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**Resource Wealth As Leverage: Natural Resource Wealth and the Failure of Non-violent Campaigns. Published in Government and Opposition**

**APPENDIX**

**Table 1 Descriptive Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| VARIABLES | N | mean | sd | min | max |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Failure of the campaign (binary) | 452 | 0.438 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Total natural resource rents as a % GDP | 357 | 8.936 | 11.91 | 0 | 73.49 |
| Campaign goals | 451 | 2.118 | 2.106 | 0 | 5 |
| Repression | 447 | 1.989 | 1.234 | 0 | 3 |
| Foreign state support to the regime | 416 | 0.438 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| Foreign state support to the campaign | 427 | 0.333 | 0.472 | 0 | 1 |
| The diversity of the campaign | 369 | 7.485 | 1.645 | 0 | 9 |
| Oil dependency | 258 | 0.159 | 0.366 | 0 | 1 |
| Success of the campaign (ordinal) | 452 | 0.743 | 0.745 | 0 | 2 |
| Regime type | 392 | -0.901 | 6.901 | -10 | 10 |
| GDP per capita | 403 | 4,292 | 4,358 | 366.4 | 23,781 |
| Fuel per GDP | 258 | 5.524 | 10.67 | 0 | 46.70 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Table 2 Additional Analysis on the Effect of Primary Commodity Exports per GDP on Non-violent Campaign Failure**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | (1) |
| VARIABLES | NV campaign failure |
|  |  |
| **Primary commodity exports (% of GDP) (Collier et al 2009)** | **7.674\*\*\*** |
|  | **(2.959)** |
| Foreign state support for the regime | -1.663\*\* |
|  | (0.780) |
| Foreign state support for the campaign | -0.819 |
|  | (0.690) |
| Regime type | -0.307\*\*\* |
|  | (0.111) |
| Campaign goals | 0.611\*\*\* |
|  | (0.184) |
| GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2007) | 0.000156 |
|  | (0.000156) |
| Repression | 0.268 |
|  | (0.579) |
| The diversity of the campaign (index) | -0.424\*\* |
|  | (0.210) |
| Constant | -0.767 |
|  | (2.100) |
|  |  |
| Observations | 157 |

Robust Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 3 Logit and Ordered Logit Analyses with the Disaggregated Campaign Goal Variable**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | NV failure | NV success | NV failure | NV success | NV failure | NV success |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total natural resource rents as a % of GDP | 0.0779\*\*\* | -0.0681\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0275) | (0.0311) |  |  |  |  |
| The support for the regime | -0.217 | -0.266 | -0.981 | 0.134 | -0.835 | 0.0568 |
|  | (0.638) | (0.607) | (0.607) | (0.544) | (0.629) | (0.538) |
| The support for the campaign | -1.048\*\* | 0.752 | -1.197\*\* | 0.501 | -1.016\*\* | 0.369 |
|  | (0.511) | (0.461) | (0.536) | (0.495) | (0.502) | (0.434) |
| Regime type | -0.137\*\*\* | 0.174\*\*\* | -0.225\*\*\* | 0.244\*\*\* | -0.214\*\*\* | 0.235\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0430) | (0.0426) | (0.0731) | (0.0670) | (0.0735) | (0.0636) |
| **camp\_goals = 1** | 0.406 | 0.244 | 0.204 | 1.210 | 0.179 | 1.180 |
| **Significant institutional reform** | (0.870) | (1.122) | (1.544) | (1.839) | (1.533) | (1.821) |
| **camp\_goals = 2** | 0.719 | -0.382 | 2.063\* | -1.090\* | 2.087\* | -1.140\* |
| **Policy change** | (0.710) | (0.471) | (1.159) | (0.633) | (1.126) | (0.622) |
| **camp\_goals = 3** | 3.081\*\* | -1.616 | 1.926 | -2.213 | 1.848 | -2.083 |
| **Territorial secession** | (1.346) | (1.577) | (1.457) | (1.673) | (1.496) | (1.692) |
| **camp\_goals = 4** | 2.504 | -2.591 | 3.091 | -2.529 | 2.948 | -2.445 |
| **Greater autonomy** | (1.887) | (2.682) | (2.067) | (4.125) | (2.092) | (4.241) |
| **camp\_goals = 5** | 2.027\*\*\* | -1.648\*\*\* | 2.586\*\*\* | -1.550\*\*\* | 2.566\*\*\* | -1.501\*\*\* |
| **Anti-occupation** | (0.640) | (0.626) | (0.734) | (0.492) | (0.759) | (0.484) |
| GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2007) | 6.19e-05 | -0.000141 | 0.000127 | -0.000105 | 0.000108 | -9.49e-05 |
|  | (7.54e-05) | (9.87e-05) | (9.22e-05) | (0.000103) | (8.04e-05) | (9.10e-05) |
| Repression | 0.436 | -0.251 | 0.754\* | -0.366 | 0.770\* | -0.386\* |
|  | (0.283) | (0.201) | (0.409) | (0.232) | (0.448) | (0.229) |
| The diversity of the campaign | -0.363\*\* | 0.217 | -0.362\*\* | 0.145 | -0.362\*\* | 0.164 |
|  | (0.169) | (0.157) | (0.169) | (0.149) | (0.164) | (0.153) |
| Fuel per GDP |  |  | 0.0642\*\*\* | -0.0405\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.0206) | (0.0213) |  |  |
| Oil dependency |  |  |  |  | 2.560\*\*\* | -1.825\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.685) | (0.874) |
| Constant cut1 |  | -1.528 |  | -2.266\* |  | -2.183 |
|  |  | (1.288) |  | (1.323) |  | (1.341) |
| Constant cut2 |  | 1.027 |  | 0.389 |  | 0.485 |
|  |  | (1.287) |  | (1.263) |  | (1.301) |
| Constant | -0.573 |  | -1.539 |  | -1.528 |  |
|  | (1.427) |  | (1.587) |  | (1.619) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 231 | 231 | 170 | 170 | 170 | 170 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The campaign goal variable is coded based on a six-point scale, ranging from 0 to 5. 0 is coded for non-violent movements seeking for regime change, and it has been taken as baseline in the empirical models in Table 2. The results on the campaign goal variable show that anti-occupation movements are more likely to fail or be less successful in achieving their goals than those aiming for a regime change. The coefficients of the anti-occupation goal variable are consistently significant across all models. In model 1, we see that the coefficient of the territorial secession goal variable is statistically significant, suggesting that non-violent movements seeking for territorial secession are more likely to fail than regime-change movements. In models 3 through 6, the coefficients of the policy change goal variable achieve statistical significance, but the statistical significance is at 0.1 level. The findings on that variable suggest that non-violent campaigns seeking for a policy change are more likely to fail or be less successful than those looking for a regime change.

**The Tables for the Revise and Resubmit Document**

**Table 4 The Results of Logit Analyses with Additional Control Variables**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| VARIABLES | nvcampaignfailure | nvcampaignfailure | nvcampaignfailure |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Total natural resource rents as a % of GDP** | **0.144\*\*\*** |  |  |
|  | **(0.0332)** |  |  |
| **Fuel resource income per GDP** |  | **27.59\*** |  |
|  |  | **(14.19)** |  |
| **Oil dependency** |  |  | **18.03\*\*\*** |
|  |  |  | **(0.745)** |
| Security force defection | -0.0145 | -0.0108 | -0.00888 |
|  | (0.0101) | (0.0107) | (0.0122) |
| Campaign diversity | -0.381\*\* | -0.392 | -0.267 |
|  | (0.175) | (0.253) | (0.193) |
| Middle East | 0.677 |  |  |
|  | (1.075) |  |  |
| Africa | -3.938\*\*\* | -10.14\* | -16.90\*\*\* |
|  | (1.401) | (6.063) | (1.290) |
| The percentage of Muslims | -0.0122 | -0.0269\* | -0.0171 |
|  | (0.0125) | (0.0147) | (0.0114) |
| Campaign size | -0.0828 | -0.147 | -0.159 |
|  | (0.249) | (0.297) | (0.282) |
| The foreign state support for the regime | -0.296 | -1.961\* | -1.799\* |
|  | (0.731) | (1.004) | (1.042) |
| The foreign state support for the movement | -0.488 | -0.555 | -0.545 |
|  | (0.665) | (0.740) | (0.662) |
| Polity | -0.109\*\* | -0.243\*\* | -0.255\*\* |
|  | (0.0553) | (0.114) | (0.113) |
| Campaign goal | 0.295\* | 0.266 | 0.495\*\*\* |
|  | (0.158) | (0.243) | (0.155) |
| GDP per capita | 5.73e-05 | 3.27e-07 | -2.12e-05 |
|  | (9.42e-05) | (0.000103) | (0.000105) |
| Repression | 0.579\* | 1.008\* | 0.895 |
|  | (0.314) | (0.524) | (0.567) |
| Constant | -0.305 | -0.182 | -1.017 |
|  | (1.419) | (1.865) | (1.935) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 213 | 148 | 148 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 5 The Logit Analysis with the Recoded Dependent Variable**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | (1) |
| VARIABLES | Failure (recoded) |
|  |  |
| Total natural resource rents as a % of GDP | -0.0568 |
|  | (0.0552) |
| Foreign state support for the regime | -2.031 |
|  | (2.167) |
| INGO support for the campaign[[1]](#footnote-1) | 0.840 |
|  | (1.968) |
| Repression | 1.172 |
|  | (1.057) |
| Security defection | -0.0498\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0187) |
| Campaign size | -0.256 |
|  | (0.677) |
| Campaign diversity | 0.0355 |
|  | (0.236) |
| GDP per capita | -0.000542 |
|  | (0.000374) |
| Campaign goals | -0.0693 |
|  | (0.460) |
| Polity | -0.522\* |
|  | (0.284) |
| Constant | -8.241\* |
|  | (4.501) |
|  |  |
| Observations | 217 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Note: As the reviewer suggested, the new dependent variable has been coded in a way that takes the failures at the end of the year, and excludes the failures on the years when the movement is ongoing or the years indicating the onset of the campaign. This analysis is only looking at the effect of natural resource rents per capita but we have also done analyses having fuel wealth per capita. The results on the independent variables on those analyses are also not significant. Increasing fuel wealth per GDP does not have a significant impact on non-violent campaign failure as total natural resource rents per capita does not.**

**We have done one more analysis with additional controls, such as the variables of security force defections, campaign size, regional dummies and the percentage of Muslim population. Security force defections and campaign size are still included in the analysis. However, when we did the analysis, the analysis didn’t produce the p-values. Here is the screenshot of the analysis below not showing the p-values.**

****

**We have also done one other analysis with the recoded dependent variable by using Haber and Menaldo’s natural resources. Here is the analysis that didn’t show the p-values and omitted some of the variables. The independent variable at the model is total natural resource income per capita.**



**Table 6 The Robustness Check with the Revised Ordinal Dependent Variable**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| VARIABLES | Campaign success | Campaign success | Campaign success |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Total natural resource rents as a % of GDP** | **-0.0671\*\*** |  |  |
|  | **(0.0301)** |  |  |
| **Oil dependency** |  | **-1.622\*\*** |  |
|  |  | **(0.794)** |  |
| **Fuel resource income per GDP** |  |  | **-3.420\*** |
|  |  |  | **(1.897)** |
| Foreign state support for the regime | 0.126 | 0.914\* | 1.004\* |
|  | (0.523) | (0.555) | (0.546) |
| Foreign state support for the campaign | 0.801 | 0.674 | 0.764 |
|  | (0.528) | (0.432) | (0.475) |
| Polity | 0.167\*\*\* | 0.249\*\*\* | 0.257\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0418) | (0.0662) | (0.0697) |
| Campaign goal | -0.453\*\*\* | -0.475\*\*\* | -0.478\*\*\* |
|  | (0.111) | (0.0859) | (0.0848) |
| GDP per capita | -0.000133\* | -0.000150\* | -0.000155\* |
|  | (8.05e-05) | (8.10e-05) | (8.92e-05) |
| Repression | -0.375 | -0.503\* | -0.508\* |
|  | (0.253) | (0.293) | (0.286) |
| Campaign diversity | 0.267\* | 0.238\* | 0.231\* |
|  | (0.140) | (0.138) | (0.139) |
| Constant cut1 | -1.538 | -1.812 | -1.856 |
|  | (1.156) | (1.350) | (1.370) |
| Constant cut2 | 0.0245 | -0.395 | -0.448 |
|  | (1.186) | (1.353) | (1.359) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 231 | 170 | 170 |

Robust standard errors have been reported in the parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 6a The Robustness Check with the Revised Ordinal Dependent Variable with Additional Controls**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| VARIABLES | Campaign success | Campaign success | Campaign success |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Total natural resource rents as a % of GDP** | **-0.148\*\*\*** |  |  |
|  | **(0.0342)** |  |  |
| **Fuel resource income per GDP** |  | **-22.637** |  |
|  |  | **(14.038)** |  |
| **Oil dependency (binary)** |  |  | **-17.29\*\*\*** |
|  |  |  | **(0.877)** |
| Security force defection | 0.00918 | 0.00686 | 0.00377 |
|  | (0.0130) | (0.0199) | (0.0223) |
| Middle East | -0.653 |  |  |
|  | (0.891) |  |  |
| Africa | 4.867\*\*\* | 17.47\*\*\* | 9.464 |
|  | (1.185) | (0.940) | (6.186) |
| The percentage of Muslims | 0.00753 | 0.00927 | 0.0148\* |
|  | (0.00871) | (0.00785) | (0.00818) |
| Campaign diversity | 0.340\* | 0.161 | 0.252 |
|  | (0.175) | (0.207) | (0.235) |
| Campaign size | 0.0832 | 0.246 | 0.235 |
|  | (0.249) | (0.247) | (0.257) |
| The foreign state support for the regime | 0.0824 | 1.981\*\* | 2.011\*\* |
|  | (0.711) | (0.885) | (0.837) |
| The foreign state support for the movement | 0.294 | 0.0141 | -0.0219 |
|  | (0.717) | (0.676) | (0.798) |
| Polity | 0.159\*\*\* | 0.385\*\* | 0.377\*\* |
|  | (0.0616) | (0.156) | (0.161) |
| Campaign goal | -0.287\*\* | -0.406\*\*\* | -0.207 |
|  | (0.117) | (0.0962) | (0.210) |
| GDP per capita | -8.40e-05 | -3.12e-05 | -5.22e-05 |
|  | (8.74e-05) | (7.97e-05) | (8.41e-05) |
| Repression | -0.391 | -0.747 | -0.761 |
|  | (0.320) | (0.522) | (0.504) |
| Constant cut1 | -0.693 | -2.223 | -1.532 |
|  | (1.530) | (2.940) | (2.808) |
| Constant cut2 | 0.944 | -0.726 | -0.00141 |
|  | (1.552) | (2.894) | (2.741) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 213 | 148 | 148 |

Robust standard errors have been reported in the parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 7 The Results of Seemingly Unrelated Regression Testing Causal Mechanisms**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | Campaign size | Security defection | Campaign size | Security defection | Campaign size | Security defection |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Total natural resources rent as a % of GDP** | **-0.0181\*\*\*** | **0.0471** |  |  |  |  |
|  | **(0.00703)** | **(0.129)** |  |  |  |  |
| **Fuel resource income per GDP** |  |  | **-2.418\*\*** | **16.02** |  |  |
|  |  |  | **(1.056)** | **(19.51)** |  |  |
| **Oil dependency** |  |  |  |  | **-0.340** | **1.793** |
|  |  |  |  |  | **(0.297)** | **(5.385)** |
| Repression | -0.0849 | 2.015 | -0.140 | 1.805 | -0.165\* | 2.063 |
|  | (0.0705) | (1.324) | (0.0893) | (1.706) | (0.0894) | (1.679) |
| Campaign goals | -0.165\*\*\* | 0.862 | -0.220\*\*\* | 0.610 | -0.220\*\*\* | 0.660 |
|  | (0.0372) | (0.704) | (0.0458) | (0.880) | (0.0468) | (0.890) |
| Security defection | 0.00685\*\* |  | 0.00482 |  | 0.00440 |  |
|  | (0.00340) |  | (0.00412) |  | (0.00415) |  |
| Foreign state support for the campaign | 0.962\*\*\* | -0.152 | 0.878\*\*\* | 2.943 | 0.783\*\*\* | 3.469 |
|  | (0.166) | (3.003) | (0.210) | (3.831) | (0.209) | (3.817) |
| Foreign state support for the regime |  | -1.665 |  | -0.999 |  | -1.535 |
|  |  | (3.142) |  | (4.187) |  | (4.147) |
| Constant | 2.656\*\*\* | -11.08\*\*\* | 2.940\*\*\* | -13.15\*\*\* | 2.961\*\*\* | -13.23\*\*\* |
|  | (0.184) | (3.307) | (0.251) | (4.471) | (0.253) | (4.483) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 264 | 264 | 181 | 181 | 181 | 181 |
| R-squared | 0.213 | 0.020 | 0.215 | 0.023 | 0.198 | 0.020 |

**Table 8 The Additional Robustness Check with Haber and Menaldo's (2011) Data and the Additional Control Variables**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| VARIABLES | nvcampaignfailure | nvcampaignfailure |
|  |  |  |
| **Total\_Resources\_Income\_per capita** | **0.00143\*\*** |  |
|  | **(0.000703)** |  |
| **Total Fuel Resource Income per capita** |  | **0.00186\*\*** |
|  |  | **(0.000882)** |
| Security force defection | -0.00807 | -0.00774 |
|  | (0.00927) | (0.00919) |
| Middle East | -0.0232 | -0.107 |
|  | (0.637) | (0.616) |
| Africa | -0.742 | -0.688 |
|  | (1.093) | (1.091) |
| Muslim population | -0.000792 | -0.00142 |
|  | (0.00742) | (0.00739) |
| Campaign size | -0.135 | -0.122 |
|  | (0.190) | (0.187) |
| The foreign state support for the state | -0.533 | -0.539 |
|  | (0.558) | (0.559) |
| The foreign state support for the movement | -0.291 | -0.309 |
|  | (0.721) | (0.717) |
| Polity | -0.115\*\* | -0.113\*\* |
|  | (0.0487) | (0.0490) |
| Campaign goals | 0.371\*\*\* | 0.376\*\*\* |
|  | (0.127) | (0.129) |
| GDP per capita | -4.40e-05 | -5.88e-05 |
|  | (9.58e-05) | (9.51e-05) |
| Repression | 0.572\* | 0.589\* |
|  | (0.308) | (0.302) |
| Constant | -2.361\*\* | -2.399\*\* |
|  | (1.158) | (1.160) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 225 | 225 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 9 The Results of the Analyses with Only Controls**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| VARIABLES | nvcampaignfailure | nvcampaignfailure |
| *Campaign-level variables* |  |  |
| The foreign state support for the regime |  | -0.396 |
|  |  | (0.428) |
| The foreign state support for the movement |  | -0.790\* |
|  |  | (0.422) |
| Campaign goals |  | 0.319\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0849) |
| Security force defections |  | -0.00299 |
|  |  | (0.00766) |
| Campaign size |  | -0.268\* |
|  |  | (0.141) |
| Repression |  | 0.382\*\* |
|  |  | (0.184) |
| Campaign diversity |  | -0.129 |
| *The variables in relation to natural resource wealth and campaign success* |  | (0.104) |
| Polity2 | -0.0651\* |  |
|  | (0.0384) |  |
| GDP per capita | -7.34e-05 |  |
|  | (7.68e-05) |  |
| Muslim population | 0.00939 |  |
|  | (0.00723) |  |
| Middle East | 0.172 |  |
|  | (0.918) |  |
| Africa | -0.850 |  |
|  | (0.667) |  |
| Constant | -0.394 | 0.164 |
|  | (0.503) | (0.829) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 314 | 318 |

**Table 10 The Results with the Natural Resource Wealth variable and the State-level Controls**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| VARIABLES | nvcampaignfailure | nvcampaignfailure | nvcampaignfailure |
|  |  |  |  |
| Total natural resource rents as a % of GDP | 0.0798\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.0208) |  |  |
| Oil dependency |  | 2.510\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.922) |  |
| Fuel resources per capita |  |  | 12.72\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (3.979) |
| Polity | -0.0503 | -0.143\* | -0.138 |
|  | (0.0393) | (0.0859) | (0.0843) |
| GDP per capita | -6.64e-05 | -0.000131 | -0.000100 |
|  | (7.64e-05) | (0.000126) | (0.000124) |
| Muslim population | 0.00157 | 0.00259 | -0.00378 |
|  | (0.00725) | (0.00948) | (0.00943) |
| Mideast | 0.334 | 0.699 | 1.199 |
|  | (1.132) | (1.091) | (1.101) |
| Africa | -2.699\*\*\* | -1.974\*\*\* | -3.865\*\*\* |
|  | (0.711) | (0.746) | (1.441) |
| Constant | -0.747 | -0.737 | -0.879 |
|  | (0.584) | (0.954) | (0.973) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 314 | 231 | 231 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 11 The Results with the Natural Resource Wealth Variable and the Campaign-level Controls**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| VARIABLES | nvcampaignfailure | nvcampaignfailure | nvcampaignfailure |
|  |  |  |  |
| Total natural resource rents as a % of GDP | 0.0671\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.0230) |  |  |
| Oil dependency |  | 2.686\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.845) |  |
| Fuel resources per capita |  |  | 6.904\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (2.495) |
| Foreign support for the regime | -0.0869 | 0.111 | 0.113 |
|  | (0.561) | (0.647) | (0.664) |
| Foreign support for the campaign | -0.906 | -0.973\*\* | -1.195\*\* |
|  | (0.562) | (0.493) | (0.563) |
| Campaign goals | 0.370\*\*\* | 0.383\*\*\* | 0.380\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0936) | (0.111) | (0.109) |
| Security efection | -0.00782 | 0.00135 | 0.00166 |
|  | (0.00856) | (0.0104) | (0.0103) |
| Campaign size | -0.177 | -0.0793 | -0.0642 |
|  | (0.199) | (0.206) | (0.217) |
| Repression | 0.199 | 0.149 | 0.120 |
|  | (0.257) | (0.281) | (0.282) |
| Campaign diversity | -0.227\* | -0.279\* | -0.285\* |
|  | (0.134) | (0.152) | (0.158) |
| Constant | 0.162 | 0.814 | 0.908 |
|  | (1.022) | (1.178) | (1.230) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 248 | 168 | 168 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1





**Robustness Check**

(Table 12 is about here)

In addition to the logit analysis, we also employ an ordered logit analysis to serve as a robustness check. The results of the ordinal logit models are presented in Table 2. The dependent variable in this analysis is the success of the non-violent campaign, which is ordinally coded from 0 to 2, with 0 representing failure, 1 referring to partial success, and full success being coded with a 2.[[2]](#footnote-2) Positive coefficients indicate that the given independent or control variable increases the level of success of the non-violent campaign, and negative coefficients identify the reverse. The findings demonstrate that the effect of natural resource wealth on the outcomes of non-violent campaigns is statistically significant. However, the magnitude of the significance wanes in this analysis, as compared to the results of our main examination. The coefficient of the total natural resource rents per capita variable suggests that the level of success of a non-violent campaign decreases as the total natural resource rents per capita of the target state increases. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. For the finding regarding the effect of oil wealth, the coefficient of the fuel exports per GDP variable demonstrates that higher fuel resource exports per GDP are associated with lesser degrees of campaign success. The coefficient, however, is significant at the 0.1 level. The coefficient of the oil dependency variable is also significant, suggesting that the level of success of a non-violent campaign is likely to be lower if the target state is an oil dependent country. For the control variables, while campaign goal and regime type keep their statistical significance, campaign diversity and foreign state support lose their statistical significance. The coefficients of these two variables are statistically significant in the logit models. The coefficients of repression and GDP per capita remain insignificant.

We also provide additional robustness checks using different natural resource data, but for the sake of brevity, the results of those analyses are reported in the Appendix. We use Haber and Menaldo’s (2011) natural resource data, covering the time period from 1800 to 2006. Two specific variables are employed to capture the total natural resource wealth and fuel resource wealth: total resource income per capita and total fuel resource income per capita. According to the findings of the empirical analyses, both variables have a significant impact on non-violent campaign outcomes. More specifically, as the target state’s total natural resource income per capita and total fuel resource income per capita increase, the likelihood of non-violent campaign failure also increases.[[3]](#footnote-3)

**Table 12 The Ordered Logit Models on the Effect of Natural Resource Wealth on Non-violent Campaign Success**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (Model 1) | (Model 2) | (Model 3) |
| VARIABLES |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Total natural resource rents as % of GDP** | **-0.0681\*\*** |  |  |
|  | **(0.0297)** |  |  |
| **Fuel per GDP** |  | **-0.0374\*** |  |
|  |  | **(0.0211)** |  |
| **Oil dependency** |  |  | **-1.751\*\*** |
|  |  |  | **(0.893)** |
| Foreign state support for the regime | -0.343 | 0.227 | 0.154 |
|  | (0.564) | (0.538) | (0.539) |
| Foreign state support for the campaign | 0.658 | 0.456 | 0.339 |
|  | (0.461) | (0.486) | (0.428) |
| Regime type | 0.167\*\*\* | 0.233\*\*\* | 0.225\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0426) | (0.0635) | (0.0608) |
| Campaign goals | -0.333\*\*\* | -0.325\*\*\* | -0.316\*\*\* |
|  | (0.119) | (0.101) | (0.100) |
| GDP per capita | -0.000149 | -8.85e-05 | -8.09e-05 |
|  | (0.000102) | (9.76e-05) | (8.65e-05) |
| Repression | -0.255 | -0.302 | -0.308 |
|  | (0.200) | (0.226) | (0.223) |
| Campaign diversity (index) | 0.236 | 0.187 | 0.204 |
|  | (0.149) | (0.139) | (0.142) |
| Constant cut1 | -1.515 | -1.602 | -1.503 |
|  | (1.152) | (1.159) | (1.174) |
| Constant cut2 | 1.025 | 1.004 | 1.118 |
|  | (1.140) | (1.090) | (1.128) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 231 | 170 | 170 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses, and they are clustered on campaign.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

1. I used this variable as a substitute variable to measure external support with international non-governmental support for the campaign because the statistical analysis dropped the variable measuring foreign state support for the campaign. After doing the analysis, STATA said “campaign\_support != 0 predicts failure perfectly”. This is because the dependent variable does not show much variation. On the new dependent variable, the percentage of observations of failed cases is just around 3. Most of the observations are coded 0, meaning that they are not failed. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. In this analysis, we have recoded “progress” variable in NAVCO in a way that code full failure 0; code achieving visible gains short of concessions, limited concessions and significant concessions 1; code full success 2. The different ways of coding the progress variable does not change our results. For instance, we code full failure 0; code achieving visible gains or limited concessions 1; code significant concessions or full success 2. When we do the analysis based on this ordinal variable, the results still hold. According to the results of those analyses, the natural resource variables are still primarily statistically significant and the increase in natural resource wealth increases the likelihood of campaign failure. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The coefficients of the independent variables keep their significance when we add more controls, such as security force defections, campaign size, region dummies, the percentage of Muslim population. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)