## Supplementary Material

## A. Party Coding

Table A.1: Party Family Classification

| Country | Incumbent | Opposition | Radical |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Denmark | Liberal Alliance | Social Democrats | RG Alliance |
|  | Venstre | D Soc-Lib Party | Socialist PP |
|  | Conservative PP | The Alternative | Danish PP |
| Germany | SPD | FDP | AFD |
|  | CDU/CSU | Greens | Left |
| Ireland | Fine Gael | Fianna Fail | Sinn Fein |
|  |  | Labour Party | Solidarity |
|  |  | Social Democrats |  |
| Italy | Forza Italia | Lega Nord |  |
|  |  | Liberi e Uguali | M5S |
|  |  | Fratelli d'Italia |  |
| Netherlands | Democrats 66 | 50plus | PVV |
|  | VVD | Groen Links | Socialist Party |
|  | Chr-Dem Appeal | PVDA |  |
| Christian Union |  |  |  |
| Spain | PSOE | CDC | Podemos |
|  |  | Ciudadanos |  |
| Sweden | SAP | Center Party | Sweden |
|  | MP | Liberal Party | Democrats |
|  |  | Moderates | Vänsterpartiet |
|  |  | KD |  |
| United Kingdom | Conservatives | Labour | UKIP |
|  |  | LibDem |  |
|  |  | SNP |  |

## B. Description of Different Opportunity Measures

## Item Wording:

- Labor Market Opportunity (Respondent): The world is changing fast. When you think about the future, how do you rate your personal chances of having a good, stable job until you retire?
- General Opportunity (Respondent): Now please think beyond the job market to your overall quality of life. How do you rate your personal chances for a secure, fulfilling life?
- Labor Market Opportunity (Children): Please think now about the life your child will face in this changing world. How do you assess your child's chances of finding good, stable employment until retirement?
- General Opportunity (Children): Now please think beyond the job market to your child's overall quality of life. How do you rate your child's chances for a secure, fulfilling life?

Correlation Matrix:

Table B.1: Correlation between Opportunity Measures

|  | General_Self | LM_Self | General_Kids | LM_Kids |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| General_Self | 1.00 | 0.71 | 0.66 | 0.62 |
| LM_Self | 0.71 | 1.00 | 0.44 | 0.49 |
| General_Kids | 0.66 | 0.44 | 1.00 | 0.83 |
| LM_Kids | 0.62 | 0.49 | 0.83 | 1.00 |

## C. Regression Tables

The following tables provide full regression results for the analyses shown and/or discussed in the main body of the manuscript.

## Tables Section: Aspirational vs apprehensive voting

Table C. 1 shows results visualized in Figure 3 (Panel (b)).

Table C.1: Opportunity Kids and Party Support (Multinomial, Reference: Incumbent Voting)

|  | Mainstream Opposition | Radical |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Kids Opportunity | -0.036 | $-0.179^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.021)$ | $(0.023)$ |
| Income | -0.015 | $-0.081^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.019)$ | $(0.020)$ |
| Age | -0.005 | $-0.011^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.004)$ | $(0.004)$ |
| Female | 0.080 | $-0.232^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.091)$ | $(0.100)$ |
| Educ: Primary | -1.052 | 0.323 |
|  | $(1.234)$ | $(1.488)$ |
| Educ: Secondary I | -1.275 | -0.047 |
|  | $(1.192)$ | $(1.447)$ |
| Educ: Secondary II | -1.482 | -0.241 |
|  | $(1.193)$ | $(1.447)$ |
| Educ: Post-Secondary | -1.505 | -0.274 |
|  | $(1.196)$ | $(1.450)$ |
| Educ: Short Tertiary | -1.519 | -0.491 |
| Educ: Tertiary I | $(1.200)$ | $(1.456)$ |
|  | -1.457 | -0.250 |
| Educ: Tertiary II | $(1.195)$ | $(1.450)$ |
|  | -1.193 | -0.320 |
| Class: Lower Service | $(1.200)$ | $(1.457)$ |
| Class: Small Business | 0.000 | $0.348^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.140)$ | $(0.162)$ |
| Class: Skilled Worker | -0.203 | 0.235 |
|  | $(0.208)$ | $(0.229)$ |
| Class: Unskilled Worker | 0.179 | $0.520^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.139)$ | $(0.161)$ |
| AIC | -0.182 | $0.422^{*}$ |
| BIC | $(0.192)$ | $(0.207)$ |
| Log Likelihood | 6262.462 | 6262.462 |
| Deviance | 6541.767 | 6541.767 |
| Num. obs. | -3085.231 | -3085.231 |
| K | 6170.462 | 6170.462 |
| $* * * p<0.001 ;{ }^{* *} p<0.01 ;{ }^{*} p<0.05$. | 3203 |  |
|  | 3203 | 3 |
|  | 3 |  |

The two models in table C. 2 show results visualized in Figure 4 (Panels (a) and (b), respectively).

Table C.2: Opportunity and Incumbent Support

|  | Opportunity Respondent | Opportunity Kids |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| General Opportunity (Respondent) | $-0.067^{* * *}$ |  |
|  | $(0.012)$ | $-0.073^{* * *}$ |
| General Opportunity (Kids) |  | $(0.016)$ |
|  |  | $-0.053^{* * *}$ |
| Income | $-0.060^{* * *}$ | $(0.014)$ |
|  | $(0.011)$ | $-0.014^{* * *}$ |
| Age | $-0.015^{* * *}$ | $(0.003)$ |
|  | $(0.002)$ | -0.678 |
| Educ: Primary | -0.994 | $(1.125)$ |
|  | $(1.108)$ | -0.971 |
| Educ: Secondary I | -1.200 | $-1.095)$ |
| Educ: Secondary II | $(1.086)$ | $(1.095)$ |
|  | -1.145 | -1.029 |
| Educ: Post-Secondary | $(1.087)$ | $(1.098)$ |
|  | -1.144 | -1.164 |
| Educ: Short Tertiary | $(1.088)$ | $(1.101)$ |
| Educ: Tertiary I | -1.319 | -1.097 |
|  | $(1.090)$ | $(1.098)$ |
| Educ: Tertiary II | -1.269 | -0.815 |
|  | $(1.088)$ | $(1.101)$ |
| Class: Lower Service | -1.052 | 0.083 |
| Class: Small Business | $(1.090)$ | $(0.110)$ |
| Class: Skilled Worker | 0.014 | 0.031 |
|  | $(0.087)$ | $(0.151)$ |
| Class: Unskilled Worker | 0.033 | 0.163 |
|  | $(0.124)$ | $(0.110)$ |
| AIC | 0.065 | 0.005 |
| BIC | $(0.086)$ | $(0.144)$ |
| Log Likelihood | -0.038 | 5204.548 |
| Deviance | $(0.112)$ | 5351.007 |
| Num. obs. | 8332.122 | -2579.274 |
|  | 8490.173 | 5158.548 |
|  | -4143.061 | 4306 |
|  | 8286.122 |  |

${ }^{* * *} p<0.001 ;{ }^{* *} p<0.01 ;{ }^{*} p<0.05$. All models include country-fixed effects.

Table C. 3 shows multinomial version of the results in Table 3, which are based on separate logistic models

Table C.3: Opportunity Types and Party Support (Reference: Incumbent)

|  | Mainstream Opp | Radical |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Type: Apprehensive | $0.222^{*}$ | $0.837^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.108)$ | $(0.115)$ |
| Type: Aspirational | 0.123 | $0.344^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.096)$ | $(0.108)$ |
| Type: Burdened | $0.431^{* * *}$ | $1.138^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.108)$ | $(0.115)$ |
| Age: $26-35$ | -0.135 | 0.228 |
|  | $(0.154)$ | $(0.177)$ |
| Age: $36-45$ | $-0.379^{*}$ | 0.002 |
|  | $(0.152)$ | $(0.175)$ |
| Age: $46-55$ | $-0.343^{*}$ | -0.024 |
|  | $(0.150)$ | $(0.172)$ |
| Age: $56-65$ | $-0.345^{*}$ | -0.041 |
|  | $(0.157)$ | $(0.179)$ |
| Age: 66 and older | $-0.522^{* *}$ | $-0.562^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.197)$ | $(0.238)$ |
| Female | 0.119 | -0.079 |
|  | $(0.075)$ | $(0.083)$ |
| Educ: Medium | 0.047 | $-0.215^{*}$ |
| Educ: High | $(0.085)$ | $(0.093)$ |
|  | -0.012 | -0.104 |
| Class: Employers | $(0.064)$ | $(0.068)$ |
|  | 0.262 | -0.033 |
| Class: Managers | $(0.218)$ | $(0.261)$ |
| Class: Production Workers | $-0.233^{*}$ | $-0.301^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.117)$ | $(0.134)$ |
| Class: Service Workers | 0.082 | $0.391^{* *}$ |
| Class: Small Business Owners | $(0.146)$ | $(0.150)$ |
| Class: Soc. Cult. Profs | $-0.268^{*}$ | -0.050 |
| Class: Tech. Profs | $(0.119)$ | $(0.128)$ |
|  | -0.160 | -0.051 |
| AIC | $(0.173)$ | $(0.187)$ |
| BIC | -0.095 | -0.038 |
| Log Likelihood | $(0.131)$ | $(0.145)$ |
| Deviance | 0.143 | 0.018 |
| Num. obs. | $(0.143)$ | $(0.163)$ |
| K | 9849.737 | 9849.737 |
| $* * * p<0.001)^{* *} p<0.01 ;{ }^{*} p<0.05$. All models include country-fixed effects. |  |  |
|  | 10189.590 | 10189.590 |
|  | -4872.869 | -4872.869 |
|  | 9745.737 | 9745.737 |
|  | 5093 | 5093 |
|  | 3 | 3 |

## Tables Section: Interacting Income and Opportunity

Table C. 4 shows results visualized in Figures 6 and 7.

Table C.4: Interacting Opportunity and Income (Continuous)

|  | Incumbent | MS Opposition | Radical |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Social Opportunity | $0.065^{*}$ | $0.084^{* *}$ | $-0.121^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.032)$ | $(0.028)$ | $(0.030)$ |
| Income | 0.024 | 0.028 | -0.014 |
|  | $(0.034)$ | $(0.030)$ | $(0.032)$ |
| Income X Opportunity | 0.004 | -0.007 | -0.004 |
|  | $(0.005)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.005)$ |
| Age | $0.008^{* *}$ | -0.003 | -0.004 |
|  | $(0.003)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.003)$ |
| Female | -0.030 | $0.153^{*}$ | $-0.162^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.068)$ | $(0.064)$ | $(0.071)$ |
| Education | 0.011 | $0.056^{* *}$ | $-0.086^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.022)$ | $(0.021)$ | $(0.024)$ |
| Class: Employers | -0.137 | 0.274 | -0.223 |
|  | $(0.205)$ | $(0.185)$ | $(0.222)$ |
| Class: Managers | $0.236^{*}$ | -0.138 | -0.126 |
|  | $(0.107)$ | $(0.104)$ | $(0.119)$ |
| Class: Production Workers | -0.240 | -0.159 | $0.335^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.130)$ | $(0.117)$ | $(0.121)$ |
| Class: Service Workers | 0.176 | $-0.241^{*}$ | 0.085 |
|  | $(0.107)$ | $(0.101)$ | $(0.109)$ |
| Class: Small Business Owners | 0.111 | -0.137 | 0.038 |
|  | $(0.156)$ | $(0.145)$ | $(0.157)$ |
| Class: Soc. Cult. Profs | 0.083 | -0.100 | 0.037 |
|  | $(0.119)$ | $(0.114)$ | $(0.127)$ |
| Class: Tech. Profs | -0.098 | 0.117 | -0.038 |
|  | $(0.131)$ | $(0.124)$ | $(0.141)$ |
| AIC | 5717.006 | 6381.774 | 5420.340 |
| BIC | 5854.254 | 6519.022 | 5557.588 |
| Log Likelihood | -2837.503 | -3169.887 | -2689.170 |
| Deviance | 5675.006 | 6339.774 | 5378.340 |
| Num. obs. | 5093 | 5093 | 5093 |

${ }^{* * *} p<0.001 ;{ }^{* *} p<0.01 ;{ }^{*} p<0.05$. All models include country-fixed effects.

## Tables Section: Implications [Robustness see below]

Table C. 5 shows results visualized in Figure 8.

Table C.5: Opportunity Types and Party Support

|  | Rad Left | MS Left | MS Right | Rad Right |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Type: Apprehensive | 0.432** | -0.045 | -0.622*** | 0.774*** |
|  | (0.134) | (0.100) | (0.096) | (0.119) |
| Type: Aspirational | 0.370** | 0.114 | $-0.308^{* * *}$ | 0.081 |
|  | (0.121) | (0.088) | (0.084) | (0.120) |
| Type: Burdened | 0.788*** | 0.011 | $-0.795^{* * *}$ | $0.637^{* *}$ |
|  | (0.123) | (0.094) | (0.094) | (0.118) |
| Age: $26-35$ | 0.266 | 0.082 | $-0.543^{* * *}$ | $0.646^{* *}$ |
|  | (0.181) | (0.128) | (0.126) | (0.184) |
| Age: 36-45 | 0.218 | -0.242 | -0.171 | 0.579** |
|  | (0.180) | (0.130) | (0.123) | (0.182) |
| Age: 46-55 | 0.227 | -0.094 | -0.253* | $0.487^{* *}$ |
|  | (0.178) | (0.127) | (0.122) | (0.180) |
| Age: 56-65 | 0.080 | -0.063 | -0.197 | 0.449* |
|  | (0.190) | (0.134) | (0.129) | (0.188) |
| Age: 66 and older | -0.346 | -0.090 | 0.156 | 0.024 |
|  | (0.299) | (0.180) | (0.171) | (0.265) |
| Female | -0.042 | 0.199** | -0.021 | $-0.296{ }^{* *}$ |
|  | (0.093) | (0.069) | (0.066) | (0.090) |
| Educ: Medium | -0.081 | 0.072 | 0.212** | $-0.504^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.103) | (0.077) | (0.075) | (0.100) |
| Educ: High | 0.065 | -0.033 | 0.048 | $-0.140^{*}$ |
|  | (0.077) | (0.057) | (0.056) | (0.070) |
| Class: Employers | -0.467 | 0.315 | 0.065 | -0.232 |
|  | (0.334) | (0.206) | (0.197) | (0.299) |
| Class: Managers | $-0.424^{* *}$ | 0.091 | 0.116 | -0.026 |
|  | (0.162) | (0.114) | (0.105) | (0.148) |
| Class: Production Workers | 0.011 | 0.142 | $-0.487^{* * *}$ | 0.437** |
|  | (0.164) | (0.128) | (0.126) | (0.150) |
| Class: Service Workers | 0.059 | 0.173 | $-0.326^{* *}$ | 0.250 |
|  | (0.139) | (0.109) | (0.104) | (0.139) |
| Class: Small Business Owners | -0.281 | -0.105 | 0.144 | 0.117 |
|  | (0.228) | (0.162) | (0.148) | (0.194) |
| Class: Soc. Cult. Profs | 0.402** | 0.346** | $-0.450^{* * *}$ | -0.106 |
|  | (0.155) | (0.121) | (0.117) | (0.164) |
| Class: Tech. Profs | -0.292 | 0.240 | -0.054 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.187) | (0.133) | (0.124) | (0.177) |
| AIC | 3418.452 | 5742.215 | 6100.390 | 3656.072 |
| BIC | 3587.485 | 5911.247 | 6269.423 | 3825.105 |
| Log Likelihood | -1683.226 | -2845.107 | -3024.195 | -1802.036 |
| Deviance | 3366.452 | 5690.215 | 6048.390 | 3604.072 |
| Num. obs. | 4921 | 4921 | 4921 | 4921 |

[^0]
## D. Robustness

While we lack a survey item that directly asks how respondents see the current economic context, we present additional models that capture whether respondents (a) are currently affected by labor market vulnerability (unemployment or underemployment), (b) have ever received unemployment benefits or (c) believe in fiscal constraint by agreeing that "governments should not impose any further tax burden on citizens".

Figure D. 1 and Table D. 1 show that our results hold when controlling for objective economic experience, which corroborates our interpretation that perceptions of long-term economic opportunity are more than just a correlate of past and current economic conditions.


Figure D.1: Opportunity and Party (top) or Incumbent (bottom) Support, controlling for objective economic circumstances (compared to main model presented in Figure 3 and 4)

Table D.1: Opportunity Types and Party Support

|  | Inc | Inc | MS Opp | MS Opp | Radical | Radical |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Type: Apprehensive | $-0.478^{* * *}$ | -0.488*** | -0.149 | -0.135 | $0.719^{* * *}$ | $0.712^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.097) | (0.098) | (0.092) | (0.092) | (0.098) | (0.099) |
| Type: Aspirational | -0.207* | -0.189* | -0.017 | -0.011 | 0.280** | 0.261** |
|  | (0.087) | (0.088) | (0.084) | (0.086) | (0.095) | (0.097) |
| Type: Burdened | $-0.721^{* * *}$ | $-0.721^{* * *}$ | -0.139 | -0.111 | $0.883^{* * *}$ | 0.861*** |
|  | (0.098) | (0.102) | (0.087) | (0.092) | (0.094) | (0.100) |
| Age: $26-35$ | -0.009 | 0.021 | -0.242 | -0.229 | 0.318* | 0.264 |
|  | (0.143) | (0.144) | (0.130) | (0.131) | (0.151) | (0.153) |
| Age: 36-45 | 0.233 | 0.280 | $-0.378^{* *}$ | $-0.363^{* *}$ | 0.226 | 0.149 |
|  | (0.141) | (0.143) | (0.128) | (0.130) | (0.149) | (0.151) |
| Age: 46-55 | 0.220 | 0.279* | $-0.335^{* *}$ | -0.318* | 0.181 | 0.096 |
|  | (0.139) | (0.142) | (0.127) | (0.130) | (0.147) | (0.150) |
| Age: 56-65 | 0.224 | 0.277 | -0.313* | -0.301* | 0.169 | 0.092 |
|  | (0.145) | (0.147) | (0.133) | (0.135) | (0.153) | (0.156) |
| Age: 66 and older | 0.513** | 0.544** | -0.280 | -0.272 | -0.244 | -0.282 |
|  | (0.184) | (0.186) | (0.171) | (0.173) | (0.207) | (0.209) |
| Female | -0.041 | -0.053 | 0.146* | 0.140* | $-0.14{ }^{*}$ | -0.124 |
|  | (0.068) | (0.068) | (0.064) | (0.065) | (0.071) | (0.072) |
| Educ: Medium | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.143* | 0.143 | $-0.240 * *$ | $-0.238^{* *}$ |
|  | (0.077) | (0.078) | (0.073) | (0.074) | (0.080) | (0.081) |
| Educ: High | 0.048 | 0.048 | 0.021 | 0.019 | -0.098 | -0.097 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.058) | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.058) | (0.058) |
| Class: Employers | -0.158 | -0.176 | 0.290 | 0.294 | -0.205 | -0.187 |
|  | (0.205) | (0.208) | (0.184) | (0.186) | (0.222) | (0.224) |
| Class: Managers | 0.263* | 0.247* | -0.119 | -0.127 | -0.178 | -0.153 |
|  | (0.107) | (0.107) | (0.103) | (0.104) | (0.118) | (0.119) |
| Class: Production Workers | -0.238 | -0.241 | -0.165 | -0.175 | 0.340** | 0.352** |
|  | (0.131) | (0.132) | (0.118) | (0.119) | (0.122) | (0.123) |
| Class: Service Workers | 0.171 | 0.168 | $-0.249^{*}$ | -0.254* | 0.102 | 0.109 |
|  | (0.107) | (0.108) | (0.101) | (0.102) | (0.109) | (0.110) |
| Class: Small Business Owners | 0.116 | 0.141 | -0.146 | -0.193 | 0.032 | 0.059 |
|  | (0.157) | (0.159) | (0.146) | (0.149) | (0.158) | (0.160) |
| Class: Soc. Cult. Profs | 0.078 | 0.064 | -0.073 | -0.073 | 0.017 | 0.024 |
|  | (0.118) | (0.119) | (0.114) | (0.114) | (0.127) | (0.128) |
| Class: Tech. Profs | -0.093 | -0.132 | 0.137 | 0.134 | -0.062 | -0.022 |
|  | (0.131) | (0.132) | (0.123) | (0.124) | (0.141) | (0.142) |
| Fiscal Constraint: Agree |  | 0.133 |  | -0.045 |  | -0.101 |
|  |  | (0.079) |  | (0.076) |  | (0.086) |
| Ever received unemp benefits |  | $-0.187^{* *}$ |  | -0.034 |  | $0.252^{* *}$ |
|  |  | (0.068) |  | (0.065) |  | (0.071) |
| Current LM Vulnerability |  | 0.069 |  | 0.014 |  | -0.119 |
|  |  | (0.102) |  | (0.092) |  | (0.099) |
| AIC | 5720.125 | 5660.205 | 6396.536 | 6336.176 | 5437.642 | 5377.095 |
| BIC | 5890.051 | 5849.464 | 6566.462 | 6525.435 | 5607.568 | 5566.354 |
| Log Likelihood | -2834.062 | -2801.103 | -3172.268 | -3139.088 | -2692.821 | -2659.548 |
| Deviance | 5668.125 | 5602.205 | 6344.536 | 6278.176 | 5385.642 | 5319.095 |
| Num. obs. | 5093 | 5045 | 5093 | 5045 | 5093 | 5045 |

${ }^{* * *} p<0.001 ;{ }^{* *} p<0.01 ;{ }^{*} p<0.05$. All models include country-fixed effects.

Figure D. 2 shows results when treating Green parties as a separate party group (analoguous to Figure 3 in the main body).


Figure D.2: General Social Opportunity and Party Choice (Multinomial, Green party separately)

Figure D. 3 shows that the pattern presented in Figure 5 is even more pronounced if we look at "emblematic" representatives of each of our quadrants rather than a respondent with averaged characteristics.

## Predicted probabilities of emblematic cases


$\bigoplus$ Incumbent $X$ Mainstream Opposition $\otimes$ Radical

Figure D.3: Predicted probabilities of support for different party families for emblematic cases of comfortable, aspirational, apprehensive, and burdened voters

Note: Probabilities are unweighted averages across country of residence. The baseline (white bars) are average predicted vote shares by party family across the entire sample.

Figure D. 4 shows that the predictions visualized in Figure 5 hold in a standard (multinomial) regression framework.


Figure D.4: Quadrant and Party Choice (Multinomial)

Figure D. 5 demonstrates that our results do not hinge on a specific set of countries included in the analysis. The pattern of results presented above are robust to a jackknife-like procedure of excluding countries one by one.

excl. DE
excl. DK
excl. ES
excl. IE
excl. IT
excl. NL
excl. SE
excl. UK

Relative to (1) aspirational (2) opposition voters

Figure D.5: Quadrant and Party Choice (Multinomial, Country Jackknife)

Figure D. 6 extends our admittedly simplistic dichotomous framework differentiating between "rich" and "poor" voters by breaking average predicted probabilities down for three income levels (i.e. for six different groups). The integration of a socio-economic middle category allows for some further refinements of these results.

## Average predicted probabilities



Figure D.6: Robustness: Income in 3 Categories (low, mid, high)

Figure D. 7 shows that our results regarding incumbent vs. opposition vs. radical voting hold when looking at perceptions with respect to respondents' kids rather than their own prospects. Figure D. 9 shows the same results with respect to support for different party families.

Figures D. 8 and D. 10 show that we can recover most of our results with an item capturing opportunity perceptions that more specifically tap into prospects on labor markets rather than general social life chances. This alternative operationalization produces similar but somewhat weaker results, especially with regard to apprehensive voters. Their political grievances seem to be more strongly motivated by a general negative view about social opportunities rather than their view on prospects at the workplace.

Average predicted probabilities


Figure D.7: Average predicted probabilities of support for different party types (Kids Social Opportunity)

Note: Probabilities are unweighted averages across all possible combinations of gender, class, education group, age group and country of residence. The baseline (white bars) are average predicted vote shares by party family across the entire sample.


Figure D.8: Average predicted probabilities of support for different party types (Labor Market Opportunity)

Note: Probabilities are unweighted averages across all possible combinations of gender, class, education group, age group and country of residence. The baseline (white bars) are average predicted vote shares by party family across the entire sample.


Figure D.9: Average predicted probabilities of support for different party families (Social Opportunity Kids)

Note: Probabilities are unweighted averages across all possible combinations of gender, class, education group, age group and country of residence. The baseline (white bars) are average predicted vote shares by party family across the entire sample.


Figure D.10: Average predicted probabilities of support for different party families (Labor Market Opportunity)

Note: Probabilities are unweighted averages across all possible combinations of gender, class, education group, age group and country of residence. The baseline (white bars) are average predicted vote shares by party family across the entire sample.

## E. Potential Coalitions among Mainstream Voters

Figure E. 1 shows relative shares of apprehensive and burdened voters among the subgroup of respondents who indicate to support of mainstream parties (any ideological leaning).


Figure E.1: Share of Burdened and Apprehensive among Mainstream Supporters

## F. Socio-Demographic and Socio-Economic

## Characteristics of Voter Groups

The Figures in this section show the underlying multinomial models that result in our qualitative summary of the socio-demographic characteristics of each quadrant presented in Figure 2.


Figure F.1: Education

## Vars in Mod: female age_grp3 educ_grp2 oesch country



Figure F.2: Age Groups

Vars in Mod: female age_grp3 educ_grp2 oesch country





Figure F.3: Gender


Figure F.4: Class


Figure F.5: Task Group

## Vars in Mod: female age_grp3 educ_grp2 oesch country






Figure F.6: Country

Vars in Mod: female age_grp3 educ_grp2 oesch country



Figure F.7: Education by Gender

## Vars in Mod: female age_grp3 educ_grp2 oesch country



Figure F.8: Age by Gender


Figure F.9: Class by Gender

## Vars in Mod: age_grp3 age_grp3 educ_grp2 oesch country



Figure F.10: Education by Age Group

Vars in Mod: age_grp3 age_grp3 educ_grp2 oesch country



Figure F.11: Gender by Age Group


Figure F.12: Class by Age Group


[^0]:    ${ }^{* * *} p<0.001 ;{ }^{* *} p<0.01 ;{ }^{*} p<0.05$. All models include country-fixed effects.

