**Online Appendix to:**

Beyond Reassurance: The Reputational Effect of Cultural Reforms in Peace Agreements

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# Political Agreements included in the analysis

The dataset of Political Agreements in Internal Conflicts (PAIC, 2020) includes 290 political agreements from 51 countries, addressing 58 different conflicts. Due to missing data on battle-related deaths, some agreements had to be discarded for the purposes of this study. The table below lists all the accords considered in this study.

Table S. 1: Peace accords considered in the study

| # | Country | Year | Agreement Name |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Afghanistan | 1992 | Peshawar Accord |
| 2 | Afghanistan | 1993 | Islamabad Accord |
| 3 | Algeria | 1994 | Decret Presidentiel Relatif a la Plate-Forme Portant sur le Consensus National sur la Periode Transitoire |
| 4 | Algeria | 1996 | Décret présidentiel relatif à la plate-forme de l'entente nationale |
| 5 | Angola | 1991 | The Bicesse Agreement |
| 6 | Angola | 1994 | The Lusaka Protocol |
| 7 | Angola | 1999 | Agreement signed by the Government of the Republic of Angola and UNITA Renovada (Luanda Protocol) |
| 8 | Angola | 2002 | Memorandum of Understanding (Luena Agreement) |
| 9 | Angola | 2006 | Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and National Reconciliation in Cabinda province |
| 10 | Bangladesh | 1997 | Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord |
| 11 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1994 | Washington Agreement |
| 12 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1995 | The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) |
| 13 | Burundi | 1994 | Agreement Emboying a Convention on Governance between the Forces for Democratic Change and the Political Parties of the Opposition |
| 14 | Burundi | 2000 | Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi |
| 15 | Burundi | 2002 | Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie |
| 16 | Burundi | 2003 | Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defense and Security Power Sharing in Burundi (The Pretoria Protocol) |
| 17 | Burundi | 2003 | Protocol on Outstanding Issues of Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi (Pretoria II Protocol) |
| 18 | Burundi | 2003 | Forces Technical Agreement (FTA) between the Transitional Government of the Republic of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD |
| 19 | Burundi | 2003 | The Global Ceasefire agreement between Transitional Government and the Forces pour la defence de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) of Mr. Nkúrunziza |
| 20 | Burundi | 2004 | Accord de partage de pouvoir au Burundi |
| 21 | Burundi | 2006 | Dar-es-Salaam Agreement on Principles Towards lasting Peace, Security and Stability in Burundi |
| 22 | Burundi | 2006 | Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL |
| 23 | Cambodia | 1991 | Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict "The Paris Agreement" |
| 24 | Central African Republic | 1998 | National Reconciliation Pact (Bangui National Reconciliation Conference) |
| 25 | Central African Republic | 2007 | Accord de paix entre le Gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine et les mouvements politico-militaires FDPC et UFDR |
| 26 | Central African Republic | 2007 | Accord de paix de Birao/Peace Agreement Between The Government of the Central African Republic And The political and military movement designated below: “Union des Forces Démocratiques |
| 27 | Central African Republic | 2008 | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| 28 | Central African Republic | 2013 | Accord Politique de libreville sur la resolution de la crise politico-securitaire en Republique Centrafricaine |
| 29 | Central African Republic | 2013 | Accord de cessez-le-feu |
| 30 | Central African Republic | 2014 | Accord de cessation de hostilite en Republique Centrafricaine |
| 31 | Central African Republic | 2015 | Agreement between the Transitional Government and the armed groups on the principles of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation and of integration into the uniformed State forces of the Central African Republic |
| 32 | Chad | 2002 | Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Chad and the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad |
| 33 | Chad | 2003 | Peace Agreement between the Government of Chad and the Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad |
| 34 | Chad | 2007 | Accord de paix entre le gouvernement du Tchad et les mouvements ci-après: UFDD, RFC, CNT, UFDDF (Accord de Syrte) |
| 35 | Chad | 2009 | Accord de Paix Entre le Gouvernement de la Republique du Tchad et le Mouvement National |
| 36 | Colombia | 1990 | Acuerdo Politico entre el Gobierno Nacional, los Partidos Politicos, el M-19, y la Iglesia Catolica en Calidad de Tutora Moral y Espiritual del Proceso |
| 37 | Colombia | 1991 | Final Agreement National Government Popular Liberation Army |
| 38 | Colombia | 1991 | Acuerdo Final |
| 39 | Colombia | 1991 | Acuerdo Final entre el Gobierno Nacional y el Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame |
| 40 | Colombia | 1992 | Acuerdo entre los Comandos Ernesto Rojas y el Gobierno Nacional |
| 41 | Colombia | 1994 | Acuerdo entre el Gobierno Nacional y el Frente Francisco Garnica de la Coordinatora Guerrillera |
| 42 | Colombia | 1994 | Acuerdo Político Final Gobierno Nacional Corriente de Renovación Socialista |
| 43 | Colombia | 1998 | Acuerdo final entre el Gobierno Nacional y el Movimiento Independiente Revolucionario Comandos Armados |
| 44 | Colombia | 2012 | General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace |
| 45 | Colombia | 2014 | Hacia un Nuevo Campo Colombiano: Reforma Rural integral |
| 46 | Colombia | 2014 | Solucion at Problema de las Drogas Illicitas |
| 47 | Colombia | 2016 | Acuerdo Sobre Cese al Fuego y de Hostilidades Bilateral y Definitivo y Dejación de las Armas entre el Gobierno Nacional y las FARC-EP |
| 48 | Colombia | 2016 | Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera |
| 49 | Comoros | 1999 | Accords d'Antananarivo |
| 50 | Comoros | 2003 | Agreement on Transitional Arrangements in the Comoros |
| 51 | Comoros | 2000 | The Joint Declaration of Fomboni |
| 52 | Congo | 1999 | Agreement on Ending Hostilities In the Republic of Congo |
| 53 | Croatia | 1995 | The Erdut Agreement |
| 54 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 1999 | Ceasefire Agreement |
| 55 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2002 | Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Pretoria Agreement) |
| 56 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2002 | Political agreement on consensual management of the transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo |
| 57 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2003 | Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act |
| 58 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2003 | Mémorandum sur le mécanisme pour la formation d'une armée nationale, restructurée et intégrée |
| 59 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2008 | Acte d'Engagement - Nord Kivu |
| 60 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2008 | Acte d'Engagement - Sud Kivu |
| 61 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2009 | Peace Agreement between the Government and le Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple |
| 62 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2013 | Joint ICGLR-SADC Final Communique on the Kampala Dialogue |
| 63 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2013 | Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region |
| 64 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2013 | Agenda for the dialogue between the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and M23 on the situation in Eastern DRC |
| 65 | Djibouti | 1994 | Agreement on Peace and national Reconciliation |
| 66 | Djibouti | 2000 | General Agreement on Reform and Civil Concord |
| 67 | Djibouti | 2001 | Agreement on Peace and national Reconciliation |
| 68 | El Salvador | 1994 | Geneva Agreement |
| 69 | El Salvador | 1990 | Agreement on Human Rights (San Jose Agreement) |
| 70 | El Salvador | 1991 | New York Act |
| 71 | El Salvador | 1991 | Mexico Agreement |
| 72 | El Salvador | 1991 | The Compressed Negotations |
| 73 | El Salvador | 1991 | Understandings Regarding the New York Agreement |
| 74 | El Salvador | 1991 | New York Agreement |
| 75 | El Salvador | 1992 | Acuerdo Complementarion del 22 de Diciembre de 1992 |
| 76 | El Salvador | 1992 | New York Act II |
| 77 | El Salvador | 1992 | Chapultepec Peace Agreement |
| 78 | El Salvador | 1993 | Acuerdo Complementario del 5 Frebrero de 1993 |
| 79 | El Salvador | 1993 | Acuerdo de la Reunion Tripartita |
| 80 | El Salvador | 1994 | Timetable for the Implementation of the most Important Agreements Pending |
| 81 | Georgia | 1992 | Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian - Ossetian Conflict (Sochi Agreement) |
| 82 | Georgia | 1992 | Moscow Agreement |
| 83 | Georgia | 1994 | Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons |
| 84 | Georgia | 1994 | Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict |
| 85 | Georgia | 1998 | Athens Meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures |
| 86 | Georgia | 1999 | Istanbul Statement of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures |
| 87 | Georgia | 2001 | Yalta Declaration of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides and Programme of Action on Confidence-Building |
| 88 | Guatemala | 1994 | Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that Have Caused Guatemalan Population to Suffer |
| 89 | Guatemala | 1994 | Agreement on the Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict |
| 90 | Guatemala | 1994 | Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights |
| 91 | Guatemala | 1995 | Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples |
| 92 | Guatemala | 1996 | Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca |
| 93 | Guatemala | 1996 | Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace |
| 94 | Guatemala | 1996 | Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements |
| 95 | Guatemala | 1996 | Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society |
| 96 | Guatemala | 1996 | Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Regime |
| 97 | Guatemala | 1996 | Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire |
| 98 | Guatemala | 1996 | Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects of the Agrarian Situation |
| 99 | Guinea-Bissau | 1998 | Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Guinea Bissau and the Self-proclaimed Military Junta |
| 100 | Guinea-Bissau | 1998 | Ceasefire Agreement in Guinea Bissau |
| 101 | Guinea-Bissau | 1998 | Agreement between the Government of Guinea Bissau and the Self-proclaimed Military Junta (Abuja Peace Agreement) |
| 102 | Guinea-Bissau | 1998 | Additional Protocol to the Abuja Accord Concerning the Formation of the Government of National Unity of Guinea Bissau |
| 103 | Haiti | 1992 | Protocol between President Jean Bertrande Aristide and the Parliamentary Negotiating Commission to Find a Definitive Solution to the Haitian Crisis |
| 104 | Haiti | 1992 | Protocol of Agreement between President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Prime Minister Designate Rene Theodore under the Auspices of the Organisation of American States |
| 105 | Haiti | 1993 | Accord de Governors Island/ Governor's Island Accord |
| 106 | India | 1993 | Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993 |
| 107 | India | 1993 | Memorandum of Settlement |
| 108 | India | 2003 | Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council |
| 109 | Indonesia | 1999 | Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East Timor |
| 110 | Indonesia | 2002 | Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement Between Government of the Republic of Indonesia And the Free Acheh Movement |
| 111 | Indonesia | 2005 | Memorandum of Understanding the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement |
| 112 | Ivory Coast | 2003 | Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords |
| 113 | Ivory Coast | 2003 | Accra Agreement |
| 114 | Ivory Coast | 2004 | Accra III |
| 115 | Ivory Coast | 2005 | Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire |
| 116 | Ivory Coast | 2005 | Declaration on the Implementation of the Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in the Côte d'Ivoire (Pretoria II) |
| 117 | Ivory Coast | 2007 | Troisième accord complémentaire à l'accord politique de Ouagadougou |
| 118 | Ivory Coast | 2007 | Premier accord complémentaire à l’accord politique de Ouagadougou |
| 119 | Ivory Coast | 2007 | Ouagadougou Political Agreement |
| 120 | Ivory Coast | 2007 | Second Complementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement |
| 121 | Ivory Coast | 2008 | Fourth Complementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement |
| 122 | Lebanon | 1989 | The Taif Accord |
| 123 | Lebanon | 2008 | Doha Agreement on the Results of the Lebanese National Dialogue Conference |
| 124 | Lesotho | 1999 | Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Lesotho and the Interim Political Authority |
| 125 | Liberia | 1990 | Joint Declaration of the Warring Parties |
| 126 | Liberia | 1993 | Cotonou Agreement |
| 127 | Liberia | 1994 | Akosombo Agreement |
| 128 | Liberia | 1994 | An acceptance and accession agreement and Agreement on the Clarification of the Akosombo Agreement (Accra Clarification) |
| 129 | Liberia | 1995 | Abuja Agreement to Supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as Subsequently Clarified by the Accra Agreement |
| 130 | Liberia | 1996 | Supplement to the Abuja Accord |
| 131 | Liberia | 2003 | Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and the political parties |
| 132 | Libya | 2015 | Libyan Political Agreement |
| 133 | Macedonia | 2001 | The Ohrid Agreement |
| 134 | Mali | 1992 | National Pact Concluded between the Governement and the Unified Movement and Fronts of Azawad Giving Expression to the Special Status of Northern Mali |
| 135 | Mali | 2006 | Accord d’Alger pour la Restauration de la Paix, de la Sécurité et du Développement dans la région de Kidal |
| 136 | Mali | 2012 | Accord carde de mise en oeuvre de l' engagement solennel du 1er Avril 2012 |
| 137 | Mali | 2013 | Accord preliminaire a l'election presidentielle et aux pourparlers inclisifs de paix au Mali |
| 138 | Mali | 2014 | Accord de Cessez-le-Feu |
| 139 | Mali | 2015 | Accord pour la paix e la reconcilation au Mali |
| 140 | Mexico | 1996 | The San Andrés Accords |
| 141 | Moldova | 1997 | Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria (The Moscow Agreement) |
| 142 | Mozambique | 1992 | General Peace Agreement for Mozambique |
| 143 | Mozambique | 2014 | Assembleia da Republica, Comissÿo dos Assuntos ¢onstitucionais, Direitos Humanos e de Legalidade |
| 144 | Myanmar | 2011 | Agreement between “Wa” Special Region and the Government |
| 145 | Myanmar | 2012 | Agreement between the State-Level Peace-Making Team and the KNU/KNLA Peace Council |
| 146 | Myanmar | 2012 | Agreement between the Union Level Peace-Making Team and the Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army |
| 147 | Nepal | 2006 | Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Comunist Party of Nepal (Maoist) |
| 148 | Nepal | 2011 | The Seven Point Agreement |
| 149 | Nicaragua | 1990 | Addendum to the Toncotin Agreement |
| 150 | Nicaragua | 1990 | Toncontin Agreement |
| 151 | Nicaragua | 1990 | Definitive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Nicaragua and the Yatama Atlantic Front of the Nicaragua Resistance |
| 152 | Nicaragua | 1990 | Effective and Definitive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and the Republic of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Resistance |
| 153 | Nicaragua | 1990 | Managua Protocol on Disarmament |
| 154 | Nicaragua | 1997 | Acuerdo de Paz entre Gobierno y Frente Norte 3-80 (Acuerdo de Managua) |
| 155 | Niger | 1994 | Ouagadougou Accord Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Niger and the Coordination of the Armed Resistance |
| 156 | Niger | 1995 | Accord établissant une paix définitive entre le Gouvernement de la République du Niger et l'Organisation de la Résistance Armée (O.R.A) |
| 157 | Pakistan | 2008 | North West Frontier Province Government’s Agreement with the Taliban |
| 158 | Pakistan | 2009 | SWAT Peace Accord |
| 159 | Papua New Guinea | 1994 | Charter of Mirigini for a New Bugainville |
| 160 | Papua New Guinea | 1995 | Waigani Communiqué |
| 161 | Papua New Guinea | 1998 | Lincoln Agreement on Peace Security and Development on Bougainville |
| 162 | Papua New Guinea | 2001 | Bougainville Peace Agreement |
| 163 | Papua New Guinea | 2001 | Joint Bougainville Ex-combatants Agreement on Weapons Disposal (Rotakas Record) |
| 164 | Philippines | 1995 | General Agreement for Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa - Soldiers of the Filipino People - Young Officers' Union |
| 165 | Philippines | 1996 | Peace Agreement |
| 166 | Philippines | 1997 | Implementing Operational Guidelines of the GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities |
| 167 | Philippines | 1997 | Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities between the GRP and the MILF |
| 168 | Philippines | 1998 | Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law |
| 169 | Philippines | 2001 | Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 |
| 170 | Philippines | 2001 | Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front |
| 171 | Philippines | 2001 | Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace |
| 172 | Philippines | 2002 | Joint Communiqué GRP-MILF |
| 173 | Philippines | 2002 | Implementing Guidelines on the Joint Communiqué of 6 May 2002 |
| 174 | Philippines | 2004 | Second Oslo Joint Statement |
| 175 | Philippines | 2009 | Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team |
| 176 | Philippines | 2012 | GPH-MILF decision points on principles as of April 2012 |
| 177 | Philippines | 2012 | Framework agreement on Bangsamoro 15 October 2012 |
| 178 | Philippines | 2014 | The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro |
| 179 | Philippines | 2014 | On the Bangsamoro waters and zones of joint cooperation addendum to the annex on revenue generation and wealth sharing and the annex on power sharing |
| 180 | Russia | 1995 | Agreement on the Basic Principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic |
| 181 | Russia | 1995 | Agreement on the Peaceful Resolution of the situation in the Chechen Republic on a set of Military Issues |
| 182 | Russia | 1996 | Russian-Chechen Agreement |
| 183 | Russia | 1996 | Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Resolution of the Chechen Crisis |
| 184 | Russia | 1996 | Khasavyourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations |
| 185 | Russia | 1996 | Russian-Chechen Truce Agreement |
| 186 | Russia | 1997 | Peace Treaty and Principles of Inter-relation between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria |
| 187 | Rwanda | 1992 | Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law |
| 188 | Rwanda | 1993 | Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons |
| 189 | Rwanda | 1993 | Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front |
| 190 | Rwanda | 1993 | Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous issues and Final Provisions |
| 191 | Rwanda | 1993 | Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front |
| 192 | Senegal | 2004 | General Peace Agreement Republic of Senegal and MFDC |
| 193 | Sierra Leone | 1996 | Peace Agreement between the Governement of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL (Abidjan Peace Agreement) |
| 194 | Sierra Leone | 1999 | Peace Agreement between the Governement of Sierra Leone and the RUF (Lomé Peace Agreement) |
| 195 | Somalia | 1993 | Addis Ababa Agreement |
| 196 | Somalia | 2002 | Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process |
| 197 | Somalia | 2004 | Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic |
| 198 | Somalia | 2008 | Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) (Djibouti Agreement) |
| 199 | Somalia | 2008 | Decision on the High Level Committee Djibouti Agreement |
| 200 | Somalia | 2008 | Modalities for the Implementation of the Cessation of Armed Confrontation |
| 201 | Somalia | 2008 | Joint statement between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) on Somalia Emergency and Drought Relief |
| 202 | Somalia | 2009 | An agreement between the Transitional Federal Government and the Puntland Regional State of Somalia |
| 203 | Somalia | 2010 | Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Maljama |
| 204 | Somalia | 2013 | Agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubba Delegation |
| 205 | South Africa | 1990 | Pretoria Minute |
| 206 | South Africa | 1990 | Groote Schuur Minute |
| 207 | South Africa | 1991 | National Peace Accord |
| 208 | South Sudan | 2012 | Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army |
| 209 | South Sudan | 2014 | Sudan People's Liberation Movement Framework for intra-SPLM dialogue |
| 210 | South Sudan | 2014 | Agreement on cessation of hostilities between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (in Opposition) |
| 211 | South Sudan | 2014 | Agreement on the resolution of the conflict in Jonglei State |
| 212 | South Sudan | 2014 | Agreement on a cessation of hostilities between the Government of South Sudan and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defense Army Cobra Faction |
| 213 | South Sudan | 2014 | Recommitment on humanitarian matters in the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in opposition SPLM/SPLA (in opposition) |
| 214 | South Sudan | 2014 | Agreement to resolve the crisis in South Sudan |
| 215 | South Sudan | 2015 | Outcome of the meeting of the principal signatory parties to the agreement on the planning implementation of the provisions in chapter II of the agreement 21 October-3 November |
| 216 | South Sudan | 2015 | Intra-SPLM Dialogue the Arusha Communique |
| 217 | South Sudan | 2015 | Areas of agreement on the establishment of the transitional government of national unity in the Republic of South Sudan |
| 218 | South Sudan | 2015 | Agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan |
| 219 | Sri Lanka | 2002 | Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam |
| 220 | Sudan | 1992 | Communique of the Abuja Sudanese Peace Conference |
| 221 | Sudan | 1996 | The Nuba Mountains’ Peace Agreement |
| 222 | Sudan | 1997 | Sudan Peace Agreement |
| 223 | Sudan | 1997 | The Fashoda Peace Agreement |
| 224 | Sudan | 2002 | Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on Aspects of Structures of Government |
| 225 | Sudan | 2004 | Declaration on the Conclusion of IGAD Negotiations on Peace in the Sudan |
| 226 | Sudan | 2004 | Improvement of Humanitarian Situation in Darfur |
| 227 | Sudan | 2004 | Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur in Accordance with the N’Djamena Agreement |
| 228 | Sudan | 2005 | Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| 229 | Sudan | 2005 | Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Cairo Agreement) |
| 230 | Sudan | 2006 | Darfur Peace Agreement |
| 231 | Sudan | 2006 | Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement |
| 232 | Sudan | 2006 | Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) And the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) |
| 233 | Sudan | 2008 | Roadmap for Return of IDPs and Implementation of Abyei Protocol |
| 234 | Sudan | 2009 | Agreement of good will and confidence building for the settlement of the problem in Darfur |
| 235 | Sudan | 2010 | Framework agreement to resolve the conflict in Darfur between the Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement Sudan |
| 236 | Sudan | 2010 | Ceasefire implementation mechanism |
| 237 | Sudan | 2011 | Framework agreement between the Government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (North) on Political Partnership between NCP and SPLMN, and Political and Security Arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States |
| 238 | Sudan | 2011 | Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on temporary agreements on the administration and security of the Abyei Area |
| 239 | Sudan | 2012 | Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement-Sudan on the basis of the Doha Document for peace in Darfur |
| 240 | Sudan | 2013 | Ceasefire agreement |
| 241 | Tajikistan | 1995 | Protocol on the Fundamental Principles for Establishing Peace and National Accord |
| 242 | Tajikistan | 1996 | Protocol on Refugees |
| 243 | Tajikistan | 1996 | Protocol on the Main Functions and Powers of the Commission on National Reconciliation |
| 244 | Tajikistan | 1996 | Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Leader of the United Tajik Opposition |
| 245 | Tajikistan | 1997 | The Moscow Declaration - General agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan |
| 246 | Tajikistan | 1997 | Statute on the Commission of National Reconciliation |
| 247 | Tajikistan | 1997 | Protocol on Military Issues |
| 248 | Tajikistan | 1997 | Protocol on the Guarantees of Implementation of the General Agreement on Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan |
| 249 | Tajikistan | 1997 | Protocol on Political Questions |
| 250 | Uganda | 2002 | Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the National Rescue Front II (Yumbe Peace Agreement) |
| 251 | Uganda | 2007 | Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the LRA/M |
| 252 | Uganda | 2007 | Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the LRA/M |
| 253 | Uganda | 2008 | Implementation Protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions |
| 254 | Uganda | 2008 | Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation |
| 255 | Uganda | 2008 | Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms |
| 256 | Uganda | 2008 | Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| 257 | United Kingdom | 1998 | The Good Friday Agreement |
| 258 | United Kingdom | 2006 | Agreement at St.Andrew's |

# Concepts

The coding of variables for this study follows and supplements the coding in PAIC. Detailed information on coding of PAIC is provided in Fontana et al. (2020).[[1]](#footnote-1) For the purpose of this appendix, it is useful to summarise the key concepts underpinning this study:

1. Cultural Reforms (CI): ‘Reforms of mechanisms and institutions through which aspects of culture may be expressed, reproduced and even transformed following a political agreement’ (Fontana et al, 2020: 13). This concept encompasses seven sets of *institutions engaging in the protection, reproduction or dissemination of aspects of culture* (education, symbols, the media, museums, cultural activities, sport, and cultural associations). We further coded cultural provisions into the two categories of:
   1. Accommodationist: provisions which “promote dual or multiple public identities” and “seek to ensure that each group has the public space necessary for it to express its identity” (McGarry et al., 2010: 41-42).
   2. Integrationist: provisions that “respond to diversity through institutions that transcend, crosscut and minimise differences” (McGarry et al., 2010: 41-42).
2. Third-party intervention (INT): ‘international organizations, third-party states and high-profile individuals acting in a wide range of roles from the earliest stages of a peace process (e.g. by mediating initial ceasefires), to the implementation of agreements (e.g. by administrating elections and verifying their results), to the peace-building stage (e.g. by repairing and constructing physical infrastructure).’
3. Power-sharing (PS): provisions ‘reflecting the representation of groups (who makes decisions and where)… (and) participation of relevant groups in decision making (through rules on how decisions are made)’ (Fontana et al, 2020: 9).
4. Territorial self-governance (TSG): ‘establishes the legally entrenched power of territorially delimited entities within the internationally recognized boundaries of existing states to exercise public policy functions independently of other sources of authority in this state, but subject to its overall legal order’ (Fontana et al, 2020: 13).
5. Transitional justice provisions (TJ): ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international assistance (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof’ (United Nations Security Council, 2004).

# Correlation between independent variables

As customary, we checked whether the data raised concern as regards the presence of collinearity between the independent variables. As shown in Table S. 1 this is not the case. In fact, a high level of correlation is only found between variables CI (Cultural reforms) and CI\_ITG (Integrationist cultural reforms), which are never used together in our analysis

Table S. 2: Correlation matrix for the all independent variables

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **PS** | **TJ** | **CI** | **CI\_ACC** | **CI\_ITG** | **TSG** | **INT** | **al\_ethnic** | **lnwdi\_gdpcapcur** | **lnwdi\_pop** | **cum\_conflict\_intensity** | **Incompatibility** |
| PS | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TJ | 0.08 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CI | 0.18 | 0.26 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CI\_ACC | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.58 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CI\_ITG | 0.17 | 0.24 | 0.93 | 0.44 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TSG | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0.42 | 0.21 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INT | 0.05 | 0.09 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.06 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| al\_ethnic | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.1 | -0.06 | 0.14 | -0.13 | 0.05 | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| lnwdi\_gdpcapcur | -0.17 | 0.03 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.15 | -0.25 | -0.28 | 1 |  |  |  |
| lnwdi\_pop | -0.12 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.21 | 0.1 | 0.11 | -0.27 | 0 | 0.42 | 1 |  |  |
| cum\_conflict\_intensity | -0.11 | 0.2 | 0.02 | -0.04 | 0.01 | 0 | -0.04 | -0.07 | 0 | 0.32 | 1 |  |
| Incompatibility | 0.09 | 0.19 | -0.02 | -0.11 | 0.05 | -0.35 | 0.08 | 0.41 | -0.27 | -0.3 | 0.15 | 1 |

Notes: An observation represents one peace agreement.

# Robustness Checks

We performed several tests to verify the reliability of our baseline results in regard to the disproportionate influence of any specific agreement; any specific conflict; yearly and regional indicators; and pacts for which the exact value of the dependent variable cannot be computed due to data limitations. Outcomes reinforce our confidence in the baseline findings, as results are robust to all alternative approaches and specifications considered.

## Sensitivity to specific peace agreements

In order to test the sensitivity of our results to outliers, we replicate our full-sample estimations while dropping each of the peace agreements sequentially. In other words, we re-estimate Equation (1) and Equation (2) 258 times, dropping a different peace agreement each time. This generates 258 replicate estimates of each model coefficient. We are interested in the coefficient for cultural institution reforms (CI) from Equation (1) and the coefficients and for accommodationist and integrationist cultural reforms (CI\_ACC and CI\_ITG) from Equation (2).

Table S. 2 reports several statistics on the 258 replicate estimates of the coefficients of interest, as well as a reminder of the estimates we obtained in our baseline analysis (our “baseline estimates” as shown in columns (1A), (2A), and (3A) in Table 5). Outcomes support that our results are not driven by any specific peace agreement. The mean of the replicate estimates coincides with our baseline coefficient. In addition, variation is low, and, for each of the coefficients of interest, the distance of replicate estimates from the baseline estimate is smaller than one standard deviation in more than 90% of cases. In addition, the replicate estimates are extremely likely to be (or not to be) statistically significant if so is (or is not) the relevant baseline estimate.

We can draw some additional considerations based on the range of the replicate estimates. For cultural reforms (column (1A)), we notice that this range is almost centred on zero. This is in line with the fact that in our baseline analysis the relationship between cultural reforms and sustainable peace is not precisely measured. As for accommodationist cultural reforms (columns (2Ai) and (3Ai)), in none of the two sets (five-year and ten-year timeframes) of 258 replications did the estimated coefficient turn out positive. In addition, the coefficients are precisely estimated in more than 98% of replicate estimations. This reinforces our confidence that accommodationist reforms contribute to sustainable peace. Finally, as regards integrationist cultural reforms, looking at the five-year timeframe (column (2Aii)) the range of the replicate coefficients includes zero (the minimum estimate is -0.01), but it is shifted towards the positive dominium (the maximum estimate is 0.81). In the ten-year timeframe (column (3Aii)) all replicate estimates have a positive sign, and are precisely estimated in more than 99% of cases. This evidence suggests that the relationship between integrationist reforms and post-agreement deaths is positive.

Table S. 3: Sensitivity to specific agreements – Statistics on the replicate estimated coefficients

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Coefficient | CI | CI\_ACC | CI\_ITG | CI\_ACC | CI\_ITG |
| Timeframe | **5Y** | **5Y** | **5Y** | **10Y** | **10Y** |
| Column | **(1A)** | **(2Ai)** | **(2Aii)** | **(3Ai)** | **(3Aii)** |
| Mean | 0.23 | -0.83 | 0.64 | -1.13 | 1.17 |
| Std.Dev. | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 |
| Min | -0.34 | -1.01 | -0.01 | -1.29 | 0.21 |
| Max | 0.39 | -0.38 | 0.81 | -0.51 | 1.35 |
| Distance from baseline est. > 1 Std.Dev. (%) | 2.7% | 7.4% | 2.3% | 9.3% | 1.9% |
| Est. coeff. is significant (%) | 0.4% | 98.4% | 0.8% | 99.6% | 99.6% |
| Baseline est. | 0.23 | -0.83\* | 0.64 | -1.13\*\* | 1.17\*\* |

Notes: There is a total of 258 replicate estimates for each coefficient. In each estimation, we drop from the (entire) sample one of the 258 agreements, sequentially. Estimates were derived from negative binomial regressions with cluster-robust standard errors (by conflict) of the models in Equation (1) and Equation (2) using as dependent variable (i) in columns (1A) to (2Aii), the cumulative number of battle deaths in the five years following the peace agreement; (ii) in columns (3Ai) and (3Aii), the cumulative number of battle deaths in the ten years following the peace agreement. The estimates we obtained in our baseline analysis (“baseline est.”) can also be found in columns (1A), (2A), and (3A) in Table 5.

## Sensitivity to specific conflicts

Our sample includes data on 258 peace agreements aimed at addressing 58 intra-state conflicts. As shown in Table S. 3, about 70% of conflicts were tackled by one to five political agreements, while about 12% were addressed by more than 11 accords in the 1989-2016 period. In order to test whether the set of agreements generated by any specific conflict disproportionately influences the analysis, we replicate our full-sample estimates while dropping all accords referring to each of the 58 conflicts, sequentially.

In other words, we re-estimate Equation (1) and Equation (2) 58 times, each time dropping the set of peace agreements addressing one specific conflict. This generates 58 replicate estimates of each model coefficient. We focus on the coefficient for cultural institution reforms (CI) from Equation (1) and the coefficients and for accommodationist and integrationist cultural reforms (CI\_ACC and CI\_ITG) from Equation (2).

Table S. 4: Conflicts by number of agreements addressing them

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| N. of PAs addressing the conflict | Frequency | % |
| 1 to 5 | 40 | 69% |
| 6 to 10 | 11 | 19% |
| 11 or more | 7 | 12% |
| Total | 58 | 100% |

Notes: An observation represents one intra-state conflict. “PA” stands for peace agreement.

Table S. 4 reports several statistics on the 58 replicate estimates of the coefficients of interest as well as a reminder of the estimates we obtained in our baseline analysis (columns (1A), (2A), and (3A) in Table 5). Outcomes show that our findings are not driven by the accords generated in response to any specific conflict. All the considerations we made on the sensitivity of results to specific agreements also apply here. Remarkably, the level of variation across estimates is larger in this analysis, and so is – relatedly – the share of estimates that differ from the baseline coefficient by more than one standard deviation. Nonetheless, these figures remain small. In conclusion, this sensitivity analysis reinforces our confidence in the baseline results.

Table S. 5: Sensitivity to specific conflicts – Statistics on the replicate estimated coefficients

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Coefficient** | **CI** | **CI\_ACC** | **CI\_ITG** | **CI\_ACC** | **CI\_ITG** |
| **Timeframe** | **5Y** | **5Y** | **5Y** | **10Y** | **10Y** |
| **Column** | **(1A)** | **(2Ai)** | **(2Aii)** | **(3Ai)** | **(3Aii)** |
| Mean | 0.23 | -0.82 | 0.64 | -1.12 | 1.16 |
| Std.Dev. | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.14 |
| Min | -0.34 | -1.04 | -0.01 | -1.33 | 0.21 |
| Max | 0.55 | -0.38 | 0.86 | -0.51 | 1.42 |
| Distance from baseline est. > 1 Std.Dev. (%) | 10.3% | 13.8% | 13.8% | 10.3% | 6.9% |
| Est. coeff. is significant (%) | 1.7% | 87.9% | 10.3% | 98.3% | 98.3% |
| Baseline est. | 0.23 | -0.83\* | 0.64 | -1.13\*\* | 1.17\*\* |

Notes: There is a total of 58 replicate estimates for each coefficient. In each estimation, we drop from the (entire) sample all accords referring to one of the 58 conflicts, sequentially. Estimates were derived from negative binomial regressions with cluster-robust standard errors (by conflict) of the models in Equation (1) and Equation (2) using as dependent variable (i) in columns (1A) to (2Aii), the cumulative number of battle deaths in the five years following the peace agreement; (ii) in columns (3Ai) and (3Aii), the cumulative number of battle deaths in the ten years following the peace agreement. The estimates we obtained in our baseline analysis (“baseline est.”) can also be found in columns (1A), (2A), and (3A) in Table 5.

## Alternative approach to recent peace agreements

For recent pacts we are unable to properly calculate the dependent variable because data on battle-related deaths are only available until 2017. In particular, as shown in Table S. 5, about 12% (14%) of agreements were signed after 2012 (2007), so we could not calculate the exact cumulative number of battle-related deaths in the five (ten) years following the accord.

Table S. 6: Peace agreements by period of signing

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Period of signing | Frequency | % |
| 1989-2007 | 192 | 74% |
| 2008-2012 | 36 | 14% |
| 2013-2016 | 30 | 12% |
| Total | 258 | 100% |

Notes: An observation represents one peace agreement.

In our baseline approach, for these observations we use the cumulative number of deaths in the available years as an approximation for the exact value of the dependent variable. In this robustness test, we adopt a more conservative approach and drop from the sample all accords signed after 2012 (or 2007 – depending on the model specification).

Results from this approach are reported in Table S. 6. Panels and columns replicate those in Table 5. Overall, outcomes confirm the findings from our baseline analyses. Specification (1A) confirms that the overall impact of cultural reforms is not precisely measured. When we allow for heterogeneous effects depending on the type of reform (accommodationist or integrationist), we find that the inclusion of accommodationist cultural reforms in intra-state peace agreements is significantly beneficial in the five-year timeframe (specification (2A)), and even more so in the ten-year timeframe (specification (3A)). On the other hand, integrationist cultural reforms are positively associated with post-agreement battle deaths, and this link is statistically significant when looking at the ten-year horizon (specification (3A)).

Panel (B) in Table S. 6 replicates the analysis by type of incompatibility. Just like in our baseline results, we find that accommodationist cultural reforms are negatively (though non-significantly) associated with battle deaths, regardless of the type of incompatibility underlying the conflict. The estimated coefficient for territorial conflicts is more than five times larger (in absolute value) than that for governmental conflicts. This result holds in both the medium and the long term. On the other hand, integrationist reforms are positively correlated with post-agreement deaths. This relationship is precisely measured in specifications (1B) and (4B).

Results on further covariates are also robust to this alternative approach. All specifications in Table S. 6 confirm the negative link between third-party intervention and post-settlement battle deaths. In addition, panel (B) supports the finding that power-sharing has a beneficial effect on sustainable peace as far as territorial conflicts are concerned – while the opposite holds for governmental conflicts.

Table S. 7: Sensitivity to alternative approach to recent peace agreements

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Obs. dropped if signing year | >2012 | >2012 | >2007 | >2012 | >2012 | >2007 | >2007 |
| Incompatibility type | **All** | **All** | **All** | **Terr.** | **Gov.** | **Terr.** | **Gov.** |
| DV: Cumulative n. of battle deaths | **5Y** | **5Y** | **10Y** | **5Y** | **5Y** | **10Y** | **10Y** |
| Panel | **(A)** | | | **(B)** | | | |
| Column | **(1A)** | **(2A)** | **(3A)** | **(1B)** | **(2B)** | **(3B)** | **(4B)** |
| Cultural reforms | 0.28 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.40) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Accommodationist cultural reforms |  | -0.80\* | -1.19\*\* | -1.27 | -0.23 | -3.57 | -0.26 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.60) | (1.06) | (0.58) | (4.09) | (0.70) |
| Integrationist cultural reforms |  | 0.69 | 1.69\*\*\* | 1.63\*\* | 0.45 | 3.56 | 1.29\*\* |
|  | (0.45) | (0.53) | (0.80) | (0.54) | (2.25) | (0.57) |
| Power-sharing | 0.23 | 0.1 | 0.01 | -1.16 | 0.49\* | -0.75 | 0.45\* |
|  | (0.31) | (0.31) | (0.33) | (0.84) | (0.28) | (1.37) | (0.24) |
| Transitional justice | -0.23 | -0.19 | -0.62 | 0.79 | -0.15 | 0.84 | -0.51 |
|  | (0.42) | (0.44) | (0.49) | (0.85) | (0.59) | (1.01) | (0.67) |
| Territorial self-governance | -0.6 | -0.27 | -0.58 | -0.21 | -0.18 | -0.16 | -0.64 |
|  | (0.44) | (0.49) | (0.61) | (0.72) | (0.64) | (1.17) | (0.89) |
| Third-party intervention | -0.84\*\* | -0.83\*\* | -1.26\*\* | -0.97 | -0.72\* | -1.55 | -1.3\*\*\* |
|  | (0.41) | (0.40) | (0.50) | (0.83) | (0.38) | (1.66) | (0.49) |
| Incompatibility | -0.8 | -0.63 | -1.17 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.94) | (0.90) | (1.14) |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -4.07 | -4.18 | -3.7 | -18.53\* | -2.77 | -21.96\* | -1.33 |
|  | (3.24) | (3.24) | (4.62) | (10.25) | (2.97) | (12.09) | (4.23) |
| ln(α) | 1.71\*\*\* | 1.70\*\*\* | 1.73\*\*\* | 1.84\*\*\* | 1.51\*\*\* | 1.92\*\*\* | 1.48\*\*\* |
|  | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.24) | (0.49) | (0.32) | (0.46) | (0.30) |
| Further controls (Zi) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 213 | 213 | 186 | 60 | 153 | 53 | 133 |

Notes: An observation represents one peace agreement. The estimates come from negative binomial regressions; cluster-robust standard errors (by conflict) are in parentheses. “ln()” is the estimate of the log of the dispersion parameter. Further controls () include measures of the cumulative conflict intensity, GDP per capita, population size, and ethnic fractionalisation. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.

## Year and region indicators

The 258 peace agreements in our sample were signed over a 28-year period (1989-2016) and refer to conflicts affecting five different regions (Africa, America, Asia Europe, and the Middle East). In this section we run two tests to check whether our findings are robust to the inclusion of indicator variables for the agreements’ year and region. The idea underlying these tests is to control for unobserved characteristics that are fixed at the year or regional level. To this aim, we estimate two modified versions of both Equation (1) and Equation (2). In the first variant, we include year indicators among the covariates. In the second variant, we introduce regional indicators (without year indicators). Overall, these two tests reinforce our confidence in the baseline findings.

Table S. 7 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the variables of interest (CI from Equation (1), and CI\_ACC and CI\_ITG from Equation (2)). Panel “Year” refers to the analysis including year indicators. For each independent variable of interest, the sign of its relationship with sustainable peace coincides with our baseline results. The loss of statistical significance can most likely be attributed to the inclusion of a substantial number of additional covariates (the year indicators).

Panel “Region” refers to the analysis with regional indicators. Again, the sign of each relationship is maintained. However, controlling for regional indicators leads to more precisely measured coefficients. In fact, all relationships are significant in this specification.

Table S. 8: Sensitivity to the inclusion of year or region indicators

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DV: Cumulative n. of battle deaths | 5Y | 5Y | 10Y |
| Panel | **Year** | | |
| Column | **(1AY)** | **(2AY)** | **(3AY)** |
| Cultural reforms | 0.05 |  |  |
|  | (0.51) |  |  |
| Accommodationist cultural reforms |  | -0.47 | -0.49 |
|  |  | (0.52) | (0.50) |
| Integrationist cultural reforms |  | 0.56 | 0.46 |
|  |  | (0.80) | (0.78) |
| Panel | **Region** | | |
| Column | **(1AR)** | **(2AR)** | **(3AR)** |
| Cultural reforms | 0.71\* |  |  |
|  | (0.43) |  |  |
| Accommodationist cultural reforms |  | -0.78\* | -1.08\*\* |
|  |  | (0.45) | (0.46) |
| Integrationist cultural reforms |  | 1.14\*\*\* | 1.52\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.43) | (0.46) |

Notes: An observation represents one peace agreement. The estimates come from negative binomial regressions on the entire sample; cluster-robust standard errors (by conflict) are in parentheses. Estimates in panel “Year” were derived from the estimation of a variant of Equation (1) and Equation (2) which includes year indicators among the covariates. Estimates in panel “Region” were derived from the estimation of a variant of Equation (1) and Equation (2) which includes regional indicators among the covariates. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.

1. For the Codebook and full PAIC dataset, please also see: Fontana, Giuditta and Kartsonaki, Argyro and Neudorfer, Natascha and Walsh, Dawn and Wolff, Stefan and Yakinthou, Christalla (2021) Political Agreements in Internal Conflicts (PAIC) Dataset and Codebook, <https://doi.org/10.25500/edata.bham.00000581>. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)