**Online appendix**

This is the online appendix for the article:

Martin Bækgaard (forthcoming). “Own-Party Bias: How Voters Evaluate Electoral Outcomes”, which has been accepted for publication in *Government and Opposition*.

This appendix reports a series of robustness checks using multi-level ordered logit regression (Table A1-A3). Since multi-level ordered logit regression does not allow for respondent fixed effects and robust standard errors, they are estimated using respondent controls and regular standard errors. Table A4 moreover report on a test of whether own-party bias varies significantly in size across different objective winner-loser configurations. Finally, Table A5-A6 tests the combined impact of pre-election expectations and own party evaluations.

Table A1: Robustness check of Table 2 using ordered logit specifications.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | All parties | Own party only | Other parties than own party |
|  |  |  |  |
| Own party | 0.803\*\*(0.133) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Party attachment | -0.129\*\*(0.0429) | 0.329\*(0.129) | -0.128\*\*(0.0433) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Own party X Party attachment | 0.438\*\*(0.128) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Female | 0.216\*\*(0.0590) | 0.442\*(0.184) | 0.197\*\*(0.0624) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Age (years) | -0.00578\*\*(0.00208) | 0.0153\*(0.00657) | -0.00799\*\*(0.00221) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Long education | -0.0279(0.0640) | -0.228(0.192) | -0.00138(0.0680) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Political knowledge | 0.0865\*\*(0.0227) | 0.0952(0.0730) | 0.0873\*\*(0.0240) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Intercept | 0.0541(0.0325) |  | 0.0671(0.0367) |
| Specification | Multi-level ordered logit | Ordered logit | Multi-level ordered logit |
| *Party fixed effects* | YES | YES | YES |
| *N (observations)* | 5357 | 581 | 4776 |
| *N (respondents)* | 621 | 581 | 619 |
| Chi2 | 2995.01\*\* | 565.84\*\* | 2638.90\*\* |

Notes: Entries are regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses; \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01.

Table A2: Robustness check of Table 3 using multi-level ordered logit specifications

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | High political knowledge | Low political knowledge | High political knowledge | Low political knowledge | High political knowledge | Low political knowledge |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Own party | 1.247\*\*(0.163) | 1.126\*\*(0.113) | 1.006\*\*(0.168) | 0.771\*\*(0.158) | 0.914\*\*(0.157) | 0.780\*\*(0.146) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 0.280\*(0.111) | 0.199\*\*(0.0710) | 0.133(0.0758) | 0.165\*(0.0709) | 0.144\*(0.0681) | 0.159\*(0.0642) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age (years) | -0.00382(0.00370) | -0.00704\*\*(0.00259) | -0.00390(0.00244) | -0.00622\*(0.00260) | -0.00400(0.00219) | -0.00574\*(0.00236) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long education | -0.00415(0.117) | -0.0508(0.0784) | -0.0282(0.0805) | -0.0138(0.0784) | -0.0221(0.0725) | -0.0252(0.0712) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political knowledge | -0.0421(0.115) | 0.132\*\*(0.0381) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Party attachment | -0.0722(0.0707) | -0.103\*(0.0514) | -0.0473(0.0542) | -0.132\*(0.0539) | -0.0453(0.0491) | -0.125\*(0.0495) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Own party X Party attachment |  |  | 0.123(0.160) | 0.512\*\*(0.159) | 0.104(0.151) | 0.424\*\*(0.151) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Winner of seats and government |  |  |  |  | 5.597\*\*(0.135) | 4.542\*\*(0.121) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Winner of government; loser of seats |  |  |  |  | 1.011\*\*(0.103) | 0.674\*\*(0.0974) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Winner of seats; loser of government |  |  |  |  | 3.931\*\*(0.115) | 3.053\*\*(0.102) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Intercept | 0.0905(0.0608) | 0.0516(0.0397) | 0.0641(0.0412) | 0.0600(0.0409) | 6.06e-32(5.43e-17) | 4.00e-32(5.45e-17) |
| *Party fixed effects* | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO | NO |
| *N* | 1869 | 3488 | 3453 | 3488 | 3453 | 3488 |
| adj. *R*2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: Entries are multi-level ordered logit regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses; \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01.

Table A3: Robustness check of Table 4 using multi-level ordered logit

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | All observations | All observations | Losers of seats and government | Losers of government and winners of seats | Winner of government and loser of seats | Winners of seats and government |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Own party | 1.136\*\*(0.0921) | 1.046\*\*(0.0848) | 1.237\*\*(0.351) | 1.302\*\*(0.156) | 1.314\*\*(0.217) | 2.426\*\*(0.401) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 0.215\*\*(0.0590) | 0.196\*\*(0.0536) | 1.014\*\*(0.264) | 0.238(0.140) | 0.404\*\*(0.151) | -0.318(0.202) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age (years) | -0.00586\*\*(0.00209) | -0.00542\*\*(0.00189) | -0.0155(0.00920) | 0.0111\*(0.00496) | -0.0368\*\*(0.00551) | 0.000487(0.00711) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long education | -0.0282(0.0641) | -0.0305(0.0583) | -0.583\*(0.290) | -0.175(0.152) | 0.153(0.164) | 0.583\*\*(0.224) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political knowledge | 0.0862\*\*(0.0228) | 0.0644\*\*(0.0207) | -0.493\*\*(0.0993) | 0.349\*\*(0.0538) | -0.195\*\*(0.0573) | 0.578\*\*(0.0823) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Party attachment | -0.0848\*(0.0409) | -0.0787\*(0.0373) | -0.579\*\*(0.183) | -0.238\*(0.0961) | 0.115(0.104) | 0.111(0.139) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Winner of seats and government |  | 5.033\*\*(0.102) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Winner of government; loser of seats |  | 0.834\*\*(0.0804) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Winner of seats; loser of government |  | 3.471\*\*(0.0864) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Party fixed effects* | YES | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| *N (observations)* | 5357 | 5357 | 1170 | 1777 | 1210 | 1200 |
| *N (respondents)* | 621 | 621 | 600 | 617 | 618 | 619 |
| Chi2 | 2990.99\*\* | 2949.16\*\* | 72.86\*\* | 399.15\*\* | 232.10 | 206.48\*\* |

Notes: Entries are multi-level ordered logit regression estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses; \**p* < 0.05; \*\* *p* < 0.01.

Table A4: Testing if ambiguity differences in own-party bias are significant

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| Own party (A) | 0.201(0.114) | 0.452\*\*(0.0460) |
|  |  |  |
| Winner of seats and government (B) | (absorbed by party fixed effects) | *
 |
|  |  |  |
| Winner of government; loser of seats (C) | (absorbed by party fixed effects) | (absorbed by party fixed effects) |
|  |  |  |
| Winner of seats; loser of government (D) | (absorbed by party fixed effects) | (absorbed by party fixed effects) |
|  |  |  |
| Loser of seats and government (E) | - | (absorbed by party fixed effects) |
|  |  |  |
| A X B | 0.251\*(0.121) | Ref. |
|  |  |  |
| A X C | 0.391\*(0.153) | 0.140(0.112) |
|  |  |  |
| A X D | 0.421\*\*(0.130) | 0.169\*(0.0753) |
|  |  |  |
| A X E | Ref. | -0.251\*(0.121) |
|  |  |  |
| Intercept | 3.129\*\*(0.0373) | 3.129\*\*(0.0373) |
| *Respondent fixed effects* | YES | YES |
| *N (observations)* | 7136 | 7136 |
| *N (respondents)* | 831 | 831 |
| *R*2 within | 0.66 | 0.66 |
| *R*2 between | 0.11 | 0.11 |
| *R*2 overall | 0.63 | 0.63 |

Notes: Entries are regression estimates from multi-level linear regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses; \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01. The only difference between the two models is a change in reference category for the ambiguity dummies.

Table A5: The combined impact of pre-election expectations and own party evaluations

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Expectations measured for: | The Social Democrats | The Liberal Party | The Social Democrats | The Liberal Party |
| Female | 0.245\*\*(0.0872) | 0.352\*\*(0.0884) | 0.231\*\*(0.0872) | 0.358\*\*(0.0886) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age (years) | 0.00264(0.00305) | -0.0224\*\*(0.00316) | 0.00271(0.00305) | -0.0224\*\*(0.00316) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Long education | -0.209\*(0.0931) | 0.190\*(0.0942) | -0.214\*(0.0932) | 0.184(0.0940) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Political knowledge | 0.112\*\*(0.0331) | -0.103\*\*(0.0345) | 0.112\*\*(0.0331) | -0.103\*\*(0.0345) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Party attachment | -0.102(0.0626) | 0.126\*(0.0623) | -0.0913(0.0629) | 0.119(0.0627) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Pre-electionexpectations  | 0.482\*\*(0.0917) | 0.258\*\*(0.0903) | 0.559\*\*(0.102) | 0.227\*(0.0945) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Own Party | 0.589\*\*(0.106) | 0.529\*\*(0.123) | 0.814\*\*(0.187) | 0.290(0.276) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Pre-electionExpectations X Own Party |  |  | -0.357(0.228) | 0.316(0.308) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Intercept | 2.528\*\*(0.182) | 3.154\*\*(0.196) | 2.499\*\*(0.184) | 3.170\*\*(0.197) |
| *N* | 614 | 617 | 614 | 617 |
| adj. *R*2 | 0.148 | 0.161 | 0.150 | 0.161 |

Notes: Entries are OLS regression estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses; \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01.

Models 1 and 2 provide the main estimates for own-party bias and pre-election expectations when we focus on either the evaluation of the electoral outcome for The Social Democrats or The Liberal Party. We see that while pre-election expectations indeed matter, the difference between the evaluation of one’s own party and other parties is at about the same level as in other analyses in the paper. Models 3 and 4 introduce interaction terms to test whether differences in evaluations are more pronounced among those with higher expectations about electoral success. In both cases, the interaction terms are clearly statistically insignificant. While the findings thus overall suggest that confirming prior expectations is of importance to electoral outcome assessments, they also suggest that the more positive evaluations of one’s own party is unaffected by pre-election expectations.

Table A6: Robustness check of Table 5 using ordered logit specifications

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Expectations measured for: | The Social Democrats | The Liberal Party | The Social Democrats | The Liberal Party |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 0.475\*\*(0.153) | 0.616\*\*(0.153) | 0.459\*\*(0.154) | 0.625\*\*(0.153) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age (years) | 0.00565(0.00541) | -0.0385\*\*(0.00554) | 0.00595(0.00542) | -0.0385\*\*(0.00554) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Long education | -0.374\*(0.165) | 0.326\*(0.164) | -0.385\*(0.166) | 0.321(0.164) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Political knowledge | 0.183\*\*(0.0578) | -0.174\*\*(0.0578) | 0.182\*\*(0.0578) | -0.174\*\*(0.0578) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Party attachment | -0.144(0.106) | 0.238\*(0.104) | -0.126(0.107) | 0.229\*(0.105) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Pre-electionexpectations  | 0.816\*\*(0.163) | 0.531\*\*(0.157) | 0.943\*\*(0.182) | 0.487\*\*(0.165) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Own party | 1.155\*\*(0.201) | 0.885\*\*(0.213) | 1.565\*\*(0.330) | 0.532(0.447) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Pre-electionExpectations X Own Party |  |  | -0.640(0.406) | 0.456(0.509) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *N* | 614 | 617 | 614 | 617 |
| Chi2 | 110.94\*\* | 118.83\*\* | 113.43\*\* | 119.63\*\* |

Notes: Entries are ordered logit regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses; \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01.