**Beyond the Dichotomous Vote: Can Expressive Ballots Increase Ideological Congruence and Decrease Parliamentary Polarization?**

**Online Appendix**

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Published in *Government & Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics*, Accepted in 2019.

**Appendix 1**

**Figure A1:** Histogram of the number of parties selected in the AB.



**Table A1**: Party placements on the economic and cultural dimensions (0–10).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Party** | **Economic Dimension** | **Cultural Dimension** |
| 50PLUS | 2 | 3.2 |
| CDA | 5.6 | 6.6 |
| CU | 4.8 | 4.3 |
| D66 | 5.2 | 0.7 |
| DENK | 2.3 | 1.5 |
| Groen Links | 2.7 | 0.7 |
| PvdA | 2.9 | 1.9 |
| PvdD | 0.6 | 1.6 |
| PVV | 6 | 7.5 |
| SGP | 6.3 | 6.6 |
| SP | 0.4 | 2.1 |
| VNL | 6.9 | 6.4 |
| VVD | 8.7 | 7.1 |

**Table A2:** Descriptive statistics.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable |  Obs |  Mean |  Std.Dev. |  Min |  Max |
|  Ideological Congruence (Economic Dimension) | 13403 | -1.428 | 1.166 | -9.375 | 0 |
|  Ideological Congruence (Cultural Dimension) | 13401 | -1.73 | 1.432 | -9 | 0 |
|  Ballot Type | 13529 | .41 | .492 | 0 | 1 |
|  Self-Placement (Economic Dimension) | 13403 | 5.326 | 2.266 | 1 | 11 |
|  Self-Placement (Cultural Dimension) | 13401 | 4.403 | 1.99 | 1 | 11 |
|  Seat Proportion Largest Party (AB) | 5545 | .344 | .15 | .12 | 1 |
| Political Interest | 9376 | 7.742 | 2.013 | 1 | 10 |
|  Sex | 13340 | .675 | .468 | 0 | 1 |
|  Age | 13334 | 54.909 | 16.54 | 14 | 108 |
|  Education  | 13346 | 2.241 | 1.231 | 1 | 7 |
|  |

Source: Election Compass Survey Dutch Elections March 2017.

**Table A3:** OLS regression models of ideological congruence per dimension.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | Congruence Economic Dimension | Congruence Cultural Dimension |
| Assembly Ballot *(Baseline is Closed List Ballot)* | 0.157\*\*\*(0.0204) | 0.278\*\*\*(0.0250) |
| Constant | −1.493\*\*\*(0.0131) | −1.844\*\*\*(0.0160) |
| *N* | 13403 | 13401 |
| *R*2 | 0.004 | 0.009 |

Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; (two-tailed)

Source: Election Compass Survey Dutch Elections March 2017.

**Table A4:** OLS regression models of ideological congruence per dimension including individual-level controls.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1Congruence Economic Dimension | Model 2Congruence Cultural Dimension |
| Assembly Ballot (*Baseline is Closed List Ballot*) | 0.137\*\*\*(0.0233) | 0.292\*\*\*(0.0284) |
| Economic Self-Placement | −0.0762\*\*\*(0.00602) | −0.203\*\*\*(0.00732) |
| Cultural Self-Placement | 0.0142\*(0.00687) | 0.103\*\*\*(0.00835) |
| Political Interest | 0.0176\*\*(0.00580) | 0.00896(0.00706) |
| Male (*Baseline is Female*) | 0.0151(0.0258) | −0.0816\*\*(0.0314) |
| Age | −0.00329\*\*\*(0.000745) | −0.00344\*\*\*(0.000907) |
| *Education* (*Baseline is PhD doctoral or Master degree*) |
| University or College undergraduate or candidate | −0.0713\*\*(0.0275) | −0.122\*\*\*(0.0334) |
| Senior Higher general secondary education or pre-university education  | −0.190\*\*\*(0.0395) | −0.238\*\*\*(0.0480) |
| Intermediate Vocational training | −0.334\*\*\*(0.0391) | −0.302\*\*\*(0.0476) |
| Junior higher general secondary education  | −0.267\*\*\*(0.0673) | −0.214\*\*(0.0819) |
| Lower secondary vocational education | −0.428\*\*\*(0.0910) | −0.570\*\*\*(0.111) |
| No/basic education | 0.00442(0.232) | −0.548+(0.282) |
| Constant | −0.964\*\*\*(0.0708) | −0.906\*\*\*(0.0861) |
| N | 9315 | 9315 |
| *R2* | 0.041 | 0.101 |
|  |

Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; (two-tailed)

Source: Election Compass Survey Dutch Elections March 2017.

**Table A5**: OLS regression models of ideological congruence per dimension with interactions with distance to closest party.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1Congruence Economic Dimension | Model 2Congruence Cultural Dimension |
| Assembly Ballot *(Baseline is Closed List Ballot)* | 0.106\*(0.0448) | 0.432\*\*\*(0.0618) |
| Distance Closest Party (Economic) | −2.469\*\*\*(0.269) |  |
| Assembly Ballot × Distance Closest Party (Economic) | 0.461(0.420) |  |
| Distance Closest Party (Economic)2 | 2.457\*\*\*(0.313) |  |
| Assembly Ballot × Distance Closest Party (Economic)2 | −0.0849(0.488) |  |
| Distance Closest Party (Cultural) |  | 0.721\*\*\*(0.211) |
| Assembly Ballot × Distance Closest Party (Cultural) |  | −1.415\*\*\*(0.330) |
| Distance Closest Party (Cultural)2 |  | −1.427\*\*\*(0.204) |
| Assembly Ballot × Distance Closest Party (Cultural)2 |  | 2.530\*\*\*(0.318) |
| Constant | −1.162\*\*\*(0.0288) | −1.796\*\*\*(0.0395) |
| *N* | 12644 | 11301 |
| *R*2 | 0.024 | 0.052 |

Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; (two-tailed)

Source: Election Compass Survey Dutch Elections March 2017.

**Table A6**: OLS regression models of ideological congruence per dimension with interactions with ideological self-placement.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1Congruence Economic Dimension | Model 2Congruence Cultural Dimension |
| Assembly Ballot (Baseline is Closed List Ballot) | −2.181\*\*\*(0.0978) | −2.904\*\*\*(0.109) |
| Economic Self-Placement | 0.261\*\*\*(0.0244) |  |
| Assembly Ballot × Economic Self-Placement | 0.890\*\*\*(0.0375) |  |
| Economic Self-Placement2 | −0.0339\*\*\*(0.00211) |  |
| Assembly Ballot × Economic Self-Placement2 | −0.0717\*\*\*(0.00327) |  |
| Cultural Self-Placement |  | −0.201\*\*\*(0.0294) |
| Assembly Ballot × Cultural Self-Placement |  | 1.283\*\*\*(0.0460) |
| Cultural Self-Placement2 |  | 0.00861\*\*(0.00283) |
| Assembly Ballot × Cultural Self-Placement2 |  | −0.106\*\*\*(0.00443) |
| Constant | −1.746\*\*\*(0.0640) | −1.162\*\*\*(0.0694) |
| *N* | 13403 | 13401 |
| *R*2 | 0.166 | 0.089 |

Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; (two-tailed)

Source: Election Compass Survey Dutch Elections March 2017.

**Appendix 2**

**Experimental Design**: **Questions**

Respondents who were randomly selected to cast a vote with the closed-list ballot were asked the following question: “Could you indicate which party you would vote for in the next parliamentary elections?”. Figure AX shows a screenshot of the closed-list ballot ‘voting procedure’. Respondents who were randomly selected to cast a vote with the Assembly Ballot were presented with the text: “Imagine you could vote in a different way: Rather than voting for one party, you can vote with the so-called ‘Assembly Ballot’. With Assembly Ballot you can determine what your ideal parliament (Second Chamber) looks like. The Second Chamber has 150 seats. You can divide these seats across all parties participating in the elections. In this question you can vote with an Assembly Ballot. Could you indicate how many seats you would allocate to each party. The total number of seats have to add up to 150.” Figure AX shows a screenshot of the Assembly Ballot ‘voting procedure’.

**Figure A2:** Screenshot of the closed-list ballot ‘voting procedure’. (N.B.: Not all parties are shown.)



**Figure A3:** Screenshot of the Assembly Ballot ‘voting procedure’. (N.B.: Not all parties are shown.)

