Supplemental Appendix for 'Harnessing Backlash: How leaders can benefit from antagonizing foreign states'

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A A formal model of strategic antagonism

I examine an incomplete information game between two actors: the leader of a country, L, and the median voter of the public, P.

The public, P, must choose whether to support the leader or an opposition candidate, and the leader seeks to maintain public support by convincing the public that her preferred policy is closer to the public's preferences than the opposition. The leader prefers either a hawkish policy, H or a moderate policy, M. I refer to each preference as the leader's "type." Each policy is placed along a continuous policy spectrum ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates a purely dovish policy and 1 represents a purely hawkish policy. H is always further to the right on the spectrum than M ($H > M$). The leader's type is not known to the public.

The game proceeds as follows.

1. The Leader chooses whether to 1) costlessly declaring a moderate policy, 2) costlessly declaring a hawkish policy, or 3) declaring a hawkish policy by provoking a foreign actor, paying a cost $c > 0$.

2. The Public decides whether to support to Leader or the opposition (O).

3. The actor who receives the Public's support, L or O, sets the state's polity

The leader's payoffs

First, the leader values receiving public support and implementing her policy. Let $G > 0$ be the value the leader receives from being reelected and implementing her preferred policy. $G = 0$ if the leader does not secure public support. Second, if a leader declares a policy, either costlessly or through a costly speech, which is not the policy she implements once in office, then she faces a cost from her domestic audience after she is elected (Ashworth, 2012). In other words, the domestic audience punishes a leader who runs on a platform that differs significantly from the policy she implements once elected. If a hawkish leader declares a moderate policy and is elected by a public that prefers the moderate policy, then she pays a cost, $k > 0$, in decreased public support if she implements her hawkish policy once she is in office. Similarly, a moderate leader elected by a hawkish public will pay this cost to implement a moderate policy after she is elected.

Thus, the leader values being supported by a constituency that shares her policy preferences over a constituency that does not share her policy preferences. Let U_x, where $x \in \{m, h\}$, represent the leader's utility depending on their type. Similarly, let D_x and I_x, where $x \in \{m, h\}$, represent the policy that the leader declared during her campaign and the policy she implements once in office, respectively. The utility for a hawkish leader (U_h) of implementing a hawkish policy (I_h) after begin elected on a hawkish platform (D_h) is greater than the utility the hawkish leader receives from implementing that same hawkish policy after running on a moderate platform: $U_h(I_h|D_h) > U_h(I_h|D_m)$. The inverse is also true for a moderate leader: $U_m(I_m|D_m) > U_m(I_m|D_h)$. I assume that the leader is sufficiently committed to her policy that she prefers to implement her preferred policy even if the public that elected her prefers the opposite policy: $U_h(I_h|D_m) > U_h(I_m|D_m)$ and $U_d(I_m|D_h) > U_m(I_h|D_h)$. The cost of reneging on campaign promises inflicted by the leader's

constituent base, k, is the difference between these outcomes, so another way of stating this assumption is: $U_m(I_m) - k > U_m(I_h)$ and $U_h(I_h) - k > U_h(I_m)$. If elected, the leader will always implement her preferred policy. Table 1 displays the leader's payoffs.

	Hardline Type Leader			Moderate Type leader		
	Costly Backlash	Costless Hardline	Costless Moderate	Costly Backlash	Costless Hardline	Costless Moderate
Public Support	G-c	G	G-k	G-c-k	G-k	G
No Support	-c	0	0	-c	0	0

Table 1: Leader payoffs, where G represents the value the leader places receiving the public support, c is the cost the leader pays for provoking a foreign backlash, and k is the cost that a leader pays for declaring a policy that is not the one they implement after receiving their support.

The public's payoffs

The public's payoff is a function of the distance between the public's policy preference and the policy which is ultimately implemented by the leader who is in power, where the public's payoff decreases as this distance increases. However, the public is uncertain whether the leader or the opposition will implement a policy closer to the public's preferred policy.

This model examines a leader's ability to use strategic antagonism to reduce public uncertainty about their preferences. Therefore, for simplicity, I assume that the opposition's preferences are publicly known and the public is only uncertain about the leader's preferences. However, it would not alter the conclusions of the model to assume that the opposition's preferred policy was known with some uncertainty.

In this stylized model, I have assumed that the foreign public is known to have dovish preferences and therefore produces a backlash against a hawkish policy. In order for this to be beneficial to the leader in shoring up her domestic support, it must be the case that the domestic public is more likely to support the leader if it believes that she is the hawkish type. When the opposition's preference is between the moderate leader and the hawkish leader ($D < O < H$), the public will support the hawkish leader over the opposition when the public's policy preference is sufficiently hawkish ($P > \frac{H+O}{2}$). Alternatively, if the opposition is more hawkish then either the moderate or hawkish type leader ($M < H < O$), then the public will only support the hawkish leader when the public is moderate or hawkish itself ($\frac{O+H}{2} > P > \frac{O+M}{2}$). This logic is presented in detail below in Appendix B. When either of these conditions hold, the public will support the leader if it believes the leader is the hawkish type and the opposition if it believes the leader is the moderate type. I refer this as a "hawkish public."

Separating Equilibrium

I identify a separating equilibrium where the hawkish leader makes the speech abroad in order to elicit the costly backlash and the moderate leader costlessly declares her moderate

policy. In this equilibrium, the public concludes that the leader is a hawk when it observes a costly speech abroad, and it concludes that the leader is moderate if it observes a costless declaration of either a moderate or a hawkish policy.

The public will support the leader only when it observes the costly speech. Therefore, in order for the equilibrium to hold, the moderate leader must prefer to not give the speech and avoid the cost of the speech (c) and the punishment from misrepresenting her preferences (k) over giving the speech and getting elected: $U_m(I_m) < c + k$.

In this equilibrium, the hawkish leader pays a cost in the form of a backlash abroad in order to declare a hawkish policy. She prefers to pay this cost over costlessly declaring a hawkish policy because the public will assume she is the hawkish type only if she pays the cost, and she prefers to pay the cost and get elected over not getting elected ($U_h(I_h) > c$). If both types of leaders value implementing their preferred policy equally ($U_m(I_m) = U_h(I_h) = G$), then these two conditions simplify to $G - k < c < G$.

When $G - k < c < G$ and there is a hawkish public, there exists a separating equilibrium where the hawkish leader provokes a costly foreign backlash, the moderate leader costlessly declares a moderate policy, and the public supports the leader if it observes a foreign backlash and supports the opposition otherwise.

B Conditions for a Hawkish public

In order to examine the range of the public's incentive to support the leader, I consider three cases defined the the location of P relative to M and H. Let q be the public's belief that the leader is the hawkish type. The public will support the leader when the public's beliefs about the leader's type cause their expected utility from supporting the leader to be greater than their expected utility from supporting the opposition: $|O-P| > q(|H-P|)+(1-q)(|M-P|)$.

Case 1: $P < M < H$. $M - P$ and $H - P$ are positive.

Case 1a: $P < M < H$ & $P < O$

The public will support the leader when $q < \dfrac{O - M}{H - M} = q^*$. In this case, the public will support the leader when $q^* > 1$, or $O > H$. However, because public is *less* likely to support the leader if they believe she is a hawkish, there is no incentive for the leader to use strategic antagonism.

Case 1b: $P < M < H$ & $P > O$

The public will support the leader when $q < \dfrac{2P - O - M}{H - M} = q^*$. The public is again *less* likely to support the leader if they believe she is a hawkish.

Case 2: $M < P < H$. $H - P$ is positive, and $M - P$ is negative.

Case 2a: $M < P < H$ & $P < O$

The public will support the leader when $O + M - 2P > q(H + M - 2P)$. If $P < \frac{H+M}{2}$, the public will support the leader when $q < q^* = \frac{O+M-2P}{H+M-2P}$. $q^* > 1$ when $O > H$. When the opposition is to the right of the hawkish type leader, the public will support the leader regardless of their beliefs about her type. $q^* > 1$ when $O + M - 2P < H + M - 2P$, or $O < H$. When the opposition is to the left of the hardline type, the public will support the opposition regardless of their beliefs about the leader's type.

q^* will be between 0 and 1 when $P > \frac{O+M}{2}$ and $O > H$. Here, the public is *more* likely to support the leader if they believe he is a hardliner. $M < P < H < O$ and $P > \frac{O+M}{2}$ define condition A.

Case 2b: $M < P < H$ & $P > O$

The public will support the leader when $M - O > q(H + M - 2P)$. If $H + M - 2P$ is positive, $P < \frac{H+M}{2}$. In other words, when P is closer to M than H, then the public will support the leader when $q < q^* = \frac{M-O}{H+M-2P}$. $q^* > 1$ when $P > \frac{H+O}{2}$. When the public is to the right of the midpoint between H and O, the public will always support the leader. When $M < O$, the public will always prefer the opposition. The public is less likely to support the leader if they believe the leader is a hardliner.

If $H + M - 2P$ is negative, $q > \frac{M-O}{H+M-2P} = q^*$, and the public will support the leader when $q > q^*$. When $P < \frac{H+O}{2}$ and $P > \frac{H+M}{2}$, the public will never support the leader. $q^* < 0$ when $M > O$. When $P > \frac{H+M}{2}$ and $M < O$, the public will always support the leader.

There may be incentives to pay a cost to signal a hardline type when $0 < q^* < 1$. This will be the case when $P > \frac{H+M}{2}$, $M < O$, & $P > \frac{H+O}{2}$ hold. In other words, when $M < O < P < H$ and the public is closer to the hardliner than the moderate and the opposition, then the public is more likely to support the leader if they believe he is a hardliner. This is condition B.

Case 3: $M < H < P$. $|H - P|$ and $|M - P|$ are negative.

Case 3a: $M < H < P$ & $P < O$

Given $M < H < P < O$, the public will support the leader when $q > \frac{O + M - 2P}{M - H} = q^*$. q^* will be negative when $P < \frac{O + M}{2}$. When the public is the left of the midpoint between O and M, they will always support the leader. When the public is to the right of the midpoint between O and M, they will support the leader when $q > q^*$.

When $q^* > 1$, the public will never support the leader. This is true when $P > \frac{O + H}{2}$. There will be an incentive to signal a hard line type when $0 < q^* < 1$, which will be true when $P < \frac{O + H}{2}$ and $P > \frac{O + M}{2}$. This is condition C.

Case 3b: $P > H > M$ & $P > O$

The public will support the leader when $q > \frac{M - O}{M - H} = q^*$. $q^* < 0$ when $M > O$. The public will always support then leader when $P > H > M > O$. $q^* > 1$ when $O > H$. The public will never support the leader when $P > O > H > M$. There will be an incentive for the leader to signal a hardline type when $0 < q^* < 1$, or when $P > H > O > M$. This is condition D.

In summary, this analysis has identified four conditions under which the public will be more likely to support the leader over the opposition if they believe the leader is a hardliner rather than a moderate. These conditions are:

1. Condition A: $M < P < H < O$ and $P > \frac{O + M}{2}$
2. Condition B: $M < O < P < H$ and $P > \frac{H + O}{2}$
3. Condition C: $M < H < P < O$, $P < \frac{O + H}{2}$, and $P > \frac{O + M}{2}$
4. Condition D: $M < O < H < P$

When any of these conditions hold, I refer to the public as a "hawkish" public.

B.1 Public costs of backlash

Let c_P represent the cost that the public bears from the backlash if they support a leader who provokes a foreign backlash. In this scenario, the public's payoff is a combination of the distance of their ideal point nd this additional cost, if invoked.

This additional cost narrows the conditions under which a public will support a leader who is hawkish, and has signaled this preference by provoking a costly backlash from a foreign public. In other words, in comparison to the scenario where the public does not

bare any of the cost of the foreign backlash ($c_P = 0$), as is assumed in the baseline model, the opposition can win support for the public with more different policy preferences. These narrower conditions are:

1. Conditions A: $M < P < H < O - c_P$ and $P > \dfrac{O + M - c_P}{2}$
2. Conditions B: $M < O < P < H$ and $P > \dfrac{H + O + c_P}{2}$
3. Conditions C: $M < H < P < O$, $P < \dfrac{O + H - c_P}{2}$, and $P > \dfrac{O + M - c_P}{2}$
4. Conditions D: $M < O + c_P < H < P$

C American Public Opinion Robustness Tables

Gallup and Pew each ran one survey in the weeks before the speech and in the weeks after. Data are from the Roper iPoll Center. Gallup's question wording on favorability towards Netanyahu is *"As I read each name, please say if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of these people – or if you have never heard of them. How about Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu?"* Pew question wording is *"Would you say your overall opinion of Benjamin Netanyahu is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?"* Together, these surveys interviewed 2,341 respondents before Netanyahu's speech between February 8th and February 22nd and 2,525 respondents after his speech between March 5th and March 28th. The fact that the surveys were conducted by the same survey firms increases the likelihood that the sample is not biased by the question phrasing or by variation in sampling methods for the groups of respondents interviewed before and after the speech.

I use a probit model to analyze the change in American public opinion before and after Netanyahu's speech. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondents reported a favorable opinion of Netanyahu. I examine two key independent variables representing the subset of Americans that I expect to be alienated by Netanyahu's speech: 1) a categorical variable indicating the respondent's party, the key subgroup being Americans who identify as Democrats (*Democrat*), and 2) a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent expressed approval of President Obama (*Approves of Obama*). These variables are only correlated at 0.43, indicating that they are capturing significantly different subsets of the American public. I interact these IVs with a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was surveyed after Netanyahu's speech (*After Speech*). My model takes the form:

$$\textit{Netanyahu Approval} \sim \beta_0 + \beta_1\ \textit{After Speech} + \beta_2\ \textit{IV} + \beta_3\ \textit{After Speech * IV} + \beta_4\ X$$

where X is a vector of control variable and IV is either *Democrat* or *Approves of Obama*. The key coefficient is β_3. My theory predicts that this coefficient will be negative and significant. The Americans surveyed before and after Netanyahu's speech do not differ significantly on most observable characteristics (Table B1). However, a larger portion of Americans who were surveyed before Netanyahu's speech were college graduates and a larger portion were lower income. To ensure that the education or income of the sample is not driving the results, I additionally analyze the change in sentiment within these subgroups. The results are robust (Tables B3 and B4).

Model 1 shows that average American opinion of Netanyahu became more unfavorable following his speech. However, model 2 demonstrates that this movement was much larger among American Democrats. This result holds after controlling for a battery of demographic controls (model 3). Where significant, the controls behave as intuition would lead us to expect: more conservative and older Americans are more likely to have a favorable opinion of Netanyahu.

Table B1: Balance Table, US surveys

	Before Speech	After Speech	p-value
Approve Obama	0.458	0.455	0.81
Democrat	0.255	0.262	0.616
Age	35.91	36.24	0.54
Male	0.53	0.53	0.96
White	0.757	0.753	0.74
Jewish	0.02	0.018	0.56
College	0.41	0.39	0.08*
Liberal	035	0.37	0.21
Moderate	0.23	0.24	0.56
Income: 30k - 75k	0.36	0.32	0.02*
Income: $> 75k$	0.32	0.30	0.38

D Israeli Public Opinion Robustness Tables

In 2015, Netanyahu was campaigning to form a coalition including right-wing parties: United Torah Judaism, Shas, and Jewish Home. I examine the relationship between whether a respondent supported one of these parties in the 2013 Knesset election, and whether they express a preference for a coalition led by the Likud. These data are from the 2015 Israel National Election Survey. The INES question wording is *"Which of these coalition governments would you prefer? a. A coalition lead by the Likud b. A coalition lead by the Zionist Union, c. A national unity government, d. Do not read out loud: Do not know/refuses to respond."* There are 469 respondents in the data. This model takes the form:

$$\textit{Support Likud Coalition} \sim \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{ After Speech} + \beta_2 \textit{ Coalition vote in 2013} + \beta_3 \textit{ After Speech * Coalition vote in 2013} + \beta_4 X$$

where X is a vector of control variable. The key coefficient is again β_3. I expect this value to be positive and significant, indicating an increase in support for a Likud-led coalition among right-wing of Israelis following the speech. In 2013, Likud and Israel Beiteinu formed an electoral alliance, and supporters voted for them jointly. Israel Beiteinu joined the Likud-led coalition formed in 2015, but not until 2016. These results are robust to pooling voters who supported "Likud - Israel Beiteinu" in 2013 or to only including voters said they would have supported Likud if the parties had run separately. Table C1 shows that the respondents surveys before and after Netanyahu's visit are not significantly different on observable characteristics.

One might be concerned that the increase in support for a Netanyahu-led coalition among far right-wing party supporters was driven by a gradual increase in support for Netanyahu over time, unrelated to the speech itself. I test the change in support for a Likud-led coalition over time by interacting whether a respondent voted for a coalition party in 2013 with a count of days since the beginning of the survey. I find that there exists no significantly different relationship in support for a Likud-led coalition over the course of the survey between Israelis who voted for a coalition member in 2013 and those who did not (Table C6). This supports

Table B2: American opinion of Netanyahu following speech

	Dependent variable: Favorable towards Netanyahu				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
After Visit	-0.204^{***}	-0.035	-0.025	0.055	0.039
	(0.044)	(0.087)	(0.103)	(0.063)	(0.074)
Independent		-0.567^{***}	-0.429^{**}		
		(0.185)	(0.214)		
Democrat		-0.956^{***}	-0.702^{***}		
		(0.087)	(0.106)		
After Visit		-0.165	-0.180		
x Independent		(0.248)	(0.330)		
After Visit		-0.535^{***}	-0.542^{***}		
x Democrat		(0.124)	(0.148)		
Approves of Obama				-0.763^{***}	-0.372^{***}
				(0.065)	(0.080)
After Visit				-0.590^{***}	-0.503^{***}
x Approves of Obama				(0.094)	(0.107)
Male			0.048		0.046
			(0.073)		(0.055)
Weekly church			0.049		-0.033
			(0.080)		(0.059)
College			0.011		0.031
			(0.078)		(0.059)
Income: 30k - 75k			0.128		0.073
			(0.097)		(0.071)
Income: $> 75k$			0.087		0.041
			(0.103)		(0.076)
Age			0.007^{***}		0.004^{**}
			(0.002)		(0.002)
White			0.012		0.039
			(0.090)		(0.067)
Ideology: Liberal			-0.427^{***}		-0.853^{***}
			(0.115)		(0.083)
Ideology: Moderate			-0.286^{***}		-0.500^{***}
			(0.089)		(0.066)
Jewish			0.452^{*}		0.586^{***}
			(0.241)		(0.191)
Constant	0.346^{***}	0.898^{***}	0.546^{***}	0.691^{***}	0.630^{***}
	(0.031)	(0.063)	(0.152)	(0.045)	(0.115)
Observations	3,399	2,093	1,539	3,293	2,625
Log Likelihood	$-2,283$	$-1,167$	-861	$-1,927$	$-1,512$

Table B3: American opinion of Netanyahu following speech, by education

	Dependent variable: Favorable towards Netanyahu			
	No college		College degree	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
After Visit	0.154	0.097	−0.288*	−0.046
	(0.136)	(0.094)	(0.162)	(0.120)
Independent	−0.166		−0.636**	
	(0.318)		(0.296)	
Democrat	−0.543***		−0.880***	
	(0.140)		(0.166)	
After Visit	−0.415		−0.024	
x Independent	(0.453)		(0.512)	
After Visit	−0.633***		−0.346	
x Democrat	(0.207)		(0.220)	
Approves of Obama		−0.099		−0.695***
		(0.107)		(0.124)
After Visit		−0.470***		−0.528***
x Approves of Obama		(0.144)		(0.165)
Male	0.111	0.097	−0.021	−0.035
	(0.101)	(0.074)	(0.108)	(0.084)
Weekly church	0.096	−0.034	−0.033	−0.040
	(0.112)	(0.079)	(0.118)	(0.090)
Income: 30k - 75k	0.091	0.075	0.355*	0.116
	(0.113)	(0.082)	(0.204)	(0.149)
Income: $> 75k$	0.140	0.151	0.236	0.022
	(0.136)	(0.099)	(0.194)	(0.141)
Age	0.010***	0.004**	0.004	0.004*
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
White	−0.054	0.092	0.081	−0.006
	(0.123)	(0.089)	(0.138)	(0.105)
Liberal	−0.223	−0.745***	−0.697***	−0.942***
	(0.151)	(0.108)	(0.187)	(0.137)
Moderate	−0.210*	−0.478***	−0.445***	−0.576***
	(0.116)	(0.085)	(0.147)	(0.109)
Jewish	0.483	0.715*	0.471*	0.600***
	(0.545)	(0.402)	(0.277)	(0.226)
Constant	0.227	0.328**	0.819***	0.983***
	(0.194)	(0.145)	(0.285)	(0.217)
Observations	792	1,408	747	1,217
Log Likelihood	−460.913	−856.038	−389.660	−634.051

Table B4: American opinion of Netanyahu following speech, by income

	Dependent variable: Favorable towards Netanyahu			
	Income: 30k - 75k		Income: $> 75k$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
After Visit	0.183	0.011	0.111	0.107
	(0.221)	(0.150)	(0.167)	(0.119)
Independent	−0.770		−0.667*	
	(0.568)		(0.364)	
Democrat	−0.413**		−0.651***	
	(0.210)		(0.172)	
After Visit	−0.014		0.407	
x Independent	(0.699)		(0.632)	
After Visit	−0.765**		−0.483**	
x Democrat	(0.311)		(0.239)	
Approves of Obama		0.091		−0.455***
		(0.155)		(0.133)
After Visit		−0.435**		−0.407**
x Approves of Obama		(0.208)		(0.177)
Male	0.059	−0.043	0.068	0.092
	(0.151)	(0.107)	(0.118)	(0.089)
Weekly church	0.178	−0.042	0.015	−0.070
	(0.167)	(0.112)	(0.125)	(0.095)
Age	0.004	0.002	0.008***	0.005**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
White	−0.079	0.080	−0.092	−0.035
	(0.177)	(0.119)	(0.141)	(0.110)
Liberal	−0.008	−0.676***	−0.446**	−0.686***
	(0.209)	(0.144)	(0.189)	(0.141)
Moderate	0.067	−0.282**	−0.277*	−0.495***
	(0.179)	(0.124)	(0.148)	(0.110)
Jewish	0.140	0.252	0.264	0.941**
	(0.666)	(0.466)	(0.487)	(0.449)
Constant	0.243	0.338*	0.613***	0.649***
	(0.275)	(0.197)	(0.229)	(0.175)
Observations	322	615	600	981
Log Likelihood	−202.343	−402.035	−335.173	−564.603

the conclusion that the increase in support for Netanyahu's coalition among hawkish Israelis was centered around his speech.

Table C1: Balance Table, Israel survey

	February 25 - March 8		
	Before Speech	After Speech	p-value
Non-Likud Coalition Vote in 2013	0.14	0.13	0.78
Age	46.9	47.5	0.71
Female	0.52	0.50	0.65
Jewish	0.74	0.72	0.60
Upper Class	0.25	0.29	0.29

Table C2 shows the full regression which supports the results show in Figure 3.

Table C2: Support for Likud-led Coalition by 2013 Coalition Support. Regression supporting marginal effects in Figure 3.

	Dependent variable:
	Support for Likud-Led Coalition
2013 Likud Vote	0.667^{***}
	(0.126)
2013 Non-Likud Coalition Vote	0.111
	(0.113)
After Speech	-0.100
	(0.074)
2013 Likud Vote x	-0.054
After Speech	(0.173)
2013 Non-Likud coalition Vote x	0.563^{***}
After Speech	(0.186)
Age	-0.005^{**}
	(0.002)
Female	0.035
	(0.062)
Jewish	0.227^{***}
	(0.083)
Upper Class	-0.183^{**}
	(0.072)
Constant	0.290^{***}
	(0.111)
Observations	166
R^2	0.384
Adjusted R^2	0.349

Table C3: Support for Likud-Led coalition, varying time ranges around Netanyahu's speech.

	Dependent variable: Support for Likud-led Coalition							
	March 1- March 4		Feb 27 - March 6		Feb 26 - March 7		Feb 25 - March 8	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
2013 Likud Vote	0.71***	0.67***	0.53***	0.51***	0.50***	0.46***	0.61***	0.56***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
2013 Non-Likud Vote	0.16	0.11	0.26***	0.23**	0.32***	0.24***	0.34***	0.27***
Coalition Vote	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
After Speech	−0.08	−0.10	−0.07	−0.03	−0.04	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
2013 Likud	−0.06	−0.05	0.08	0.06	0.09	0.06	−0.02	−0.03
x After Speech	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
2013 Non-Likud Coal.	0.61***	0.56***	0.32**	0.28**	0.19	0.22*	0.17	0.22*
x After Speech	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Age		−0.005**		−0.004***		−0.004***		−0.002**
		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Female		0.03		0.01		0.004		0.01
		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Jewish		0.23***		0.18***		0.19***		0.16***
		(0.08)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.04)
Upper Class		−0.18**		−0.11**		−0.12**		−0.11***
		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)
Constant	0.20***	0.29***	0.22***	0.26***	0.20***	0.25***	0.17***	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Observations	174	166	319	309	373	360	469	454
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.35	0.24	0.28	0.21	0.26	0.24	0.28

Table C4: Support for Likud-Led coalition, Pooling 2013 voters for Likud and other right-wing coalition parties

	Dependent variable: Support for Likud-led Coalition							
	March 1- March 4		Feb 27 - March 6		Feb 26 - March 7		Feb 25 - March 8	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
2013 Coalition Vote	0.400***	0.353***	0.389***	0.360***	0.403***	0.346***	0.471***	0.413***
	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.054)	(0.055)
After Speech	−0.081	−0.093	−0.074	−0.034	−0.042	−0.013	−0.018	−0.008
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.045)
2013 Coalition Vote x After Speech	0.299**	0.282**	0.214**	0.186*	0.147	0.156	0.080	0.102
	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.085)	(0.086)
Age		−0.005**		−0.003**		−0.003***		−0.002*
		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Female		0.052		0.012		0.005		0.017
		(0.064)		(0.046)		(0.043)		(0.037)
Jewish		0.193**		0.173***		0.181***		0.154***
		(0.085)		(0.060)		(0.051)		(0.045)
Upper Class		−0.223***		−0.128**		−0.130***		−0.125***
		(0.073)		(0.053)		(0.050)		(0.042)
Constant	0.200***	0.297**	0.216***	0.262***	0.197***	0.250***	0.174***	0.190***
	(0.043)	(0.114)	(0.038)	(0.086)	(0.035)	(0.074)	(0.028)	(0.065)
Observations	174	166	319	309	373	360	469	454
Adjusted R^2	0.262	0.305	0.235	0.269	0.210	0.256	0.233	0.265

Table C5: 2013 Coalition votes and agreement with the statement that "Israel should do what is best for its security, even at the price of a confrontation with the American administration." Israelis who supported the coalition parties in 2013 are more likely to agree with this statement. Analysis is done on data collect before March 3, 2015 to avoid measuring the impact of speech.

	Dependent variable:			
	Agrees or Strongly agrees			
	OLS		*Logit*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
2013 Likud Vote	0.231***	0.217***	1.021***	0.994***
	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.314)	(0.339)
2013 Non-Likud Coalition Vote	0.270***	0.204***	1.244***	0.985***
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.348)	(0.360)
Age		−0.004**		−0.016**
		(0.001)		(0.006)
Female		0.059		0.267
		(0.049)		(0.225)
Jewish		0.189***		0.793***
		(0.069)		(0.304)
Upper Class		−0.049		−0.215
		(0.055)		(0.247)
Constant	0.519***	0.526***	0.078	0.135
	(0.030)	(0.091)	(0.125)	(0.403)
Observations	379	369	379	369
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.077		
Log Likelihood			−243.963	−230.123

Table C6: In the full data, there is no relationship between prior support for a non-Likud coalition party and time.

	Dependent variable:			
	Support for Likud-led coalition			
	OLS		*probit*	*logit*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
2013 Likud Vote	−106.347**	−116.521**	−368.904**	−654.571**
	(53.520)	(53.342)	(184.393)	(315.569)
2013 Non-Likud Coalition Vote	52.469	70.815	180.129	262.073
	(57.447)	(57.248)	(187.681)	(311.235)
Date	−0.002	−0.002	−0.005	−0.010
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.009)
2013 Likud Vote x Date	0.006**	0.007**	0.022**	0.040**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.019)
2013 Non-Likud Coalition Vote x Date	−0.003	−0.004	−0.011	−0.016
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.019)
Age		−0.003***	−0.011***	−0.020***
		(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Female		−0.039*	−0.127*	−0.225*
		(0.021)	(0.074)	(0.128)
Jewish		0.157***	0.690***	1.245***
		(0.027)	(0.116)	(0.221)
Upper Class		−0.066***	−0.265***	−0.432***
		(0.023)	(0.085)	(0.148)
Constant	36.638	25.081	80.982	165.712
	(23.482)	(23.559)	(87.395)	(153.777)
Observations	1,595	1,544	1,544	1,544
Adjusted R^2	0.218	0.249		
Log Likelihood			−762.240	−762.308

Table C7: Opinion that 'The Likud leadership will deal with Israel's security issues best' following speech

	DV: Likud leadership will deal with Israel's foreign affairs and security issues best							
	March 1- March 4		Feb 28 - March 5		Feb 27 - March 6		Feb 26 - March 7	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
2013 Likud Vote	0.76***	0.74***	0.69***	0.66***	0.69***	0.66***	0.67***	0.63***
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
2013 Non-Likud	0.19	0.15	0.22**	0.18*	0.22**	0.18*	0.31***	0.22**
Coalition Vote	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
After Speech	0.12	0.10	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.09*	0.13**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
2013 Likud Vote x	−0.12	−0.13	−0.03	−0.06	−0.03	−0.06	−0.08	−0.11
After Speech	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
2013 Non-Likud Coalition	0.34*	0.30	0.25*	0.22	0.25*	0.22	0.10	0.15
Vote x After Speech	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Age		−0.004**		−0.003*		−0.003*		−0.004***
		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Female		−0.02		−0.03		−0.03		−0.02
		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)
Jewish		0.24***		0.23***		0.23***		0.26***
		(0.09)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.05)
Upper Class		−0.15*		−0.13**		−0.13**		−0.13**
		(0.08)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.05)
Constant	0.24***	0.31**	0.26***	0.25***	0.26***	0.25***	0.24***	0.27***
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Observations	174	166	319	309	319	309	373	360
Adjusted R^2	0.29	0.31	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.29	0.22	0.29

Table C8: Men do not increase their support for a Likud-led coalition after the speech

	Dependent variable: Support for Likud-led Coalition			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male	−0.05	−0.09	−0.09	−0.08
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
After Speech	−0.03	−0.05	−0.05	−0.04
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Male x After Speech	0.001	0.15	0.15	0.14
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Age	−0.01***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
2013 Likeud Vote	0.62***	0.53***	0.53***	0.49***
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
2013 Non-Likud Coalition Vote	0.31***	0.36***	0.36***	0.34***
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Jewish	0.22**	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Upper Class	−0.19***	−0.12**	−0.12**	−0.12**
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	0.35***	0.31***	0.31***	0.29***
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Observations	166	309	309	360
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.27	0.27	0.26

Figure 4: Change in support for Likud-led coalition, by sex



Male respondents did not significantly increase their support for a Likud-led coalition following speech.

Figure 5: Google Searches for "Netanyahu" from within the US, 1/1/2015 - 3/31/2015



US Google searches for the term "Netanyahu" increased to approximately thirty times the previous baseline in the US n March 3rd.

Figure 6: Google Searches for "Congress" from within Israel, 1/1/2015 - 3/31/2015

Israeli Google searches for the term "Congress" spiked on March 3rd to fives times the volume of any day in the previous two months.