**Supplementary Material**

**Appendix I: Cases to illustrate the arguments**

Case 1: The Taliban in Afghanistan

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan degenerated into a brutal civil war between rival mujahideen groups. As the mujahideen factions and warlords were fighting each other for power, Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the region, funding *madrassas* (religious boarding schools) in Pakistan that sought to spread the conservative Wahhabi version of Islam. The Taliban emerged in late 1994 as a Messianic movement made up of *Taliban* (literally, students) from *madrassas* who were living as refugees in Pakistan. They vowed to install a traditional Islamic government and end the fighting among the mujahideen. With massive covert assistance from Pakistan’s ISID, Army, and Air Force, it overthrew the largely Tajik (and northern) mujahideen regime in Kabul, capturing the capital in September 1996.

While Taliban was inspired by fundamentalist religious doctrines, it was organized primarily along ethnic and tribal lines. The leadership of the movement consisted almost exclusively of Ghilzai Pashtuns. The movement is largely led by a single tribe, with most of the senior leaders drawn from Mullah Omar’s own Hotaki tribe. Taliban was also highly centered on the charismatic Mullah Omar, who held mystical power that came from wearing the Cloak of the Prophet and ultimately made all the decisions within the organization. The success of Taliban depends on all members of the movement maintaining obedience to the amir through the command chain leading up to the supreme leader (Semple 2015: 11). Thus, as an organization held together by religious doctrines, obedience to armed mullahs, and kinship ties, Taliban served as an institutional vehicle to sustain the armed struggle (Johnson and Mason 2006, Rashid 1999), making it less necessary to form a political party.

Case 2: The FRELIMO in Mozambique

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) was a nationalist movement formed to achieve Mozambique’s independence from Portugal. During the prolonged independence war, FRELIMO faced a stubborn and strong enemy: the Portuguese government saw the overseas province as an integral part of the Portuguese state and was determined to violently exterminate the independence movement. The Portuguese army was reasonably disciplined and effective and, from a military point, held the upper hand during the 10-year conflict. To sustain the anti-colonial struggle, FRELIMO relied on its peasant network to provide critical supplies and ammunition. Popular mobilization in the “liberated areas” became a hallmark of FRELIMO’s strategy: villagers were required to participate in the weekly meetings for the purpose of political education and collective decision making. FRELIMO launched a project of popular empowerment that increased peasant access to education and health care, with party soldiers often assigned to medical assistance programs (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 84-99). By the time of independence, FRELIMO had become a party with strong roots in the society, earning “a substantial credibility in the minds of a large proportion of the country’s overall population” (Saul 2004: 1040, in Shillington 2004).

Case 3: The APRC in the Gambia

In the Gambia, a 1994 *coup detat* led by General Yahya Jammeh brought to an end a long period of civilian rule in the country. Facing international pressure and domestic economic troubles, however, Jammeh was forced to announce a two-year schedule for returning the country to civilian control. In preparation for the presidential election promised in 1996, Jammeh and a group of military cadres around him retired from active duties and formed a party called the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC). It soon became clear that the APRC was nothing more than an instrument to facilitate Jammeh’s personal rule. During his reign, Jammeh was ruthless in eliminating political rivals, including those who had once been his closest allies within the APRC. To prevent potential challengers from emerging, Jammeh maintained a high degree of cabinet turnover and promoted many APRC ministers from obscurity who were wholly dependent on the president’s favor (Perfect 2010: 61). Although civilian government has nominally been restored, the military remained the most important support base for Jammeh, who vowed to expand the roles and functions of the armed forces. As one observer commented, there was “no evidence that APRC intended to put the military under civilian control” (Edie 2000: 187-8). The organizational weakness of the APRC was manifested in the results of the legislative elections in 2017, one year after Yammeh was removed from power after defeat in the presidential election. The party won merely five seats in the National Assembly, a steep decline from the 43 seats it obtained in the previous election.

Case 4: The United Russia Party in Russia

In the 1990s, President Boris Yeltsin chosen not to build a pro-government party out of fear that his power would be challenged by strong party organizations (Levitsky and Way 2010: 187-8, Remington 2008: 965). Lacking the support of a stable majority party in the legislature, Yeltsin clashed with the *Duma* on a range of issues and the policy process was often deadlocked (Remington 2008: 970). Things changed after the inauguration of Vladmir Putin, who decided to support a dominant party that could serve as a stable voting bloc for the passage of his legislative initiatives and an instrument to co-opt powerful regional leaders. This effort led to the formation of the United Russia (UR), a much more robust organization than any of the pro-regime blocs that existed during the Yeltsin years. The UR largely controlled career advancement in the legislature, its strong voting discipline ensured the success of Putin’s legislative agenda, and it developed a solid structure that penetrated the national territory (Reuter 2017).

However, the UR’s genesis as a post-seizure creation still placed notable limits on its institutional strength. First, the party almost played no role in the selection of important members of the presidential administration, the real locus of power in Russian politics. The UR did not serve as a springboard to high-ranking positions in the executive branch. Indeed, senior officials in the presidential administration, including Putin himself, had remained formally outside of the ruling party (Bader 2011: 194-5, Remington 2008: 974, Reuter 2017). Second, the UR lacked independent power in making policy and voting decisions, which were all externally determined by the Kremlin. As one scholar put it, “in the present system the Kremlin has the ability to intervene in any decision (the UR) chooses”, and that the dominant party merely “provide(s) a curtain behind which the Kremlin can pull the levers” (Slider 2010: 272).

Case 5: The KMT in Taiwan

The KMT-led government was defeated in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and fled to the island of Taiwan, where it quickly consolidated its one-party rule. Taiwan was characterized by substantial linkage to the West in the postwar period. The United States significantly influenced Taiwan’s modernization process through military support, economic aid, educational exchanges, and social interactions (Tucker 1994). Starting from the 1970s, especially after the ROC’s eviction from the United Nations, the KMT faced growing international pressure to liberalize the political system. The KMT government realized that it must pursue political liberalization to gain legitimacy and retain Western support. Reforms were carried out that gradually reduced the KMT’s dominance in the political system: non-KMT members were appointed to government posts, the martial law was lifted in 1987 to allow the formation of opposition parties, and censorship was gradually ceased (Hood 1997). Meanwhile, foreign pressure did not prevent the KMT from maintaining a highly centralized party organization that penetrated deep into society. Due to the introduction of controlled elections since the 1950s, the KMT had experienced electoral candidates and a proven effective electoral machine. The KMT expanded its support base during the 19770s by recruiting local Taiwanese into the party, re-constituting the KMT as a more Taiwanese party. The KMT also completed two smooth leadership successions after the death of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, making the party less identified with the Chiang family. Although the institutionalization of the KMT did not prevent Taiwan’s transition to democracy, it did place the party in a strong position to thrive as a dominant party in the democratic era (Slater and Wong, 2013).

Case 6: The MPLA in the Angola

Angola is blessed with a vast wealth of natural resource that includes oil and diamonds. The oil sector alone accounts for 50-60 percent of GDP and 75-80 percent of government revenues. In post-independence Angola, natural resource wealth has negatively affected the strength of the ruling MPLA through two mechanisms. First, the oil revenue allows the ruling elite to enrich themselves and largely neglect non-oil tax revenues. The MPLA regime therefore has little incentive to care about the needs of the population. Instead of deepening its social roots and building broad-based support, the party relies heavily on Europeanized coastal peoples. The population as a whole has not benefited much from oil riches, as income distribution remains extremely skewed. Second, oil wealth allows the MPLA regime to build a large coercive force, which serves as a substitute for strong parties to maintain regime stability. Angola ranked the 11th biggest military spender in the world in 2010, in terms of military expenditures as percentage of GDP. It also has a large number of private security companies. During the protracted civil war, oil provided the critical financial resources for the MPLA regime to sustain its military campaign against the rebel group UNITA. Due to the corrosive effects of resource rents, although the MPLA came to power through an anti-colonial revolutionary struggle, the ruling party is highly personalistic and very narrowly based (Amundsen 2014; Barrows 2012; Hammond 2011; Frynas and Wood 2001).

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**Appendix II Testing additional implications of the theory**

In this appendix, we test several additional observable implications of the general theory. First, the theory contends that, if the current regime allows for multiparty elections through which the opposition can contest national power, the power-seeking group will have less incentive to build strong parties, especially along the dominance dimension. The argument predicts that parties that were formed under regimes that allowed multiparty elections will be weaker after they seize power. To test this hypothesis, we focus on a sub-sample of ruling parties that were formed under the previous regime and seized power through elections, coups, or armed rebellions. Ruling parties that were created by dictators after seizure of power or imposed by foreign countries are excluded since they were not opposition groups that managed to overthrow the old regimes. We consulted the HTW dataset (Wahman et al. 2013) and relevant historical records to code whether multiparty elections were present in the previous regime. A dummy variable (*multiparty*) was created that equals one if such elections existed. As shown in Table 1, the presence of multiparty elections negatively affects control over military and legislative cohesion. This provides moderate support for the argument that the existence of legal pathway to power reduces incentives of party building. The absence of the legal channel forces the opposition to build stronger parties that engaged in armed resistance (among the 33 ruling parties that won power through armed rebellion, multiparty elections were absent in 28 cases).

Second, we test the argument that parties created to overthrow weak regimes tend to be weaker compared with those that faced strong incumbents. As a proxy for the strength of previous regimes, we used GWF’s authoritarian regime classifications. Because personalist and military dictatorships are usually considered fragile and narrowly based regimes, we created a dummy variable *weak former regime* that equals one if the former regime was personalist, military, or a hybrid of the two (GWF coded some regimes as hybrids). Testing the argument requires a sample of ruling parties that came to power by forcibly toppling the previous regimes. Among the ARPD dataset’s classification of how parties gained power, two categories fit this condition: those that led an armed takeover of the state and those that led a coup. In total there are 40 ruling parties in the sample. Table 2 shows that effects of overthrowing a weak regime on subsequent party strength. We find that parties that gained power on the heels of weak regimes tend to have less control over the cabinet and are more prone to party switching. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions. However, these parties are also found to demonstrate more legislative cohesion. This unexpected result may indicate the need for better operationalization of key variables or more fine-grained theorizing. We look forward to clarifying this point in future studies.

Third, we test the argument that, after seizing power, the dictator is more likely to form a ruling party if he intends to gain legitimacy by winning elections. If the argument is right, the timing of party formation should be in close proximity to the next national election. The fact parties were formed shortly before elections suggest that they were used by dictators as instruments to gain popular mandate. On the other hand, if there is a considerable time lapse between the two events, the validity of the argument should be questioned. To test the prediction, we relied on the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) Dataset to identify the time lapse between party formation and the following elections. For the 78 ruling parties created by sitting dictators for which election data is available, 32 (41.0 percent) were formed in the same year as the next election, and 22 (28.2 percent) were formed just one year before the next election. Considering the fact that not all dictatorships hold elections, and that the interval between national elections is typically 3-5 years, the time proximity between party formation and elections, as revealed by the data, is unlikely to be coincidental. That is, if the desire to win elections does not drive the decision to form a ruling party, the probability that 69.2 percent of post-seizure creation took place in the year of or one year before elections is quite low. The evidence, while suggestive, is consistent with our argument.

**Table 1 The effects of multiparty party elections under previous region on party strength**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | legislative cohesion |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| multiparty elections under previous regime | 0.0741 | 0.0458 | -1.5889\*\* | -2.4251 | -0.7527\* |
|  | (1.20) | (0.10) | (-2.35) | (-0.89) | (-1.90) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.1315\*\*\* | -1.4626\*\* | -2.5647\*\* | -2.0278\*\* | -0.2108\* |
|  | (-4.00) | (-2.34) | (-2.05) | (-2.24) | (-1.94) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| regional democracy | 0.2025\*\* | -0.5677 | -0.9271 | -4.0712 | 0.0304 |
|  | (2.34) | (-0.50) | (-0.66) | (-0.80) | (0.09) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0082 | -0.1867 | -0.4385 | 0.8607 | 0.1040 |
|  | (0.27) | (-0.62) | (-1.14) | (0.83) | (0.82) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 0.2425\*\*\* | 1.1717 | 0.5763 | -0.4601 | 0.4691\* |
|  | (2.71) | (1.09) | (0.54) | (-0.20) | (1.77) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | 0.1240 | 1.8232 | -1.4291 | -10.4619\*\* | -0.6989 |
|  | (0.97) | (1.51) | (-1.19) | (-2.51) | (-0.93) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | -0.0274 | 0.1828 | 0.2050 | -3.2512\*\*\* | -0.4601\*\* |
|  | (-0.94) | (1.19) | (1.10) | (-3.98) | (-2.54) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party age | -0.0008 | 0.0516\*\*\* | 0.0267 | 0.1631\*\*\* | 0.0147\*\*\* |
|  | (-0.67) | (3.26) | (1.54) | (4.96) | (3.42) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cold War | -0.0069 | 1.2850\*\*\* | 0.2990 | 4.6860\*\*\* | 0.2167\*\* |
|  | (-0.28) | (3.02) | (0.82) | (3.92) | (2.44) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| oil price | 0.0009\* | -0.0006 | 0.0174\*\*\* | -0.0102 | 0.0011 |
|  | (1.67) | (-0.11) | (3.65) | (-1.17) | (1.20) |
| Observations | 1328 | 1328 | 1328 | 1280 | 1328 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. t statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by country.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table 2 The effects of overthrowing a weak regime on subsequent party strength**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | legislative cohesion |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| weak former regime | -0.0661 | -3.9197\*\*\* | 0.5152 | -6.9443\*\*\* | 0.8002\*\*\* |
|  | (-0.76) | (-3.73) | (0.69) | (-4.21) | (4.70) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.1812\*\*\* | -2.9495\*\*\* | -2.0072\*\* | -1.0810\* | -0.1766\*\* |
|  | (-5.63) | (-7.79) | (-2.07) | (-1.65) | (-2.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| regional democracy | 0.2759\*\*\* | 10.9982\*\*\* | -2.2547 | 0.7060 | 0.0475 |
|  | (2.76) | (3.65) | (-1.62) | (0.24) | (0.16) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0392\*\* | -1.4798\*\*\* | -0.8250\* | 0.5123 | 0.0323 |
|  | (2.08) | (-4.22) | (-1.68) | (0.87) | (0.34) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 0.1984\* | 2.2831\* | 0.5310 | -3.1817 | 0.1955 |
|  | (1.85) | (1.66) | (0.48) | (-1.11) | (1.36) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | -0.0012 | 0.8830 | -0.1158 | -20.2775\* | -0.3558 |
|  | (-0.00) | (0.46) | (-0.06) | (-1.94) | (-0.22) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | -0.0720 | 1.0781\*\* | 0.1066 | 0.5075 | -0.3641\*\* |
|  | (-1.39) | (2.12) | (0.37) | (0.32) | (-2.30) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party age | 0.0012 | 0.1057\*\*\* | 0.0904\*\*\* | -0.0119 | 0.0084\* |
|  | (0.49) | (4.65) | (3.38) | (-0.42) | (1.88) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cold War | 0.0380 | 3.2779\*\*\* | 1.0019\*\* | 1.4767 | 0.1401 |
|  | (1.04) | (5.66) | (2.00) | (1.41) | (1.41) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| oil price | 0.0015 | 0.0039 | 0.0205\*\* | 0.0055 | 0.0016\* |
|  | (1.53) | (0.26) | (2.32) | (0.53) | (1.69) |
| Observations | 465 | 465 | 465 | 465 | 465 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. t statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by country.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Appendix III: The construction of the party strength index**

Based on the theoretical discussion, five variables are employed to measure party strength. The first variable (*de-personalization*) indicates the extent to which power is personalized at the expense of the party. The second and third variables (*legislative cohesion, party switching*) reflect party cohesion. The fourth variable (*control cabinet*) measures party control over the state administration. The fifth variable (*control military*) shows how firmly the party controls the military.

Data on these variables are taken from two sources: the Authoritarian Regime Data Set collected by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (the GWF dataset)[[1]](#footnote-1) and the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) project (Coppedge et al. 2016, 2019). The V-DEM project provides indicators on different features of political parties, which are based on coding by thousands of country experts. Below we explain how these variables were constructed.

The first variable *de-personalization* isa time-varying latent variable that draws upon various regime features to indicate the degree to which “a dictator has personal discretion and control over the key levers of power in his political system.” Examples of these features include whether access to high office depends on personal loyalty to the regime leader and whether the party executive committee is absent or simply a rubber stamp of for the leader’s decision. GWF used a logistic item-response theory (IRT) model to synthesize these features and construct the measure *personalism.*[[2]](#footnote-2)We transform the original variable into an index called *de-personalization* ranging from 0 to 1, with higher levels of personalism approaches 0 and lower levels of personalism approaches 1.

The second variable measures party control over the state administration. *Cabinet control* shows the proportion of cabinet positions occupied by members of the ruling party. It is reasonable to assume that higher values of *control cabinet* indicate greater party control over the recruitment of elites into the executive branch. *Control cabinet* is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 3:

* 0: No support party.
* 1: 1/3 or more of cabinet positions go to non-party members.
* 2: Some but fewer than 1/3 of cabinet members are not party members.
* 3: Cabinet ministers (except defense) are party members.

The third variable shows how firmly the party controls the military. *Control military* is an ordinal variable that corresponds to five levels of party control:

* 0. Military controls party OR no party.
* 1. No party interference in military.
* 2. Party and military influence each other .
* 3. Party interferes in military but does not impose party structure.
* 4. Party imposes party structure on military.

The fourth and fifth variables are designed to reflect party cohesion. *Party switching* measures the percentage of the members of the national legislature that changes or abandons their party in between elections. We transform the variable so that higher values indicate lower percentages of party switching (greater cohesion). *Legislative cohesion* indicates how often party members vote as a coherent bloc on important bills. High levels of *cohesion* suggest that members tend to vote with their parties, and *vice versa*.

One cautionary note is that the V-DEM project’s coding of political parties is at the country-year level, not the party level. The country experts were asked to generalize across parties in a given country, focusing on “what the most common practices are” (see the codebook in Coppedge et al. 2019). In using this source, we assume that the experts have assigned additional weight to the ruling parties so that the country-level features approximate those of the ruling parties. Moreover, only two of the five indicators of party strength come from the V-dem data set. This allows us to assess whether the main findings still hold without using information from the V-DEM data set.

**Appendix IV: Robustness tests**

We perform a number of additional tests to examine if the main results are sensitive to alternative measurement of key variables, model specifications, and estimation methods. First, we run the main analysis with country fixed effects, which requires the exclusion of time-invariant covariates such as ruling parties’ genetic models. Therefore, this approach is mainly used to test the effects of resource wealth and external democratizing pressure. Compared with the random effects estimation, the fixed effects approach is more conservative as it does not make the strong assumption that unit-specific effects are uncorrelated with independent variables. Table 1 shows that the coefficients for *resource* and *regional democracy* still have the right signs but their p values have increased. This is not surprising since the fixed effects estimation only explore *within-country* variation. The power of resource wealth and international pressure to explain *between-country* variation in party strength is not reflected in this model.

(Table 1 about here)

Second, we look for other plausible ways of measuring the latent concept of international pressure. As alternative proxies, we employ the share of a country’s international governmental organization (IGO) co-members that are democratic, and the share of its military allies that are democratic. The assumption here is that extensive ties to external democracies through IGOs and military alliances can translate into democratizing pressure. Table 2 shows that IGO co-membership has a positive impact on de-personalization, but negatively affects other indicators of party strength. Table 3 shows that democratic alliances significantly reduce ruling parties’ dominance of the political system, but have no effect on other indicators of party strength. These results are broadly consistent with hypothesis 4 and 5.

(Table 2 and 3 about here)

Third, we examine whether dependence on foreign aid has similar negative effects on party strength as resource rents. Like resource wealth, foreign aid may be used to co-opt opposition and build up coercive, reducing the necessity of party building. Aid dependence is measured as the sum of commitments received from foreign countries and international organizations, divided by population. As shown in Table 4, aid dependence significantly increases the likelihood of party switching, but otherwise has no effect on the outcome. This may be due to the fact that aid dependence is more endogenous than resource wealth. Countries more dependent on foreign aid also tend to have closer ties to the West, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of rents from those of foreign pressure.

(Table 4 about here)

Fourth, considering the slow-moving nature of the dependent variables, using country-year observations might require difficult assumptions about the time needed for independent variables to show their effects. To address this concern, we conduct a cross-sectional analysis, using average values of party strength over a regime’s lifetime as the outcome. The independent variables are averaged accordingly. The results from Table 5 are largely similar to those from using country-year observations. One notable difference is that, in the cross-sectional analysis, international pressure no longer leads to more impersonalized ruling party. This shows that the positive effects of international pressure on party institutionalization is mainly realized *over time* within a regime, not between regimes.

(Table 5 about here)

Moreover, we perform analyses to examine how revolution and post-seizure creation affect party strength at the 5th, 10th, and 15th year in a regime’s lifespan. Since whether a regime survives to a particular year is by no means random, we use the Heckman selection model to correct bias from non-ramdomly selected samples. Four variables are used to predict regime survival: revolution, post-seizure creation, growth rate, and a regime’s total sum of trade with autocracies. In almost all models, post-seizure creation of the ruling party is negatively associated with regime survival to a given year, while growth rate and trade with autocracy increase survival rate. Revolutionary origins do not predict whether a regime can survive to the 5th or 10th year, but strongly predicts whether it can survive to the 15th year.

As shown in Table 6-8, revolution is positively associated with de-personalization and control over military at t=5 and t=10, but such effects disappear at t=15. Thus, revolutionary origins strongly determine whether a ruling party can last over 15 years, but among those parties that do pass the 15th year mark, revolutionary origins do not make much difference in terms of party strength. Put differently, the main benefits of revolution on party strength are realized in the first 15 years of a regime’s lifespan. By contrast, post-seizure creation continues to have negative effects on party strength 15 years after a regime’s founding.

(Table 6-8 about here)

Fifth, we examine the legacy of other pathways to power in addition to revolution and post-seizure creation. We focus on three such pathways: election (party wins an election, possibly uncompetitive), coup (party leads a coup), and foreign imposition (party installed by a foreign power). Table 9 shows the effects of each route to power on various indicators of party strength, with the reference group being all ruling parties that gained power through pathways other than the above-mentioned three. We find that ruling parties that gained power through elections tend to be more impersonal, but they are also less cohesive. Parties that came to power through coups tend to be more personalistic and have less control over cabinet positions, but are more cohesive in legislative voting. Finally, ruling parties imposed by foreign powers have significantly greater control over the cabinet and military. The explanation for this pattern is simple: the vast majority of these cases (451 country-year observations out of 482) were communist parties imposed by the Soviet Union. They adopted the model of Leninist vanguard party that asserted total control over state institutions. This result demonstrates the importance of Marxist-Leninist ideological doctrines on party strength.

(Table 9 about here)

Sixth, one may wonder whether the positive impact of revolution on party strength is an artifact of revolutionary parties being mostly communist. This is not the case. Among the 24 ruling parties coded by the ARPD as communist (organized as Communist with international involvement from the Communist International), only 8 came to power through revolutionary struggles. Indeed, if we focus only on the sub-sample of communist parties and re-run the main analysis (see Table 11), revolution is still positively associated with control over cabinet, control over military, and legislative cohesion. Thus, revolution positively affects party strength *independent of* the communist origins of these parties. Compared with other communist parties, however, those with revolutionary origins tend to be more personalistic, possibly due to the fact that revolutions were often led by charismatic leaders.

(Table 10 about here)

**Table 1 Fixed effects estimation**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | Legislative cohesion |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.0639 | -0.6867 | -2.2372 | -2.4685\*\* | -0.1897 |
|  | (-1.35) | (-1.47) | (-1.45) | (-2.03) | (-1.58) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| regional democracy | 0.3640\*\*\* | -1.4808 | -3.9282 | -4.0232 | -0.0761 |
|  | (2.85) | (-0.75) | (-1.61) | (-0.91) | (-0.21) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | -0.0002 | -0.1706 | 1.3831\*\* | -0.3510 | 0.1334 |
|  | (-0.01) | (-0.26) | (2.11) | (-0.34) | (1.35) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 0.1780\*\* | -1.3079 | 1.2106 | 1.7357 | 0.5688\*\*\* |
|  | (2.02) | (-1.41) | (0.92) | (0.73) | (2.96) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | -0.2347\*\*\* | -0.0901 | -1.5835 | -4.4373\*\*\* | -0.2432 |
|  | (-4.28) | (-0.12) | (-1.44) | (-2.69) | (-1.17) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party age | -0.0004 | 0.0319\* | 0.0177 | 0.1377\*\*\* | 0.0079\*\* |
|  | (-0.34) | (1.91) | (0.46) | (3.59) | (2.23) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cold War | -0.0514 | 1.3595\*\*\* | -0.4212 | 3.4400\*\*\* | 0.1410 |
|  | (-1.39) | (2.93) | (-1.25) | (3.14) | (1.59) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| oil price | 0.0003 | 0.0040 | 0.0057 | 0.0078 | 0.0022\*\* |
|  | (0.59) | (0.76) | (0.88) | (0.82) | (2.34) |
| Observations | 2329 | 2329 | 2329 | 2297 | 2345 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. t statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by country.

p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table 2 Explaining authoritarian party strength**

**(alternative measurement of international pressure 1)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | Legislative cohesion |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| revolution | 0.0267 | 0.9720\* | 1.6058\*\*\* | -0.4620 | -0.1978 |
|  | (0.36) | (1.67) | (2.98) | (-0.23) | (-0.67) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| post-seizure creation | -0.1771\*\*\* | -0.7869\*\* | -1.9343\*\*\* | 2.1012 | -0.3016 |
|  | (-2.91) | (-2.30) | (-4.28) | (1.00) | (-1.26) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.0872 | -2.1130\*\*\* | -1.6264 | -2.2003\*\* | -0.2185\*\* |
|  | (-1.39) | (-3.49) | (-1.28) | (-2.15) | (-2.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| IGO membership | 0.5297\*\* | -4.7600\* | -1.3118 | -8.5210\* | -0.6674\* |
|  | (2.19) | (-1.95) | (-0.54) | (-1.90) | (-1.80) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0156 | -0.0807 | -0.1305 | -0.1936 | 0.0946 |
|  | (0.39) | (-0.37) | (-0.45) | (-0.20) | (0.99) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 0.1487\* | 0.7481 | 0.8140 | 1.3610 | 0.5574\*\*\* |
|  | (1.69) | (0.65) | (0.76) | (0.61) | (3.12) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | -0.1391 | 1.1473\* | -1.8559\*\* | -7.9898\*\* | -0.6310 |
|  | (-1.49) | (1.67) | (-2.10) | (-2.39) | (-1.58) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | -0.0739\*\*\* | 0.1323 | 0.0550 | -2.3936\*\*\* | -0.0771 |
|  | (-2.75) | (1.02) | (0.41) | (-2.89) | (-0.55) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party age | -0.0019 | 0.0355\*\*\* | 0.0179\* | 0.1519\*\*\* | 0.0057 |
|  | (-1.48) | (4.11) | (1.81) | (3.65) | (1.64) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cold War | 0.0408 | 0.6682\* | 0.1778 | 4.3102\*\*\* | 0.0982 |
|  | (1.06) | (1.83) | (0.51) | (4.12) | (1.13) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| oil price | -0.0003 | 0.0031 | 0.0079\* | -0.0138 | 0.0019\* |
|  | (-0.55) | (0.65) | (1.80) | (-1.30) | (1.84) |
| Observations | 2208 | 2208 | 2208 | 2163 | 2208 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. t statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by country.

* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table 3 Explaining authoritarian party strength**

**(alternative measurement of international pressure 2)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | Legislative cohesion |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| revolution | 0.1163\*\* | 0.8524 | 1.5102\* | 0.2202 | 0.0093 |
|  | (2.38) | (1.13) | (1.88) | (0.13) | (0.03) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| post-seizure creation | -0.0528 | -0.5347 | -1.0294\*\* | 2.0616 | -0.2340 |
|  | (-0.76) | (-1.64) | (-2.50) | (0.91) | (-1.27) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.0840\* | -1.3269\*\* | -1.5347 | -2.4506\*\* | -0.1578 |
|  | (-1.65) | (-2.14) | (-1.19) | (-2.37) | (-1.60) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| democratic alliance | 0.0795 | -1.2143\*\* | -2.6522\*\*\* | -0.8459 | -0.3119 |
|  | (1.28) | (-2.49) | (-4.00) | (-0.35) | (-1.49) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0068 | -0.2838 | 0.1501 | -0.8504 | 0.1304 |
|  | (0.13) | (-1.30) | (0.38) | (-0.92) | (1.46) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 0.2137\* | -0.0891 | 0.4480 | 3.9266 | 0.4820\*\* |
|  | (1.93) | (-0.06) | (0.34) | (1.58) | (2.16) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | -0.0547 | 1.2890 | -0.7458 | -7.2349\* | -0.6258 |
|  | (-0.46) | (1.54) | (-0.93) | (-1.89) | (-1.42) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | -0.0463\* | 0.1953 | 0.2290\* | -2.1295\*\*\* | -0.1731 |
|  | (-1.86) | (1.36) | (1.94) | (-2.64) | (-1.35) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party age | -0.0013 | 0.0292\*\*\* | 0.0237\*\*\* | 0.1631\*\*\* | 0.0074\*\* |
|  | (-1.08) | (4.16) | (2.70) | (3.57) | (2.45) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cold War | -0.0138 | 1.7362\*\*\* | 0.8568\*\* | 5.8364\*\*\* | 0.2362\*\* |
|  | (-0.36) | (4.97) | (2.17) | (4.10) | (2.33) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| oil price | -0.0003 | 0.0013 | -0.0031 | -0.0104 | 0.0011 |
|  | (-0.49) | (0.29) | (-0.56) | (-0.93) | (1.09) |
| Observations | 1596 | 1596 | 1596 | 1596 | 1596 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. t statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by country.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table 4 The effects of aid dependence on party strength**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | legislative cohesion |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| revolution | -0.0144 | 1.1028 | 1.9119\*\*\* | 0.4715 | -0.3499 |
|  | (-0.17) | (1.58) | (2.81) | (0.22) | (-1.56) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ptycreate | -0.1406\*\*\* | -0.6443\* | -1.9794\*\*\* | 4.8161\* | -0.4710\*\* |
|  | (-2.76) | (-1.90) | (-3.33) | (1.88) | (-2.39) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.0874\* | -1.8790\*\*\* | -2.4199\* | -2.4449\* | -0.1665 |
|  | (-1.92) | (-3.04) | (-1.71) | (-1.92) | (-1.51) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| regional democracy | 0.2172\*\* | -1.7531\*\* | -2.3864\*\* | -8.0873 | -0.4414 |
|  | (2.01) | (-2.27) | (-2.25) | (-1.52) | (-1.21) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0015 | -0.0343 | -0.0819 | -0.0614 | 0.2367\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (-0.13) | (-0.23) | (-0.06) | (2.05) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 0.1561\* | 0.5166 | 1.5246 | 1.0754 | 0.3424 |
|  | (1.85) | (0.46) | (1.31) | (0.42) | (1.61) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | -0.1819 | 2.0212\*\*\* | -0.8996 | -7.2459\* | -0.2554 |
|  | (-1.59) | (2.86) | (-0.82) | (-1.83) | (-0.54) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | 0.0011 | 0.1277 | 0.1464 | -1.9832\* | -0.2091 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.90) | (0.88) | (-1.72) | (-1.35) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Party\_Age | -0.0023 | 0.0365\*\*\* | 0.0160 | 0.1773\*\*\* | 0.0107\*\*\* |
|  | (-1.61) | (4.03) | (1.63) | (3.87) | (2.68) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cold War | -0.0144 | 1.1190\*\*\* | -0.1422 | 4.6303\*\*\* | 0.2164\*\* |
|  | (-0.44) | (3.62) | (-0.53) | (4.07) | (2.39) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| oil price | 0.0008\*\* | 0.0026 | 0.0045 | 0.0104 | 0.0012 |
|  | (1.99) | (0.67) | (1.29) | (1.17) | (1.51) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| aid dependence | 0.0001 | 0.0011 | -0.0014 | -0.0068\*\* | -0.0003 |
|  | (0.94) | (0.48) | (-0.56) | (-2.03) | (-0.89) |
| Observations | 1590 | 1590 | 1590 | 1559 | 1590 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. t statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by country.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table 5 Explaining average party strength over regime lifetime**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | Legislative cohesion |
| revolution | 0.1423\*\* | 0.3355 | 1.4959\*\*\* | -0.5762 | -0.0528 |
|  | (2.43) | (1.42) | (5.22) | (-0.24) | (-0.20) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| post-seizure creation | -0.0959\*\* | -0.2686 | -0.5149\*\* | -0.5585 | -0.4435\*\* |
|  | (-2.38) | (-1.65) | (-2.61) | (-0.34) | (-2.46) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.3925\*\*\* | -0.6098 | -1.6415\*\*\* | -6.4432 | -0.5100 |
|  | (-3.30) | (-1.27) | (-2.82) | (-1.31) | (-0.96) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| regional democracy | 0.0204 | -2.3316\*\*\* | -1.5986\*\*\* | -12.2257\*\*\* | -0.4414 |
|  | (0.23) | (-6.47) | (-3.66) | (-3.35) | (-1.11) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0855\*\*\* | 0.0155 | 0.2722\*\* | 1.5112 | 0.1245 |
|  | (3.30) | (0.15) | (2.15) | (1.39) | (1.08) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | -0.4632 | 4.5107\*\* | 1.1064 | 46.3513\*\* | 6.9229\*\*\* |
|  | (-0.87) | (2.09) | (0.42) | (2.12) | (2.91) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | 0.0226 | 0.0600 | -0.2624 | -1.2563 | -0.2645 |
|  | (0.32) | (0.21) | (-0.77) | (-0.44) | (-0.85) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | -0.0002 | -0.0221 | -0.0368 | 0.2450 | -0.0558 |
|  | (-0.02) | (-0.40) | (-0.56) | (0.44) | (-0.93) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party age | -0.0009 | 0.0117\*\* | 0.0157\*\*\* | 0.1918\*\*\* | 0.0179\*\*\* |
|  | (-0.75) | (2.48) | (2.76) | (4.02) | (3.47) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| oil price | -0.0043\*\*\* | 0.0043 | 0.0123\*\* | 0.0245 | 0.0124\*\* |
|  | (-3.55) | (0.89) | (2.10) | (0.50) | (2.31) |
| Observations | 154 | 154 | 154 | 153 | 154 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. All variables are mean values over a regime’s lifetime. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. t statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by country.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table 6 Explaining average party strength at t=5**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | Legislative cohesion |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| revolution | 0.1839\*\* | 0.0861 | 1.7282\*\*\* | -2.6294 | -0.0781 |
|  | (2.51) | (0.28) | (4.29) | (-0.75) | (-0.20) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| post-seizure creation | -0.1644\*\* | -0.2636 | -0.5110\* | 0.9179 | 0.2717 |
|  | (-2.44) | (-0.56) | (-1.66) | (0.35) | (1.07) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.4300\*\* | -0.5843 | -0.5447 | -2.3238 | 0.1669 |
|  | (-2.17) | (-0.71) | (-0.50) | (-0.25) | (0.16) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| regional democracy | -0.0419 | -2.0948\*\*\* | -1.2735\*\* | -6.1830 | -0.0621 |
|  | (-0.37) | (-4.59) | (-2.08) | (-1.14) | (-0.10) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0488 | 0.0864 | 0.1283 | 1.4811 | 0.0819 |
|  | (1.46) | (0.59) | (0.71) | (0.93) | (0.35) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 0.9166\* | 1.7754 | -0.9093 | 55.7088\*\* | 4.1607 |
|  | (1.67) | (0.65) | (-0.31) | (2.18) | (1.47) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | -0.0092 | -0.1562\*\* | -0.0467 | 0.4239 | -0.0856 |
|  | (-0.56) | (-2.13) | (-0.52) | (0.54) | (-1.14) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | 0.0026 | 0.0084 | 0.0018 | 0.2249\*\*\* | 0.0135 |
|  | (1.52) | (1.18) | (0.19) | (2.77) | (1.25) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party age | -0.0012 | 0.0085 | 0.0106\* | -0.0277 | -0.0014 |
|  | (-1.00) | (1.59) | (1.68) | (-0.51) | (-0.25) |
| survive into 5th year |  |  |  |  |  |
| revolution | -0.0244 | -0.0157 | -0.0134 | -0.0148 | 0.0488 |
|  | (-0.06) | (-0.04) | (-0.03) | (-0.04) | (0.12) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| post-seizure creation | -0.8286\*\*\* | -0.8232\*\*\* | -0.8325\*\*\* | -0.8239\*\*\* | -0.8609\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.39) | (-3.38) | (-3.41) | (-3.40) | (-3.52) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 5.6449\*\* | 5.5952\*\* | 5.6623\*\* | 5.5440\*\* | 5.3950\*\* |
|  | (2.22) | (2.05) | (2.25) | (2.22) | (2.09) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| trade with autocracy | 12.4076\*\*\* | 11.9946\*\* | 12.5987\*\*\* | 12.0487\*\*\* | 11.6370\* |
|  | (2.95) | (2.10) | (2.87) | (2.70) | (1.81) |
| Observations | 148 | 148 | 148 | 147 | 148 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. All variables are mean values over a regime’s first 5 years. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. Heckman selection model is used to correct for bias from nonrandom sample selection. t statistics in parenthesis.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table 7 Explaining average party strength at t=10**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | Legislative cohesion |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| revolution | 0.1793\*\* | 0.2232 | 1.4789\*\*\* | -4.9894 | -0.1607 |
|  | (2.27) | (0.78) | (3.32) | (-1.45) | (-0.41) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| post-seizure creation | -0.1080 | -0.2179 | -0.5278 | 0.9721 | 0.0185 |
|  | (-1.60) | (-0.85) | (-1.42) | (0.27) | (0.06) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.4479\*\* | -0.8686 | -0.8948 | -4.7033 | 0.2765 |
|  | (-2.47) | (-1.29) | (-0.86) | (-0.61) | (0.32) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| regional democracy | -0.2267\* | -2.1772\*\*\* | -1.1957 | -3.9680 | 0.3219 |
|  | (-1.74) | (-4.46) | (-1.59) | (-0.73) | (0.55) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0778\*\* | 0.1353 | -0.0190 | 1.3203 | 0.1447 |
|  | (1.97) | (0.92) | (-0.08) | (0.80) | (0.72) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | -0.6512 | -0.9018 | -3.9913 | -45.3587 | 2.4210 |
|  | (-0.61) | (-0.23) | (-0.68) | (-0.96) | (0.50) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | -0.0008 | -0.0949 | -0.0989 | 0.7960 | -0.2090\*\* |
|  | (-0.04) | (-1.27) | (-0.86) | (0.96) | (-2.10) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | 0.0013 | 0.0003 | 0.0021 | 0.1122 | 0.0014 |
|  | (0.68) | (0.04) | (0.18) | (1.37) | (0.14) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party age | 0.0003 | 0.0063 | 0.0099 | 0.0004 | -0.0002 |
|  | (0.22) | (1.21) | (1.23) | (0.01) | (-0.03) |
| survive into 10th year |  |  |  |  |  |
| revolution | 0.4926 | 0.5083 | 0.5177 | 0.5130 | 0.5541 |
|  | (1.32) | (1.35) | (1.37) | (1.36) | (1.50) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| post-seizure creation | -0.6935\*\*\* | -0.7031\*\*\* | -0.7166\*\*\* | -0.7034\*\*\* | -0.7319\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.19) | (-3.23) | (-3.27) | (-3.23) | (-3.35) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 6.1666\*\* | 5.8652\*\* | 6.0339\*\* | 5.9431\*\* | 6.4713\*\* |
|  | (2.29) | (2.18) | (2.22) | (2.20) | (2.33) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| trade with autocracy | 6.3960\* | 10.4717\*\* | 10.5108\*\*\* | 10.3438\*\* | 9.8070\* |
|  | (1.94) | (2.57) | (2.59) | (2.53) | (1.67) |
| Observations | 159 | 159 | 159 | 158 | 159 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. All variables are mean values over a regime’s first 10 years. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. Heckman selection model is used to correct for bias from nonrandom sample selection. t statistics in parenthesis.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table 8 Explaining average party strength at t=15**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | Legislative cohesion |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| revolution | 0.0354 | -0.2693 | 0.2347 | -9.0099\*\*\* | -0.5787 |
|  | (0.43) | (-0.74) | (0.43) | (-2.76) | (-1.34) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| post-seizure creation | -0.1558\*\* | -0.0315 | -0.8715\*\* | -0.9810 | -0.2479 |
|  | (-2.27) | (-0.10) | (-2.09) | (-0.37) | (-0.66) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.4766\*\*\* | -1.1437\* | -1.5363 | -2.0445 | -0.5037 |
|  | (-3.13) | (-1.86) | (-1.64) | (-0.48) | (-0.71) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| regional democracy | -0.2343\* | -2.6383\*\*\* | -2.9547\*\*\* | -12.9152\*\*\* | -0.5755 |
|  | (-1.75) | (-5.15) | (-3.75) | (-3.84) | (-1.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0642 | 0.0118 | -0.3328 | -0.4098 | -0.0525 |
|  | (1.55) | (0.08) | (-1.36) | (-0.45) | (-0.30) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | -1.1088 | -9.2178\* | -12.2052\* | -173.4028\*\*\* | 1.8196 |
|  | (-0.92) | (-1.86) | (-1.68) | (-5.32) | (0.32) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | 0.0226 | 0.0261 | -0.0744 | 0.0755 | -0.0886 |
|  | (1.32) | (0.40) | (-0.74) | (0.24) | (-1.25) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | 0.0030\* | 0.0078 | 0.0255\*\* | 0.0115 | 0.0073 |
|  | (1.83) | (1.26) | (2.55) | (0.19) | (1.09) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party age | 0.0014 | 0.0039 | 0.0165 | 0.0260 | -0.0027 |
|  | (0.69) | (0.51) | (1.38) | (0.34) | (-0.33) |
| survive into 15th year |  |  |  |  |  |
| revolution | 0.7835\*\* | 0.8000\*\* | 0.8311\*\* | 0.4361 | 0.8000\*\* |
|  | (2.28) | (2.31) | (2.42) | (1.34) | (2.31) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| post-seizure creation | -0.5944\*\*\* | -0.6099\*\*\* | -0.6624\*\*\* | -0.5751\*\*\* | -0.6099\*\*\* |
|  | (-2.76) | (-2.81) | (-2.99) | (-2.64) | (-2.81) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 6.4700\*\* | 6.0406\*\* | 6.1807\*\* | 3.8292 | 6.0406\*\* |
|  | (2.34) | (2.17) | (2.23) | (1.46) | (2.17) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| trade with autocracy | 7.5318\*\* | 11.2683\*\*\* | 12.1349\*\*\* | 3.4170 | 11.2683\*\*\* |
|  | (2.49) | (2.99) | (3.45) | (1.51) | (2.99) |
| Observations | 170 | 170 | 170 | 169 | 170 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. All variables are mean values over a regime’s first 15 years. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. Heckman selection model is used to correct for bias from nonrandom sample selection. t statistics in parenthesis.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table 9 Explaining authoritarian party strength:**

**the legacy of other pathways to power**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | legislative cohesion |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| gained power through election | 0.1417\*\* | -0.4437 | 0.1516 | -2.1690\* | -0.5552\*\* |
|  | (2.15) | (-1.33) | (0.35) | (-1.66) | (-2.36) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| gained power through coup | -0.1710\*\*\* | -2.0847\*\*\* | 0.5979 | 0.2799 | 0.3311\*\*\* |
|  | (-3.26) | (-4.84) | (0.43) | (0.19) | (3.38) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| foreign imposed | 0.1999 | 3.3913\*\*\* | 3.1392\*\*\* | -10.1825 | -0.1279 |
|  | (1.60) | (3.43) | (4.40) | (-0.76) | (-0.56) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.0832\*\* | -1.4513\*\*\* | -1.3997 | -2.4608\*\* | -0.1728 |
|  | (-2.01) | (-2.67) | (-1.49) | (-2.06) | (-1.61) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| regional democracy | 0.3107\*\*\* | -2.6724\*\*\* | -1.7982\* | -3.8403 | -0.0874 |
|  | (2.81) | (-2.97) | (-1.79) | (-0.96) | (-0.30) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0003 | 0.1739 | -0.2126 | -0.2531 | 0.1414 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.70) | (-0.80) | (-0.27) | (1.50) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 0.1940\*\* | 0.4083 | 2.0422\* | 2.0135 | 0.6130\*\*\* |
|  | (2.12) | (0.49) | (1.85) | (0.88) | (3.01) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | -0.0498 | 1.7570\*\* | -0.8761 | -11.3377\*\*\* | -0.4029 |
|  | (-0.41) | (2.40) | (-1.10) | (-2.65) | (-0.90) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | -0.0617\*\* | 0.1295 | 0.1059 | -2.4378\*\*\* | -0.2943\*\* |
|  | (-2.32) | (1.05) | (0.64) | (-2.98) | (-2.10) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Party\_Age | -0.0014 | 0.0445\*\*\* | 0.0276\*\* | 0.1452\*\*\* | 0.0116\*\*\* |
|  | (-1.15) | (4.46) | (2.55) | (3.89) | (3.86) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cold War | 0.0162 | 1.0386\*\*\* | -0.0827 | 4.6984\*\*\* | 0.1884\*\* |
|  | (0.45) | (3.48) | (-0.30) | (4.32) | (2.19) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| oil price | -0.0001 | 0.0006 | 0.0072\* | -0.0080 | 0.0010 |
|  | (-0.32) | (0.17) | (1.76) | (-1.01) | (1.17) |
| Observations | 2329 | 2329 | 2329 | 2281 | 2329 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. t statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by country.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table 10 Explaining authoritarian party strength:**

**the sub-sample of communist regimes**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | de-personalization | control cabinet | control military | party switching | legislative cohesion |
| main |  |  |  |  |  |
| revolution | -0.2433\* | 11.6564\*\*\* | 3.8974\*\* | -3.7207 | 0.7882\* |
|  | (-1.65) | (6.65) | (2.36) | (-1.00) | (1.82) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| resource | -0.1929\*\*\* | 1.3335\*\* | -4.8768 | 0.2692 | -0.0410 |
|  | (-2.72) | (2.53) | (-0.89) | (1.13) | (-0.59) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| regional democracy | 0.4367\*\*\* | -25.1495\*\*\* | -12.8392\*\*\* | -0.7072 | 0.0120 |
|  | (4.04) | (-6.98) | (-5.40) | (-1.58) | (0.06) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP per capita (logged) | 0.0282 | 0.7149 | 0.3117 | -0.0385 | 0.1276 |
|  | (0.92) | (0.99) | (0.57) | (-0.16) | (1.59) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| growth | 0.2164 | -5.6109 | 6.2412\*\* | -0.4497 | 0.6131 |
|  | (0.89) | (-1.11) | (2.33) | (-0.27) | (1.11) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ethnic fragmentation | 0.0458 | 5.2991\*\* | 1.6351 | -9.5010 | -1.4884 |
|  | (0.17) | (1.97) | (0.95) | (-0.96) | (-1.10) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| population (logged) | 0.0817\*\* | 0.0385 | 0.2293\*\* | 1.6757 | 0.0139 |
|  | (2.14) | (0.19) | (2.34) | (1.64) | (0.06) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| party age | -0.0032 | 0.0056 | 0.0231\* | -0.0262 | -0.0042 |
|  | (-1.23) | (0.11) | (1.92) | (-1.47) | (-0.47) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cold War | 0.0408 | -7.2764\*\*\* | -2.1036\*\*\* | 0.0628 | -0.0182 |
|  | (0.75) | (-8.39) | (-3.78) | (0.28) | (-0.17) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| oil price | 0.0006 | 0.0075 | -0.0069 | -0.0023 | 0.0013 |
|  | (0.58) | (0.27) | (-0.75) | (-0.48) | (0.96) |
| Observations | 411 | 411 | 411 | 411 | 411 |

The dependent variables are indicators of party strength. Entries in model (1), (4), and (5) are OLS coefficients. Entries in model (2) and (3) are ordered logit coefficients. t statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by country.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

**Appendix V**

To make more transparent the factual basis of our coding, we provide description of selected cases to illustrate why they were coded as ruling parties originated from revolutions or post-seizure creation. In the case of revolution, we also provide examples to explain why some cases do not qualify.

Revolutions are defined as sustained, violent struggles that seek to overthrow the current regime and transform existing social order. Following Levitsky and Way (2013), sustained violent struggles are armed conflicts that persist for at least one year. Armed conflicts may precede or immediately follow the seizure of power. Radical transformation of social order includes, among other things, the building of socialism, large-scale land reform, and the accomplishment of racial equality. Violent struggles are those that caused more than 1000 deaths. Using these criteria and based on secondary sources, I was able to identify 19 cases of revolutions in the dataset, which are listed below. Some subjectivity is inevitable in the coding process, so I also conducted jackknife analysis to estimate the effects of revolution by excluding each of the 19 cases. The main results are robust to the exclusion of any specific revolutionary case from the sample.

* Ruling parties that originated from Revolutions:

1. Guinea-Bissau, African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), 1974-1999
2. Albania, Communist Party of Albania/Party of Labor of Albania/Socialist Party of Albania, 1944-1991
3. China, Chinese Communist Party,1949-
4. Cambodia, Communist Party of Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge), 1975-1979
5. Russia, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991
6. Eritrea, Eritrean People's Liberation Front / People's Front for Democracy and Justice, 1991-
7. Taiwan, Kuomintang, 1949-1995
8. Laos, Lao People's Revolutionary Party, 1975-
9. Nicaragua, Sandinista National Liberation Front, 1979-1990
10. Mozambique, Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), 1975-
11. Algeria, National Liberation Front (FLN), 1962-
12. Angola, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, 1975-
13. Cuba, United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution/Communist Party of Cuba, 1959-
14. Bolivia, Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, 1952-1964
15. Rwanda, Rwandan Patriotic Front, 1994-
16. Yugoslavia, Communist Party of Yugoslavia / League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990
17. Vietnam, Vietnam Workers' Party (DLDV), 1954-
18. North Korea, Workers' Party of North Korea / Workers' Party of Korea, 1949-
19. Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriot Front (ZANU-PF), 1981-

* Description of selected examples of ruling parties that originated from revolutions:

1. Zimbabwe: The Zimbabwe African Nation Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 1980-

Rhodesia under white minority rule declared unilateral independence from Britain in 1969. Meanwhile, black groups were demanding majority rule and launching military insurgencies. Two political forces, ZANU and ZAPU, were split from the War of Liberation that lasted for 15 years. ZANU aimed for a protracted, revolutionary war rather than a swift collapse of the white regime because they want to lay the foundation for seizing national power. It adopted the Maoist strategy of building bases in the countryside and sealing off the cities. The guerrillas spent most of their time mobilizing and politicizing the masses. Political meetings were held in villages at night. Their goal was achieved in 1980, following the Lancaster House Agreement, when the UK granted independence to Zimbabwe. ZANU came to power after winning the first post-independence national elections. By 1987 a *de facto* one-party state was established, as ZAPU was merged into ZANU to form an official ZANU-PF. (Moorcraft 2011, Laakso 2003)

1. Mozambique: The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), 1975-

Influenced by Marxism-Leninism, Frelimo was founded in 1962 as a movement not only to achieve Mozambique’s independence from Portuguese but also socialism. Frelimo launched an armed struggle against the Portuguese in 1964 and managed to establish “liberated zones” in Northern Mozambique in the late 1960s. After the 1974 coup in Lisbon, Frelimo and Portugal negotiated Mozambique’s independence, which was achieved in June 1975. Having established a one-party state, Frelimo gradually leaned towards the USSR and adopted Marxism –Leninism as the official state ideology. An opposition movement called Renamo, supported by Rhodesia, engulfed the country in a prolonged civil war until a peace agreement was signed in 1992. Supported by the international community, Mozambique was transformed into a multiparty system with Frelimo and Renamo operating as the two main parties, although Frelimo has kept power by winning all post-conflict national elections (Simpson 1993, Carbone 2005, Manning 2010, Sumich 2010).

1. Nicaragua: The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), 1979-1990

Founded in 1961, the FSLN was a Marxist guerrilla organization that launched an armed rebellion against the personalitic rule of the Somoza family. In a 1969 manifesto, the FSLN vowed to establish a revolutionary government based on worker-peasant alliance. They aimed to build a popular democracy with direct participation of the masses. By 1977, the armed struggle gradually gained support among the population and different social groups began to side with the FSLN. In 1979 the FSLN overthrew the Somaza dynasty and established a revolutionary government in its place. The FSLN won the presidency and legislature in the 1984 multiparty elections. In 1990, intense US pressure forced the FSLN to compromise by holding a free election in which it was defeated by a US-assembled coalition (Prevost and Vanden 2016, Parsa 2000, May et al. 2018).

* Examples of borderline cases that do not qualify for revolutions:

1. Chad: Patriotic Salvation Movement, 1990-

Between 1982 and 1990 Chad was ruled by a one-party regime led by warlord Hissène Habré. In the late 1980s a rift emerged between Habré and his chief military advisor Idriss Déby, who allegedly launched a coup against Habré in 1989. After fleeing to Sudan, Déby and his allies formed an insurgent group named Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) and mounted a decisive offensive against Habré’s regime and entered the capital N’Djamena in 1990. By all accounts, the MPS was motivated by desire for power and ethnic animosities and has no ideology to transform the basic social order. Therefore, it cannot be counted as a party with revolutionary origins (Banks et al. 2009: 240).

1. Tunisia, Neo-Destour Party/Destourien Socialist Party/Constitutional Democratic Rally, 1956-2011

Pressure for political reforms began after World War I and resulted in establishment of the nationalist Neo-Destour (New Constitution) Party in 1934, which spearheaded the drive for independence from France under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba. Nationalist aspirations were further stimulated by World War II, and an initial breakdown in independence negotiations led to the outbreak of guerrilla warfare against the French in 1952. Internal autonomy was conceded by France on June 3, 1955, and on March 20, 1956, the protectorate was terminated, with the country gaining full independence. Tunisian independence was achieved primarily through negotiations with France rather than a sustained violent struggle. To the extent violence was involved, it mainly took the form of protests, demonstrations, and terrorist attacks on colonial personnel and facilities (Banks et al. 2009: 1358). Therefore, it cannot be counted as a party with revolutionary origins.

* Description of selected examples of ruling parties created after a dictator has seized power:

1. Gambia: The Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), 1996-2016

The 1994 coup led by General Jammeh brought an end to the longest surviving multiparty democracy in Africa. The military suspended the constitution and banned a number of political parties and individual politicians. Under international and domestic pressures, the military cadres surrounding Jammeh took off uniforms and formed a civilian party, APRC, to contest the 1996 election. The APRC was removed from power after losing the 2016 presidential elections. (Edie 2000, Saine 2002, Perfect 2010)

1. Azerbaijan: The New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), 1993-

Azerbaijan gained independence in 1990 under pro-Moscow Communist leadership, but the communist government was forcibly unseated by the Popular Azerbaijan Front (PAF) in 1992. The protracted war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the incompetence of the PAF led to a military coup in June 1993, after which the former Communist party chief Heydar Aliyev became the president. Aliyev was credited with bringing stability and economic growth back to Azerbaijan. The YAP was established by Aliyev in 1992 in opposition to the then-ruling PAF. The Party has dominated presidential and legislative elections since 1993. (Cornell 2001, Lansford 2015).

1. Russia: United Russia: 2004-

United Russia's predecessor was the Unity bloc, which was created three months before the December 1999 Duma elections. In July 2001, the unified party, called ‘Union of Unity and Fatherland’ held its founding congress, and in December 2001 it became United Russia. United Russia characterized itself as wholly supportive of President Putin's agenda, which proved a recipe for success and resulted in the party scoring a major victory in the 2003 Duma elections, receiving more than a third of the popular vote. Since then it has won all legislative elections. Although Putin only began to serve as the party leader in 2008, he has long been a supporter of the party.

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1. The GWF dataset forms the basis of empirical analysis in the book *How Dictatorship Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse* (Geddes et al., 2018). The dataset and the accompanying codebook can be downloaded at: <http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/how-dictatorships-work/>. Last accessed on May 1, 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For a detailed discussion of how the composite measure was constructed, see Geddes et al. (2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)