**Supplementary Materials:**

**International Influences on the Survival of Territorial Non-State Actors**

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# **A Sample of Sovereign States and Territorial Contenders**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A1: List of Cases** | | |  |
| **Sovereign State** | **Territorial Contender** | **Years of TC’s Existence** | **Death Type** |
| **Belize** (1981-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **United States of Central America** (1823-1839) | Liberal Revolt  Costa Rica  Omoa  Santiago Nonualco  League of Cities  Mita | 1827-1829  1829-1830  1832  1833  1835  1837-1839 | 4  3  2  2  2  4 |
| **Guatemala** (1840-2010) | Los Altos, part I  Los Lucios  Los Altos, part II  Chiquimila  Izabal  Zacapa – FAR  Quiche – EGP  El Peten – FAR II  Lake Atitlan – ORPA | 1838-1840  1847-1850  1848-1849  1848-1850  1962-1967  1965-1968  1972-1985  1975-1985  1979-1985 | 2  2  2  2  1  2  2  2  2 |
| **Honduras** (1840-2010) | Amapala | 1910 | 3 |
| **Nicaragua** (1840-2010) | Leon  Mosquitia  Sandino’s Revolt  Sandinistas | 1854-1855  1860-1894  1927-1933  1970-1979 | 4  2  3  4 |
| **Costa Rica** (1840-2010) | Southern Costa Rica | 1948 | 4 |
| **Colombia** (1830-2010) | Free State of the Isthmus  FARClandia  ELN-Colombia | 1840-1841  1966-2010  1970-2010 | 3  0  0 |
| **Venezuela** (1831-2010) | State of the East  Federal Army of the West  Funes Fiefdom | 1831  1859-1863  1913-1921 | 3  4  2 |
| **Brazil** (1822-2010) | Pernambuco  Republic of Para  Piratini Republic  Sabinada  Balaiada  Canudos  Rio Grandense  Brazilian Navy Revolt  Contestado | 1824  1835-1837  1835-1845  1837-1838  1838-1840  1893-1897  1893-1894  1893-1894  1913-1915 | 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 |
| **Paraguay** (1816-2010) | Concepcion | 1947 | 2 |
| **Uruguay** (1829-2010) | El Cerrito  Colorados de Uruguay  Blancos de Uruguay  Saravia | 1843-1851  1863-1865  1870-1872  1896-1904 | 2  4  2  2 |
| **Guinea-Bissau** (1974-2010) | Guinea-Bissau Military | 1998-1999 | 4 |
| **Gambia** (1965-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Mali** (1960-2010) | Azawad, part I  Azawad, part II  Azawad, part III  Mali Tuaregs, part I  Mali Tuaregs, part II | 1990-1996  1991-1996  1991-1994  2006-2007  2007-2009 | 3  3  1  3  2 |
| **Mauritania** (1960-2010) | Saharawi | 1976-2010 | 0 |
| **Niger** (1960-2010) | Niger Tuaregs, part I  Niger Tuaregs, part II | 1991-1998  2007-2010 | 3  3 |
| **Ivory Coast** (1960-2010) | Northern Ivory Coast | 2002-2010 | 3 |
| **Burkina Faso** (1960-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Sierra Leone** (1961-2010) | Katanga – Sierra Leone  RUF – Sierra Leone  Kamajors  Occra Hills | 1963-1969  1991-2002  1991-1997  1999-2000 | 2  3  3  2 |
| **Ghana** (1957-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Togo** (1960-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Nigeria** (1960-2010) | Biafra  Maitatsine | 1967-1970  1980 | 2  2 |
| **Gabon** (1960-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Chad** (1960-2010) | Northern Chad  BET, part I  Southern Chad  Ouaddai & Biltine  BET, part II  Daguessa & Tissi | 1966-1977  1971-1979  1979-1982  1980-1982  1983-1987  2006-2007 | 1  4  2  4  2  2 |
| **Congo/Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo** (1960-2010) | Katanga  South Kasai  Stanleyville, part I  Balubakat  Kwilu  Stanleyville, part II  Fizi Pocket  Kasai / MIBA  Hutu Camps  AFDL – Zaire  RCD – Goma  Northwest DRC  RCD – Kisangani  Bafwasende  UPC – South Ituri  FAPC – South Ituri  Goma-Serufuli  Kivu – CNDP | 1960-1963  1960-1962  1960-1962  1961  1963-1967  1964-1966  1967-1985  1993-1997  1994-1996  1996-1997  1998-2006  1998-2006  1999-2003  2000-2006  2002-2003  2003-2005  2003-2007  2006-2009 | 2  2  2  2  2  2  3  1  1  4  3  3  3  3  1  3  3  2 |
| **Uganda** (1962-2010) | Rwenzururu Kingdom  Karamoja  Post-Amin Ugandan Army  West Nile – UNRF  Luwero Triangle – NRA I  Western Uganda – NRA II  Acholiland – UPDA  North Central Uganda – HSM  West Nile – WNBF  Bundibugyo – ADF | 1962-1982  1979-2009  1980  1981-1986  1981-1983  1985-1986  1986-1988  1986-1987  1995-1997  1996-2001 | 3  3  2  3  2  4  3  2  2  2 |
| **Kenya** (1963-2010) | Northern Frontier District  Mount Elgon | 1963-1968  2005-2008 | 2  2 |
| **Tanzania** (1961-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Rwanda** (1962-2010) | Rwandan Tutsis | 1990-1994 | 4 |
| **Somalia** (1960-2010) | Puntland  Somaliland  Bay & Bakool  Islamic Courts Union | 1991-2010  1991-2010  1995-2004  2006 | 0  0  3  2 |
| **Ethiopia** (1941-2010) | Eritrea, part I  Ogaden, part I  Bale & Sidamo, part I  Afar  Tigray  Ogaden, part II  Eritrea, part II  Bale & Sidamo, part II | 1961-1982  1963-1964  1965-1970  1975-1976  1975-1991  1976-1980  1977-1991  1977-1980 | 1  2  2  2  4  2  4  2 |
| **South Africa** (1910-2010) | Transkei  Bophuthatswana  Venda  Ciskei | 1976-1994  1977-1994  1979-1994  1981-1994 | 3  3  3  3 |
| **Namibia** (1990-2010) | Rehoboth Basters | 1990 | 3 |
| **Lesotho** (1966-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Botswana** (1966-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Madagascar** (1960-2010) | Antananarivo Province | 2002 | 4 |
| **Libya** (1952-2010) | Green Mountains – LIFG | 1995-1998 | 2 |
| **Armenia** (1991-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Georgia** (1991-2010) | Abkhazia  South Ossetia | 1991-2010  1991-2010 | 0  0 |
| **Iran** (1900-2010) | Tabriz, Sattar Khan  Bakhtiari Movement  Gilan Movement  Jangali Movement  Western Azerbaijan  Azadistan  Arabistan  Iranian Azerbaijan  Republic of Mahabad | 1908-1909  1909  1909  1917-1921  1919-1922  1920  1921-1924  1945-1946  1945-1946 | 3  3  3  2  2  2  2  2  3 |
| **Turkey** (1922-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Iraq** (1932-2010) | Iraqi Kurdistan – KDP  Iraqi Kurdistan – PUK  Eastern Iraq – AaI  Sadr Movement | 1991-2010  1994-2006  2001-2003  2003-2008 | 0  1  1  3 |
| **Syria** (1946-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Lebanon** (1943-2010) | Palestinians  Druze  Christians  Hezboallah | 1969-1982  1975-1989  1976-1990  1985-2010 | 2  3  2  0 |
| **Jordan** (1946-2010) | Palestinians | 1968-1970 | 2 |
| **Israel** (1948-2010) | Palestine  Gaza | 1994-2010  2006-2010 | 0  0 |
| **Saudi Arabia** (1932-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Kyrgyzstan** (1991-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Kazakhstan** (1991-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **India** (1947-2010) | Hyderabad  Nagaland  Sikkim  Mizoram  Naxalite  Naxalite – MCC  Assam  Greater Nagalim  Lesser Nagalim  Southern Manipur | 1947-1948  1947-1975  1947-1975  1966  1980-2010  1980-2004  1986-1992  1988-2010  1988-2010  2003-2010 | 2  3  3  2  0  1  2  0  0  0 |
| **Bhutan** (1949-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Pakistan** (1947-2010) | Khanate of Kalat  Karachi  Southern Punjab  Malakand  Lahore Shias  Swat Valley  NW Frontier Province | 1947-1948  1984-1997  1985-2010  1994-1995  1996  2007  2008-2010 | 3  3  0  3  2  3  0 |
| **Bangladesh** (1971-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Burma** (1948-2010) | Arakan Buddhists  Arakan Rohingyas  Red Flag Communists  Karenni State  Kawthoolei – KNU  White Flag Communists  Burmese Militias  Mon, part I  Kuomintang  Mon, part II  Kachin  Shan State Army  Karen Communists – KNUP  Pao, part I  Lahu  Khun Sa / SSA-South  Wa State  Kokang – MNDAA  Eastern Shan State  Pao, part II | 1948-1958  1948-1961  1948-1975  1948-2010  1948-2010  1948-1989  1948-1958  1948-1958  1950-1961  1958-2010  1961-2010  1964-1989  1966-1975  1966-1991  1972-1984  1983-2010  1989-2010  1989-2009  1989-2010  1991-2010 | 3  2  2  0  0  1  3  3  2  0  0  3  2  3  1  0  0  2  0  0 |
| **Cambodia** (1954-2010) | Khmer Rouge, part I  Anti-KR Cambodians  Khmer Rouge, part II  Cambodian Refugee Camps | 1965-1975  1978-1979  1979-1998  1979-1991 | 4  4  3  3 |
| **South Vietnam** (1954-1975) | Viet Cong | 1954-1975 | 4 |
| **Malaysia** (1957-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Singapore** (1959-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Brunei** (1984-2010) | *None* |  |  |
| **Philippines** (1946-2010) | Huklandia  Moro, part I – MNLF  Moro, part II – MILF  New People’s Army | 1946-1954  1972-1977  1981-2010  1982-1992 | 2  3  0  2 |
| **Indonesia** (1945-2010) | Republic of South Moluccas  West Sumatra  East Timor  Aceh | 1950  1958  1975-1978  1999-2005 | 2  2  2  3 |
| **Papua New Guinea** (1975-2010) | Bougainville Island  Me’ekaumi | 1989-2001  2002-2010 | 3  0 |

**Death Type Key:** 0 = continued existence, 1 = absorbed by other TC, 2 = forceful reintegration, 3 = peaceful reintegration, 4 = promoted to sovereign statehood.

# **B Descriptive Statistics and Other Outcome Types**

Table B1 reports overall descriptive statistics to provide a sense of each variable’s empirical distribution. Table B2 reports descriptive statistics for our key variables of interest—human rights treaty embeddedness and the number of international rivals—stratified by the survival status of territorial contenders (TCs) under observation. The unit of analysis is the TC-year.

While the average lifespan of a TC is short,[[3]](#footnote-3) TC death is still a relatively rare event. TCs survive the year for 91.76% of our observations. Among these cases, the average treaty embeddedness score for their host state is 0.287, and the average count of rivals is 0.947. By contrast, countries that have peacefully reintegrated their TCs tend to be much more embedded in the international human rights treaty regime (0.676) and tend to have slightly fewer international rivals (0.837). This accords with our expectation that human rights treaties raise the relative appeal of peaceful reintegration processes, while rivals work to actively hamper these efforts. The average for both indicators is lower when a country forcefully reintegrates a TC, consistent the notion that treaties restrain state behavior while rivals allow TCs to avoid being conquered.

We also briefly investigate two other forms of death that are not covered in our main analysis: absorption by another territorial contender, and instances where a TC is successfully promoted to sovereign state status, typically by conquering their hosts. Both outcomes are rare. Only 12 TCs are absorbed by a competitor, and only 14 ever achieve sovereign independence. Lacking sufficient power for a comprehensive analysis, we restrict ourselves to a brief account of the descriptive statistics.

We begin with TCs that are absorbed by their competitors. These cases tend to be clustered in a small number of countries which are both more embedded in the international human rights treaty regime, and which have more international rivals. These cases cluster in a small number of countries including Guatemala, Mali, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (3 TCs), Ethiopia, Iraq (2), India, and Burma (2). The apparent link between rivalry and inter-TC conquest is consistent with the notion that states have an interest in fostering violence and discord in rival territory. The apparent link with human rights treaty embeddedness is more surprising but is driven primarily by states who have committed themselves to respecting human rights, but lack the capacity to control the behaviors of non-state actors on their territory.

The promotion to sovereign statehood category also offers a glimpse into the rare instances of success in our data. Consistent with our broader theoretical expectations, TCs tend to succeed in countries that are *both* embedded in the human rights treaty regime *and* have more international rivals. Conceptually, this reflects a best-possible state-making ecology for a TC, facing a host who is constrained from using coercive force, pre-disposed toward peaceful settlement, and undermined by an international rival with an interest in hastening its demise. Indeed, we find a similar pattern among cases that are right-censored, managing to survive until the last year of observation without having been removed by their hosts. Thus, while alternative death types are rare in our data, we find additional support for our overarching expectation that states are faced with a variety of international constraints that condition whether and how they manage their TC problem.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table B1: Descriptive Statistics | | | | | |
|  | N | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
| *Sovereign State Rivals* | 1772 | 0.951 | 1.329 | 0 | 6 |
| *Human Rights Treaty Embeddedness* | 1750 | 0.310 | 0.924 | -2.657 | 2.588 |
| *Sovereign State Capabilities* | 1772 | -5.855 | 1.454 | -9.327 | -2.611 |
| *Number of Other Territorial Contenders* | 1772 | 4.309 | 3.184 | 1 | 11 |
| *TC Mountainous Terrain* | 1772 | 0.716 | 0.451 | 0 | 1 |
| *Host State Failure* | 1772 | 0.107 | 0.309 | 0 | 1 |
| *Host State Development* | 1772 | -2.717 | 1.385 | -8.623 | 7.880 |
| *ln(TC Population)* | 1772 | 13.441 | 1.386 | 7.496 | 16.944 |
| *Sovereign State Allies* | 1772 | 0.769 | 0.933 | 0 | 5 |
| *TC Loot* | 1772 | 0.328 | 0.470 | 0 | 1 |
| *TC Foreign Support* | 1772 | 0.288 | 0.453 | 0 | 1 |
| *TC Recognition* | 1772 | 0.130 | 0.421 | 0 | 2 |
| *TC Fragmentation* | 1772 | 0.188 | 0.391 | 0 | 1 |
| *Host State Executive Constraint* | 1772 | 4.024 | 2.292 | 1 | 7 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table B2:** Descriptive Statistics by Survival Status | | | | | |
|  | Number of Cases  (Percent of Total) | Average Human Rights Treaty Embeddedness | Average Number of International Rivals | |
| Surviving | 1,653  (91.76%) | 0.287 | | 0.947 | |
| Forceful Reintegration | 50  (2.82%) | 0.254 | | 0.760 | |
| Peaceful Reintegration | 43  (2.43%) | 0.676 | | 0.8372 | |
| Absorbed by Another TC | 12  (0.68%) | 0.603 | | 2.083 | |
| Promotion to Sovereign state | 14  (0.79%) | 0.469 | | 1.214 | |
| Censored (Surviving as-of 2010) | 27  (1.52%) | 0.967 | | 1.111 | |

# **C Supplementary Regression Results**

Table C1 reports the same results as Table 3 in the main text, but lists the coefficient estimates and standard errors for each control variable as well. In most cases, the control variables are insignificant. The results also further corroborate the conclusion we draw in the main text, that the effect of international factors are not trivial in comparison to (seemingly) domestic political processes.

The results pertaining to host state capability, development, and capacity are often insignificant and/or sensitive to model specification strategy. Unlike the survival analyses in the main text, host state capabilities and sate failure are no longer significant predictors of forceful or peaceful reintegration, at least not after including country and year fixed effects. Host state development has a greater impact in these results but, again, the relationships are not always consistent with those uncovered in the duration analysis. In the duration analysis host state development reduced the hazard of peaceful reintegration, while here there is a positive association. Conversely, in the duration analysis host state development was insignificant for forceful reintegration, while here we find a positive, significant relationship.

As an additional check, we also conducted an analysis using Lee and Zhang’s (2017) measure of state capacity. The measure is conceptually centered around legibility (a state’s knowledge about its citizens) and is derived from the accuracy of official census data. Because the measure is available for a limited subset of countries, we run separate regressions and omit other control variables. The international factors continue to exhibit significant effects on peaceful renegotiations in these models, even with the limited sample, but the capacity indicator is always insignificant. In brief, the international factors at the core of our theory appear to have at least as much, perhaps more, explanatory power when compared against the features of the state typically given pride of place in the state making literature.

Among the remaining controls, the number of other TCs in a host increases the probability of forceful reintegration in these models, corroborating Walter’s (2006) argument that states may act more forcefully against non-state challengers if they fear signaling weakness will cultivate other challenges in the future. TCs controlling territory with lootable resources are also less likely to peacefully reintegrate, perhaps forgoing political integration in the hopes of maintaining an untaxed stream of profits.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table C1:** Correlates of Territorial Contender Death, Forceful Reintegration (1948-2010) | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **Peaceful**  **Reintegration** | | | **Forceful**  **Reintegration** | | | | **Peaceful or Forceful**  **Reintegration** | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| *Sovereign State Rivals* | -0.949\* | -1.638\* | -1.613\* | | -0.396 | -0.189 | -0.564 | -0.651\* | -0.740\* | -1.035\* |
|  | (0.348) | (0.479) | (0.558) | | (0.305) | (0.338) | (0.412) | (0.194) | (0.225) | (0.268) |
| *Human Rights Treaty* | 1.647\* | 1.193\* | 1.744\* | | -0.011 | 0.541 | 0.733 | 0.606\* | 0.881\* | 0.984\* |
| *Embeddedness* | (0.424) | (0.551) | (0.713) | | (0.247) | (0.390) | (0.542) | (0.202) | (0.301) | (0.364) |
| *Sovereign State Capabilities* |  |  | 2.025 | |  |  | 1.576 |  |  | 1.750 |
|  |  |  | (2.096) | |  |  | (1.625) |  |  | (1.124) |
| *Number of Other Territorial* |  |  | 0.369 | |  |  | 0.638\* |  |  | 0.448\* |
| *Contenders* |  |  | (0.251) | |  |  | (0.266) |  |  | (0.166) |
| *Host State Failure* |  |  | -0.873 | |  |  | -0.112 |  |  | -0.369 |
|  |  |  | (0.923) | |  |  | (0.797) |  |  | (0.567) |
| *Host State Development* |  |  | -4.338\* | |  |  | 0.814\* |  |  | 0.360 |
|  |  |  | (1.402) | |  |  | (0.315) |  |  | (0.257) |
| *ln(TC Population)* |  |  | -0.013 | |  |  | -0.142 |  |  | -0.085 |
|  |  |  | (0.186) | |  |  | (0.191) |  |  | (0.123) |
| *Sovereign State Allies* |  |  | 0.592 | |  |  | -0.072 |  |  | 0.001 |
|  |  |  | (0.622) | |  |  | (0.348) |  |  | (0.262) |
| *TC Loot* |  |  | -1.466\* | |  |  | -0.419 |  |  | -0.742\* |
|  |  |  | (0.594) | |  |  | (0.509) |  |  | (0.363) |
| *TC Foreign Support* |  |  | -0.170 | |  |  | 0.586 |  |  | 0.433 |
|  |  |  | (0.792) | |  |  | (0.453) |  |  | (0.366) |
| *TC Recognition* |  |  | -1.800 | |  |  | 0.072 |  |  | -0.000 |
|  |  |  | (1.427) | |  |  | (0.710) |  |  | (0.595) |
| *TC Fragmentation* |  |  | 1.070 | |  |  | -0.882 |  |  | -0.300 |
|  |  |  | (0.722) | |  |  | (0.662) |  |  | (0.441) |
| *Host State Executive Constraint* |  |  | 0.010 | |  |  | 0.167 |  |  | 0.119 |
|  |  |  | (0.190) | |  |  | (0.140) |  |  | (0.105) |
| Host Fixed Effects | P | P | P | | P | P | P | P | P | P |
| Year Fixed Effects |  | P | P | |  | P | P |  | P | P |
| TC-Years | 1375 | 1375 | 1375 | | 1349 | 1349 | 1349 | 1547 | 1547 | 1547 |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table C2:** Regression Analysis of Territorial Contender Death, Forceful Reintegration (1948-2010) | | | | |
|  | **Peaceful**  **Reintegration**  **(1)** | **Forceful**  **Reintegration**  **(2)** | | **Peaceful or Forceful**  **Reintegration**  **(3)** |
| *Sovereign State Rivals* | -2.751\* | | 0.505 | -0.992\* |
|  | (0.864) | | (0.673) | (0.333) |
| *Human Rights Treaty Embeddedness* | 2.781\* | | 0.026 | 1.506\* |
|  | (0.996) | | (1.145) | (0.633) |
| *State Capacity* | 0.002 | | 0.295 | 0.022 |
|  | (0.067) | | (0.228) | (0.062) |
| Host Fixed Effects | P | | P | P |
| Year Fixed Effects | P | | P | P |
| TC-Years | 575 | | 389 | 624 |
| Note: Logit coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses, \* p<0.05. | | | | |

# **D Measuring Human Rights Treat Embeddedness**

Table D1 lists the human rights treaties that are components of Fariss’s (2018) measure of human rights treaty embeddedness.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Table D1:** Component Treaties of Human Rights Treaty Embeddedness Indicator | | |
| *Treaty Name* | *Signed* | *In Force* |
| Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide | 1948 | 1951 |
| International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination | 1965 | 1969 |
| International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights | 1966 | 1976 |
| International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Optional Protocol | 1966 | 1976 |
| International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights | 1966 | 1976 |
| International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid | 1971 | 1973 |
| Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women | 1979 | 1981 |
| Convention Against Torture | 1984 | 1985 |
| Convention Against Torture Article 21 (no reservation) | 1984 | 1985 |
| Convention Against Torture Article 22 (no reservation) | 1984 | 1985 |
| Convention on the Rights of the Child | 1989 | 1990 |
| International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Optional Protocol 2 | 1989 | 1991 |
| Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families | 1990 | 2003 |
| International Criminal Court | 1998 | 2002 |
| Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women Optional Protocol | 1999 | 2000 |
| Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional Protocol 1 | 2000 | 2002 |
| Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional Protocol 2 | 2000 | 2002 |
| Convention Against Torture Optional Protocol | 2002 | 2006 |
| Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities | 2006 | 2007 |
| Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Optional Protocol | 2006 | 2008 |
| International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance | 2006 | 2010 |
| International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Optional Protocol | 2008 | 2013 |
| Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional Protocol 3 | 2011 |  |
| *Note:* Table reproduced from Fariss (2017) | | |

# **E Investigation of Rivalry Data**

This section presents the classifications of each rivalry in our dataset and our notes indicating why we think each rivalry could not have been caused by the presence or activities of an existing territorial contender. The purpose of these classification is to help rule out the possibility that our findings about external rivalry and prolonged territorial contender survival are an instance of reverse causality.

We begin by quoting Thompson and Dreyer at some length about how they classify each rivalry, because only their category of “interventionary rivals” is worrisome to us:

“Each rivalry is then categorized in terms of the type of issues that appear to motivate it. There are four main types: 1) Spatial – states contest the exclusive control of territory; 2) Positional – states contest relative shares of influence over activities and prestige within a regional or global system; 3) Ideological – states contest the relative virtues of different belief systems relating to political, economic, societal, or religious phenomena; 4) Interventionary – states intrude into the internal affairs of other states as a means of reducing external threat or acquiring leverage in the other state’s decision making.” (pp. 9-10 of the pdf version of Chapter One of the eBook).

We present our findings below. We categorize them by host state and include all of the sovereign states that comprise the territorial contenders dataset’s sampling frame (for more detail about this dataset see Lemke and Crabtree 2020), even if the host state has no rivals or territorial contenders. Then we provide the rivalry number (as assigned by Thompson and Dreyer), the years of the rivalry, the type of the rivalry, and our notes as to whether fears of reverse causation are valid.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table E1:** Rivalries in Latin America | | | | | |
| **Host Country** | **Rivalry No.** | **Rival Name** | **Years of Rivalry** | **Rivalry Type** | **Description** |
| **Belize** | 173 | Guatemala | 1981-1993 | Spatial | No TCs in Belize |
| **Guatemala** | 173 | Belize | 1981-1993 | Spatial | No mention of Guatemalan TCs in rivalry description. Really just about the border demarcation. |
| **Honduras** | 47 | El Salvador | 1840-1992 | Ideological, Spatial, Interventionary | No TCs in Honduras during this rivalry in our study |
|  | 53 | Nicaragua | 1844-1961 | Ideological, Spatial, Interventionary | The one TC in Honduras during this time emerged well after this rivalry started. |
|  | 171 | Nicaragua | 1980-1987 | Ideological, Interventionary | No TCs in Honduras during this rivalry |
| **Costa Rica** | 108 | Nicaragua | 1948-1990 | Ideological | No mention of Costa Rican TC in rivalry description |
| **Nicaragua** | 108 | Costa Rica | 1948-1990 | Ideological | No mention of Nicaraguan TCs in rivalry description. |
|  | 53 | Honduras | 1844-1961 | Ideological, Spatial, Interventionary | No mention of Nicaraguan TCs in rivalry description |
|  | 171 | Honduras | 1980-1987 | Ideological, Interventionary | No TCs in Nicaragua during this rivalry |
|  | 154 | Colombia | 1979-1990 | Spatial | No TCs in Nicaragua during this rivalry |
| **Colombia** | 154 | Nicaragua | 1979-1990 | Spatial | No mention of Colombian TCs in this rivalry’s description. |
|  | 43 | Venezuela | 1831-ongoing | Spatial, Ideological | This rivalry long precedes Colombia’s TCs and thus they cannot have caused it. Though there is an interesting quote in Thompson & Dreyer: “Since the turn of the century, the list of grievances has been expanded by accusations involving poor control of smuggling, illegal immigration, the drug trade, and assistance given to rebels.” This is consistent with our expectations. |
| **Venezuela** | 43 | Colombia | 1831-ongoing | Spatial, Ideological | No mention of Venezuelan TCs in this rivalry’s description |
|  | 168 | Guyana | 1979-ongoing | Ideological, Spatial | No TCs in Venezuela during this rivalry |
| **Brazil** | 34 | Argentina | 1817-1985 | Positional, Spatial | No mention of Brazilian TCs in this rivalry’s description |
| **Paraguay** | No rivalries during the time of our study | | | |  |
| **Uruguay** | No rivalries during the time of our study | | | |  |

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| **Table E2:** Rivalries in Africa | | | | | |
| **Host Country** | **Rivalry No.** | **Rival Name** | **Years of Rivalry** | **Rivalry Type** | **Description** |
| **Guinea-Bissau** | 176 | Senegal | 1989-2000 | Spatial | No mention of Guinea-Bissau’s 1998-99 TC, at any rate the rivalry preceded it and the rivalry was not Interventionary |
| **Gambia** | No rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Mali** | 129 | Burkina-Faso | 1960-1986 | Ideological, Spatial | No TCs in Mali during this rivalry |
| **Mauritania** | 134 | Morocco | 1960-1969 | Spatial, Positional | No mention of Mauritania’s TC in the commentary |
|  | 178 | Senegal | 1989-1995 | Spatial, Interventionary | No mention of Mauritania’s TC in the commentary, instead it is all about conflict over the border territory between them. The Saharawi are at the other end of the state. |
| **Niger** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Ivory Coast** | 131 | Ghana | 1960-1970 | Ideological, Positional, Spatial | No TCs in Ivory Coast during this rivalry |
| **Burkina Faso** | 129 | Mali | 1960-1986 | Ideological, Spatial | No TCs in Burkina Faso during this rivalry |
| **Sierra Leone** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Ghana** | 131 | Ivory Coast | 1960-1970 | Ideological, Positional, Spatial | No TCs in Ghana. |
|  | 132 | Nigeria | 1960-1966 | Positional, Interventionary | No TCs in Ghana. |
|  | 133 | Togo | 1960-1995 | Spatial | No TCs in Ghana. |
| **Togo** | 133 | Ghana | 1960-1995 | Spatial | No TCs in Togo during this rivalry |
| **Nigeria** | 132 | Ghana | 1960-1966 | Positional, Interventionary | No TCs in Nigeria during this rivalry |
|  | 163 | Cameroon | 1975-2008 | Spatial | No mention of Nigerian TC in the rivalry’s description |
| **Gabon** | 156 | Eq. Guinea | 1972-ongoing | Spatial | No TCs in Gabon during this rivalry |
| **Chad** | 151 | Libya | 1966-1994 | Spatial, Positional, Interventionary | From Thompson & Dreyer: “Conflict between Chad and Libya began in 1966 when Libya began actively supporting FROLINAT and Chad's northern rebellion.” In this instance one might argue the TC “caused” the rivalry, though Libya’s desires for Chadian territory long predate it. Of course, the subsequent five TCs in Chad all post-date this rivalry and therefore could not cause it. |
|  | 143 | Sudan | 1964-1969 | Interventionary | “Arab Muslims in Sudan were inspired by Egyptian president Gamal Abdal Nasser's message of Pan-Arabism, which promoted the revival and resurgence of Arabs and of Islam. Beginning in 1964, Sudanese leaders provided a safe haven for Chadian rebels intent on toppling Chad's central government. By 1966 Sudan was providing arms and logistical assistance to rebels in Chad. Sudan supported the opposition led by the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT), helping its organizing and training and providing bases in Sudan as a staging ground for raids on Chad. In 1969 Colonel Jaafar Numayri, who was suspicious of the Marxists in his government and opposed to the leftists of FROLINAT, took over in Sudan. Numayri's opposition to FROLINAT ended Sudanese support for Chad’s rebels, which resulted in the improvement of relations, and brought about the termination of this phase of rivalry.” This rivalry “causes” the TC and then contributes to its longevity. Sudanese support ends in 1969 and then FROLINAT splits into Northern Chad and BET, Part 1. Latter supported by Libya survives, former withers and eventually dies (by unifying with BET, part 1) after much harassment by Chad and her French allies. All of this is consistent with our theoretical expectations. (Quotes from Thompson and Dreyer’s summary of this rivalry) |
| **Chad** | 196 | Sudan | 2004-ongoing | Interventionary | “The Chadian leader, Idris Debry, had been forced to take refuge in the late 1980s in Sudan but was able to return a few years later and take control of the country with Sudanese support. When war broke out in Darfur roughly along Arab–non-Arab lines in 2003, Debry initially attempted to restrain eastern Chadian assistance to non-Arab rebels in Darfur. Yet Chad also had to absorb a large number of refugees from Sudan who were fleeing from the fighting in Darfur. Sudan apparently saw the Chadian government's efforts as too weak and unlikely to succeed and decided that the time was right for new decision makers in Chad. They began supporting Chadian rebels in 2004, predicated on the idea that the Darfurian rebellion might be easier to terminate if eastern Chadian bases were eliminated. By 2005 Chad was supporting rebels fighting the Sudanese government. Repeated efforts to agree to stop supporting each other's rebels were made in 2006, 2007, and 2008, but none have worked sufficiently to alter the nature of the conflict.” Again, the rivalry comes before the TC (#483.6) and not only helps it prolong but in some ways created it. The 2007 agreement was able to forcefully reintegrate Daguessa and Tissi. (Quotes from Thompson and Dreyer’s summary of this rivalry) |
| **DRC** | 161 | Angola | 1975-1997 | Ideological, Position, Interventionary | T&D’s commentary is about Zaire’s efforts to destabilize Angola, not vice versa. |
|  | 192 | Rwanda | 1996-2009 | Interventionary | Rivalry precedes the TC (e.g., the AFDL, which Rwanda helped make a TC), so the case is consistent with our expectations. |
|  | 193 | Uganda | 1996-2009 | Interventionary | Rivalry precedes TCs in DRC, rival helps make them, supports them, all consistent. |
| **Uganda** | 193 | DRC | 1996-2009 | Interventionary | Commentary is all about intervening in DRC, not reverse, no mention of Ugandan TCs. |
|  | 195 | Rwanda | 1999-2009 | Interventionary | Summary is all about the rivals disagreeing about how to intervene in DRC, not each other. |
|  | 175 | Kenya | 1987-1994 | Positional, Interventionary | From Thompson and Dreyer’s summary: “In 1987 Uganda accused Kenya of assisting Ugandan rebel forces. Tension remained high through the late 1980s and early 1990s as Ugandan leaders continued to believe that Kenya was secretly assisting rebel forces in eastern Uganda. Similarly, on several occasions the Arap Moi administration in Kenya has accused Uganda of providing Kenyan dissidents with arms. Such accusations continued until the mid-1990s.” The Ugandan rebels in eastern Uganda during this time could be the Karamoja, and if so, they were a TC. However, the rivalry is clearly stated to have started by Museveni changing Uganda’s foreign relations to favor Tanzania over Kenya, so no TC à Rivalry possibility here. |
|  | 142 | Sudan | 1963-1972 | Interventionary | The only TC in Uganda at the time of this rivalry was on the opposite side of the country and had nothing to do with this rivalry. |
| **Uganda** | 187 | Sudan | 1994-ongoing | Interventionary | T&D’s discussion is about possible Sudanese support for the LRA, which never qualifies as a TC. |
|  | 155 | Tanzania | 1971-1979 | Ideological, Spatial | Only 1 TC in Uganda during this time, not related to this relationship. |
| **Kenya** | 141 | Somalia | 1963-1981 | Spatial | This rivalry is about Somalia’s desire to unite all Somali territories, including Kenya’s Northern Frontier district. So the rivalry predates the emergence of a TC in this part of Kenya. |
|  | 177 | Sudan | 1989-1994 | Spatial, Interventionary | No TCs in Kenya during this rivalry. |
|  | 175 | Uganda | 1987-1994 | Positional, Interventionary | No TCs in Kenya during this rivalry. |
| **Tanzania** | 144 | Malawi | 1964-1994 | Spatial, Ideological | No TCs in Tanzania during this rivalry. |
|  | 155 | Uganda | 1971-1979 | Ideological, Spatial | No TCs in Tanzania during this rivalry. |
| **Rwanda** | 192 | DRC | 1996-2009 | Interventionary | Rwanda intervened in DRC, not the other way around. |
|  | 195 | Uganda | 1999-2009 | Interventionary | This is the one where they disagree about how to intervene in DRC. |
|  | 139 | Burundi | 1962-1966 | Interventionary | No TCs in Rwanda during this rivalry. |
| **Somalia** | 130 | Ethiopia | 1960-ongoing | Spatial, Interventionary | (a) This rivalry long precedes any TCs in Somalia, and (b) really weird to say this rivalry continues after 1991 when there really is no longer a Somalia! |
|  | 141 | Kenya | 1963-1981 | Spatial | Long predates any TCs in Somalia. |
| **Ethiopia** | 194 | Eritrea | 1998-ongoing | Spatial | This is about their border, no TCs in Ethiopia during the rivalry. |
|  | 130 | Somalia | 1960-ongoing | Spatial, Interventionary | This rivalry/TC relationship fits our story in that Somalia clearly helped Ethiopian TCs in Ogaden and Bale & Sidamo. But doesn’t fit our story in that Ethiopia forcefully reintegrated these TCs anyway. |
|  | 147 | Sudan | 1965-ongoing | Interventionary | COULD BE A SECOND CASE WHERE TC à Rivalry, b/c Eritrea emerges as TC in 1961 and this rivalry started over Sudanese support for that TC. |
| **South Africa** | 162 | Angola | 1975-1988 | Ideological, Position, Interventionary | This has nothing to do with RSA’s TCs, rather with SAfrican support for Angola’s rebels. |
|  | 166 | Mozambique | 1976-1991 | Ideological, Interventionary | Predates any SAfrican TCs, is about Renamo and ANC, neither a TC. |
|  | 150 | Zambia | 1965-1991 | Interventionary, Ideological | This rivalry predates SAfrican TCs, is about support for ANC, not a TC. |
|  | 172 | Zimbabwe | 1980-1992 | Ideological, Interventionary | Has nothing to do with TCs in South Africa. |
| **Namibia** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Lesotho** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Botswana** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Madagascar** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Libya** | 151 | Chad | 1966-1994 | Spatial, Positional, Interventionary | This is one where Libya supports Chadian TCs, not the other way around. No TCs in Libya during this rivalry. |
|  | 159 | Egypt | 1973-1992 | Ideological, Positional | No TCs in Libya during this rivalry. |
|  | 160 | Sudan | 1973-1985 | Spatial | No TCs in Libya during this rivalry. |

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| **Table E3: Rivalries in the Middle East** | | | | | |
| **Host Country** | **Rivalry No.** | **Rival Name** | **Years of Rivalry** | **Rivalry Type** | **Description** |
| **Armenia** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Georgia** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Iran** | 121 | Egypt | 1955-1971 | Positional, Ideological | Iran has no TCs during this rivalry. |
|  | 167 | Egypt | 1979-ongoing | Positional, Ideological | Iran has no TCs during this rivalry. |
|  | 169 | Israel | 1979-ongoing | Positional | Iran has no TCs during this rivalry. |
|  | 127 | Iraq | 1958-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | Iran has no TCs during this rivalry. |
|  | 170 | Saudi Arabia | 1979-ongoing | Positional, Ideological | Iran has no TCs during this rivalry. |
|  | 188 | Afghanistan | 1996-2001 | Spatial, Ideological, Interventionary | No TCs in Iran during this rivalry. |
| **Turkey** | 65 | Bulgaria | 1878-1950 | Spatial | Turkey has no TCs during this rivalry. |
|  | 122 | Greece | 1955-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | Turkey has no TCs during this rivalry. |
|  | 104 | Syria | 1946-2004 | Spatial | Turkey has no TCs during this rivalry. |
| **Iraq** | 98 | Egypt | 1943-ongoing | Positional | Rivalry predates any TCs in Iraq. |
|  | 110 | Israel | 1948-ongoing | Positional | Rivalry predates any TCs in Iraq. |
|  | 101 | Syria | 1946-ongoing | Positional | Rivalry predates any TCs in Iraq. |
|  | 127 | Iran | 1958-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | Rivalry predates any TCs in Iraq. |
|  | 136 | Kuwait | 1961-ongoing | Spatial | Rivalry predates any TCs in Iraq. |
| **Iraq** | 92 | Saudi Arabia | 1932-1957 | Positional, Spatial | Rivalry predates any TCs in Iraq. |
|  | 153 | Saudi Arabia | 1968-ongoing | Positional | Rivalry predates any TCs in Iraq. |
| **Syria** | 135 | Egypt | 1961-1990 | Positional | No TCs in Syria during this rivalry. |
|  | 101 | Iraq | 1946-ongoing | Positional | No TCs in Syria during this rivalry in our study. |
|  | 112 | Israel | 1948-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | No TCs in Syria during this rivalry in our study. |
|  | 103 | Jordan | 1946-ongoing | Ideological, Positional | No TCs in Syria during this rivalry in our study. |
|  | 137 | Saudi Arabia | 1961-1970 | Ideological, Positional | No TCs in Syria during this rivalry. |
|  | 104 | Turkey | 1946-2004 | Spatial | No TCs in Syria during this rivalry. |
| **Lebanon** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Jordan** | 100 | Egypt | 1946-1970 | Positional | Rivalry predates Jordan’s TC by decades. |
|  | 111 | Israel | 1948-1994 | Spatial, Positional | Rivalry predates Jordan’s TC by decades. |
|  | 102 | Saudi Arabia | 1946-1958 | Positional, Spatial | Rivalry predates Jordan’s TC by decades. |
|  | 103 | Syria | 1946-ongoing | Ideological, Positional | Rivalry predates Jordan’s TC by decades. |
| **Israel** | 109 | Egypt | 1948-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | Rivalry predates Israel’s TCs by decades. |
|  | 169 | Iran | 1979-ongoing | Positional | Rivalry predates Israel’s TCs by two decades. |
|  | 110 | Iraq | 1948-ongoing | Positional | Rivalry predates Israel’s TCs by decades. |
|  | 111 | Jordan | 1948-1994 | Spatial, Positional | Rivalry predates Israel’s TCs by decades. |
|  | 112 | Syria | 1948-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | Rivalry predates Israel’s TCs by decades. |
| **Saudi Arabia** | 125 | Egypt | 1957-1970 | Ideological, Positiona | No TCs in Saudi Arabia during this rivalry. |
|  | 102 | Jordan | 1946-1958 | Positional, Spatial | No TCs in Saudi Arabia during this rivalry. |
|  | 137 | Syria | 1961-1970 | Ideological, Positional | No TCs in Saudi Arabia during this rivalry. |
|  | 170 | Iran | 1979-ongoing | Positional, Ideological | No TCs in Saudi Arabia during this rivalry. |
|  | 92 | Iraq | 1932-1957 | Positional, Spatial | No TCs in Saudi Arabia during this rivalry. |
|  | 153 | Iraq | 1968-ongoing | Positional | No TCs in Saudi Arabia during this rivalry. |
|  | 179 | Yemen | 1990-2000 | Spatial, Positional | No TCs in Saudi Arabia during this rivalry. |

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| **Table E4: Rivalries in Asia** | | | | | |
| **Host Country** | **Rivalry No.** | **Rival Name** | **Years of Rivalry** | **Rivalry Type** | **Description** |
| **Kyrgyzstan** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Kazakhstan** | 184 | Uzbekistan | 1991-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | There are no Kazakh TCs during this rivalry. |
| **India** | 107 | China | 1948-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | No mention of any of India’s TCs in T&D’s commentary. At best this rivalry could be caused by the three TCs that emerged in 1947 (Hyderabad, Nagaland, and Sikkim), but none of them are mentioned in the commentary. |
|  | 106 | Pakistan | 1947-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | No mention of any of India’s TCs in T&D’s commentary, but there is a statement about this rivalry actually beginning before independence. I think it safe to conclude that no TCs “caused” this rivalry. The closest we might come to supporting that statement would be to focus on Jammu and Kashmir, but J&K has never qualified as a TC because Indian military forces have always been present and India has never lost control of the territory. |
| **Bhutan** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Pakistan** | 105 | Afghanistan | 1947-ongoing | Spatial, Interventionary | No mention of any of Pakistan’s TCs. Like in the next case, the only one possibly relevant is Kalat, which is not mentioned. Seems safe to conclude this rivalry was not caused by any TCs. |
|  | 106 | India | 1947-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | No mention of any of Pakistan’s TCs. The only one in existence in 1947 was Khanate of Kalat, and it is not mentioned as, in any way, causing this rivalry. |
| **Bangladesh** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Burma** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Cambodia** | 123 | S. Vietnam | 1956-1975 | Spatial | No mention of any TCs, rivalry seems clearly about pre-colonial borders. |
|  | 165 | Vietnam | 1976-1983 | Spatial, Ideological | This rivalry begins two years before the anti-Khmer forces establish their TC, so the rivalry cannot be “caused” by the TC. |
| **S. Vietnam** | 123 | Cambodia | 1956-1975 | Spatial. | No mention of the Viet Cong. |
|  | 119 | N. Vietnam | 1954-1975 | Ideological, Positional | Nothing in T&D’s commentary suggests the rivalry was a reaction to the TC threatening South Vietnam. |
| **Malaysia** | 140 | Indonesia | 1962-1966 | Positional, Spatial, Ideological | No TCs in Malaysia during this rivalry. |
|  | 148 | Singapore | 1965-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | No TCs in Malaysia during this rivalry. |
| **Singapore** | 148 | Malaysia | 1965-ongoing | Positional, Spatial | No TCs in Singapore during this rivalry. |
| **Brunei** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Philippines** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |
| **Indonesia** | 118 | Netherlands | 1951-1962 | Spatial | The commentary T&D provide is about a territorial disagreement persisting from the colonial era. There was a TC in Indonesia just before this rivalry, but it was in an entirely different part of the country. No reason to think it had any role in the onset of this rivalry. |
|  | 140 | Malaysia | 1962-1966 | Positional, Spatial, Ideological | An Indonesian TC appears to have played a role in the birth of this rivalry (specifically the short-lived West Sumatra of 1958), but T&D’s commentary suggests that the main reason for the rivalry had nothing to do with any TCs: “It did not help that Malaya expressed some support for rebels in Indonesia's outer periphery or that Indonesia perceived Malaya as facilitating smuggling into Indonesia. But Indonesia's actual rivalry with Malaysia was driven in part by a spatial conflict in which Indonesia sought to prevent the creation and survival of the proposed Federation of Malaysia, which would unite Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak with Malaya in 1963 (the union occurred although Singapore withdrew in 1965—see the Malaysia-Singapore rivalry in this chapter). Indonesia's President Sukarno also feared that a united federation could ultimately threaten Indonesia's positional dominance in the region.” Seems to be clear evidence that Indonesian TCs did not “cause” this rivalry. |
| **Papua New Guinea** | No Rivalries |  |  |  |  |

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3. The average age of a territorial contender when it has either died or been censored (i.e., surviving as-of 2010) is about 12 years old. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)