**Online Appendices**

**Appendix A- Marginal Seats by Party**

This appendix shows the proportion of seats that were marginal for each party in both the ROC and Quebec. It shows that in the ROC, the NDP consistently had fewer marginal seats than the other parties. In Quebec the NDP had no marginal ridings in 2004 and just 1 marginal riding in 2006. It, however, had the highest proportion of marginal ridings in 2011 and the second highest in 2015.

**Figure A1: Marginal Ridings by Party (ROC)**



**Figure A2: Marginal Ridings by Party (Quebec)**



**Appendix B- Donations and Donors**

This appendix looks at two alternative measures of local campaign strength, the number of donations a local association received in the election year and the year prior and the number of individuals that donated to the association in the election year and the year prior. The results of these analyses are broadly similar to the results of analyses looking at party spending as a percentage of the limit presented in the main body of the paper.

*Trends in Donations and Donors*

Trends in the number of donors for to each party and the amount of donations received reflect the trends in campaign spending discussed in the body of the paper. Figures B1 and B2 show the NDP lagging behind its competitors both donations and number of donors throughout the 2006-2015 period in the ROC. Unlike with campaign spending, the gap in the amount raised by the Liberals and NDP grows a bit between 2011 and 2015. It should be noted, however, that the gap in this growth is not large, and the Liberals out fundraised the NDP by a large margin even in 2011 when the party made its breakthrough.

**Figure B1: Average Donations by Party (ROC)**



**Figure B2: Average Number of Donors by Party (ROC)**



Figures B3 and B4 show the NDP at a persistent disadvantage in fundraising in Quebec compared to all parties from 2006 to 2011. In 2015 the NDP passed the Bloc Quebecois and Conservatives, but remained at a significant disadvantage compared to the Liberals in money raised. The same is true with respect to the number of donors to each party, though the NDP made up more ground against the Liberals with regards to the number of donors to the party as compared to the amount of donations that they received. Again, these results are similar to those of the analyses in the main paper that look at campaign spending.

**Figure B3: Average Donations by Party (Quebec)**



**Figure B4: Average Donors by Party (Quebec)**



*Effect on vote share*

Figures B5 and B6 show that in the ROC donations and donors to NDP EDAs have a positive correlation with the party’s vote share while donations and donors to Liberal EDAs party have a negative correlation with NDP vote share. The impact of Conservative donations and donors is less clear with neither having a statistically significant effect on either Conservative vote share or the vote shares of the two other major parties.

**Figure B5: Effect of Fundraising on NDP Vote (ROC)**



The margins plot is for the model shown in table E3 in appendix E. Bars show the range of effects for a 95% confidence level.

**Figure B6: Effect of Number of Donors on NDP Vote Share (ROC)**



The margins plot is for the model shown in table E5 in appendix E. Bars show the range of effects for a 95% confidence level.

 Figures B7 and B8 show that the correlations between donations and donors with vote share in Quebec is more complicated. Donations to NDP EDAs are correlated with increases in NDP vote share, but it is not clear that donations to any of the other parties are correlated with a decline in NDP vote share. When one looks at donors, the relationship between the number of donors to an NDP local association and NDP vote share is not statistically significant not is the relationship between the number of donors to BQ or Liberal associations and NDP vote share. The number of donors to Conservative EDAs, however, is correlated with a decrease in NDP vote share.

**Figure B7: Effect of Donations on NDP Vote Share (Quebec)**



The margins plot is for the model shown in table E4 in appendix E. Bars show the range of effects for a 95% confidence level.

**Figure B8: Effect of Donors on NDP Vote Share (Quebec)**



The margins plot is for the model shown in table E6 in appendix E. Bars show the range of effects for a 95% confidence level.

*Effect on seat share*

Consistent with the analysis for campaign spending, the donations and the number of donors to an association appear to have little effect on the number of seats that NDP won. The estimated number of seats that the NDP won had donations had no effect on vote share is shown in figure B9. In every year except for 2011 the estimated number of seats that the NDP would have won had donations or donors not affected vote share is slightly below the number of seats they actually won. Only in 2011 is the number of seats the party is estimated to won higher, and even in that year, the difference is marginal. Figure B10 shows similar findings for measures focusing on donors.

**Figure B9: Estimated Seats Without the Donations Effects**



Xs show the predicted number of seats based on the effects noted in the above analysis. Bars show the ranges for a 95% confidence level.

**Figure B10: Estimated Seats without Donors Effects**



Xs show the predicted number of seats based on the effects noted in the above analysis. Bars show the ranges for a 95% confidence level.

*Conclusion*

While the relationship between donations and donors and vote and seat share tend to be smaller than those of spending, for the most part, they point in the same direction as the analysis on spending. In Quebec, the impact on vote share is less clear, particularly with respect to impact the number of donors to a local association has on vote share. The difference between the number of seats the NDP is estimated to have won had the two fundraising measures not mattered and the number of seats the NDP won in reality is also lower than the differences noted in the main body of the paper.

**Appendix C- Models Using Spending as a Percentage of All Spending**

An alternative approach to measuring party spending is to look at spending as a percentage of all spending in the riding as opposed to spending as a percentage of the Elections Canada limit. This is done in this appendix. To calculate this, the percentage of the limit of the three major parties (four in Quebec) is summed to calculate the total percentage of the limit spent in each riding. The percentage of the limit spent by each major party is then divided by total for all parties (and multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation) to calculate the percentage of all spending in the riding spent by the given party. Because the percentage of spending by each major in each riding sums to 100, one party must be excluded in order to avoid collinearity. As Conservative spending has the weakest impact on NDP vote share, I set Conservative spending as the base category, excluding it from all regression analysis. I do not include descriptive analysis of the percentage of the limit spent in this appendix as that will mirror the descriptive analysis of spending as a percentage of the Elections Canada limit.

*Effect on NDP vote share*

Figure C1 shows that in the ROC each percentage point increase in NDP spending in a riding, as a percentage of all money spent, is correlated with an increase in NDP vote share of 0.25 points. By contrast, each percentage point of Liberal spending is correlated with a decrease in NDP vote share by about 0.02 points, though this finding is only statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. In Quebec a percentage point increase in NDP spending is correlated with a similar, though slightly smaller increase in NDP vote share, as demonstrated in figure B2. It, however, is not clear that Liberal spending has an effect on NDP vote share.

**Figure C1: Effect of Percentage of Total Spending on NDP Vote Share (ROC)**



The margins plot is for the model shown in table E7 in appendix E. Bars show the range of effects for a 95% confidence level.

**Figure C2: Effect of Percentage of Total Spending on NDP Vote Share (Quebec)**



The margins plot is for the model shown in table E8 in appendix E. Bars show the range of effects for a 95% confidence level.

 When one models the effect of a percentage of spending on the seats that a party wins, the results are very similar to the analysis that uses percentage of the Elections Canada limit. In each election year the NDP is estimated to have won fewer seats had spending not mattered than it did in reality. The difference is statistically significant in each election year. This analysis produces a more certain finding that the NDP was not hurt spending than the analysis of spending as a percentage of the Elections Canada limit.

**Figure C3: Estimated Seats Without Spending as Percentage of All Party Spending Effects**



Xs show the predicted number of seats based on the effects noted in the above analysis. Bars show the ranges for a 95% confidence level.

 The analysis of spending as a percentage of the amount of spent in each riding thus confirms the findings of the analysis that looks at spending as a percentage of the Elections Canada limit. If anything, the findings discussed in the main body of the paper come through even more starkly in the analysis of spending as percentage of all party spending. It is as clear in this analysis that spending affects vote share and even clearer that the NDP did not lose seats as a result of their overall disadvantage in local spending.

**Appendix D- Separate Regression Models for Each Year**

The models in the main body of the paper pool each election year together, generating a single effect of spending on election outcomes for each year. This assumes both the effect of party spending on vote share and standard errors for that effect will be consistent from year to year. One can relax these assumptions but running separate regression analyses for each year as is done in this appendix. The results are broadly similar to those presented in the main the body of the paper, confirming the paper’s findings.

 Figure D1 shows the correlation of NDP, Conservative, and Liberal spending with NDP vote share in each election between 2006 and 2011 in the ROC. It shows a fairly consistent positive correlation of NDP spending on NDP vote share. In each year one percentage point of NDP spending (against the Elections Canada limit) is worth just over 0.1 percentage points in vote share to the NDP. By contrast, each percentage point of Liberal spending costs the NDP votes, though never more than 0.1 percentage points in vote share. Finally, it is notable that effect of Conservative spending on vote share is never statistically significant, though the magnitude of the effect is always negative.

**Figure D1: Effect of Campaign Spending on NDP Vote Share (ROC)**



Xs show the effect of the party’s campaign spending on a riding’s NDP vote share from the models in appendix E, tables E9, E11, E13, and E15. Bars show the ranges for a 95% confidence level from those same models.

 Figure D2 shows that in Quebec the story is similar. Each percentage point of NDP spending is correlated with an increase in NDP vote share by just over 0.1 percentage points. Like in the ROC Liberal spending tends to decrease NDP vote share, but unlike in the ROC, Conservative spending tends to decrease it as well (though less so in 2008). The relationship between BQ spending and NDP vote share is less clear. In no year is the relationship statistically significant and in 2011 and 2015 the magnitude of the relationship is positive.

**Figure D2: Effect of Campaign Spending on NDP Vote Share (Quebec)**



Xs show the effect of the party’s campaign spending on a riding’s NDP vote share from the models in appendix E, tables E10, E12, E14, and E16. Bars show the ranges for a 95% confidence level from those same models.

 When one looks at how this effects NDP seat share, the results are less clear than in the main body of the paper, though there is still no evidence that the NDP is hurt by their local spending disadvantage. In each year analyzed it is estimated that the NDP would have won fewer seats than they did in reality had local spending not mattered, shown in figure D3. At the same time the difference in seat share for a 95% confidence level overlaps with the number of seats that the NDP, so one cannot be as certain that the NDP were not hurt by local spending as one can by when one looks at the analysis that pools election years.

**Figure D3: Seats won without spending effect compared to seats won in actuality**



Xs show the predicted number of seats based on the effects noted in the above analysis. Bars show the ranges for a 95% confidence level.

**Appendix E- Regression Tables**

Included in this appendix are the full regression tables for each of the analyses in the main body of the paper as well as in the other appendices.

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| **Table E1: Effect of Spending on Vote Share in ROC** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP |
| NDP Spending | -0.064\*\*\*[-0.079,-0.049] | -0.056\*\*\*[-0.069,-0.043] | 0.134\*\*\*[0.118,0.149] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.061\*\*\*[-0.078,-0.045] | 0.101\*\*\*[0.085,0.118] | -0.032\*\*\*[-0.045,-0.019] |
| Conservative Spending | 0.047\*\*\*[0.029,0.064] | -0.021\*\*[-0.037,-0.005] | -0.014\*[-0.029,0.000] |
| Previous Vote | 0.575\*\*\*[0.538,0.613] | 0.565\*\*\*[0.528,0.602] | 0.559\*\*\*[0.522,0.597] |
| Incumbent | 4.669\*\*\*[3.887,5.453] | 6.018\*\*\*[5.176,6.861] | 4.967\*\*\*[3.991,5.943] |
| Density | -0.097[-0.361,0.167] | 0.092[-0.159,0.342] | -0.226\*\*[-0.443,-0.008] |
| Franco Population | -0.021[-0.054,0.013] | 0.018[-0.014,0.050] | 0.013[-0.015,0.041] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.022\*[-0.045,0.002] | 0.049\*\*\*[0.027,0.072] | 0.001[-0.018,0.020] |
| Median Income | 0.055\*\*\*[0.027,0.083] | -0.024\*[-0.050,0.002] | -0.030\*\*[-0.053,-0.007] |
| BC | 3.150\*[-0.129,6.428] | -4.208\*\*\*[-7.293,-1.124] | -0.631[-3.291,2.029] |
| Prairies | 7.817\*\*\*[4.560,11.074] | -6.153\*\*\*[-9.164,-3.141] | -1.778[-4.376,0.820] |
| Ontario | 4.056\*\*[0.932,7.180] | -3.691\*\*[-6.619,-0.764] | -0.724[-3.285,1.837] |
| Atlantic  | -0.222[-3.466,3.022] | 1.379[-1.676,4.433] | -1.307[-3.991,1.376] |
| 2008 | -0.271[-1.244,0.701] | -2.115\*\*\*[-3.039,-1.190] | -0.834\*\*[-1.640,-0.027] |
| 2011 | 1.485\*\*\*[0.476,2.493] | -4.309\*\*\*[-5.302,-3.316] | 5.298\*\*\*[4.467,6.128] |
| 2015 | -12.094\*\*\*[-13.388,-10.801] | 21.346\*\*\*[6.625,22.631] | -6.509\*\*\*[-7.605,-5.412] |
| Constant | 12.495 | 10.534 | 11.176 |
| R2 | 0.890 | 0.902 | 0.885 |
| Observations | 957 | 957 | 957 |
| \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01Estimates are based on a single seemingly unrelated regression model that account for the effect of each party’s spending on each party’s vote share.The range of effects for a 95% confidence level are in brackets. |

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| **Table E2: Effect of Spending on Vote Share in Quebec** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP | BQ |
| NDP Spending | 0.001[-0.042,0.045] | -0.059\*\*\*[-0.092,-0.025] | 0.143\*\*\*[0.104,0.182] | -0.069\*\*\*[-0.100,-0.038] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.016[-0.047,0.014] | 0.112\*\*\*[0.087,0.137] | -0.043\*\*\*[-0.070,-0.016] | -0.027\*\*[-0.050,-0.005] |
| Conservative Spending | 0.099\*\*\*[0.072,0.126] | -0.031\*\*\*[-0.050,-0.012] | -0.051\*\*\*[-0.073,-0.029] | -0.029\*\*\*[-0.048,-0.010] |
| BQ Spending | -0.028\*[-0.059,0.002] | -0.012[-0.036,0.011] | 0.011[-0.015,0.037] | 0.027\*\*[0.006,0.049] |
| Previous Vote | 0.524\*\*\*[0.457,0.592] | 0.450\*\*\*[0.374,0.526] | 0.466\*\*\*[0.375,0.558] | 0.621\*\*\*[0.564,0.678] |
| Incumbent | 9.145\*\*\*[7.420,10.871] | 4.317\*\*\*[2.671,5.963] | 2.653\*\*\*[1.147,4.159] | 6.672\*\*\*[5.505,7.838] |
| Density | -0.532\*\*\*[-0.930,-0.133] | -0.626\*\*\*[-0.949,-0.304] | 0.326\*[-0.026,0.677] | 0.443\*\*\*[0.157,0.728] |
| Franco Population | 0.022[-0.040,0.083] | -0.045\*[-0.098,0.008] | -0.032[-0.086,0.022] | -0.036[-0.082,0.010] |
| Visible Minority Population | 0.020[-0.078,0.118] | 0.271\*\*\*[0.185,0.356] | -0.142\*\*\*[-0.230,-0.054] | -0.100\*\*\*[-0.170,-0.030] |
| Median Income | -0.025[-0.090,0.039] | 0.006[-0.044,0.057] | -0.009[-0.066,0.049] | 0.017[-0.028,0.063] |
| 2008 | -14.696\*\*\*[-16.813,-12.580] | 12.134\*\*\*[10.336,13.932] | 3.760\*\*\*[1.957,5.563] | 0.915[-0.509,2.340] |
| 2011 | -15.506\*\*\*[-17.511,-13.502] | -0.112[-1.721,1.497] | 31.661\*\*\*[29.901,33.421] | -7.360\*\*\*[-8.804,-5.917] |
| 2015 | -11.960\*\*\*[-15.001,-8.920] | 26.502\*\*\*[23.996,29.007] | -3.842\*[-7.953,0.270] | -0.537[-3.066,1.993] |
| Constant | 18.408 | 3.586 | 11.010 | 10.409 |
| R2 | 0.799 | 0.923 | 0.904 | 0.938 |
| Observations | 301 | 301 | 301 | 301 |
| \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01Estimates are based on a single seemingly unrelated regression model that account for the effect of each party’s spending on each party’s vote share.The range of effects for a 95% confidence level are in brackets. |

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| **Table E3: Effect of Donations on Vote Share in ROC** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP |
| NDP Spending | -0.039\*\*\*[-0.057,-0.020] | -0.030\*\*\*[-0.047,-0.013] | 0.057\*\*\*[0.040,0.075] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.011\*\*[-0.020,-0.002] | 0.035\*\*\*[0.026,0.043] | -0.017\*\*\*[-0.025,-0.010] |
| Conservative Spending | 0.004[-0.004,0.011] | 0.004[-0.003,0.011] | -0.004[-0.011,0.003] |
| Previous Vote | 0.667\*\*\*[0.631,0.702] | 0.654\*\*\*[0.619,0.690] | 0.690\*\*\*[0.654,0.725] |
| Incumbent | 5.050\*\*\*[4.239,5.861] | 6.042\*\*\*[5.181,6.903] | 5.789\*\*\*[4.768,6.810] |
| Density | -0.139[-0.423,0.145] | -0.068[-0.337,0.200] | 0.026[-0.219,0.272] |
| Franco Population | -0.025[-0.060,0.010] | 0.012[-0.021,0.045] | 0.018[-0.013,0.048] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.007[-0.031,0.017] | 0.044\*\*\*[0.021,0.068] | -0.010[-0.031,0.010] |
| Median Income | 0.059\*\*\*[0.030,0.088] | -0.016[-0.042,0.011] | -0.038\*\*\*[-0.063,-0.013] |
| BC | 2.983\*[-0.417,6.382] | -4.573\*\*\*[-7.773,-1.373] | 0.140[-2.759,3.040] |
| Prairies | 7.114\*\*\*[3.749,10.478] | -6.262\*\*\*[-9.369,-3.154] | -1.011[-3.826,1.804] |
| Ontario | 3.605\*\*[0.369,6.841] | -3.290\*\*[-6.320,-0.259] | -0.568[-3.366,2.231] |
| Atlantic  | 0.027[-3.337,3.390] | 1.158[-2.008,4.325] | -1.336[-4.272,1.601] |
| 2008 | 0.094[-0.914,1.102] | -3.020\*\*\*[-3.986,-2.055] | -0.720[-1.600,0.159] |
| 2011 | 1.589\*\*\*[0.548,2.631] | -4.878\*\*\*[-5.922,-3.833] | 5.597\*\*\*[4.691,6.504] |
| 2015 | -11.167\*\*\*[-12.488,-9.847] | 19.131\*\*\*[17.775,20.486] | -6.612\*\*\*[-7.749,-5.476] |
| Constant | 7.012 | 9.681 | 9.412 |
| R2 | 0.882 | 0.895 | 0.862 |
| Observations | 957 | 957 | 957 |
| \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01Estimates are based on a single seemingly unrelated regression model that account for the effect of each party’s spending on each party’s vote share.The range of effects for a 95% confidence level are in brackets. |

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| **Table E4: Effect of Donations on Vote Share in Quebec** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP | BQ |
| NDP Spending | -0.014[-0.082,0.054] | -0.028[-0.083,0.026] | 0.107\*\*\*[0.042,0.172] | -0.045\*[-0.092,0.002] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.005[-0.020,0.011] | 0.031\*\*\*[0.018,0.043] | -0.008[-0.022,0.006] | -0.018\*\*\*[-0.029,-0.007] |
| Conservative Spending | 0.027\*\*\*[0.008,0.045] | -0.025\*\*\*[-0.040,-0.011] | -0.017\*\*[-0.034,-0.001] | 0.006[-0.007,0.019] |
| BQ Spending | -0.055\*\*[-0.104,-0.006] | -0.008[-0.046,0.030] | 0.025[-0.019,0.068] | 0.034[-0.001,0.070] |
| Previous Vote | 0.627\*\*\*[0.562,0.691] | 0.588\*\*\*[0.514,0.663] | 0.591\*\*\*[0.497,0.685] | 0.703\*\*\*[0.649,0.757] |
| Incumbent | 8.076\*\*\*[6.303,9.849] | 3.289\*\*\*[1.577,5.000] | 2.139\*\*\*[0.543,3.735] | 5.834\*\*\*[4.593,7.075] |
| Density | -0.707\*\*\*[-1.123,-0.290] | -0.599\*\*\*[-0.942,-0.255] | 0.600\*\*\*[0.218,0.983] | 0.426\*\*\*[0.128,0.723] |
| Franco Population | 0.025[-0.032,0.082] | -0.074\*\*\*[-0.127,-0.022] | -0.027[-0.080,0.025] | -0.018[-0.061,0.025] |
| Visible Minority Population | 0.029[-0.073,0.132] | 0.216\*\*\*[0.124,0.309] | -0.170\*\*\*[-0.268,-0.073] | -0.045[-0.117,0.027] |
| Median Income | -0.029[-0.095,0.038] | 0.000[-0.054,0.055] | 0.002[-0.060,0.064] | 0.018[-0.028,0.064] |
| 2008 | -12.379\*\*\*[-14.369,-10.390] | 11.182\*\*\*[9.456,12.908] | 2.840\*\*\*[1.195,4.485] | 0.208[-1.032,1.449] |
| 2011 | -15.261\*\*\*[-17.281,-13.241] | -0.765[-2.430,0.900] | 30.801\*\*\*[28.996,32.606] | -7.208\*\*\*[-8.631,-5.784] |
| 2015 | -12.818\*\*\*[-15.613,-10.023] | 26.443\*\*\*[23.983,28.903] | -5.769\*\*\*[-9.914,-1.625] | 0.700[-1.571,2.970] |
| Constant | 18.935 | 5.371 | 7.197 | 3.873 |
| R2 | 0.780 | 0.910 | 0.884 | 0.935 |
| Observations | 301 | 301 | 301 | 301 |
| \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01Estimates are based on a single seemingly unrelated regression model that account for the effect of each party’s spending on each party’s vote share.The range of effects for a 95% confidence level are in brackets. |

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| **Table E5: Effect of Donors on Vote Share in ROC** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP |
| NDP Spending | -0.002\*\*\*[-0.004,-0.001] | -0.003\*\*\*[-0.004,-0.001] | 0.003\*\*\*[0.002,0.005] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.002\*\*[-0.003,-0.000] | 0.005\*\*\*[0.004,0.006] | -0.003\*\*\*[-0.004,-0.001] |
| Conservative Spending | 0.001[-0.000,0.001] | 0.000[-0.000,0.001] | -0.001\*\*[-0.001,-0.000] |
| Previous Vote | 0.684\*\*\*[0.650,0.718] | 0.678\*\*\*[0.643,0.713] | 0.712\*\*\*[0.678,0.746] |
| Incumbent | 5.059\*\*\*[4.260,5.857] | 5.895\*\*\*[5.034,6.756] | 5.836\*\*\*[4.812,6.859] |
| Density | -0.254\*[-0.525,0.017] | -0.058[-0.312,0.195] | 0.146[-0.088,0.380] |
| Franco Population | -0.024[-0.059,0.011] | 0.008[-0.025,0.041] | 0.019[-0.012,0.050] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.002[-0.026,0.021] | 0.055\*\*\*[0.032,0.079] | -0.024\*\*[-0.045,-0.004] |
| Median Income | 0.058\*\*\*[0.029,0.086] | -0.008[-0.034,0.018] | -0.042\*\*\*[-0.067,-0.016] |
| BC | 2.314[-1.088,5.715] | -4.309\*\*\*[-7.538,-1.079] | 0.775[-2.152,3.702] |
| Prairies | 6.488\*\*\*[3.127,9.849] | -5.983\*\*\*[-9.113,-2.853] | -0.579[-3.415,2.258] |
| Ontario | 3.267\*\*[0.025,6.509] | -3.296\*\*[-6.354,-0.238] | -0.205[-3.028,2.619] |
| Atlantic  | -0.126[-3.490,3.238] | 1.328[-1.859,4.514] | -1.344[-4.300,1.612] |
| 2008 | 0.067[-0.945,1.078] | -2.943\*\*\*[-3.916,-1.970] | -0.766\*[-1.653,0.122] |
| 2011 | 1.497\*\*\*[0.450,2.544] | -4.853\*\*\*[-5.911,-3.795] | 5.700\*\*\*[4.781,6.619] |
| 2015 | -11.755\*\*\*[-13.001,-10.509] | 19.708\*\*\*[18.399,21.018] | -6.483\*\*\*[-7.588,-5.378] |
| Constant | 6.657 | 8.259 | 9.158 |
| R2 | 0.882 | 0.894 | 0.860 |
| Observations | 957 | 957 | 957 |
| \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01Estimates are based on a single seemingly unrelated regression model that account for the effect of each party’s spending on each party’s vote share.The range of effects for a 95% confidence level are in brackets. |

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| **Table E6: Effect of Donors on Vote Share in Quebec** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP | BQ |
| NDP Spending | 0.003[-0.002,0.008] | -0.001[-0.006,0.003] | 0.003[-0.002,0.008] | -0.004\*\*[-0.007,-0.000] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.001[-0.005,0.004] | 0.008\*\*\*[0.004,0.011] | -0.002[-0.007,0.002] | -0.004\*\*[-0.007,-0.001] |
| Conservative Spending | 0.012\*\*\*[0.006,0.017] | -0.006\*\*\*[-0.010,-0.001] | -0.007\*\*\*[-0.012,-0.002] | -0.003[-0.007,0.001] |
| BQ Spending | -0.002[-0.006,0.002] | -0.001[-0.004,0.003] | 0.000[-0.003,0.004] | 0.002[-0.001,0.005] |
| Previous Vote | 0.620\*\*\*[0.555,0.685] | 0.580\*\*\*[0.505,0.654] | 0.602\*\*\*[0.509,0.695] | 0.684\*\*\*[0.629,0.738] |
| Incumbent | 8.224\*\*\*[6.483,9.965] | 3.529\*\*\*[1.835,5.224] | 2.405\*\*\*[0.827,3.983] | 6.179\*\*\*[4.989,7.370] |
| Density | -0.689\*\*\*[-1.096,-0.281] | -0.705\*\*\*[-1.051,-0.360] | 0.652\*\*\*[0.266,1.038] | 0.427\*\*\*[0.137,0.718] |
| Franco Population | 0.001[-0.054,0.056] | -0.059\*\*[-0.112,-0.006] | -0.013[-0.065,0.040] | -0.011[-0.055,0.033] |
| Visible Minority Population | 0.012[-0.087,0.112] | 0.265\*\*\*[0.174,0.357] | -0.170\*\*\*[-0.266,-0.073] | -0.066\*[-0.136,0.003] |
| Median Income | -0.029[-0.095,0.037] | -0.007[-0.062,0.048] | 0.004[-0.059,0.067] | 0.022[-0.025,0.068] |
| 2008 | -12.282\*\*\*[-14.267,-10.298] | 10.722\*\*\*[8.966,12.478] | 2.879\*\*\*[1.198,4.559] | 0.348[-0.901,1.596] |
| 2011 | -14.930\*\*\*[-16.978,-12.882] | -1.390[-3.124,0.344] | 30.799\*\*\*[28.945,32.653] | -7.005\*\*\*[-8.444,-5.567] |
| 2015 | -12.492\*\*\*[-15.235,-9.748] | 25.647\*\*\*[23.149,28.145] | -5.862\*\*\*[-9.984,-1.740] | 0.179[-2.142,2.500] |
| Constant | 19.815 | 4.623 | 6.431 | 4.527 |
| R2 | 0.784 | 0.907 | 0.880 | 0.934 |
| Observations | 301 | 301 | 301 | 301 |
| \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01Estimates are based on a single seemingly unrelated regression model that account for the effect of each party’s spending on each party’s vote share.The range of effects for a 95% confidence level are in brackets. |

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| **Table E7: Effect of Spending as a Percentage of Total Spending on Vote Share in ROC** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP |
| NDP Spending | -0.206\*\*\*[-0.238,-0.174] | -0.048\*\*\*[-0.073,-0.023] | 0.250\*\*\*[0.217,0.282] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.196\*\*\*[-0.229,-0.162] | 0.215\*\*\*[0.184,0.246] | -0.024\*[-0.050,0.003] |
| Previous Vote | 0.533\*\*\*[0.494,0.571] | 0.544\*\*\*[0.507,0.581] | 0.541\*\*\*[0.501,0.582] |
| Incumbent | 4.843\*\*\*[4.085,5.601] | 5.996\*\*\*[5.173,6.819] | 5.319\*\*\*[4.345,6.293] |
| Density | -0.221\*[-0.474,0.032] | 0.137[-0.101,0.376] | -0.146[-0.359,0.067] |
| Franco Population | -0.021[-0.054,0.011] | 0.025[-0.006,0.056] | 0.008[-0.020,0.036] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.019[-0.041,0.004] | 0.047\*\*\*[0.025,0.069] | 0.001[-0.018,0.020] |
| Median Income | 0.044\*\*\*[0.017,0.071] | -0.019[-0.044,0.006] | -0.023\*\*[-0.047,-0.000] |
| BC | 2.294[-0.905,5.492] | -3.408\*\*[-6.420,-0.396] | -0.109[-2.796,2.578] |
| Prairies | 6.971\*\*\*[3.785,10.157] | -5.436\*\*\*[-8.393,-2.480] | -1.290[-3.922,1.342] |
| Ontario | 3.526\*\*[0.481,6.571] | -3.222\*\*[-6.079,-0.366] | -0.220[-2.799,2.358] |
| Atlantic  | -0.636[-3.810,2.539] | 1.169[-1.819,4.157] | -0.444[-3.148,2.261] |
| 2008 | -0.080[-1.026,0.866] | -2.328\*\*\*[-3.225,-1.430] | -0.906\*\*[-1.713,-0.100] |
| 2011 | 1.825\*\*\*[0.842,2.809] | -4.694\*\*\*[-5.663,-3.724] | 5.287\*\*\*[4.456,6.117] |
| 2015 | -10.247\*\*\*[-11.429,-9.065] | 19.957\*\*\*[18.782,21.132] | -7.463\*\*\*[-8.438,-6.487] |
| Constant | 23.398 | 6.762 | 8.287 |
| R2 | 0.895 | 0.907 | 0.884 |
| Observations | 957 | 957 | 957 |
| \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01Estimates are based on a single seemingly unrelated regression model that account for the effect of each party’s spending on each party’s vote share.The range of effects for a 95% confidence level are in brackets. |

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| **Table E8: Effect of Spending as a Percentage of total Spending on Vote Share in Quebec** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP | BQ |
| NDP Spending | -0.169\*\*\*[-0.242,-0.096] | -0.002[-0.055,0.051] | 0.209\*\*\*[0.141,0.277] | 0.023[-0.028,0.073] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.157\*\*\*[-0.214,-0.100] | 0.209\*\*\*[0.167,0.252] | 0.022[-0.028,0.072] | -0.023[-0.063,0.016] |
| BQ Spending | -0.158\*\*\*[-0.207,-0.107] | 0.016[-0.017,0.050] | 0.088\*\*\*[0.047,0.128] | 0.059\*\*\*[0.022,0.095] |
| Previous Vote | 0.533\*\*\*[0.463,0.603] | 0.447\*\*\*[0.372,0.521] | 0.482\*\*\*[0.389,0.575] | 0.639\*\*\*[0.584,0.694] |
| Incumbent | 9.025\*\*\*[7.291,10.760] | 4.386\*\*\*[2.783,5.989] | 2.239\*\*\*[0.734,3.744] | 6.502\*\*\*[5.367,7.636] |
| Density | -0.425\*\*[-0.826,-0.024] | -0.505\*\*\*[-0.818,-0.193] | 0.324\*[-0.046,0.694] | 0.194[-0.098,0.487] |
| Franco Population | 0.002[-0.057,0.061] | -0.049\*[-0.100,0.001] | -0.030[-0.084,0.024] | -0.018[-0.064,0.028] |
| Visible Minority Population | 0.003[-0.098,0.105] | 0.226\*\*\*[0.142,0.311] | -0.127\*\*\*[-0.222,-0.033] | -0.044[-0.118,0.030] |
| Median Income | -0.019[-0.084,0.046] | 0.016[-0.034,0.065] | -0.013[-0.073,0.047] | 0.005[-0.042,0.052] |
| 2008 | -14.106\*\*\*[-16.157,-12.054] | 11.998\*\*\*[10.324,13.672] | 3.887\*\*\*[2.082,5.692] | 0.135[-1.269,1.540] |
| 2011 | -15.199\*\*\*[-17.182,-13.216] | -0.090[-1.611,1.432] | 31.651\*\*\*[29.857,33.444] | -7.868\*\*\*[-9.317,-6.420] |
| 2015 | -10.819\*\*\*[-14.189,-7.449] | 24.861\*\*\*[22.130,27.591] | -4.312\*\*[-8.547,-0.076] | -1.178[-3.854,1.498] |
| Constant | 32.598 | -0.293 | 3.420 | 5.898 |
| R2 | 0.800 | 0.927 | 0.896 | 0.934 |
| Observations | 301 | 301 | 301 | 301 |
| \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01Estimates are based on a single seemingly unrelated regression model that account for the effect of each party’s spending on each party’s vote share.The range of effects for a 95% confidence level are in brackets. |

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| **Table E9: Effect of Spending on Vote Share in 2015 in ROC** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP |
| NDP Spending | -0.121\*\*\*[-0.167,-0.075] | -0.047\*[-0.095,0.002] | 0.175\*\*\*[0.128,0.221] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.157\*\*\*[-0.204,-0.109] | 0.212\*\*\*[0.154,0.269] | -0.033\*[-0.070,0.004] |
| Previous Vote | 0.707\*\*\*[0.643,0.771] | 0.612\*\*\*[0.537,0.688] | 0.599\*\*\*[0.542,0.655] |
| Incumbent | 0.729[-0.267,1.724] | 1.733\*[-0.227,3.694] | 0.618[-0.853,2.089] |
| Density | 0.413\*\*[0.058,0.767] | -0.172[-0.614,0.270] | -0.033[-0.329,0.264] |
| Franco Population | -0.036[-0.083,0.012] | 0.063\*\*[0.004,0.122] | -0.005[-0.045,0.035] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.007[-0.039,0.026] | 0.062\*\*\*[0.021,0.104] | -0.044\*\*\*[-0.071,-0.017] |
| Median Income | 0.051\*\*[0.012,0.089] | -0.038[-0.084,0.009] | -0.004[-0.036,0.029] |
| BC | 3.506[-1.978,8.990] | -5.556[-12.366,1.254] | -4.491\*[-9.073,0.092] |
| Prairies | 11.892\*\*\*[6.452,17.333] | -9.819\*\*\*[-16.457,-3.180] | -7.558\*\*\*[-12.020,-3.097] |
| Ontario | 9.765\*\*\*[4.484,15.045] | -7.150\*\*[-13.685,-0.615] | -6.872\*\*\*[-11.306,-2.438] |
| Atlantic  | 1.198[-4.317,6.714] | 2.691[-4.139,9.522] | -9.243\*\*\*[-13.899,-4.588] |
| Constant | -2.267 | 29.898 | 7.776 |
| R2 | 0.919 | 0.851 | 0.892 |
| Observations | 260 | 260 | 260 |

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| **Table E10: Effect of Spending on Vote Share in 2015 in Quebec** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP | BQ |
| NDP Spending | -0.351\*\*\*[-0.450,-0.252] | 0.073\*[-0.006,0.151] | 0.162\*\*\*[0.075,0.248] | 0.138\*\*\*[0.059,0.217] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.292\*\*\*[-0.383,-0.202] | 0.270\*\*\*[0.196,0.344] | 0.031[-0.044,0.105] | -0.010[-0.078,0.058] |
| BQ Spending  | -0.407\*\*\*[-0.517,-0.296] | 0.016[-0.064,0.096] | 0.128\*\*\*[0.042,0.213] | 0.237\*\*\*[0.141,0.333] |
| Previous Vote | 0.466\*\*\*[0.334,0.598] | 0.422\*\*\*[0.242,0.602] | 0.376\*\*\*[0.262,0.489] | 0.461\*\*\*[0.307,0.615] |
| Incumbent | 0.996[-2.396,4.388] | 1.474[-1.662,4.611] | 2.141\*\*\*[0.840,0.3441] | 3.021[-2.741,8.784] |
| Density | 0.951\*\*\*[0.331,1.572] | -1.394\*\*\*[-1.972,-0.816] | 0.670\*\*[0.077,1.263] | -0.499\*[-1.032,0.033] |
| Franco Population | 0.428\*\*\*[0.222,0.635] | -0.251\*\*[-0.444,-0.058] | -0.268\*\*\*[-0.465,-0.071] | 0.102[-0.084,0.289] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.056[-0.188,0.076] | 0.275\*\*\*[0.128,0.422] | -0.233\*\*\*[-0.359,-0.108] | 0.047[-0.066,0.159] |
| Median Income | 0.159\*\*\*[0.064,0.254] | 0.034[-0.053,0.122] | -0.206\*\*\*[-0.298,-0.113] | 0.035[-0.048,0.119] |
| Constant | -14.877 | 39.785 | 39.323 | -11.895 |
| R2 | 0.857 | 0.877 | 0.656 | 0.815 |
| Observations | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 |

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| **Table E11: Effect of Spending on Vote Share in 2011 in ROC** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP |
| NDP Spending | -0.196\*\*\*[-0.246,-0.146] | -0.060\*\*[-0.105,-0.014] | 0.255\*\*\*[0.190,0.319] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.185\*\*\*[-0.240,-0.129] | 0.238\*\*\*[0.176,0.299] | -0.032[-0.091,0.027] |
| Previous Vote | 0.547\*\*\*[0.489,0.605] | 0.489\*\*\*[0.433,0.545] | 0.607\*\*\*[0.530,0.683] |
| Incumbent | 6.175\*\*\*[4.753,7.598] | 6.821\*\*\*[5.106,8.537] | 3.492\*\*\*[1.486,5.498] |
| Density | -0.560\*\*\*[-0.945,-0.174] | 0.364\*[-0.050,0.777] | 0.354\*[-0.061,0.769] |
| Franco Population | -0.074\*\*\*[-0.126,-0.021] | -0.025[-0.083,0.033] | 0.071\*\*[0.012,0.129] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.015[-0.048,0.018] | 0.024[-0.013,0.061] | 0.040\*\*[0.003,0.076] |
| Median Income | 0.014[-0.027,0.055] | 0.011[-0.033,0.056] | -0.049\*\*[-0.094,-0.004] |
| BC | 3.154[-1.468,7.777] | -5.821\*\*[-10.858,-0.784] | 1.598[-3.480,6.675] |
| Prairies | 6.462\*\*\*[1.904,11.021] | -5.298\*\*[-10.213,-0.383] | -0.110[-5,060,4.840] |
| Ontario | 4.955\*\*[0.611,9.298] | -5.871\*\*[-10.622,-1.120] | 3.316[-1.515,8.148] |
| Atlantic  | 5.180\*\*[0.634,9.726] | -1.814[-6.845,3.217] | 0.984[-4.097,6.064] |
| Constant | 24.167 | 3.176 | 10.459 |
| R2 | 0.937 | 0.902 | 0.908 |
| Observations | 232 | 232 | 232 |

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| **Table E12: Effect of Spending on Vote Share in 2011 in Quebec** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP | BQ |
| NDP Spending | -0.162\*\*\*[-0.262,-0.061] | -0.063\*[-0.129,0.003] | 0.433\*\*\*[0.253,0.613] | -0.129\*\*\*[-0.219,-0.040] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.135\*\*\*[-0.203,-0.066] | 0.106[-0.063,0.150] | 0.054[-0.054,0.162] | 0.023[-0.035,0.081] |
| BQ Spending  | -0.135\*\*\*[-0.196,-0.073] | -0.025[-0.055,0.005] | 0.202\*\*\*[0.123,0.280] | 0.018[-0.040,0.077] |
| Previous Vote | 0.685\*\*\*[0.591,0.779] | 0.531\*\*\*[0.445,0.616] | 0.777\*\*\*[0.526,1.029] | 0.627\*\*\*[0.538,0.717] |
| Incumbent | 5.511\*\*\*[2.847,8.175] | 3.262\*\*\*[1.439,5.086] | -5.768[-14.917,3.381] | 5.238\*\*\*[2.922,7.553] |
| Density | -0.004[-0.488,0.479] | 0.162[-0.176,0.501] | -0.716\*[-1.554,0.123] | 0.477\*\*[0.031,0.924] |
| Franco Population | -0.105\*\*[-0.187,-0.023] | 0.020[-0.036,0.075] | 0.030[-0.109,0.168] | -0.034[-0.108,0.040] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.040[-0.179,0.099] | 0.126\*\*[0.026,0.225] | -0.070[-0.309,0.169] | -0.081[-0.210,0.048] |
| Median Income | -0.055[-0.129,0.019] | 0.003[-0.047,0.052] | 0.075[-0.057,0.207] | -0.051[-0.119,0.018] |
| Constant | 23.007 | -2.746 | 16.513 | 4.176 |
| R2 | 0.927 | 0.969 | 0.670 | 0.919 |
| Observations | 74 | 74 | 74 | 74 |

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| **Table E13: Effect of Spending on Vote Share in 2008 in ROC** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP |
| NDP Spending | -0.221\*\*\*[-0.293,-0.148] | -0.050\*\*[-0.098,-0.003] | 0.345\*\*\*[0.272,0.419] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.244\*\*\*[-0.318,-0.169] | 0.229\*\*\*[0.168,0.290] | -0.008[-0.064,0.048] |
| Previous Vote | 0.386\*\*\*[0.297,0.476] | 0.559\*\*\*[0.477,0.642] | 0.386\*\*\*[0.290,0.483] |
| Incumbent | 10.901\*\*\*[9.021,12.782] | 10.286\*\*\*[8.545,12.027] | 11.231\*\*\*[9.113,13.350] |
| Density | -0.526\*[-1.113,0.061] | 0.389[-0.105,0.883] | -0.677\*\*\*[-1.164,-0.191] |
| Franco Population | 0.059[-0.013,0.131] | 0.025[-0.034,0.085] | -0.030[-0.091,0.030] |
| Visible Minority Population | 0.015[-0.039,-0.068] | -0.022[-0.069,0.024] | 0.036[-0.007,0.080] |
| Median Income | 0.003[-0.063,0.070] | 0.021[-0.034,0.076] | -0.026[-0.081,0.030] |
| BC | 0.138[-6.433,6.710] | 2.875[-2.550,8.301] | -2.166[-7.523,3.190] |
| Prairies | 0.844[-5.813,7.501] | 3.397[-1.991,8.785] | -0.636[-5.933,4.661] |
| Ontario | -1.480[-7.698,4.738] | 4.025[-1.059,9.109] | -1.456[-6.585,3.672] |
| Atlantic  | -10.176\*\*\*[-16.671,-3.682] | 6.464\*\*[1.147,11.780] | 3.862[-1.527,9.252] |
| Constant | 34.854 | -6.239 | 8.017 |
| R2 | 0.891 | 0.918 | 0.892 |
| Observations | 232 | 232 | 232 |

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| **Table E14: Effect of Spending on Vote Share in 2008 in Quebec** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP | BQ |
| NDP Spending | -0.129\*\*[-0.242,-0.017] | 0.039[-0.053,0.131] | 0.289\*\*\*[0.205,0.372] | -0.161\*\*\*[-0.242,-0.079] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.109\*\*[-0.211,-0.007] | 0.299\*\*\*[0.209,0.390] | -0.028[-0.094,0.037] | -0.065\*[-0.140,0.009] |
| BQ Spending  | -0.009[-0.082,0.064] | 0.020[-0.036,0.076] | -0.010[-0.054,0.034] | -0.001[-0.053,0.052] |
| Previous Vote | 0.647\*\*\*[0.514,0.779] | 0.412\*\*\*[0.271,0.553] | 0.272\*\*[0.033,0.512] | 0.695\*\*\*[0.604,0.786] |
| Incumbent | 7.968\*\*\*[4.410,11.525] | 5.338\*\*\*[2.508,8.167] | 14.186\*\*\*[9.959,18.413] | 6.380\*\*\*[4.437,8.323] |
| Density | -0.573\*[-1.200,0.055] | -0.422[-0.974,0.131] | 0.210[-0.196,0.617] | 0.359[-0.103,0.821] |
| Franco Population | -0.176\*\*\*[-0.277,-0.076] | 0.035[-0.066,0.135] | 0.047[-0.019,0.113] | 0.039[-0.040,0.118] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.051[-0.275,0.174] | 0.194\*[-0.009,0.397] | 0.073[-0.073,0.220] | -0.004[-0.171,0.164] |
| Median Income | -0.090[-0.198,0.017] | -0.017[-0.107,0.073] | 0.155\*\*\*[0.085,0.225] | -0.031[-0.110,0.049] |
| Constant | 28.292 | 5.034 | -3.263 | 4.117 |
| R2 | 0.893 | 0.937 | 0.773 | 0.960 |
| Observations | 74 | 74 | 74 | 74 |

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| **Table E15: Effect of Spending on Vote Share in 2006 in ROC** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP |
| NDP Spending | -0.246\*\*\*[-0.303,-0.189] | -0.037\*[-0.078,0.003] | 0.272\*\*\*[0.215,0.329] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.107\*\*\*[-0.162,-0.052] | 0.096\*\*\*[0.049,0.143] | 0.020[-0.018,0.058] |
| Previous Vote | 0.560\*\*\*[0.495,0.624] | 0.609\*\*\*[0.547,0.671] | 0.573\*\*\*[0.502,0.645] |
| Incumbent | 6.108\*\*\*[4.742,7.464] | 6.337\*\*\*[5.212,7.461] | 7.358\*\*\*[5.914,8.803] |
| Density | -0.074[-0.485,0.338] | -0.066[-0.434,0.302] | -0.239[-0.561,0.083] |
| Franco Population | -0.002[-0.052,0.048] | -0.016[-0.061,0.029] | 0.015[-0.024,0.055] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.029[-0.068,0.010] | 0.078\*\*\*[0.045,0.112] | -0.012[-0.041,0.016] |
| Median Income | 0.029[-0.068,0.010] | -0.059\*\*\*[-0.101,-0.018] | 0.007[-0.030,0.044] |
| BC | -3.117[-7.724,1.489] | -2.277[-6.414,1.860] | 4.993\*\*\*[1.410,8.577] |
| Prairies | 1.401[-3.235,6.037] | -6.727\*\*\*[-10.837,-2.617] | 4.036\*\*[0.495,7.576] |
| Ontario | -3.679[-8.076,0.718] | -2.137[-6.046,1.772] | 4.325\*\*[0.882,7.768] |
| Atlantic  | -2.378[-7.013,2.258] | -1.409[-5.534,2.716] | 3.642\*[-0.026,7.310] |
| Constant | 25.758 | 10.476 | -0.711 |
| R2 | 0.940 | 0.943 | 0.939 |
| Observations | 233 | 233 | 233 |

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| **Table E16: Effect of Spending on Vote Share in 2006 in Quebec** |
|  | Conservative | Liberal | NDP | BQ |
| NDP Spending | -0.417\*\*\*[-0.680,-0.154] | -0.013[-0.193,0.167] | 0.324\*\*\*[0.235,0.412] | 0.207\*\*[0.028,0.386] |
| Liberal Spending | -0.130\*\*[-0.235,-0.026] | 0.215\*\*\*[0.145,0.286] | 0.011[-0.018,0.040] | 0.028[-0.044,0.101] |
| BQ Spending  | -0.118\*\*\*[-0.199,-0.037] | 0.059\*\*[0.006,0.112] | 0.031\*\*\*[0.010,0.053] | 0.075\*\*\*[0.019,0.131] |
| Previous Vote | 0.169[-0.040,0.378] | 0.374\*\*\*[0.258,0.490] | 0.471\*\*\*[0.279,0.663] | 0.680\*\*\*[0.581,0.780] |
| Incumbent | 18.278\*\*\*[15.013,21.543] | 4.362\*\*\*[1.130,7.595] | Omitted | 8.289\*\*\*[6.295,10.283] |
| Density | -1.358\*\*\*[-2.132,-0.584] | -0.510\*[-1.069,0.049] | 0.278\*\*[0.060,0.495] | 0.694\*\*[0.159,1.230] |
| Franco Population | -0.020[-0.147,0.108] | -0.169\*\*\*[-0.276,-0.062] | -0.020[-0.056,0.015] | -0.064[-0.166,0.037] |
| Visible Minority Population | -0.178[-0.462,0.106] | 0.375\*\*\*[0.178,0.572] | -0.045[-0.123,0.033] | -0.116[-0.312,0.081] |
| Median Income | -0.186\*\*\*[-0.317,-0.055] | 0.013[-0.079.0.105] | 0.032[-0.005,0.068] | 0.029[-0.062,0.120] |
| Constant | 45.868 | 8.769 | 2.388 | 2.019 |
| R2 | 0.828 | 0.952 | 0.790 | 0.943 |
| Observations | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 |