

**Supplemental Information:**  
**The Role of District Magnitude in  
When Women Represent Women**

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## A Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics - Model 1

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Women's Issues	400	5.432	5.348	0.000	1.980	6.667	50.000
M	400	3.625	2.245	2	2	5	8
Woman	400	0.185	0.389	0	0	0	1
M X Woman	400	0.752	1.871	0	0	0	8

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics - Model 2

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Women's Issues	516	4.936	5.448	0.000	1.084	6.501	50.000
M	516	4.167	2.340	2	2	7	8
Woman	516	0.180	0.385	0	0	0	1
M x Woman	516	0.816	2.006	0	0	0	8

Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics - Model 3

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Women's Issues	281	5.718	5.567	0.000	2.299	6.849	50.000
M	281	4.313	2.364	2	2	7	8
Woman	281	0.196	0.397	0	0	0	1
M x Woman	281	0.936	2.155	0	0	0	8

Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics - Model 4

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Women's Issues	232	4.025	5.179	0	0	6.2	32
M	232	3.996	2.303	2	2	6	8
Woman	232	0.164	0.371	0	0	0	1
M x Woman	232	0.681	1.814	0	0	0	8

Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics - Model 5

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Women's Issues	108	4.619	3.538	0.000	2.169	6.478	20.896
M	108	3.370	2.156	2	2	5	8
Woman	108	0.111	0.316	0	0	0	1
M x Woman	108	0.398	1.394	0	0	0	8

Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics - Model 6

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Women's Issues	144	4.176	3.957	0.000	0.860	6.400	20.896
M	144	4.056	2.353	2	2	7	8
Woman	144	0.111	0.315	0	0	0	1
M x Woman	144	0.486	1.639	0	0	0	8

Table A.7: Descriptive Statistics - Model 7

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Women's Issues	88	4.579	3.412	0.000	2.546	6.040	20.896
M	88	4.000	2.334	2	2	5.5	8
Woman	88	0.091	0.289	0	0	0	1
M x Woman	88	0.398	1.497	0	0	0	8


Table A.8: Descriptive Statistics - Model 8

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Women's Issues	160	7.572	6.393	0.000	3.704	9.958	50.000
M	160	6.062	1.639	3	5	8	8
Woman	160	0.238	0.427	0	0	0	1
M x Woman	160	1.431	2.691	0	0	0	8

## B Descriptive Figures


The Figures B.1, B.2, and B.3 below show the average share of legislators' portfolios dedicated to women's issues by legislator gender. We observe that before the electoral reform the share of portfolios devoted to women's issues by men legislators was lower than the values observed for women legislators. This pattern continues to hold true no matter which legislative session we observe (Figures B.1 and B.3). Women's bill sponsorship portfolios continue to contain a larger share of bills on women's issues across all legislative sessions (Figure B.1) and district magnitudes (Figure B.2).

Figure B.1: Average Share of Portfolio on Women's Issues, by Legislative Session and Gender




Note: Bars represent the average share of bills' portfolio on women's issue. 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.2: Average Share of Portfolio on Women's Issues, by District Magnitude and Gender




Note: Bars represent the average share of bills' portfolio on women's issue. 95% confidence intervals.


Figure B.3: Portfolio Share for Women and Men Legislators




(a) 2010-2014 (Pre-Reform)



(b) 2014-2015 (Pre-Reform)




(c) 2015-2018 (Post-Reform)



(d) 2018-2022 (Post-Reform)

Figure B.4: Average Share of Portfolio on Women's Issues, by Party and Gender



*Note:* Bars represent the average share of bills' portfolio on women's issue. 95% confidence intervals. Bars without confidence intervals are for party-delegation of one-member. We plot data only for parties that had women and men legislators.

## C Including Data from Gonzalo Fuenzalida and Javier Macaya

Table C.9: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014-2021 *Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile*—Including Data from Gonzalo Fuenzalida and Javier Macaya

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Bills' Portfolio on Women's Issues (%)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M	0.429** (0.183)	0.173 (0.148)	0.306* (0.177)	0.773*** (0.093)	0.672* (0.356)	0.441* (0.230)	0.762*** (0.289)	0.354** (0.177)
Woman	4.958*** (1.104)	2.752*** (0.906)	1.403 (1.352)					2.805 (3.457)
M x Woman	0.761** (0.317)	1.109*** (0.243)	1.293*** (0.347)	0.934** (0.407)	0.597 (0.429)	0.334*** (0.125)	1.009* (0.533)	1.083* (0.573)
Constant								3.214*** (1.032)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	405	523	284	236	111	148	90	162
R <sup>2</sup>	0.408	0.405	0.400	0.450	0.105	0.040	0.258	0.426
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.404	0.402	0.394	0.446	0.089	0.027	0.241	0.415

*Note:* Table's entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Robust standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table C.10: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women's issues when M increases by one — Including Data from Gonzalo Fuenzalida and Javier Macaya

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	1.180** (0.52, 1.86)	1.290** (0.79, 1.75)	1.600** (0.89, 2.31)	1.710** (0.93, 2.43)	1.240** (0.31, 2.21)	0.790** (0.36, 1.17)	1.740** (0.69, 3.01)	1.420** (0.30, 2.56)
Men	0.430** (0.08, 0.76)	0.170 (-0.11, 0.46)	0.300 (-0.07, 0.66)	0.770** (0.6, 0.97)	0.660 (-0.04, 1.3)	0.450** (0.02, 0.89)	0.760** (0.22, 1.33)	0.360** (0.02, 0.71)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	405	523	284	232	111	148	90	162

*Note:* Table's entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women's Issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table C.9 has the complete results for the models.



## D Models using Log-M

Table D.11: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude–2014-2021 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile–Using Log-M

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Bills' Portfolio on Women's Issues (%)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M (log)	2.868*** (0.951)	1.292* (0.771)	2.291** (0.910)	3.125*** (0.355)	3.827** (1.886)	2.430* (1.279)	4.317*** (1.424)	1.997** (0.892)
Woman	4.172*** (1.353)	1.174 (1.124)	-0.394 (1.656)					-2.720 (5.075)
M (log) x Woman	3.126** (1.300)	4.847*** (1.010)	5.607*** (1.439)	4.023** (1.576)	2.370 (1.849)	1.407*** (0.529)	4.077* (2.285)	6.871** (3.026)
Constant								1.837 (1.504)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160
R <sup>2</sup>	0.411	0.412	0.409	0.492	0.097	0.037	0.247	0.435
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.407	0.408	0.402	0.487	0.080	0.023	0.229	0.424

*Note:* Table's entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Robust standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table D.12: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women's issues when log M increases by 0.405 [log(3)-log(2)]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	2.420** (1.20, 3.69)	2.510** (1.53, 3.36)	3.180** (1.85, 4.54)	2.910** (1.67, 4.04)	2.470** (0.51, 4.46)	1.590** (0.56, 2.51)	3.350** (1.38, 5.69)	3.550** (1.23, 5.98)
Men	1.150** (0.42, 1.88)	0.510 (-0.07, 1.13)	0.910** (0.16, 1.64)	1.260** (0.99, 1.57)	1.510** (0.08, 2.9)	1.020** (0.01, 1.97)	1.740** (0.65, 2.88)	0.840** (0.15, 1.48)
FE by Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160

*Note:* Table's entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women's issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table D.11 has the complete results for the models.

## E Models using Different Dictionaries

Table E.13: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014-2021 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile — Using Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi’s (2013) Dictionary, removing false positive bills

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Bills’ Portfolio on Women’s Issues (%)							
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M		0.208*	0.104	0.142	0.117***	0.485**	0.284*	0.530**	0.156
		(0.120)	(0.091)	(0.119)	(0.045)	(0.214)	(0.169)	(0.206)	(0.123)
Woman		2.389***	1.874***	0.507					0.912
		(0.652)	(0.648)	(0.846)					(1.934)
M x Woman		0.398**	0.484***	0.680***	0.217	0.184	0.138	0.528	0.619**
		(0.201)	(0.146)	(0.215)	(0.249)	(0.258)	(0.090)	(0.362)	(0.307)
Constant									1.593**
									(0.722)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations		400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160
R <sup>2</sup>		0.304	0.304	0.280	0.071	0.093	0.030	0.209	0.296
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.299	0.300	0.272	0.063	0.076	0.017	0.190	0.282

*Note:* Table’s entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Robust standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table E.14: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one — Using Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi’s (2013) Dictionary, removing false positive bills

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	0.600**	0.590**	0.820**	0.340	0.650**	0.430**	1.030**	0.770**
	(0.21, 1.00)	(0.31, 0.85)	(0.41, 1.24)	(-0.15, 0.79)	(0.07, 1.26)	(0.12, 0.72)	(0.3, 1.93)	(0.2, 1.35)
Men	0.210*	0.100	0.140	0.110**	0.480**	0.290*	0.530**	0.160
	(-0.02, 0.43)	(-0.07, 0.28)	(-0.11, 0.38)	(0.03, 0.21)	(0.06, 0.86)	(-0.03, 0.61)	(0.14, 0.93)	(-0.08, 0.4)
FE by Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160

*Note:* Table’s entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women’s issues*) when M increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.05; \*p < 0.1. Table E.13 has the complete results for the models.

Table E.15: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014-2021 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile — Using Barnes’ (2016) Dictionary, removing false positive bills

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Bills’ Portfolio on Women’s Issues (%)							
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M		0.339** (0.166)	0.199 (0.128)	0.280* (0.166)	0.337*** (0.064)	0.679** (0.315)	0.133 (0.228)	0.717** (0.301)	0.442*** (0.170)
Woman		1.951** (0.882)	1.939** (0.950)	0.257 (1.112)					4.899 (3.011)
M x Woman		0.877*** (0.303)	0.747*** (0.250)	1.130*** (0.322)	0.097 (0.432)	0.444 (0.308)	-0.057 (0.273)	0.756** (0.372)	0.436 (0.496)
Constant									1.790* (1.011)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.313	0.291	0.306	0.133	0.141	0.002	0.227	0.334	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.308	0.287	0.298	0.126	0.125	-0.012	0.209	0.322	

*Note:* Table’s entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Robust standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table E.16: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one — Using Barnes’ (2016) Dictionary, removing false positive bills

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	1.210** (0.58, 1.84)	0.960** (0.45, 1.42)	1.410** (0.76, 2.06)	0.440 (-0.4, 1.23)	1.110** (0.38, 1.84)	0.100 (-0.56, 0.67)	1.450** (0.66, 2.37)	0.860* (-0.09, 1.84)
Men	0.340** (0.01, 0.64)	0.200 (-0.05, 0.45)	0.270 (-0.08, 0.61)	0.330** (0.22, 0.47)	0.670** (0.05, 1.24)	0.150 (-0.3, 0.57)	0.720** (0.15, 1.3)	0.450** (0.12, 0.78)
FE by Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160

*Note:* Table’s entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women’s issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table E.15 has the complete results for the models.

Table E.17: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014–2021 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile — Using Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi’s (2013) and Barnes’ (2016) Dictionaries, removing false positive bills

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Bills’ Portfolio on Women’s Issues (%)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M	0.447** (0.179)	0.214 (0.137)	0.346* (0.178)	0.356*** (0.066)	0.780** (0.332)	0.212 (0.225)	0.742** (0.297)	0.491*** (0.183)
Woman	2.896*** (0.981)	2.155** (0.887)	0.012 (1.185)					4.160 (3.251)
M x Woman	0.868*** (0.319)	0.919*** (0.241)	1.299*** (0.342)	0.368 (0.381)	0.597 (0.379)	0.240 (0.174)	1.081** (0.424)	0.679 (0.548)
Constant								1.860* (1.072)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160
R <sup>2</sup>	0.349	0.347	0.337	0.200	0.169	0.017	0.300	0.362
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.345	0.343	0.330	0.193	0.153	0.003	0.284	0.350

*Note:* Table’s entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Robust standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table E.18: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one — Using Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi’s (2013) and Barnes’ (2016) Dictionaries, removing false positive bills

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	1.310** (0.64, 1.98)	1.150** (0.65, 1.59)	1.650** (0.94, 2.35)	0.730* (-0.02, 1.42)	1.350** (0.49, 2.24)	0.480* (-0.02, 0.91)	1.800** (0.93, 2.84)	1.150** (0.1, 2.23)
Men	0.450** (0.1, 0.77)	0.210 (-0.05, 0.48)	0.340* (-0.03, 0.7)	0.350** (0.23, 0.49)	0.770** (0.11, 1.37)	0.230 (-0.21, 0.65)	0.740** (0.18, 1.32)	0.500** (0.14, 0.85)
FE by Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160

*Note:* Table’s entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women’s issues*) when  $M$  increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table E.17 has the complete results for the models.

Table E.19: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014-2021 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile — Using Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi’s (2013) Dictionary

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Bills’ Portfolio on Women’s Issues (%)							
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M		0.207*	0.114	0.144	0.094**	0.466**	0.309*	0.507**	0.147
		(0.120)	(0.091)	(0.119)	(0.046)	(0.217)	(0.172)	(0.213)	(0.123)
Woman		2.409***	2.047***	0.596					0.673
		(0.661)	(0.654)	(0.883)					(1.968)
M x Woman		0.418**	0.470***	0.689***	0.166	0.359	0.136	0.726*	0.678**
		(0.203)	(0.148)	(0.220)	(0.255)	(0.301)	(0.148)	(0.394)	(0.315)
Constant									1.682**
									(0.721)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.313	0.309	0.290	0.043	0.116	0.031	0.250	0.305	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.308	0.305	0.283	0.034	0.099	0.017	0.232	0.292	

*Note:* Table’s entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Robust standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table E.20: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one — Using Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi’s (2013) Dictionary

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	0.620**	0.590**	0.830**	0.260	0.810**	0.460**	1.210**	0.820**
	(0.21, 1.03)	(0.31, 0.84)	(0.41, 1.26)	(-0.24, 0.72)	(0.16, 1.5)	(0.08, 0.8)	(0.41, 2.17)	(0.23, 1.42)
Men	0.210*	0.110	0.140	0.090**	0.450**	0.320*	0.500**	0.150
	(-0.02, 0.43)	(-0.06, 0.29)	(-0.11, 0.38)	(0.01, 0.19)	(0.04, 0.85)	(-0.01, 0.64)	(0.1, 0.92)	(-0.09, 0.39)
FE by Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160

*Note:* Table’s entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women’s issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.05; \*p < 0.1. Table E.19 has the complete results for the models.

Table E.21: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014-2021 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile — Using Barnes’ (2016) Dictionary

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Bills’ Portfolio on Women’s Issues (%)							
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M		0.206 (0.187)	0.156 (0.142)	0.155 (0.183)	0.360*** (0.070)	0.621** (0.313)	0.131 (0.233)	0.633** (0.295)	0.396** (0.170)
Woman		1.746* (0.922)	2.065** (0.998)	0.297 (1.227)					7.174* (4.139)
M x Woman		1.134*** (0.315)	0.873*** (0.268)	1.350*** (0.334)	0.070 (0.433)	0.568** (0.285)	-0.104 (0.219)	0.908*** (0.352)	0.322 (0.623)
Constant									2.148** (1.010)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.339	0.309	0.339	0.140	0.144	0.003	0.247	0.375	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.334	0.305	0.332	0.133	0.128	-0.011	0.230	0.363	

*Note:* Table’s entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Robust standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table E.22: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one — Using Barnes’ (2016) Dictionary

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	1.330** (0.67, 1.99)	1.040** (0.48, 1.55)	1.500** (0.81, 2.20)	0.430 (-0.41, 1.22)	1.170** (0.51, 1.86)	0.050 (-0.50, 0.54)	1.520** (0.76, 2.38)	0.700 (-0.53, 1.95)
Men	0.200 (-0.16, 0.54)	0.150 (-0.12, 0.43)	0.150 (-0.23, 0.51)	0.350** (0.23, 0.51)	0.610* (-0.01, 1.18)	0.150 (-0.31, 0.58)	0.640** (0.08, 1.21)	0.400** (0.08, 0.73)
FE by Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160

*Note:* Table’s entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women’s issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table E.21 has the complete results for the models.

Table E.23: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014-2021 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile — Using Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi’s (2013) and Barnes’ (2016) Dictionaries

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Bills’ Portfolio on Women’s Issues (%)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M	0.310 (0.197)	0.168 (0.149)	0.217 (0.193)	0.379*** (0.072)	0.733** (0.327)	0.217 (0.229)	0.668** (0.289)	0.435** (0.183)
Woman	2.606** (1.031)	2.221** (0.935)	-0.051 (1.313)					6.196 (4.283)
M x Woman	1.160*** (0.332)	1.068*** (0.257)	1.557*** (0.356)	0.341 (0.389)	0.889** (0.377)	0.277* (0.151)	1.401*** (0.423)	0.623 (0.664)
Constant								2.308** (1.079)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160
R <sup>2</sup>	0.375	0.364	0.372	0.201	0.208	0.019	0.370	0.403
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.370	0.360	0.365	0.194	0.193	0.005	0.355	0.392

*Note:* Table’s entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Robust standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table E.24: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one — Using Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi’s (2013) and Barnes’ (2016) Dictionaries

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	1.460** (0.76, 2.17)	1.250** (0.7, 1.74)	1.780** (1.02, 2.52)	0.720* (-0.04, 1.43)	1.600** (0.74, 2.48)	0.510** (0.05, 0.91)	2.050** (1.17, 3.08)	1.040* (-0.27, 2.37)
Men	0.310 (-0.07, 0.66)	0.160 (-0.12, 0.45)	0.210 (-0.19, 0.59)	0.370** (0.24, 0.53)	0.720** (0.08, 1.31)	0.230 (-0.21, 0.66)	0.670** (0.12, 1.23)	0.440** (0.09, 0.8)
FE by Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160

*Note:* Table’s entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women’s issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.05; \*p < 0.1. Table E.23 has the complete results for the models.

## F Logistic Transformation and Beta Regression Model

Table F.25: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014-2021 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile—Logistic Transformed DV

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Bills' Portfolio on Women's Issues (%)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M	0.053** (0.023)	0.020 (0.019)	0.041* (0.023)	0.150*** (0.014)	0.094* (0.055)	0.055 (0.037)	0.110** (0.045)	0.041 (0.025)
Woman	0.777*** (0.099)	0.647*** (0.106)	0.441*** (0.135)					0.447 (0.309)
M x Woman	0.024 (0.024)	0.052** (0.021)	0.074*** (0.028)	0.022 (0.038)	0.002 (0.039)	-0.024 (0.016)	0.039 (0.048)	0.073 (0.051)
Constant								-2.840*** (0.151)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160
R <sup>2</sup>	0.359	0.344	0.346	0.505	0.039	0.013	0.114	0.416
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.355	0.340	0.339	0.501	0.021	-0.001	0.093	0.405

*Note:* Table's entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models with a logistic transformed dependent variable. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Robust standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table F.26: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women's issues when M increases by one—Logistic Transformed DV

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	1.500** (0.41, 2.58)	1.540** (0.56, 2.45)	2.510** (1.14, 3.87)	4.120** (2.49, 5.46)	2.320* (-0.13, 4.56)	0.820 (-0.88, 2.33)	3.510** (1.04, 5.96)	1.090** (0.29, 1.57)
Men	1.320** (0.22, 2.33)	0.490 (-0.44, 1.43)	0.980* (-0.2, 2.12)	3.590** (3.01, 4.27)	2.270 (-0.42, 4.51)	1.420 (-0.34, 3.08)	2.700** (0.62, 4.65)	0.240* (-0.05, 0.45)
FE by Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160

*Note:* Table's entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women's issues*) when  $M$  increases by one unit. The predicted changes were transformed from the logistic form to percentages to easiness interpretation. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table F.25 has the complete results for the models.



Table F.27: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014-2021 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile—Beta Regression Models

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Bills' Portfolio on Women's Issues (%)							
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M		0.074*	0.019	0.049	0.337***	0.151**	0.081	0.187***	0.043
		(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.036)
Woman		1.186***	0.978***	0.777***					0.639*
		(0.135)	(0.158)	(0.179)					(0.380)
M x Woman		-0.006	0.040	0.052	-0.133**	-0.035	-0.067**	0.007	0.066
		(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.056)	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.055)	(0.060)
Constant		-3.702***	-3.532***	-3.564***	-4.738***	-2.917***	-2.629***	-3.135***	-3.061***
		(0.118)	(0.107)	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.132)	(0.103)	(0.144)	(0.232)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.286	0.445	0.323	0.725	0.421	0.571	0.559	0.310	
Log Likelihood	861.650	1,236.549	595.106	689.039	268.722	369.816	237.537	297.485	

*Note:* Table's entries are unstandardized coefficients from beta regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table F.28: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women's issues when M increases by one — Beta Regression Model

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	0.540*	0.450*	0.700**	0.300**	0.720**	0.100	1.170**	1.000**
	(-0.03, 1.09)	(-0.03, 0.89)	(0.20, 1.20)	(0.12, 0.56)	(0.07, 1.52)	(-0.39, 0.75)	(0.44, 2.14)	(0.13, 1.45)
Men	0.200**	0.050	0.150	0.660**	0.999**	0.580	1.130**	0.200
	(0.00, 0.42)	(-0.12, 0.23)	(-0.08, 0.37)	(0.6, 0.71)	(0.15, 2.63)	(-0.12, 1.65)	(0.38, 2.34)	(-0.19, 0.42)
FE by Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	232	108	144	88	160

*Note:* Table's entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women's issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table F.27 has the complete results for the models.

## G Using Data Pre-Covid

Table G.29: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014–2019 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile (Pre-Covid)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Bills' Portfolio on Women's Issues (%)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M	0.408 (0.255)	0.133 (0.176)	0.268 (0.245)	0.779*** (0.093)	0.518 (0.411)	0.321 (0.269)	0.647* (0.352)	0.207 (0.251)
Woman	4.271*** (1.173)	2.161** (1.067)	0.359 (1.508)					-1.338 (4.543)
M x Woman	0.933*** (0.315)	1.237*** (0.266)	1.514*** (0.362)	0.928** (0.407)	0.505** (0.235)	0.287 (0.271)	0.955*** (0.216)	1.766** (0.750)
Constant								5.856*** (1.536)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	393	509	274	232	108	144	88	153
R <sup>2</sup>	0.390	0.393	0.384	0.451	0.061	0.022	0.174	0.407
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.386	0.389	0.377	0.446	0.043	0.008	0.154	0.395

*Note:* Table's entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-7. Standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table G.30: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women's issues when M increases by one — Pre-Covid

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	1.330** (0.56, 2.12)	1.380** (0.76, 1.96)	1.780** (0.93, 2.61)	1.710** (0.93, 2.43)	1.000** (0.28, 1.68)	0.640* (-0.07, 1.24)	1.580** (0.98, 2.25)	1.950** (0.51, 3.41)
Men	0.400 (-0.10, 0.88)	0.130 (-0.20, 0.47)	0.260 (-0.24, 0.74)	0.770** (0.60, 0.97)	0.510 (-0.31, 1.25)	0.340 (-0.18, 0.84)	0.650* (-0.01, 1.35)	0.220 (-0.28, 0.71)
FE by Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	393	509	274	232	108	144	88	153

*Note:* Table's entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women's issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table G.29 has the complete results for the models.

## H Including Party Fixed Effects

In this appendix, we present models in which we include party FEs. We only added party FEs in models 1, 2, 3, and 8 because party FEs are perfectly collinear with legislators FEs used in models 4-7. Again, we observe that women in larger districts are more likely to introduce bills on women's issues. Moreover, all results for men are null, indicating no evidence that men in districts with large  $M$  are more likely to introduce bills on women's issues.

Table H.31: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014–2021 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile (Including Party FE)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Bills' Portfolio on Women's Issues (%)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(8)
M	0.160 (0.216)	−0.003 (0.155)	0.030 (0.207)	0.011 (0.190)
Woman	4.628*** (1.111)	2.531*** (0.920)	0.613 (1.347)	0.421 (3.525)
M x Woman	0.850*** (0.310)	1.166*** (0.237)	1.483*** (0.346)	1.517** (0.603)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Party	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	400	516	281	160
R <sup>2</sup>	0.410	0.409	0.413	0.435
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.405	0.406	0.407	0.424

*Note:* Table's entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-3. Standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table H.32: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women's issues when  $M$  increases by one — Including Party FE

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 8
Women	1.000** (0.36, 1.66)	1.180** (0.67, 1.63)	1.510** (0.81, 2.23)	1.520** (0.38, 2.57)
Men	0.160 (-0.260, 0.550)	−0.010 (-0.300, 0.290)	0.020 (-0.41, 0.440)	0.000 (-0.39, 0.380)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Party	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	400	516	281	160

*Note:* Table's entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women's issues*) when  $M$  increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table H.31 has the complete results for the models.

## I Including Number of Women Legislators in the District

In this appendix, we include models in which we account for the number of women legislators in the district. We do not estimate model 4 in this appendix because this model only uses data from the 2014-2018 session and includes legislator fixed effects. As a result, the number of women legislators in the district is perfectly collinear with these FEs. Also, we opted not to add this control to the main models discussed in the text because the number of women legislators in the district is post-treatment to the electoral reform. In other words, the change in the district magnitude affected the number and proportion of women legislators in the district. Consequently, any interpretation should be made with caution. That said, controlling for the number of women elected in the district, we still find that the women legislators' portfolio share on women's issues increases when M increases.

Table I.33: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014-2019 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile (Including % of Women in the District)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Bills' Portfolio on Women's Issues (%)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
M	0.338*	0.092	0.220	0.561	0.324	0.654**	0.273
	(0.196)	(0.155)	(0.192)	(0.346)	(0.249)	(0.293)	(0.185)
Woman	4.497***	2.284**	1.028				2.365
	(1.167)	(0.918)	(1.331)				(3.341)
M x Woman	0.774**	1.108***	1.295***	0.479	0.234	0.834	1.100**
	(0.312)	(0.238)	(0.340)	(0.472)	(0.171)	(0.552)	(0.561)
# of Women in the District	0.356	0.405	0.342	0.987*	1.307*	1.097*	0.307
	(0.304)	(0.293)	(0.321)	(0.595)	(0.673)	(0.581)	(0.342)
Constant							3.313***
							(1.023)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	108	144	88	160
R <sup>2</sup>	0.410	0.407	0.403	0.140	0.082	0.309	0.428
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.405	0.403	0.394	0.115	0.062	0.285	0.413

*Note:* Table's entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-3 and 5-7. Standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table I.34: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one — Including % of Women in the District

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Women	1.120** (0.5, 1.73)	1.200** (0.72, 1.71)	1.510** (0.82, 2.21)	1.050** (0.1, 1.93)	0.540** (0.09, 1.08)	1.480** (0.37, 2.64)	1.390** (0.36, 2.36)
Men	0.340* (-0.04, 0.71)	0.090 (-0.21, 0.38)	0.220 (-0.18, 0.62)	0.580* (-0.08, 1.21)	0.310 (-0.13, 0.85)	0.650** (0.03, 1.21)	0.290 (-0.1, 0.64)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	400	516	281	108	144	88	160

*Note:* Table’s entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women’s issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table I.33 has the complete results for the models.

## J Lone Women Legislators in the District

In this appendix, we analyze data from women legislators who are the sole woman in their district, keeping the data from all men legislators in the datasets. We cannot estimate models 5 and 7 using this strategy because all women legislators in the datasets used in these models were from districts with  $M = 2$ . In all six models, we find that the change of one unit in  $M$  is associated with an increase in the portfolio share on women's issues, though the estimates are not significant in models 1 and 8. One possible explanation for this lack of statistical significance is that 83% (28) of the women in the data used in model 1 were from districts with  $M = 2$ . In the case of model 8, there are only six women in the dataset, the lowest number across all datasets. Except for the estimate from model 4, all predicted increases in this appendix are smaller than those reported in the body of the text, suggesting that lone women do not focus more on women's issues than women legislators in general.

Table J.35: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude—2014-2019 Cámara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile (Lone Women Legislators)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Bills' Portfolio on Women's Issues (%)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(6)	(8)
M	0.404** (0.173)	0.166 (0.148)	0.355** (0.171)	0.779*** (0.093)	0.358 (0.247)	0.351** (0.177)
Woman	6.165*** (1.323)	2.211** (1.018)	1.597 (1.083)			1.161 (6.938)
M x Woman	-0.138 (0.338)	1.076*** (0.411)	0.654 (0.409)	1.160** (0.510)	0.297 (0.246)	0.730 (1.586)
Constant						3.225*** (1.037)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	360	470	247	220	138	128
R <sup>2</sup>	0.226	0.261	0.116	0.460	0.024	0.094
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.219	0.256	0.105	0.455	0.009	0.072

*Note:* Table's entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered-robust standard errors by legislator in parentheses for models 1-4 and 6. Standard errors in parentheses for model 8. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table J.36: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one  
— Lone Women Legislators

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 6	Model 8
Women	0.250 (-0.45, 0.94)	1.270** (0.43, 1.99)	1.010** (0.15, 1.85)	1.940** (0.95, 2.86)	0.640** (0.01, 1.29)	1.070 (-2.12, 4.03)
Men	0.400** (0.06, 0.72)	0.160 (-0.12, 0.46)	0.350** (0, 0.69)	0.770** (0.6, 0.97)	0.350 (-0.12, 0.79)	0.350** (0.04, 0.68)
FE by Legislative Term	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
FE by Reform	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
FE by Legislator	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	360	470	247	220	138	128

Note: Table’s entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women’s issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table J.35 has the complete results for the models.

## K Dictionaries

Table K.37: Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi's (2013) Dictionary

<b>Spanish</b>	<b>English</b>
abortiva	abortion inducing
aborto	abortion
abuso sexual	sexual abuse
acceso igualitario	equal access
acido folico	folic acid
acoso sexual	sexual harassment
alimentarios morosos	maintenance debtors
ama de casa	housewife
anencefalia	anencephaly
antiaborto	anti-abortion
anticoncepcion	contraception
anticoncepcion de emergencia	emergency contraception
anticoncepcion quirurgica	surgical contraception
anticonceptivo	contraceptive
apellido de soltera	maiden name
ataque sexual	sexual abuse
beneficio de pension	pension benefit
cancer de mama	breast cancer
cancer de utero	uterus cancer
colposcopia	vaginal examination
comisaria de la mujer	women police station
comision interamericana de mujeres	inter-american commission of women
Continued on next page	



**Table K.37 – continued from previous page**

<b>Spanish</b>	<b>English</b>
concubina	concubine
consejo nacional de la mujer	national woman council
contra la mujer	against woman
contracepcion quirurgica	surgical contraception
contraceptivos	contraceptive
contralor de nacimientos	birth control
conyuge superstite	conjoint successible
cuello uterino	cervix
cuidado de los ninos	childcare
cuota alimentaria	maintenance
cupo femenino	gender quota
cupo sindical femenino	gender quota in labor unions
d.i.u.	uid
derechos de las mujeres	women's rights
derechos reproductivos	reproductive rights
derechos sexuales	sexual rights
desigualdades de genero	gender disparities
deudores alimentarios	maintenance debtors
día despues	day-after
día internacional de la mujer	women's international day
discriminacion contra la mujer	discrimination against women
discriminacion salarial	pay discrimination
division sexual del trabajo	sexual division of labor
Continued on next page	

**Table K.37 – continued from previous page**

<b>Spanish</b>	<b>English</b>
divorciada	divorced
divorcio vincular	absolute divorce
ecografia	sonogram
educacion sexual	sexual education
embarazada	pregnant
embarazo	pregnancy
empleada domestica	slavy (maid)
empleo de mujeres	women's employment
equidad de genero	gender equality
falopio	oviduct
fecundidad no deseada	unexpected fertility
feminicidio	femicide
feminismo	feminism
feminista	feminist
fetal	fetal
feto	fetus
filiacion	filiation
foro de mujeres	women forum
gestacion	gestation
gravidez	pregnancy
guarderia	nursery
guarderia infantil	children's nursery
hostigamiento sexual	sexual harassment
Continued on next page	

**Table K.37 – continued from previous page**

<b>Spanish</b>	<b>English</b>
identidad de genero	gender identity
igual pago por trabajo de igual valor	equal pay for equal work
igualdad de genero	gender equality
igualdad de trato	equal treatment
igualdad real de oportunidades	equal opportunities
inequidad de genero	no gender equality
integridad sexual	sexual integrity
intersexualidad	intersexuality
jardines maternos	nursery school
jubilacion de la mujer	women retirement
lactancia	breastfeeding
lactantes	unweaned baby
leche materna	breast milk
ley de cupo	gender quota
licencia por maternidad	maternity leave
licencia por paternidad	paternity leave
machismo	male chauvinism
machista	male chauvinist
madre nina	young mother
madre trabajadora	working mother
mamografía	mammography
maternidad	maternity
maternidad subrogada	subrogate maternity
Continued on next page	

**Table K.37 – continued from previous page**

<b>Spanish</b>	<b>English</b>
materno infantil	mother and child
menopausia	menopause
metodos anticonceptivos	methods of contraception
misoprostol	misoprostol
mortalidad materna	maternal mortality
mujer	woman
mujer argentina	argentine woman
mujer trabajadora	worker woman
mujer violada	raped woman
mujeres argentinas	argentine women
mujeres en la ciencia	women in science
mujeres en las listas	women in electoral lists
mujeres trabajadoras	working women
orientacion sexual	sexual orientation
papanicolau	smear test
papiloma	papilloma
paridad de genero	gender parity
participacion igualitaria	equal participation
parto	childbirth
parto humanizado	humanized childbirth
patria potestad	parental custody
perspectiva de genero	gender perspective
planificacion familiar	family planning
Continued on next page	

**Table K.37 – continued from previous page**

<b>Spanish</b>	<b>English</b>
potestad compartida	shared legal authority
procreacion responsable	responsible parenthood
prostitucion	prostitution
razon de raza	race issue
razon de sexo	gender issue
reasignacion sexual	sexual reallocation
representacion femenina	female representation
responsabilidades familiares compartidas	shared family responsibilities
salud reproductiva	reproductive health
salud sexual	sexual health
segregacion laboral	labor segregation
servicio domestico	housework
sexista	sexist
sexo biologico	biological gender
sexo femenino	female
sexo subrepresentado	underrepresented gender
tecnologias reproductivas	reproductive technologies
trabajador domestico	household worker
trabajo domestico	housework
transexualidad	transexuality
transgeneridad	gender reassignment
transmision sexual	sexual transmission
utero	uterus
Continued on next page	

**Table K.37 – continued from previous page**

<b>Spanish</b>	<b>English</b>
uterino	uterine
violada	raped
violencia contra las mujeres	violence against women
violencia de genero	gender violence
violencia domestica	domestic violence
violencia familiar	family violence
violencia hacia la mujer	violence against woman
vitro	in vitro

Table K.38: Barnes' (2016) Dictionary

<b>Spanish</b>	<b>English</b>
aborto	abortion
abuso sexual	sexual abuse
anticonceptivo	contraceptive
anticonceptivos	contraceptives
condón	condom
condones	condoms
diu	uid
embarazada	pregnant
embarazo	pregnancy
embrazada	pregnant
emprendedoras	entrepreneur
Continued on next page	

**Table K.38 – continued from previous page**

<b>Spanish</b>	<b>English</b>
femenino	feminine
fertilidad	fertility
flujos	fluid
flujos vaginales por tricomonas	vaginal discharge from trichomonas
forro	condom (slang)
género	gender
genito-mamario	genito-mammary
hpv	hpv
madre	mother
madres	mothers
mama	breast
menopausia	menopause
menstruación	menstruation
mujer	woman
mujeres	women
pap	Pap
pastilla	pill
pildora	pill
preservatio	preservative
preservatioes	preservatives
prevención de la transmisión del virus	prevention of virus transmission
procreación	procreation
procreación responsable	responsible procreation
Continued on next page	

**Table K.38 – continued from previous page**


<b>Spanish</b>	<b>English</b>
prostitución	prostitution
puerperio	puerperium
reproductiva	reproductive
reproductivo	reproductive
salud sexual	sexual health
semen	semen
sexo	sex
sexual	sexual
sexuales	sexual (plural)
uterio	uterus
vaginal	vaginal
vaginales	vaginal (plural)



## **L Results After Removing Specific Parties**


In this appendix, we present results for models in which we leave each time one party out of our sample. Our goal with this analysis is to evaluate whether the results reported in the body of the text are driven by specific parties. Because of the large number of models (8 models x 19 parties = 152), we only graphically report the predicted change in cosponsorship portfolio on women's issues. Figures L.5 and L.6 show the predicted change for women legislators. We find statistically significant increases in the portfolio share on women's issues in 150 out of the 152 (the two exceptions are for model 5 where we limit ourselves to only reelected members). For men legislators (Figures L.7 and L.8), the predicted changes are positive and statistically significant in 105 out of the 152 models. In sum, the behavior of specific party delegations does not seem to drive our finding that women legislators introduce more bills on women's issues when M increases.

Figure L.5: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women's issues when M increases by one — Legislator is a woman (Part 1)




Note: Dots are predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women's issues*) when  $M$  increases by one unit. 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

Figure L.6: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one — Legislator is a woman (Part 2)




Note: Dots are predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women’s issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

Figure L.7: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one — Legislator is a man (Part 1)



Note: Dots are predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women's issues*) when  $M$  increases by one unit. 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

Figure L.8: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women’s issues when M increases by one — Legislator is a man (Part 2)



Note: Dots are predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women’s issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 90% and 95% confidence intervals.

## M Women's Issues in Argentina

In this appendix, we present an analysis using the Argentine case. We gathered all bills introduced by Argentine deputies between 1999 and 2014 from Calvo (2014). This dataset includes 96,373 bills from 1,130 unique legislators (373 of whom were women). During this period, Argentina used a CLPR system with a gender quota of 30% with a placement mandate. District magnitude ranged from 2 to 35.<sup>1</sup> The system and the quota were not reformed during this period. We coded all bills into women's issues and other issues using Htun et al.'s (2013) and Barnes' (2016) dictionaries—dictionaries elaborated based on the Argentine case.

We measure *Women's Issues* using three dependent variables: share of bills coded as women's issues based on both dictionaries, based only on Barnes (2016), and based only on Htun, Lacalle, and Micozzi (2013). We only include our two variables of interest and an interaction term in our first three models. Then, we add fixed effects by party and term. Our findings from models using the Argentine case align with our expectations. District magnitude increases the share of the portfolio dedicated to women's issues. This increase is large for women. As shown in Table M.40, an increase of one unit in district magnitude is associated with a growth of between 0.14pp (model 4) and 0.08pp (model 3) in *Women's issues*. Although these estimates seem substantive small, using model 4, we would expect a 4.48pp difference in *Women's Issues* in the portfolio of a woman in the smallest district (M=2) and a woman in the largest district (M=35). For men, this difference would be equal to only 0.64pp.

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<sup>1</sup>Argentina uses staggered elections. For districts with an odd number of legislators, M changes by one unit every two years—see Lucardi (2019) for a description. Unfortunately, we were unable to assign the legislators from these districts to the year they were elected. Due to this limitation, we use the number of legislators in the district divided by two as a proxy for district magnitude.

Table M.39: Association Between Legislative Portfolio, Gender, and District Magnitude–1999-2014  
*Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina*

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Bills' Portfolio on Women's Issues (%)					
	Barnes + Htun et al.	Barnes	Htun et al.	Barnes + Htun et al.	Barnes	Htun et al.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
M	0.009 (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.016** (0.007)
Woman	2.155*** (0.332)	1.373*** (0.285)	1.817*** (0.278)	2.022*** (0.330)	1.293*** (0.284)	1.717*** (0.289)
M x Woman	0.111*** (0.032)	0.107*** (0.031)	0.076*** (0.026)	0.116*** (0.033)	0.109*** (0.031)	0.083*** (0.028)
Constant	2.363*** (0.138)	1.621*** (0.114)	1.793*** (0.112)			
FE by Legislative Term	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE by Party	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,669	2,669	2,669	2,669	2,669	2,669
R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.073	0.077	0.093	0.076	0.082
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.088	0.072	0.076	0.092	0.075	0.081

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized coefficients from linear regression models. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Table M.40: Predicted Change in the cosponsorship portfolio on women's issues when M increases by one  
 — *Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina*

	Model 1 (Barnes + Htun et al.)	Model 2 (Barnes)	Model 3 (Htun et al.)	Model 4 (Barnes + Htun et al.)	Model 5 (Barnes)	Model 6 (Htun et al.)
Women	0.120** (0.06, 0.18)	0.120** (0.06, 0.17)	0.080** (0.03, 0.13)	0.140** (0.07, 0.21)	0.130** (0.07, 0.19)	0.100** (0.04, 0.15)
Men	0.010* (-0.01, 0.02)	0.010** (0, 0.02)	0.010 (-0.01, 0.02)	0.020** (0.01, 0.04)	0.020** (0.01, 0.03)	0.020** (0.00, 0.03)
FE by Legislative Term	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
FE by Party	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,669	2,669	2,669	2,669	2,669	2,669

Note: Table's entries are the predicted change in the dependent variable (*Women's issues*) when *M* increases by one unit. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Table M.39 has the complete results for the models.

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