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A Centrally Managed Officials Investigated by the CDIC

Table A.1: List of Centrally Managed Officials Investigated by the CDIC

ID	Purge Year	Name	Position	Party Punish	Criminal Punish	Sentencing length
1	2008	Chen Shaoyong	Member of Fujian CPC Standing Committee	1	1	20
2	2009	Song Yong	Vice Chairman of Liaoning People's Congress	1	1	Death with Reprieve
3	2009	Wang Huayuan	Member of Zhejiang CPC Standing Committee	1	1	Death with Reprieve
4	2009	Sun Shuyi	Chairman of Shandong CPPCC	1	1	Death Penalty
5	2009	Chen Shaoji	Vice Chairman of Guangdong CPPCC	1	1	Death with Reprieve
6	2009	Li Tangtang	Vice Governor of Ningxia	1	1	Life Imprisonment
7	2010	Liu Zhuozhi	Vice Chairman of Inner Mongolia People's Congress	1	1	Life Imprisonment
8	2010	Zhang Jiameng	Vice Chairman of Zhejiang People's Congress	1	1	Life Imprisonment
9	2010	Si Xinliang	Member of Zhejiang CPC Standing Committee	NA	NA	NA
10	2010	Liang Chunlu	Vice Chairman of Guangxi CPPCC	0	0	
11	2011	Han Zhiran	Member of Inner Mongolia CPC Standing Committee	0	0	
12	2011	Huang Sheng	Vice Governor of Shandong	1	1	Life Imprisonment
13	2011	Li Chengyun	Vice Governor of Sichuan	1	1	10
14	2012	Li Chuncheng	Deputy Party Secretary of Sichuan	1	1	13
15	2013	Wang Suyi	Member of Inner Mongolia CPC Standing Committee	1	1	Life Imprisonment
16	2013	Fu Xiaoguang	Vice Governor of Heilongjiang	0	0	
17	2013	Ji Jianye	Mayor of Nanjing	1	1	15
18	2013	Chen Anzhong	Vice Chairman of Jiangxi People's Congress	1	1	12
19	2013	Chen Baihuai	Vice Chairman of Hubei CPPCC	1	1	17
20	2013	Guo Youming	Vice Governor of Hubei	1	1	15
21	2013	Li Daqiu	Vice Chairman of Guangxi CPPCC	1	1	15
22	2013	Guo Yongxiang	Vice Chairman of Sichuan People's Congress	1	1	20
23	2013	Li Chongxi	Chairman of Sichuan CPPCC	1	1	12
24	2013	Liao Shaohua	Member of Guizhou CPC Standing Committee	1	1	16
25	2014	Wu Changshun	Vice Chairman of Tianjin CPPCC	1	1	Death with Reprieve
26	2014	Liang Bin	Member of Hebei CPC Standing Committee	1	1	8
27	2014	Jin Daoming	Vice Chairman of Shanxi People's Congress	1	1	Life Imprisonment
28	2014	Fang Wenping	Member of Shanxi CPC Standing Committee	NA	NA	NA
29	2014	Du Shanxue	Member of Shanxi CPC Standing Committee	1	1	Life Imprisonment
30	2014	Ling Policy	Vice Chairman of Shanxi CPPCC	1	1	12.5
31	2014	Ren Runhou	Vice Governor of Shanxi	1	1	NA
32	2014	Chen Chuanping	Member of Shanxi CPC Standing Committee	1	1	6.5
33	2014	Nie Chunyu	Member of Shanxi CPC Standing Committee	1	1	15
34	2014	Bai Yun	Member of Shanxi CPC Standing Committee	1	1	12
35	2014	Huang Xianjun	Member of Shanxi CPC Standing Committee	NA	NA	NA
36	2014	Pan Yiyang	Vice Chairman of Inner Mongolia	1	1	20
37	2014	Chen Tiexin	Vice Chairman of Liaoning CPPCC	1	1	13.75
38	2014	Sui Fengfu	Vice Chairman of Heilongjiang People's Congress	1	1	11
39	2014	Zhang Daixin	Deputy Commander of Heilongjiang Military Region	1	1	10
40	2014	Han Xuejian	Member of Heilongjiang CPC Standing Committee	1	1	12.5
41	2014	Zhao Shaolin	Member of Jiangsu CPC Standing Committee	1	1	4
42	2014	Han Xiancong	Vice Chairman of Anhui CPPCC	1	1	16
43	2014	Yao Mugen	Vice Governor of Jiangxi	1	1	13
44	2014	Zhao Zhiyong	Secretary-General of Jiangxi CPC Committee	1	0	
45	2014	Wang Min	Member Shandong CPC Standing Committee	1	1	12
46	2014	Qin Yuhai	Vice Chairman of Henan People's Congress	1	1	13.5
47	2014	Yuan Shijun	Commander of Hubei Military Region	NA	NA	NA

ID	Purge Year	Name	Position	Party Punish	Criminal Punish	Sentencing length
48	2014	Yang Baohua	Vice Chairman of Hunan CPPCC	1	1	11
49	2014	Zhou Zhenhong	Member of Guangdong CPC Standing Committee	1	1	Death with Reprieve
50	2014	Wan Qingliang	Member of Guangdong CPC Standing Committee	1	1	Life Imprisonment
51	2014	Zhu Mingguo	Chairman of Guangdong CPPCC	1	1	Death with Reprieve
52	2014	Ji Wenlin	Vice Governor of Hainan	1	1	12
53	2014	Tan Li	Vice Governor of Hainan	1	1	Life Imprisonment
54	2014	Tan Qiwei	Vice Chairman of Chongqing People's Congress	1	1	12
55	2014	Ye Wanyong	Member of Sichuan CPC Standing Committee	NA	NA	NA
56	2014	Shen Peiping	Vice Governor of Yunnan	1	1	12
57	2014	Zhang Tianxin	Member of Yunnan CPC Standing Committee	1	0	
58	2014	Bai Enpei	Party Secretary of Yunnan	1	1	Death with Reprieve
59	2014	Zhu Zuoli	Vice Chairman of Shaanxi CPPCC	1	1	11
60	2014	Mao Xiaobing	Member of Qinghai CPC Standing Committee	1	1	Life Imprisonment
61	2015	Lv Xiwen	Deputy Secretary of Beijing CPC Committee	1	1	13
62	2015	Jing Chunhua	Secretary-General of Hebei CPC Committee	1	1	18
63	2015	Zhou Benshun	Party Secretary of Hebei	1	1	15
64	2015	Sun Qingyun	Vice Chairman of Shaanxi CPPCC	0	0	
65	2015	Zhao Liping	Vice chairman of Inner Mongolia CPPCC	1	1	Death Penalty
66	2015	Han Zhiran	Vice Chairman of Inner Mongolia CPPCC	0	0	
67	2015	Gu Chunli	Vice Governor of Jilin	1	1	12
68	2015	Gai Ruyin	Vice Chairman of Heilongjiang People's Congress	1	1	14
69	2015	Ai Baojun	Member of Shanghai CPC Standing Committee	1	1	17
70	2015	Yang Weize	Member of Jiangsu CPC Standing Committee	1	1	12
71	2015	Guo Zhenggang	Deputy Political Commissar of Zhejiang Military Region	NA	NA	NA
72	2015	Si Xinliang	Vice Chairman of Zhejiang CPPCC	1	1	13
73	2015	Xu Gang	Vice Governor of Fujian	1	1	13
74	2015	Su Shulin	Governor of Fujian	1	1	16
75	2015	Xu Aimin	Vice Chairman of Jiangxi CPPCC	1	0	
76	2015	Yan Shiyuan	Member of Shandong CPC Standing Committee	0	0	
77	2015	Lan Weijie	Deputy Commander of Hubei Military Region	1	1	Life Imprisonment
78	2015	Tong Mingqian	Vice Chairman of Hunan CPPCC	1	1	5
79	2015	Yu Yuanhui	Member of Guangxi CPC Standing Committee	1	1	11
80	2015	Qiu He	Vice Party Secretary of Yunnan	1	1	14.5
81	2015	Cao Jianfang	Secretary-General of Yunnan CPC Committee	1	1	NA
82	2015	Le Dake	Vice Chairman of Tibet	1	1	13
83	2015	Sun Qingyun	Vice Chairman of Shaanxi CPPCC	0	0	
84	2015	Lu Wucheng	Vice Chairman of Gansu People's Congress	1	1	12.5
85	2015	Bai Xueshan	Vice Chairman of Ningxia	1	1	15
86	2015	Li Zhi	Vice Chairman of Xinjiang	1	1	12
87	2016	Yin Hailin	Member of Tianjin CPC Standing Committee	1	0	
88	2016	Zhang Yue	Member of Hebei CPC Standing Committee	1	1	15
89	2016	Wang yang	Vice Chairman of Liaoning People's Congress	1	1	16.5
90	2016	Su Hongzhang	Member of Liaoning CPC Standing Committee	1	1	14
91	2016	Zheng Yuzhuo	Vice Chairman of Liaoning People's Congress	1	1	3.5
92	2016	Yang Luyu	Vice Party Secretary of Shandong	1	0	
93	2016	Chen Shulong	Vice Governor of Anhui	1	1	Life Imprisonment
94	2016	Liu Lizu	Vice Chairman of Jiangxi CPPCC	1	0	
95	2016	Chen Xuefeng	Member of Henan CPC Standing Committee	1	1	Life Imprisonment
96	2016	Wu Tianjun	Member of Henan CPC Standing Committee	1	1	11
97	2016	Zhang Wenxiong	Member of Hunan CPC Standing Committee	1	1	15
98	2016	Liu Zhigeng	Vice Governor of Guangdong	1	1	Life Imprisonment
99	2016	Li Jia	Member of Guangdong CPC Standing Committee	1	1	13

ID	Purge Year	Name	Position	Party Punish	Criminal Punish	Sentencing length
100	2016	Liu Zhiyong	Vice Chairman of Guangxi CPPCC	0	0	
101	2016	Lai Derong	Vice Chairman of Guangxi CPPCC	1	0	
102	2016	Zhang Lifu	Vice Chairman of Hainan People's Congress	1	0	
103	2016	Wei Hong	Governor of Sichuan	0	0	
104	2016	Li Chengyun	Vice Governor of Sichuan	1	1	10
105	2016	Kong Lingzhong	Vice Chairman of Guizhou CPPCC	0	0	
106	2016	Yang Zhenchao	Vice Governor of Anhui	1	1	Life Imprisonment
107	2016	Lu Ziyue	Member of Zhejiang CPC Standing Committee	1	1	Life Imprisonment
108	2016	Li Yunfeng	Vice Governor of Jiangsu	1	1	12
109	2017	Huang Xingguo	Mayor of Tianjin	1	1	12
110	2017	Wang Hongjiang	Member of Tianjin CPC Standing Committee	0	0	
111	2017	Yang Chongyong	Vice Chairman of Hebei People's Congress	1	1	Life Imprisonment
112	2017	Zhang Jiehui	Vice Chairman Hebei People's Congress	1	1	15
113	2017	Li Wenke	Vice Chairman of Liaoning People's Congress	1	1	16
114	2017	Liu Qiang	Vice Governor of Liaoning	1	1	12
115	2017	Zhou Huachen	Vice Chairman of Jilin People's Congress	NA	NA	NA
116	2017	Chen Yuxu	Prosecutor General of Shanghai People's Procuratorate	1	1	Life Imprisonment
117	2017	Xu Qianfei	President of Jiangsu Higher People's Court	0	0	
118	2017	Zhou Chunyu	Vice Governor of Anhui	1	1	20
119	2017	Liu Shanqiao	Vice Chairman of Hubei	1	1	12
120	2017	Liu Xinqi	Deputy Party Secretary of Xinjiang PCC	1	0	
121	2017	Wei Minzhou	Vice Chairman of Shaanxi People's Congress	1	1	Life Imprisonment
122	2017	He Ting	Vice Mayor of Chongqing	1	0	
123	2017	Mu Huaping	Vice Mayor of Chongqing	0	0	
124	2017	Sun Zhengcai	Member of Chongqing CPC Standing Committee	1	1	Life Imprisonment
125	2017	Yu Haiyan	Vice Governor of Gansu	1	1	15
126	2017	Wang Sanyun	Party Secretary of Gansu	1	1	12

Note: CPPCC: Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; PCC: Production and Construction Corporation. We note here that the purged Nanjing mayor served at the vice-governor (not prefectural) rank, because Nanjing is one of 15 cities with a designated higher status. NA denotes that information are unavailable.

B Purging Subordinates to Signal Loyalty

Aside from expressing anti-client bias in political selection, provincial party bosses have other ways to signal loyalty to Xi Jinping during the corruption crackdown. Research shows that provincial party committees establish their own roving inspection teams to intensify corruption investigations (Wang 2022). Provincial party bosses can use their enforcement to prominently signal they are following the center in its anticorruption effort. To test this conjecture, we examine the effect of provincial-level purge intensity on the likelihood of purge of prefectural officials (here, party secretaries and mayors) by the provincial disciplinary and inspection commission.

Table B.1 shows the result. Purge of prefectural officials is positively correlated with CDIC provincial purge intensity (columns 1 to 3). The full model with prefectural and individual controls shows that the purge of one additional CM official in the province leads to a 1.5 percentage point increase in the probability of purge of prefectural chief executives. Given that average dismissal rate of prefectural chief executives is 4.3% in our panel data, the results suggest that the within corruption investigations follows the purges of CM officials. In addition, we examine whether provincial party bosses show leniency toward their connected subordinates in these purges (columns 4 to 6). The interaction term of purge and connections is negative but insignificant, suggesting that provincial party bosses are impartial between connected and unconnected subordinates in making their purge decisions.

Table B.1: Purging Subordinates to Signal Loyalty

	Dismissals of Prefectural Chief Executives					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Purge Intensity*Connection				-0.011 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)
Purge Intensity	0.014*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)
Connection				0.005 (0.023)	0.010 (0.026)	0.015 (0.027)
Observations	1,479	1,267	1,267	1,479	1,267	1,267
R-squared	0.251	0.264	0.264	0.253	0.266	0.266
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level reported in parentheses. Prefectural controls are relative economic performance and relative fiscal performance. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

C Extensions: Mayor Sample, Bias against Performance, Roving Inspections

Table C.1: Mayor Result

DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Purge Intensity*Connection			-0.009 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.014)
Connection	-0.005 (0.038)	-0.031 (0.043)	0.013 (0.040)	-0.008 (0.046)	0.018 (0.061)
Purge Intensity			-0.013 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.014)
Observations	1,449	1,240	1,449	1,240	1,240
R-squared	0.276	0.277	0.282	0.283	0.283
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	N	Y	N	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	N	N	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

Table C.2: Bias against Performance

DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Purge Intensity*Relative Growth Rate	0.0004 (0.0048)		0.0004 (0.0048)		0.0000 (0.0049)	
Purge Intensity*Relative Fiscal Growth Rate		-0.0011 (0.0049)		-0.0015 (0.0049)		-0.0029 (0.0050)
Purge Intensity*Connection					-0.0259** (0.0102)	-0.0266*** (0.0101)
Purge Intensity	-0.0058 (0.0043)	-0.0058 (0.0043)	-0.0036 (0.0046)	-0.0036 (0.0046)	0.0032 (0.0056)	0.0033 (0.0056)
Relative GDP Growth Rate	0.0059 (0.0116)		0.0088 (0.0116)	0.0095 (0.0094)	0.0087 (0.0116)	0.0092 (0.0094)
Relative Fiscal Growth Rate		-0.0075 (0.0108)	-0.0108 (0.0098)	-0.0088 (0.0109)	-0.0109 (0.0098)	-0.0071 (0.0110)
Connection			-0.0306 (0.0326)	-0.0305 (0.0326)	0.0105 (0.0383)	0.0119 (0.0386)
Observations	1,267	1,267	1,267	1,267	1,267	1,267
R-squared	0.2726	0.2730	0.2769	0.2770	0.2805	0.2807
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.3: Roving Inspection

DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Roving Inspection*Connection	-0.047 (0.039)	-0.026 (0.047)	-0.026 (0.047)
Connection	-0.012 (0.027)	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.025 (0.033)
Roving Inspection	0.023 (0.021)	0.033 (0.022)	0.033 (0.022)
Relative GDP Growth Rate		0.009 (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)
Relative Fiscal Growth Rate		-0.011 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.010)
Observations	1,479	1,267	1,267
R-squared	0.274	0.276	0.277
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	N	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

D Summary Statistics on Political Turnover

Table D.1: Political Turnover of Prefectural Party Secretaries, 2013-2017

Type of Career Change	Freq	Percentage
Promotion	138	8.30
Lateral Transfer	219	13.20
Dismissed for Corruption	46	2.80
Retirement	45	2.70
Demotion	4	0.20
Death	3	0.20
No Change	1200	72.50
Total	1655.00	100.00

E Summary Statistics

Table E.1: Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Political Turnover	1655	0.083	0.277	0	1
Connection	1655	0.208	0.406	0	1
Purge Intensity	1655	1.260	1.654	0	9
Female	1655	0.054	0.227	0	1
Minority	1655	0.103	0.304	0	1
College	1655	0.581	0.494	0	1
Age	1646	53.369	3.256	38	62
Age ²	1646	2858.888	343.702	1444	3844
Years in Office	1655	2.542	1.535	1	9
Years in Office ²	1655	8.815	10.739	1	81
Years of Work Experience	1615	32.604	4.666	13	55
Years of Party Membership	1499	30.388	4.061	16	42
DIC	1655	0.185	0.388	0	1
Court and Law Enforcement Organization	1655	0.176	0.381	0	1
Propaganda	1655	0.298	0.458	0	1
Youth League	1655	0.170	0.376	0	1
Youth League	1655	0.254	0.435	0	1
Relative GDP Growth Rate	1402	0.003	0.965	-3.960554	2.624113
Relative Fiscal Growth Rate	1402	-0.012	0.961	-3.884242	3.52752
Roving Inspection	1655	0.291	0.454	0	1
Provincial Party Boss Term	1655	3.768	1.760	2	10

F Robustness Tests

Our first concern is the coding scheme for political turnover. In our baseline specification, we use a conservative definition of career advancement: we only code promotion as the career movement to a position with higher administrative rank and leadership (or first-tier) status (e.g., Vice Governor, Provincial Party Committee Standing Committee Member). However, researchers raise concerns about the consistency between formal advancement along the career ladder and increase in de facto political power. For example, prefectural party secretaries can be “promoted” to chair or deputy chair of the Provincial People’s Congress or People’s Political Consultative Conference. These are not leadership offices, but they rank one level above a prefectural party secretary. Some scholars suggest coding these moves as promotion because the advancement in formal administrative rank brings considerable perks and benefits (e.g., Landry, Lü, and Duan 2018; Kou and Tsai 2014). Taking this into account, we re-construct our dependent variable, political turnover, coding de jure promotion, with advancement in administrative rank as 1 and 0 otherwise. Results are in Table F.1. We observe the estimate of the interaction of connection and purge intensity is negative and statistically significant at the .05 level across all specifications. Again, results suggest provincial party bosses have an anti-client bias in promoting prefectural party secretaries.

We are also concerned about the measurement of purge intensity. In the baseline model, we count the number of purged CM officials as the measure of purge intensity. Such measure captures the number of CM officials in each province. To account for this problem, we construct a ratio measure of purge intensity by dividing the number of CM officials purged in a province by the number of existing CM officials. We manually collected data on the number of the CM officials from sources, including China Vita, Chinese Communist Party and state cadres’ database website, and Baidu Baike.²⁴ We find that the number of CM officials are relative stable across years and has limited inter-provincial variation. We use the ratio measure as a robustness check. We show that our key findings are robust when using this ratio measure (Table F.2).

24. We follow Liu, Qian, and Zhang 2021’s approach to compute the number of CM officials.

In addition to the measures of our dependent variable, we are concerned about the independent variable of interest. While the patronage connection measure used in the main result is substantively a great fit to test our theory of anti-client bias, we also try three alternative measures of connections developed by Shih, Adolph, and Liu (2012). They propose connections between a political boss and subordinates arising from shared birthplace or overlap in educational institutions or workplaces. Table F.3 shows results using the alternative measures of connections developed by Shih, Adolph, and Liu (2012). We find that estimates of the interaction of CM official purges and connections measured by shared birthplace or overlapped education experience are small and statistically insignificant. Our explanation for the insignificant results is that city party secretaries have a more diverse demographic and educational experience than the top political leaders analyzed in the literature. Our data show that only 7% and 0.7% of city party secretaries have common birthplace and overlapped education experience with their party bosses, respectively. Therefore, the small variation on these measures fails to yield meaningful estimation. By contrast, the interaction of CM official purges and overlapped work experience is negative and significant at the 5% level, reassuring the validity of the anti-client bias.

Another concern is about the standard errors. Because one of the two key variables of interest in this research is centrally-mandated arrests at the province-level. Using prefecture-level standard errors may overstate the t-values and inflate the statistical significance of the findings. We address this concern by clustering the standard errors at the provincial level (Table F.4). We also use wild bootstrap estimation to verify the robustness (Table F.5).

We are also concerned that our dependent variable is binary. In addition to linear probability models, we estimate probit models with year fixed effects. Results are in Table F.6 and marginal effect plot is in Figure F.1. Regressions using probit models yield negative and significant estimates for the interaction term, suggesting that our baseline findings are not sensitive to choice of statistical model.²⁵

Other unobserved prefectural-level confounders may impact our estimation. First, 27 of our

25. The result of the probit model with fixed effects should be interpreted with caution because it may suffer from an incidental parameter problem (Greene 2002).

prefectural party secretaries are promoted from one province to another or to the central government. It is likely that the Central Organizational Department plays a more important role than do provincial party bosses in decisions on these career moves. Moreover, 15 prefectures, known as vice-provincial-level cities, have an administrative rank superior to other prefectures in China. The Central Organization Department has the final say on career advancement of party secretaries of these cities. Lastly, provincial party bosses might show favoritism in their promotion decisions to prefectural party secretaries who hold their prefectural office because they are already purge winners, having succeeded an official purged by the CDIC. To address all these concerns, we exclude, one by one, autonomous prefectures, inter-provincial promotions, prefectures in which vice-provincial status obtains, and prefectural party secretaries who succeeded a purged official—and we re-run the analysis using the full model specification. The results of this set of subsample analyses are in Table F.7. Consistent with our expectation, the negative association between promotion and the interaction of connection and purge remains significant.

We are also concerned about the data structure. As career changes occur at the end of a party secretary's term, we collapse our prefecture-year panel data to term-level data, using a dependent variable that denotes promotion upon term completion. In doing so, we obtain 737 leadership spells. We use the baseline specification of Table 1 to estimate the model. Results of the term-level analysis are in Table F.8. Again, the interaction term is strongly associated with political turnover at the .05 level across all specifications. The results suggest that unit of analysis does not affect the robustness of findings in our baseline model.

Last, we provide empirical evidence to exclude alternative explanations of the observed anti-client bias: provincial party bosses promote non-clients as clients are less competent or corrupt. We test this conjecture by examining the effect of patronage connections on the economic performance (2) fiscal performance and (3) corruption dismissal rate of prefectural party secretaries, controlling for prefecture and year fixed effects and individual controls. Table F.9 presents the results. All estimates of connections are negative but statistically insignificant, suggesting that clients perform as well as non-clients and do not have a higher corruption dismissal rate than non-clients. The

results further rule out the alternative competence or corruption explanations.

Table F.1: Alternative Coding Scheme for Promotion

DV: De jure promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Purge Intensity*Connection	-0.027** (0.011)	-0.024** (0.011)	-0.026** (0.011)
Purge Intensity	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)
Connection	0.019 (0.035)	-0.000 (0.041)	0.023 (0.042)
Observations	1,479	1,267	1,267
R-squared	0.279	0.282	0.284
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	N	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

Table F.2: Ratio Measure

DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Purge Intensity (Ratio)*Connection	-0.684*** (0.233)	-0.625** (0.249)	-0.646** (0.252)
Connection	0.019 (0.031)	-0.004 (0.036)	0.011 (0.038)
Purge of CM Officials (Ratio)	0.041 (0.126)	0.032 (0.133)	0.078 (0.138)
Observations	1,479	1,267	1,267
R-squared	0.277	0.278	0.281
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	N	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

Table F.3: Alternative Measures of Connections
DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Shared Birthplace*Purge Intensity	0.009 (0.014)			
Overlapped Education Experience *Purge Intensity		0.001 (0.006)		
Overlapped Work Experience *Purge Intensity			-0.024** (0.011)	
Shared Birthplace	-0.160** (0.074)			
Overlapped Education Experience		0.102* (0.059)		
Overlapped Work Experience			0.032 (0.029)	
Purge Intensity	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.015 (0.010)	
Observations	1,211	1,267	1,260	
R-squared	0.286	0.276	0.280	
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y	
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	
Prefectural Controls	Y	Y	Y	
Provincial Controls	Y	Y	Y	

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

Table F.4: Clustering Standard Errors at Provincial level
DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Purge Intensity*Connection			-0.028**	-0.025**	-0.026**
			(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Purge Intensity			0.002	0.001	0.003
			(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Connection	-0.023	-0.045	0.019	-0.004	0.011
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.037)
Observations	1,479	1,267	1,479	1,267	1,267
R-squared	0.273	0.274	0.277	0.278	0.280
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	N	Y	N	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	N	N	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at provincial level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)
 Table F.5: Using Wild Bootstrap Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Purge Intensity*Connection	-0.028	-0.025	-0.026
	[-.04679, -.008328]	[-.04597, -.004668]	[-.04726, -.005434]
Observations	1,490	1,276	1,276
R-squared	0.100	0.098	0.101
Number of cityID	325	277	277
Purge Intensity	Y	Y	Y
Connection	Y	Y	Y
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	N	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	Y

Note: Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term.

Table F.6: Probit Model

DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
urge Intensity*Connection	-0.160** (0.072)	-0.190** (0.084)	-0.152* (0.082)	-0.185** (0.088)
Purge Intensity	-0.008 (0.027)	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.022 (0.030)	0.017 (0.034)
Connection	-0.038 (0.132)	0.217 (0.143)	0.153 (0.164)	0.319* (0.178)
Observations	1,655	1,490	1,276	1,276
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	N	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	N	N	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	N	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

Table F.7: Subsample Analysis

DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	Sample Excluding		
	Inter-province Promotion	Vice-province City	Prefectural Winner
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Purge Intensity*Connection	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.022** (0.010)	-0.032*** (0.011)
Purge Intensity	-0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)
Connection	0.024 (0.034)	0.018 (0.040)	0.035 (0.043)
Observations	1,243	1,194	1,162
R-squared	0.284	0.278	0.288
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls Y	Y	Y	
Prefectural Controls	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	Y	Y	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

Table F.8: Term-level Analysis

Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Purge Intensity*Connection	-0.089*** (0.025)	-0.088*** (0.028)	-0.088*** (0.028)
Purge Intensity	0.005 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)
Connection	0.060 (0.056)	0.032 (0.065)	0.033 (0.072)
Observations	584	515	515
R-squared	0.559	0.557	0.561
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	N	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level reported in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at prefectural level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

Table F.9: Effect of Performance on Patronage Connections

VARIABLES	(1) Relative GDP Growth Rate	(2) Relative Fiscal Growth Rate	(3) Corruption Dismissal
Connection	-0.007 (0.109)	-0.021 (0.107)	-0.006 (0.013)
Observations	1,267	1,267	1,479
R-squared	0.353	0.250	0.285
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection, courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

Table F.10: T Test for Connected vs Unconnected

Years in Office	N (Non Clients)	N (Clients)	Mean (Non Clients)	Mean (Clients)	Dif	St Err	T value	P value
	543	194	3.013	2.304	.709	.141	5.05	0

Table F.11: Effect of Promotion on Purge

DV: Purge

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)	-0.113** (0.047)	-0.128*** (0.048)	-0.127*** (0.048)
Observations	584	515	515
R-squared	0.516	0.527	0.528
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	N	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	N	N	Y

*Note: Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*


Table F.12: Alternative Explanation: Cadre Rotation

DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1) Control Experience	(2) With Experience	(3) Without Experience	(4) Provincial Leader FE
Purge Intensity*Connection	-0.026** (0.010)	-0.045** (0.022)	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.026** (0.010)
Purge Intensity	0.003 (0.006)	0.017 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)
Connection	0.008 (0.038)	-0.035 (0.060)	0.020 (0.054)	0.014 (0.038)
Relative GDP Growth Rate	0.009 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.018)	0.021 (0.013)	0.010 (0.009)
Relative Fiscal Growth Rate	-0.011 (0.010)	0.002 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.010)
Roving Inspection	0.026 (0.021)	0.045 (0.035)	-0.005 (0.028)	
Provincial Party Boss Term	-0.006 (0.008)	0.008 (0.024)	-0.018 (0.012)	
Provincial Experience	0.025 (0.028)			
Observations	1,267	555	678	1,267
R-squared	0.281	0.387	0.310	0.307
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y

*Note: Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic growth rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

Figure F.1: Marginal Effect Using Probit Model



G Comparison of Purge Winners and Peers

Table G.1: Winners vs. Peers

Variable	<i>Peers</i>		<i>Winners</i>		(5) P-value of T-test
	(1) Mean	(2) SD	(3) Mean	(4) SD	
Connection	0.262	(0.440)	0.270	(0.446)	(0.841)
Female	0.047	(0.211)	0.051	(0.221)	(0.826)
Minority	0.095	(0.293)	0.109	(0.313)	(0.607)
College	0.573	(0.495)	0.628	(0.485)	(0.244)
Age	54.079	(3.275)	53.518	(2.810)	(0.064)
Years in Office	2.758	(1.711)	3.124	(1.656)	(0.023)
Years of Work Experience	33.362	(4.542)	32.664	(4.415)	(0.107)
Years of Party Membership	31.064	(4.154)	30.685	(3.382)	(0.340)
Relative Economic Performance	0.016	(0.964)	0.137	(1.034)	(0.221)
Relative Fiscal Performance	-0.022	(0.896)	0.074	(0.935)	(0.293)
DIC	0.195	(0.397)	0.161	(0.368)	(0.354)
Court and Law Enforcement	0.175	(0.380)	0.197	(0.399)	(0.544)
Organization	0.317	(0.466)	0.241	(0.429)	(0.082)
Propaganda	0.168	(0.374)	0.168	(0.375)	(0.990)
Youth League	0.248	(0.432)	0.197	(0.399)	(0.205)
Observations	600		137		

Note: The unit of analysis is at the term (individual-city) level.

H Additional Tables for Key Extensions

Table H.1: List of Provincial Party Secretaries Connected to Xi Jinping

	Name	Province
1	Zhang Qingwei	Heilongjiang
2	Liu Cigui	Hainan
3	Xie Fuzhan	Henan
4	Lu Xinshe	Jiangxi
5	Liu Jiayi	Shandong
6	Che Jun	Zhejiang
7	Li Jiheng	Yunnan
8	Chen Hao	Yunnan
9	Shi Taifeng	Ningxia
10	Lin Duo	Gansu
11	Wang Rulin	Shanxi
12	Luo Huining	Shanxi
13	Li Xi	Liaoning
14	Li Jiheng	Inner Mongolia
15	Chen Quanguo	Xinjiang
16	Wang Xuejun	Anhui
17	Li Jinbin	Anhui
18	Zhao Kezhi	Hebei
19	Chen Miner	Guizhou
20	Jiang Chaoliang	Hubei
21	Li Qiang	Jiangsu
22	Bayin Chaolu	Jilin
23	Lou Qinjian	Shaanxi
24	Wu Yingjie	Tibet
25	Du Jiahao	Hunan
26	Wang Guosheng	Qinghai

Table H.2: Heterogeneous Effect of Purge on Political Appointment

DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sample	full	full	full	province experience
Xi's Client*Connection*Purge Intensity			-0.049** (0.024)	-0.046 (0.043)
Purge Intensity*Connection			-0.019* (0.011)	-0.029 (0.031)
Xi's Client*Connection		0.023 (0.067)	0.115 (0.079)	0.098 (0.103)
Xi's Client*Purge Intensity			0.002 (0.015)	0.021 (0.029)
Purge Intensity		-0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.007)	0.008 (0.021)
Connection		-0.035 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.043)	-0.062 (0.074)
Xi's Client	-0.030 (0.071)		-0.047 (0.073)	0.067 (0.096)
Observations	1,267	1,267	1,267	555
R-squared	0.276	0.277	0.283	0.389
Prefectural and Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefectural Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. Prefectural controls are relative economic rate and relative fiscal growth rate. Provincial controls are roving inspection and provincial party boss's term. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*

Table H.3: Marginal Effect Difference in Connections Between Xi's Factions and Non-Xi's Faction

Purge Intensity	Constrast dy/dx	SE	Z	P Value		
0	0.1145266	0.0788317	1.45	0.146	-0.0399807	0.2690339
1	0.0659598	0.066943	0.99	0.324	-0.0652461	0.1971657
2	0.017393	0.0625531	0.28	0.781	-0.1052088	0.1399948
3	-0.0311738	0.0671492	-0.46	0.642	-0.1627837	0.1004362
4	-0.0797406	0.0791816	-1.01	0.314	-0.2349337	0.0754525
5	-0.1283074	0.0958907	-1.34	0.181	-0.3162498	0.059635
6	-0.1768742	0.1152603	-1.53	0.125	-0.4027802	0.0490319
7	-0.225441	0.1361596	-1.66	0.098	-0.4923089	0.041427
8	-0.2740077	0.1579827	-1.73	0.083	-0.5836481	0.0356326
9	-0.3225745	0.1803946	-1.79	0.074	-0.6761415	0.0309924

Table H.4: Effect of Purge on Political Selection in 2008–2017

DV: Political Turnover (Promotion = 1, Otherwise = 0)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Purge Intensity*Connection			-0.018** (0.007)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.017** (0.008)
Purge Intensity			-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)
Connection	0.007 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.017)	0.021 (0.017)	0.014 (0.019)	0.027 (0.022)
Roving Inspection					0.018 (0.021)
Provincial Party Boss Term					-0.006 (0.004)
Relative GDP Growth Rate		0.003 (0.006)		0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)
Relative Fiscal Growth Rate		-0.005 (0.006)		-0.005 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)
Observations	3,041	2,579	3,041	2,579	2,579
R-squared	0.160	0.156	0.163	0.158	0.160
Prefecture and Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

*Note: Standard errors clustered at prefectural level are reported in parentheses. Individual-level controls are: female; college; years of work experience; years of party membership; age; age-squared; years in office; years in office-squared; and work experience in discipline inspection; courts and law enforcement, organization, and propaganda. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.*




Figure H.1: Kernel Estimation

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