing cross-country data using a binary measure for the presence of former rebels in the executive power, the authors find that countries with power sharing agreements have higher corruption levels than the ones without a consociational cabinet.

Minority veto is listed as the third most analyzed feature of consociational systems (36.546percent). Minority veto is studied in depth by Ram & Strøm (2014) who examine a global dataset on consociational arrangements. The findings suggest that minority vetoes are usually present in more developed countries, yet still rare. According to the authors, minority veto does not provide the incumbent leader high payoffs and they are difficult to implement due to the administrative weaknesses of most conflict-prone societies.

Cultural autonomy, examined in 35.12% of the articles, also seems to play an important role in power sharing agreements, as stated by for e.g., Rossi (2014). The author advocates for a formal agreement between Serb and Albanian communities in Kosovo, once the lack of a clear consociational pact in the region leads to an intensification of the ethnic cleavages between Serb and Albanian communities.

8. Measuring Power Sharing in the Quantitative and Qualitative Literature

The articles analyzed in our study encompass a broad variety of methodological approaches. Especially important for our analysis are the articles measuring the concepts of consociational democracies empirically. In our dataset, 99 articles provide an empirical measure of power sharing, representing approximately 26.5% of the total. Table A9 illustrates how the concepts of consociational democracies are operationalized in the literature, indicating how power sharing is defined by the respective authors as well.

It is also possible to find an empirical measurement of power sharing concepts in the qualitative literature. In 1996, Lijphart analyzed India as a confirming case for his theory of consociational democracy. He reinforces that consociationalism is characterized and can be empirically measured

by examining ‘[...] (1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, (2) cultural autonomy for these groups, (3) proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments, and (4) a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy’ (Lijphart 1996: 258). He finds that, despite previously presenting strong indicators in all categories, after the late 1960s, some elements of the power sharing agreements in India were weakened due to pressure of civil society. Other examples found in the literature encompasses the empirical measuring of coalition governments in Belgium as an indicator of power sharing (Frognier 1988), or the empirical analysis of internal conditions (e.g., no majority groups and violence being perceived as a traumatic experience) in Western European countries to ensure consociationalism (Lehmbruch 1975).

Moreover, Jarstad (2009) uses the Post-Accord Elections (PAE) dataset for measuring consociational agreements in Africa. For every five years following a peace accord, the PAE data collection reports whether or not power sharing was stipulated in the agreement and what are the outcomes for democratic stability and non-recurrence of war. Focusing on Pakistan, Adeney (2009) empirically operationalized power sharing elements as to how the different groups were represented in the core institutions of the state. Using proportional and diverse representation in the executive branch is one of the most common ways of empirically accounting for the presence of power sharing pacts (see for e.g., Younis 2011; Coakley & Fraenkel 2014). Adeney (2002) also contributed to the consociational democracy literature by using other forms of qualitative measurement of power sharing. She used nine variables related to Lijphart's (1969) conceptualization of consociational democracy, namely (1) executive weightage, (2) separate electorates, reserved seats, legislative weightage, bicameral representation, (3) religious reorganization, linguistic reorganization, residual power, and (4) community veto right, to investigate consociational federalism in India and Pakistan (Adeney 2002: 12).

In contrast, Horowitz (2014) presents a more flexible empirical identification strategy for power sharing, in which he argues that ethnic power sharing can be identified in any society that implements at least one consociational practice in its constitution. Another interesting empirical measure of consociational settlements is presented by Cheeseman (2011). He investigates power sharing agreements on two dimensions (elite cohesion and distribution of violence) and finds that, at least in the African region, even though power sharing might have provided means to break out of violent conflict, ‘[...] the positive gains of unity government were only realized following a series of failed power-sharing arrangements.’ (Cheeseman 2011: 359).

Table A9: Operationalization of power sharing in the quantitative literature

Article	Measurement of Power-Sharing
Blas (2018)	A measure of government coalitions.
Brancati & Snyder (2011)	Fiscal or political decision-making authority over at least one issue area and 0 otherwise.
Bunte & Vinson (2016)	Districts are coded as power sharing cases if the patterns of political appointments, statements by interviewees, and historical progression of election results agreed that a power sharing arrangement operates in this district.
Cammett & Malesky (2012)	(1) executive coalition; (2) legislative coalition (3) open-list (4) closed-list; (5) proportional allotment of bureaucratic appointments; (6) specialized minority vetoes.
Cederman et al. (2015)	Governmental power sharing: group representatives in either a junior or a central role. Territorial power sharing: operationalized as the degree of territorial autonomy.
Cederman et al. (2017)	All group years following the accommodative event: inclusion in power sharing or territorial autonomy.
Cederman et al. (2018)	Binary: a country with two or more groups sharing power (as either junior or senior partners) is considered to have inclusion.
Charron (2009)	Ethno-federalism: (1) sub-units that are defined territorially and identified with an ethnic and/or linguistic minority; (2) dual sovereignty, where policy making is divided between a center and its sub-units and (3) a center-sub-unit relationship that is marked by coordination and autonomy. Together, they generate a dichotomous indicator for whether a country has an ethno-federal or an integrationist political structure.
Conley & Dahan (2013)	Measure of party coalitions.
Derouen et al. (2009)	Political, territorial and military power sharing (dichotomous variables).
Gates et al. (2016)	19 indicators of power sharing. (e.g., elements of consociationalism such as grand coalitions and mutual veto).
Graham et al. (2017)	Analyses the effects of power sharing on democratic survival by differentiating between inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power sharing institutions.
Haass & Ottmann (2017)	Binary variable taking the value of 1 when a rebel group has taken over positions in the national government after a peace agreement.
Hartzell & Hoddie (2003)	Index of power sharing based on indicators for political, territorial, military, and economic power sharing.
Jarstad & Nilsson (2008)	Test political, military, and territorial agreements and whether these pacts are implemented – all the variables are coded dichotomously with 0 and 1.
Jarstad & Nilsson (2018)	Power Sharing pacts are coded either as territorial, political, or military pacts.
Joshi & Mason (2011)	Dummy variables identifying whether or not military, political, economic, and territorial power sharing agreements exist between the government and the rebels.
Koktsidis & Apostolou (2016)	Administration of surveys where respondents would evaluate six topic areas: 1. Types of settlement. 2. Motives for settlement. 3. Constraints against settlement. 4. Preconditions for settlement. 5. Crisis-related considerations. 6. Hopes placed in the conclusion of peace talks.

Lijphart (1985a)	Comparing elements of federalism and consociationalism.
Lindemann (2011)	Inclusiveness of elite bargaining is the degree to which positions of political, military, economic, and territorial power are shared between competing social groups.
Liu (2011)	The effect of power sharing institutions on minority language recognition is estimated by operationalizing the size of the district, proportionality in the government, and level of federalism.
Lutz & Farrington (2006)	Measurement of parties' policy positions concerning consociationalism.
Mattes & Savun (2009)	Coding of four types of power sharing: political, territorial, military, and economic.
McGarry & Loizides (2015)	Split ministries and public offices between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
Mitchell (2014)	Political party's share of the vote.
Mueller & Rohner (2018)	Measurement of power sharing elements in local districts aiming at comparing fatalities pre-and post-implementation of consociational agreements.
Mukherjee (2006)	Political Power-Sharing Agreement is operationalized as a dummy variable which is coded as 1 if the proposed agreement after the termination of the civil war includes any one of three political provisions.
Obayashi (2018)	Power-sharing is operationalized as political power sharing agreements signed by the government and rebel groups.
Ohmura (2011)	Three types of power sharing arrangements are identified here: political, military, and territorial power sharing. Power-Sharing Arrangement is coded 1 if a government and a rebel group agree with more than one power sharing pact, 0 if otherwise.
Ottmann & Vüllers (2015)	The occurrence of power sharing within a government-rebel dyad at any given time during the five-year post-conflict period, unless violence recurs earlier.
Pospieszna & Schneider (2013)	A measure of autonomy of different ethnic groups.
Ray (2016)	Ethnic Power Relations dataset: exclusion from political power on the eve of independence.
Reynal-Querol (2002)	Colomer (2000): parliamentary-majoritarian, presidential and semi-presidential, and parliamentary-proportional representation.
Roessler & Ohls (2018)	Ethnic power sharing: a measure of whether a given nonruling group was included in a governing coalition in that year (dichotomous variable).
Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008)	Proportional representation electoral system.
Selway & Templeman (2012)	Measuring of: (1) electoral system (majoritarian, proportional representation or mixed); (2) regime type (presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary); (3) federalism.
Shastri (2005)	1. Ethnic distribution of candidates by party. 2. Ethnic distribution of MP's & representativity of population's ethnic distribution. 3. Ethnic distribution of members of Parliament by party. 4. Ethnic composition of the Cabinet & Presidency.

Strasheim & Fjelde (2014)	Representation of warring parties in government.
Strøm et al. (2017)	Measures of inclusive, dispersive, and constraining power sharing focusing on 19 indicators.
Wolff (2009)	Measure whether ethnic heterogeneity in the self-governing entity leads to the establishment of local institutions. This would guarantee power sharing between relevant identity groups.

Source: Compiled by Author

References

- Adeney, K. (2002) Constitutional centring: nation formation and consociational federalism in India and Pakistan. *Commonwealth and comparative politics* 40 (3), 8–33.
- Adeney, K. (2009) The Limitations of Non-consociational Federalism: The Example of Pakistan. *Ethnopolitics* 8 (1), 87–106.
- Aeby, M. (2016) Making an impact from the margins? Civil society groups in Zimbabwe's interim power-sharing process. *Journal of modern African studies* 54 (4), 703–728.
- Aeby, M. (2018) Inside the Inclusive Government: Interparty Dynamics in Zimbabwe's Power-Sharing Executive. *Journal of Southern African studies* 44 (5), 855–877.
- Agarin, T., McCulloch, A. & Murtagh, C. (2018) Others in Deeply Divided Societies: A Research Agenda. *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 24 (3), 299–310.
- Bhattacharyya, H. & Mukherjee, J. (2018) Bodo ethnic self-rule and persistent violence in Assam: A failed case of multinational federalism in India. *Regional & Federal Studies* 28 (4), 469–487.
- Bieber, F. (2002) Bosnia–Herzegovina: Developments towards a More Integrated State? *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 22 (1), 205–218.
- Bieber, F. & Keil, S. (2009) Power-sharing revisited: lessons learned in the Balkans? *Review of Central and East European law* 34 (4), 337–360.
- Binningsbø, H. M. & Dupuy, K. (2009) Using Power-Sharing to Win a War: The Implementation of the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone. *Africa Spectrum* 44 (3), 87–107.
- Blas, A. (2018) Power-sharing coalitions in the Basque Country (1987–1998): centripetal coalitions vs. consociational coalitions. *Nations and nationalism* 24 (4), 998–1022.
- Bogaards, M. (2000) The Uneasy Relationship between Empirical and Normative Types in Consociational Theory. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12 (4), 395–423.
- Bogaards, M. (2019) Consociationalism and Centripetalism: Friends or Foes? *Swiss Political Science Review* 28 (1), 129.
- Bogaards, M., Helms, L. & Lijphart, A. (2019) The Importance of Consociationalism for Twenty-First Century Politics and Political Science. *Swiss Political Science Review* 25 (4), 341–356.
- Bourgeois, D. (2007) Administrative Nationalism. *Administration and society* 39 (5), 631–655.
- Brancati, D. & Snyder, J. L. (2011) Rushing to the polls: the causes of premature postconflict elections. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55 (3), 469–492.
- Bunte, J. B. & Vinson, L. T. (2016) Local power-sharing institutions and interreligious violence in Nigeria. *Journal of Peace Research* 53 (1), 49–65.
- Byrne, S. (2001) Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. *Journal of Peace Research* 38 (3), 327–352.
- Byrne, S. & McCulloch, A. (2012) Gender, Representation and Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Institutions. *International Peacekeeping* 19 (5), 565–580.
- Cammett, M. & Malesky, E. (2012) Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56 (6), 982–1016.
- Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S. & Wucherpfennig, J. (2017) Predicting the decline of ethnic civil war: Was Gurr right and for the right reasons? *Journal of Peace Research* 54 (2), 262–274.
- Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S. & Wucherpfennig, J. (2018) The Diffusion of Inclusion: An Open-Polity Model of Ethnic Power Sharing. *Comparative Political Studies* 51 (10), 1279–1313.

- Cederman, L.-E., Hug, S., Schädel, A. & Wucherpfennig, J. (2015) Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late? *American Political Science Review* 109 (2), 354–370.
- Charron, N. (2009) Government Quality and Vertical Power-Sharing in Fractionalized States. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 39 (4), 585–605.
- Cheeseman, N. (2011) The internal dynamics of power-sharing in Africa. *Democratization* 18 (2), 336–365.
- Chiriyankandath, J. (1997) "Unity in diversity"? Coalition politics in India (with special reference to Kerala). *Democratization* 4 (4), 16–39.
- Church, C. (1989) Behind the Consociational Screen: Politics in Contemporary Switzerland. *West European Politics* 12 (2), 35–54.
- Coakley, J. & Fraenkel, J. (2014) Resolving conflict in bipolar societies: The fate of political settlements in Fiji and Northern Ireland. *Political Science* 66 (1), 23–45.
- Collins, A. (1998) The ethnic security dilemma: Evidence from Malaysia. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs* 20 (3), 261–278.
- Conley, R. S. & Dahan, C. (2013) Legislative Behaviour in the Northern Ireland Assembly, 2007–11: Conflict and Consensus in a Developing Consociational Democracy. *Political Studies* 61, 177–195.
- Curtis, D. (2013) The international peacebuilding paradox: Power sharing and post-conflict governance in Burundi. *African affairs* 112 (446), 72–91.
- Dahl, R. A. (1973) *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. Yale Univ. Press, New Haven.
- Daley, P. (2006) Ethnicity and political violence in Africa: The challenge to the Burundi state. *Political Geography* 25 (6), 657–679.
- Dalle Mulle, E. (2016) Belgium and the Brussels Question: The Role of Non-Territorial Autonomy. *Ethnopolitics* 15 (1), 105–124.
- Daly, S. Z. (2014) The dark side of power-sharing: middle managers and civil war recurrence. *Comparative politics* 46 (3), 333–353.
- Derouen, K., Lea, J. & Wallensteen, P. (2009) The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements. *Conflict Management & Peace Science* 26 (4), 367–387.
- Deschouwer, K. (2006) And the peace goes on? Consociational democracy and Belgian politics in the twenty-first century. *West European Politics* 29 (5), 895–911.
- Dixon, P. (2011) Is Consociational Theory the Answer to Global Conflict? From the Netherlands to Northern Ireland and Iraq. *Political Studies Review* 9 (3), 309–322.
- Doucouliafos, H. & Ulubaşoğlu, M. A. (2008) Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (1), 61–83.
- Fraenkel, J. & Grofman, B. (2004) A neo-Downsian model of the alternative vote as a mechanism for mitigating ethnic conflict in plural societies. *Public Choice* 121 (3-4), 487–506.
- Frogner, A.-P. (1988) The mixed nature of Belgian cabinets between majority rule and consociationalism. *European Journal of Political Research* 16 (2), 207–228.
- Gates, S., Graham, B. A., Lupu, Y., Strand, H. & Strøm, K. W. (2016) Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace. *Journal of politics* 78 (2), 512–526.
- Gleason, G. (2001) Power sharing in Tajikistan: political compromise and regional instability. *Conflict, Security & Development CSD* 1 (03), 125–134.
- Graham, B. A., Miller, M. K. & Strøm, K. W. (2017) Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival. *American Political Science Review* 111 (4), 686–704.
- Guelke, A. (2003) Civil society and the Northern Irish peace process. *Voluntas* 14 (1), 61–78.

- Haass, F. & Ottmann, M. (2017) Profits from Peace: The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption. *World Development* 99, 60–74.
- Haddad, S. (2009) Lebanon: From Consociationalism to Conciliation. *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 15 (3/4), 398–416.
- Hartzell, C. & Hoddie, M. (2003) Institutionalizing peace: power sharing and post-civil war conflict management. *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2), 318–332.
- Hartzell, C. & Hoddie, M. (2015) The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and Post—Civil War Democracy. *World Politics* 67 (01), 37–71.
- Hayden, R. M. (2005) "Democracy" without a Demos? The Bosnian Constitutional Experiment and the Intentional Construction of Nonfunctioning States. *East European Politics & Societies* 19 (2), 226–259.
- Hoekman, T. (2013) Testing ties: opposition and power-sharing negotiations in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African studies* 39 (4), 903–920.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1985) *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Univ. of Calif. Press, Berkeley, Calif. u.a.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2002) Explaining the Northern Ireland agreement: the sources of an unlikely constitutional consensus. *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (2), 193–220.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2014) Ethnic power sharing: Three big problems. *Journal of Democracy* 25 (2), 5–20.
- Hulsey, J. W. (2010) 'Why did they vote for those guys again?' Challenges and contradictions in the promotion of political moderation in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Democratization* 17 (6), 1132–1152.
- Jabbara, J. G. & Jabbara, N. W. (2001) Consociational democracy in Lebanon: a flawed system of governance. *Journal of Developing Societies* XVII (2), 71–89.
- Jarstad, A. & Nilsson, D. (2018) Making and Keeping Promises: Regime Type and Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Agreements. *Peace & Change* 43 (2), 178–204.
- Jarstad, A. K. (2009) The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace. *Africa Spectrum* 44 (3), 41–62.
- Jarstad, A. K. & Nilsson, D. (2008) From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords. *Conflict Management & Peace Science* 25 (3), 206–223.
- Joshi, M. & Mason, T. D. (2011) Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of Peace in Post–Civil War States. *International Interactions* 37 (4), 388–413.
- Kasapović, M. (2005) Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consociational or Liberal Democracy? *Politicka Misao* 42 (5), 3–30.
- Kendhammer, B. (2014) Citizenship, federalism and powersharing: Nigeria's federal character and the challenges of institutional design. *Ethnopolitics* 13 (4), 396–417.
- Kennedy, J. (2004) A Switzerland of the north? The nationalistes and a bi-national Canada. *Nations and nationalism* 10 (4), 499–518.
- Kennedy, R., Pierson, C. & Thomson, J. (2016) Challenging identity hierarchies: Gender and consociational power-sharing. *British journal of politics and international relations* 18 (3), 618–633.
- Knox, C. (1996) The emergence of power sharing in Northern Ireland: lessons from local government. *Journal of conflict studies* XVI (1), 7–29.
- Koktsidis, P. I. & Apostolou, M. (2016) Ethnic Federalism and Power Sharing in Cyprus: Motives, Constraints, and Preconditions. *Mediterranean Quarterly a Journal of Global Issues* 27 (3), 105–134.

- Lehmbruch, G. (1975) Consociational democracy in the international system. *European Journal of Political Research* 3 (4), 377–391.
- Lemarchand, R. (2007) Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *African affairs* 106 (422), 1–20.
- Lijphart, A. (1968) Typologies of Democratic Systems. *Comparative Political Studies* 1 (1), 3–44.
- Lijphart, A. (1969) Consociational Democracy. *World Politics* 21 (2), 207–225.
- Lijphart, A. (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
- Lijphart, A. (1985a) Non-Majoritarian democracy: A comparison of federal and consociational theories. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 15 (2), 3–15.
- Lijphart, A. (1985b) *Power-sharing in South Africa*. Inst. of Internat. Studies Univ. of California, Berkeley.
- Lijphart, A. (1996) The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation. *American Political Science Review* 90 (2), 258–268.
- Lindemann, S. (2011) Just another change of guard? Broad-based politics and civil war in Museveni's Uganda. *African affairs* 110 (440), 387–416.
- Liu, A. H. (2011) Linguistic effects of political institutions. *Journal of politics* 73 (1), 125–139.
- Lustick, I. S., Miodownik, D. & Eidelson, R. J. (2004) Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It? *American Political Science Review* 98 (2), 209–229.
- Lutz, K. G. & Farrington, C. (2006) Alternative Ulster? Political parties and the non-constitutional policy space in Northern Ireland. *Political Studies* 54 (4), 715–742.
- Matlosa, K. & Shale, V. (2013) The pains of democratisation: the uneasy interface between elections and power-sharing arrangements in Africa. *Africa review* 5 (1), 1–22.
- Mattes, M. & Savun, B. (2009) Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design. *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (3), 737–759.
- McCrudden, C. & O'Leary, B. (2013) Courts and Consociations, or How Human Rights Courts May De-stabilize Power-sharing Settlements. *European Journal of International Law* 24 (2), 477–501.
- McCulloch, A. (2018) The Use and Abuse of Veto Rights in Power-Sharing Systems: Northern Ireland's Petition of Concern in Comparative Perspective. *Government and opposition* 53 (4), 735–756.
- McEvoy, J. (2018) Letting “the people(s)” decide: peace referendums and power-sharing settlements. *Democratization* 25 (5), 864–881.
- McGarry, J. & Loizides, N. (2015) Power-sharing in a re-united Cyprus: Centripetal coalitions vs. proportional sequential coalitions. *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 13 (4), 847–872.
- McGarry, J. & O'Leary, B. (2006) Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland. *Government & Opposition* 41 (1), 43–63.
- Mehler, A. (2009) Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship. *African affairs* 108 (432), 453–473.
- Mehler, A. (2013) Consociationalism for weaklings, autocracy for muscle men? Determinants of constitutional reform in divided societies. *Civil Wars* 15 (Sup.1), 21–43.
- Mitchell, P. (1991) Conflict regulation and party competition in Northern Ireland. *European Journal of Political Research* 20 (1), 67–92.

- Mitchell, P. (2014) The single transferable vote and ethnic conflict: The evidence from Northern Ireland. *Electoral Studies* 33, 246–257.
- Mueller, H. & Rohner, D. (2018) Can power-sharing foster peace? Evidence from Northern Ireland. *Economic Policy* 33 (95), 447–484.
- Mukherjee, B. (2006) Why political power-sharing agreements lead to enduring peaceful resolution of some civil wars, but not others? *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (2), 479–504.
- Nagle, J. (2018a) Between Conflict and Peace: An Analysis of the Complex Consequences of the Good Friday Agreement. *Parliamentary Affairs* 71 (2), 395–416.
- Nagle, J. (2018b) Beyond ethnic entrenchment and amelioration: an analysis of non-sectarian social movements and Lebanon's consociationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41 (7), 1370–1389.
- Nagle, J. (2018c) Crafting radical opposition or reproducing homonormativity? Consociationalism and LGBT rights activism in Lebanon. *Journal of Human Rights* 17 (1), 75–88.
- Nagle, J. & Fakhoury, T. (2018) Between Co-Option and Radical Opposition: A Comparative Analysis of Power-Sharing on Gender Equality and LGBTQ rights in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 24 (1), 82–99.
- Obayashi, K. (2018) Distributional effects of political power-sharing arrangements and their negative consequences for post-agreement stability. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 3 (2), 109–132.
- Ohmura, H. (2011) Termination and Recurrence of Civil War: Which Outcomes Lead to Durable Peace after Civil War? *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 12 (3), 375–398.
- O'Leary, B. (2013) Power Sharing: An Advocate's Conclusion. In: McEvoy, J. & O'Leary, B. (eds.) *Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places*. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, pp. 386–416.
- Ololajulo, B. O. (2016) 'Eating with One Spoon': Zoning, Power Rotation and Political Corruption in Nigeria. *African Studies* 75 (1), 153–169.
- Omotola, J. S. (2010) Mechanisms of post-election conflict resolution in Africa's 'new' democracies. *African Security Review* 19 (2), 2–13.
- Orlović, S. (2015) Consociational experiments in the Western Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. *New Balkan Politics* (17), 29–50.
- Ottmann, M. & Vüllers, J. (2015) The power-sharing event dataset (PSED): a new dataset on the promises and practices of power-sharing in post-conflict countries. *Conflict management and peace science* 32 (3), 327–350.
- Pallaver, G. (2014) South Tyrol's changing political system: from dissociative on the road to associative conflict resolution. *Nationalities Papers* 42 (3), 376–398.
- Panayiotou, A. (2006) Models of compromise and 'power sharing' in the experience of Cypriot modernity. *Cyprus review* 18 (2), 75–103.
- Parker, C. & Zemni, S. (1998) From securitization toward consociation? The civic dynamic of Palestinian Authority-Islamist rivalry. *Arab studies journal* VI-VII (2-1), 34–56.
- Peters, B. G. (2006) Consociationalism, corruption and chocolate: Belgian exceptionalism. *West European Politics* 29 (5), 1079–1092.
- Pospieszna, P. & Schneider, G. (2013) The illusion of 'peace through power-sharing': constitutional choice in the shadow of civil war. *Civil Wars* 15 (Supp.1), 44–70.
- Ram, M. & Strøm, K. W. (2014) Mutual veto and power-sharing. *International Area Studies Review* 17 (4), 343–358.

- Ray, S. (2016) Sooner or later: The timing of ethnic conflict onsets after independence. *Journal of Peace Research* 53 (6), 800–814.
- Reynal-Querol, M. (2002) Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (1), 29–55.
- Rice, C., Somerville, I. & Wilson, J. (2015) Democratic communication and the role of special advisers in Northern Ireland's consociational government. *International Journal of Public Administration* 38 (1), 4–14.
- Roessler, P. & Ohls, D. (2018) Self-Enforcing Power Sharing in Weak States. *International Organization* 72 (2), 423–454.
- Rossi, M. (2014) Ending the impasse in Kosovo: partition, decentralization, or consociationalism? *Nationalities Papers* 42 (5), 867–889.
- Rožić, P. (2013) Consociational Electoral Engineering Revisited: Findings from Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Romanian Journal of Political Science* 13 (2), 4–39.
- Salamey, I. & Tabar, P. (2012) Democratic transition and sectarian populism: the case of Lebanon. *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 5 (4), 497–512.
- Schneider, G. & Wiesehomeier, N. (2008) Rules That Matter: Political Institutions and the Diversity-Conflict Nexus. *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (2), 183–203.
- Sebastian, L. C. (2004) The paradox of Indonesian democracy. *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26 (2), 256–279.
- Segawa, N. (2015) Ethnic Politics and Consociationalism in the 2013 Malaysian Election. *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 16 (2), 177–194.
- Selway, J. & Templeman, K. (2012) The myth of consociationalism? Conflict reduction in divided societies. *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (12), 1542–1571.
- Shastri, A. (2005) Channelling ethnicity through electoral reform in Sri Lanka. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 43 (1), 34–60.
- Simonsen, S. G. (2005) Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: Lessons from Recent Cases. *Security Dialogue* 36 (3), 297–318.
- Sözen, A. (2004) A model of power-sharing in Cyprus: from the 1959 London-Zurich agreements to the Annan plan. *Turkish studies* 5 (1), 61–77.
- Spears, I. S. (2002) Africa: the limits of power-sharing. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (3), 123–136.
- Sriram, C. L. (2013) Making rights real? Minority and gender provisions and power-sharing arrangements. *International journal of human rights* 17 (2), 275–288.
- Sriram, C. L. & Zahar, M.-J. (2009) The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond. *Africa Spectrum* 44 (3), 11–39.
- Stojanovic, N. (2008) How to solve the dilemma of power sharing? Formal and informal patterns of representation in the swiss multilingual cantons. *Representation* 44 (3), 239–253.
- Strasheim, J. & Fjelde, H. (2014) Pre-designing democracy: institutional design of interim governments and democratization in 15 post-conflict societies. *Democratization* 21 (2), 335–358.
- Strøm, K. W., Gates, S., Graham, B. A. & Strand, H. (2017) Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint: Powersharing in the World's States, 1975–2010. *British Journal of Political Science* 47 (1), 165–185.
- Tangerås, T. P. & Lagerlöf, N.-P. (2009) Ethnic Diversity, Civil War and Redistribution*. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 111 (1), 1–27.

- Thaib, T. L. (2014) Political Power-Sharing from Islamic Perspective (Tahaluf al-Siyasi Fi al-Islam): Muslim's Experience in Malaysia. *Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture* 2 (4), 19–30.
- Tilley, J., Evans, G. & Mitchell, C. (2008) Consociationalism and the evolution of political cleavages in Northern Ireland, 1989-2004. *British Journal of Political Science* 38 (4), 699–717.
- Tridimas, G. (2011) The political economy of power-sharing. *European Journal of Political Economy* 27 (2), 328–342.
- Vandeginste, S. (2011) Power-sharing as a fragile safety valve in times of electoral turmoil: the costs and benefits of Burundi's 2010 elections. *Journal of modern African studies* 49 (2), 315–335.
- Vandeginste, S. (2014) Political representation of minorities as collateral damage or gain: the Batwa in Burundi and Rwanda. *Africa Spectrum* 49 (1), 3–26.
- Walsh, D. & Doyle, J. (2018) External Actors in Consociational Settlements: A Re-examination of Lijphart's Negative Assumptions. *Ethnopolitics* 17 (1), 21–36.
- Wantchekon, L. (2000) Credible power-sharing agreements: theory with evidence from South Africa and Lebanon. *Constitutional political economy* 11 (4), 339–352.
- White, T. J. (2007) Civil Society and Peace in Northern Ireland. *Peace Review* 19 (3), 445–451.
- White, T. J. (2011) Consolidating peace and democracy in Northern Ireland: The role of civil society. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 4 (3), 259–271.
- Wight, P. (2017) South Sudan And The Four Dimensions Of Power-Sharing. *ACPR: African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review* 7 (2), 1–35.
- Wilford, R. (2000) Designing the Northern Ireland Assembly. *Parliamentary Affairs* 53 (3), 577–590.
- Wilkinson, S. I. (2000) India, consociational theory, and ethnic violence. *Asian survey* 40 (5), 767–791.
- Wise, L. (2018) Setting Aside the "Others": Exclusion amid Inclusion of Non-dominant Minorities in Peace Agreements. *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 24 (3), 311–323.
- Wolff, S. (2004) Between Stability and Collapse: Internal and External Dynamics of Post-agreement Institution-building in Northern Ireland. *Ethnopolitics* 3 (2), 8–21.
- Wolff, S. (2009) Complex Power-sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance in Contemporary Conflict Settlements. *Ethnopolitics* 8 (1), 27–45.
- Yiftachel, O. (1992) The state, ethnic relations and democratic stability: Lebanon, Cyprus and Israel. *GeoJournal* 28 (3), 319–332.
- Younis, N. (2011) Set up to fail: consociational political structures in post-war Iraq, 2003-2010. *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 4 (1), 1–18.
- Zanker, F., Simons, C. & Mehler, A. (2015) Power, peace, and space in Africa: Revisiting territorial power sharing. *African affairs* 114 (454), 72–91.