**Selective Attention:**

**The United Nations Security Council and Armed Conflict**

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**Online Appendix**

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**Table A1: Descriptive statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **N** | **Mean** | **S.d.** | **Min** | **Max** |
| Agenda (dichotomous) | 935 | 0.355 | 0.479 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Agenda (count of meetings) | 935 | 3.112 | 5.897 | 0.000 | 41.000 |
| Battle deaths (log) | 935 | 5.819 | 1.640 | 3.258 | 11.058 |
| Civilian fatalities (log) | 935 | 2.745 | 2.785 | 0.000 | 13.167 |
| Refugees (log) | 935 | 0.540 | 0.518 | 0.000 | 1.295 |
| Mean P5 s-score | 903 | 0.416 | 0.050 | 0.254 | 0.602 |
| Mean P5 s-score, unewighted | 903 | 0.697 | 0.070 | 0.535 | 0.828 |
| Mean P5 kappa score | 903 | 0.010 | 0.137 | -0.158 | 0.487 |
| P5 trade | 910 | 0.004 | 0.009 | 0.000 | 0.126 |
| P5 arms exports | 935 | 0.010 | 0.022 | 0.000 | 0.149 |
| P5 contiguity | 935 | 0.327 | 0.469 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| P5 conflict party | 935 | 0.103 | 0.304 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| P5 preference heterogeneity | 903 | 0.243 | 0.079 | 0.121 | 0.583 |
| S-score, US | 903 | 0.390 | 0.131 | 0.181 | 0.796 |
| s S-score, UK | 903 | 0.729 | 0.101 | 0.453 | 1.000 |
| S-score, RUS | 903 | 0.786 | 0.108 | 0.442 | 1.000 |
| S-score, CHN | 903 | 0.859 | 0.101 | 0.578 | 1.000 |
| Trade proportion, US | 910 | 0.003 | 0.012 | 0.000 | 0.214 |
| Trade proportion, UK | 910 | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.000 | 0.100 |
| Trade proportion, FRA | 910 | 0.002 | 0.007 | 0.000 | 0.080 |
| Trade proportion, RUS | 910 | 0.003 | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.211 |
| Trade proportion, CHN | 910 | 0.004 | 0.012 | 0.000 | 0.104 |
| Arms exports, US | 935 | 0.006 | 0.021 | 0.000 | 0.164 |
| Arms exports, UK | 935 | 0.005 | 0.022 | 0.000 | 0.243 |
| Arms exports, FRA | 935 | 0.005 | 0.028 | 0.000 | 0.429 |
| Arms exports, RUS | 935 | 0.015 | 0.053 | 0.000 | 0.486 |
| Arms exports, CHN | 935 | 0.019 | 0.066 | 0.000 | 0.665 |
| Contiguity, US | 935 | 0.002 | 0.046 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Contiguity, UK | 935 | 0.004 | 0.065 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Contiguity, FRA | 935 | 0.032 | 0.176 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Contiguity, RUS | 935 | 0.144 | 0.352 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Contiguity, CHN | 935 | 0.180 | 0.384 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Colony, UK | 935 | 0.333 | 0.471 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Colony, FRA | 935 | 0.157 | 0.364 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Colony, RUS | 935 | 0.041 | 0.198 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Peacekeeping operation | 935 | 0.144 | 0.352 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Incompatbility is government | 935 | 1.617 | 0.486 | 1.000 | 2.000 |
| Population (millions) | 914 | 9.564 | 24.37 | 0.796 | 1379 |
| Liberal democracy index | 917 | 0.263 | 0.176 | 0.013 | 0.795 |
| GDP/capita | 876 | 4504.675 | 6849.336 | 219.962 | 42201.641 |

**Table A2: Logit coefficients, UNSC attention**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* |
| Battle deaths | 0.85\*\*\* | 0.63\* | 1.51\*\* | 0.88\*\*\* | 0.68\* | 1.52\*\* |
|  | (0.23) | (0.30) | (0.57) | (0.23) | (0.30) | (0.57) |
| Civilian fatalities | 0.39 | 0.65\* | 0.76 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.22) | (0.29) | (0.54) |  |  |  |
| Refugees |  |  |  | 0.33 | 0.54 | 0.67 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.21) | (0.30) | (0.49) |
| Mean P5 s-score | -1.16\*\* | -1.44\* | -6.51\*\* | -1.14\*\* | -1.43\* | -6.44\*\* |
|  | (0.42) | (0.69) | (2.29) | (0.42) | (0.69) | (2.31) |
| P5 trade | 0.87 | -9.11\*\* | 1.17 | 0.85 | -9.02\*\* | 1.15 |
|  | (0.58) | (3.20) | (1.03) | (0.58) | (3.22) | (1.03) |
| P5 arms exports | -0.87 | -0.24 | -1.67 | -0.83 | -0.11 | -1.70 |
|  | (0.60) | (1.00) | (1.35) | (0.59) | (0.97) | (1.37) |
| P5 contiguity | -0.81 | -0.37 | -0.38 | -0.87 | -0.50 | -0.50 |
|  | (1.01) | (1.29) | (2.17) | (1.01) | (1.31) | (2.20) |
| P5 preference heterogeneity | 0.62\* | -0.34 | 1.65 | 0.63\* | -0.34 | 1.69 |
|  | (0.30) | (0.48) | (1.02) | (0.30) | (0.48) | (1.03) |
| Population | -10.53\*\*\* | -20.66\*\* | -7.15 | -10.56\*\*\* | -20.34\*\* | -7.22 |
|  | (3.11) | (7.13) | (4.31) | (3.12) | (7.19) | (4.47) |
| Liberal democracy index | -0.52 | -1.18\* | -0.31 | -0.52 | -1.19\* | -0.32 |
|  | (0.41) | (0.56) | (0.78) | (0.41) | (0.57) | (0.79) |
| GDP/capita | 0.46 | 1.24 | 2.34 | 0.45 | 1.22 | 2.32 |
|  | (0.55) | (0.74) | (1.28) | (0.55) | (0.75) | (1.26) |
| Peacekeeping operation | 5.23\*\*\* | 5.13\*\*\* | 0.00 | 5.20\*\*\* | 5.09\*\*\* | 0.00 |
|  | (0.87) | (1.32) | (.) | (0.87) | (1.32) | (.) |
| Incompatibility is government | 1.69\*\* | 1.19 | 2.79\* | 1.67\*\* | 1.25 | 2.81\* |
|  | (0.58) | (0.93) | (1.24) | (0.58) | (0.93) | (1.24) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -7.73\*\*\* | -15.04\*\*\* | -97.89 | -7.72\*\*\* | -14.93\*\*\* | -94.61 |
|  | (1.24) | (3.15) | (70.27) | (1.24) | (3.16) | (69.44) |
| ICC | 0.65 | 0.66 | 0.79 | 0.65 | 0.67 | 0.79 |
| *N* | 843 | 455 | 332 | 843 | 455 | 332 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown.

**Figure A3. Predicted probability of UNSC attention, by region.**

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**Table A3: Logit coefficients, UNSC attention, Sub-Saharan Africa**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** |
| Battle deaths | 0.85\* | 0.88\* |
|  | (0.40) | (0.40) |
| Civilian fatalities | 0.61\* |  |
|  | (0.30) |  |
| Refugees |  | 0.71\* |
|  |  | (0.32) |
| Mean P5 s-score | -2.31\*\* | -2.27\*\* |
|  | (0.83) | (0.83) |
| P5 trade | 5.02 | 5.06 |
|  | (3.44) | (3.52) |
| P5 arms exports | 2.64 | 2.77 |
|  | (1.81) | (1.79) |
| P5 preference heterogeneity | -2.08\*\* | -2.10\*\* |
|  | (0.74) | (0.75) |
| Population | -9.08 | -9.23 |
|  | (5.13) | (5.18) |
| Liberal democracy index | -0.65 | -0.71 |
|  | (0.69) | (0.70) |
| GDP/capita | -7.63 | -8.22 |
|  | (4.53) | (4.57) |
| Peacekeeping operation | 8.09\*\*\* | 8.17\*\*\* |
|  | (1.67) | (1.67) |
| Incompatibility is government | 4.35\*\* | 4.26\*\* |
|  | (1.57) | (1.56) |
| Constant | -9.35\*\*\* | -9.52\*\*\* |
| *N* | 303 | 303 |
| ICC | 0.53 | 0.53 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown.

**Table A4: Logit coefficients, UNSC attention, disaggregated interest measures**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* |
| S-score, US | -0.01 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.40) |  |  |  |  |  |
| S-score, UK | -0.99 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.80) |  |  |  |  |  |
| S-score, RUS | 2.91\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.83) |  |  |  |  |  |
| S-score, CHN | -1.73 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.93) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, US |  | -4.94\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (1.54) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, UK |  | 0.69 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (1.20) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, FRA |  | -1.16 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (1.05) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, RUS |  | -0.28 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.72) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, CHN |  | 1.36\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.43) |  |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, US |  |  | -0.27 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.37) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, UK |  |  | -0.83 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (1.44) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, FR |  |  | -0.21 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.47) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, RUS |  |  | -0.25 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.51) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, CHN |  |  | -1.36\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.52) |  |  |  |
| Contiguity, RUS |  |  |  | 1.59 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (1.26) |  |  |
| Contiguity, CHN |  |  |  | -2.42 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (1.36) |  |  |
| ODA proportion, US |  |  |  |  | 0.15 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.28) |  |
| ODA proportion, UK |  |  |  |  | 0.05 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.36) |  |
| ODA proportion, FRA |  |  |  |  | 0.05 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.23) |  |
| Colony, UK |  |  |  |  |  | -1.58 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.05) |
| Colony, FRA |  |  |  |  |  | -0.73 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.11) |
| Colony, RUS |  |  |  |  |  | 1.65 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.65) |
| P5 trade | -0.15 |  | -0.06 | -0.29 | -0.33 | -0.40 |
|  | (0.43) |  | (0.40) | (0.35) | (0.34) | (0.36) |
| P5 contiguity | -3.04\* | -1.44 | -0.73 |  |  |  |
|  | (1.29) | (1.09) | (1.05) |  |  |  |
| P5 conflict party | 0.31 | 0.75 | 0.58 | 0.37 | 0.47 |  |
|  | (0.79) | (0.77) | (0.77) | (0.74) | (0.85) |  |
| Liberal democracy index | -0.38 | -0.42 | -0.55 | -0.49 | -0.60 | -0.48 |
|  | (0.49) | (0.44) | (0.41) | (0.41) | (0.43) | (0.41) |
| Peacekeeping operation | 5.13\*\*\* | 5.61\*\*\* | 5.21\*\*\* | 5.09\*\*\* | 4.98\*\*\* | 5.21\*\*\* |
|  | (0.86) | (0.97) | (0.87) | (0.84) | (0.83) | (0.85) |
| Incompatibility is government | 2.37\*\*\* | 1.94\*\*\* | 2.28\*\*\* | 2.29\*\*\* | 2.13\*\*\* | 2.24\*\*\* |
|  | (0.60) | (0.58) | (0.59) | (0.55) | (0.56) | (0.55) |
| Mean P5 s-score |  | -1.16\* | -1.02\* | -0.88\* | -0.85\* | -0.87\* |
|  |  | (0.45) | (0.42) | (0.38) | (0.42) | (0.40) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -8.65\*\*\* | -8.55\*\*\* | -8.77\*\*\* | -8.24\*\*\* | -8.10\*\*\* | -8.06\*\*\* |
|  | (1.41) | (1.37) | (1.39) | (1.28) | (1.29) | (1.33) |
| ICC | 0.79 | 0.77 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.76 | 0.73 |
| *N* | 884 | 884 | 884 | 848 | 851 | 884 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown.

**Table A5: Logit coefficients, UNSC attention, negative binomial models (count of meetings)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** |
| Battle deaths | 0.16\* | 0.17\* |
|  | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Civilian fatalities | 0.04 |  |
|  | (0.07) |  |
| Refugees |  | 0.03 |
|  |  | (0.07) |
| Mean P5 s-score | -0.22 | -0.22 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| P5 trade | 0.29 | 0.29 |
|  | (0.24) | (0.24) |
| P5 arms exports | -0.41\* | -0.41\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.18) |
| P5 contiguity | 0.41 | 0.41 |
|  | (0.40) | (0.40) |
| P5 preference heterogeneity | 0.30\*\* | 0.30\*\* |
|  | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Population | -4.15\*\*\* | -4.10\*\*\* |
|  | (1.14) | (1.14) |
| Liberal democracy index | -0.09 | -0.09 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.19) |
| GDP/capita | 0.08 | 0.08 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.14) |
| Peacekeeping operation | 1.26\*\*\* | 1.25\*\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Incompatibility is government | 0.81\*\* | 0.81\*\* |
|  | (0.26) | (0.26) |
| Constant | -3.79\*\*\* | -3.78\*\*\* |
|  | (0.52) | (0.52) |
| *N* | 843 | 843 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown.

**Table A6: Logit coefficients, UNSC attention, no controls**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  | All data | 1989-2004 | 2005-2019 | All data | 1989-2004 | 2005-2019 |
| Battle deaths | 0.81\*\*\* | 0.51 | 1.48\*\* | 0.82\*\*\* | 0.56\* | 1.46\*\* |
|  | (0.19) | (0.26) | (0.56) | (0.19) | (0.26) | (0.56) |
| Civilian fatalities | 0.12 | 0.29 | 0.41 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.18) | (0.24) | (0.50) |  |  |  |
| Refugees |  |  |  | 0.10 | 0.18 | 0.40 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.18) | (0.25) | (0.46) |
| Mean P5 s-score | -0.29 | -0.92 | -2.10 | -0.28 | -0.89 | -2.12 |
|  | (0.36) | (0.62) | (1.24) | (0.36) | (0.61) | (1.26) |
| P5 trade | -0.17 | -7.56\*\*\* | -0.22 | -0.18 | -7.41\*\*\* | -0.23 |
|  | (0.41) | (2.22) | (0.82) | (0.41) | (2.22) | (0.85) |
| P5 arms exports | -0.92 | -0.58 | -1.34 | -0.91 | -0.53 | -1.36 |
|  | (0.49) | (0.76) | (1.08) | (0.49) | (0.75) | (1.09) |
| P5 contiguity | -3.00\* | -2.38 | -4.60 | -3.02\* | -2.44 | -4.64 |
|  | (1.21) | (1.50) | (2.61) | (1.21) | (1.49) | (2.62) |
| P5 preference heterogeneity | 0.76\* | 0.16 | 1.44 | 0.76\*\* | 0.17 | 1.47 |
|  | (0.29) | (0.46) | (1.18) | (0.29) | (0.46) | (1.20) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -4.32\*\*\* | -8.92\*\*\* | -66.78 | -4.31\*\*\* | -8.86\*\*\* | -66.14 |
|  | (0.78) | (1.57) | (54.61) | (0.78) | (1.57) | (54.30) |
| N | 884 | 473 | 411 | 884 | 473 | 411 |
| ICC | 0.80 | 0.81 | 0.94 | 0.80 | 0.81 | 0.94 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown.

**Table A7: Logit coefficients, UNSC attention, disaggregated interest measures, no controls**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* |
| S-score, US | 0.29 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.40) |  |  |  |  |  |
| S-score, UK | -0.25 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.68) |  |  |  |  |  |
| S-score, RUS | 2.28\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.70) |  |  |  |  |  |
| S-score, CHN | -1.34 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.78) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, US |  | -3.82\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (1.21) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, UK |  | 1.03 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (1.03) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, FRA |  | -1.98 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (1.06) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, RUS |  | -0.17 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.77) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, CHN |  | 1.22\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.40) |  |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, US |  |  | -0.01 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.27) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, UK |  |  | -0.82 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (1.44) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, FR |  |  | -0.62 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.66) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, RUS |  |  | -0.05 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.46) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, CHN |  |  | -1.00\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.42) |  |  |  |
| Contiguity, RUS |  |  |  | 0.45 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (1.57) |  |  |
| Contiguity, CHN |  |  |  | -3.23\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (1.51) |  |  |
| ODA proportion, US |  |  |  |  | 0.15 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.21) |  |
| ODA proportion, UK |  |  |  |  | 0.48 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.32) |  |
| ODA proportion, FRA |  |  |  |  | 0.03 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.24) |  |
| Colony, UK |  |  |  |  |  | -1.02 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.20) |
| Colony, FRA |  |  |  |  |  | 0.39 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (1.32) |
| Colony, RUS |  |  |  |  |  | 2.36 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (2.07) |
| P5 trade | -0.17 |  | -0.02 | -0.16 | -0.24 | -0.34 |
|  | (0.39) |  | (0.42) | (0.37) | (0.38) | (0.36) |
| P5 contiguity | -4.38\*\* | -2.32 | -2.16 |  |  |  |
|  | (1.38) | (1.20) | (1.18) |  |  |  |
| P5 conflict party | 1.10 | 1.54\* | 1.29 | 1.25 | 1.27 |  |
|  | (0.76) | (0.76) | (0.72) | (0.73) | (0.82) |  |
| Mean P5 s-score |  | -0.43 | -0.34 | -0.14 | -0.09 | -0.13 |
|  |  | (0.38) | (0.36) | (0.36) | (0.38) | (0.35) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -3.92\*\*\* | -4.90\*\*\* | -4.30\*\*\* | -4.08\*\*\* | -4.44\*\*\* | -4.70\*\*\* |
|  | (0.85) | (0.86) | (0.81) | (0.78) | (0.77) | (0.93) |
| ICC | 0.85 | 0.83 | 0.81 | 0.82 | 0.84 | 0.83 |
| *N* | 884 | 884 | 884 | 848 | 851 | 884 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown.

**Table A8: Linear probability models, UNSC attention**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* |
| Battle deaths | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.04\* | 0.05\* | 0.05\*\*\* | 0.05\*\* | 0.05\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Civilian fatalities | 0.02 | 0.04\* | 0.01 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |  |  |  |
| Refugees |  |  |  | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Mean P5 s-score | -0.08\*\* | -0.07\* | -0.18\*\* | -0.08\*\* | -0.07\* | -0.18\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| P5 trade | -0.01 | -0.12\* | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.12\* | 0.00 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.03) |
| P5 arms exports | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.03 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| P5 contiguity | -0.07 | -0.04 | 0.02 | -0.07 | -0.05 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.11) |
| P5 preference heterogeneity | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.07\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.05 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
| Population | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.15\* | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.15\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| Liberal democracy index | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.04 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| GDP/capita | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.12 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.06) |
| Peacekeeping operation | 0.46\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.46\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.28\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.05) |
| Incompatibility is government | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.11\* | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.11\* | 0.16\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.02 | -0.02 | -1.86 | 0.02 | -0.02 | -1.85 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.07) | (2.20) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (2.19) |
| ICC | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.64 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.64 |
| *N* | 843 | 455 | 388 | 843 | 455 | 388 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown.

**Table A9: Linear probability models, UNSC attention, disaggregated interest measures**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* |
| S-score, US | -0.01 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.03) |  |  |  |  |  |
| S-score, UK | -0.03 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.04) |  |  |  |  |  |
| S-score, RUS | 0.13\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.04) |  |  |  |  |  |
| S-score, CHN | -0.08 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.05) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, US |  | -0.05\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.02) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, UK |  | -0.02 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.03) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, FRA |  | 0.02 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.02) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, RUS |  | 0.01 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.02) |  |  |  |  |
| Trade proportion, CHN |  | 0.02 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.01) |  |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, US |  |  | -0.00 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.01) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, UK |  |  | 0.00 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.01) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, FRA |  |  | -0.00 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.01) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, RUS |  |  | -0.02 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.02) |  |  |  |
| Arms exports, CHN |  |  | -0.04\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.02) |  |  |  |
| Contiguity, US |  |  |  | -0.18 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.34) |  |  |
| Contiguity, UK |  |  |  | 0.18 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.33) |  |  |
| Contiguity, FRA |  |  |  | -0.20 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.20) |  |  |
| Contiguity, RUS |  |  |  | 0.16 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.11) |  |  |
| Contiguity, CHN |  |  |  | -0.12 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.10) |  |  |
| ODA proportion, US |  |  |  |  | 0.00 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.01) |  |
| ODA proportion, UK |  |  |  |  | 0.01 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.02) |  |
| ODA proportion, FRA |  |  |  |  | -0.00 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.01) |  |
| Colony, UK |  |  |  |  |  | -0.12 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.08) |
| Colony, FRA |  |  |  |  |  | -0.06 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.09) |
| Colony, RUS |  |  |  |  |  | 0.17 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.14) |
| P5 trade | -0.02 |  | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 |
|  | (0.02) |  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| P5 contiguity | -0.10 | -0.03 | -0.01 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |  |  |  |
| P5 conflict party | 0.31 | 0.75 | 0.58 | 0.37 | 0.47 |  |
|  | (0.79) | (0.77) | (0.77) | (0.74) | (0.85) |  |
| Liberal democracy index | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.04 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Peacekeeping operation | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.43\*\*\* | 0.44\*\*\* | 0.44\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Incompatibility is government | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Mean P5 s-score |  | -0.06\* | -0.05\* | -0.05\* | -0.06\* | -0.05\* |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -0.16\* | -0.15 | -0.18\* | -0.18\* | -0.17\* | -0.15 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| ICC | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.49 | 0.50 |
| *N* | 884 | 884 | 884 | 884 | 851 | 884 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown.

**Table A10: Logit coefficients, UNSC attention, lagged severity variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
|  | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* | *All data* | *1989-2004* | *2005-2019* |
| Battle deaths (lag) | 0.49 | -0.02 | 1.23\* | 0.54\* | 0.01 | 1.28\* |
|  | (0.27) | (0.41) | (0.59) | (0.27) | (0.42) | (0.60) |
| Civilian fatalities (lag) | 0.73\*\* | 1.21\*\* | 0.61 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.27) | (0.39) | (0.55) |  |  |  |
| Refugees (lag) |  |  |  | 0.59\* | 1.06\*\* | 0.39 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.26) | (0.40) | (0.50) |
| Mean P5 s-score | -1.72\*\* | -1.28 | -6.43\* | -1.68\*\* | -1.31 | -6.23\* |
|  | (0.55) | (0.89) | (2.60) | (0.55) | (0.90) | (2.57) |
| P5 trade | 0.79 | -8.69\*\* | 0.82 | 0.71 | -8.59\*\* | 0.78 |
|  | (0.71) | (3.31) | (0.98) | (0.70) | (3.31) | (0.98) |
| P5 arms exports | -0.48 | 0.12 | -0.97 | -0.47 | 0.21 | -1.02 |
|  | (0.62) | (0.99) | (1.12) | (0.62) | (1.00) | (1.13) |
| P5 contiguity | -0.14 | 0.67 | -0.82 | -0.27 | 0.40 | -0.81 |
|  | (1.17) | (1.61) | (2.07) | (1.15) | (1.66) | (2.11) |
| P5 preference heterogeneity | 0.72 | -0.22 | 1.93 | 0.73\* | -0.27 | 1.85 |
|  | (0.37) | (0.74) | (1.01) | (0.37) | (0.75) | (1.01) |
| Population | -11.58\*\* | -26.84\*\* | -6.52 | -11.34\*\* | -26.28\* | -6.43 |
|  | (3.59) | (10.02) | (4.40) | (3.55) | (10.40) | (4.44) |
| Liberal democracy index | -0.17 | -0.81 | -0.37 | -0.20 | -0.89 | -0.42 |
|  | (0.49) | (0.71) | (0.79) | (0.49) | (0.74) | (0.80) |
| GDP/capita | 0.59 | 1.13 | 1.81 | 0.59 | 1.16 | 1.83 |
|  | (0.66) | (0.88) | (1.19) | (0.65) | (0.90) | (1.20) |
| Peacekeeping operation | 5.45\*\*\* | 6.07\*\*\* | 0.00 | 5.35\*\*\* | 5.99\*\*\* | 0.00 |
|  | (1.16) | (1.67) | (.) | (1.15) | (1.69) | (.) |
| Incompatibility is government | 2.20\*\* | 1.70 | 2.91\* | 2.20\*\* | 1.96 | 2.98\* |
|  | (0.77) | (1.31) | (1.46) | (0.77) | (1.34) | (1.47) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -6.73\*\*\* | -13.87\*\*\* | -32.88 | -6.66\*\*\* | -13.86\*\*\* | -30.19 |
|  | (1.46) | (4.04) | (69.98) | (1.45) | (4.14) | (70.08) |
| ICC | 0.69 | 0.75 | 0.71 | 0.69 | 0.77 | 0.72 |
| *N* | 673 | 351 | 274 | 673 | 351 | 274 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown.

**Table A11: Logit coefficients, UNSC attention, alternative interest measures**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** |
| Battle deaths | 0.85\*\*\* | 0.92\*\*\* | 0.85\*\*\* |
|  | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.23) |
| Civilian fatalities | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.37 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.22) | (0.22) |
| Mean P5 s-score | -1.16\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.42) |  |  |
| Mean P5 s-score, unweighted |  | -9.56\* |  |
|  |  | (4.56) |  |
| Mean P5 kappa score |  |  | -5.51 |
|  |  |  | (3.78) |
| P5 trade | 0.87 | 0.79 | 0.73 |
|  | (0.58) | (0.55) | (0.58) |
| P5 arms exports | -0.87 | -0.69 | -0.80 |
|  | (0.60) | (0.57) | (0.57) |
| P5 contiguity | -0.81 | -0.39 | -0.42 |
|  | (1.01) | (1.03) | (1.06) |
| P5 preference heterogeneity | 0.62\* | 0.74\* | 0.88\* |
|  | (0.30) | (0.30) | (0.35) |
| Population | -10.53\*\*\* | -11.02\*\*\* | -11.02\*\*\* |
|  | (3.11) | (3.12) | (3.19) |
| Liberal democracy index | -0.52 | -0.74 | -0.60 |
|  | (0.41) | (0.42) | (0.43) |
| GDP/capita | 0.46 | 0.38 | 0.46 |
|  | (0.55) | (0.52) | (0.55) |
| Peacekeeping operation | 5.23\*\*\* | 5.23\*\*\* | 4.89\*\*\* |
|  | (0.87) | (0.87) | (0.82) |
| Incompatibility is government | 1.69\*\* | 1.58\*\* | 1.70\*\* |
|  | (0.58) | (0.58) | (0.58) |
| Constant | -7.73\*\*\* | -1.64 | -8.32\*\*\* |
|  | (1.24) | (3.31) | (1.29) |
| *N* | 843 | 843 | 843 |
| ICC | 0.65 | 0.65 | 0.67 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown. Model (1) is the same as the one in the main table, included here for comparison.

**Table A12: Logit coefficients, UNSC attention, measures for non-permanent members**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** |
| Battle deaths | 0.89\*\*\* | 0.85\*\*\* |
|  | (0.24) | (0.23) |
| Civilian fatalities | 0.37 | 0.39 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.22) |
| Mean E10 s-score | -5.49 |  |
|  | (3.27) |  |
| P5-E10 s-score difference |  | 6.41 |
|  |  | (6.89) |
| Mean P5 s-score | -1.06\* | -1.20\*\* |
|  | (0.42) | (0.42) |
| P5 trade | 0.86 | 0.84 |
|  | (0.57) | (0.58) |
| P5 arms exports | -0.86 | -0.88 |
|  | (0.60) | (0.60) |
| P5 contiguity | -0.97 | -1.04 |
|  | (1.03) | (1.06) |
| P5 preference heterogeneity | 0.36 | 0.55 |
|  | (0.33) | (0.31) |
| Population | -10.87\*\*\* | -10.72\*\*\* |
|  | (3.10) | (3.15) |
| Liberal democracy index | -0.55 | -0.49 |
|  | (0.42) | (0.42) |
| GDP/capita | 0.36 | 0.40 |
|  | (0.55) | (0.56) |
| Peacekeeping operation | 5.29\*\*\* | 5.27\*\*\* |
|  | (0.88) | (0.88) |
| Incompatibility is government | 1.62\*\* | 1.69\*\* |
|  | (0.58) | (0.59) |
| Constant | -3.80 | -7.28\*\*\* |
|  | (2.58) | (1.32) |
| *N* | 843 | 843 |
| ICC | 0.66 | 0.66 |

Standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation. Cubic time polynomial not shown.

**Tables A13-A18. Difference between coefficients, disaggregated measures of P5 interests**

Note: All differences are tested as linear combinations using Stata’s *lincom* command.

**S-scores**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **US** | **CHN** | **UK** | **FRA** | **RUS** |
| **US** | - | 1.71 (1.00) | 0.97 (0.97) | - | -2.92 (0.83)\*\*\* |
| **CHN** | -1.71 (1.00) | - | -0.74 (1.56) | - | -4.63 (1.57)\*\* |
| **UK** | -0.97 (0.97) | 0.74 (1.56) | - | - | -3.89 (1.22)\*\*\* |
| **FRA** | - | - | - | - | - |
| **RUS** | 2.92 (0.83)\*\*\* | 4.63 (1.57)\*\* | 3.89 (1.22)\*\*\* | - | - |

Note: Difference between coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis.

\* p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001

**Trade importance**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **US** | **CHN** | **UK** | **FRA** | **RUS** |
| **US** | - | -5.04 (1.40)\*\*\* | -4.85 (1.93)\*\* | -1.84 (1.44) | -3.65 (1.45)\* |
| **CHN** | 5.04 (1.40)\*\*\* | - | 0.19 (1.16) | 3.20 (1.20)\*\* | 1.39 (0.91) |
| **UK** | 4.85 (1.93)\*\* | -0.19 (1.16) | - | 3.01 (1.89) | 1.20 (1.34) |
| **FRA** | 1.84 (1.44) | -3.20 (1.20)\*\* | -3.01 (1.89) | - | -1.81 (1.33) |
| **RUS** | 3.65 (1.45)\* | -1.39 (0.91) | -1.20 (1.34) | 1.81 (1.33) | - |

Note: Difference between coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis.

\* p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001

**Arms exports**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **US** | **CHN** | **UK** | **FRA** | **RUS** |
| **US** | - | 0.99 (0.50)\* | 0.80 (1.46) | 0.61 (0.71) | 0.04 (0.53) |
| **CHN** | -0.99 (0.50)\* | - | -0.18 (1.50) | -0.38 (0.78) | -0.95 (0.69) |
| **UK** | -0.80 (1.46) | 0.18 (1.50 | - | -0.20 (1.63) | -0.76 (1.57) |
| **FRA** | -0.61 (0.71) | 0.38 (0.78) | 0.20 (1.63) | - | -0.57 (0.83) |
| **RUS** | -0.04 (0.53) | 0.95 (0.69) | 0.76 (1.57) | 0.57 (0.83) | - |

Note: Difference between coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis.

\* p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001

**Contiguity**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **US** | **CHN** | **UK** | **FRA** | **RUS** |
| **US** | - | - | - | - | - |
| **CHN** | - | - | - | - | -3.68 (2.16) |
| **UK** | - | - | - | - | - |
| **FRA** | - | - | - | - | - |
| **RUS** | - | 3.68 (2.16) | - | - | - |

Note: Difference between coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis.

\* p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001

**ODA**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **US** | **CHN** | **UK** | **FRA** | **RUS** |
| **US** | - | - | -0.33 (0.41) | 0.11 (0.33) | - |
| **CHN** | - | - | - | - | - |
| **UK** | 0.33 (0.41) | - | - | 0.45 (0.40) | - |
| **FRA** | -0.11 (0.33) | - | -0.45 (0.40) | - | - |
| **RUS** | - | - | - | - | - |

Note: Difference between coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis.

\* p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001

**Colonial links**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **US** | **CHN** | **UK** | **FRA** | **RUS** |
| **US** | - | - | - | - | - |
| **CHN** | - | - | - | - | - |
| **UK** | - | - | - | -1.41 (1.45) | -3.39 (2.14) |
| **FRA** | - | - | 1.41 (1.45) | - | -1.98 (2.19) |
| **RUS** | - | - | 3.39 (2.14) | 1.98 (2.19) | - |

Note: Difference between coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis

.\* p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001

**Figure A4. Time-varying effect model, coefficients for (a) battle deaths and (b) civilian fatalities**

1. (b)

Note: Time-varying coefficients (β(t)) for battle deaths (left-hand panel) and civilian fatalities (right-hand panel) across years (t) in sample, with 95 percent confidence intervals. Estimated using the TVEM package (Dziak et al. 2021) in R 4.0.5. See Tan et al. (2012) for further details.

**Table A19. Predicted probabilities of UNSC attention, US and China trade importance hypothetical example**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **China trade = 0.00** | **China trade = 0.01** |
| **US trade = 0.00** | 0.34 [0.26, 0.43] | 0.42 [0.33, 0.52] |
| **US trade = 0.01** | 0.14 [0.04, 0.24] | 0.19 [0.08, 0.31] |

Note: Average predictive margins with 95% confidence intervals. Calculations based on model 2 in Table A4. Trade importance = proportion of trade (between 0 and 1) with observed conflict country in the year prior to observation.

**References**

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