**Online Appendix**

***Ethnic inequality***

In this manuscript, we measure ethnic inequality using two different measures. Ethnic inequality based on nighttime luminosity data (Alesina et al. 2016) and survey based measure by Houle (2015). Alesina et al. (2016) calculates the level of ethnic inequality by comparing satellite images of luminosity across historic homelands of each ethno-linguistic group. They use two geo-coded ethnic homeland data from Georeferencing of Ethnic Group (GREG) data (Weidmann, Rod, and Cederman 2010) and Ethnologue data (Gordon 2005). Among two ethnic inequality measures, we use GREG based ethnic inequality mainly because GREG based ethnic inequality data has a greater country coverage than Ethnologue based ethnic inequality data. Since original GREG based measure use territorial boundary of early 1960s, Alesina et al.(2016) portray the map of more recent territorial boundary of 2000 Digital Chart of the World from Harvard University. This generates 2129 ethnic homelands. Among these, 1637 homelands are occupied by single ethnic groups and remaining 492 ethnic homelands are occupied by multiple ethnic groups (maximum 3 ethnic groups). For example, Brussel area in Belgium are ethnic homelands for both Flemings and Walloons. In this case, they assume that the luminosity of Brussel area contributes to the average luminosity of both Flemings and Walloons. After identifying ethnic group location, it uses the mean luminosity per capita as a proxy for the level of economic development for each ethnic group. Then, it constructs the country level Gini coefficient (G) to measure ethnic inequality based on the following formula:

where n is the total number of ethnic groups in a given country, yi is the value of luminosity per capita for the historical homeland of group i, and yi is in non-decreasing order (yi <= yi+1). This new measure of ethnic inequality captures differences in mean incomes across ethnic groups and reflects the overall level of ethnic inequality in a given country (Alesina et al. 2016). Since this measure is based on Gini coefficient, it has a range between 0 to 0.97, where smaller score means low ethnic inequality and higher score means greater discrepancy of light per capita among ethnic homelands. Here, 0 score indicates country has only one ethnic homeland, which are the cases of South Korea and North Korea, for example. This variable is measured at three time points – 1992, 2000, and 2012, covering a global sample of 173 countries. To construct the annual level of ethnic inequality, we linearly interpolated ethnic inequality measure using these three time points.

Even though GREG based ethnic inequality has the greatest coverage of ethnic inequality data, it also has a problem if competing ethnic groups share same ethnic homelands. Most clear case would be Rwanda. Here, two major ethnic group, Hutu and Tutsi share ethnic homeland. Due to this reason, GREG does not even differentiate the ethnic homeland of Hutu and Tutsi. So, ethnic inequality measure in Rwanda is based on comparison only between Banyaruanda (including both Hutu and Tutsi) and remaining Twa. Thus, we also use ethnic inequality from survey based measure (Houle 2015) for robustness check. Houle (2015) constructs a between-group economic inequality (BGI) index using multiple cross-national surveys[[1]](#footnote-1). Using various survey data, he creates a group-level ethnic inequality dataset by calculating inequality between average income/wealth for a given ethnic group and average income/wealth for the given country. The specific formula for calculation is shown as below:

where gi is the average income/wealth of ethnic group i, and G is the average income/wealth of the given country[[2]](#footnote-2). He then calculates the country-level BGI variable as a weighted average of group-level BGI in which the weights are the sizes of ethnic groups. Thus, this measure of country-level BGI captures the average level of economic inequality across ethnic groups in a given country (Houle 2015).

Table A1. The effect of ethnic inequality on state repression (Non-OECD sample)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CIRI  1992-2011 | | PTS  1992-2013 | | Fariss  1992-2013 | |
| Ethnic Inequality (EI) | 0.423\*\* | 2.230\*\*\* | 0.549\*\*\* | 1.287\*\*\* | -0.939\*\*\* | -1.437\*\*\* |
|  | (0.174) | (0.421) | (0.095) | (0.172) | (0.075) | (0.143) |
| Polity 2 | -0.062\*\*\* | 0.009 | -0.022\*\*\* | 0.008 | 0.021\*\*\* | 0.002 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.018) | (0.003) | (0.007) | (0.002) | (0.006) |
| Ethnic Inequality\* |  | -0.141\*\*\* |  | -0.061\*\*\* |  | 0.037\*\*\* |
| Polity2 |  | (0.031) |  | (0.013) |  | (0.010) |
| Interstate War | 0.574\*\* | 0.562\*\* | -0.096 | -0.093 | 0.021 | 0.017 |
|  | (0.240) | (0.248) | (0.108) | (0.110) | (0.039) | (0.040) |
| Civil War | 0.948\*\*\* | 0.928\*\*\* | 0.421\*\*\* | 0.432\*\*\* | -0.174\*\*\* | -0.170\*\*\* |
|  | (0.126) | (0.125) | (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.026) | (0.025) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.332\*\*\* | -0.302\*\*\* | -0.108\*\*\* | -0.117\*\*\* | 0.166\*\*\* | 0.164\*\*\* |
|  | (0.059) | (0.056) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.017) |
| GDP growth | 0.011\*\* | 0.011\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Population (logged) | 0.592\*\*\* | 0.589\*\*\* | 0.262\*\*\* | 0.259\*\*\* | -0.284\*\*\* | -0.278\*\*\* |
|  | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.017) | (0.018) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | 0.039\*\*\* | 0.046\*\*\* | 0.004 | 0.004 | -0.015\*\* | -0.016\*\* |
|  | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.007) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.257 | 0.339 | 0.107 | 0.168\* | -0.535\*\*\* | -0.471\*\*\* |
|  | (0.219) | (0.215) | (0.086) | (0.089) | (0.059) | (0.067) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *R*2 | 0.621 | 0.624 | 0.744 | 0.738 | 0.586 | 0.555 |
| *Countries* | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 | 123 |
| *N* | 2,170 | 2,170 | 2,485 | 2,485 | 2,485 | 2,485 |

Note: All models are estimated with Prais-Winsten correction for panel-specific AR1 process. The numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors. Stata command xtpcse is used. All regressions include decade and regional dummy variables. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Decade and regional dummies, and intercepts are omitted to conserve space.

\*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

Table A2. The effect of ethnic inequality on state repression (use Ethnologue based ethnic inequality measure)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CIRI  1992-2011 | | PTS  1992-2013 | | Fariss  1992-2013 | | |
| Ethnic Inequality (EI) | 0.788\*\*\* | 1.233\*\*\* | 0.085 | 0.210 | -0.431\*\*\* | -0.558\*\*\* |
|  | (0.189) | (0.396) | (0.111) | (0.191) | (0.125) | (0.152) |
| Polity 2 | -0.068\*\*\* | -0.044\*\* | -0.022\*\*\* | -0.015\* | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.016\*\*\* |
|  | (0.008) | (0.018) | (0.003) | (0.008) | (0.003) | (0.005) |
| Ethnic Inequality\* |  | -0.038 |  | -0.011 |  | 0.012 |
| Polity 2 |  | (0.025) |  | (0.013) |  | (0.009) |
| Interstate War | 0.505\*\* | 0.493\*\* | -0.025 | -0.026 | 0.009 | 0.010 |
|  | (0.220) | (0.220) | (0.093) | (0.093) | (0.038) | (0.038) |
| Civil War | 0.865\*\*\* | 0.853\*\*\* | 0.409\*\*\* | 0.408\*\*\* | -0.142\*\*\* | -0.143\*\*\* |
|  | (0.126) | (0.126) | (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.497\*\*\* | -0.499\*\*\* | -0.272\*\*\* | -0.271\*\*\* | 0.301\*\*\* | 0.307\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.020) | (0.022) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| GDP growth | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.014\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.002 | -0.001\* | -0.001\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Population (logged) | 0.515\*\*\* | 0.516\*\*\* | 0.217\*\*\* | 0.216\*\*\* | -0.232\*\*\* | -0.233\*\*\* |
|  | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.020) | (0.019) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | 0.046\*\*\* | 0.049\*\*\* | 0.019\*\* | 0.020\*\* | -0.023\*\*\* | -0.023\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.007) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.795\*\*\* | 0.765\*\*\* | 0.536\*\*\* | 0.549\*\*\* | -0.896\*\*\* | -0.902\*\*\* |
|  | (0.199) | (0.204) | (0.102) | (0.102) | (0.108) | (0.107) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *R*2 | 0.634 | 0.633 | 0.724 | 0.726 | 0.576 | 0.565 |
| *Countries* | 137 | 137 | 137 | 137 | 137 | 137 |
| *N* | 2,472 | 2,472 | 2,801 | 2,801 | 2,802 | 2,802 |

Note: All models are estimated with Prais-Winsten correction for panel-specific AR1 process. The numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors. All regressions include decade dummy and regional dummy variables. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Decade and regional dummies, and intercepts are omitted to conserve space.

\*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

Table A3. Summary statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| VARIABLES | N | mean | sd | min | max | Data Source |
| Physical Integrity Rights | 3,118 | 3.176 | 2.224 | 0 | 8 | CIRI |
| PTS (average) | 3,509 | 2.486 | 1.109 | 1 | 5 | PTS |
| Human Rights Protection | 3,512 | 0.509 | 1.319 | -2.703 | 4.705 | Fariss (2014) |
| Empowerment Rights Index | 2,699 | 8.322 | 4.005 | 0 | 14 | CIRI |
| Political Civil Liberty Rights | 2,701 | 0.696 | 0.278 | 0.026 | 0.987 | VDEM |
| Ethnic Inequality (GREG) | 2,720 | 0.463 | 0.232 | 0 | 0.966 | Alesina et al. (2016) |
| Ethnic Inequality (Ethnologue) | 2,472 | 0.539 | 0.289 | 0.001 | 0.989 | Alesina et al. (2016) |
| Ethnic Inequality (BGI) | 1,002 | 0.536 | 0.483 | 0.000179 | 4.780 | Houle (2015) |
| Polity2 Score | 3,217 | 13.235 | 6.532 | 0 | 20 | Polity IV |
| Interstate War | 3,512 | 0.009 | 0.095 | 0 | 1 | Armed Conflict Dataset 2014 |
| Civil War | 3,512 | 0.130 | 0.337 | 0 | 1 | Armed Conflict Dataset 2014 |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | 3,407 | 7.931 | 1.618 | 4.228 | 11.364 | WDI |
| GDP growth | 3,413 | 3.931 | 7.051 | -62.07 | 149.97 | WDI |
| Largest discriminated group | 1,693 | 0.039 | 0.112 | 0 | 0.768 | Buhaug et al. (2014) |
| Richest | 3,684 | 1.212 | 0.842 | 1 | 9.634 | Buhaug et al. (2014) |
| Poorest | 3,684 | 1.231 | 0.512 | 1 | 6.046 | Buhaug et al. (2014) |
| Population (logged) | 3,488 | 15.788 | 1.778 | 11.18 | 21.023 | WDI |
| Oil and Gas per capita (logged) | 3,386 | 2.682 | 2.998 | 0 | 10.617 | Ross (2015) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 3,512 | 0.453 | 0.256 | 0 | 0.93 | Alesina et al. (2003) |
| Income Inequality | 2,854 | 44.349 | 6.635 | 22.2 | 68.6 | Solt (2009) |
| Educational Inequality | 3,176 | 0.405 | 0.034 | 0.348 | 0.46 | Benaabdelaali et al. (2012) |
| Strikes | 3,006 | 0.092 | 0.397 | 0 | 5 | Banks (2014) |
| Riots | 3,005 | 0.208 | 0.746 | 0 | 12 | Banks (2014) |
| Revolutions | 3,005 | 0.198 | 0.559 | 0 | 9 | Banks (2014) |
| Demonstrations | 3,005 | 0.475 | 1.257 | 0 | 24 | Banks (2014) |
| Aggregate conflict index | 3,003 | 736.28 | 1558.97 | 0 | 21250 | Banks (2014) |
| Government expenditure | 3,290 | 15.984 | 6.264 | 2.047 | 55.55 | WDI |
| Public health expenditure | 2,980 | 3.401 | 1.919 | 0.0035 | 11.284 | WDI |

Table A4. Country list in the main analysis

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| North America | South America | Europe | Sub Saharan Africa | Middle East | Asia | Oceania |
| Belize  Canada  Costa Rica  Cuba  Dominican Republic  El Salvador  Grenada  Guatemala  Haiti  Honduras  Mexico  Nicaragua  Panama  Trinidad and Tobago  United States | Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Ecuador  Guyana  Paraguay  Peru  Suriname  Uruguay  Venezuela | Albania  Armenia  Austria  Azerbaijan  Belgium  Belarus  Bosnia and Herzegovina  Bulgaria  Croatia  Cyprus  Czech Republic  Denmark  Estonia  Finland  France  Georgia  Greece  Hungary  Ireland  Italy  Latvia  Lithuania  Luxembourg  Macedonia  Moldova  Netherlands  Norway  Poland  Portugal  Romania  Russia  Slovakia  Slovenia  Spain  Sweden  Switzerland  Ukraine  United Kingdom | Angola  Benin  Botswana  Burkina Faso  Burundi  Cameroon  Cape Verde  Central African Republic  Chad  Comoros  Congo  Democratic Republic of the Congo  Djibouti  Equatorial Guinea  Eritrea  Ethiopia  Gabon  Gambia  Ghana  Guinea  Guinea-Bissau  Ivory Coast  Kenya  Lesotho  Liberia  Madagascar  Malawi  Mali  Mauritania  Mauritius  Mozambique  Namibia  Niger  Nigeria  Rwanda  Senegal  Sierra Leone  Somalia  South Africa  Swaziland  Tanzania  Togo  Uganda  Zambia  Zimbabwe | Algeria  Bahrain  Egypt  Iran  Iraq  Israel  Jordan  Kuwait  Lebanon  Libya  Morocco  Oman  Qatar  Saudi Arabia  Sudan  Syria  Tunisia  Turkey  United Arab Emirates | Afghanistan  Bangladesh  Bhutan  Brunei  Cambodia  China  India  Indonesia  Japan  Kazakhstan  Kyrgyz Republic  Laos  Malaysia  Mongolia  Nepal  Pakistan  Philippines  Singapore  South Korea  Sri Lanka  Tajikistan  Thailand  Turkmenistan  Uzbekistan  Vietnam | Australia  Fiji  New Zealand  Papua New Guinea  Solomon Islands |

*Robustness Check: Endogeneity*

There is a possibility that the relationship between ethnic inequality and state repression is driven by reverse causation. Ethnic inequality might well be a result of repressive or discriminatory practices by states targeting particular ethnic minorities. In the main text, we addressed endogeneity issue by providing illustrative examples on how state repression may affect ethnic inequality in either a positive or negative direction. We further address the concern of reverse causation by conducting an instrumental variable analysis. We employ an *inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands* variable from Alesina et al. (2016) as an instrument for ethnic inequality. The rationale of using this variable as an instrument builds on Michalopoulos (2012) that argues land endowment inequality leads to location-specific human capital development. Following Alesina et al. (2016)’s approach, we rely on georeferenced data on seven geographic traits (average land quality, mean temperature, mean precipitation, distance to the coast, mean elevation, variability in precipitation, and seasonality in temperature) and employ principal component analysis to extract the first component as the composite index of inequality in geographical endowments across ethnic groups (our instrument for ethnic inequality). The first principal component explains about 53%of the common variance of the seven variables. And the correlation between this instrument and the ethnic inequality index is about 0.56. We, therefore, redo our main analysis with two stage least square estimator. Table A5 presents the results of the instrumental approach. We continue to find support for our argument that ethnic inequality increases state repression and its impact is moderated by the level of democracy. The F-statistics for the excluded instrument clearly pass the “rule of thumb” that it should be at least 10 (30.6 for the ethnic inequality variable and 17.5 for the interacted term). So, this result should not be considered to have the problem of weak identification (Staiger and Stock 1997). Therefore, we do not believe reverse causation is driving our main empirical findings.

Table A5. Instrumental approach

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CIRI | PTS | Fariss |
| Ethnic Inequality (EI) | 2.022\*\* | 1.451\*\*\* | -0.896\* |
|  | (0.908) | (0.398) | (0.497) |
| Polity 2 | -0.021 | 0.013 | 0.012 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.014) | (0.019) |
| Ethnic Inequality\* | -0.150\*\* | -0.113\*\*\* | 0.068\* |
| Polity2 | (0.061) | (0.031) | (0.040) |
| Interstate War | 1.397 | -0.336 | 0.203 |
|  | (0.930) | (0.563) | (0.627) |
| Civil War | 2.415\*\*\* | 1.257\*\*\* | -1.253\*\*\* |
|  | (0.360) | (0.193) | (0.222) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.423\*\*\* | -0.247\*\*\* | 0.354\*\*\* |
|  | (0.082) | (0.042) | (0.057) |
| GDP growth | 0.030 | -0.009 | -0.011 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.019) | (0.027) |
| Population (logged) | 0.456\*\*\* | 0.181\*\*\* | -0.258\*\*\* |
|  | (0.059) | (0.033) | (0.040) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | 0.019 | 0.010 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.016) | (0.026) |
| Ethnic fractionalization | -0.005 | 0.145 | -0.102 |
|  | (0.376) | (0.175) | (0.242) |
|  |  |  |  |
| *R*2 | 0.808 | 0.773 | 0.780 |
| *N* | 154 | 154 | 154 |

Note: Second stage of 2SLS estimates. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Stata command ivreg2 is used. Instrument is *inequality in geographic endowments across ethnic homelands* (Alesina et al. 2016). All regressions include decade and regional dummy variables. Decade and regional dummies, and intercepts are omitted to conserve space.

\*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

Table A6. Use multiple imputation

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CIRI | PTS | Fariss Index |
| Ethnic Inequality (EI) | 1.105\*\*\* | 0.747\*\*\* | -0.677\*\*\* |
|  | (0.248) | (0.128) | (0.125) |
| Polity 2 | -0.038\*\*\* | -0.010\*\* | 0.008\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Ethnic Inequality\* | -0.079\*\*\* | -0.042\*\*\* | 0.044\*\*\* |
| Polity2 | (0.016) | (0.008) | (0.007) |
| Interstate War | 0.478\*\* | -0.0004 | -0.015 |
|  | (0.228) | (0.101) | (0.046) |
| Civil War | 1.0766\*\*\* | 0.499\*\*\* | -0.328\*\*\* |
|  | (0.117) | (0.049) | (0.037) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.496\*\*\* | -0.222\*\*\* | 0.281\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.018) | (0.029) |
| GDP growth | 0.006\* | 0.001 | -0.0001 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.0008) |
| Population (logged) | 0.404\*\*\* | 0.176\*\*\* | -0.155\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.012) | (0.021) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | 0.021\* | -0.0002 | -0.009 |
|  | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.008) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.367\*\*\* | 0.390\*\*\* | -0.626\*\*\* |
|  | (0.134) | (0.077) | (0.127) |
|  |  |  |  |
| *Countries* | 196 | 196 | 196 |
| *N* | 4,251 | 4,251 | 4,251 |

Note: Missing values are imputed using the AMELIA II (Honaker and King 2010). All models are estimated with Prais-Winsten correction for panel-specific AR1 process. The numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors. Stata command xtpcse is used. All regressions include decade and regional dummy variables. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Decade and regional dummies, and intercepts are omitted to conserve space.

\*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

Table A7. Control for the size of the largest discriminated group or the size of the excluded ethnic populations

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CIRI | PTS | Fariss | CIRI | PTS | Fariss |
| Ethnic Inequality (EI) | 1.525\*\*\* | 1.268\*\*\* | -1.478\*\*\* | 1.028\*\* | 0.919\*\*\* | -1.232\*\*\* |
| (0.425) | (0.174) | (0.126) | (0.430) | (0.190) | (0.130) |
| Polity 2 | -0.020 | 0.002 | -0.003 | -0.039\*\* | -0.001 | 0.009 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.016) | (0.008) | (0.007) |
| EI \* Polity2 | -0.086\*\*\* | -0.055\*\*\* | 0.044\*\*\* | -0.040 | -0.034\*\* | 0.019 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.014) | (0.012) | (0.029) | (0.015) | (0.012) |
| Interstate War | 0.426\*\* | -0.018 | 0.002 | 0.466\*\* | 0.036 | -0.016 |
|  | (0.204) | (0.093) | (0.035) | (0.220) | (0.088) | (0.037) |
| Civil War | 1.087\*\*\* | 0.515\*\*\* | -0.186\*\*\* | 1.002\*\*\* | 0.448\*\*\* | -0.184\*\*\* |
|  | (0.159) | (0.071) | (0.034) | (0.131) | (0.055) | (0.028) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.488\*\*\* | -0.242\*\*\* | 0.312\*\*\* | -0.512\*\*\* | -0.285\*\*\* | 0.359\*\*\* |
| (0.036) | (0.022) | (0.019) | (0.032) | (0.023) | (0.022) |
| GDP growth | 0.009 | 0.000 | -0.000 | 0.009\* | 0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| Population (logged) | 0.479\*\*\* | 0.190\*\*\* | -0.243\*\*\* | 0.541\*\*\* | 0.225\*\*\* | -0.251\*\*\* |
| (0.024) | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.015) | (0.012) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | 0.052\*\*\* | 0.016\*\* | -0.018\*\* | 0.044\*\*\* | 0.026\*\*\* | -0.025\*\*\* |
| (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.009) |
| Ethnic Frac | 0.517\*\* | 0.265\*\*\* | -0.284\*\*\* | 0.203 | 0.119 | -0.399\*\*\* |
|  | (0.214) | (0.097) | (0.071) | (0.191) | (0.091) | (0.082) |
| Largest Discrimi.  Group | 2.165\*\*\* | 1.249\*\*\* | -0.978\*\*\* |  |  |  |
| (0.450) | (0.209) | (0.178) |  |  |  |
| *Excluded Pop.* |  |  |  | 0.868\*\*\* | 0.480\*\*\* | -0.355\*\*\* |
|  | |  |  |  | (0.226) | (0.126) | (0.082) |
|  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *R*2 | | 0.666 | 0.798 | 0.686 | 0.631 | 0.756 | 0.645 |
| *Countries* | | 149 | 149 | 149 | 137 | 137 | 137 |
| *N* | 1,950 | 2,012 | 2,012 | 2,490 | 2,501 | 2,501 |

Note: All models are estimated with Prais-Winsten correction for panel-specific AR1 process. The numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors. Stata command xtpcse is used. The first three models control for the size of the largest discriminated group from Buhaug et al. (2014). The last three models control for the size of the excluded ethnic populations. All regressions include decade and regional dummy variables. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Decade and regional dummies, and intercepts are omitted to conserve space.

\*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

Table A8. Employ an alternative survey-based measure of ethnic inequality

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CIRI | PTS | Fariss |
| Ethnic Inequality (Houle) | 1.427\*\*\* | 0.643\*\*\* | -0.629\*\*\* |
| (0.400) | (0.199) | (0.129) |
| Polity 2 | -0.071\*\*\* | -0.025\*\* | 0.014\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.010) | (0.005) |
| Ethnic Inequality\* | -0.074\*\*\* | -0.033\*\*\* | 0.028\*\*\* |
| Polity2 | (0.026) | (0.013) | (0.007) |
| Interstate War | -0.055 | -0.077 | 0.026 |
|  | (0.187) | (0.083) | (0.033) |
| Civil War | 1.371\*\*\* | 0.481\*\*\* | -0.251\*\*\* |
|  | (0.162) | (0.069) | (0.035) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.504\*\*\* | -0.340\*\*\* | 0.515\*\*\* |
| (0.045) | (0.027) | (0.031) |
| GDP growth | 0.002 | 0.002 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.001) |
| Population (logged) | 0.509\*\*\* | 0.203\*\*\* | -0.353\*\*\* |
| (0.039) | (0.037) | (0.026) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | -0.003 | 0.031\*\* | 0.001 |
| (0.017) | (0.014) | (0.013) |
| Ethnic fractionalization | 0.475\* | 0.407\*\* | -0.260 |
|  | (0.285) | (0.175) | (0.303) |
|  |  |  |  |
| *R*2 | 0.667 | 0.781 | 0.668 |
| *Countries* | 76 | 76 | 76 |
| *N* | 1,435 | 1,510 | 1,511 |

Note: All models are estimated with Prais-Winsten correction for panel-specific AR1 process. The numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors. Stata command xtpcse is used. All regressions include decade and regional dummy variables. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Decade and regional dummies, and intercepts are omitted to conserve space.

\*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

Table A9. Control for government expenditure, public health expenditure or vertical inequality

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CIRI | PTS | Fariss | CIRI | PTS | Fariss | CIRI | PTS | Fariss |
| Ethnic Inequality (EI) | 1.517\*\*\* | 1.068\*\*\* | -1.213\*\*\* | 1.389\*\* | 1.015\*\*\* | -1.147\*\*\* | 1.314\*\*\* | 1.542\*\*\* | -1.315\*\*\* |
| (0.517) | (0.192) | (0.131) | (0.546) | (0.174) | (0.129) | (0.437) | (0.229) | (0.297) |
| Polity 2 | -0.030 | 0.002 | -0.001 | -0.034\* | 0.005 | -0.011\* | -0.031\* | 0.018\*\* | 0.004 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.019) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.019) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| EI\*Polity 2 | -0.090\*\*\* | -0.059\*\*\* | 0.043\*\*\* | -0.080\*\* | -0.056\*\*\* | 0.056\*\*\* | -0.081\*\*\* | -0.082\*\*\* | 0.033\*\* |
|  | (0.033) | (0.014) | (0.011) | (0.032) | (0.013) | (0.011) | (0.029) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Interstate War | 0.571\*\* | 0.061 | -0.019 | 0.427\*\* | -0.029 | 0.020 | 0.646\*\*\* | -0.052 | -0.008 |
|  | (0.224) | (0.092) | (0.041) | (0.203) | (0.101) | (0.041) | (0.197) | (0.096) | (0.037) |
| Civil War | 1.038\*\*\* | 0.463\*\*\* | -0.174\*\*\* | 1.011\*\*\* | 0.374\*\*\* | -0.142\*\*\* | 1.004\*\*\* | 0.410\*\*\* | -0.160\*\*\* |
|  | (0.138) | (0.057) | (0.028) | (0.152) | (0.054) | (0.029) | (0.130) | (0.056) | (0.030) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.478\*\*\* | -0.270\*\*\* | 0.374\*\*\* | -0.407\*\*\* | -0.240\*\*\* | 0.378\*\*\* | -0.568\*\*\* | -0.296\*\*\* | 0.385\*\*\* |
| (0.034) | (0.020) | (0.017) | (0.040) | (0.020) | (0.012) | (0.034) | (0.024) | (0.042) |
| GDP growth | 0.006 | 0.001 | -0.001\* | 0.010\* | 0.003\* | -0.002\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.002 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| Population (logged) | 0.497\*\*\* | 0.206\*\*\* | -0.253\*\*\* | 0.540\*\*\* | 0.227\*\*\* | -0.281\*\*\* | 0.546\*\*\* | 0.203\*\*\* | -0.239\*\*\* |
| (0.025) | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.024) | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.021) | (0.017) | (0.027) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | 0.042\*\*\* | 0.018\*\* | -0.035\*\*\* | 0.013 | 0.008 | -0.026\*\*\* | 0.045\*\*\* | 0.009 | -0.043\*\*\* |
| (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.013) | (0.008) | (0.011) |
| Ethnic | 0.470\*\* | 0.294\*\*\* | -0.425\*\*\* | 0.247 | 0.376\*\*\* | -0.421\*\*\* | 0.581\*\*\* | 0.413\*\*\* | -0.434\*\*\* |
| Fract. | (0.191) | (0.083) | (0.063) | (0.197) | (0.087) | (0.078) | (0.201) | (0.103) | (0.128) |
| Government expenditure | -0.008 | -0.002 | -0.001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.002) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Health  expenditure |  |  |  | -0.176\*\*\* | -0.064\*\*\* | 0.040\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.029) | (0.011) | (0.009) |  |  |  |
| Income Gini |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.047\*\*\* | 0.018\*\*\* | -0.017\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| Educational Gini |  |  |  |  |  |  | -5.934\* | -5.407\*\*\* | -2.411\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (3.350) | (1.308) | (0.310) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *R*2 | 0.640 | 0.760 | 0.636 | 0.643 | 0.765 | 0.656 | 0.708 | 0.775 | 0.623 |
| *Countries* | 151 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 147 | 147 | 147 |
| *N* | 2,622 | 2,954 | 2,955 | 2,316 | 2,663 | 2,664 | 2,378 | 2,401 | 2,401 |

Note: All models are estimated with Prais-Winsten correction for panel-specific AR1 process. The numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors. Stata command xtpcse is used. The first three models control for government expenditure while the next three models control for public health expenditure. The last three models use income inequality from Solt (2009) and education inequality from Benaabdelaali, Hanchane and Kamal (2012) All regressions include decade and regional dummy variables. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Decade and regional dummies, and intercepts are omitted to conserve space. \*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

Table A10. Cross-sectional regressions

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CIRI | PTS | Fariss | CIRI | PTS | Fariss |
|  | Average | Average | Average | 10 years avg after 2000 | 10 years avg after 2000 | 10 years avg after 2000 |
| Ethnic Inequality  (Average) | 1.458\* | 1.015\*\* | -0.739 |  |  |  |
| (0.772) | (0.391) | (0.503) |  |  |  |
| Ethnic Inequality |  |  |  | 1.866\*\* | 1.518\*\*\* | -1.316\*\*\* |
| (2000) |  |  |  | (0.745) | (0.389) | (0.493) |
| Polity 2 | -0.025 | 0.003 | 0.010 | -0.020 | 0.012 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.028) | (0.015) | (0.019) |
| EI \* Polity2 | -0.123\* | -0.076\*\*\* | 0.068\*\* | -0.155\*\*\* | -0.110\*\*\* | 0.106\*\*\* |
|  | (0.051) | (0.026) | (0.034) | (0.049) | (0.026) | (0.032) |
| Interstate War | 0.736 | -0.229 | 0.465 | 1.407 | -0.342 | 0.163 |
|  | (1.477) | (0.748) | (0.962) | (1.511) | (0.790) | (0.999) |
| Civil War | 2.670\*\*\* | 1.392\*\*\* | -1.294\*\*\* | 2.431\*\*\* | 1.249\*\*\* | -1.248\*\*\* |
|  | (0.332) | (0.168) | (0.216) | (0.320) | (0.167) | (0.211) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.434\*\*\* | -0.244\*\*\* | 0.367\*\*\* | -0.437\*\*\* | -0.240\*\*\* | 0.359\*\*\* |
| (0.083) | (0.042) | (0.054) | (0.081) | (0.042) | (0.053) |
| GDP growth | 0.043 | 0.015 | -0.022 | 0.032 | -0.010 | -0.012 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.015) | (0.019) | (0.030) | (0.016) | (0.020) |
| Population (logged) | 0.408\*\*\* | 0.163\*\*\* | -0.236\*\*\* | 0.460\*\*\* | 0.179\*\*\* | -0.258\*\*\* |
| (0.059) | (0.030) | (0.038) | (0.060) | (0.031) | (0.039) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | 0.033 | 0.011 | -0.011 | 0.021 | 0.009 | -0.012 |
| (0.036) | (0.018) | (0.023) | (0.035) | (0.018) | (0.023) |
| Ethnic Frac | 0.130 | 0.187 | -0.182 | 0.025 | 0.131 | -0.132 |
|  | (0.361) | (0.183) | (0.235) | (0.370) | (0.194) | (0.245) |
| *R*2 | | 0.810 | 0.797 | 0.788 | 0.808 | 0.773 | 0.782 |
| *N* | 155 | 155 | 155 | 154 | 154 | 154 |

Note: All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The first three models estimate the effect of average ethnic inequality on average state repression. The last three models estimate the effect of ethnic inequality level in 2000 for predicting state repression in next 10 years. All regressions include regional dummy variable. Regional dummies and intercepts are omitted to conserve space. \*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

Table A11. Ordered logit estimations

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | PTS (Amnesty) | PTS (State) |
| Ethnic Inequality (EI) | 1.372\*\* | 2.006\*\* |
| (0.590) | (0.849) |
| Polity 2 | 0.016 | -0.005 |
|  | (0.027) | (0.032) |
| EI \* Polity2 | -0.108\*\* | -0.137\*\* |
|  | (0.044) | (0.056) |
| Interstate War | -0.290 | 0.067 |
|  | (0.315) | (0.314) |
| Civil War | 1.091\*\*\* | 1.122\*\*\* |
|  | (0.192) | (0.201) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.431\*\*\* | -0.684\*\*\* |
| (0.078) | (0.100) |
| GDP growth | 0.005 | 0.010\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.006) |
| Population (logged) | 0.309\*\*\* | 0.516\*\*\* |
| (0.068) | (0.077) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | 0.050 | 0.034 |
| (0.032) | (0.039) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.150 | 0.404 |
|  | (0.330) | (0.454) |
| LDV=2 | 2.173\*\*\* | 2.151\*\*\* |
|  | (0.218) | (0.221) |
| LDV=3 | 3.764\*\*\* | 3.798\*\*\* |
|  | (0.310) | (0.321) |
| LDV=4 | 5.638\*\*\* | 5.737\*\*\* |
|  | (0.383) | (0.402) |
| LDV=5 | 7.644\*\*\* | 8.831\*\*\* |
|  | (0.490) | (0.544) |
|  |  |  |
| *Log-Likelihood* | -2131.5919 | -2236.9122 |
| Countries | 2,461 | 3,060 |
| *N* | 150 | 151 |

Note: All models are estimated with panel ordered logit estimation. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors. Stata command xtologit is used. All regressions include decade and regional dummy variables. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Decade and regional dummies, and intercepts are omitted to conserve space. \*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

Table A12. Use relative income gaps variables

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | CIRI | PTS | Fariss |
| Richest | 1.094\*\* | 0.320 | -0.553\*\*\* |
|  | (0.431) | (0.248) | (0.130) |
| Poorest | 1.072\*\*\* | 0.366\*\* | -0.670\*\*\* |
|  | (0.378) | (0.180) | (0.102) |
| Polity 2 | 0.022 | -0.014 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.040) | (0.022) | (0.011) |
| Richest\*Polity2 | -0.054\* | -0.011 | 0.011 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.017) | (0.008) |
| Poorest\*Polity2 | -0.071\*\*\* | -0.020 | 0.026\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.012) | (0.007) |
| Richest\*Poorest | -0.554\*\*\* | -0.168 | 0.281\*\*\* |
|  | (0.213) | (0.122) | (0.063) |
| Richest\*Poorest\* | 0.039\*\*\* | 0.013 | -0.016\*\*\* |
| Poliy2 | (0.014) | (0.009) | (0.004) |
| Interstate War | 0.225 | 0.094 | -0.025 |
|  | (0.143) | (0.066) | (0.026) |
| Civil War | 1.266\*\*\* | 0.465\*\*\* | -0.161\*\*\* |
|  | (0.125) | (0.049) | (0.022) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.465\*\*\* | -0.240\*\*\* | 0.362\*\*\* |
| (0.039) | (0.020) | (0.024) |
| GDP growth | 0.008\*\* | 0.000 | -0.001\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Population (logged) | 0.436\*\*\* | 0.186\*\*\* | -0.217\*\*\* |
| (0.022) | (0.016) | (0.015) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | 0.019 | -0.001 | -0.004 |
| (0.015) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Ethnic | 0.336\*\* | 0.203\*\*\* | -0.345\*\*\* |
| Fractionalization | (0.166) | (0.067) | (0.060) |
|  |  |  |  |
| *R*2 | 0.577 | 0.693 | 0.552 |
| *Countries* | 150 | 150 | 150 |
| *N* | 3,270 | 3,767 | 3,806 |

Note: All models are estimated with Prais-Winsten correction for panel-specific AR1 process. The numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors. Stata command xtpcse is used. All regressions include decade and regional dummy variables. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Decade and regional dummies, and intercepts are omitted to conserve space.

\*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

Table A13. Use civil liberty restriction as the dependent variable

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Empowerment Rights  Index | Political Civil Liberties Index |
| Ethnic Inequality (EI) | -0.555\* | -0.163\*\*\* |
| (0.300) | (0.040) |
| Interstate War | 0.138 | 0.019\*\* |
|  | (0.276) | (0.008) |
| Civil War | -0.275\*\* | -0.003 |
|  | (0.131) | (0.004) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | 0.959\*\*\* | 0.042\*\*\* |
| (0.045) | (0.008) |
| GDP growth | -0.003 | -0.001\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.000) |
| Population (logged) | 0.027 | 0.030\*\*\* |
| (0.040) | (0.004) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | -0.377\*\*\* | -0.010\*\*\* |
| (0.027) | (0.002) |
| Ethnic fractionalization | -1.575\*\*\* | -0.112\*\*\* |
|  | (0.310) | (0.041) |
|  |  |  |
| *R*2 | 0.822 | 0.869 |
| *Countries* | 158 | 155 |
| *N* | 2,810 | 3,164 |

Note: The Empowerment Rights Index from CIRI database includes the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers’ Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators while the Political Civil Liberties Index from the VDEM database captures the extent to which political liberties are respected by the government such as freedom of association and expression. All models are estimated with Prais-Winsten correction for panel-specific AR1 process. The numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors. Stata command xtpcse is used. All regressions include decade and regional dummy variables. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Decade and regional dummies, and intercepts are omitted to conserve space.

\*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

*Investigating Potential Mechanisms*

Our theory suggests that ethnic inequality can be linked to state repression by fuelling distributive conflicts and generating political instability. To understand the empirical support for the potential mechanism, we first test the effect of ethnic inequality on measurable and observed political instabilities. We use diverse forms of political instabilities, general strikes, riots, revolutions and anti-government demonstrations (Banks 2014), as dependent variables.[[3]](#footnote-3) In addition to employing these four separate indicators as the dependent variables, we also use two aggregated indexes – political dissent (the sum of annual numbers of general strikes, riots, and demonstrations) (Nordas and Davenport 2013) and the conflict index (Banks 2014).[[4]](#footnote-4) We also include standard control variables: Polity2 score, GDP per capita (log), GDP growth, population (log), oil per capita (log), ethnic fractionalization and decade dummies.

Since the dependent variables of general strikes, riots, revolutions, demonstrations, and political dissents are annual counts of incidents in each country, we use a panel negative binomial estimation. It takes into account the discrete and non-negative nature of the dependent variables as well as the over-dispersion issue of the count data. We use random effects estimations since fixed effect estimations would drop country cases with all zero outcomes on the dependent variables.[[5]](#footnote-5) Following other studies examining political instability (Houle 2016), we also include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side equation. This is because the number of political conflicts in year t is likely to be dependent on the level of instability in year t-1.

The first five models in Table A14 generally support that ethnic inequality is associated with political instability. We find that a higher level of ethnic inequality spurs more general strikes, anti-government demonstrations, and political dissents. In the last model, we also employ a linear model to examine the relationship between ethnic inequality and the aggregated conflict index. We use a Prais-Winsten estimation with a first order panel-specific auto-correlation structure and panel-corrected standard errors. We observe a similar pattern that ethnic inequality increases political conflicts. Therefore, the results in Table A14, on balance, suggest that ethnic inequality leads to domestic political instabilities. This lends support to our argument that ethnic inequality increases perceived threats to rulers by fuelling distributive conflicts and domestic grievances.

Table A14. The impact of ethnic inequality on political instability 1992-2009

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Strikes | Riots | Revolutions | Demonstrations | Dissent | Conflict index |
| Lagged DV | 0.309\*\*\* | 0.161\*\*\* | 0.251\*\*\* | 0.069\*\*\* | 0.055\*\*\* | 0.526\*\*\* |
|  | (0.086) | (0.030) | (0.035) | (0.016) | (0.009) | (0.072) |
| Ethnic inequality | 1.851\*\* | 0.392 | 0.740 | 0.671\* | 0.842\*\*\* | 297.196\*\* |
| (0.743) | (0.481) | (0.575) | (0.358) | (0.319) | (134.446) |
| Polity 2 | 0.082\*\*\* | 0.013 | -0.011 | 0.025\*\* | 0.032\*\*\* | -3.064 |
|  | (0.024) | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.012) | (0.0110) | (6.780) |
| GDP per Capita (logged) | -0.034 | -0.106 | -0.506\*\*\* | 0.057 | 0.069 | -68.462\* |
| (0.124) | (0.088) | (0.116) | (0.071) | (0.062) | (36.188) |
| GDP growth | -0.020 | -0.012 | -0.013\*\* | -0.013\* | -0.015\*\* | -2.960 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (3.284) |
| Population (logged) | 0.309\*\*\* | 0.333\*\*\* | 0.243\*\* | 0.281\*\*\* | 0.324\*\*\* | 112.329\*\*\* |
| (0.099) | (0.061) | (0.093) | (0.048) | (0.041) | (25.726) |
| Oil per capita (logged) | -0.043 | -0.004 | 0.063 | -0.021 | -0.024 | 14.626 |
| (0.061) | (0.041) | (0.050) | (0.032) | (0.028) | (10.480) |
| Ethnic | -0.781 | 0.087 | -0.400 | -0.737\*\* | -0.547\*\* | -92.153 |
| Fractionalization | (0.607) | (0.392) | (0.590) | (0.318) | (0.270) | (89.611) |
| *Log-Likelihood* | -613.736 | -1122.947 | -959.717 | -1930.033 | -2415.976 | - |
| *R*2 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.452 |
| *Countries* | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 | 152 |
| *N* | 2,490 | 2,488 | 2,488 | 2,489 | 2,488 | 2,485 |

Note: The first five models are random effect negative binomial estimations. The last model is panel corrected standard error models (adjust for panel-specific AR1 process). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All regressions include decade dummy variables. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Decade dummies and intercepts are omitted to conserve space.

\*\*\* p <= 0.01; \*\* p <=0.05; \*p<=0.1

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1. Those surveys include Afrobarometer, Comparative Study of the Electoral Systems, Demographic and Health Surveys, International Social Survey Program, Latinobarometer, and World Value Survey. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This formula is also used by Cederman et al. (2011) for calculating ethnic inequality. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Our theoretical expectation is that governments respond not only just to observed but also to anticipated political dissents. It is highly plausible that rulers would employ a repressive strategy both to pre-empt and to counter the domestic instability. If pre-emptive repression is successful, we would only be able to see a few incidents of domestic instability but would still observe high levels of state repression. Therefore, the test of the impact of ethnic inequality on observed domestic instability incidents would be a conservative test of the conjecture that ethnic inequality fuels distributive conflicts and domestic grievances. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. In addition to the information on the four separate CNTS indicators that we mentioned, the conflict index also contains information regarding assassinations, guerillas, major government crises and purges. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The main results are broadly similar when we use a country fixed effect. However, the sample size is considerably reduced. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)