

## Appendix

### Timing for the formal model

The game proceeds in the following order:

1. Each party  $p \in \{I, C\}$  simultaneously announces a policy platform  $\phi_j$ .
2. Observing these platforms as well as "partisan" preferences  $\sigma_{ij}$  and  $\epsilon$ , citizens vote for their preferred party.
3. The electoral result is realized, with the winning party setting policy  $\hat{\phi}$ .
4. If any citizen group's food consumption falls below  $\theta$ , they engage in revolt  $\rho_i = 1$ .
5. Observing the outcome of the election and citizen unrest, the military decides to engage in a coup or not ( $K \in \{0, 1\}$ ), which is successful with probability  $\mu(\rho)$ .

### Citizen indirect utility

Given citizen consumption utility defined in Equation 1, citizen indirect utility can be expressed as

$$v_R(\phi) = \gamma \ln(\gamma(\bar{f} - \theta)) + (1 - \gamma) \ln((1 - \gamma)(\pi + \phi)(\bar{f} - \theta)) \quad (9)$$

for rural citizens, and as

$$v_U(\phi) = \gamma \ln(\gamma(\frac{w}{\pi + \phi} - \theta)) + (1 - \gamma) \ln((1 - \gamma)(w - (\pi + \phi)\theta)) \quad (10)$$

for urban citizens. Given these indirect utility functions,  $\partial v_R / \partial \phi > 0^{47}$  and  $\partial v_U / \partial \phi < 0$ . Therefore, rural voters should always favor the maximum feasible subsidy  $\bar{\phi}$ , whereas urban citizens should always favor the lowest feasible subsidy  $\underline{\phi}$ .

### Probability of electoral victory function

In addition to consideration of the effects of pricing policy on their consumption utility, citizens also possess individual "partisan" preferences for the Incumbent over the Challenger parties ( $\sigma_{ij}$ ), as well as a shared valence preference ( $\epsilon$ ). This means that a voter will prefer the Challenger over the Incumbent whenever  $v_j(\phi_I) + \sigma_{ij} + \epsilon \leq v_j(\phi_C)$ . For citizens of type  $j$ , given each party's policy proposal, there exists an individual who is exactly indifferent between the two; this individual must possess  $\hat{\sigma}_j$  such that

$$\hat{\sigma}_j = v_j(\phi_C) - v_j(\phi_I) - \epsilon \quad (11)$$

This cut-point represents the voter such that all voters in group  $j$  with  $\sigma_{ij} < \hat{\sigma}_j$  will vote for  $C$ , while the remainder will vote for  $I$ . As such, we can characterize total votes won by the Challenger party by

$$V_C = \alpha F_R(\hat{\sigma}_R) + (1 - \alpha) F_U(\hat{\sigma}_U) \quad (12)$$

where  $F_j(\cdot)$  is the distribution of pro-incumbent party biases in each citizen subgroup. Replacing these distributions with their known functional form and substituting in for each critical citizen's payoff gives the following closed form solution to the vote share won by the Challenger party:<sup>48</sup>

$$v_C(\phi_C | \phi_G) = (1 - \alpha) \psi_U \left[ \gamma \ln \left( \frac{\frac{w}{\pi + \phi_C} - \theta}{\frac{w}{\pi + \phi_I} - \theta} \right) + (1 - \gamma) \ln \left( \frac{w - (\pi + \phi_C)\theta}{w - (\pi + \phi_I)\theta} \right) \right] + \alpha \psi_R \left[ (1 - \gamma) \ln \left( \frac{\pi + \phi_C}{\pi + \phi_I} \right) \right] - \epsilon + \frac{1}{2} \quad (13)$$

47. Technically, this is true as long as prices remain greater than zero – given that demand become infinite at zero price, this should never occur in equilibrium.

48. Equivalently, the vote share won by the Incumbent is simply  $V_I(\cdot) = 1 - V_C(\cdot)$ .

Under majority rule, we can now construct the probability of electoral victory for the Challenger as simply the probability that  $V_C(\cdot) > 0.5$ . Given distributional assumptions on  $\epsilon$ , and defining  $\psi = \alpha\psi_R + (1 - \alpha)\psi_U$  as the average density of individual pro-incumbent biases across groups, the probability that  $C$  wins the election is

$$V_C(\phi_C|\phi_I) = \frac{\eta}{\psi} \left[ (1 - \alpha)\psi_U \left( \gamma \ln\left(\frac{\frac{w}{\pi + \phi_C} - \theta}{\frac{w}{\pi + \phi_I} - \theta}\right) + (1 - \gamma) \ln\left(\frac{w - (\pi + \phi_C)\theta}{w - (\pi + \phi_I)\theta}\right) \right) + \alpha\psi_R (1 - \gamma) \ln\left(\frac{\pi + \phi_C}{\pi + \phi_I}\right) \right] + \frac{1}{2} \quad (14)$$

With a fully specified probability of electoral victory function, parties will (taking their opponent's choice as given) select a subsidy policy that maximizes their expected likelihood of winning the election. However, as discussed above, this consideration of electoral victory may also be tempered by the possibility that extreme pricing policy leads to unrest, which may trigger a coup.

### Comparative Statics for Rural Citizens

For rural citizens, under Equilibrium 1 the legitimacy of the democratic system is given by

$$\Lambda_R(\hat{\phi} = \bar{\phi}) = \mathbb{E}[\nu_R(\bar{\phi})] - \mathbb{E}[\nu_R(0)]. \quad (15)$$

Because rural agents' market income is  $\gamma_R = (\pi + \hat{\phi})\bar{f}$ , rural income is  $(\pi + \bar{\phi})\bar{f}$  under democracy, and  $(\pi + 0)\bar{f} = \pi\bar{f}$  under military rule; because  $\bar{\phi} > 0$  and because  $\frac{\partial \mu_R}{\partial \gamma_R} > 0$ , the elected government's rural-biased economic policy enhances the material legitimacy of democracy for rural citizens.

Under Equilibrium 2, the legitimacy of the democratic system for rural citizens is instead given by

$$\Lambda_R(\hat{\phi} = \tilde{\phi}) = \mathbb{E}[\nu_R(\tilde{\phi})] - \mathbb{E}[\nu_R(0)]. \quad (16)$$

Because rural agents' market income is  $\gamma_R = (\pi + \hat{\phi})\bar{f}$ , rural income is  $(\pi + \tilde{\phi})\bar{f}$  under democracy, and  $(\pi + 0)\bar{f} = \pi\bar{f}$  under military rule; because  $\tilde{\phi} > 0$  and because  $\frac{\partial \mu_R}{\partial \gamma_R} > 0$ , the material legitimacy of democracy for rural citizens is still positive, even under less rural-biased economic policy. However, comparing the legitimacy of the two equilibria shows that rural citizens are even more likely to support democracy when electoral politics generates extreme bias in favor of the rural sector, or  $\Lambda_U(\bar{\phi}) > \Lambda_U(\tilde{\phi})$ .

Finally, we clarify the scope conditions under which the model likely applies. First, the model presupposes a military that can take power from an elected government if a sufficient number of citizens revolt. This is not the case in consolidated democracies; we do not argue that our model extends to countries like the United States or the United Kingdom in which the military is purely under civilian control. Second, most citizens of the country modeled are relatively poor, which is necessary for the "hunger threshold" to hold; if most citizens are far above the hunger threshold, even the most rural-biased policy that is feasible given the government's budget constraint does not cause citizens' food consumption to drop below the hunger threshold.

### Military's ideal policy

Given utility for the military as defined in Equation 4, it is trivially true that the military will prefer to select the  $\phi$  which minimizes  $C(\phi)$ . While there may exist more complicated costs or benefits to food subsidy policies when a country must rely on international markets for food trade,<sup>49</sup> here we consider the simpler case in which the government must assume some positive costs either from subsidizing consumers (as may arise from maintaining food distribution networks, etc.) as

49. The logic of the costs arising in this case is developed at length in Ballard-Rosa (2016), for example.

well as from subsidizing producers (as can arise in cases where governments purchase over-priced agricultural produce from domestic farmers that must subsequently be re-sold at a loss). A simple functional form to capture these increasing costs can be given by  $C(\phi) = \phi^2$ ; given this nature of pricing policy, the military will wish to select the least costly subsidy that still ensures that no unrest occurs. So long as  $f_U^*(0) \geq \theta$ , this is accomplished by selecting  $\phi_M^* = 0$ .

**Appendix 1. Additional Empirical Results****Table A-1. Summary Statistics**

	Obs	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Pref. democ.	176473	0.74	0.44	0.00	1.00
Support coup (unempl.)	106416	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Support coup (corrupt.)	142091	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
Support coup (crime.)	146593	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
Urban	192336	0.65	0.48	0.00	1.00
Rural transfer bias	89596	-1.75	8.00	-60.77	4.38
Male	192336	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00
Age	191703	39.08	15.69	16.00	101.00
Educ. (7-11 yrs)	192336	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Educ. (12+ yrs)	192336	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
White	192336	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Democracy	178978	7.64	1.92	0.00	10.00
GDP per capita (current US\$)	192336	59.94	48.30	5.06	222.17
GDP growth (annual %)	190779	4.11	2.75	-5.50	13.09
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	165966	10.15	5.24	1.77	23.88
Population, total	192336	234.59	448.31	2.83	2060.78
Population density (people per sq. km of land area)	192336	104.22	127.66	3.45	659.02
Urban population (% of total)	192336	62.76	17.36	8.55	95.15
Tax revenue (% of GDP)	93081	15.54	4.06	10.44	27.27
Trade (% of GDP)	185295	78.33	30.75	22.51	154.75
Oil rents (% of GDP)	151035	4.00	6.94	0.00	29.15

**Table A-2.** Preferences for Democracy/Coup support, controlling for crime.

VARIABLES	(1) Pref. democ.	(2) Support coup (unemp.)	(3) Support coup (corrupt)	(4) Support coup (crime)
Urban	-0.033 (0.023)	0.006 (0.021)	0.034* (0.020)	0.042 (0.027)
Rural transfer bias	0.086*** (0.016)	-0.054 (0.040)	0.016* (0.009)	0.006 (0.017)
Urban x Transfer bias	-0.050*** (0.012)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.022** (0.011)	0.015* (0.009)
Crime is problem	0.091*** (0.017)	-0.069*** (0.023)	-0.009 (0.027)	0.021 (0.024)
Neighborhood unsafe	-0.067*** (0.010)	0.063*** (0.012)	0.089*** (0.013)	0.092*** (0.011)
Demog. controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	48,834	41,483	43,383	43,611
Countries	13	13	13	13

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

This table reports results of probit regression of preference for democracy or support for a coup on demographic and country-level covariates, as well as controls for individual concerns about crime. Country and year fixed effects are suppressed for presentation.

**Table A-3.** Preferences for Democracy and Rural Bias (additional controls).

VARIABLES	(1) Pref. democ.	(2) Pref. democ.	(3) Pref. democ.	(4) Pref. democ.
Urban	-0.049** (0.022)	-0.053** (0.022)	-0.042* (0.025)	-0.051** (0.023)
Rural transfer bias	0.077*** (0.018)	0.078*** (0.017)	0.078*** (0.018)	0.072*** (0.017)
Urban x Transfer bias	-0.046*** (0.010)	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.047*** (0.009)	-0.045*** (0.007)
Econ. doing badly	-0.106*** (0.030)			-0.103*** (0.031)
Ideology (Left / Right)		0.005 (0.011)		0.002 (0.011)
Trust in Armed Forces			0.017** (0.008)	0.013* (0.007)
Demog. controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	50,223	39,830	44,756	36,240
Countries	13	13	12	12
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

This table reports results of probit regression of preference for democracy on demographic and country-level covariates, as well as additional controls. See text for definitions. Country and year fixed effects are suppressed for presentation.

**Table A-4.** Coup Support and Rural Bias (additional controls).

VARIABLES	(1) Coup (unemp.)	(2) Coup (corrupt.)	(3) Coup (crime)
Urban	0.019 (0.017)	0.045* (0.023)	0.045 (0.030)
Rural transfer bias	-0.304*** (0.016)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.031* (0.017)
Urban x Transfer bias	0.046** (0.019)	0.025* (0.014)	0.016 (0.017)
Econ. doing badly	0.163*** (0.029)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.021)
Ideology (Left / Right)	0.011 (0.012)	0.011 (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)
Trust in Armed Forces	0.045*** (0.014)	0.058*** (0.009)	0.052*** (0.011)
Demog. controls	✓	✓	✓
Country controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	31,168	32,809	32,894
Countries	12	12	12
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses			
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

This table reports results of probit regression of support for coups on demographic and country-level covariates, as well as additional controls. See text for definitions. Country and year fixed effects are suppressed for presentation.

**Table A-5.** Preferences for Democracy/Coup support and Rural Bias (alternate coding).

VARIABLES	(1) Pref. democ.	(2) Coup (unemp.)	(3) Coup (corrupt.)	(4) Coup (crime)
Urban	-0.020 (0.023)	-0.003 (0.023)	0.026 (0.018)	0.035 (0.024)
Transfers to producers from consumers (TPC)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Urban x TPC	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Male	0.021 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.057*** (0.019)
Age	0.009*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.001)
Educ. (7-11 yrs)	0.097*** (0.026)	-0.116*** (0.029)	-0.058 (0.041)	-0.068* (0.036)
Educ. (12+ yrs)	0.221*** (0.037)	-0.330*** (0.046)	-0.262*** (0.065)	-0.310*** (0.062)
White	-0.024 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.029)	0.015 (0.029)	0.009 (0.030)
Democracy	-8.914*** (2.066)	-12.364*** (0.784)	-12.338*** (0.862)	-6.446*** (1.393)
GDP per capita (current US\$)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)
GDP growth (annual %)	0.019 (0.014)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.012** (0.006)
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	-0.008 (0.022)	-0.050 (0.035)	-0.054*** (0.008)	-0.014 (0.016)
Population, total	-0.002 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Population density	0.044*** (0.010)	0.114*** (0.012)	0.084*** (0.003)	0.039*** (0.006)
Urban population (% of total)	-0.008 (0.041)	-0.154*** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.013)	0.012 (0.024)
Tax revenue (% of GDP)	0.210** (0.082)	0.045 (0.056)	0.141*** (0.029)	0.086* (0.046)
Trade (% of GDP)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.007)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	-0.191*** (0.057)	0.089*** (0.028)	-0.048*** (0.010)	-0.006 (0.017)
Crime is problem	0.086*** (0.016)	-0.070*** (0.022)	-0.009 (0.027)	0.022 (0.024)
Neighborhood unsafe	-0.067*** (0.010)	0.063*** (0.012)	0.089*** (0.013)	0.092*** (0.011)
Observations	48,834	41,483	43,383	43,611
Countries	13	13	13	13

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

This table reports results of a probit regression of preference for democracy or support for a coup on a measure of producer-biased transfers from consumers, as well as demographic and country-level covariates. Country and year fixed effects are suppressed for presentation.



**Table A-6.** Preferences for Democracy/Coup support and Rural Bias (multilevel model).

VARIABLES	(1) Pref. democ.	(2) Coup (unemp.)	(3) Coup (corrupt.)	(4) Coup (crime)
Urban	-0.014* (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.024** (0.010)
Rural transfer bias	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.030*** (0.008)	-0.013*** (0.005)
Urban x Transfer bias	-0.016*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)
Demog. controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	50,223	42,874	44,793	45,018
Number of countries	13	13	13	13
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

This table reports results of a multi-level regression of preference for democracy or support for a coup on demographic and country-level covariates, including nested country- and year-level random intercepts (not reported).

**Table A-7.** Bootstrap SEs

VARIABLES	(1) Pref. democ.
Urban	-0.047*** (0.015)
Rural transfer bias	0.080*** (0.016)
Urban x Transfer bias	-0.048*** (0.011)
Demog. controls	✓
Country controls	✓
Observations	50,223
Number of countries	13
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

This table reports results of probit regression of preference for democracy on demographic and country-level covariates, with bootstrapped SEs (50 reps). Country and year fixed effects are suppressed for presentation.

**Table A-8.** Bootstrap SEs

VARIABLES	(1) Coup support (unemp.)	(2) Coup support (corrupt)	(3) Coup support (crime)
Urban	0.024 (0.017)	0.054*** (0.013)	0.064*** (0.014)
Rural transfer bias	-0.105 (0.100)	0.010 (0.022)	0.003 (0.021)
Urban x Transfer bias	0.044*** (0.010)	0.025** (0.012)	0.017* (0.010)
Demog. controls	✓	✓	✓
Country controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	42,874	44,793	45,018
Number of countries	13	13	13
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

This table reports results of probit regression of support for a coup on demographic and country-level covariates, with bootstrapped SEs (50 reps). Country and year fixed effects are suppressed for presentation.

Table A-9. Authoritarianism Control.

VARIABLES	(1) Coup (unemp.)	(2) Coup (corrupt)	(3) Coup (crime)
Urban	0.025 (0.022)	0.058*** (0.021)	0.069** (0.029)
Rural transfer bias	-0.164*** (0.049)	0.009 (0.011)	0.005 (0.018)
Urban x Rural transfer bias	0.036*** (0.013)	0.018 (0.013)	0.012 (0.015)
Male	-0.029 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.025)	-0.069*** (0.021)
Age	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.001)
Educ. (7-11 yrs)	-0.103*** (0.027)	-0.056 (0.041)	-0.059 (0.037)
Educ. (12+ yrs)	-0.317*** (0.053)	-0.278*** (0.068)	-0.310*** (0.068)
White	-0.012 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.029)	0.004 (0.029)
Democracy	-22.394*** (4.584)	-9.571*** (0.900)	-4.734*** (1.485)
GDP per capita (current US\$)	0.022*** (0.006)	-0.003** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
GDP growth (annual %)	0.017* (0.009)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.006)
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	0.050 (0.032)	-0.033*** (0.010)	0.003 (0.013)
Population, total	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Population density (people per sq. km of land area)	0.223*** (0.046)	0.068*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.007)
Urban population (% of total)	-0.211*** (0.032)	-0.045** (0.018)	0.017 (0.024)
Tax revenue (% of GDP)	0.094** (0.045)	0.077*** (0.028)	0.045 (0.045)
Trade (% of GDP)	-0.107*** (0.030)	0.014*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.003)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	0.012 (0.053)	-0.007 (0.022)	0.026 (0.031)
Support for Authoritarianism (reverse coded)	-0.427*** (0.071)	-0.303*** (0.060)	-0.309*** (0.060)
Observations	38,263	40,059	40,215
Number of countries	13	13	13

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

This table reports results of probit regression of support for a coup on demographic and country-level covariates, as well a control for authoritarianism. Authoritarianism variable indicates whether the respondent prefers a strong leader (1) or an electoral democracy (2), from LAPOP Dataset. Country and year fixed effects are suppressed for presentation.

**Table A-10.** Right wing, Turnout, and Votes for Challenger Controls

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Pref. democ.	Pref. democ.	Pref. democ.
Urban	-0.053**	-0.045**	-0.055**
Rural transfer bias	0.022	0.023	0.023
Urban × Rural transfer bias	0.078***	0.066***	0.059
	0.017	0.018	0.048
Ideology (Left / Right)	-0.048***	-0.048***	-0.033***
	0.008	0.011	0.009
Turn Out	0.005		
	0.011		
Votes for Challenger		0.091***	
		0.022	
			0.023
			0.028
Male	0.030	0.027	0.034*
	0.020	0.018	0.017
Age	0.009***	0.008***	0.010***
	0.001	0.001	0.002
Education	0.092***	0.085***	0.093***
	0.025	0.025	0.031
Grad	0.224***	0.211***	0.273***
	0.037	0.036	0.044
White	-0.031	-0.015	-0.003
	0.035	0.035	0.038
Polity	-6.655***	-5.976**	-2.572
	1.761	2.650	4.228
GDP per capita	0.012***	0.009	0.007
	0.004	0.006	0.006
GDP growth	-0.002	0.006	0.013
	0.008	0.013	0.015
Agriculture	0.029	0.017	0.056
	0.019	0.026	0.042
Population	0.000	-0.002	-0.002
	0.001	0.001	0.002
Population density	0.029***	0.024	0.001
	0.011	0.016	0.029
Urban population	0.013	0.022	-0.082
	0.026	0.038	0.080
Tax revenue	0.208***	0.171*	0.185*
	0.058	0.088	0.100
Trade	-0.004	0.001	-0.011
	0.005	0.005	0.012
Oil rents	-0.068*	-0.127*	0.009
	0.038	0.069	0.065
N	39830	50223	31526

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

This table reports results of probit regression of preference for democracy on demographic and country-level covariates, as well as controls for Right Wing (1-10 where 1 is right wing), Turnout (0/1 where 1 is did vote), and Votes for Challenger (0/1 where 1 is a vote for the challenger) from the LAPOP dataset Country and year fixed effects are suppressed for presentation.



**Table A-11.** Alternative Measure of Democracy

VARIABLES	(1) Pref. democ.	(2) Coup (unemp.)	(3) Coup (corrupt.)	(4) Coup (crime)
Urban	-0.047**	0.024	0.055***	0.065***
	0.023	0.018	0.019	0.025
Rural transfer bias	0.087***	-0.022	-0.028**	-0.052***
	0.025	0.042	0.013	0.010
Urban × Rural transfer bias	-0.048***	0.044***	0.025**	0.017*
	0.011	0.013	0.010	0.010
Male	0.027	-0.019	-0.016	-0.066***
	0.018	0.021	0.022	0.019
Age	0.009***	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.009***
	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001
Education	0.088***	-0.106***	-0.049	-0.059
	0.026	0.027	0.041	0.036
Grad	0.218***	-0.324***	-0.258***	-0.306***
	0.036	0.047	0.066	0.063
White	-0.014	-0.003	0.007	0.005
	0.035	0.027	0.028	0.029
Electoral component index	-0.872	3.981*	-4.845***	-7.220***
	1.299	2.361	0.752	0.522
GDP per capita	0.010**	0.008	0.000	0.001
	0.005	0.006	0.001	0.001
GDP growth	0.007	-0.008	0.004	0.013***
	0.013	0.010	0.003	0.002
Agriculture	0.022	-0.021	-0.043***	-0.010***
	0.024	0.022	0.004	0.002
Population	-0.001	0.003	0.001***	0.001*
	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.000
Population density	0.033**	0.121***	0.072***	0.033***
	0.014	0.027	0.003	0.002
Urban population	0.007	-0.116***	-0.088***	-0.047***
	0.043	0.039	0.007	0.006
Tax revenue	0.184**	0.003	0.102***	0.077***
	0.082	0.055	0.018	0.011
Trade	0.002	-0.032	-0.004	-0.014***
	0.006	0.023	0.003	0.002
Oil rents	-0.107	0.041	0.057***	0.117***
	0.076	0.042	0.014	0.012
N	50223	42874	44793	45018

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

This table reports results of a multi-level regression of preference for democracy on placebo treatments as well as demographic and country-level covariates, and an alternative measure of democracy. (V-Dem's Electoral Component Index (scored 0-1, low to high), which includes Freedom of Association (0-1), Clean Elections (0-1), Share of Population with Suffrage (%), and the Elected Executive Index (0-1)). Country and year fixed effects are suppressed for presentation.

**Table A-12.** Preferences for Democracy (placebo tests).

VARIABLES	(1) Pref. democ.	(2) Pref. democ.	(3) Pref. democ.
Urban	-0.052 (0.038)	0.218 (0.244)	-0.087 (0.059)
Military expenditure (% of GDP)	-0.172 (0.205)		
Urban x Mil. spending	-0.009 (0.037)		
Expenditure on education (% govt spend.)		0.050*** (0.008)	
Urban x Educ. spending		-0.014 (0.013)	
Unemployment			-0.006 (0.023)
Urban x Unemployment			0.003 (0.005)
Demog. controls	✓	✓	✓
Country controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	76,877	39,490	81,133
Countries	13	10	14

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses


\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

This table reports results of a multi-level regression of preference for democracy on placebo treatments as well as demographic and country-level covariates. See text for definitions. Country and year fixed effects are suppressed for presentation.

**Table A-13.** Urban population shares


COUNTRY	Urban pop.
Bolivia	65.5%
Brazil	83.7%
Chile	88.2%
Colombia	74.5%
Costa Rica	69.4%
Dominican Republic	71.3%
El Salvador	63.3%
Guatemala	48.45
Honduras	50.4%
Jamaica	53.4%
Paraguay	58.0%
Peru	76.2%
Uruguay	93.4%

**Additional Figures**




**Figure A-1.** Marginal effect of urban dwelling on coup (corrupt.) support. This figure reports the marginal effect of living in an urban area on support for a coup (when corruption is high), conditional on whether a country is characterized by rural bias. Dark grey diamonds correspond to marginal effects estimated at the median value of each tercile of the distribution. Light grey bars indicate the empirical distribution of the transfer bias measure.





**Figure A-2.** Marginal effect of urban dwelling on coup (crime) support. This figure reports the marginal effect of living in an urban area on support for a coup (when crime is high), conditional on whether a country is characterized by rural bias. Dark grey diamonds correspond to marginal effects estimated at the median value of each tercile of the distribution. Light grey bars indicate the empirical distribution of the transfer bias measure.



**Figure A-3.** *Rural bias, alternate measure.* Empirical distribution of transfers to agricultural producers from consumers (in 100s USD), from 16 Latin American countries.