## Online Appendix for 'Public Demand for Extraterritorial environmental and social Public goods provision'

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#### A.1 Case

This section gives background on our case, the Responsible Business Initiative (RBI) in Switzerland, a citizens' initiative for a partial revision of the Swiss Constitution, by which civil society organizations and citizens in Switzerland sought to implement a strict and binding implementation of the "UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights", and thus improve the environmental and human rights performance of Swiss companies in foreign countries.

#### A.1.1 Direct democratic system of Switzerland

The direct democratic political system in Switzerland gives citizens the right for a citizens' initiative for a partial revision of the Swiss Constitution (also called 'petition for a popular referendum', German: "Eidgenössischen Volksinitiative auf Teilrevision der Bundesverfassung"). This is a far-reaching mean for citizens to directly amend the constitution from outside parliament without judicial review. As discussed by Serdült (2014: 72f.), with such an initiative, "[p]arliament in such a case has no control over the proposed text, which can take the form of a general proposal or of a specific draft. In cases where parliament agrees with a general proposition, it is supposed to draft the respective constitutional provisions and submit it to a vote. In cases where it does not agree, the proposition is put to the people for a vote [...]. Should the people accept, a corresponding bill has to be drafted by the National Assembly, which is then again put forward to the people for a binding vote (requiring a double majority)." The only two requirements to start such an initiative are a collection of 100,000 signatures of Swiss citizens within 18 months and its formal correctness (compliance with ius cogens and comprising only one well-defined subject). Hence, citizens can propose far-reaching institutional changes as well as submit extreme policies, though these are rarely accepted at the ballot box in political practice. Note that parliament can react to initiatives in three ways: First, do nothing and let the people decide whether to accept the initiative or not. In the first case, the initiative is accepted; in the second case, the status quo is upheld. Second, by coupling the initiative with a direct counter-proposal. As noted by Serdült (2014: 73), "counter-proposals are usually less extreme than citizens' initiatives; however, they tend to incorporate some of the demands by the initiators and thus have, in general, a higher chance of passing." If a direct counter-proposal is put on the ballot by the legislative, citizens vote yes/no for both initiative and counter-proposal and answer a tie-break question (which proposal should be accepted in case of a dual yes vote). Hence, potential outcomes are the status quo (if both are rejected) or the initiative or the counter-proposal (if either sees majority support). Third, as was the case with the Responsible Business Initiative, the legislative can agree on a so-called indirect counter-proposal. This is a law which both parliamentary chambers agree upon. While this law is not put before the people, it takes up the core demands of an initiative in a less extreme form, intending to provide incentives to the initiators of the initiative to pull back their requests before the vote happens and/or to crowd-out support for popular initiatives by putting forth policy proposals that represent weaker deviations from the status quo. Potential outcomes of such a vote with an indirect counter-proposal are either the initiative (if accepted) or, in case the initiative is rejected at the ballot, the indirect counter-proposal comes into force (if not challenged within three months by another initiative, which rarely happens in political practice) – hence, such indirect counter proposals directly change the status quo against which the initiative is evaluated by citizens.

Note that a successful initiative requires a double majority: majority support of Swiss citizens; and a majority of cantons in which a majority of citizens support the initiative.

#### A.1.2 The Responsible Business Initiative and its timeline

As outlined above, the direct democratic institutional framework in which the RBI) is proposed is the so-called 'petition for a popular referendum' (German: Volksinitiative). By collecting 100,000 signatures within 18 months, Swiss citizens (and organizations) are permitted to initiate popular referenda on constitutional amendments. Hence, these referenda have the potential to create far-reaching competencies for government intervention – in the case of the RBI, in companies' business conduct. This particular petition was submitted by an alliance of humanitarian and environmental civil society organisations in 2016. Their demands are outlined in Appendix Section A.1.3. Several features made the RBI noteworthy among the many initiatives submitted to amend the Swiss constitution: First, it was quick in collecting 100,000+ signatures and even over-collected substantively (with 120,000+ signatures submitted). This already signaled strong popular support to parliament. Hence, after its submission, the RBI became the subject of intense parliamentary debate and has been stuck in this debate for a long time. The reason is that the two chambers of the Swiss Parliament had a back-and-forth debate on whether to make a direct, indirect, or no counter-proposal and then what concrete type of 'indirect counter-

proposal' (see above) to make. While both chambers of the Swiss Parliament opted to write a counter-proposal in November of 2017, the content of the counter-proposal was contested until 2020 – with left and green parties supporting more stringent regulation, liberal and right-wing parties opposing it. The policy-making process, thus, has turned into a strategic game between the petitioners and the different chambers and committees inside the Swiss Parliament (see, e.g. Hofer et al. 2017). In June of 2020, the two chambers finally agreed on an indirect counter-proposal that called on reporting requirements for Swiss firms and even stricter due diligence where conflict minerals or child labor is involved but dropped the liability requirement demanded by the RBI and called upon alignment of Swiss implementation of the law with the behavior of other European countries. Hence, it chanced the status quo (round tables) to reporting while taking the behavior of other states into account (cf. the levels of our conjoint experiment). As the RBI failed to gain the double majority in late 2020, the indirect counter-proposal became law in 2022 (as not challenged by another referendum).

A detailed timeline of these events is below:

- April 21, 2015: Responsible Business Initiative registered and starting to collect signatures
- October 10, 2016: Responsible Business Initiative submitted to federal chancellery with 120'418 signatures
- November 2017: Ständerat (upper chamber) committee opts to write an indirect counter-proposal.
- December 2017: Nationalrat (lower chamber) committee decides against indirect counter-proposal.
- February 2018: National rat (lower chamber) committee reconsidering its decision, opts for an indirect counter-proposal.
- June 2018: National rat (lower chamber) accepts indirect counter-proposal.
- October 2018: Ständerat (upper chamber) committee decides to use sub-committee.
- March 2019: Sub-committee result
- March 2019: Ständerat (upper chamber) rejects indirect counter-proposal.

- June 2019: Nationalrat (lower chamber) decides to maintain its indirect counterproposal.
- December 2019: Ständerat (upper chamber) rejects indirect counter-proposal, drafts own indirect counter-proposal, which approximates initiative demands to a lesser extent.
- March 2020: Nationalrat (lower chamber) decides to maintain its own more stringent indirect counter-proposal again.
- June 2020: Both chambers agree on an indirect counter-proposal, which does not substantively approximate the initiative's demands and resembles the Ständerat (upper chamber) proposal. The initiative committee decides not to withdraw the initiative.
- November 29, 2020: Date of the referendum. A majority of Swiss citizens approve the referendum (50.73%) (first criteria of a successful referendum passed), but within Swiss cantons and half-cantons, the referendum sees majority support in less than half (only 8 1/2 against 12 5/2) of the cantons and half-cantons (second criteria of a successful referendum failed). In particular, the referendum failed to garner majorities in rural 'swing' cantons, the populations of which tend to be politically more conservative.<sup>2</sup>
- As not challenged within three months by another referendum, the indirect counterproposal of the Swiss government on regulating Swiss corporations *abroad* became law. This requires Swiss MNEs with business abroad to report on matters of environment and human rights in their business. This requires Swiss MNEs with business abroad to conduct due diligence and report on their measures in the realm of conflict minerals and child labor. Swiss MNEs will not be liable before Swiss courts.<sup>3</sup>

See https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20201129/can636.html for the referendum results in all the cantons.

For the contents of the law, see https://www.parlament.ch/centers/eparl/curia/2016/20160077/Schlussabstimmungstext2NSD.pdf.

#### A.1.3 Responsible Business Initiative text

The following subsection lists the proposed initiative text, i.e., what citizens voted on to ensure (as suggested by initiators) compliance of Switzerland with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

The Federal Constitution will be amended as follows:

Art 101a: Responsibility of business

- 1 The Confederation shall take measures to strengthen respect for human rights and the environment through business.
- 2 The law shall regulate the obligations of companies that have their registered office, central administration, or principal place of business in Switzerland according to the following principles:
- a. Companies must respect internationally recognized human rights and international environmental standards, also abroad; they must ensure that human rights and environmental standards are also respected by companies under their control. Whether a company controls another is to be determined according to the factual circumstances. Control may also result through the exercise of power in a business relationship.
- b. Companies are required to carry out appropriate due diligence. This means, in particular, that they must: identify real and potential impacts on internationally recognized human rights and the environment; take appropriate measures to prevent the violation of internationally recognized human rights and international environmental standards, cease existing violations, and account for the actions taken. These duties apply to controlled companies as well as to all business relationships. The scope of the due diligence to be carried out depends on the risks to the environment and human rights. In the process of regulating mandatory due diligence, the legislator is to take into account the needs of small and medium-sized companies that have limited risks of this kind.
- c. Companies are also liable for damage caused by companies under their control where they have, in the course of business, committed violations of internationally recognized human rights or international environmental standards. They are not liable under this provision, however, if they can prove that they took all due care per paragraph b to avoid

the loss or damage, or that the damage would have occurred even if all due care had been taken.

d. The provisions based on the principles of paragraphs a-c apply irrespective of the law applicable under private international law.

#### A.1.4 Campaign arguments

Appendix Figure A.1 shows a screenshot of page 14 of the official voting leaflet (not available in English) sent out by the federal administration to all voting-age Swiss citizens before the referendum on November 29, 2020. Such a leaflet is sent out along with the mail-in ballot to all voting-age Swiss before every national voting day. The leaflet includes the text of the proposed constitutional amendment, a summary of the proposal, and arguments by both supporter and opponent groups. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the page where proponents' arguments are summarized. The first two paragraphs provide a summary of the proposal from the proponents' perspective. Paragraphs three and four argue in favor of introducing corporate liability and against the counter-proposal put forth by the federal council. Translated to English, the first two paragraphs read:

"The Responsible Business Initiative demands that large corporations based in Switzerland comply with human rights and international environmental standards. Those who do business worldwide must also take responsibility. Corporations that use child labor or poison rivers should be held accountable. Glencore poisons rivers and evicts indigenous women farmers. Syngenta sells toxic pesticides that have long been banned in Switzerland. And Swiss gold refineries process raw gold from child labor. In poor countries, in particular, there is often no functioning rule of law, and people have hardly any means of defending themselves."

#### **Argumente**

#### Initiativkomitee

Die Konzernverantwortungsinitiative fordert, dass sich Grosskonzerne mit Sitz in der Schweiz an Menschenrechte und internationale Umweltstandards halten. Wer weltweit Geschäfte tätigt, muss auch Verantwortung übernehmen. Konzerne, die auf Kinderarbeit setzen oder Flüsse vergiften, sollen dafür geradestehen.

#### Worum geht es?

Glencore vergiftet Flüsse und vertreibt indigene Bäuerinnen. Syngenta verkauft toxische Pestizide, die bei uns schon lange verboten sind. Und Schweizer Goldraffinerien verarbeiten Rohgold aus Kinderarbeit. Gerade in armen Ländern gibt es oft keinen funktionierenden Rechtsstaat und die Menschen haben kaum Möglichkeiten, sich zu wehren.

## Für Schäden geradestehen

Konzerne sollen für Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Umweltzerstörung geradestehen. Betroffene erhalten deshalb neu die Möglichkeit, in der Schweiz auf Schadenersatz zu klagen. Dabei müssen sie beweisen, dass der Konzern für den Missstand verantwortlich ist. Wenn die Schweizer Konzernzentrale angemessene Schritte ergriffen hat, um den Schaden zu verhindern, wird die Klage abgewiesen. Die Initiative wird nicht dazu führen, dass sich Konzerne aus heiklen Ländern zurückziehen. Auch Rohstoffkonzerne können so geschäften, dass sie keine Menschenrechte verletzen oder die Umwelt zerstören. Wer anständig wirtschaftet, hat nichts zu befürchten.

#### Wirkungsloser Gegenvorschlag

Auch der Bundesrat anerkennt den Handlungsbedarf. Der Gegenvorschlag ist jedoch eine reine Alibi-Übung. Konzerne sollen bloss Hochglanzbroschüren veröffentlichen. Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Umweltschäden bleiben ohne Konsequenzen.

**Figure A.1:** Screenshot of page 14 of the official voting leaflet (not available in English) sent out by the federal administration to all voting-age citizens before the referendum on November 29 2020.

Appendix Figure A.2 shows an excerpt of the website of the Swiss advocacy coalition for supply chain regulation. During the campaign for the Responsible Business Initiative, the advocacy coalition would publish several of these "examples" of Swiss corporations' alleged violations of environmental standards and human rights on the internet. These articles are only available in Switzerland's main languages, German and French. In English, the titles of these articles read as follows (from left to right):

"Syngenta sells highly toxic pesticide paraquat."

"Minors toil in Glencore mine."

"Arsenic poisoning caused by copper production on behalf of the Swiss metals company IXM."




Figure A.2: Screenshot (01.12.2020) of examples of Swiss corporations' alleged violations of environmental standards and human rights on the website of the Swiss advocacy coalition for supply chain regulation. Most of the website is only available in Switzerland's main languages, German and French (see https://konzernverantwortung.ch/beispiele/). Some of the coalition's website contents are available in English (see www.corporatejustice.ch).

#### A.1.5 National policies

As of early 2022, similar to Switzerland, Norway, France, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany have enacted binding regulations. Specifically, the policies in question are the French Loi de vigilance, the German Lieferkettengesetz, the UK's Modern Slavery Act, the Swiss counter-proposal to the Responsible Business Initiative (see above), the Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Law and the Norwegian Transparency act. Finland is expected to follow suit in the next years. Further bills are currently being processed in the Netherlands (on the expansion of its current modern slavery regulation), in Canada, in Belgium and Austria. In Australia, some large companies have to report on working conditions in their production networks. Similarly, in Japan, companies have to adhere and report based on a corporate governance code (no sanctions regime). Also, the EU is expected to adopt comprehensive regulation of corporate value chains with regard to the environment and human rights in 2022 (so far, only Conflict Minerals Regulation is in force). Current debates center around the extent of civil and criminal liability provisions, just as in the Swiss case. In sum, even though responsible corporate business conduct in production has become a policy-making priority, the current regulatory approaches differ vastly. The Danish Institute for Human Rights (see https://globalnaps.org/) and the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (see https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/) provide details on the scope and stringency of the national policies. For an overview, see also https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/0ed8097a/aroundthe-globe-business-human-rights-update and https://corporatejustice.org/ publications/comparative-table-corporate-due-diligence-laws-and-legislative-proposalsin-europe-2/.

#### A.2 Research Design

#### A.2.1 Exemplary choice task

The following text was used to introduce respondents to the conjoint task (our translation from German). The attribute levels as displayed to respondents during the conjoint tasks themselves are shown in **bold** letters.

"As just mentioned, the first question that arises is whether Switzerland should oblige its companies to greater protection of people and the environment at their locations abroad in any case, or only if other countries do the same.

There are three options here:

Option 1: In any case, no matter what other industrial countries do.

#### Option 2: Only if Western industrial nations do the same,

i.e., if countries in Europe and North America, e.g., Germany and the USA, also oblige their companies.

#### Option 3: Only if industrial nations worldwide do the same,

i.e., if countries in Asia, America, and Europe, e.g., China, Brazil, the USA, or Germany, also oblige their companies.

#### [screen-break]

As said earlier, there is also a second important question. What exactly should Swiss companies operating abroad be required to do under a new law? Here, too, there are three possibilities:

#### Option 1: Participation in regular discussions on the subject

how people and the environment can be better protected abroad, organised by business associations and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs.

#### Option 2: Public, detailed report

by companies about their locations abroad, which describes the risks to people and the environment abroad and the measures taken by the company to counter them.

# Option 3: Public, detailed report as above and more stringent liability in Switzerland,

so that companies can be brought to court in Switzerland for damage to people

and the environment that they may cause abroad. Up to now, this could only be done abroad."

Appendix Figure A.3 displays a screenshot of a conjoint table and the corresponding questions in the original language (German).

						De	eutsch 🗸
	Vorschlag A	Vo	orschlag B				
Die Schweiz verpflichtet ihre Firmen:	Nur, wenn westliche Wirtschaftsnationen das Gleiche tun	Wirts	venn weltw chaftsnation Gleiche tu	nen			
Inhalt des Gesetzes:	Beteiligung an regelmässigen Gesprächen zum Thema	reg	Beteiligung an regelmässigen Gesprächen zum Thema				
Auf einer Skala gegen:	a von 1 (total dagege	en) bis 7	7 (total da	für), wie	stark sind	Sie für od	der
	Total dageg	en				Т	otal dafür
	Total dageg	en 2	3	4	5	T 6	otal dafür 7
Vorschlag A			3	4		6	
Vorschlag A Vorschlag B	1	2				6	7
Vorschlag B  Wenn Sie heut	1	2 O O	O O g zwische	O O en beiden	0	6	7 O O

**Figure A.3:** Screenshot of an exemplary conjoint table as displayed to survey participants in German.

#### A.2.2 Treatment vignette texts in original wording and response items

#### i. Norms treatment vignette

"The impetus for the debate on a new Swiss law comes from the UN, the 'United Nations', to which practically all states in the world belong. The UN has established the following basic standard for the behavior of companies:

- All countries in the world have a duty to ensure that their companies act responsibly everywhere, including abroad.
- In concrete terms, this means that companies must respect environmental standards and human rights worldwide.
- It also follows that all people worldwide have a right to compensation for damage caused to them by a company.

Whether and how this UN basic standard is implemented, for example, in the form of a new law, is left to the individual countries."

#### ii. Policy vignettes

Introductory statement (always included): "Let us assume that a federal referendum had taken place and that a new law with the following content had been adopted and would now be implemented:"

Low reciprocity, low stringency: "In any case, Switzerland obliges its companies to provide greater protection for people and the environment abroad. Companies must take part in regular discussions on how people and the environment can be better protected abroad. These talks are organized by business associations and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs."

Low reciprocity, middle stringency: "In any case, Switzerland obliges its companies to provide greater protection for people and the environment abroad. Every year, companies must prepare a publicly accessible, detailed report on their locations abroad."

Low reciprocity, high stringency: "In any case, Switzerland obliges its companies to provide greater protection for people and the environment abroad. Companies must prepare a publicly accessible, detailed report on their locations abroad. In addition, Swiss

companies can be brought to court not only abroad but also in Switzerland for damage to people and the environment caused abroad."

Middle reciprocity, low stringency: "Switzerland only obliges its companies to provide greater protection for people and the environment abroad if other Western economic nations in Europe and North America (e.g. Germany and the USA) also oblige their companies to do so. Companies must take part in regular discussions on how to better protect people and the environment abroad. These discussions are organized by business associations and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs."

Middle reciprocity, middle stringency: "Switzerland only obliges its companies to provide greater protection for people and the environment abroad if other Western economic nations in Europe and North America (e.g., Germany and the USA) also oblige their companies to do so. Every year, companies must prepare a publicly accessible, detailed report on their locations abroad."

Middle reciprocity, high stringency: "Switzerland only obliges its companies to provide greater protection for people and the environment abroad if other Western economic nations in Europe and North America (e.g. Germany and the USA) also oblige their companies to do so. Companies must prepare a publicly accessible, detailed report on their locations abroad. In addition, Swiss companies can be brought to court not only abroad but also in Switzerland for damage to people and the environment caused abroad."

High reciprocity, low stringency: "Switzerland only obliges its companies to provide greater protection for people and the environment abroad if other economic nations in Asia, America, and Europe (e.g., China, Brazil, the USA, or Germany) also oblige their companies to do so. Companies must take part in regular discussions on how to better protect people and the environment abroad. These talks are organized by business associations and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs."

High reciprocity, middle stringency: "Switzerland only obliges its companies to provide greater protection for people and the environment abroad if other economic nations in Asia, America, and Europe (e.g., China, Brazil, the USA, or Germany) also oblige their companies to do so. Every year, companies must prepare a publicly accessible, detailed report on their locations abroad."

High reciprocity, high stringency: "Switzerland only obliges its companies to provide greater protection for people and the environment abroad if other economic nations in Asia, America, and Europe (e.g., China, Brazil, the USA, or Germany) also oblige their companies to do so. Companies must prepare a publicly accessible, detailed report on their locations abroad. In addition, Swiss companies can be brought to court not only abroad but also in Switzerland for damage to people and the environment caused abroad."

Respondents were then asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with regard to a battery of statements on potential policy consequences (on a 5-point Likert scale).

"If a new law had been enacted and implemented in this specific form, do you personally agree or disagree with the following statements? This law...

- strengthens Switzerland's reputation in the world.
- requires what you should expect from any decent company.
- experts would say is a good solution.
- causes high costs for Swiss companies.
- puts Swiss companies at a disadvantage compared to companies from other countries.
- greatly reduces damage to people and the environment caused by Swiss companies.
- is window-dressing and will have no advantages for people and the environment."

#### A.2.3 Social concern items

The following items are based in wording on the environmental concern scale applied in Diekmann and Preisendörfer (2003) but adapted to concern for living and social conditions in developing countries. The adaptation, however, meant dropping items from the original index, which in a very close adaptation would have lost their meaning. Hence, in our social concern index, we asked respondents to indicate agreement or disagreement on a 5-point Likert scale regarding the following statements:

I am afraid when I think about the bad social and living conditions under which many people have to live in developing countries.

Watching TV or reading in the newspaper about problems in developing countries, I am often embarrassed and angry.

In my opinion, problems in developing countries are greatly exaggerated by human rights activists.

It is still true that politicians do much too little for better social and living conditions in developing countries.

In favor of people in developing countries, we all should be willing to reduce our current standard of living.

#### A.3 Additional Results




Figure A.4: Left panel: Perceived consequences of regulatory frameworks which vary by the two policy attributes stringency (upper panels of subplots, baseline attribute level: "round table") and reciprocity (lower panel of subplots, baseline attribute level: "economies worldwide") by subgroups of respondents that received the norms treatment or not (yes: triangles; no: circles). Respondents are presented with one experimental vignette each. Coefficients depict the effects of attribute level change on respondents' evaluation of the statement in the subplot header within subgroup (split-sample regressions; outcome: 5-point rating scale whether such a policy would (not) have the consequence of the subplot heading). The solid line indicates 3.5 (agreement to statement). Right panel: Difference in marginal means of norm-experiment subgroups. The solid line indicates 0. All regressions control for fixed respondent characteristics (gender, age, language, regional provenance) to improve the efficiency of the estimates. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors are shown.

Table A.1: Effect of norm treatment on mechanisms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	strengthens Swiss reputation	is good behavior	is expert solution	is costly	disadvantages Switzerland	reduces damage	is window-dressing
Norms treatment=1	0.03	0.08*	0.05	-0.02	-0.07 <sup>+</sup>	0.04	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Constant	4.17***	3.63***	2.46**	3.32***	3.04***	2.98***	3.46***
	(0.59)	(0.55)	(0.75)	(0.56)	(0.62)	(0.61)	(0.66)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	2736.00	2684.00	2476.00	2657.00	2714.00	2717.00	2691.00
Adj. R2	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.06	0.02	0.02
Control group mean	3.76	4.00	3.38	3.44	3.13	3.47	2.78
Control group stand. dev.	1.05	1.01	0.97	1.04	1.15	1.10	1.18

Effect of norm treatment on average perceived consequences (model header indicates outcome variable) of regulatory frameworks, irrespective of stringency/reciprocity in the policy proposal. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Norms control group mean and standard deviation are displayed in the bottom rows. Regressions control for fixed respondent characteristics (gender, age, language, regional provenance) to improve the efficiency of the estimates.

<sup>\*</sup> (+,\*\*,\*\*\*) indicates p < 0.05 (0.1, 0.01, 0.001)




Figure A.5: Average marginal component effects (AMCEs) (left panel) and marginal means (right panel) of the conjoint choice experiment for the two attributes stringency (upper subplot-panel, baseline attribute level: "round table") and reciprocity (lower subplot-panel, baseline attribute level: "economies worldwide") by subgroups of environmental and social concern and by respondents receiving the norms treatment (lower panel) or not (upper panel). Coefficients based on split-sample regressions for quintiles of the first component of ten indicators of environmental (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2003) and six of social concern (see Appendix Section A.2.3)), and by norms treatment. Solid line indicates 0 (left panel) and 0.5 (right panel). 95% confidence intervals from respondent-level clustered standard errors are shown. Individuals make repeated choices in a hypothetical referendum between two policy proposals.




Figure A.6: Marginal means of the conjoint experiment rating task for the two attributes stringency (upper panel, baseline attribute level: "round table") and reciprocity (lower panel, baseline attribute level: "economies worldwide") by respondents receiving the norms treatment (squares) or not (triangles). Coefficients based on split-sample regressions for respondents receiving the norms treatment (N: 8,980; clusters: 1,502) or not (N: 9,004; clusters: 1,506). Solid line indicates 4 (agreement). 95% confidence intervals from respondent-level clustered standard errors shown. Individuals make repeated choices in a hypothetical referendum between two policy proposals.

#### A.4 External Validity

In this section, we assess, first, the extent to which our quota-representative sample is representative of the Swiss population beyond the interlocked quotas on age and gender as well as quotas on education and regional provenance we used. As indicated by Appendix Figure A.7, this is the case for unquoted environmental concern, making us confident that the results obtained in our study capture the attitudes of Swiss citizens more generally.




Figure A.7: The blue bars (N=4813) show the distribution of the environmental concern scale (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2003) as measured in the first wave of the Swiss Environmental Panel (SEP) (Rudolph et al. 2020), a 2018 dual-mode survey based on a random sample of the Swiss population obtained from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. In comparison, the red bars (N=3010), indicate the distribution of environmental concern among participants in our quota sample drawn from Intervista's online panel. A global test of the equality of distribution functions (Kaplan 2019) shows that both functions likely do not differ statistically (p-value 0.708).

Second, we assess to what extent Swiss citizens' attitudes towards regulation are comparable to the regulatory preferences of citizens' from other high-income countries. Appendix Figure A.8 draws on ISSP data from the year 2016 (ISSP Research Group 2018). The ISSP questionnaire 2016 focused on the "Role of Government". The Figure below shows the proportions of responses on binary indicator variables based on the following survey items. The item ordering in the list corresponds to the top to bottom order of the panels in the Figure. Text in square brackets indicates piped text or a battery item. The binary categories are ordered within the Figure panels such that the top category implies attitudes in favor of **more** government intervention.

- On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to [impose strict laws to make industry do less damage to the environment]. (Fourpoint scale, "definitely should be" to "definitely should not be", response categories 2 and below coded as "Pro".)
- In general, how often do you think that major private companies in [country] do the following? [Comply with laws and regulations?]. (Four-point scale, "almost always" to "almost never", response categories 3 and over coded as "Rarely".)
- Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say 'much more', it might require a tax increase to pay for it. [The environment]. (Five-point scale, "spend much more" to "spend much less", response categories 2 and below coded as "More".)
- Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which you are against. [Less government regulation of business]. (Five-point scale, "strongly in favor of" to "Strongly against", response categories 3 and over coded as "Disagree".)

Overall, we do not observe substantive differences in attitudes towards regulatory policy between Swiss and other high-income countries' citizens. The only notable difference consists in that Swiss citizens are more likely to think that "firms comply with rules" (63% in Switzerland, 55% in other countries). This would imply that Swiss citizens should perceive self-regulation as slightly more trustworthy. These findings are robust to alternative comparisons (e.g., excluding Scandinavian countries or non-European countries).




Figure A.8: Proportions on binary indicators of regulatory preferences of Swiss citizens (orange, N top to bottom = 1'025, 1'000, 1'026, 998) and citizen of other high-income countries (green, N top to bottom = 16'100, 15'430, 16'087, 15'201). Whiskers denote 95% confidence intervals. High-income countries: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States

### **Appendix References**

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