**Online Appendix**

**“Render unto Caesar Just a Little Bit Longer: The Relationship Between Constitutional Reforms and Executive Survival”**

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***Government & Opposition***

**Table A1: Restricted Model for the Complete Sample**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | CoefficientRisk of Removal | Hazard RatioRisk of Removal |
| VARIABLES |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | -0.14\* | 0.87\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -0.64\*\*\* | 0.53\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 2,449 | 2,449 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A2: Survival Analysis of the Executive (Timing of Constitutional Change)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Coefficient | Hazard Ratio |
| VARIABLES | Risk of Removal | Risk of Removal |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | -0.22\* | 0.81\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.10) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -1.23\*\*\* | 0.29\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.03) |
| Contested Leader | 0.20 | 1.22 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.17) |
| Timing of Constitutional Change | -0.17\*\*\* | 0.84\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Entry Age (36-60) | 0.52\* | 1.69\* |
|  | (0.29) | (0.49) |
| Entry Age (61-88) | 0.80\*\*\* | 2.22\*\*\* |
|  | (0.30) | (0.66) |
| Government System | -0.13 | 0.88 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.10) |
| Authoritarian Regime | -0.69\*\*\* | 0.50\*\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.08) |
| Hybrid Regime | -0.39\*\*\* | 0.68\*\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.10) |
| Conflict | 0.00\*\*\* | 1.00\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Economic Growth | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.95\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | -0.38\*\* | 0.69\*\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.12) |
| Asia | -0.32\* | 0.72\* |
|  | (0.19) | (0.13) |
| Eastern Europe | 0.21 | 1.24 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.24) |
| Latin America | 0.34\*\* | 1.40\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.20) |
| Middle East & N. Africa | -0.67\*\*\* | 0.51\*\*\* |
|  | (0.23) | (0.12) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 531 | 531 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A3: Survival Analysis of the Executive (Presidentialism Index)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Coefficient | Hazard Ratio |
| VARIABLES | Risk of Removal | Risk of Removal |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | -0.23\* | 0.80\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.09) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -0.89\*\*\* | 0.41\*\*\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.04) |
| Presidentialism Index | -0.99\*\*\* | 0.37\*\*\* |
|  | (0.28) | (0.10) |
| Government System | -0.06 | 0.94 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Authoritarian Regime | -0.43\*\* | 0.65\*\* |
|  | (0.19) | (0.12) |
| Hybrid Regime | -0.07 | 0.94 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.15) |
| Conflict | 0.00\*\*\* | 1.00\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Economic Growth | -0.04\*\*\* | 0.96\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.00) |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 0.13 | 1.14 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.20) |
| Asia | 0.08 | 1.08 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.20) |
| Eastern Europe | 0.53\*\*\* | 1.70\*\*\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.31) |
| Latin America | 0.59\*\*\* | 1.81\*\*\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.27) |
| Middle East & N. Africa | -0.51\*\* | 0.60\*\* |
|  | (0.25) | (0.15) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 533 | 533 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A4: Survival Analysis of the Executive (with Entry Age Interactions)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | CoefficientRisk of Removal | Hazard RatioRisk of Removal |
| VARIABLES |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | -0.64 | 0.53 |
|  | (0.47) | (0.25) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -0.55\*\*\* | 0.58\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.02) |
| Contested Leader | 0.06 | 1.06 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.13) |
| Entry Age (36-60) | 0.22 | 1.24 |
|  | (0.29) | (0.35) |
| Entry Age (61-88) | 0.44 | 1.55 |
|  | (0.29) | (0.45) |
| Contested\*Altered Term Limit | 0.21 | 1.23 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.27) |
| Entry Age (36-60) \*Altered Term Limit | 0.28 | 1.32 |
|  | (0.47) | (0.62) |
| Entry Age (61-88) \*Altered Term Limit | 0.56 | 1.74 |
|  | (0.49) | (0.85) |
| Government System | -0.21\*\* | 0.81\*\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.07) |
| Authoritarian Regime | -0.51\*\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.08) |
| Hybrid Regime | 0.07 | 1.10 |
|  | (0.09) | (0.10) |
| Conflict | 0.00\* | 1.00\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Economic Growth | -0.04\*\*\* | 0.96\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | -0.08 | 0.92 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.12) |
| Asia | 0.03 | 1.03 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Eastern Europe | 0.41\*\*\* | 1.50\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.18) |
| Latin America | 0.30\*\*\* | 1.36\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.16) |
| Middle East & N. Africa | -0.34\* | 0.71\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.13) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,045 | 1,045 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A5: Survival Analysis of the Executive (with Presidentialism Index Interaction)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Coefficient | Hazard Ratio |
| VARIABLES | Risk of Removal | Risk of Removal |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | -0.19 | 0.83 |
|  | (0.24) | (0.20) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -0.89\*\*\* | 0.41\*\*\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.04) |
| Presidentialism Index | -0.97\*\*\* | 0.38\*\*\* |
|  | (0.29) | (0.11) |
| Presidentialism Index \*Altered Term Limit | -0.08 | 0.92 |
|  | (0.42) | (0.39) |
| Government System | -0.06 | 0.94 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Authoritarian Regime | -0.43\*\* | 0.65\*\* |
|  | (0.19) | (0.12) |
| Hybrid Regime | -0.07 | 0.94 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.15) |
| Conflict | 0.00\*\*\* | 1.00\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Economic Growth | -0.04\*\*\* | 0.96\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 0.13 | 1.13 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.20) |
| Asia | 0.08 | 1.08 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.20) |
| Eastern Europe | 0.52\*\*\* | 1.69\*\*\* |
|  | (0.19) | (0.31) |
| Latin America | 0.59\*\*\* | 1.80\*\*\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.27) |
| Middle East & N. Africa | -0.51\*\* | 0.60\*\* |
|  | (0.25) | (0.15) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 533 | 533 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A6: Survival Analysis of the Executive for Democracies and Dictatorships**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Coefficient  | Coefficient |
| VARIABLES | Risk of Removal (Non-Democracies) | Risk of Removal (Democracies) |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | -0.28\* | -0.02 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.14) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -0.81\*\*\* | -0.53\*\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.05) |
| Contested Leader | 0.39\*\* | 0.01 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.14) |
| Entry Age (36-60) | 0.83\*\*\* | -1.11\*\*\* |
|  | (0.26) | (0.34) |
| Entry Age (61-88) | 1.06\*\*\* | -0.76\*\* |
|  | (0.32) | (0.34) |
| Government System | 0.04 | -0.36\*\*\* |
|  | (0.21) | (0.10) |
| Conflict | 0.00\*\*\* | 0.00 |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Economic Growth | -0.02\*\* | -0.05\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 0.02 | -0.13 |
|  | (0.49) | (0.15) |
| Asia | -0.14 | 0.11 |
|  | (0.52) | (0.13) |
| Eastern Europe | 0.11 | 0.53\*\*\* |
|  | (0.62) | (0.12) |
| Latin America | 0.40 | 0.32\*\* |
|  | (0.49) | (0.13) |
| Middle East & N. Africa | -0.59 | 0.57\*\* |
|  | (0.50) | (0.25) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 296 | 795 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A7: Survival Analysis of the Executive (Using Geddes et al.’s (2014) Regime Categories)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | CoefficientRisk of Removal | Hazard RatioRisk of Removal |
| VARIABLES |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | -0.40\*\* | 0.67\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.11) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -0.55\*\*\* | 0.58\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.03) |
| Contested Leader | -0.33\* | 0.72\* |
|  | (0.17) | (0.12) |
| Entry Age (36-60) | -0.23 | 0.79 |
|  | (0.34) | (0.27) |
| Entry Age (61-88) | 0.08 | 1.08 |
|  | (0.34) | (0.37) |
| Government System | -0.40\*\*\* | 0.68\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.08) |
| Military | 0.20 | 1.23 |
|  | (0.24) | (0.30) |
| Monarchy | -1.15\*\*\* | 0.32\*\*\* |
|  | (0.40) | (0.13) |
| Oligarchy | 0.35 | 1.42 |
|  | (0.45) | (0.64) |
| Party | -0.74\*\*\* | 0.47\*\*\* |
|  | (0.19) | (0.09) |
| Personalist | 1.14\*\*\* | 3.13\*\*\* |
|  | (0.25) | (0.79) |
| Mixed Autocracy | 0.07 | 1.07 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.24) |
| Non-autocracy (others) | 0.54\*\*\* | 1.71\*\*\* |
|  | (0.17) | (0.29) |
| Conflict | 0.00\*\*\* | 1.00\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Economic Growth | -0.03\*\*\* |  0.97\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 0.13 | 1.14 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.24) |
| Asia | 0.15 | 1.15 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.17) |
| Eastern Europe | 0.80\*\*\* | 2.22\*\*\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.28) |
| Latin America | 0.59\*\*\* | 1.80\*\*\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.27) |
| Middle East & N. Africa | 0.23 | 1.25 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.28) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 629 | 629 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A8: Survival Analysis of the Executive in Personalist Regimes (Restricted Model)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | CoefficientRisk of Removal | Hazard RatioRisk of Removal |
| VARIABLES |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | -0.05 | 0.95 |
|  | (0.39) | (0.37) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -1.12\*\*\* | 0.33\*\*\* |
|  | (0.21) | (0.07) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 54 | 54 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A9: Survival Analysis of the Executive in Party Regimes (Restricted Model)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | CoefficientRisk of Removal | Hazard RatioRisk of Removal |
| VARIABLES |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | -0.92\*\* | 0.40\*\* |
|  | (0.46) | (0.18) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -0.75\*\*\* | 0.47\*\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.06) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 73 | 73 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A10: Survival Analysis of the Executive in Military Regimes (Restricted Model)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | CoefficientRisk of Removal | Hazard RatioRisk of Removal |
| VARIABLES |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | 1.08\* | 2.95\* |
|  | (0.55) | (1.63) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -1.09\*\*\* | 0.33\*\*\* |
|  | (0.28) | (0.09) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 33 | 33 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A11: Survival Analysis of the Executive (Using Alternative Regime Type Variable)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | CoefficientRisk of Removal | Hazard RatioRisk of Removal |
| VARIABLES |
|  |  |  |
| Term Limit Alteration | -0.30\* | 0.74\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.12) |
| Constitutional Change Event | -0.57\*\*\* | 0.56\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.03) |
| Contested Leader | 0.07 | 1.07 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.16) |
| Entry Age (36-60) | -0.02 | 0.98 |
|  | (0.33) | (0.32) |
| Entry Age (61-88) | 0.23 | 1.26 |
|  | (0.34) | (0.43) |
| Government System | -0.38\*\*\* | 0.68\*\*\* |
|  | (0.12) | (0.08) |
| Autocracy (GWF) | -0.20 | 0.82 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.10) |
| Conflict | 0.00\*\*\* | 1.00\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Economic Growth | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.95\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 0.21 | 1.23 |
|  | (0.20) | (0.25) |
| Asia | 0.13 | 1.13 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.16) |
| Eastern Europe | 0.73\*\*\* | 2.07\*\*\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.27) |
| Latin America | 0.62\*\*\* | 1.85\*\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.27) |
| Middle East & N. Africa | -0.00 | 1.00 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.22) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 603 | 603 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1