Online Appendices to "Local-Level Democratic Backsliding? The Consolidation of Aspiring Dominant-Party Regimes in Hungary and Poland" by Conor O'Dwyer and Matthew Stenberg in Government and Opposition.

	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4	Model A5	Model A6	Model A7	Model A8	Model A9
Population	-1.129**	0.591*	-0.216	-0.908*	0.637^{*}	-0.0697	-0.597	-0.846*	-0.715
(logged)	(0.365)	(0.277)	(0.176)	(0.388)	(0.288)	(0.189)	(0.591)	(0.396)	(0.473)
Unemployment	1.210	-0.496	0.108	1.910	-0.380	0.925	12.41	1.898	8.298
Rate	(7.087)	(3.376)	(2.560)	(7.030)	(3.398)	(2.592)	(11.34)	(7.106)	(8.286)
% Over 60 yrs old	-8.064	2.586	-2.466	-6.756	2.685	-1.892	-9.015	-6.293	-9.894
	(4.514)	(2.836)	(2.143)	(4.512)	(2.859)	(2.157)	(7.101)	(4.543)	(5.932)
Cuala Vaar-2	-0.123	0.116	-0.0649	-0.227	0.121	-0.113	0.133	-0.269	-0.261
Cycle Teal-2	(0.317)	(0.238)	(0.151)	(0.323)	(0.239)	(0.153)	(0.455)	(0.327)	(0.413)
Cuala Vaar-2		-0.108	-0.335		-0.0921	-0.338			
Cycle Teal-5		(0.269)	(0.239)		(0.271)	(0.239)			
Country-Hungory			1.913***			1.882^{***}			
Country—ITungary			(0.189)			(0.188)			
Dominant Party	3.676***	1.915***	2.706^{***}	3.602***	1.892^{***}	2.664***		3.532***	2.680^{***}
Incumbent	(0.326)	(0.240)	(0.161)	(0.325)	(0.243)	(0.162)		(0.322)	(0.419)
Number of				-0.128	-0.0480	-0.106*	-1.000***	-0.588***	-0.0873
Candidates				(0.0855)	(0.0723)	(0.0497)	(0.237)	(0.178)	(0.112)
Decided in 2nd							-2.373*	-1.283	
Round							(0.989)	(0.746)	
2 nd Round x							0 050**	0.525*	
Number of							(0.350)	(0.323)	
Candidates							(0.209)	(0.204)	
Constant	3.959*	-3.073*	-0.741	3.287	-3.123*	-1.079	3.477	4.119*	3.253
	(1.790)	(1.401)	(0.931)	(1.825)	(1.410)	(0.947)	(2.893)	(1.918)	(2.168)
Observations	1110	771	1881	1110	771	1881	1110	1110	544

Appendix A. Logistic Regression Coefficients (Dependent variable: win by dominant party).

Standard errors in parentheses p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001

Appendix B. Suburbs

Appendix B includes a dummy variable to indicate if a municipality is a suburb or not, to see if effects are driven by satellite municipalities tied to the politics of larger cities. If municipalities are listed by the OECD/Eurostat as being in a functional urban area (FUA) but are not the core city, then they are coded as 1. Core cities and municipalities outside the OECD/Eurostat's FUAs are coded as 0. The variable itself is not statistically significant and its inclusion has no substantial effects on the size or significance of our variables of interest.

	Model B1	Model B2	Model B3	Model B4	Model B5	Model B6	Model B7	Model B8	Model B9
Population	-1.128**	0.557^{*}	-0.239	-0.906*	0.603^{*}	-0.0936	-0.596	-0.844*	-0.721
(logged)	(0.365)	(0.281)	(0.177)	(0.388)	(0.292)	(0.190)	(0.591)	(0.396)	(0.472)
Unemployment	0.787	-1.108	-0.540	1.439	-0.960	0.324	10.61	1.388	7.797
Rate	(7.220)	(3.507)	(2.622)	(7.161)	(3.533)	(2.661)	(11.57)	(7.242)	(8.374)
% Over 60 yrs ald	-8.492	1.924	-3.244	-7.220	2.062	-2.600	-10.65	-6.797	-10.58
	(4.731)	(3.008)	(2.263)	(4.715)	(3.037)	(2.284)	(7.449)	(4.756)	(6.226)
Cycle Veer-2	-0.122	0.145	-0.0461	-0.227	0.148	-0.0947	0.132	-0.269	-0.259
Cycle Teal-2	(0.318)	(0.243)	(0.152)	(0.323)	(0.244)	(0.154)	(0.456)	(0.327)	(0.413)
Cuala Vaar-2		-0.0772	-0.304		-0.0644	-0.310			
Cycle Teal-5		(0.274)	(0.241)		(0.276)	(0.241)			
Country-Hungory			1.920^{***}			1.889^{***}			
Country—Inungary			(0.190)			(0.189)			
Dominant Party	3.676***	1.913***	2.702^{***}	3.601***	1.892***	2.662***		3.531***	2.677***
Incumbent	(0.326)	(0.240)	(0.160)	(0.326)	(0.244)	(0.161)		(0.322)	(0.419)
Number of				-0.129	-0.0445	-0.104*	-1.003***	-0.590***	-0.0863
Candidates				(0.0856)	(0.0725)	(0.0498)	(0.237)	(0.178)	(0.112)
Suburb	-0.0972	-0.143	-0.177	-0.109	-0.133	-0.156	-0.399	-0.116	-0.148
Suburb	(0.306)	(0.220)	(0.163)	(0.303)	(0.222)	(0.162)	(0.492)	(0.305)	(0.382)
Decided in 2nd							-2.389*	-1.292	
Round							(0.990)	(0.747)	
2 nd Round x							0.860**	0.526**	
Number of							(0.269)	(0.320)	
Candidates							(0.209)	(0.204)	
Constant	4.091*	-2.730	-0.406	3.428	-2.802	-0.773	4.024	4.276*	3.485
	(1.839)	(1.490)	(0.978)	(1.867)	(1.502)	(0.998)	(2.978)	(1.964)	(2.246)
Observations	1110	771	1881	1110	771	1881	1110	1110	544

Table B. Logistic Regression Coefficients	(Dependent variable: win b	by dominant party).
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Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Appendix C. Number of Viable Candidates (receiving over 10% of the vote)

Appendix C replaces the 'Number of Candidates' independent variable with a variable counting the number of candidates receiving more than 10% of the vote in the first round, to assess if the effect of number of candidates was skewed by unviable candidates. Effects on our variables of interest are small; however, the number of candidates variable *gains* significance in Models 4 (all Polish elections) and 9 (second round elections only) when limited to viable candidates.

	Model C1	Model C2	Model C3	Model C4	Model C5	Model C6	Model C7	Model C8	Model C9
Population	-1.129**	0.591*	-0.216	-1.000**	0.600^{*}	-0.184	-1.066	-1.058**	-0.792
(logged)	(0.365)	(0.277)	(0.176)	(0.367)	(0.279)	(0.178)	(0.581)	(0.379)	(0.437)
Unemployment	1.210	-0.496	0.108	2.575	-0.432	0.828	13.41	2.564	9.188
Rate	(7.087)	(3.376)	(2.560)	(7.260)	(3.400)	(2.624)	(11.94)	(7.524)	(8.403)
% Over 60 yrs ald	-8.064	2.586	-2.466	-6.868	2.710	-1.950	-11.32	-7.388	-9.389
	(4.514)	(2.836)	(2.143)	(4.622)	(2.870)	(2.189)	(7.514)	(4.813)	(5.989)
Cuala Vaar-2	-0.123	0.116	-0.0649	-0.220	0.125	-0.0894	0.343	-0.174	-0.221
Cycle Teal-2	(0.317)	(0.238)	(0.151)	(0.326)	(0.240)	(0.153)	(0.470)	(0.338)	(0.410)
Cycle Veer=2		-0.108	-0.335		-0.107	-0.364			
Cycle Year-5		(0.269)	(0.239)		(0.270)	(0.242)			
Country -Una comy			1.913***			1.878***			
Country-Hungary			(0.189)			(0.191)			
Dominant Party	3.676***	1.915***	2.706^{***}	3.676***	1.901***	2.685***		3.698***	2.724***
Incumbent	(0.326)	(0.240)	(0.161)	(0.334)	(0.243)	(0.163)		(0.342)	(0.421)
Number of Viable				-0.384**	-0.0611	-0.209*	-1.898***	-1.117***	-0.403*
Candidates				(0.145)	(0.127)	(0.0853)	(0.430)	(0.328)	(0.196)
Decided in 2nd							-2.191	-0.725	
Round							(1.409)	(1.057)	
2 nd Round x							1 242*	0.621	
Number of Viable							1.242	(0.021)	
Candidates							(0.309)	(0.380)	
Constant	3.959^{*}	-3.073*	-0.741	4.202^{*}	-2.983*	-0.427	7.035^{*}	5.879**	4.344*
	(1.790)	(1.401)	(0.931)	(1.804)	(1.420)	(0.947)	(3.019)	(2.000)	(2.176)
Observations	1110	771	1881	1110	771	1881	1110	1110	544

Table C. Logistic Regression Coefficients (Dependent variable: win by dominant party).

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Appendix D. Larger cities with list-based Council elections

Larger cities (population over 20,000 in Poland and over 10,000 in Hungary) have different systems for electing City Councils, using party list voting. While mayoral elections are not conducted using party list votes, the use of list votes for council elections could have secondary impacts on mayoral elections by impacting the salience of partisanship. To assess the impact of this additional difference in electoral rules, the models were run again with two different robustness checks. Table D1 includes only cities with populations above this threshold. There are three notable effects of this. First, population loses significance across the models – perhaps unsurprising, given that we only include large municipalities. Second, there is a significant negative effect associated with the 3rd cycle year in Hungary, although dominant party candidates are still more likely to win. Third, the significance of number of candidates decreases; however, its interaction with elections reaching the second round remains significant. This suggests that the absolute number of candidates has a reduced impact in larger municipalities; however, the clarifying effect provided by the second round is still in effect.

	Model D1	Model D2	Model D3	Model D4	Model D5	Model D6	Model D7	Model D8	Model D9
Population	-1.010	0.922	0.240	-1.221	0.819	0.142	-1.391	-1.153	-1.195
(logged)	(0.878)	(0.485)	(0.347)	(0.924)	(0.500)	(0.375)	(1.422)	(0.913)	(1.035)
Unemployment	22.26	-3.612	3.359	22.03	-3.845	3.081	59.39 [*]	22.25	19.79
Rate	(14.50)	(5.526)	(4.781)	(14.70)	(5.574)	(4.831)	(23.65)	(14.46)	(17.25)
0/Oxer 60 xm ald	-11.88	-1.427	-6.151	-13.48	-1.017	-6.321	-13.45	-10.51	-16.38
% Over 60 yrs. old	(7.986)	(5.146)	(3.982)	(8.401)	(5.188)	(4.046)	(12.14)	(8.311)	(10.60)
Cuala Vaar-2	-0.358	0.0321	-0.316	-0.228	0.0289	-0.290	0.659	-0.305	-0.414
Cycle Teal-2	(0.576)	(0.354)	(0.240)	(0.605)	(0.355)	(0.244)	(0.835)	(0.602)	(0.780)
Cycle Veer=2		-0.884*	-1.032**		-0.961*	-1.054**			
Cycle Year=5		(0.431)	(0.385)		(0.438)	(0.389)			
Country-IIon corre			2.518***			2.585***			
Country=Hungary			(0.321)			(0.340)			
Dominant Party	3.458***	2.515***	2.909***	3.516***	2.542***	2.926***		3.420***	2.510***
Incumbent	(0.497)	(0.347)	(0.247)	(0.510)	(0.349)	(0.251)		(0.502)	(0.683)
Number of				0.107	0.0949	0.0550	-0.688	-0.506	0.197
Candidates				(0.131)	(0.109)	(0.0751)	(0.405)	(0.320)	(0.162)
Decided in 2nd							-4.194*	-2.982*	
Round							(1.842)	(1.393)	
2 nd Round x							0.074*	0.762*	
Number of							(0.974)	(0.703)	
Candidates							(0.443)	(0.340)	
Constant	3.360	-3.524	-2.312	4.106	-3.483	-2.105	4.954	5.355	4.639
	(4.008)	(2.196)	(1.656)	(4.154)	(2.213)	(1.694)	(6.508)	(4.227)	(4.794)
Observations	530	391	921	530	391	921	530	530	277

Table D1. Logistic Regression Coefficients in cities above party-list threshold (Dependent variable: win by dominant party).

Standard errors in parentheses

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The results in Table D2 approach the question in a slightly different way, including a dummy variable, where 1 is a city above the electoral threshold (20,000 in Poland, 10,000 in Hungary) for party-list Council voting, and 0 is a city beneath that threshold. In this specification, we can see that the effect of population similarly goes away almost entirely, with the exception of the Hungary specific models. This is not surprising given the significant multicollinearity between population and cities meeting the electoral threshold. The threshold variable itself is not statistically significant in any model. In this formulation, findings for number of candidates and the effect of the second round directly correspond to those seen in the main models in the text and Appendix A, suggesting that there our results are not driven by a statistically significant association between the use of a party list for council elections and the likelihood of the nationally dominant party candidate winning the mayoral election.

	Model D1B	Model D2B	Model D3B	Model D4B	Model D5B	Model D6B	Model D7B	Model D8B	Model D9B
Population	-1.052	0.804^{*}	0.0124	-0.836	0.845^{*}	0.160	-0.537	-0.817	-0.861
(logged)	(0.543)	(0.396)	(0.261)	(0.558)	(0.403)	(0.272)	(0.845)	(0.567)	(0.686)
Unemployment	1.169	-0.717	-0.144	1.872	-0.604	0.665	12.39	1.886	8.464
Rate	(7.085)	(3.356)	(2.552)	(7.028)	(3.379)	(2.585)	(11.34)	(7.107)	(8.334)
% Over 60 yrs old	-8.070	2.396	-2.567	-6.765	2.495	-1.999	-9.030	-6.300	-9.936
	(4.514)	(2.813)	(2.130)	(4.512)	(2.838)	(2.145)	(7.105)	(4.544)	(5.946)
Cycle Vear=?	-0.123	0.114	-0.0655	-0.226	0.119	-0.113	0.134	-0.268	-0.263
	(0.317)	(0.237)	(0.151)	(0.322)	(0.238)	(0.152)	(0.455)	(0.327)	(0.414)
Cycle Vear-3		-0.117	-0.340		-0.101	-0.343			
		(0.268)	(0.238)		(0.270)	(0.238)			
Country-Hungary			1.976***			1.945***			
Country-Hungary			(0.198)			(0.197)			
Dominant Party	3.675***	1.939***	2.715^{***}	3.601***	1.916^{***}	2.673***		3.532***	2.686^{***}
Incumbent	(0.326)	(0.239)	(0.160)	(0.325)	(0.243)	(0.161)		(0.322)	(0.421)
Number of				-0.127	-0.0463	-0.106*	-0.999****	-0.588***	-0.0882
Candidates				(0.0854)	(0.0720)	(0.0494)	(0.237)	(0.178)	(0.112)
Party List Council	-0.0710	-0.233	-0.239	-0.0667	-0.229	-0.240	-0.0572	-0.0267	0.132
Election Threshold	(0.374)	(0.302)	(0.206)	(0.370)	(0.304)	(0.206)	(0.575)	(0.373)	(0.443)
Decided in 2nd							-2.373*	-1.282	
Round							(0.989)	(0.746)	
2 nd Round x							0.858**	0.524^{*}	
Number of							(0.269)	(0.224)	
Candidates							(0.20)	(0.204)	
Constant	3.665	-3.769 [*]	-1.574	3.009	-3.805^{*}	-1.917	3.247	4.006	3.820
	(2.356)	(1.680)	(1.164)	(2.382)	(1.690)	(1.183)	(3.706)	(2.478)	(2.907)
Observations	1110	771	1881	1110	771	1881	1110	1110	544

Table D2. Logistic Regress	ion Coefficients (Dep	endent variable: win	by dominant party)
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Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Appendix E. Urban-rural gmina

Appendix E assesses if urban-rural gmina are driving the findings in Poland (there is no analogous category in Hungary, so only Poland-specific models are included) using a dichotomous variable for local government units with this status. We find no effect for the urban-rural gmina, and the inclusion of the variable does not substantively affect the significance or size of other variables.

	Model E1	Model E4	Model E7	Model E8	Model E9
Population	-1.207**	-0.992*	-1.010	-0.921*	-0.846
(logged)	(0.398)	(0.416)	(0.648)	(0.423)	(0.507)
Unemploy-	1.691	2.432	14.29	2.349	8.168
ment Rate	(7.196)	(7.149)	(11.57)	(7.206)	(8.203)
% Over 60 yrs.	-8.872	-7.627	-12.91	-7.032	-11.02
old	(4.766)	(4.745)	(7.528)	(4.752)	(6.064)
Cuala Vaar-2	-0.101	-0.206	0.257	-0.250	-0.227
Cycle Teal-2	(0.322)	(0.327)	(0.466)	(0.331)	(0.411)
Dominant	3.677***	3.600***		3.528***	2.621***
Party	(0.330)	(0.330)		(0.326)	(0.420)
Incumbent	· · ·	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	***		
Number of		-0.132	-1.012	-0.594	-0.0886
Candidates		(0.0864)	(0.240)	(0.180)	(0.111)
Urban-Rural	-0.134	-0.156	-0.806	-0.136	-0.239
Gmina	(0.284)	(0.281)	(0.453)	(0.281)	(0.335)
Decided in 2 nd			-2.444*	-1.312	
Round			(1.002)	(0.753)	
2 nd Round x			0.962**	0.520**	
Number of			0.802	0.550	
Candidates			(0.272)	(0.206)	
Constant	4.510 [*]	3.903	6.549	4.671*	4.244
Constant	(2.112)	(2.125)	(3.435)	(2.207)	(2.570)
Observations	1109	1109	1109	1109	544

Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001