*Online appendix for*

**Affective polarization and the populist radical right: Creating the hating?**

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**Appendix A Regression tables CSES**

Table 1. Interaction ingroup and outgroup (both party families)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
|  | b/se |
|  |  |
| Inparty (ref: Green) |  |
| *Mainstream left* | 0.904\*\*\* |
|  | (0.182) |
| *Mainstream right* | 1.686\*\*\* |
|  | (0.169) |
| *Populist radical left* | 1.009\*\* |
|  | (0.336) |
| *Populist radical right* | 5.600\*\*\* |
|  | (0.304) |
| Outparty (ref: PRR) |  |
| *Green* | 6.097\*\*\* |
|  | (0.241) |
| *Mainstream left* | 4.062\*\*\* |
|  | (0.222) |
| *Mainstream right* | 2.379\*\*\* |
|  | (0.206) |
| *Populist radical left* | 2.840\*\*\* |
|  | (0.390) |
| Mainstream left # Green | -3.320\*\*\* |
|  | (0.261) |
| Mainstream left # Mainstream left | 1.324\*\*\* |
|  | (0.217) |
| Mainstream left # Mainstream right | -1.004\*\*\* |
|  | (0.207) |
| Mainstream left # Populist radical left | -1.213\*\*\* |
|  | (0.245) |
| Mainstream right # Green | -5.428\*\*\* |
|  | (0.247) |
| Mainstream right # Mainstream left | -3.104\*\*\* |
|  | (0.215) |
| Mainstream right # Mainstream right | 0.301 |
|  | (0.204) |
| Mainstream right # Populist radical left | -2.973\*\*\* |
|  | (0.218) |
| Populist radical left # Green | -3.824\*\*\* |
|  | (0.436) |
| Populist radical left # Mainstream left | -2.131\*\*\* |
|  | (0.447) |
| Populist radical left # Mainstream right | -1.582\*\*\* |
|  | (0.329) |
| Populist radical left # Populist radical left | 2.736\*\*\* |
|  | (0.496) |
| Populist radical right # Green | -10.381\*\*\* |
|  | (0.407) |
| Populist radical right # Mainstream left | -7.888\*\*\* |
|  | (0.360) |
| Populist radical right # Mainstream right | -5.536\*\*\* |
|  | (0.341) |
| Populist radical right # Populist radical left | -6.115\*\*\* |
|  | (0.444) |
| Countries (ref: Austria) |  |
| *Belgium* | 0.649\* |
|  | (0.284) |
| *Bulgaria* | -1.058\*\* |
|  | (0.322) |
| *Croatia* | -0.142 |
|  | (0.212) |
| *Czech Republic* | 0.267 |
|  | (0.250) |
| *Denmark* | 0.601\*\* |
|  | (0.207) |
| *Estonia* | 0.242 |
|  | (0.209) |
| *Finland* | 0.822\*\*\* |
|  | (0.232) |
| *France* | 0.187 |
|  | (0.213) |
| *Germany* | 0.523\* |
|  | (0.254) |
| *Great Britain* | 0.172 |
|  | (0.235) |
| *Greece* | -0.619 |
|  | (0.376) |
| *Hungary* | -0.167 |
|  | (0.384) |
| *Iceland* | 0.334 |
|  | (0.228) |
| *Ireland* | 0.478+ |
|  | (0.270) |
| *Italy* | 0.234 |
|  | (0.214) |
| *Latvia* | -0.464 |
|  | (0.288) |
| *Lithuania* | 0.012 |
|  | (0.343) |
| *Netherlands* | 1.102\*\*\* |
|  | (0.233) |
| *Norway* | 1.099\*\*\* |
|  | (0.241) |
| *Poland* | -0.024 |
|  | (0.255) |
| *Portugal* | 0.419+ |
|  | (0.251) |
| *Romania* | -0.006 |
|  | (0.319) |
| *Slovakia* | 0.067 |
|  | (0.269) |
| *Slovenia* | -0.151 |
|  | (0.234) |
| *Spain* | -0.482 |
|  | (0.308) |
| *Sweden* | 0.734\*\* |
|  | (0.232) |
| *Switzerland* | 1.110\*\*\* |
|  | (0.211) |
| Intercept | 0.848\*\*\* |
|  | (0.244) |
| Level-2 (country-wave) |  |
| Intercept | -1.135\*\*\* |
|  | (0.081) |
| Level 1 (residual) |  |
| Intercept | 0.923\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) |


Table 2. Interaction ingroup (party families), outgroup (PRR vs rest) and ideological distance

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | b/se |
|  |  |
| Inparty is PRR (vs non-PRR) | -1.718\*\*\* |
|  | (0.098) |
| Outparty is PRR (vs non-PRR) | -2.320\*\*\* |
|  | (0.166) |
| Inparty is PRR X outparty is PRR | 5.207\*\*\* |
|  | (0.310) |
| Ideological distance | -0.511\*\*\* |
|  | (0.018) |
| Ingroup is PRR # Ideological distance | 0.181\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) |
| Outgroup is PRR # Ideological distance | 0.142\*\*\* |
|  | (0.034) |
| Ingroup is PRR # Outgroup is PRR # Ideological distance | 0.025 |
|  | (0.050) |
| Country (ref: Austria) |  |
| *Belgium* | 0.770\*\*\* |
|  | (0.220) |
| *Bulgaria* | -0.620\*\*\* |
|  | (0.181) |
| *Croatia* | 0.449\*\*\* |
|  | (0.132) |
| *Czech Republic* | 0.453\* |
|  | (0.195) |
| *Denmark* | 0.635\*\*\* |
|  | (0.135) |
| *Estonia* | 0.660\*\*\* |
|  | (0.135) |
| *Finland* | 0.715\*\*\* |
|  | (0.173) |
| *France* | 0.339\* |
|  | (0.156) |
| *Germany* | 0.375+ |
|  | (0.201) |
| *Great Britain* | 0.612\*\*\* |
|  | (0.150) |
| *Greece* | -0.513 |
|  | (0.332) |
| *Hungary* | 0.209 |
|  | (0.383) |
| *Iceland* | 0.654\*\*\* |
|  | (0.177) |
| *Ireland* | 0.348 |
|  | (0.231) |
| *Italy* | 0.728\*\*\* |
|  | (0.135) |
| *Latvia* | -0.022 |
|  | (0.153) |
| *Lithuania* | 0.497 |
|  | (0.377) |
| *Netherlands* | 1.081\*\*\* |
|  | (0.173) |
| *Norway* | 1.188\*\*\* |
|  | (0.174) |
| *Poland* | 0.352+ |
|  | (0.200) |
| *Portugal* | 0.763\*\*\* |
|  | (0.142) |
| *Romania* | 0.365 |
|  | (0.233) |
| *Slovakia* | 0.285 |
|  | (0.229) |
| *Slovenia* | 0.01 |
|  | (0.180) |
| *Spain* | -0.278 |
|  | (0.311) |
| *Sweden* | 0.868\*\*\* |
|  | (0.186) |
| *Switzerland* | 1.227\*\*\* |
|  | (0.140) |
| Intercept | 5.533\*\*\* |
|  | (0.149) |
| Level 2: election |  |
| Intercept | -1.139\*\*\* |
|  | (0.088) |
| Level 1: observation |  |
| Intercept | 0.974\*\*\* |
|  | (0.013) |
| N | 591687 |

Table 3 Interaction ingroup (party families), outgroup (PRR vs rest) and electoral success / incumbency

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
|  | b/se |
|  |  |
| Inparty (ref: Green) |  |
| *Mainstream left* | 0.267+ |
|  | (0.149) |
| *Mainstream right* | 0.164+ |
|  | (0.089) |
| *Populist radical left* | -0.255\* |
|  | (0.124) |
| *Populist radical right* | -1.417\*\*\* |
|  | (0.164) |
| Outparty (ref: non-PRR) |  |
| *PRR* | -3.388\*\*\* |
|  | (0.208) |
| Inparty X outparty (ref: Green X non-PRR) |  |
| *Mainstream left # PRR* | 0.781\* |
|  | (0.341) |
| *Mainstream right # PRR* | 0.544\* |
|  | (0.231) |
| *Populist radical left # PRR* | 1.327\*\*\* |
|  | (0.319) |
| *Populist radical right # PRR* | 7.533\*\*\* |
|  | (0.366) |
| Electoral support for PRR | 0.006 |
|  | (0.009) |
| *Mainstream left # Electoral succes of PRR* | -0.012+ |
|  | (0.006) |
| *Mainstream right # Electoral succes of PRR* | -0.013+ |
|  | (0.007) |
| *Populist radical left # Electoral succes of PRR* | 0.015 |
|  | (0.018) |
| *Populist radical right # Electoral succes of PRR* | -0.014+ |
|  | (0.007) |
| PRR # Electoral succes of PRR | 0.019+ |
|  | (0.011) |
| *Mainstream left # PRR # Electoral succes of PRR* | -0.005 |
|  | (0.011) |
| *Mainstream right # PRR # Electoral succes of PRR* | 0.016 |
|  | (0.012) |
| *Populist radical left # PRR # Electoral succes of PRR* | -0.035+ |
|  | (0.020) |
| *Populist radical right # PRR # Electoral succes of PRR* | -0.047\*\*\* |
|  | (0.014) |
| Outparty in government | -1.071\*\*\* |
|  | (0.156) |
| *Mainstream left # Outparty in government* | -1.162\*\*\* |
|  | (0.307) |
| *Mainstream right # Outparty in government* | -0.462\*\* |
|  | (0.162) |
| *Populist radical left # Outparty in government* | -0.243 |
|  | (0.271) |
| *Populist radical right # Outparty in government* | 0.933\*\*\* |
|  | (0.271) |
| Outparty is PRR # Outparty in government | 0.561 |
|  | (0.537) |
| *Mainstream left # PRR # Outparty in government* | 1.225\* |
|  | (0.590) |
| *Mainstream right # PRR # Outparty in government* | 0.201 |
|  | (0.646) |
| *Populist radical left # PRR # Outparty in government* | 0.685 |
|  | (0.600) |
| *Populist radical right # PRR # Outparty in government* | -2.645\*\* |
|  | (0.864) |
| Inparty is a coalition partner | -1.396\*\*\* |
|  | (0.221) |
| *Mainstream left # Inparty is a coalition partner* | -0.148 |
|  | (0.244) |
| *Mainstream right # Inparty is a coalition partner* | -0.08 |
|  | (0.250) |
| *Populist radical left # Inparty is a coalition partner* | -0.618 |
|  | (0.416) |
| *Populist radical right # Inparty is a coalition partner* | 0.772\*\* |
|  | (0.283) |
| Outparty is PRR # Inparty is a coalition partner | 1.820\*\*\* |
|  | (0.361) |
| *Mainstream left # PRR # Inparty is a coalition partner* | -0.369 |
|  | (0.467) |
| *Mainstream right # PRR # Inparty is a coalition partner* | -0.527 |
|  | (0.414) |
| *Populist radical left # PRR # Inparty is a coalition partner* | 0.494 |
|  | (0.662) |
| *Populist radical right # PRR # Inparty is a coalition partner* | -4.742\*\*\* |
|  | (0.679) |
| Outparty in government # Inparty is a coalition partner | 3.012\*\*\* |
|  | (0.397) |
| *Mainstream left # Outparty in government # Inparty is a coalition partner* | 1.210\*\* |
|  | (0.459) |
| *Mainstream right # Outparty in government # Inparty is a coalition partner* | 0.502 |
|  | (0.399) |
| *Populist radical left # Outparty in government # Inparty is a coalition partner* | 1.038 |
|  | (0.801) |
| *Populist radical right # Outparty in government # Inparty is a coalition partner* | -1.887\*\*\* |
|  | (0.513) |
| Outparty is PRR # Outparty in government # Inparty is a coalition partner | 4.952\*\*\* |
|  | (1.296) |
| *Mainstream left # PRR # Outparty in government # Inparty is a coalition partner* | -9.101\*\*\* |
|  | (1.654) |
| *Mainstream right # PRR # Outparty in government # Inparty is a coalition partner* | -7.262\*\*\* |
|  | (1.710) |
| *Populist radical left # PRR # Outparty in government # Inparty is a coalition partner* | -9.194\*\*\* |
|  | (1.538) |
| Ideological distance | -0.388\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) |
| Intercept | 6.119\*\*\* |
|  | (0.104) |
| Level 2: election |  |
| Intercept | -0.538\*\*\* |
|  | (0.067) |
| Level 1: observation |  |
| Intercept | 0.927\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) |
| N | 589354 |

**Appendix B Comparing PVV support in LISS, national elections, and European elections**

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**Appendix C Regression tables LISS**

Table 1 Predicting outparty sympathy (2008-2019), fixed effects for respondents

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
|  | b/se |
| Inparty (ref: mainstream right) |  |
| *Greens* | -2.512\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) |
| *Mainstream left* | -2.110\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |
| *Populist radical left* | -2.931\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) |
| *Populist radical right* | -2.319\*\*\* |
|  | (0.028) |
| Outparty (ref: mainstream right) |  |
| *Greens* | -2.114\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |
| *Mainstream left* | -1.681\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |
| *Populist radical left* | -2.157\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) |
| *Populist radical right* | -3.474\*\*\* |
|  | (0.026) |
| Greens # Greens | 5.994\*\*\* |
|  | (0.041) |
| Greens # Mainstream left | 3.548\*\*\* |
|  | (0.046) |
| Greens # Populist radical left | 4.221\*\*\* |
|  | (0.047) |
| Greens # Populist radical right | 0.432\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) |
| Mainstream left # Greens | 3.755\*\*\* |
|  | (0.037) |
| Mainstream left # Mainstream left | 4.674\*\*\* |
|  | (0.033) |
| Mainstream left # Populist radical left | 3.496\*\*\* |
|  | (0.039) |
| Mainstream left # Populist radical right | 0.466\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) |
| Populist radical left # Greens | 4.243\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) |
| Populist radical left # Mainstream left | 2.994\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) |
| Populist radical left # Populist radical left | 6.264\*\*\* |
|  | (0.036) |
| Populist radical left # Populist radical right | 1.932\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) |
| Populist radical right # Greens | 1.192\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) |
| Populist radical right # Mainstream left | 0.586\*\*\* |
|  | (0.047) |
| Populist radical right # Populist radical left | 2.352\*\*\* |
|  | (0.049) |
| Populist radical right # Populist radical right | 6.575\*\*\* |
|  | (0.044) |
| Intercept | 6.532\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) |

Table 2 Predicting outpartisan sympathy (2019)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
|  | b/se |
|  |  |
| Inparty (ref: mainstream right) |  |
| *Greens* | -2.512\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) |
| *Mainstream left* | -2.110\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |
| *Populist radical left* | -2.931\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) |
| *Populist radical right* | -2.319\*\*\* |
|  | (0.028) |
| Outparty (ref: mainstream right) |  |
| *Greens* | -2.114\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |
| *Mainstream left* | -1.681\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |
| *Populist radical left* | -2.157\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) |
| *Populist radical right* | -3.474\*\*\* |
|  | (0.026) |
| Greens # Greens | 5.994\*\*\* |
|  | (0.041) |
| Greens # Mainstream left | 3.548\*\*\* |
|  | (0.046) |
| Greens # Populist radical left | 4.221\*\*\* |
|  | (0.047) |
| Greens # Populist radical right | 0.432\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) |
| Mainstream left # Greens | 3.755\*\*\* |
|  | (0.037) |
| Mainstream left # Mainstream left | 4.674\*\*\* |
|  | (0.033) |
| Mainstream left # Populist radical left | 3.496\*\*\* |
|  | (0.039) |
| Mainstream left # Populist radical right | 0.466\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) |
| Populist radical left # Greens | 4.243\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) |
| Populist radical left # Mainstream left | 2.994\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) |
| Populist radical left # Populist radical left | 6.264\*\*\* |
|  | (0.036) |
| Populist radical left # Populist radical right | 1.932\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) |
| Populist radical right # Greens | 1.192\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) |
| Populist radical right # Mainstream left | 0.586\*\*\* |
|  | (0.047) |
| Populist radical right # Populist radical left | 2.352\*\*\* |
|  | (0.049) |
| Populist radical right # Populist radical right | 6.575\*\*\* |
|  | (0.044) |
| Intercept | 6.532\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) |

Table 3 Interaction with PVV electoral support and coalition inclusion

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
|  | b/se |
| Inparty (ref: mainstream right) |  |
| *Greens* | -2.512\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) |
| *Mainstream left* | -2.110\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |
| *Populist radical left* | -2.931\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) |
| *Populist radical right* | -2.319\*\*\* |
|  | (0.028) |
| Outparty (ref: mainstream right) |  |
| *Greens* | -2.114\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |
| *Mainstream left* | -1.681\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |
| *Populist radical left* | -2.157\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) |
| *Populist radical right* | -3.474\*\*\* |
|  | (0.026) |
| Greens # Greens | 5.994\*\*\* |
|  | (0.041) |
| Greens # Mainstream left | 3.548\*\*\* |
|  | (0.046) |
| Greens # Populist radical left | 4.221\*\*\* |
|  | (0.047) |
| Greens # Populist radical right | 0.432\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) |
| Mainstream left # Greens | 3.755\*\*\* |
|  | (0.037) |
| Mainstream left # Mainstream left | 4.674\*\*\* |
|  | (0.033) |
| Mainstream left # Populist radical left | 3.496\*\*\* |
|  | (0.039) |
| Mainstream left # Populist radical right | 0.466\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) |
| Populist radical left # 1.outparty\_clas | 4.243\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) |
| Populist radical left # Mainstream left | 2.994\*\*\* |
|  | (0.043) |
| Populist radical left # Populist radical left | 6.264\*\*\* |
|  | (0.036) |
| Populist radical left # Populist radical right | 1.932\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) |
| Populist radical right # 1.outparty\_clas | 1.192\*\*\* |
|  | (0.048) |
| Populist radical right # Mainstream left | 0.586\*\*\* |
|  | (0.047) |
| Populist radical right # Populist radical left | 2.352\*\*\* |
|  | (0.049) |
| Populist radical right # Populist radical right | 6.575\*\*\* |
|  | (0.044) |
| PVV in power | |
|  | |
| Mainstream right | |
|  | |
| PVV in power # Mainstream left | |
|  | |
| PVV in power # Mainstream right | |
|  | |
| PVV in power # Populist radical left | |
|  | |
| PVV in power # Populist radical right | |
|  | |
| Support for PVV | |
|  | |
| Mainstream left # Support for PVV | |
|  | |
| Mainstream right # Support for PVV | |
|  | |
| Populist radical left # Support for PVV | |
|  | |
| Populist radical right # Support for PVV | |
|  | |
| Intercept | 6.532\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) |

**Appendix D Robustness check: replication Figure 2 with distance on nativism (MARPOR) rather than left-right ideology**

