Online Appendix

**Twelve Votes for an Exit.**

**Compromise and Responsiveness in the Brexit Process**

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# Tactical voting

In the article, we reported that Kenneth Clarke suspected that tactical voting was an obstacle to the success of his proposal of a Customs Union. We can check Clarke’s idea more in detail with the data reported in Figure A. 1, where we have cross-tabulated the vote expressed on his motion with the one proposing a Confirmatory referendum. Both were defeated with similar results. 192 MPs (green cell in the left panel) voted in favour of both motions, whereas 247 opposed both of them.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Referendum |  |
|  |  | Noes | Abst. | Ayes | Total |
| Customs union | Noes | 247 | 2 | 22 | 271 |
| Abst  | 9 | 43 | 54 | 106 |
| Ayes | 39 | 34 | 192 | 265 |
|   | Total | 295 | 79 | 268 |  |
|  |  | Referendum |  |
|  |  | Noes | Abst. | Ayes | Total |
| Customs union | Noes | 247 | 2 | 22 | 271 |
| Abst  | 9 | 43 |  | 52 |
| Ayes | 39 |  | 281 | 320 |
|  | Total | 295 | 45 | 303 |  |

Fig. A.1 Actual and hypothetical votes on Customs Union and Confirmatory referendum

The suspicion is that there were some tactical abstentions (yellow), or even opposition (orange). Excluding those who abstained on both motions (who may have been absent, or not convinced at all), and reshuffling those potential tactical absentees we obtain the hypothetical results presented in the right-hand panel. This time, both motions are able to move a majority, and Clarke’s proposal even with a clear advantage of almost 50 votes against its opponents. Politically speaking, since the Customs Union motion is median on the second dimension, it is more probable that there were tactical abstentions damaging it, compared to those damaging the Confirmatory referendum option.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Common Market 2.0 |  |
|  |  | Noes | Abst. | Ayes | Total |
| Customs union | Noes | 243 | 14 | 14 | 271 |
| Abst  | 8 | 93 | 4 | 106 |
| Ayes | 32 | 63 | 170 | 265 |
|   | Total | 283 | 170 | 189 |  |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Common Market 2.0 |  |
|  |  | Noes | Abst. | Ayes | Total |
| Customs union | Noes | 243 | 14 |  | 257 |
| Abst  | 8 | 93 |  | 101 |
| Ayes |  |  | 283 | 283 |
|  | Total | 251 | 107 | 283 |  |

Fig. A.2 Actual and hypothetical votes on Customs Union and Common Market 2.0

In figure A.2 we check the same idea by cross-tabulating the votes on the Customs Union with that on Common Market 2.0, with the Scottish Nationalists being accused (in the second round) of similar strategic voting. This time, reshuffling the tactical abstentions would not be enough to produce a positive majority, and thus we need to assume some tactical opponents as well.[[1]](#footnote-1)

The same short-sighted behaviour has been adopted by supporters of other soft options, and apparently even between no-deal supporters and those in favour of contingent preferential agreements, although, in the latter case, more cooperative behaviours would not have changed their overall negative results. A constitutive element of this lack of cooperation consists in the limited cross-party mutual trust. Table A.1 illuminates this aspect by exploring the distribution of supporters of the different options.

Table A.1. Cross-party support for the eight plus four motions

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Con | DUP | Green | Ind | Lab | LibDem | PC | SNP |
| No deal | 157 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Preferential agreement | 126 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Customs union | 34 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 228 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| EFTA – EEA | 59 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Common market 2.0 | 37 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 144 | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| Labour plan | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 234 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Confirmatory referendum | 11 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 206 | 11 | 4 | 32 |
| Revoke art. 50 | 13 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 119 | 10 | 4 | 34 |
| Customs union | 36 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 230 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Common market 2.0 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 185 | 2 | 4 | 32 |
| Confirmatory referendum | 14 | 0 | 1 | 16 | 203 | 11 | 4 | 31 |
| Parliamentary supremacy | 9 | 0 | 1 | 14 | 121 | 10 | 4 | 32 |

# Agreement indices

To provide greater insight into the cohesion of each parliamentary group, in Table A.2 we report the agreement index for the various parties on each indicative division, together with their overall averages. The index is computed for each group according to the following formula:

AI = Max [Y, N, A] – ½ [(Y+N+A) – Max [Y, N, A]] / (Y+N+A)

Where Y represents the number of Ayes, N the number of Noes, and A those who did not participate in the division. The index takes the minimum value of 0 when the MPs evenly split among the three options, and the maximum value of 1 when they vote as a bloc. All other things being equal, it is clearly more likely for larger parties to have lower agreement indices. In fact, apart from the group of independent MPs, the Conservative and the Labour parliamentary parties were, in that order, the least cohesive groups.

Table A.2.Agreement index by party on the indicative votes

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Con | DUP | Green | Ind | Lab | LibDem | PC | SNP |
| No deal | 0.25 | 0.85 | 1.00 | 0.57 | 0.96 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.96 |
| Preferential agreement | 0.58 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.36 | 0.73 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Customs union | 0.46 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.36 | 0.29 | 0.73 | 1.00 | 0.96 |
| EFTA – EEA | 0.63 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.85 | 0.73 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Common market 2.0 | 0.82 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.88 | 0.73 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Labour plan | 0.73 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 0.86 | 1.00 | 0.96 |
| Confirmatory referendum | 0.71 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.72 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.87 |
| Revoke art. 50 | 0.10 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.57 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.91 |
| Customs union | 0.63 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.36 | 0.86 | 0.18 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Common market 2.0 | 0.60 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.60 | 0.18 | 1.00 | 0.87 |
| Confirmatory referendum | 0.70 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.75 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.83 |
| Parliamentary supremacy | 0.73 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.26 | 0.86 | 1.00 | 0.87 |
| Average indicative | 0.58 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.25 | 0.64 | 0.75 | 1.00 | 0.94 |

# Maps and dimensions

The aggregating procedure explained in the text is based on discrete ordinal preferences, which are exhibited either by supporting, abstaining or rejecting any motion put to a vote. As such, abstention does not need to be equally ‘distant’ from ayes and noes, as long as it is perceived as middling between the other two voting options. It could also be perfectly reasonable for a moderate MP to vote against opposite motions, such as triggering a no-deal exit and the revocation of article 50, retaining his/her internal coherence, and yet contributing to produce the typical collective paradox of intransitivity that prevents the success of the preferred moderate options (Riker 1961). The procedure returns a two-dimensional space, in which the location of each MP can now be approximated linearly as Euclidean distances. Most importantly, proximities on both dimensions are, even visibly, only moderatly related to party belongings, which makes this space at odd with the tradition and behaviour of MPs in a Westminster’s party government (Hix and Noury 2015).

It should be noted that, substantially speaking, a similar interpretation of Brexit related divisions has been provided by some qualitative accounts of the process (Lynch et al. 2019) and, most importantly, adopting entirely different aggregating procedures, e.g. starting from similarity scores between pairs of MPs in the perspective of a social network approach. ‘The network analysis showed that while there are two distinct (ideology) clusters on both the Brexit and the non-Brexit case, the inter-connectivities across these clusters differ significantly. In non-Brexit divisions, it is almost certain that MPs follow the party rhetoric, and defying the party whip is largely negligible. As demonstrated by the network visualisation, most cross-party alliances happen within one cluster only and rarely does it ever cross to the other side. Meanwhile, within-party conflicts are also very minimal. On the other hand, in the Brexit divisions, there was a visible blurring of the party line, and cross-cluster interaction is obvious and apparent. There exists strong repulsion across various node pairs, and while in the non-Brexit case, cross-party alliances only happen within a cluster, it is evident that in the Brexit case, cross-party alliances could happen across two clusters that intuitively have polarised ideological beliefs’ (Intal and Yasseri 2019: 27: 27).

If we extend our analyses to the whole set of Brexit related divisions in year 2019 – we counted more than 80, and the complete list is reported at the end of this appendix – we still need two linear dimensions to represent the behaviour of MPs (see figure A.3). Moreover, we again register an ‘anomalous’ amount of overlap amongst MPs belonging to opposite parties, though not as large as the one on our subset of fifteen votes.



Fig. A.3 The Map of MPs on 84 Brexit-related divisions

However, the latter graph is much more ‘clustered’ than the one picturing the indicative divisions in the article, and lends itself also to an interpretation on the basis of a single curvilinear relationship. In fact, the squared values of the scores of the first dimension explain approximately 18% of the locations on the second dimension.

Even if the map presented in the article is much more dispersed than the one in figure A.3, one could argue that it also lends to that curvilinear interpretation. In reality, for our twelve divisions, that approach explains only 3% of the variance on the second dimension, so that the expected curvilinear relationship is not robustly confirmed by the data (see Figure A.4). Moreover, especially considering the large confidence intervals, the horizontal distances on the first dimension do not differ much from those that would derive following that curvilinear approach.

Overcoming that limit, what would be the consequences of that interpretation for what we describe in the rest of the article? Having one single curvilinear political space instead of two orthogonal dimensions certainly impacts on the interpretation of the second panel of Figure 2 in the article, since there would not exist any second dimension. However, it would probably affect very marginally those concerning the first dimension, since those linear differences would be only spread out more widely following the curvilinear distances. The same could be said for what we found in the second part of the article concerning the issue of responsiveness and compromise, something that we tackle exclusively on the basis of the horizontal dimension and distances.



Fig. A.4 A curvilinear interpretation of the map of MPS on the 12 indicative votes

Eventually, combining qualitative reconstructions, the results of other statistical approaches, the plausibility of a curvilinear interpretation and the substantive consequences of the latter approach, we are confident about the plausibility of our two-dimensional interpretation, that implicitly identifies voting behaviours associated with divisions not included in the present analysis, like the one on the meaningful votes.

Below, we also include a series of maps similar to the one in the article, but this time including the government membership (at the beginning of Theresa May’s premiership, though not necessarily at the moment of the vote) and the names of some relevant MPs (figure A.5), classified according to their UK country of election (figure A.6), and by the number of Ayes in the indicative votes (figure A.7).

Clearly, there is no relationship between country and position on the map, whereas the more they are placed on the right-hand side in figure A.7, the more they compromise voting not just for their preferred option.



Fig. A.5 The Map of MPs on the indicative votes with the position of some prominent MPs



Fig. A.6 The Map of MPs on indicative votes classified by country of election



Fig. A.7 The Map of MPs classified by number of ayes in the twelve indicative votes

# Background models

For a better clarity, figure 2 in the article compares standardized coefficients of the described bivariate models. For completeness, we report below also the representation of the original coefficients together with the tables producing them.



Fig. A.8 Raw coefficients of the bivariate models presented in Figure 2

On the left-hand side, we evaluate the determinants of the scores on the first dimension of the map, while on the right-hand side, we compare the corresponding values for the second dimension. The scale for the coefficients of the census covariates is located at the bottom of the graph, and the corresponding zero line is solid; the scale corresponding to the coefficients for the referendum results is at the top, and the null value is reported with a dashed vertical line.

In Tables A.3 and A.4 we report the coefficients of the regressions that produced figure 2 in the article. They are all OLS regression with party fixed effect and robust standard errors. The varying number of cases should be attributed to the fact that census data are not homogeneous across all countries of the United Kingdom.

Tab. A.3 Regression coefficients for left panel of Figure 2 in the article

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Pop density | 0.03 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.04) |  |  |  |  |
| Not deprived |  | 0.18\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.05) |  |  |  |
| University |  |  | 0.20\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.04) |  |  |
| Age 15-24 |  |  |  | 0.06\* |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.03) |  |
| Born UK |  |  |  |  | -0.10\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.04) |
| Constant | -0.73\*\*\* | -1.31\*\*\* | -0.91\*\*\* | -0.82\*\*\* | -0.33\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.14) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.16) |
| Party fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| R-squared | 0.72 | 0.71 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 |
| Observations | 638 | 568 | 568 | 627 | 638 |
|  | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Christian | -0.10\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.04) |  |  |  |  |
| Routine job |  | -0.18\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.03) |  |  |  |
| Manufacturing |  |  | -0.12\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.03) |  |  |
| Leave pct |  |  |  | -0.22\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.04) |  |
| Leave dummy |  |  |  |  | -0.19\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.04) |
| Constant | -0.41\*\*\* | -0.47\*\*\* | -0.58\*\*\* | -0.22\*\*\* | -0.58\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Party fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| R-squared | 0.72 | 0.73 | 0.72 | 0.74 | 0.73 |
| Observations | 638 | 638 | 627 | 638 | 638 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Tab. A.4 Regression coefficients for right panel of Figure 2 in the article

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Pop density | -0.29\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.07) |  |  |  |  |
| Not deprived |  | -0.17\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.08) |  |  |  |
| University |  |  | -0.34\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.06) |  |  |
| Age 15-24 |  |  |  | -0.14\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.07) |  |
| Born UK |  |  |  |  | 0.27\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.06) |
| Constant | 0.01 | 0.48\* | 0.27\*\*\* | 0.19\*\* | -1.15\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.25) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.24) |
| Party fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| R-squared | 0.15 | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.15 |
| Observations | 638 | 568 | 568 | 627 | 638 |
|  | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Christian | 0.18\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.06) |  |  |  |  |
| Routine job |  | 0.35\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.06) |  |  |  |
| Manufacturing |  |  | 0.28\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.06) |  |  |
| Leave pct |  |  |  | 0.31\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.06) |  |
| Leave dummy |  |  |  |  | 0.33\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.07) |
| Constant | -0.60\*\*\* | -0.56\*\*\* | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.80\*\*\* | -0.30\*\*\* |
|  | (0.20) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.16) | (0.07) |
| Party fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| R-squared | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.16 |
| Observations | 638 | 638 | 627 | 638 | 638 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Running a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and a White’s test, we realized that regressing the scores on the first dimension on the percentage of Leave votes interacted with the electoral margin in the 2017 election posed a problem of heteroskedasticity. This time, instead of simply modifying the standard errors for more robust evidence, we modelled the errors according to our theoretical expectations. We thus ran a heteroskedastic regression in which the variance around our estimate depended on the date of first election, with senior MPs (i.e. smaller year) expected to have larger freedom margins and thus greater variance. This is the first model below, which produced the marginal effect for the interaction plotted in figure 3 in the article. The likelihood-ratio test confirms that this specification fits the data better than a usual OLS with constant variance.

Tab. A.5 Heteroskedastic regressions. Model (1) for figure 3 in the article, and model (2) reversing the interaction and variance modelling (s.e. in parentheses)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| First dimension |  |  |  |  |
| Leave pct | -1.31\*\*\* | (0.25) | -43.72 | (33.81) |
| Electoral margin | -0.01\*\* | (0.00) |  |  |
| Leave pct \* Electoral margin | 0.02\*\* | (0.01) |  |  |
| Year of first election |  |  | -0.01 | (0.01) |
| Leave pct \* Year of first election |  |  | 0.02 | (0.02) |
| Constant | -0.06 | (0.13) | 19.57 | (18.28) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Ln (variance) |  |  |  |  |
| Year of first election | -0.05\*\*\* | (0.01) |  |  |
| Electoral margin |  |  | 0.01\* | (0.00) |
| Constant | 89.23\*\*\* | (14.56) | -1.95\*\*\* | (0.11) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Party fixed effects | ✓ | ✓ |
| Observations | 638 | 638 |

We also inverted the variables, as in model (2), interacting the year of election and modelling the variance though the electoral margin. However, the coefficients, the likelihood-ratio test, and the marginal effects (plotted below in figure A.9) are not as interesting

Fig. A.9 Marginal effect of Leave pct at different years of election (model (2) reported and described above)

# Responsiveness and compromise

The following tables report some regression models complementing the analysis of the electoral costs of non-responsiveness and of compromise reported in the article. There we observed that the average cost of non-responsiveness was larger for Labour incumbents compared to Tories, while Leave preferences were negatively associated with the support of the former and positively with that of the latter.

When we further separate the analysis into each combination between incumbent party and Brexit result (see Table A.6), we notice some interesting result. In Leave districts, and all the other factors considered, the proportion of Leave votes in the 2016 referendum still has the lion’s share in explaining the 2019 change in support: the coefficient of that variable is highly significant, and its magnitude is larger than the average effects reported in models 2 and 3 in the article’s Table 2. The association is so important that it partially absorbs the effect of non-responsiveness, which is now less systematic and comparatively smaller in magnitude (models 1 and 2).

Table A.6 Non-responsiveness and electoral consequences

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Delta votesLeave Con districts | Delta votesLeave Lab districts | Delta votesRemain Con districts | Delta votesRemain Lab districts |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-responsiveness | -1.20\*\*\* | -1.82\* | -1.73\*\* | -0.49 |
|  | (0.34) | (1.02) | (0.72) | (1.75) |
| Leave vote | 48.32\*\*\* | -51.82\*\*\* | 22.90\*\*\* | -3.95 |
|  | (2.34) | (5.69) | (4.55) | (4.48) |
| Margin 2017 | -0.12\*\*\* | -0.03 | -0.16\*\*\* | -0.02 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Change turnout  | -0.13 | -0.12 | -0.53\*\*\* | -0.36\*\*\* |
|  | (0.10) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.07) |
| Constant | -21.67\*\*\* | 20.56\*\*\* | -8.85\*\*\* | -2.55 |
|  | (1.37) | (3.44) | (1.94) | (1.79) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| R-squared | 0.76 | 0.43 | 0.58 | 0.19 |
| Observations | 236 | 151 | 80 | 103 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Interestingly, that association is weaker in Remain districts, and disappears when the incumbent is a Labour MP (model 4). In these circumstances, one could expect responsiveness to gain relevance, but that happened only, and partially, with Tory incumbents (model 3). On the contrary, a variable that becomes always systematic is the difference in turnout levels. The circumstances of the 2019 election, with Boris Johnson most likely succeeding in finally delivering Brexit, may have reduced in Remain districts the punishment of incumbents not capable to prevent that outcome thanks to alienation and selective abstentions: a hypothesis that our data cannot however definitely confirm.

Table A.7 Compromise and electoral consequences

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | Delta Con votes Confirmed | Delta Con votes Substituted |
|  |  |  |
| First dimension | 0.22 | -1.59\*\*\* |
|  | (0.29) | (0.52) |
| Leave vote | 43.37\*\*\* | 47.67\*\*\* |
|  | (1.89) | (6.10) |
| Margin 2017 | -0.13\*\*\* | -0.16\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Change turnout | -0.27\*\* | 0.10 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.20) |
| Constant | -18.73\*\*\* | -21.24\*\*\* |
|  | (1.02) | (3.09) |
|  |  |  |
| R-squared | 0.81 | 0.77 |
| Observations | 267 | 49 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

In Table A.7 (model 1 and 2) we note that when Conservative MPs decided to step down and not compete in the 2019 election - something that happened mostly due to the divergences between the new prime minister and those Tories wanting to avoid a hard exit at all costs - the party suffered a larger electoral retreat due to the compromising attitude of its representatives compared to districts in which the incumbent Tory MP was confirmed as candidate. However, our analysis cannot confirm that this happened because the electorate did not support the new candidates, or because it sanctioned the behaviour of their previous representatives by changing their vote.

# Extended list of EU divisions

*Division Date Title*

291 09/01/2019 Timescale for Setting Out Plan for Negotiations if Proposed Agreement for the UK Withdrawal from the EU is Rejected by MPs - 9 Jan 2019 at 13:57

292 15/01/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) Act - Withdrawal Agreement - Right for the UK to Unilaterally Terminate the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland -

293 15/01/2019 European Union Withdrawal Agreement - 15 Jan 2019 at 19:00

296 16/01/2019 Motion of No Confidence in Her Majesty's Government - 16 Jan 2019 at 19:00

307 29/01/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 - Consideration of Government Plans - Options to Prevent Withdrawal Without Agreement - Referendum

308 29/01/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 — Delay Withdrawal — Rule-Out No-Deal

309 29/01/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 - Prioritising Debate on Withdrawal in the House of Commons - Enabling MPs to Amend Motions -

310 29/01/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 - Seek to Delay Withdrawal Until 31 December 2019 if no Withdrawal Agreement by 26 February 2019 -

311 29/01/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 - Seek to Delay Withdrawal if no Withdrawal Agreement by 26 February 2019 - 29 Jan 2019 at 19:00

312 29/01/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 - Reject Leaving the European Union Without a Withdrawal Agreement - 29 Jan 2019 at 19:00

313 29/01/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 - Avoid Hard Border on the Island of Ireland Without the UK Remaining Aligned to the EU Customs Union 331 14/02/2019 UK Withdrawal from the EU - Withdrawal Agreement - Ireland - 14 Feb 2019 at 17:00

332 14/02/2019 UK Withdrawal from the EU - Delay of up-to Three Months - Ireland - 14 Feb 2019 at 17:00

333 14/02/2019 UK Withdrawal from the EU - Withdrawal Agreement - Ireland - 14 Feb 2019 at 17:00

345 27/02/2019 UK Withdrawal from the EU - Negotiation Aims - 27 Feb 2019 at 18:48

346 27/02/2019 UK Withdrawal from the EU - Leaving Without a Withdrawal Agreement - 27 Feb 2019 at 18:48

347 27/02/2019 UK Withdrawal from the EU - Consideration of a Short Delay if Withdrawal Agreement and Leaving Without an Agreement Rejected -

354 12/03/2019 European Union Withdrawal Agreement - 12 Mar 2019 at 19:00

357 13/03/2019 UK Withdrawal from the European Union - Leaving Without an Agreement - 13 Mar 2019 at 19:00

358 13/03/2019 UK Withdrawal from the European Union - 13 Mar 2019 at 19:00

359 13/03/2019 UK Withdrawal from the European Union - Leaving Without a Withdrawal Agreement - 13 Mar 2019 at 19:00

360 14/03/2019 UK Withdrawal from the EU - Delay Withdrawal to Enable a Further Referendum on Withdrawal to be Held - 14 Mar 2019 at 17:00

361 14/03/2019 UK Withdrawal from the EU - Preventing Delay Withdrawing Continuing Beyond 30 June 2019 - 14 Mar 2019 at 17:00

362 14/03/2019 UK Withdrawal from the EU - Consider Cross Party Proposal To Seek Majority Support in the House of Commons - 14 Mar 2019 at 17:00

363 14/03/2019 UK Withdrawal from the EU - Delay to Avoid Leaving Without a Withdrawal Agreement - 14 Mar 2019 at 17:00

364 14/03/2019 UK Withdrawal from the European Union - Delay Withdrawal if MPs Agree Withdrawal Agreement - 14 Mar 2019 at 17:00

373 25/03/2019 Business of the House - Precedence for Government Business - 25 Mar 2019 at 21:47

374 25/03/2019 Business of the House - Enable MPs to Decide Between Leaving the European Union Without a Withdrawal Agreement and Delaying Withdrawal –

375 25/03/2019 Business of the House - Precedence for Government Business - 25 Mar 2019 at 22:14

385 27/03/2019 Business of the House - Proceedure for Consideration of the UK's Withdrawal From the EU - 27 Mar 2019 at 15:00

386 27/03/2019 EU Withdrawal and Future Relationship - Motion (B) - Leave Without a Deal on 12 April 2019 - 27 Mar 2019 at 22:56

387 27/03/2019 EU Withdrawal and Future Relationship - Motion (D) - Retain Freedom of Movement of People and Goods via EFTA Membership -

388 27/03/2019 EU Withdrawal and Future Relationship - Motion (H) - Retain Relatively Free Movement of People and Goods via EFTA - No Customs Union with EU

389 27/03/2019 EU Withdrawal and Future Relationship - Motion (J) - Customs Union - 27 Mar 2019 at 22:56

390 27/03/2019 EU Withdrawal and Future Relationship - Motion (K) - Labourâ€™s Alternative Plan - 27 Mar 2019 at 22:56

391 27/03/2019 EU Withdrawal and Future Relationship - Motion (L) - Opportunity to Decide Between Remaining In the EU and Leaving Without a Withdrawal agree

392 27/03/2019 EU Withdrawal and Future Relationship Votes - (M) - Public Vote on Withdrawal Agreement and Framework for Future Relationship with the EU

393 27/03/2019 EU Withdrawal and Future Relationship - Motion (O) - Seeking Preferential Trade Arrangements To Apply In Absense of Withdrawal Agreement

394 27/03/2019 Draft European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Exit Day) (Amendment) Regulations 2019- Delay Withdrawal from 29 March to 12 April or 22 May

395 29/03/2019 UK Withdrawal from the European Union - Withdrawal - Withdrawal Agreement - 29 Mar 2019 at 14:11

396 01/04/2019 Business of the House - Proceedure for Consideration of the UK's Withdrawal From the EU - 1 Apr 2019 at 16:35

397 01/04/2019 EU Withdrawal and Future Relationship - Motion (C) Customs Union - 1 Apr 2019 at 22:53

398 01/04/2019 Motion (D) Common Market 2.0 - Retain Relatively Free Movement of People and Goods via EFTA Membership - External Tariff Alignment with EU

399 01/04/2019 EU Withdrawal and Future Relationship - Motion (E) Confirmatory Public Vote on Withdrawal Agreement and Framework for Future Relationship

400 01/04/2019 Motion (G) Parliamentary Supremacy - MPs to Decide Between Remaining in the EU and Leaving Without a Withdrawal Agreement

402 03/04/2019 Business of the House - Consideration of Motions on EU Withdrawal on 8 April 2019 - 3 Apr 2019 at 17:00

403 03/04/2019 Business of the House - European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill - MPs to Decide if to Delay UK Withdrawal from EU - 3 Apr 2019 at 17:00

404 03/04/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill - Second Reading - 3 Apr 2019 at 19:00

405 03/04/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill - Clause 1 - Consideration by MPs of Any Withdrawal Delay Proposed by the European Council –

406 03/04/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill - Clause 1 - Directions for the Prime Minister - 3 Apr 2019 at 22:11

407 03/04/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill - Clause 1 - No Delay to Withdrawal Beyond 22 May 2019 - 3 Apr 2019 at 22:11

408 03/04/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill - New Clause 4 - Amendability of Motions - 3 Apr 2019 at 22:11

409 03/04/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill - Third Reading - 3 Apr 2019 at 22:11

410 08/04/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill - Clause 1 - Arrangements for Moving a Motion on Seeking to Delay the UK Leaving the EU

411 08/04/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill - Clause 1 - Length of Delay to the UK Leaving the EU - 8 Apr 2019 at 22:00

412 08/04/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill - Clause 1 - Alternative Date for the UK Leaving the EU - 8 Apr 2019 at 22:00

413 09/04/2019 Exiting the European Union - Delay Until 30 June 2019 - 9 Apr 2019 at 17:12

420 12/06/2019 Business of the House - Consideration of Motions on EU Withdrawal on 25 June 2019 - 12 Jun 2019 at 16:25

430 09/07/2019 Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill — Progress report

431 09/07/2019 Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill — Progress report

432 09/07/2019 Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill — Progress report

436 18/07/2019 Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill — Progress reports

437 18/07/2019 Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill — Progress reports

439 03/09/2019 Consideration of the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill — Requiring Prime Minister to Seek Delay To Withdrawal

440 04/09/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill — Second Reading — Requiring Prime Minister to Seek Delay to Withdrawal

441 04/09/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill — Clause 1 — Purpose of Delaying Withdrawal — Content of Bill to Implement Withdrawl Agreement

442 04/09/2019 European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 6) Bill — Third Reading — Requiring Prime Minister to Seek Delay to Withdrawal

443 04/09/2019 Early Parliamentary General Election

444 09/09/2019 Provision of Information on Both the Suspension of Parliament and Planning for Leaving the EU Without a Withdrawal Agreement

445 09/09/2019 Early Parliamentary General Election

1 15/10/2019 Draft Environment (Legislative Functions from Directives) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

2 17/10/2019 Business of the House (Saturday 19 October) — Amendments and Votes

3 19/10/2019 European Union Withdrawal — Withhold Approval of Withdrawal Agreement Unless and Until it is Implemented in UK Law

4 22/10/2019 European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill — Second Reading

5 22/10/2019 European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill (Programme) — Completion of Consideration Within Three Sitting Days

6 23/10/2019 Draft Freedom of Establishment and Free Movement of Services (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

7 23/10/2019 Draft Statutory Auditors, Third Country Auditors and International Accounting Standards (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

8 23/10/2019 Draft Financial Services (Miscellaneous) (Amendment) (EU Exit) (No. 3) Regulations 2019

11 24/10/2019 Queen's Speech — Programme for Government — Leaving the European Union

12 24/10/2019 Queen's Speech — Programme for Government

13 28/10/2019 Early Parliamentary General Election

14 29/10/2019 Business of the House — Arrangements for Consideration of the Early Parliamentary General Election Bill — Enable Opposition

15 29/10/2019 Early Parliamentary General Election Bill — Clause 1 — Election Date — 9 vs 12 December

16 29/10/2019 Early Parliamentary General Election Bill — Third Reading

# References

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1. Actually, in the first round, all the Scottish Nationalists refrained from voting in favour of both motions. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)