**Supplementary Appendices for “Anticipated election result and protest voting: why and when Canadian voters signal discontent”**

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# Supplementary Material A –Variable Wording and Descriptive Statistics

This section of the Appendix includes the question wording of each variable used in the study, along with the descriptive statistics. Variables are quoted from the questionnaire available from the Harvard Dataverse from which the data was downloaded. The original variable names are provided as well (each starting with a Q or PQ).

**A1. Dependent Variable – Insincere Voting**

The variable was generated based on like/dislike ratings of all the parties competing in the respondents’ provinces. The party rated the highest was coded as the most preferred party. In case of a tie between multiple parties, respondents were asked a follow-up question to choose among the parties they rated identical (closed answers question where only the major Canadian parties were provided). The party named in the follow-up question was then coded as the most preferred party. Respondents were coded as having voted sincerely if they reported having voted for their highest ranked party in the post-election study and insincere otherwise.

Question/Item (Q17): *Please rate each of the following FEDERAL political parties on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you "really dislike" that party and 10 means that you "really like" that party.*

Question/Item (Q18): *All in all, which party do you like the most?*

Question/Item (PQ6): Which party’s candidate did you vote for?

**A2. Independent Variable - Ideological Congruence**

The variable was generated based on the left-right placements of the relevant parties in the respondents’ provinces and their self-placement on the same scale.

Question/Item (Q30a2): *Where would you place each of the FEDERAL political parties on the same scale, where 0 means "far left" and 10 means "far right"?*

Question/Item (Q30a): *In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a 0 to 10 scale where 0 means "far left" and 10 means "far right"?*

**A3. Independent Variable - Party Competence**

The variable was generated based on three subsequently asked questions in the survey. Respondents were first asked which issue was most important from them. The question was asked in a closed-answer format with nine substantial categories and an other-category. In the follow-up question, respondents were asked if there was a party they considered most competent to deal with their issue and if yes, which one. If the party that respondents named was the same party they preferred the most, they were coded as “0. Most preferred party is the most competent” and else “1. Most preferred party is not the most competent.”

Question/Item (Q2): *What is the most important issue to you personally in the current FEDERAL election?*

Question/Item (Q3): *In your view, is there a party that is best able to deal with [MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE NAMED BY RESPONDENT]?*

Question/Item (Q3B): *Which party?*

The distribution of answers in the final sample for the variable Q2 that was analyzed in the main regression models looks as follows:

Table A3.1 Most Important Issues by Category in Analyzed Set of Respondents (N=1,565)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Issue** | **% in Analyzed Set of Respondents** |
| The economy | 39.11 |
| Healthcare/social programs | 19.43 |
| Taxes | 13.99 |
| The security of Canadians | 7.09 |
| The environment | 6.77 |
| Democratic reform | 5.11 |
| Other | 4.47 |
| Foreign policy | 2.05 |
| Childcare | 1.28 |
| Crime | 0.7 |

Note: Respondents who answered with "Don't know" to the question "In your view, is there a party that is best able to deal with [most important issue]?" are excluded. The N hence matches those in Table A10.1 further below.

**A4. Covariate – Expected Competition (in district)**

Respondents were asked how close they would expect the election to be in their riding (district).

Question/Item (Q29): *Do you expect the outcome of the election in your LOCAL RIDING to be: very close, somewhat close, not very close or not close at all?*

**A5. Covariate – Relative Chances of Respondent’s Most Preferred Party’s Candidate to win the Riding**

This variable is generated based on respondents’ perceived chances of the competing parties to win their riding (district). Respondents were asked to rate the parties’ chances on a scale from 0 to 10. To calculate the relative winning chances of their most preferred party, I summed up the chances they gave all parties and divided it by the chance they gave their most preferred party to win. Hence, this measure ranges from “0. No chance that most preferred party will win the riding) to “1. Most preferred party is guaranteed to win the riding.”

Question/Item (Q28): *Please rate the chances of each party’s candidate winning the seat in your LOCAL RIDING on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "no chance at all" and 10 means "certain to win".*

**A6. Covariate – Importance of Election Result (District and National Level)**

These two control variables were generated based on two questions in which respondents were asked how important the election result at each of the two levels, district and national, is to them. With respect to the district level, respondents were asked how much they cared for who would win their district. Regarding the national level, they were asked how much they cared about who formed the government.

Question/Item (Q20): *On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you "don’t care at all" and 10 means that you "care a lot," how much do you care which party will form the government in Canada after the election?*

Question/Item (Q26): *On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means that you "don’t care at all" and 10 means that you "care a lot", how much do you care who is elected in your local riding?*

**A7. Covariate – Party Identification**

The questions about party identification were asked with respect to the Federal political parties. Respondents were first asked a filter question (if they usually consider themselves close to a party) and of they answered with yes, which party. For the later question, respondents were provided with answers for the five major Canadian parties.

Question/Item (Q47): Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular FEDERAL political party?

Question/Item (Q47a): Which party do you feel closest to?

**A8. Covariate – Candidate Preferences Local/National**

To identify if respondents’ preferred district candidate matched their preferred party, I used a question in which they were directly asked about whether they had a preferred candidate and if so, from which party. Respondents were then either coded as “0. Preferred local candidate and most preferred party match” or “1. Preferred local candidate and most preferred party do not match.” The baseline category (“no”) for the local candidate preference dummy includes voters who do not explicitly state to have a preference for any local candidate who competes in their riding. The baseline category for the national leader preference dummy (“no”) also includes respondents who rank at least two candidates as their most liked leaders.For the national leaders, I used like/dislike ratings of all national party leaders. If favorite leader was from respondents’ most preferred parties, they were coded as “0. Preferred party leader and most preferred party match” and “1. Preferred party leader and most preferred party do not match” otherwise.

Question/Item (Q19): *Please rate each of the following FEDERAL party leaders on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that you "really dislike" that leader and 10 means that you "really like" that leader.*

Question/Item (Q27): *Is there a local candidate that you particularly like in your riding?*

**A9. Covariate – Demographics and Province**

Demographics were either collected as party of the survey (province) or asked from respondents (age, gender, education). The education dummy for university/non-university education is coded based on educational attainment and not program. Respondents must have completed some university degree to be coded as “1. University Education.”

**A10. Descriptive Statistics**

The following table includes descriptive statistics for all variables, dependent, independent, and controls. The statistics are based on the final sample of respondents analyzed (N=1,829).

Table A10.1 Descriptive statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Statistic | N | Mean | Std. | Min | Max |
| Insincere Voting | 1,829 | 0.14 | - | 0 | 1 |
| Ideological incongruence | 1,491 | 1.24 | 1.33 | 0 | 9 |
| Part incompetence  | 1,565 | 0.25 | - | 0 | 1 |
| Expected Competition | 1,696 | 1.80 | 0.83 | 0 | 3 |
| Relative Win Chances | 1,661 | 0.39 | 0.20 | 0 | 1 |
| Outcome Importance (Riding) | 1,818 | 7.78 | 2.32 | 0 | 10 |
| Outcome Importance (National) | 1,818 | 8.64 | 1.72 | 0 | 10 |
| Party Identifier  | 1,829 | 0.51 | - | 0 | 1 |
| Preferred local candidate (from another party) | 1,636 | 0.06 | - | 0 | 1 |
| Preferred national party leader (from another party) | 1,827 | 0.09 | - | 0 | 1 |
| Female | 1,829 | 0.47 | - | 0 | 1 |
| University Education | 1,829 | 0.39 | - | 0 | 1 |
| Province | 1,829 | 1.16 | - | 0 | 2 |
| Age | 1,829 | 53.73 | 14.58 | 21 | 87 |

*Note*: Respondents in the sample for the main analyses are at least 21 because of the question about who they voted for in the previous election. There are three respondents who are in fact 21, even though the previous election took place in 2011. This may reflect the fact that respondents were interviewed prior to the actual Election Day; Standard deviations are only provided for continuous variables.

# Supplementary Material B – Full Regression Results

To preserve space and clarity in the main text, Table 1 in the paper did not include coefficients from the covariates. Table B1 below shows the full regression results for all five models presented in the main text, including the covariates.

Table B1 Effect of perceived party quality (ideological incongruence and party competence) on insincere voting

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: Insincere Vote |
|   |  Model 1  |  Model 2A  |  Model 2B  |  Model 3A  |  Model 3B  |
| Quality: Ideological incongruence  |  0.16\* (0.07) |  0.21 (0.17) |  0.16\* (0.08) |  0.02(0.19) |  0.16\* (0.07) |
| Quality: Party incompetence  |  0.58\* (0.23) |  0.57\* (0.23) |  0.86 (0.47) |  0.59\* (0.23) |  0.71 (0.52) |
| Win chance (const.)  | -5.08\*\*\* (0.72) | -4.81\*\*\* (1.01) | -4.78\*\*\* (0.84) | -5.12\*\*\* (0.73) | -5.08\*\*\* (0.72) |
| Expected electoral competition (const.)  |  0.30\* (0.12) |  0.30\* (0.13) |  0.30\* (0.13) |  0.19(0.18) |  0.32\* (0.14) |
| Quality: Ideological Congruence × Win chance (const.)  |  | -0.19 (0.50) |  |  |  |
| Quality: Party Competence × Win chance (const.)  |  |  | -1.02 (1.50) |  |  |
| Quality: Ideological Congruence × Expected electoral competition (const.)  |  |  |  |  0.07 (0.09) |  |
| Quality: Party Competence × Expected electoral competition (riding)  |   |   |   |   |  -0.08  (0.26)  |
| Importance: riding result  |  -0.09  (0.05)  |  -0.09  (0.05)  |  -0.09  (0.05)  |  -0.09  (0.05)  |  -0.09  (0.05)  |
| Importance: national result  |  -0.05  (0.07)  |  -0.05  (0.07)  |  -0.05  (0.07)  |  -0.04  (0.07)  |  -0.05  (0.07)  |
| Party identifier  |  -0.22  (0.21)  |  -0.22  (0.21)  |  -0.22  (0.21)  |  -0.22  (0.21)  |  -0.22  (0.21)  |
| Preferred local candidate (other party)  |  1.61\*\*\* (0.30)  |  1.62\*\*\* (0.30)  |  1.62\*\*\* (0.30)  |  1.61\*\*\* (0.30)  |  1.62\*\*\* (0.30)  |
| Preferred national party leader (other party)  |  1.04\*\*\* (0.27)  |  1.04\*\*\* (0.27)  |  1.05\*\*\* (0.27)  |  1.03\*\*\* (0.27)  |  1.04\*\*\* (0.27)  |
| Female  |  -0.20  (0.20)  |  -0.20 (0.20)  |  -0.21 (0.21)  |  -0.20 (0.21)  |  -0.20 (0.20)  |
| Age  |  -0.01\* (0.01)  |  -0.01\* (0.01)  |  -0.01\* (0.01)  |  -0.01\* (0.01)  |  -0.01\* (0.01)  |
| University education  |  0.05(0.20)  |  0.04 (0.20)  |  0.05 (0.20)  |  0.05 (0.20)  |  0.05 (0.20)  |
| *Reference: Québec* |  |  |  |  |  |
| British Columbia  |  0.52\* (0.26)  |  0.51 (0.26)  |  0.52\* (0.26)  |  0.51 (0.26)  |  0.52\* (0.26)  |
| Ontario  |  0.09 (0.26)  |  0.09 (0.27)  |  0.08 (0.27)  |  0.08 (0.27)  |  0.09(0.27)  |
| Constant |  0.35 (0.70)  |  0.29 (0.73)  |  0.27 (0.72)  |  0.53 (0.74)  |  0.32 (0.71)  |
| Observations  | 1,139 | 1,139 | 1,139 | 1,139 | 1,139 |
| Log Likelihood  | -345.71 | -345.64 | -345.48 | -345.4 | -345.67 |
| AIC | 721.42 | 723.28 | 722.95 | 722.79 | 723.34 |
| *Notes:* Model names correspond to those in Table 1 in the main text; Table reports log odds from logistic regression models with standard errors in parentheses; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001. |

# Supplementary Material C – Robustness Check 1

In this section, I conduct two robustness checks to test the assumption that the theorized mechanism of protest voting works regardless of which party voters prefer the most. To that end, I conduct two separate analysis, one in which I exclude respondents with preference for one particular party, a process I repeat for all the five parties under investigation (Table C1). In the second test, I add a dummy variable to the main model which adjusts for the specific party respondents prefer (Table C2).

Table C1 Robustness Check 1a - Re-run of Model 1 (Table 1 in the text) with deletion of voters by party preference in each Model

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: Insincere Vote |
|   |  No Conservatives |  No New Democratic Party |  No Liberals |  No Bloc Québécois |  No Greens |
| Quality: Ideological incongruence  |  0.11(0.10)  |  0.15 (0.09)  |  0.14 (0.08)  |  0.21\*\* (0.08)  |  0.14 (0.08)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Quality: Party incompetence  |  0.26 (0.29)  |  0.35 (0.27)  |  0.82\*\* (0.26)  |  0.79\*\* (0.25)  |  0.59\* (0.24)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Win chance (riding)  |  -6.83\*\*\* (1.02)  |  -5.29\*\*\* (0.84)  |  -4.24\*\*\* (0.76)  |  -5.13\*\*\* (0.75)  |  -4.53\*\*\* (0.78)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Expected electoral competition (riding)  |  0.33\* (0.16)  |  0.34\* (0.15)  |  0.22 (0.14)  |  0.29\* (0.13)  |  0.31\* (0.13)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Importance: riding result  |  -0.12 (0.06)  |  -0.07 (0.05)  |  -0.06 (0.05)  |  -0.08 (0.05)  |  -0.11\* (0.05)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Importance: national result  |  -0.06 (0.09)  |  -0.06 (0.08)  |  0.01 (0.08)  |  -0.07 (0.07)  |  -0.05 (0.07)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Party identifier  |  -0.09 (0.28)  |  -0.35 (0.25)  |  -0.31 (0.24)  |  -0.14 (0.22)  |  -0.23 (0.22)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Preferred local candidate (other party)  |  1.92\*\*\* (0.38)  |  1.77\*\*\*(0.33)  |  1.73\*\*\* (0.36)  |  1.40\*\*\*(0.32)  |  1.40\*\*\* (0.32)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Preferred national party leader (other party)  |  1.26\*\*\* (0.33)  |  0.55 (0.36)  |  1.16\*\*\* (0.31)  |  1.05\*\*\* (0.27)  |  1.14\*\*\* (0.27)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female  |  -0.33 (0.26)  |  -0.12 (0.24)  |  -0.05 (0.23)  |  -0.15 (0.21)  |  -0.38 (0.22)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age  |  -0.01 (0.01)  |  -0.01(0.01)  |  -0.02\* (0.01)  |  -0.01\* (0.01)  |  -0.02\* (0.01)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| University education  |  0.05 (0.26)  |  0.14(0.24)  |  0.13 (0.23)  |  0.003 (0.21)  |  -0.03 (0.21)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reference: Québec |  |  |  |  |  |
| British Columbia  |  0.69\* (0.33)  |  0.82\*\* (0.30)  |  0.28 (0.31)  |  0.15 (0.29)  |  0.44 (0.27)  |
| Ontario  |  -0.01 (0.34)  |  0.17 (0.31)  |  0.35 (0.29)  |  -0.31 (0.30)  |  0.01 (0.28)  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant |  0.92 (0.93)  |  0.13 (0.82)  |  -0.39 (0.82)  |  0.76 (0.72)  |  0.57 (0.74)  |
| Observations  | 664 | 921 | 825 | 1,055 | 1,091 |
| Log Likelihood  | -206 | -258.26 | -265.76 | -318.62 | -319.35 |
| AIC | 442.01 | 546.52 | 561.52 | 667.24 | 668.69 |
| *Notes:* Table reports log odds from logistic regression models with standard errors in parentheses; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001. |

In the models presented in Table C2, I re-run the main model for H1 (Model 1 in Table 1) five times and exclude respondents by preferences for each of the five Canadian parties included here in one of the iterations. If the identified effects were primarily driven by voters with a preference for a particular party, then the exclusion of these respondents should strongly alter the effect sizes (cf. Neumayer and Plümper 2017, 48/49). The results show that the effect of ideological congruence is relatively robust, as indicated by similar effect sizes across the models. At the same time, the effect size for party competence varies to a greater extent, depending on which respondents are excluded. This applies particularly when respondents with preferences for the Conservatives or the New Democratic Party are excluded. These results add to the level of uncertainty found in the main analysis but should not lead to a rejection of the main findings. This is further supported by the second test presented in Table C2. The results stem from the original model used to test Hypothesis 1 but include an additional covariate namely, a categorical variable for the party that respondents prefer the most. The reference category contains respondents who prefer the Conservative Party the most. The main finding here is that in comparison to the original analysis, the estimates for the two measures of party quality (ideological congruence and party incompetence) remain stable both in their statistical significance but more importantly, in their size and direction of the relationship.

Table C2 Robustness Check 1b - Re-run of Model 1 (Table 1 in the text) Inclusion of Preference Dummy in Main Model for Hypothesis 1

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: Insincere Vote |
|   |  Model C1A  |
| Quality: Ideological incongruence  |  0.15\* (0.08)  |
| Quality: Party incompetence  |  0.68\*\* (0.25)  |
| Reference: Conservative Party |  |
| New Democratic Party |  0.68\* (0.28)  |
| Liberal Party |  -0.26 (0.28)  |
| Bloc Québécois |  -1.09\* (0.48)  |
| Green Party |  0.50 (0.42)  |
| Win chance (constituency)  |  -4.84\*\*\* (0.77)  |
| Expected electoral competition (constituency)  |  0.30\* (0.13)  |
| Importance: constituency result  |  -0.10\* (0.05)  |
| Importance: national result  |  -0.06 (0.07)  |
| Party identifier  |  -0.21(0.22)  |
| Preferred local candidate (other party)  |  1.67\*\*\* (0.31)  |
| Preferred national party leader (other party)  |  0.92\*\*\* (0.28)  |
| Female  |  -0.28 (0.21)  |
| Age  |  -0.01 (0.01)  |
| University education  |  0.11 (0.21)  |
| Reference: Québec |  |
| British Columbia  |  -0.02 (0.29)  |
| Ontario  |  -0.42 (0.30)  |
| Constant |  0.58 (0.73)  |
| Observations  | 1,139 |
| Log Likelihood  | -336.67 |
| AIC | 711.34 |
| *Notes:* Table reports log odds from logistic regression models with standard errors in parentheses; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001. |

# Supplementary Material D – Robustness Check 2

In this section, I present the results from additional analyses in which I do not constrain the respondents included in the models to those whose preferences match the party they voted for in the previous election. This test thus relaxes the assumption of a long-term perspective. It moves the baseline against which preferences and behaviour are compared from the previous election to the current election. From this perspective, it suffices what voters want in the given election, irrespective of their previous voting behaviour. In a way, this test may be considered an easier, yet less dynamic test of the protest voting mechanism. At the same time, if the results differed dramatically from those presented in the main analyses, we may call into question whether the primary findings are the arbitrary result of complicated assumptions rather than systematic correlations. Additionally, this type of test is also required because of the absence of information about voters’ preferences prior to the previous election in 2011 and the well-documented issues of the inaccuracy of the vote recall question (Dassonneville and Hooghe 2017).

Adopting a short-term perspective has two consequences. First, potential switchers are irrelevant, and the sincerity of the vote alone determines whether or not a respondent can be considered a potential protest voter. Second, while the long-term perspective of protest voting assumes that parties primarily rely on election results to learn about voter preferences, there are other sources that parties may rely on. For instance, the rapid development of Big Data in political campaigning now allows parties to learn more about voters’ preferences (e.g., Nickerson and Rogers 2014), taking away some of the importance of a baseline established by previous elections. Moreover, parties can utilize a whole array of other ways to collect intel about voters preferences, such as local party organizations (Koop 2012), the media Arce (e.g., Arceneaux et al. 2016) or public opinion polls (e.g., Turcotte 2012). The short-term perspective thus assumes that parties know about voters’ preferences, a crucial assumption to identify if and how protest voting matters (which is less relevant from the voters’ perspective).

The analyses presented below repeat the steps taken in the primary analyses. By and large, the results are comparable to those obtained in the primary analyses: lower ideological congruence and party incompetence with respect to handling respondents’ most important issues increase the likelihood of insincere voting. Neither perceived chances to win the constituency seat nor perceived electoral competition in respondents’ constituencies moderate the former relationships consistently in the expected ways (if any). These findings indicate a stable relationship between negative party evaluations and insincere voting, regardless of the time perspective.

Table D1 Robustness Check 2 - Re-run of Model 1 (Table 1 in the text) without restriction to set of respondents (all hypotheses)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Dependent Variable: Insincere Vote |
|   |  Model D1A  |  Model D1B  |  Model D2A  |  Model D2B  |  Model D3A  |  Model D3B  |
| Quality: Ideological incongruence  |  0.12\*\*\* (0.04)  |  0.10\* (0.05)  |  0.07(0.10)  |  0.10\* (0.05)  |  0.12 (0.11)  |  0.10\* (0.05)  |
| Quality: Party incompetence  |  1.67\*\*\* (0.11)  |  1.10\*\*\* (0.15)  |  1.10\*\*\* (0.15)  |  1.37\*\*\* (0.29)  |  1.10\*\*\* (0.15)  |  1.22\*\*\* (0.34)  |
| Win chance (riding)  |   |  -4.87\*\*\* (0.47)  |  -5.01\*\*\* (0.66)  |  -4.41\*\*\* (0.62)  |  -4.87\*\*\* (0.47)  |  -4.88\*\*\* (0.47)  |
| Expected electoral competition (riding)  |   |  0.21\* (0.08)  |  0.21\* (0.08)  |  0.21\* (0.08)  |  0.22 (0.12)  |  0.24\* (0.11)  |
| Quality: Ideological Congruence\*Win chance (district)  |   |   |  0.09 (0.31)  |   |   |   |
| Quality: Party Competence\*Win chance (district)  |   |   |   |  -1.01 (0.93)  |   |   |
| Quality: Ideological Congruence\*Expected electoral competition (riding)  |   |   |   |   |  -0.01 (0.06)  |   |
| Quality: Party Competence\*Expected electoral competition (riding)  |   |   |   |   |   |  -0.07 (0.17)  |
| Importance: riding result  |   |  -0.04 (0.03)  |  -0.04 (0.03)  |  -0.04 (0.03)  |  -0.04 (0.03)  |  -0.04 (0.03)  |
| Importance: national result  |   |  -0.04 (0.04)  |  -0.04 (0.04)  |  -0.04 (0.04)  |  -0.04 (0.04)  |  -0.04 (0.04)  |
| Party identifier  |   |  -0.46\*\* (0.15)  |  -0.46\*\* (0.15)  |  -0.46\*\* (0.15)  |  -0.46\*\* (0.15)  |  -0.46\*\* (0.15)  |
| Preferred local candidate (other party)  |   |  1.97\*\*\* (0.20)  |  1.97\*\*\* (0.20)  |  1.98\*\*\* (0.20)  |  1.97\*\*\* (0.20)  |  1.97\*\*\* (0.20)  |
| Preferred national party leader (other party)  |   |  0.78\*\*\* (0.19)  |  0.78\*\*\* (0.19)  |  0.79\*\*\* (0.19)  |  0.78\*\*\* (0.19)  |  0.78\*\*\* (0.19)  |
| Female  |   |  -0.26 (0.14)  |  -0.26 (0.14)  |  -0.27 (0.14)  |  -0.26 (0.14)  |  -0.26 (0.14)  |
| Age  |   |  -0.02\*\*\* (0.004)  |  -0.02\*\*\* (0.004)  |  -0.02\*\*\* (0.004)  |  -0.02\*\*\* (0.004)  |  -0.02\*\*\* (0.004)  |
| University education  |   |  0.11 (0.14)  |  0.12 (0.14)  |  0.11 (0.14)  |  0.11 (0.14)  |  0.11 (0.14)  |
| Reference: Québec |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| British Columbia  |   |  0.67\*\*\* (0.17)  |  0.67\*\*\* (0.17)  |  0.67\*\*\* (0.17)  |  0.67\*\*\* (0.17)  |  0.67\*\*\* (0.17)  |
| Ontario  |   |  0.19 (0.18)  |  0.19 (0.18)  |  0.18 (0.18)  |  0.19 (0.18)  |  0.19 (0.18)  |
| Constant |  -1.98\*\*\* (0.09)  |  0.38 (0.46)  |  0.43 (0.48)  |  0.30 (0.47)  |  0.36 (0.48)  |  0.34 (0.47)  |
| Observations  | 2,260 | 1,903 | 1,903 | 1,903 | 1,903 | 1,903 |
| Log Likelihood  | -1,099.10 | -705.55 | -705.51 | -704.96 | -705.54 | -705.47 |
| AIC | 2,204.19 | 1,441.10 | 1,443.01 | 1,441.91 | 1,443.08 | 1,442.94 |
| *Notes:* Table reports log odds from logistic regression models with standard errors in parentheses; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001. |

Figure D1 Average marginal effects of party quality (ideological congruence and party competence) on insincere voting by perceived chances to win the constituency



*Note*: Figures are based on Model D2A (Figure D1.1) and Model D2B (Figure D1.2) in Table D1 in this section of the complementary material; The reference group for the average marginal effect of the party competence dummy in Figure D1.2 is “Most preferred party is competent to handle respondent’s most important issue.”

Figure D2 Average marginal effects of party quality (ideological congruence and party competence) on insincere voting by expected electoral competition



*Note*: Figures are based on Model D3A (Figure D2.1) and Model D3B (Figure D2.2) in Table D1 in this section of the complementary material; The reference group for the average marginal effect of the party competence dummy in Figure D2.2 is “Most preferred party is competent to handle respondent’s most important issue.”

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