**Supplementary Materials for “Pathways to Power in Authoritarian Regimes: Civil Service, Multipartyism, and Legislative Selection in Cameroon” *Government & Opposition***

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**Appendix A: Summary Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Obs. (N)** | **Clusters (n)** | **Overall Mean** | **Overall SD** | **Min.** | **Max.** |
| Renomination | 966 | 662 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Career Civil Servant | 923 | 637 | 0.22 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 |
| Businessperson | 923 | 637 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 |
| Professional Occupation | 966 | 637 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Service in Executive Branch | 966 | 662 | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| Locally Elected | 966 | 662 | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |
| Finance Committee | 966 | 662 | 0.17 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| Legislative Leadership | 966 | 662 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Population Density (Log) | 966 | 662 | 3.83 | 1.58 | -0.78 | 8.34 |
| Ethnic Heterogeneity | 966 | 662 | 0.92 | 0.79 | 0 | 2 |
| Term | 966 | 662 | 1.72 | 0,23 | 0 | 8 |
| Single Member District | 620 | 498 | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| Regime Stronghold | 620 | 498 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Age Elected | 966 | 662 | 43.32 | 9.0 | 22 | 72 |
| Education Level | 966 | 662 | 4.61 | 1/66 | 1 | 8 |
| Gender | 966 | 662 | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 |
| Traditional Title | 966 | 662 | 0.10 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |

**Appendix B: Detailed Distribution of Occupational Sector (1973-2019)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Occupational Sector** | **1973** | **1978** | **1983** | **1988** | **1992** | **1997** | **2002** | **2007** | **2013** |
| Agriculture | 8% | 8% | 4% | 3% | 0% | 5% | 2% | 2% | 1% |
| Architect | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Banking | 1% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 3% | 1% | 2% | 1% |
| Business | 5% | 4% | 10% | 16% | 20% | 26% | 35% | 37% | 31% |
| Civil/Public Service | 34% | 37% | 34% | 26% | 32% | 26% | 24% | 26% | 29% |
| Clergy | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 0% |
| Clerical / Worker | 1% | 1% | 0% | 3% | 2% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 1% |
| Consultant | 1% | 2% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 2% |
| Economist | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 1% |
| Education | 31% | 33% | 35% | 30% | 25% | 14% | 16% | 12% | 15% |
| Engineer | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 4% | 6% | 8% | 3% |
| Legal Professional | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 3% | 1% | 4% | 3% |
| Media | 1% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 1% |
| Medical Professional | 8% | 5% | 3% | 8% | 10% | 11% | 6% | 3% | 3% |
| Military/Police | 0% | 0% | 0% | 2% | 1% | 2% | 1% | 0% | 1% |
| Non-Profit | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 0% |
| Other | 0% | 0% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 1% |
| Scientist / Researcher | 0% | 0% | 2% | 2% | 3% | 4% | 3% | 2% | 3% |
| Unknown | 12% | 11% | 9% | 2% | 2% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 3% |

**Appendix C: Occupational Background, Multipartyism, and Legislative Renomination**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | Baseline | Control for Multiparty | Interaction with Multiparty | Single Party Era | Multiparty Era |
| Career Civil Servant | 1.20 | 1.20 | 0.67 | 0.86 | 2.06\*\* |
|  | (0.24) | (0.24) | (0.22) | (0.31) | (0.57) |
| Businessperson | 1.43 | 1.43 | 1.92 | 2.02 | 1.61 |
|  | (0.31) | (0.31) | (1.05) | (1.27) | (0.41) |
| Multiparty Era |  | 0.52\* | 0.39\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.17) | (0.15) |  |  |
| Civil Servant x Multiparty |  |  | 2.56\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (1.08) |  |  |
| Business x Multiparty |  |  | 0.79 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.46) |  |  |
| Service in Executive Branch | 2.20\* | 2.20\* | 2.37\* | 1.62 | 3.49\* |
|  | (0.84) | (0.84) | (0.92) | (1.04) | (1.82) |
| Locally Elected | 2.88\*\*\* | 2.88\*\*\* | 2.92\*\*\* | 4.86\*\* | 2.86\*\*\* |
|  | (0.76) | (0.76) | (0.77) | (2.92) | (0.90) |
| Finance Committee | 2.09\*\*\* | 2.09\*\*\* | 2.06\*\*\* | 3.13\*\* | 1.76\* |
|  | (0.44) | (0.44) | (0.44) | (1.25) | (0.47) |
| Legislative Leader | 2.92\*\*\* | 2.92\*\*\* | 2.94\*\*\* | 2.24 | 3.58\*\*\* |
|  | (0.75) | (0.75) | (0.75) | (1.15) | (1.11) |
| Department Population Density (log) | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.71\*\* | 1.08 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Ethnic Heterogeneity of Department | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.03 | 0.82 | 1.28 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.16) | (0.20) |
| Term | 1.02 | 1.02 | 1.06 | 0.90 | 1.96 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.27) | (0.34) | (0.90) |
| Term^2 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 1.01 | 0.85 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.08) |
| Age Elected | 0.96\*\*\* | 0.96\*\*\* | 0.96\*\*\* | 1.01 | 0.94\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Education Level | 1.07 | 1.07 | 1.09 | 1.01 | 1.09 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.12) | (0.07) |
| Gender | 0.82 | 0.82 | 0.83 | 1.50 | 0.72 |
|  | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.72) | (0.22) |
| Traditional Title | 1.57 | 1.57 | 1.58 | 3.28 | 1.01 |
|  | (0.55) | (0.55) | (0.56) | (2.21) | (0.46) |
| Single Member District |  |  |  |  | 2.12\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.78) |
| Regime Stronghold |  |  |  |  | 0.95 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.24) |
| Constant | 6.57\*\* | 6.57\*\* | 7.11\*\* | 6.02 | 0.86 |
|  | (4.25) | (4.25) | (4.66) | (7.09) | (0.71) |
| Prob>Chi2 | 151.84\*\*\* | 151.84\*\*\* | 154.18\*\*\* | 54.70\*\*\* | 98.56\*\*\* |
| *Ψ(2)* | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.42 | 0.50 | 0.42 |
| Observations | 909 | 909 | 909 | 304 | 605 |
| Number of groups | 57 | 57 | 57 | 42 | 57 |

*Note:* Multi-level mixed effects logistics regression. Odds ratio of legislative renomination by the CPDM is reported. Grouping variables are department (level 1) and MP (level 2). All models include controls for Year. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

**Appendix D: Classifying Occupational Sector**

The classification of occupational sectors is based on the categories used by other scholarly work on African legislatures (Mattes and Mozaffar 2016, Hornsby 1989, Koter 2017), with further sub-categories based upon the available reports from the Interparliamentary Union database (Union 2018). Legislators were coded according to what their *primary occupation* was, as well as what their *starting* and *ending occupations* were prior to their first election. Given some ambiguity in job titles, occupational designations also required reference to secondary sources. For civil service positions, titles were cross referenced with an available index of public sector jobs. If these positions fell largely outside of actual administration (e.g. primary school teacher, agricultural technician), they were classified under other occupational categories. For business occupations, names were cross-referenced with data on corporations from *Africa South of the Sahara* and Cameroon’s Chamber of Commerce, *Groupement Inter-Patronal Du Cameroun* (GIGAM).

Determinations about seniority under specific occupational categories were based on a number of criteria. First, for civil service positions information regarding the class (A, B, C, D) and degree of position (1st, 2nd, 3rd) was consulted, as well as evidence of whether the individual held decision-making authority over an aspect of government. Second, for business occupations, if an individual could not be tied to a recognizable enterprise (e.g. reporting a generic “trader” or “economic operator” as their occupation), they are considered *junior business*. Third, for specialized professions a distinction is made between senior roles that require extensive advanced training (generally the equivalent of a JD/MD/PhD) versus petty roles that required less advanced training (generally the equivalent of an MA or advanced technical degree).

**Table 1** Occupational Categories and Examples of Occupations Reported

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Occupational Category** | **Occupational Sub-Category** | **Occupation Examples** |
| Civil Service | Administration | Administrative Officer  Executive Officer  Superintendent  Foreign Affairs Secretary  Labor Controller  Railway Supervisor  Inspector of Sports  PTT Officer  Education Officer  Inspector of Education  Court Registrar/Administrator  Magistrate  Foreign Affairs Attaché  Fonctionnaire  Department Head  Director/Deputy Director |
| Civil Service | Executive | Secretary-General  Deputy Minister  Minister  Assistant Cabinet Secretary  Cabinet Secretary  Governor  Prefect/Sub-Prefect  Cooperative Manager |
| Civil Service | Financial Control | Customs Controller  Customs Official  Import Inspector  Inspector of Trade  Port Administrator  Revenue/Tax Inspector  Receiver of Finance  Bursar/Treasurer  Financial/Treasury Controller |
| Civil Service | Territorial Administration | Deputy Prefect/Sub-Prefect  Divisional Officer  Municipal Officer/Secretary  Government Delegate to Department/Region  Departmental/Regional Inspector  General Secretary of Urban Community  Superintendent |
| Business | Finance | Banker  Bank Manager |
| Business | Infrastructure/Natural Resources | Cocoa/Sugar Exporter  Building/Public Works  Logistics Company  Oil Production/Distribution  Real Estate  Development/Construction Company  Rural Development  Stevedore  Timber Production/Distribution |
| Business | Large Corporation (identified in public record) | Beer Distribution  Hotel/Hospitality/Tourism  Media  Manufacturing/Textiles |
| Business | Small Business | Executive Officer  Consultant  Businessman/Economic Operator  Trader  Mill Owner  Small Agricultural Enterprise |
| Professional | Petty Professional | Accountant  Nurse/Assistant Nurse  Veterinary Technician  Agricultural Technician  Forest Technician |
| Professional | Senior Professional | Architect  Engineer  Barrister/Lawyer/Solicitor  Dentist  Doctor/Surgeon  Economist  Veterinarian  Scientist/Researcher |
| Agriculture/Farming | Agriculture/Farming | Breeder  Cultivator  Farmer  Planter |
| Education | Education | Career Advisor/Vocational Counselor/Tutor  Primary School Teacher  Headmaster  Physical Education and Sports Teacher  Secondary School Teacher  Youth Instructor |
| Clerk/Worker | Clerk/Worker | Clerical Assistant  Clerical Officer  Office Agent  Secretary/Typist  Driver |
| Other | Other | Clergy/Pastor  Military/Police  Mixed Career  Media/Journalist  Non-Profit  Housewife  Student |

**Appendix E: Comparative Data on Legislative Occupational Composition**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Occupation | Nigeria (2007) | CAR (2005) | Gambia (2002) | Uganda (2006) | Burkina Faso (2002) | Congo, Rep (2007) | Mali (2007) | Senegal (2001) | Djibouti (2008) |
| Business | 14% | 10% | 13% | 3% | 10% | 17% | 7% | 17% | 11% |
| Civil Servants | 9% | 18% | 23% | 14% | 45%\* | 0% | 17% | 6% | 63% |
| Educators | 11% | 21% | 25% | 14% |  | 22% | 21% | 25% | 6% |
| Legal Professionals | 12% | 3% | 0% | 10% | 0% | 4% | 3% | 12% | 3% |
| Medical Professionals | 2% | 4% | 2% | 3% | 0% | 4% | 1% | 0% | 3% |
| Scientists/Researchers | 6% | 5% | 0% | 4% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% |
| Engineers/PC Experts | 4% | 0% | 6% | 2% | 0% | 10% | 1% | 17% | 0% |
| Bankers | 7% | 7% | 8% | 11% | 0% | 4% | 3% | 0% | 0% |
| Economists | 3% | 3% | 0% | 3% | 0% | 0% | 6% | 0% | 0% |
| Architects | 1% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 0% | 0% |
| Media | 3% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 3% | 1% | 2% | 3% |
| Consultant | 1% | 0% | 0% | 2% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% |
| Liberal Profession | 0% | 21% | 0% | 1% | 26% | 0% | 34% | 0% | 0% |
| Farming/Agriculture | 1% | 6% | 12% | 3% | 0% | 0% | 3% | 2% | 0% |
| Military/Police | 0% | 0% | 0% | 2% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 5% |
| Clerical | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% |
| Other | 0% | 2% | 12% | 11% | 19% | 10% | 6% | 4% | 6% |
| Unknown | 22% | 0% | 0% | 14% | 0% | 24% | 2% | 16% | 0% |

*Sourc*e:(Union 2018). *Notes*: \*includes educators; measures of civil/public servants include social and development workers.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Occupation | Benin  (1991) | Benin  (2015) |
| Business | 8% | 27% |
| Civil/Public Servants (excl. customs officials) | 20% | 12% |
| Customs Officials | 0% | 8% |
| Educators | 13% | 3% |
| Legal Professionals | 30% | 5% |
| Medical Professionals |  |  |
| Academics | 27% | 16% |
| Engineers/PC Experts | 13% | 12% |

*Source*:(Koter 2017)

**Appendix F: Alternative Multi-Level Model Specifications**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Two Level  (MP-Year) | Three Level  (Department-Year-MP) | Four Level  (Region-Department-MP-Year) |
| Career Civil Servant | 0.72 | 0.66 | 0.66 |
|  | (0.23) | (0.22) | (0.22) |
| Multiparty Era | 0.48\* | 0.43\* | 0.42\* |
|  | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| Civil Servant x Multiparty | 2.33\* | 2.59\* | 2.52\* |
|  | (0.94) | (1.09) | (1.05) |
| Businessperson | 2.03 | 2.17 | 2.29 |
|  | (1.04) | (1.14) | (1.21) |
| Business x Multiparty | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.66 |
|  | (0.36) | (0.37) | (0.38) |
| Service in Executive Branch | 2.51\* | 2.69\* | 2.77\*\* |
|  | (0.93) | (1.03) | (1.05) |
| Locally Elected | 2.91\*\*\* | 2.99\*\*\* | 3.00\*\*\* |
|  | (0.75) | (0.79) | (0.79) |
| Finance Committee | 1.96\*\* | 1.97\*\*\* | 2.03\*\*\* |
|  | (0.40) | (0.41) | (0.43) |
| Legislative Leader | 3.05\*\*\* | 3.19\*\*\* | 3.15\*\*\* |
|  | (0.75) | (0.80) | (0.79) |
| Department Population Density (log) | 1.00 | 1.01 | 0.98 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Ethnic Heterogeneity of Department | 1.05 | 1.03 | 1.04 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Term | 1.16 | 1.06 | 1.06 |
|  | (0.27) | (0.26) | (0.26) |
| Term^2 | 0.96 | 0.97 | 0.98 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Age Elected | 0.94\*\*\* | 0.94\*\*\* | 0.95\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.01) |
| Education Level | 1.07 | 1.08 | 1.10 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Gender | 0.77 | 0.79 | 0.84 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.21) |
| Traditional Title | 1.71 | 1.62 | 1.71 |
|  | (0.57) | (0.56) | (0.59) |
| Constant | 13.96\*\*\* | 12.33\*\*\* | 10.54\*\*\* |
|  | (8.48) | (8.00) | (6.84) |
| *Ψ (MP)* | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| *Ψ(2) (Department)* |  | 0.36 | 0.15 |
| *Ψ(2) (Region)* |  |  | 0.29 |
| Observations | 923 | 923 | 923 |
| Number of groups | 637 | 637/57) | 10/59/637 |
| Prob > chi2 | 170.9\*\*\* | 165.38\*\*\* | 162.9\*\*\* |

*Note:* Multi-level mixed effects logistic regression. Odds ratio of legislative renomination by the CPDM is reported. Grouping in Model 1 is MP (level 1) and year (level 2). Grouping in Model 2 is Department (level 1), MP (level 2), Year (level 3). Grouping in Model 3 is Region (level 1), Department (level2), MP (level 3), year (level 4). All models include controls for Year. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

**Appendix G: Alternative Measures of Socio-Economic Development**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Mud Floors | No Electricity | All Measures |
| Career Civil Servant | 1.90\* | 1.94\* | 1.92\* |
|  | (0.51) | (0.52) | (0.52) |
| Businessperson | 1.67\* | 1.65\* | 1.59 |
|  | (0.42) | (0.42) | (0.40) |
| Service in Executive Branch | 3.71\*\* | 3.80\*\* | 3.69\*\* |
|  | (1.89) | (1.94) | (1.86) |
| Locally Elected | 2.98\*\*\* | 2.95\*\*\* | 2.79\*\*\* |
|  | (0.93) | (0.92) | (0.87) |
| Finance Committee | 1.89\* | 1.84\* | 1.89\* |
|  | (0.50) | (0.49) | (0.51) |
| Legislative Leader | 3.69\*\*\* | 3.69\*\*\* | 3.79\*\*\* |
|  | (1.14) | (1.14) | (1.17) |
| % of Homes with Mud Floor | 3.40\* |  | 11.34 |
|  | (1.76) |  | (14.29) |
| % of Homes without Electricity |  | 2.18 | 0.40 |
|  |  | (1.10) | (0.53) |
| Department Population Density (log) |  |  | 1.13 |
|  |  |  | (0.09) |
| Ethnic Heterogeneity of Department | 1.15 | 1.18 | 1.14 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.16) |
| Term | 1.57 | 1.59 | 1.56 |
|  | (0.59) | (0.59) | (0.59) |
| Term^2 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.90 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Single Member District | 2.15\* | 2.03 | 2.32\* |
|  | (0.78) | (0.74) | (0.86) |
| Regime Stronghold | 0.86 | 0.87 | 0.97 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.20) | (0.22) |
| Age Elected | 0.94\*\*\* | 0.94\*\*\* | 0.94\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Education Level | 1.11 | 1.10 | 1.10 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Gender | 0.76 | 0.73 | 0.74 |
|  | (0.23) | (0.22) | (0.23) |
| Traditional Title | 1.36 | 1.34 | 1.33 |
|  | (0.59) | (0.59) | (0.58) |
| Constant | 0.52 | 0.69 | 0.31 |
|  | (0.46) | (0.64) | (0.33) |
| Prob > chi2 | 104.27\*\*\* | 103.21\*\*\* | 106.64\*\*\* |
| *Ψ(2)* | 0.27 | 0.33 | 0.22 |
| Observations | 611 | 611 | 611 |
| Number of groups | 57 | 57 | 57 |

*Note:* Multi-level mixed effects logistics regression. Odds ratio of legislative renomination by the CPDM is reported. Grouping variables are department (level 1) and MP (level 2). All models include controls for Year. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. The data is only available from the 1976, 1987, and 2005 census. Data from 1976 was used for the 1973 and 1978 election, data from 1987 for the 1983, 1988, and 1992 elections, and data from 2005 for the 1997, 2002, and 2007 elections.

**Appendix H: Seniority and Legislative Renomination**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Civil Service Seniority | Business Seniority | Civil & Business Seniority | Proportion of Time in Occupation |
| ***Civil Service Seniority*** |  |  |  |  |
| Clerical Role | 0.49 |  | 0.56 |  |
|  | (0.41) |  | (0.49) |  |
| Junior Administrator | 1.65 |  | 1.90 |  |
|  | (0.54) |  | (0.64) |  |
| Senior Administrator | 2.07 |  | 2.42\* |  |
|  | (0.81) |  | (0.97) |  |
| Executive Role | 1.30 |  | 1.44 |  |
|  | (1.23) |  | (1.38) |  |
| % Career in Gov. |  |  |  | 2.19\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.67) |
| ***Business Seniority*** |  |  |  |  |
| Junior Business |  | 0.71 | 0.85 |  |
|  |  | (0.20) | (0.25) |  |
| Senior Business |  | 2.87\*\* | 3.52\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.97) | (1.25) |  |
| % Career in Bus. |  |  |  | 1.39 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.37) |
| Service in Executive Branch | 4.15\* | 4.31\*\* | 4.67\* | 3.27\* |
|  | (2.99) | (2.13) | (3.42) | (1.64) |
| Locally Elected | 2.72\*\* | 2.71\*\* | 2.65\*\* | 2.79\*\*\* |
|  | (0.84) | (0.84) | (0.84) | (0.86) |
| Finance Committee | 1.81\* | 1.81\* | 1.69 | 1.70\* |
|  | (0.49) | (0.49) | (0.47) | (0.45) |
| Legislative Leader | 3.95\*\*\* | 3.75\*\*\* | 3.74\*\*\* | 3.67\*\*\* |
|  | (1.23) | (1.17) | (1.19) | (1.14) |
| Dept. Pop. Density (log) | 1.09 | 1.04 | 1.06 | 1.08 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Ethnic Heterogeneity | 1.26 | 1.20 | 1.29 | 1.22 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.17) | (0.20) | (0.18) |
| Term | 1.53 | 1.45 | 1.51 | 1.53 |
|  | (0.57) | (0.53) | (0.57) | (0.57) |
| Term^2 | 0.90 | 0.92 | 0.91 | 0.90 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Age Elected | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.93\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Education Level | 1.04 | 1.09 | 1.09 | 1.09 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Gender | 0.63 | 0.72 | 0.71 | 0.64 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.22) | (0.22) | (0.19) |
| Traditional Title | 1.27 | 1.32 | 1.18 | 1.38 |
|  | (0.56) | (0.57) | (0.53) | (0.60) |
| Constant | 1.89 | 1.91 | 1.83 | 1.30 |
|  | (1.45) | (1.50) | (1.48) | (1.03) |
| Prob > chi2 | 100.17\*\*\* | 105.13\*\*\* | 107.87\*\*\* | 100.94\*\*\* |
| *Ψ(2)* | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.34 |
| Observations | 611 | 611 | 611 | 611 |
| Number of groups | 57 | 57 | 57 | 57 |

*Note:* Multi-level mixed effects logistics regression. Odds ratio of legislative renomination by the CPDM is reported. Proportion of time in an occupation is approximated by working back from age elected to an assumed age when a career began (25). Grouping variables are department (level 1) and MP (level 2). All models include controls for Year. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

**Appendix I: Partisanship and Legislative Renomination**

\*The available information only notes whether a legislator served in a leadership role prior to their election. This data is only available consistently from 2007 onwards. There is no data on partisan careers, which would track an individual through the party to that leadership position.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Section President | Sub-Section President | Combined |
| Career Civil Servant | 1.85 | 2.10 | 1.98 |
|  | (0.73) | (0.84) | (0.80) |
| Businessperson | 1.63 | 1.84 | 1.71 |
|  | (0.56) | (0.63) | (0.60) |
| Service in Executive Branch | 2.12 | 2.11 | 1.94 |
|  | (1.47) | (1.47) | (1.37) |
| Locally Elected | 2.56\* | 2.26\* | 2.31\* |
|  | (1.04) | (0.90) | (0.94) |
| Finance Committee | 2.34 | 2.33 | 2.30 |
|  | (1.03) | (1.02) | (1.01) |
| Legislative Leader | 3.68\*\* | 3.85\*\* | 3.80\*\* |
|  | (1.69) | (1.78) | (1.77) |
| Section President | 1.23 |  | 1.14 |
|  | (0.38) |  | (0.36) |
| Sub Section President |  | 2.11\* | 2.11\* |
|  |  | (0.61) | (0.62) |
| Department Population Density (log) | 0.98 | 1.01 | 1.01 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Ethnic Heterogeneity of Department | 1.07 | 0.96 | 0.95 |
|  | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.19) |
| Term | 1.74 | 1.73 | 1.66 |
|  | (0.87) | (0.88) | (0.85) |
| Term^2 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 0.93 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Single Member District | 1.36 | 1.70 | 1.64 |
|  | (0.56) | (0.72) | (0.71) |
| Regime Stronghold | 0.74 | 0.76 | 0.76 |
|  | (0.23) | (0.24) | (0.24) |
| Age Elected | 0.95\*\* | 0.95\*\* | 0.95\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Education Level | 1.16 | 1.15 | 1.15 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Gender | 0.98 | 1.00 | 0.97 |
|  | (0.42) | (0.44) | (0.43) |
| Traditional Title | 0.84 | 0.87 | 0.90 |
|  | (0.47) | (0.50) | (0.51) |
| Constant | 2.53 | 1.77 | 2.38 |
|  | (3.05) | (2.19) | (3.05) |
| Prob > chi2 | 37.38\* | 41.76\*\* | 41.77\*\* |
| *Ψ(2)* | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Observations | 290 | 291 | 289 |
| Number of groups | 56 | 56 | 56 |

*Note:* Multi-level mixed effects logistics regression. Odds ratio of legislative renomination by the CPDM is reported Grouping variables are department (level 1) and MP (level 2). All models include controls for Year. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

**Appendix J: Electoral Competition and Institutions**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Election Results | Interaction w/ Election Results | Interaction w/ Stronghold | Interaction w/ SMD |
| Career Civil Servant | 3.17\*\* | 10.70 | 2.52 | 3.18\*\* |
|  | (1.20) | (16.47) | (1.72) | (1.32) |
| Businessperson | 1.77 | 0.49 | 1.13 | 1.97 |
|  | (0.57) | (0.61) | (0.52) | (0.69) |
| Civil Servant x Election Result |  | 0.98 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.02) |  |  |
| Business x Election Result |  | 1.01 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.01) |  |  |
| Civil Servant x Stronghold |  |  | 1.41 |  |
|  |  |  | (1.14) |  |
| Business x Stronghold |  |  | 2.15 |  |
|  |  |  | (1.26) |  |
| Civil Servant x SMD |  |  |  | 1.08 |
|  |  |  |  | (1.10) |
| Business x SMD |  |  |  | 0.48 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.39) |
| Service in Executive Branch | 1.35 | 1.35 | 1.41 | 1.39 |
|  | (0.89) | (0.91) | (0.94) | (0.93) |
| Locally Elected | 3.40\*\* | 3.36\*\* | 3.52\*\* | 3.39\*\* |
|  | (1.36) | (1.34) | (1.41) | (1.37) |
| Finance Committee | 2.61\* | 2.59\* | 2.67\* | 2.66\* |
|  | (1.02) | (1.01) | (1.05) | (1.05) |
| Legislative Leader | 2.38\* | 2.26\* | 2.37\* | 2.36\* |
|  | (0.90) | (0.86) | (0.90) | (0.90) |
| Dep. Pop. Density (log) | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.96 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Ethnic Heterogeneity | 1.06 | 1.04 | 1.06 | 1.06 |
|  | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.20) |
| Term | 2.13 | 2.18 | 2.16 | 2.17 |
|  | (1.23) | (1.27) | (1.27) | (1.27) |
| Term^2 | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0.91 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Regime Stronghold | 1.07 | 1.00 | 0.76 | 1.04 |
|  | (0.43) | (0.40) | (0.37) | (0.42) |
| Single Member District | 1.96 | 1.97 | 1.99 | 2.42 |
|  | (0.75) | (0.73) | (0.74) | (1.26) |
| Election Result | 0.99 | 0.998 | 0.98 | 0.99 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Age Elected | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.94\*\*\* | 0.93\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Education Level | 1.16 | 1.15 | 1.17 | 1.16 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Gender | 1.15 | 1.15 | 1.22 | 1.15 |
|  | (0.51) | (0.51) | (0.53) | (0.51) |
| Traditional Title | 1.31 | 1.37 | 1.29 | 1.34 |
|  | (0.71) | (0.73) | (0.69) | (0.73) |
| Constant | 2,665,304.37 | 2,665,304.37 | 3,075,192.50 | 1,337,488.51 |
|  | (1.02e+09) | (1.02e+09) | (1.72e+09) | (413661465.87) |
| Prob > chi2 | 59.08\*\*\* | 61.94\*\*\* | 61.02\*\*\* | 59.35\*\*\* |
| *Ψ(2)* | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.10 |
| Observations | 330 | 330 | 330 | 330 |
| Number of groups | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 |

*Note:* Multi-level mixed effects logistics regression. Odds ratio of legislative renomination by the CPDM is reported. Grouping variables are department (level 1) and MP (level 2). All models include controls for Year. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

**Appendix K: Professional Careers and Renomination Rates**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | Baseline | Control for Multiparty | Interaction w/ Multiparty | Single Party Era | Multiparty Era |
| Professional | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.67 | 0.58 | 0.72 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.28) | (0.26) | (0.18) |
| Multiparty Era |  | 0.61 | 0.61 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.19) | (0.19) |  |  |
| Professional x Multiparty |  |  | 1.08 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.52) |  |  |
| Service in Executive Branch | 2.50\* | 2.50\* | 2.50\* | 1.65 | 4.19\*\* |
|  | (0.93) | (0.93) | (0.93) | (1.00) | (2.07) |
| Locally Elected | 2.94\*\*\* | 2.94\*\*\* | 2.94\*\*\* | 3.91\*\* | 2.87\*\*\* |
|  | (0.75) | (0.75) | (0.75) | (2.01) | (0.89) |
| Finance Committee | 1.99\*\*\* | 1.99\*\*\* | 2.00\*\*\* | 2.61\* | 1.91\* |
|  | (0.41) | (0.41) | (0.42) | (0.97) | (0.50) |
| Legislative Leader | 3.02\*\*\* | 3.02\*\*\* | 3.02\*\*\* | 1.98 | 3.83\*\*\* |
|  | (0.74) | (0.74) | (0.74) | (0.86) | (1.18) |
| Dep. Pop Density (log) | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.78\* | 1.05 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Ethnic Heterogeneity | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.72\* | 1.18 |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.17) |
| Term | 1.08 | 1.08 | 1.08 | 0.85 | 1.51 |
|  | (0.26) | (0.26) | (0.26) | (0.29) | (0.55) |
| Term^2 | 0.97 | 0.97 | 0.98 | 1.02 | 0.91 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Age Elected | 0.95\*\*\* | 0.95\*\*\* | 0.95\*\*\* | 0.98 | 0.94\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Education Level | 1.08 | 1.08 | 1.08 | 1.07 | 1.09 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.07) |
| Gender | 0.78 | 0.78 | 0.78 | 1.25 | 0.67 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.57) | (0.20) |
| Traditional Title | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.54 | 1.25 |
|  | (0.42) | (0.42) | (0.42) | (0.58) | (0.54) |
| Single Member District |  |  |  |  | 2.04\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.72) |
| Regime Stronghold |  |  |  |  | 0.92 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.22) |
| Constant | 10.86\*\*\* | 10.86\*\*\* | 11.00\*\*\* | 12.83\* | 1.45 |
|  | (6.70) | (6.70) | (6.83) | (13.24) | (1.12) |
| Prob > chi2 | 175.64\*\*\* | 175.64\*\*\* | 175.69\*\*\* | 69.05\*\*\* | 101.90\*\*\* |
| *Ψ(2)* | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.11 | 0.34 |
| Observations | 960 | 960 | 960 | 345 | 615 |
| Number of groups | 57 | 57 | 57 | 43 | 57 |

*Note:* Multi-level mixed effects logistics regression. Odds ratio of legislative renomination by the CPDM is reported. Grouping variables are department (level 1) and MP (level 2). All models include controls for Year. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

**Appendix L: Types and Length of Business Careers and Renomination Rates**

As an additional inquiry into legislative renomination rates during the multiparty era, Figure 1 looks at types and lengths of business careers among 1st term MPs. Unfortunately, the CV data is not as detailed for business elites as it is for government civil servants, which means that for most MPs we could only designate whether they worked for a large corporation/ conglomerate or whether they operated a small business. We do distinguish MPs who worked in the finance sector and those who worked for major companies involved in resource extraction (oil, timber, mining) and infrastructure (road building, rural development, public works). These industries are generally considered more lucrative with high rates of return on investment. The category “large corporations” includes several unclear entities, but also ownership of major companies like media outlets, textiles, manufacturing, and agricultural plantations. Small business includes individually owned entities that operate at a local scale like retail and select importers. For the most part, the CV records for these figures indicate an occupation of “businessman” and public searches do not associate them with any of the major companies that operate in Cameroon.

Most business elites enter parliament after working for smaller businesses. Most business elites also enter parliament after at least 10 years of work, which corresponds with the notion that legislative candidates need to have sufficient resources to fund campaigns. Renomination rates are, as expected, strongest among business elites who worked in more lucrative sectors. Notably, there are very few MPs who enter the legislature from the finance sector and banking. This is congruent with an understanding of the restrictive business environment in Cameroon. Banking has only slightly been liberalized since the early 1990s, and there are currently only four privately held banks.

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**Figure 1** Type and Length of Business Experience and Legislative Renomination. *Note:* Type of business experience is broken down according to career length (1=0 to 10 years, 2=11-20 years, 3= more than 20 years)

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