Supplementary Materials

A Experiment overview

In March and May of 2020, we recruited 3395 and 7748 respondents on YouGov and Lucid, respectively. The YouGov study was fielded among a nationally representative sample of American voters. The Lucid experiment was conducted among a diverse sample of Americans who self-identify as partisans (i.e., excluding independents). In this paper, we will refer to the former as our YouGov sample or experiment, and the latter as our Lucid sample or experiment. These details are summarised in Table A1. Both experiments were pre-registered on OSF ⁹.

Platform Date N Target population

Experiment 1 YouGov March 23–30, 2020 3395 US electorate

Experiment 2 Lucid May 12–22, 2020 7749 Partisans only

Table A1: Summary of experiments

Our YouGov sample was fielded as part of a YouGov Omnibus survey in which respondents answer multiple survey modules from different YouGov clients. In order to rule out any unforeseen interactions with previous modules and to measure additional respondent covariates that are not offered on YouGov, we therefore fielded a replication and extension study on the Lucid survey platform. Our Lucid study differed in three respects from the YouGov study. First, we measured respondent covariates such as political knowledge, Trump approval, attitudes towards democracy, and system support. We also measured policy attitudes towards reforming the Electoral College. Second, we changed the treatment to replace the scenario in which the Electoral College winner wins the popular vote by 3 percentage points with one in which the Electoral College winner loses the popular vote by 5 percentage points. Finally, we added an additional manipulation in which we randomly reminded respondents of the 2016 Electoral College and popular vote results prior to being exposed to our hypothetical election outcome. Figures A1 and A2 illustrate these experimental procedures.


Two surprising results from the March 2020 sample motivated us to collect additional data. First, we found suggestive evidence that Republican participants rated election outcomes in which the popular vote winner lost in the Electoral College as more legitimate than when the popular vote winner also won the Electoral College. We found this surprising and wanted to see if it would replicate. (In the May experiment, it did not.) A second unexpected result from the first experiment was the absence of a popular vote margin effect—specifically, popular vote inversions of three percentage points were not seen as less legitimate than inversions of one percentage point. To verify this result, we added a five percentage point inversion as a condition in our May experiment and again found very little effect of vote margin on perceived legitimacy conditional on an inversion taking place.

⁹https://osf.io/r5muc/?view_only=0fbc60a331ea47dc9085527f67589424
and https://osf.io/7bxkc/?view_only=e53f83a7d0fe42e8a753a357c341eb0c.

START Other YouGov modules RANDOMIZE Democrat wins Republican wins Electoral College Electoral College RANDOMIZE and wins and wins but loses but loses popular vote +1%popular vote +3%popular vote -1% popular vote -3%Electoral legitimacy questions (DV) END

Figure A1: YouGov experimental procedure

Figure A2: Lucid experimental procedure



B Sample demographics and covariate balance

Table B1 presents sample characteristics for both experiments.

Table B1: Sample characteristics

		Mean	Median	Min.	Max
YouGov	Female	0.53	1	0	1
	Age	47.4	47	18	89
	White	0.65	1	0	1
	Republican	0.32	0	0	1
Lucid	Female	0.52	1	0	1
	Age	44.3	42	18	106
	White	0.71	1	0	1
	Republican	0.48	0	0	1

The number of respondents by treatment condition is shown in Table B2. Across eight conditions in both experiments, treatment assignment seems to be balanced.

In Tables B3 and B4 we summarize test statistics for covariate balance across treatment arms. For the margins condition, t-tests are conducted relative to the reference category (+1% condition). In Table B5, we also test for covariate balance across those reminded of the 2016 election outcome in our Lucid sample. Out of all 36 tests, only one group's mean (proportion of whites in the -3% condition) is statistically significant relative to control. We further confirm in Table B6 with regressions of treatment assignment on covariates that all observed F-statistics are above conventional significance levels, suggesting that covariates are jointly orthogonal to treatment assignment.

Table B2: Treatment assignment by condition

	Who won EC	+3%	+1%	-1%	-3%	-5%
YouGov	Democrat	405	449	430	406	
	Republican	451	397	420	437	
Lucid	Democrat Republican		956 913	884 940	904 866	852 918

Table B3: Covariate balance by popular vote margin treatment

		+3%	+1%	-1%	-3%	-5%
YouGov	Female	0.52	0.52	0.55	0.53	
		(0.01)		(-1.31)	(-0.22)	
	Age	46.5	48.1	47.8	47.4	
		(1.95)		(0.41)	(0.85)	
	White	0.66	0.66	0.65	0.61*	
		(-0.08)		(-0.59)	(-2.23)	
	Republican	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.31	
		(0.48)		(-0.40)	(-0.15)	
Lucid	Female		0.52	0.52	0.52	0.51
				(-0.12)	(0.39)	(0.86)
	Age		44.3	44.7	44.3	44.6
				(-0.81)	(-0.03)	(-0.61)
	White		0.71	0.72	0.70	0.71
				(0.84)	(-0.19)	(0.52)
	Republican		0.48	0.46	0.50	0.51
				(0.85)	(-1.33)	(-1.81)

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Means for variable by condition. T-statistic relative to the +1% condition in parentheses.)

Table B4: Covariate balance by party of Electoral College winner treatment

		Democrats won	Republicans won
YouGov	Female	0.52	0.54
			(-0.86)
	Age	48.0	46.8
			(1.98)
	White	0.64	0.65
			(0.73)
	Republican	0.32	0.33
			(-0.08)
Lucid	Female	0.52	0.51
			(0.59)
	Age	44.7	44.3
			(1.00)
	White	0.71	0.71
			(-0.29)
	Republican	0.48	0.49
			(-0.45)

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Means for variable by condition. T-statistic relative to the condition where a Democratic candidate wins in parentheses.)

Table B5: Covariate balance by 2016 reminder treatment

		Control	Reminded
Lucid	Female	0.52	0.51
			(0.76)
	Age	44.6	44.4
			(0.52)
	White	0.72	0.71
			(-1.18)
	Republican	0.48	0.49
			(-0.52)

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Means for variable by condition. T-statistics relative to control condition in parentheses.)

Table B6: F-statistics for regressions of treatment assignment on covariates

	You	Gov		Lucid	
Treatment	Margin	EC winner	Margin	EC winner	2016 reminder
Female	0.025	0.016	-0.015	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Age	-0.000	-0.001*	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Not white	0.099*	-0.020	0.018	0.001	0.018
	(0.041)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Republican	0.040	0.006	0.063	0.006	0.011
	(0.042)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.012)
F statistic	1.624	1.538	1.525	0.4827	0.7528
	(df = 4; 3390)	(df = 4; 3390)	(df = 4; 7145)	(df = 4; 7145)	(df = 4; 7202)

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). OLS models where dependent variable is transformed into numeric. For margin treatment, party treatment and 2016 reminder treatment, the +1% condition, Democratic EC winner condition and control condition are respectively turned into 0.

Table C1: Pair-wise correlations between dependent variables

	YouGov	Lucid
Fair/legitimate	0.81	0.73
Legitimate/rightful	0.82	0.74
Rightful/fair	0.81	0.73

C Measurement of dependent variables

We measure legitimacy using three questions presented in random order. Each item was coded in the same direction with higher values indicating greater agreement with the result of the election.

- Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?
 - Definitely the rightful winner (4)
 - Probably the rightful winner (3)
 - Probably not the rightful winner (2)
 - Definitely not the rightful winner (1)
- Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?
 - Entirely legitimate (4)
 - Somewhat legitimate (3)
 - Not very legitimate (2)
 - Not legitimate at all (1)
- Do you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?
 - Very fair (4)
 - Somewhat fair (3)
 - Not very fair (2)
 - Not at all fair (1)

In Figure C1, we visualize the distribution of each dependent variable for both experiments. Correlations between all three items are high (0.7-0.8) in both experiments. We therefore combined them to increase scale reliability (Broockman, Kalla and Sekhon 2017). In Table C1, we summarize the correlations between each item. Cronbach's α for internal consistency are 0.93 and 0.89, respectively, for the YouGov and Lucid experiments, suggesting that our scale is very reliable.

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Figure C1: Distribution of dependent variables

D YouGov results with independents

Below we report the full results from Table 1 in the main text as well as additional models including independents from the YouGov sample (column 1) and the Lucid model with the 2016 election reminder included as a control variable (column 4). The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is +1%. Political interest was measured by the following question: "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs." Responses were measured on a four-point Likert scale with a don't know option (which is treated as missing). The measure of political interest ranges from 1 to 4 where higher values indicate greater interest. Respondent race was measured with the following question: "What racial or ethnic group best describes you?" and is answered in eight categories (White, Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, Native American, Middle Easter, Mixed Race, Other). Respondents who do not identify as white are assigned a value of 1 for the nonwhite measure and those who identify as white are assigned a value of 0. Education levels are measured with the following question: "What is the highest level of education you have completed?" Respondents answered on a six-point scale from "No high school degree" to "Postgraduate degree." The college graduate indicator takes a value of 1 if respondents have a four-year college degree or more and 0 if not. Female respondents are also represented with indicators for respondents who identify as female to the question "Are you male or female?" (1 if female, 0 if male). Finally, indicators are included for age groups of 30-44, 45-59, and 60+ years old; the 18–29 age group is the reference category.

Neither the direction nor magnitude of effect sizes and standard errors varies between model specifications. Relative to +1%, an inversion causes a significant decrease in perceived legitimacy, while an increase in popular vote margin does not. Co-partisans who win are seen as more legitimate. Finally, we confirm that adding the 2016 election result reminder manipulation as a control does not change our results (a consequence of randomization).

Table D1: Effects of winner vote margin on election legitimacy (relative to +1 percentage point)

	YouGo	ov	Lu	cid
	With independents	Partisans only	Partisans only	Partisans only
+3 percentage points	0.007	0.014		
	(0.038)	(0.041)		
-1 percentage point	-0.454***	-0.483***	-0.319***	-0.319***
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.026)
-3 percentage point	-0.472***	-0.506***	-0.333***	-0.333***
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.026)	(0.026)
-5 percentage point			-0.342***	-0.342***
			(0.026)	(0.026)
Co-partisan wins	0.376***	0.416***	0.247***	0.247***
-	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Political interest	0.090***	0.091***	0.065***	0.065***
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Non-white	-0.166***	-0.167***	-0.174***	-0.175***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.021)
College educated	0.037	0.049	0.088***	0.088***
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Female	-0.209***	-0.201***	-0.257***	-0.257***
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age 30–44	0.036	0.010	0.083**	0.083**
	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Age 45–59	0.123*	0.114*	0.130***	0.129***
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Age 60+	0.136**	0.133**	0.184***	0.184***
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.030)
2016 reminder				0.0173
				(0.019)
Respondents	3194	2664	7150	7150

^{*} p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. "Election legitimacy" is measured based on survey responses which scale together as a composite measure.

E Linear probability models for binary categories

In Table E1, we show results from an alternative coding of the dependent variable in which we transform the dependent variable into a binary indicator of whether the respondent answered in an affirmative manner to each of the disaggregated response items — i.e, the respondent answers that the candidate who won the Electoral College is "definitely" or "probably" the rightful winner, that the presidency is "entirely" or "somewhat" legitimate, or that the victory was "very" or "somewhat" fair, the answer is recorded as a 1 and 0 otherwise (see Supplementary Materials C for details on the response items). Each model is a OLS with robust standard errors. The reference category is +1%.

Across all models, inversions reduce perceived legitimacy by 10–25 percentage points on this binary measure. These results do not vary meaningfully by popular vote margin. Overall, these results suggest that our results reported in the main text are not simply a reflection of respondents changing their responses between the top two affirmative categories; a substantial number of respondents change from positive to negative evaluations

Table E1: Effects of winner vote margin on binary measures (relative to +1 percentage point)

		YouGov			Lucid	
Dependent variable	Fair	Legitimate	Rightful	Fair	Legitimate	Rightful
+3 percentage points	0.012	0.001	-0.001			
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)			
-1 percentage point	-0.245***	-0.138***	-0.174***	-0.148***	-0.096***	-0.127***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
-3 percentage point	-0.223***	-0.143***	-0.224***	-0.151***	-0.117***	-0.155***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
-5 percentage point				-0.169***	-0.104***	-0.135***
				(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Co-partisan wins	0.130***	0.115***	0.137	0.093***	0.107***	0.100***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Respondents	3194	3194	3194	7150	7150	7150

^{*} p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent answered in an affirmative manner for each item. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group. Both models above include only self-identified Democrats or Republicans including leaners. (See Supplementary Materials D for full results including results with independents in the YouGov sample.)

F Average marginal effects of vote margins with different baseline

We further explore H3 by presenting the average marginal effects of electoral margins on legitimacy using the same models as Table 2, but using the -1 percentage point condition as the baseline. We show these alternative results to highlight that penalties on electoral legitimacy do not seem to be exacerbated by the inversion margin, but simply by the fact of the inversion itself. Table F1 shows these results. Only in the five-point inversion condition among Democrats in our Lucid experiment can we reject the null hypothesis that the size of the loser's popular vote victory made no difference — the estimated marginal effect relative to a 1-point margin is -0.103 (SE=0.035) and is statistically significant.

Table F1: Average marginal effects by party (relative to -1 percentage point)

	Dem	ocrats	Repul	olicans
	YouGov	Lucid	YouGov	Lucid
Co-partisan wins	0.492***	0.310***	0.316***	0.165***
	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.048)	(0.026)
+3 percentage points	0.846***		0.0183	
	(0.055)		(0.068)	
+1 percentage points	0.868***	0.490***	-0.048	0.105***
	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.068)	(0.037)
-3 percentage points	-0.082	-0.068	0.060	-0.009
	(0.057)	(0.035)	(0.067)	(0.037)
-5 percentage points		-0.103***		0.009
		(0.035)		(0.037)

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.05 (two-sided). Marginal effects calculations from the models reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table G1 in Supplementary Materials G. These quantities are calculated by first taking first-order partial derivatives of the model specified in columns 2 and 3 of Table G1 with respect to the variables of interest (having a co-partisan winner or a given popular vote margin). We then use the resulting equations to estimate the average marginal effects of the variable of interest for Democrats and Republican averaging over other terms in the model (i.e., copartisan winner for margins and vice versa).

G Heterogeneous treatment effects by partisanship

Table G1 shows results from regressions analyzing how the effects of our popular vote margin manipulation on perceived legitimacy vary with the partisanship of respondent and the winning candidate. The reference categories are a Democratic respondent, a win for the opposite-party (Republican) candidate, and a +1 percentage point margin in the popular vote. The top three rows show estimates of the marginal effect of a Republican respondent, a copartisan victory, and the interaction of those two conditions. Below, the table is organized in blocks of four rows, with each block corresponding to an alternative popular vote outcome – a larger (three percentage point) non-inversion margin, then inversions of -1, -3, and -5 percentage points. Within each block, estimates on the interaction terms illustrate the marginal effects of a win by a copartisan candidate, of respondent partisanship (Republican rather than Democrat), and of Republican respondents with a copartisan winner. In our main text, we calculate the average marginal effect of the treatment manipulation; namely, the effect of switching the winner of the EC vote to a co-partisan candidate and switching the popular vote margin (relative to winning the popular vote by 1 percent). As noted in the caption of Table 2, these quantities are calculated by first taking first-order partial derivatives of the model specified in columns 2 and 3 of Table G1 with respect to the variables of interest (having a co-partisan winner or a given popular vote margin). We then use the resulting equations to estimate the average marginal effects of the variable of interest for Democrats and Republican averaging over other terms in the model (i.e., copartisan winner for margins and vice versa). We conduct these calculations using R's margins package.

Starting at the top, the first three rows estimate effects for the baseline scenario of a one-percent popular vote win for the presidential winner. In the initial experiment with YouGov, we find no difference in perceived legitimacy by respondent partisanship, but in the Lucid sample, Republican respondents rate legitimacy higher in this scenario by 0.253 (SE=0.052). In both experiments, the magnitude of the copartisan effect is not distinguishable between Democrats and Republicans.

The next block of rows shows marginal effects of increasing the popular vote margin of the presidential winner to three percentage points. We included this scenario only in the YouGov experiment. We find no difference in effect overall, no difference in the magnitude of the copartisan effect, no effect by respondent partisanship, and none for the interaction between respondent partisanship and the party of the winning candidate. In short, when the popular vote winner wins the presidency, even narrowly, respondents appear to be at their legitimacy ceiling. Moving from a narrow to a more comfortable popular vote margin does not push legitimacy higher.

The next block of rows shows estimates for a narrow inversion, moving from a popular vote win of one percentage point to a popular vote loss of one percentage point for the presidential winner. The first set of coefficients in this block show the marginal effect of this inversion on Democratic respondents — -0.822 (SE=0.090) in the YouGov sample and -0.475 (SE=0.056) in Lucid. The next estimates show that, contra H4, this decrease in legitimacy is not related to the partisanship of the presidential winner. Among Democrats, assessments of legitimacy decrease as much when a copartisan wins by inversion as when a Republican does. While not statistically significant, Democrats seems to even penalize co-partisan candidates who win an electoral inversion *more*. This negative effect of inversions on legitimacy is absent among Republican respondents (the effect observed among Democrats is offset by positive interactions between the inversion conditions and Republican identification). Finally, we note that the response to inversions among Republicans varied somewhat by party of the winning candidate in the YouGov sample. In the YouGov sample

(but not Lucid), Republicans rated an election outcome in which a Democrat won the Electoral College but lost the popular vote as more legitimate than a Republican co-partisan winning in an inversion. Because this result shows up in the YouGov sample only, and not the Lucid replication, we treat it with caution, but we note that it is the opposite of what H4 would posit—that inversion wins by opposite-party candidates would reduce legitimacy assessments more than inversion wins by copartisans.

The next block of estimates replicate precisely the same pattern for a three percentage point inversion as for the one percentage point inversion above. Democrats rate inversions lower in legitimacy regardless of the partisanship of the winner. This inversion penalty is offset entirely among Republican respondents, where we see the same YouGov-only pattern of greater legitimacy for Democratic inversion winners than Republicans.

Finally, the bottom block shows that these effects persist when the popular vote margin in the inversion scenario is five percentage points (tested in the Lucid experiment only). Democratic respondents punish this inversion, not distinguishing by the partisanship of winner, but the effect is offset among Republicans, who impose no inversion penalty. As these estimates underscore, we find no evidence for H3, which predicted that popular vote margins would affect legitimacy under inversions. Democrats do impose an inversion penalty, but its magnitude is indistinguishable across the vote margin scenarios we tested.

Table G1: Effects of winner margin on legitimacy by partisanship (relative to +1 percentage point)

	YouGov (w/independe	YouGov	Lucid
D. III	<u> </u>	•	0.050***
Republican respondent	-0.064	-0.008	0.253***
Comment in the comment of the commen	(0.97)	(0.105)	(0.052)
Co-partisan wins	0.456***	0.496***	0.324***
G	(0.061)	(0.073)	(0.050)
Co-partisan × Republican	0.183	0.141	-0.080
	(0.114)	(0.121)	(0.066)
+3 percentage points	-0.028	-0.024	
	(0.066)	(0.085)	
+3 percentage points × co-partisan candidate	0.006	0.004	
	(0.089)	(0.104)	
+3 percentage points × Republican respondent	0.213	0.208	
	(0.134)	(0.144)	
+3 percentage points \times co-partisan \times Republicans	-0.243	-0.238	
	(0.159)	(0.167)	
-1 percentage points	-0.609***	-0.822***	-0.475***
- Landa Land	(0.070)	(0.090)	(0.056)
-1 percentage points × co-partisan candidate	-0.303**	-0.092	-0.029
r · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(0.010)	(0.115)	(0.074)
-1 percentage points × Republican respondent	0.935***	1.142***	0.412***
- Language Language and the control of the control	(0.131)	(0.142)	(0.075)
-1 percentage points \times co-partisan \times Republican	-0.244	-0.450*	-0.054
- L	(0.166)	(0.175)	(0.098)
-3 percentage points	-0.713***	-0.986***	-0.565***
r Landa Land	(0.070)	(0.090)	(0.057)
-3 percentage points × co-partisan candidate	-0.200	0.072	0.015
t transmit transmit	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.076)
-3 percentage points × Republican respondent	1.076***	1.343***	0.476***
o percentage points // respectivent respondent	(0.126)	(0.137)	(0.075)
-3 percentage points \times co-partisan \times Republican	-0.300	-0.568***	-0.063
o karanana kanana karanana	(0.164)	(0.173)	(0.100)
-5 percentage points			-0.571***
- L			(0.056)
-5 percentage points × co-partisan candidate			-0.042
- r			(0.074)
-5 percentage points × Republican respondent			0.570***
- r			(0.074)
-5 percentage points \times co-partisan \times Republican			-0.145
o percentage points // co partisan // republican			(0.098)
Control variables	√	✓	✓
Respondents	3194	2664	7150

^{*} p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. "Election legitimacy" measured based on survey responses which scale together as a composite measure. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group. The models in the center and rightmost columns include only self-identified Democrats or Republicans including leaners. The leftmost model includes all participants in the YouGov sample (including independents).

H Political knowledge

We test whether political knowledge moderates the effect of popular vote margins on election legitimacy. Political knowledge is measured as the number of correct answers to questions regarding the length of a US senator's term, how many senators represent each state, how many times an individual can be elected President, the name of the Prime Minister of the UK, and the length of a US House member's term. We categorize respondents in roughly equal bins with those who scored 0 or 1 points as "low knowledge," 2 or 3 points as "medium knowledge," and 4 or 5 as "high knowledge" respondents. Table H1 shows these results. We also calculate average marginal effects using the same model for political knowledge and report these results in Table H2. First, in general, high political knowledge is associated with greater perceived legitimacy across all election scenarios. However, this finding masks heterogeneity by party. On average, political knowledge increases legitimacy for Republicans, but decreases legitimacy for Democrats. These differences are exacerbated in inversion conditions—perceived legitimacy is reduced more by inversions among Democratic respondents with high political knowledge compared to those who have low political knowledge, while knowledge generally does not significantly moderate the effects of the popular vote margin among Republicans.

Table H1: Political knowledge interaction (relative to +1 percentage point, and low political knowledge)

Medium political knowledge High political knowledge Co-partisan wins Co-partisan wins × medium knowledge	-0.002 (0.067) 0.355***	0.022
High political knowledge Co-partisan wins	(0.067)	
Co-partisan wins		
Co-partisan wins	0.555	(0.066) 0.355***
•	(0.067)	(0.068)
Co partison wins × madium knowledge	0.218**	0.246***
	(0.074) 0.144	(0.018)
	(0.091)	
Co-partisan wins × high knowledge	-0.006 (0.089)	
Republican respondent		0.113 (0.075)
Republican \times medium knowledge		0.161 (0.090)
Republican × high knowledge		0.081 (0.089)
-1 percentage points	-0.117	-0.210**
-1% × co-partisan wins	(0.078) -0.55	(0.075)
-1% × Republican respondent	(0.106)	0.145
-1% × medium knowledge	-U UOS	(0.105) -0.191*
-170 A medium knowledge	-0.098 (0.098)	(0.093)
-1% \times high knowledge	-0.421***	-0.561***
-1% \times co-partisan wins \times medium knowledge	(0.103)	(0.098)
-1% \times co-partisan wins \times high knowledge	(0.132) 0.182	
-1% \times Republican \times medium knowledge	(0.137)	0.150
-1% × Republican × high knowledge		(0.129) 0.504***
		(0.131)
-3 percentage points	-0.183*	-0.275***
-3% × co-partisan wins	(0.075) -0.000	(0.075)
-	(0.107)	0.206
-3% × Republican respondent		0.206 (0.106)
-3% × medium knowledge	-0.027 (0.097)	-0.157 (0.094)
-3% × high knowledge	-0.362***	-0.640***
-3% \times co-partisan wins \times medium knowledge	-0.131	
-3% × co-partisan wins × high knowledge	(0.134) 0.111	
5% % co partisan with % ingh knowledge	(0.138)	
-3% × Republican × medium knowledge	(0.101)	(0.100) 0.105
-5% × Republican × medium knowledge		(0.131)
-3% \times Republican \times high knowledge		0.575*** (0.133)
-5 percentage points	-0.202**	-0.346***
	(0.074)	(0.074)
-5% × co-partisan wins	-0.065 (0.106)	0.255
-5% × Republican respondent		0.257* (0.104)
-5% × medium knowledge	0.015 (0.096)	-0.103 (0.092)
-5% × high knowledge	-0.291** (0.103)	-0.602*** (0.099)
-5% \times co-partisan wins \times medium knowledge	-0.121 (0.131)	(0.077)
-5% \times co-partisan wins \times High knowledge	0.103 (0.139)	
-5% \times Republican \times medium knowledge	(0.139)	0.058
-5% \times Republican \times high knowledge		(0.128) 0.610*** (0.131)
Control variables	√	(0.151)
Respondents	7150	7150

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). OLS model with robust standard errors.

Table H2: Average marginal effect of political knowledge on legitimacy

	All	Lucid Republicans	Democrats
Medium political knowledge	0.026	0.149***	-0.090**
	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.033)
High political knowledge	0.153***	0.408***	-0.087*
	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.036)

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided).

I Democratic support moderators

We attempt to measure a latent factor related to support for democracy. Our measured items consist of three questions below.

- How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important," what position would you choose? (full response scale was 1–10 scale)
 - 1 through 7 (low bin)
 - 8 and 9 (medium bin)
 - 10 (high bin)
- Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.
 - Agree strongly (high bin)
 - Agree somewhat (medium bin)
 - Neither agree or disagree (low bin)
 - Disagree somewhat (low bin)
 - Disagree strongly (low bin)
- We should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems rather than relying on a democratic form of government.
 - Agree strongly (low bin)
 - Agree somewhat (low bin)
 - Neither agree or disagree (medium bin)
 - Disagree somewhat (high bin)
 - Disagree strongly (high bin)

Because the three variables do not clearly load on a single factor in a principal components factor analysis, we estimate a separate model for each variable following our pre-analysis plan. To avoid a linearity assumption, each moderator is separated into approximate terciles (shown in parentheses above), where the "High" bin is coded to indicate higher support for democratic values. The results are reported in Table I1. We also calculate average marginal effects in Table I2.

Table I1: Effects of democratic support on electoral legitimacy (relative to +1 percentage point)

Moderator (medium)			Lucid	
Moderator (high)		(Live in democracy)	(Democracy best)	(Strong hand
Moderator (high)	Moderator (medium)		0.163*	0.005
Copartisan wins			(0.067)	(0.065)
Copartisan wins 0.150* (0.098***) 0.219**** 0.219*** Copartisan wins × moderator (medium bin) 0.131 (0.086) (0.093) (0.089) Copartisan wins × moderator (high bin) 0.191* (0.080) (0.080) (0.089) 0.155* -1 percentage point -0.187*** -0.192* (0.078) -0.062 0.155* -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) (0.062) (0.078) (0.056) -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) 0.031 (0.094) -0.010* 0.211* -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) 0.031 (0.094) -0.010* 0.078* -1 percentage point × copartisan wins -0.016 (0.089) -0.099 (0.088) 0.099* -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.016 (0.087) -0.107 (0.076) -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins -0.114 (0.116) -0.12 -0.102 -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.014 (0.128) -0.137 (0.131) -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -0.0254**** -0.281**** -0.031 -3 percentage point × moderator (high bin) <td>Moderator (high)</td> <td>0.189**</td> <td>0.316***</td> <td>0.075</td>	Moderator (high)	0.189**	0.316***	0.075
Copartisan wins × moderator (medium bin)		(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.059)
Copartisan wins × moderator (medium bin) 0.131 (0.086) (0.093) (0.089) 0.0931 (0.089) Copartisan wins × moderator (high bin) 0.191* (0.080) (0.088) 0.155* (0.080) -1 percentage point -0.187*** (0.080) (0.088) -0.075 -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) 0.062 (0.078) (0.056) (0.056) -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) 0.031 (0.094) (0.010) (0.096) -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) 0.270*** (0.097) (0.096) -1 percentage point × copartisan wins -0.016 (0.089) (0.098) (0.098) -1 percentage point × copartisan wins -0.016 (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.016 (0.128) (0.137) (0.137) -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins 0.0419 (0.118) (0.137) (0.131) -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins 0.0419 (0.199) (0.132) (0.115) -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) 0.010 (0.096) (0.097) (0.096) -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) 0.010 (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) 0.010 (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins 0.052 (0.088) (0.110) (0.096) -3 p	Copartisan wins	0.150*	0.298***	0.219***
Copartisan wins × moderator (high bin) Copartisan wins Copartis			(0.073)	(0.052)
Copartisan wins × moderator (high bin) Copartisan wins × moderator (medium bin) Copartisan wins × moderator (medium bin) Copartisan wins × moderator (high bin) Copartisan wins → 0.062 Copartisan wins → 0.062 Copartisan wins → 0.062 Copartisan wins → 0.062 Copartisan wins → 0.070 Copartisan wins → 0.082 Copartisan wins → 0.082 Copartisan wins → 0.093 Copartisan wins → 0.094 Copartisan wins → 0.095 Copartisan wins → 0.096 Copartisan wins → 0.099 Copartisan wins → 0.016 Copartisan wins → 0.0419 Copartisan wins → 0.0410 Copartisan wins → 0.042	Copartisan wins \times moderator (medium bin)	0.131	-0.131	-0.033
-1 percentage point		, ,	, ,	(0.089)
-1 percentage point	Copartisan wins \times moderator (high bin)			0.155*
(0.062) (0.078) (0.056) (0.076) (0.076) (0.056) (0.021) (0.094) (0.101) (0.096) (0.094) (0.101) (0.096) (0.089) (0.089) (0.099) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.108) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088) (0.099) (0.088) (0.099) (0.088) (0.099) (0.088) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.108) (0.119) (0.132) (0.119) (0.132) (0.119) (0.132) (0.119) (0.132) (0.119) (0.132) (0.115) (0.086) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) (0.098) (0.0		(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.075)
(0.062) (0.078) (0.056) (0.076) (0.076) (0.056) (0.021) (0.094) (0.101) (0.096) (0.094) (0.101) (0.096) (0.089) (0.089) (0.099) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.108) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088) (0.099) (0.088) (0.099) (0.088) (0.099) (0.088) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.087) (0.107) (0.076) (0.087) (0.108) (0.119) (0.132) (0.119) (0.132) (0.119) (0.132) (0.119) (0.132) (0.119) (0.132) (0.115) (0.086) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.096) (0.096) (0.098) (0.0	-1 percentage point	-0.187**	-0.192*	-0.068
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-1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins	-1 percentage point × copartisan wins	-0.016	-0.142	
1		(0.087)	(0.107)	(0.076)
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-3 percentage point		(0.128)	(0.137)	(0.131)
-3 percentage point	-1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins	0.0419	0.149	0.118
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-3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.143	-3 percentage point × copartisan wins			
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-3 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins -0.075	-3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins			
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(0.120) (0.136) (0.117) Control variables √ √ √			, ,	` /
Control variables	-5 percentage point \times moderator (high bin) \times copartisan wins			
Respondents 7150 6954 7150	Control variables		✓	✓
	Respondents	7150	6954	7150

^{*} p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group.)

Table I2: Average marginal effect of moderators (relative to lowest moderator category)

Moderator	Category	AME
Live in democracy	Medium	0.039
		(0.027)
	High	0.129***
		(0.025)
Democracy is best	Medium	0.072**
		(0.027)
	High	0.263***
		(0.27)
Don't need strongman	Medium	-0.164***
		(0.026)
	High	-0.155***
		(0.022)

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point.

J Electoral sovereignty moderators

We attempt to measure a latent factor related to support for electoral sovereignty. Our measured items consist of three questions below.

- For future presidential elections, would you support or oppose changing to a system in which the president is elected by direct popular vote, instead of by the Electoral College? ¹⁰
 - Support strongly (high bin)
 - Support somewhat (medium bin)
 - Neither support or oppose (low bin)
 - Oppose somewhat (low bin)
 - Oppose strongly (low bin)
- The United States is a republic, not a democracy.
 - Agree strongly (low bin)
 - Agree somewhat (low bin)
 - Neither agree or disagree (medium bin)
 - Disagree somewhat (high bin) 11
 - Disagree strongly (high bin)
- People should choose their leaders in free elections.
 - Agree strongly (low bin)
 - Agree somewhat (low bin)
 - Neither agree or disagree (medium bin)
 - Disagree somewhat (high bin)
 - Disagree strongly (high bin)

Because the three variables do not clearly load on a single factor in a principal components factor analysis, we estimate a separate model for each variable following our pre-analysis plan. To avoid a linearity assumption, each moderator is separated into approximate terciles (shown in parentheses), where the "High" bin is coded to indicate higher support for elections. The results are reported in Table J1. We also report average marginal effects in Table J2.

¹⁰Support for the National Popular Vote was asked both before and after the experimental module of our survey. We use the pre-treatment measure for our moderator here.

¹¹In administrating our survey, we made a mistake where this option was incorrectly labeled as "Disagree strongly," resulting in having the "Disagree strongly" option shown twice.

Table J1: Effects of electoral sovereignty on electoral legitimacy (relative to +1 percentage point)

Moderator (medium bin) -0.107** -0.1055 -0.433** -0.081 -0.023* -0.223* -0.081 -0.023* -0.023* -0.023* -0.040 -0.097* -0.014 -0.097* -0.044*** -0.016 -0.0979 -0.075 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.177 -0.034 -0.179 -0.218* -0.254 -0.086 -0.0880 -0.0990 -0.211* -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -0.253** -0.084 -0.086 -0.0880 -0.0880 -0.0284 -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) -0.581*** -0.018 -0.007 -0.0074 -0.0075 -0.0287 -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.061 -0.0074 -0.075 -0.0287 -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.0113 -0.1177 -0.0319 -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins -0.013 -0.013 -0.1177 -0.018 -0.0287 -0.128 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.0287 -0.128 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.0292 -0.0084 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0084 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0086 -0.0088 -0.0087 -0.0098 -0.0099 -0.0098 -0.0099 -0.0098 -0.0099	Moderator (high bin)		(EC)	Lucid (is Republic)	(Free election)
Moderator (high bin)	Moderator (high bin)	Moderator (medium bin)	-0.107**	-0.155	-0.433**
Moderator (high bin)	Moderator (high bin) -0.081 -0.223** -0.238 Copartisan wins 0.197*** 0.244*** 0.041 Copartisan wins × moderator (medium bin) 0.077 -0.034 0.177 Copartisan wins × moderator (high bin) 0.190* 0.218* 0.254 Copartisan wins × moderator (high bin) 0.190* 0.218* 0.254 -1 percentage point (0.082) (0.090) (0.211) -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -0.253*** -0.084 0.248 -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) -0.581*** -0.084 0.248 -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) -0.581*** -0.018 0.007 -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.061 -0.002 0.097 -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.011 0.017 -0.128 -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins -0.017 -0.018 0.029 -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -0.018 0.017 -0.175 -0.128 -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin)	` '	(0.021)	(0.056)	(0.157)
(0.064) (0.072) (0.144)	Copartisan wins	Moderator (high bin)			
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1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	1			(0.075)	(0.287)
-1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins -0.017	-1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -1 percentage point × moderator (high bin) -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -2 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -4 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -6 percentage point × moderator (high bin) -7 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -8 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -9 percentage point × moderator (high bin) -1 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -1 percentage point ×	-1 percentage point \times moderator (medium bin) \times copartisan wins	-0.030	0.033	-0.117
-3 percentage point	-3 percentage point		(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.319)
-3 percentage point	-3 percentage point	-1 percentage point \times moderator (high bin) \times copartisan wins	0.017	-0.175	-0.128
Countrol variables Countro	1.0		(0.123)	(0.134)	(0.292)
-3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -0.236** -0.138 -0.221 -0.084) -0.085) -0.240 -3 percentage point × moderator (high bin) -0.644*** -0.018 -0.003 -0.092) -0.017 -0.073 -0.097 -0.074 -0.077 -0.0327) -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.091 -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.091 -3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.091 -0.117 -0.118 -0.354) -3 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins -0.029 -0.028 -0.071 -0.123 -0.032) -5 percentage point -0.003 -0.265*** -0.442* -0.054 -0.059 -0.183 -5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -0.345*** -0.068 -0.372 -0.086 -0.087 -0.026 -1.118 -0.094 -0.107) -0.188) -5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) -0.600*** -0.026 -0.118 -0.094 -0.107) -0.188) -5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.154* -0.044 -0.321 -0.074 -0.075 -0.025 -0.175 -0.175 -0.0114 -0.187 -0.252 -0.175 -0.0124 -0.189 -0.255 -0.187 -0.252 -0.175 -0.0124 -0.189 -0.255 -0.175 -0.0140 -0.189 -0.025 -0.175 -0.025 -0.175 -0.025 -0.175 -0.0140 -0.189 -0.025 -0.187 -0.252 -0.0170 -0.0124 -0.0139 -0.0295	-3 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -0.236** -0.138 -0.221 -0.084) -0.085) -0.092 -0.018 -0.003 -0.092) -0.017 -0.091 -0.121 -0.125 -0.017 -0.018 -0.029 -0.028 -0.071 -0.123 -0.0332) -5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins -0.003 -0.265*** -0.442* -0.086 -0.054 -0.086 -0.087 -0.086 -0.087 -0.088 -0.094 -0.094 -0.107 -0.188 -5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) -0.600*** -0.006 -0.094 -0.107 -0.188 -5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -0.600*** -0.026 -0.118 -0.094 -0.075 -0.028 -0.075 -0.0289 -0.071 -0.074 -0.075 -0.0289 -0.075 -0.0144 -0.0155 -0.025 -0.175 -0.1149 -0.1151 -0.0321 -0.252 -0.124 -0.129 -0.0295 -0.0124 -0.139 -0.0295	-3 percentage point			
$ \begin{array}{c} (0.084) & (0.085) & (0.240) \\ (0.092) & (0.107) & (0.224) \\ (0.092) & (0.107) & (0.224) \\ (0.097) & (0.074) & (0.077) & (0.327) \\ (0.327) & (0.074) & (0.077) & (0.327) \\ (0.327) & (0.074) & (0.077) & (0.327) \\ (0.327) & (0.117) & (0.118) & (0.354) \\ (0.117) & (0.118) & (0.354) \\ (0.123) & (0.137) & (0.332) \\ (0.123) & (0.137) & (0.332) \\ (0.123) & (0.137) & (0.332) \\ (0.086) & (0.087) & (0.088) \\ (0.086) & (0.087) & (0.208) \\ (0.094) & (0.107) & (0.188) \\ (0.094) & (0.107) & (0.188) \\ (0.094) & (0.107) & (0.188) \\ (0.094) & (0.107) & (0.188) \\ (0.075) & (0.086) & (0.075) & (0.289) \\ (0.075) & (0.086) & (0.075) & (0.289) \\ (0.075) & (0.086) & (0.075) & (0.289) \\ (0.074) & (0.075) & (0.289) \\ (0.086) & (0.087) & (0.289) \\ (0.074) & (0.075) & (0.289) \\ (0.074) & (0.075) & (0.289) \\ (0.089) & (0.014) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.015) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.015) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.015) & (0.289) \\ (0.124) & (0.139) & (0.295) \\ (0.0124) & (0.139) & (0.295) \\ \end{array}$	(0.084) (0.085) (0.240)		, ,		
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-5 percentage point	(0.123) (0.137) (0.332) -5 percentage point		(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.354)
-5 percentage point	-5 percentage point	-3 percentage point \times moderator (high bin) \times copartisan wins	0.029	0.028	0.071
$ \begin{array}{c} (0.054) & (0.059) & (0.183) \\ (0.086) & (0.087) & (0.208) \\ (0.086) & (0.087) & (0.208) \\ (0.086) & (0.087) & (0.208) \\ (0.094) & (0.107) & (0.188) \\ (0.094) & (0.107) & (0.188) \\ (0.074) & (0.075) & (0.289) \\ (0.074) & (0.075) & (0.289) \\ (0.074) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.074) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ (0.086) & (0.081) & (0.187) & (0.289) \\ (0.086) & (0.081) & (0.187) & (0.289) \\ (0.086) & (0.081) & (0.187) & (0.289) \\ (0.086) & (0.081) & (0.187) & (0.289) \\ (0.086) & (0.081) & (0.183) & (0.081) \\ (0.086) & (0.087) & (0.081) & (0.081) \\ (0.094) & (0.094) & (0.098) \\ (0.094) & (0.094) & (0.098) \\ (0.094) & (0.098) & (0.098) \\ (0.094) & (0.094) & (0.098) \\ (0.094) & (0.098) & (0.098) $	(0.054) (0.059) (0.183) -5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) (0.086) (0.087) (0.208) -5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) (0.094) (0.107) (0.188) -5 percentage point × copartisan wins (0.094) (0.107) (0.188) -5 percentage point × copartisan wins (0.074) (0.075) (0.289) -5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins (0.136) (0.025) (0.115) -5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins (0.081) (0.115) (0.321) -5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins (0.081) (0.116) (0.125) Control variables (0.054) (0.059) (0.088) -0.026 (0.118) -0.027 (0.074) (0.075) (0.289) -0.175 (0.114) (0.115) (0.321) -0.081 (0.124) (0.139) (0.295)		(0.123)	(0.137)	(0.332)
$ \begin{array}{c} (0.054) & (0.059) & (0.183) \\ -0.345*** & -0.068 & 0.372 \\ (0.086) & (0.087) & (0.208) \\ -5 \text{ percentage point} \times \text{ moderator (high bin)} & -0.600*** & -0.026 & 0.118 \\ (0.094) & (0.107) & (0.188) \\ -5 \text{ percentage point} \times \text{ copartisan wins} & -0.154* & -0.044 & 0.321 \\ (0.074) & (0.075) & (0.289) \\ -5 \text{ percentage point} \times \text{ moderator (medium bin)} \times \text{ copartisan wins} & 0.136 & -0.025 & 0.175 \\ (0.114) & (0.115) & (0.321) \\ -5 \text{ percentage point} \times \text{ moderator (high bin)} \times \text{ copartisan wins} & 0.081 & -0.187 & 0.252 \\ (0.124) & (0.139) & (0.295) \\ \hline \text{Control variables} & \checkmark & \checkmark & \checkmark \\ \hline \end{array} $	(0.054) (0.059) (0.183) -5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) (0.086) (0.087) (0.208) -5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) (0.094) (0.107) (0.188) -5 percentage point × copartisan wins (0.094) (0.107) (0.188) -5 percentage point × copartisan wins (0.074) (0.075) (0.289) -5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins (0.136) (0.025) (0.115) -5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins (0.081) (0.115) (0.321) -5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins (0.081) (0.116) (0.125) Control variables (0.054) (0.059) (0.088) -0.026 (0.118) -0.027 (0.074) (0.075) (0.289) -0.175 (0.114) (0.115) (0.321) -0.081 (0.124) (0.139) (0.295)	-5 percentage point	-0.003	-0.265***	-0.442*
$ \begin{array}{c} -5 \text{ percentage point} \times \text{moderator (medium bin)} & \begin{array}{c} -0.345^{****} & -0.068 \\ (0.086) & (0.087) \\ (0.086) & (0.087) \\ (0.086) & (0.087) \\ (0.098) & (0.208) \\ \end{array} \\ -5 \text{ percentage point} \times \text{moderator (high bin)} & \begin{array}{c} -0.600^{****} & -0.026 \\ (0.094) & (0.107) \\ (0.107) & (0.188) \\ \end{array} \\ -5 \text{ percentage point} \times \text{ copartisan wins} & \begin{array}{c} -0.154^{**} & -0.044 \\ (0.074) & (0.075) \\ (0.074) & (0.075) \\ \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} (0.289) \\ 0.289) \\ -5 \text{ percentage point} \times \text{ moderator (medium bin)} \times \text{ copartisan wins} & \begin{array}{c} 0.136 \\ (0.114) & (0.115) \\ \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} (0.321) \\ 0.321) \\ \end{array} \\ -5 \text{ percentage point} \times \text{ moderator (high bin)} \times \text{ copartisan wins} & \begin{array}{c} 0.081 \\ 0.081 \\ \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} -0.187 \\ 0.252 \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} 0.252 \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{Control variables} & \checkmark & \checkmark & \checkmark \\ \end{array}$	-5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) -0.345*** -0.068 0.372 (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.208) -5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) -0.600*** -0.026 0.118 (0.094) (0.107) (0.188) -5 percentage point × copartisan wins -0.154* -0.044 0.321 (0.074) (0.075) (0.289) -5 percentage point × moderator (medium bin) × copartisan wins 0.136 -0.025 0.175 (0.114) (0.115) (0.321) -5 percentage point × moderator (high bin) × copartisan wins 0.081 -0.187 0.252 (0.124) (0.139) (0.295)	1 6 1			
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Control variables	Control variables	-5 percentage point × moderator (nigh bin) × copartisan wins			
		Control variables			
	Respondents 7150 7150 7150				

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group.)

Table J2: Average marginal effect of moderators (relative to lowest moderator category)

Moderator	Category	AME
Support NPV	Medium	-0.271***
		(0.024)
	High	-0.420***
		(0.022)
US is not republic	Medium	-0.228***
		(0.023)
	High	-0.151***
		(0.024)
Choose leader in free election	Medium	-0.115
		(0.064)
	High	-0.055
		(0.059)

^{*} p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point.

K 2016 reminder

In our Lucid experiment, prior to showing respondents the hypothetical election profile, half of the respondents were randomized to see a reminder of the 2016 result. The text of the treatment is shown below (the full design of our Lucid experiment is summarized in Figure A2).

Before we start, we would like to remind you that the most recent presidential election took place in 2016. Donald Trump was elected President after winning the Electoral College (304 Trump to 227 Clinton), although Hillary Clinton won the popular vote (48% Clinton to 46% Trump).

As model (1) indicates, the reminder reduced perceived legitimacy on average among Democrats and increased it among Republicans (averaging over popular vote margin conditions). However, as model (2) indicates, the reminder did not significantly moderate the effects of the popular vote margin on election legitimacy.

Table K1: Effects of 2016 reminder on election legitimacy (relative to +1 percentage point)

	(1)	cid (2)
Co-partisan wins	0.244***	0.347***
•	(0.018)	(0.070)
2016 reminder	-0.057*	-0.029
Republican respondent	(0.027) 0.465***	(0.078) 0.219***
	(0.026)	(0.075)
Republican respondent × 2016 reminder	0.145*** (0.036)	0.067 (0.103)
Republican respondent × copartisan wins		-0.112
Copartisan wins × 2016 reminder		(0.096) -0.043
Republican respondent \times copartisan wins \times 2016 reminder		(0.100) 0.066 (0.133)
-1 percentage point	-0.311***	-0.458**
$-1\% \times \text{Republican respondent}$	(0.025)	(0.077) 0.335**
-1% × 2016 reminder		(0.107) -0.039
-1% × copartisan wins × Republican respondent		(0.112) 0.072
		(0.141)
-1% \times copartisan wins \times 2016 reminder		0.187 (0.148)
-1% \times Republican respondent \times 2016 reminder		0.149 (0.150)
-1% \times copartisan wins \times Republican respondent \times 2016 reminder		-0.245 (0.196)
-3 percentage point	-0.345*** (0.025)	-0.545** (0.077)
$-3\% \times \text{Republican respondent}$	(0.023)	0.427***
$-3\% \times 2016$ reminder		(0.108) -0.039
-3% \times copartisan wins \times Republican respondent		(0.113) 0.040
$-3\% \times \text{copartisan wins} \times 2016 \text{ reminder}$		(0.141) 0.061
-3% × Republican respondent × 2016 reminder		(0.152) 0.095
-3% × copartisan wins × Republican respondent × 2016 reminder		(0.150) -0.202
3 // Copartisan wins / Republican respondent / 2010 feminder		(0.200)
-5 percentage points	-0.356***	-0.546**
-5% × Republican respondent	(0.025)	(0.077) 0.496***
-5% × 2016 reminder		(0.106) -0.054
		(0.112)
-5% × copartisan wins × Republican respondent		-0.161 (0.139)
-5% \times copartisan wins \times 2016 reminder		-0.072 (0.148)
-5% \times Republican respondent \times 2016 reminder		0.145
-5% \times copartisan wins \times Republican respondent \times 2016 reminder		(0.147) 0.030 (0.195)
Control variables	√	✓
Respondents	7150	7150

^{*} p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.05 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. "Election legitimacy" measured based on survey responses which scale together as a composite measure. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group.)

L Electoral College support

We measured support for Electoral College twice in our Lucid experiment — once before our experimental section and once after. Our question wording was as follows:

- For future presidential elections, would you support or oppose changing to a system in which the president is elected by direct popular vote, instead of by the Electoral College?
 - Support strongly (1)
 - Support somewhat (2)
 - neither support nor oppose (3)
 - Oppose somewhat (4)
 - Oppose strongly (5)

Survey responses were coded as indicated in parentheses. A higher number indicates higher support for the existing Electoral College system (and conversely less support for the National Popular Vote Initiative).

In Table L1, we estimate several models that predict support for post-treatment Electoral College support. As model (2) indicates, we find that the reminder of the 2016 election outcome increased support for the Electoral College overall among Republicans. However, attitudes toward the Electoral College were not affected by the popular vote margin (model 1) nor were those effects moderated by respondent partisanship (model 2), whether the winning candidate was a co-partisan (model 3), or the interaction between the two (model 4).

Table L1: Effects of winner margins on Electoral College support (relative to +1 percentage point)

		Lu	cid	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pre-treatment EC support	0.786***	0.734***	0.785***	0.733***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
2016 reminder	0.035	-0.030		
D 11' 1 4	(0.021)	(0.026)		0.472***
Republican respondent		0.385*** (0.046)		0.473*** (0.052)
Copartisan wins		(0.040)	-0.33	-0.005
Copurisum wins			(0.041)	(0.048)
2016 reminder × Republican respondent		0.132***	()	(/
		(0.040)		
Republican respondent \times copartisan wins				-0.043
				(0.076)
-1 percentage point	-0.006	0.040	-0.049	0.024
- percentage point	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.050)
-1 percentage point × Republican respondent	, ,	-0.093	, ,	-0.137
		(0.056)		(0.077)
-1 percentage point \times copartisan wins			0.083	0.034
			(0.056)	(0.071)
-1 percentage point \times Republican respondent \times copartisan wins				0.085
				(0.111)
-3 percentage point	0.041	0.047	0.006	0.022
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.047)
-3 percentage point \times Republican respondent		-0.037		-0.061
		(0.056)		(0.073)
-3 percentage point \times copartisan wins			0.071	0.051
-3 percentage point × Republican respondent × copartisan wins			(0.057)	(0.073) 0.053
-3 percentage point × Republican respondent × copartisan wins				(0.111)
				(0.111)
-5 percentage points	0.007	-0.006	-0.034	-0.026
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.050)
-5 percentage point \times Republican respondent		0.004		-0.013
		(0.057)	0.000	(0.080)
-5 percentage point × copartisan wins			0.080	0.040
-5 percentage point × Republican respondent × copartisan wins			(0.058)	(0.074) 0.035
5 percentage point × repuonean respondent × copartisan wins				(0.114)
Control variables	√	√	√	√
Respondents	7028	7028	7028	7028

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The reference category for the popular vote margin coefficients is a popular vote victory of one percentage point. Electoral College support measured based on likert scale in which a higher number means support for the Electoral College. All models above control for political interest, race, college education, sex, and age group.)

M Survey instruments

Interviews: 3500

Field Period: March 12, 2020 - March 30, 2020

Project Manager: Sam Luks - 650.462.8009

YouGov interviewed 3687 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 3500 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, and education. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) 1—year sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file).

The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, and region. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles.

The weights were then post-stratified on 2016 Presidential vote choice, and a four-way stratification of gender, age (4-categories), race (4-categories), and education (4-categories), to produce the final weight.

Variable List

caseid Panman Sample ID weight Gen Pop Weight

cand1party Winning Candidate's party
cand2party Losing Candidate's party
popvote Popular vote outcome
pop_per Percentage points
Q1 Rightful winner
Q2 Legitimatcy
Q3 Fairness

Q3 Fairness
birthyr Birth Year
gender Gender
race Race
educ Education

marstat Marital Status
employ Employment Status
faminc_new Family income
pid3 3 point party ID

pid7 7 point Party ID presvote16post 2016 President Vote Post Election

inputstate State of Residence

Voter Registration Status

Ideology

Political Interest

starttime Questionnaire Start Time endtime Questionnaire End Time

Verbatims

Variable map and codebook

Name: caseid

votereg

newsint

ideo5

Description: Panman Sample ID

Numeric Variable - no categories

answered : 3500

Name: weight

Description: Gen Pop Weight

Numeric Variable - no categories

answered : 3500

Name: cand1party

Description: Winning Candidate's party

Count Code Label
---- ---1756 1 Democratic
1744 2 Republican

Name: cand2party

Description: Losing Candidate's party

Count Code Label
---- ---1744 1 Democratic
1756 2 Republican

Name: popvote

Description: Popular vote outcome

Count	Code	Label
1755	1	and wins
1745	2	but loses

Name: pop_per

Description: Percentage points

Count	Code	Label
1745	1	1 percentage point
1755	2	3 percentage points

Name: Q1

Description: Rightful winner

Count	Code	Label
1637	1	Definitely the rightful winner
918	2	Probably the rightful winner
572	3	Probably not the rightful winner
373	4	Definitely not the rightful winner

Name: Q2

Description: Legitimatcy

Count	Code	Label
1704	1	Entirely legitimate
959	2	Somewhat legitimate
486	3	Not very legitimate
351	4	Not legitimate at all

Name: Q3

Description: Fairness

Count	Code	Label
1490	1	Very fair
987	2	Somewhat fair
601	3	Not very fair
422	4	Not at all fair

Name: birthyr Description: Birth Year

Numeric Variable - no categories

answered : 3500

Name: gender Description: Gender

Count	Code	Label
1639	1	Male
1861	2	Female

Name: race Description: Race

Count	Code	Label
2270	1	White
414	2	Black
517	3	Hispanic
128	4	Asian
37	5	Native American
47	6	Mixed
84	7	0ther
3	8	Middle Eastern

Name: educ

Description: Education

Count	Code	Label
184	1	No HS
1194	2	High school graduate
772	3	Some college
338	4	2-year
634	5	4-year
378	6	Post-grad

Name: marstat

Description: Marital Status

Count	Code	Label
1616	1	Married
75	2	Separated
375	3	Divorced
161	4	Widowed
1099	5	Never married
174	6	Domestic / civil partnership

Name: employ

Description: Employment Status

Count	Code	Label
1296	1	Full-time
366	2	Part-time
28	3	Temporarily laid off
239	4	Unemployed
747	5	Retired
288	6	Permanently disabled
247	7	Homemaker
233	8	Student
56	9	Other

Name: faminc_new
Description: Family income

Count	Code	Label
229	1	Less than \$10,000
248	2	\$10,000 - \$19,999
342	3	\$20,000 - \$29,999
342	4	\$30,000 - \$39,999
285	5	\$40,000 - \$49,999
296	6	\$50,000 - \$59,999
191	7	\$60,000 - \$69,999
238	8	\$70,000 — \$79,999
264	9	\$80,000 - \$99,999
189	10	\$100,000 - \$119,999
190	11	\$120,000 - \$149,999
107	12	\$150,000 - \$199,999
49	13	\$200,000 - \$249,999
26	14	\$250,000 - \$349,999
17	15	\$350,000 - \$499,999
14	16	\$500,000 or more
473	97	Prefer not to say

Name: pid3

Description: 3 point party ID

Count	Code	Label
1339	1	Democrat
815	2	Republican
975	3	Independent
125	4	Other

Name: pid7

Description: 7 point Party ID

Count	Code	Label
918	1	Strong Democrat
421	2	Not very strong Democrat
338	3	Lean Democrat
503	4	Independent
323	5	Lean Republican
257	6	Not very strong Republican
558	7	Strong Republican
182	8	Not sure
0	9	Don't know

Name: presvote16post

Description: 2016 President Vote Post Election

Count	Code	Label
1275	1	Hillary Clinton
963	2	Donald Trump
98	3	Gary Johnson
53	4	Jill Stein
15	5	Evan McMullin
52	6	Other
1033	7	Did not vote for President
11	98	skipped

Name: inputstate

Description: State of Residence

Count	Code	Label
65	1	Alabama
7	2	Alaska
104	4	Arizona
27	5	Arkansas
396	6	California
73	8	Colorado
28	9	Connecticut
19	10	Delaware
18	11	District of Columbia
274	12	Florida
114	13	Georgia

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10 15 Hawaii
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- 16 16 Idaho
- 150 17 Illinois
- 67 18 Indiana
- 39 19 Iowa
- 39 19 10Wa
- 20 20 Kansas
- 55 21 Kentucky
- 35 22 Louisiana
- 14 23 Maine
- 68 24 Maryland
- 73 25 Massachusetts
- 77 26 Michigan
- 64 27 Minnesota
- 23 28 Mississippi
- 65 29 Missouri
- 16 30 Montana
- 17 31 Nebraska
- 47 32 Nevada
- 18 33 New Hampshire
- 134 34 New Jersey
- 27 35 New Mexico
- 185 36 New York
- 88 37 North Carolina
- 7 38 North Dakota
- 127 39 Ohio
 - 38 40 Oklahoma
- 54 41 Oregon
- 151 42 Pennsylvania
- 13 44 Rhode Island
- 42 45 South Carolina
- 9 46 South Dakota
- 60 47 Tennessee
- 277 48 Texas
- 24 49 Utah
- 4 50 Vermont
- 103 51 Virginia
- 72 53 Washington
- 30 54 West Virginia
- 49 55 Wisconsin
 - 7 56 Wyoming
- 0 60 American Samoa
- 0 64 Federated States of Micronesia
- 0 66 Guam
- 0 68 Marshall Islands
- 0 69 Northern Mariana Islands
- 0 70 Pala
- 0 72 Puerto Rico
- 0 74 U.S. Minor Outlying Islands
- 0 78 Virgin Islands
- 0 81 Alberta

0	82	British Columbia
0	83	Manitoba
0	84	New Brunswick
0	85	Newfoundland
0	86	Northwest Territories
0	87	Nova Scotia
0	88	Nunavut
0	89	Ontario
0	90	Prince Edward Island
0	91	Quebec
0	92	Saskatchewan
0	93	Yukon Territory
0	99	Not in the U.S. or Canada

Name: votereg

Description: Voter Registration Status

Count	Code	Label
3035	1	Yes
354	2	No
111	3	Don't kno

Name: ideo5 Description: Ideology

Count	Code	Label
514	1	Very liberal
587	2	Liberal
1029	3	Moderate
572	4	Conservative
459	5	Very conservative
339	6	Not sure

Name: newsint

Description: Political Interest

Count	Code	Label
1782	1	Most of the time
858	2	Some of the time
396	3	Only now and then
261	4	Hardly at all
203	7	Don't know

Name: starttime

Description: Questionnaire Start Time

DateTime variable - no categories

Name: endtime

Description: Questionnaire End Time

DateTime variable - no categories

Electoral margins experiment Survey Flow

EmbeddedData

pidValue will be set from Panel or URL.

SUPPLIER_IDValue will be set from Panel or URL.

SUPNAMEValue will be set from Panel or URL.

Q BallotBoxStuffingValue will be set from Panel or URL.

Q_PopulateResponseValue will be set from Panel or URL.

Q_RelevantIDDuplicateScoreValue will be set from Panel or URL.

Q RelevantIDFraudScoreValue will be set from Panel or URL.

Q_RelevantIDDuplicateValue will be set from Panel or URL.

ridValue will be set from Panel or URL.

Standard: Consent (2 Questions)
Standard: Age (2 Questions)
Standard: Gender (2 Questions)
Standard: State (2 Questions)
Standard: PID (2 Questions)

Branch: New Branch

If

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? Independent Is Selected Or Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? Other Is Selected Or Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? Not sure Is Selected

Standard: PID other (2 Questions)

Branch: New Branch

lf

If Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party? Neither Is Selected

Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party? Not sure Is Selected

EndSurvey: Advanced

Branch: New Branch

lf

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? Republican Is Selected

Standard: PID Republican (2 Questions)

Branch: New Branch

If

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? Democrat Is Selected

Standard: PID Democrat (2 Questions)

Standard: Ideo (2 Questions)
Standard: Educ (2 Questions)

Standard: Race (2 Questions)

Standard: Political interest (2 Questions)
Standard: Trump approval (1 Question)
Standard: Live in democracy (2 Questions)
Standard: EC policy PRE (2 Questions)

Standard: Dem support statements intro (2 Questions)
Standard: Dem support statements (5 Questions)

Standard: Political knowledge intro (2 Questions)

Standard: Political knowledge (6 Questions)

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

Standard: PV margins prompt only (2 Questions)

Standard: PV margins prompt + 2016 reminder (2 Questions)

BlockRandomizer: 1 -

Block: R-lose1 (5 Questions)
Standard: D-lose1 (5 Questions)
Standard: R-lose3 (5 Questions)
Standard: D-lose3 (5 Questions)
Standard: R-win1 (5 Questions)
Standard: D-win1 (5 Questions)
Standard: R-lose5 (5 Questions)
Standard: D-lose5 (5 Questions)

Standard: Explain answer (2 Questions)
Standard: EC policy POST (2 Questions)

Standard: Manipulation checks (5 Questions)

Standard: Trolling (2 Questions)
Standard: Look up (2 Questions)
Standard: Comments (2 Questions)

Standard: End (1 Question)

EndSurvey: Advanced

Page Break

Start of Block: Consent Q34 This study is being conducted by We ask for your attention for a few minutes and we thank you for your attention and your responses. Your participation is voluntary and you may decline the survey or withdraw at any time. No information that identifies you will be collected or retained by the researchers. However, any online interaction carries some risk of being accessed. Do you consent to participate in the survey? Yes (1) O No (2) Q122 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4) **End of Block: Consent** Start of Block: Age Q35 In what year were you born? (Please answer in full 4-digit years) Q121 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)

End of Block: Age
Start of Block: Gender
Q36 Are you male or female?
○ Male (1)
O Female (2)
Q120 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: Gender
Start of Block: State
Q44 In which state do you currently reside?
▼ Alabama (1) I do not reside in the United States (53)
Q119 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: State
Start of Block: PID

Q44 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a?
O Democrat (1)
O Republican (2)
O Independent (3)
Other (4)
O Not sure (5)
Q118 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: PID
Start of Block: PID other
Q45 Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party?
○ The Democratic Party (1)
O The Republican Party (2)
O Neither (3)
O Not sure (4)
Q117 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)

End of Block: PID other
Start of Block: PID Republican
Q47 Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
○ Strong Republican (1)
O Not very strong Republican (2)
Q116 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: PID Republican
Start of Block: PID Democrat
Q46 Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
○ Strong Democrat (1)
O Not very strong Democrat (2)
Q115 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: PID Democrat
Start of Block: Ideo

Q43

When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself as liberal, conservative, or neither liberal

nor conservative?

Start of Block: Educ

	O Very conservative (1)
	O Somewhat conservative (2)
	○ Slightly conservative (3)
	○ Moderate; middle of the road (4)
	○ Slightly liberal (5)
	O Somewhat liberal (6)
	○ Very liberal (7)
Firs Las Pag	14 Timing st Click (1) st Click (2) ge Submit (3) sk Count (4)
End	d of Block: Ideo

Q48
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
O Did not graduate from high school (1)
O High school diploma or the equivalent (GED) (2)
O Some college (3)
O Associate's degree (4)
O Bachelor's degree (5)
O Master's degree (6)
O Professional or doctorate degree (7)
Q113 Timing First Click (1)
Last Click (2) Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)
End of Block: Educ
Start of Block: Pace

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Q49 With which race or ethnicity do you most identify?
O American Indian or Alaska Native (1)
O Black or African American (2)
O Asian/Pacific Islander (3)
○ White (4)
O Hispanic/Latino/Chicano/a (5)
○ Multi-racial (6)
Other (7)
Q112 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: Race
Start of Block: Political interest
Q50 Generally, how interested are you in politics?
O Not at all interested (1)
O Not very interested (2)
O Somewhat interested (3)
O Very interested (4)
C Extremely interested (5)

Q111 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)	
End of Block: Political interest	
Start of Block: Trump approval	
Q51 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?	
O Strongly approve (1)	
O Somewhat approve (2)	
O Somewhat disapprove (3)	
O Strongly disapprove (4)	
End of Block: Trump approval	

Start of Block: Live in democracy

osition would you choose?
O Not at all important1 (1)
O 2 (2)
O 3 (3)
O 4 (4)
O 5 (5)
O 6 (6)
O 7 (7)
O 8 (8)
O 9 (9)
O Absolutely important10 (10)
2105 Timing irst Click (1) ast Click (2) rage Submit (3) click Count (4)
nd of Block: Live in democracy
tart of Block: EC policy PRE

Q66 How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important," what

Q85 For future presidential elections, would you support or oppose changing to a system in which the president is elected by direct popular vote, instead of by the Electoral College?
O Support strongly (1)
O Support somewhat (2)
O Neither support nor oppose (3)
Oppose somewhat (4)
Oppose strongly (5)
Q104 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: EC policy PRE
Start of Block: Dem support statements intro
Q86 Now we're going to show you several more statements. After each one, we would like you to tell us how strongly you agree or disagree.
Q106 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: Dem support statements intro
Start of Block: Dem support statements

Q71 Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.
O Agree strongly (1)
O Agree somewhat (2)
O Neither agree nor disagree (3)
O Disagree somewhat (4)
O Disagree stronglly (5)
Q72 The United States is a republic, not a democracy.
O Agree strongly (1)
O Agree somewhat (2)
O Neither agree nor disagree (3)
O Disagree strongly (4)
O Disagree strongly (5)
Q73 People should choose their leaders in free elections.
O Agree strongly (1)
O Agree somewhat (2)
O Neither agree nor disagree (3)
O Disagree somewhat (4)
O Disagree strongly (5)

Q74 We should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems rather than relying on a democratic form of government.
O Agree strongly (1)
O Agree somewhat (2)
O Neither agree nor disagree (3)
O Disagree somewhat (4)
O Disagree strongly (5)
Q107 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: Dem support statements
Start of Block: Political knowledge intro
The next set of questions helps us learn what types of information are commonly known to the public. Please answer these questions on your own without asking anyone or looking up the answers. Many people don't know the answers to these questions, but we'd be grateful if you would please answer every question even if you're not sure what the right answer is.
It is important to us that you do NOT use outside sources like the Internet to search for the correct answer. Will you answer the following questions without help from outside sources?
○ Yes (1)
O No (2)

Q108 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)	
End of Block: Political knowledge intro	
Start of Block: Political knowledge	
Q53 For how many years is a United States Senator elected - that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator?	
○ Two years (1)	
O Four years (2)	
O Six years (3)	
○ Eight years (4)	
O None of the above (5)	
O I don't know (6)	

Q54
How many U.S. Senators are there from each state?
One (1)
○ Two (2)
O Four (3)
O Depends on which state (4)
O Don't know (5)
Q55 How many times can an individual be elected President of the United States
under current laws?
Once (1)
O Twice (2)
O Four times (3)
O Unlimited number of terms (4)
O Don't know (5)

Q56 Who is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom?
O Richard Branson (1)
O Nick Clegg (2)
○ Theresa May (3)
O Boris Johnson (4)
O Margaret Thatcher (5)
O Don't know (6)
Q57 For how many years is a member of the United States House of Representatives elected—that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. House member?
○ Two years (1)
O Four years (2)
○ Six years (3)
○ Eight years (4)
O For life (5)
O Don't know (6)
Q109 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: Political knowledge

Start of Block: PV margins prompt only

Q78

We are interested in how people evaluate the outcomes of presidential elections, which are decided in the United States by the Electoral College. In the questions that follow, we will ask you to evaluate a possible outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

Q103 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

End of Block: PV margins prompt only

Start of Block: PV margins prompt + 2016 reminder

Q17

We are interested in how people evaluate the outcomes of presidential elections, which are decided in the United States by the Electoral College. In the questions that follow, we will ask you to evaluate a possible outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

Before we start, we would like to remind you that the most recent presidential election took place in 2016. Donald Trump was elected President after winning the Electoral College (304 Trump to 227 Clinton), although Hillary Clinton won the popular vote (48% Clinton to 46% Trump).

Q102 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

End of Block: PV margins prompt + 2016 reminder

Start of Block: R-lose1

Q2 Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the
rightful winner?
O Definitely the rightful winner (1)
O Probably the rightful winner (2)
O Probably not the rightful winner (3)
O Definitely not the rightful winner (4)
Q3 Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?
O Very fair (1)
O Somewhat fair (2)
O Not very fair (3)
O Not at all fair (4)

Q101 Timing First Click (1)
Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)
End of Block: R-lose1
Start of Block: D-lose1
040
Q18 Imagine the Democratic candidate wins the Electoral College and the presidency in 2020 but loses the popular vote by 1 percentage point compared to the Republican candidate.
Q19 Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?
C Entirely legitimate (1)
O Somewhat legitimate (2)
O Not very legitimate (3)
O Not legitimate at all (4)
O20

Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

 Definitely the rightful winner (1) Probably the rightful winner (2) Probably not the rightful winner (3) Definitely not the rightful winner (4)
Q21 Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?
 Very fair (1) Somewhat fair (2) Not very fair (3) Not at all fair (4)
Q100 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)

End of Block: D-lose1

Start of Block: R-lose3	
Q5 Imagine the Republican candidate wins the Electoral College and the presidency in 2020 but loses the popular vote by 3 percentage point compared to the Democratic candidate.	
Q6 Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?	
 Entirely legitimate (1) Somewhat legitimate (2) Not very legitimate (3) 	
O Not legitimate at all (4)	_

O Definitely the rightful winner (1)
O Probably the rightful winner (2)
O Probably not the rightful winner (3)
O Definitely not the rightful winner (4)
Q8 Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?
O Very fair (1)
O Somewhat fair (2)
O Not very fair (3)
O Not at all fair (4)

Q99 Timing First Click (1)
Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: R-lose3
Start of Block: D-lose3
Q22 Imagine the Democratic candidate wins the Electoral College and the presidency in 2020 but loses the popular vote by 3 percentage point compared to the Republican candidate.
Q23 Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?
O Entirely legitimate (1)
O Somewhat legitimate (2)
O Not very legitimate (3)
O Not legitimate at all (4)
024

Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the

rightful winner?

O Definitely the rightful winner (1)
O Probably the rightful winner (2)
O Probably not the rightful winner (3)
O Definitely not the rightful winner (4)
Q25 Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?
O Very fair (1)
○ Somewhat fair (2)
O Not very fair (3)
O Not at all fair (4)
Q98 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: D-lose3

Q9 Imagine the Republican candidate wins the Electoral College and the presidency in 2020 and wins the popular vote by 1 percentage point compared to the Democratic candidate.	
Q10 Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?	
 Entirely legitimate (1) Somewhat legitimate (2) Not very legitimate (3) Not legitimate at all (4) 	

Start of Block: R-win1

Q11 Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?
ngiliai wiinici:
O Definitely the rightful winner (1)
O Probably the rightful winner (2)
O Probably not the rightful winner (3)
O Definitely not the rightful winner (4)
Q12 Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?
Trould you amin and mining candidate o trotory was rain or not rain.
O Very fair (1)
O Somewhat fair (2)
O Not very fair (3)
O Not at all fair (4)

Q97 Timing
First Click (1) Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)
End of Block: R-win1
Start of Block: D-win1
Q26
Imagine the Democratic candidate wins the Electoral College and the presidency in 2020 and wins the popular vote by 1 percentage point compared to the Republican candidate.
Q27 Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?
O Entirely legitimate (1)
O Somewhat legitimate (2)
O Not very legitimate (3)
O Not legitimate at all (4)

Q28

Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

 Definitely the rightful winner (1) Probably the rightful winner (2) Probably not the rightful winner (3) Definitely not the rightful winner (4)
Q29 Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?
O Vory fair (1)
Very fair (1)Somewhat fair (2)
O Not very fair (3)
O Not at all fair (4)
Q96 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)

End of Block: D-win1

Start of Block: R-lose5
Q13 Imagine the Republican candidate wins the Electoral College and the presidency in 2020 but loses the popular vote by 5 percentage point compared to the Democratic candidate.
Q14 Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?
O Entirely legitimate (1)
O Somewhat legitimate (2)
O Not very legitimate (3)
O Not legitimate at all (4)

Q15 Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the
rightful winner?
O Definitely the rightful winner (1)
O Probably the rightful winner (2)
O Probably not the rightful winner (3)
O Definitely not the rightful winner (4)
Q16
Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?
O Very fair (1)
O Somewhat fair (2)
O Not very fair (3)
O Not at all fair (4)

Q95 Timing
First Click (1) Last Click (2)
Page Submit (3)
Click Count (4)
End of Block: R-lose5
Start of Block: D-lose5
Q30 Imagine the Democratic candidate wins the Electoral College and the presidency in 2020 but loses the popular vote by 5 percentage point compared to the Republican candidate.
Q31 Would you view the winning candidate's presidency to be legitimate or not legitimate?
○ Entirely legitimate (1)
O Somewhat legitimate (2)
O Not very legitimate (3)
O Not legitimate at all (4)
022

Q32

Would you consider the winning candidate to be the rightful winner of the election or not the rightful winner?

 Definitely the rightful winner (1) Probably the rightful winner (2) Probably not the rightful winner (3) Definitely not the rightful winner (4)
Q33 Would you think the winning candidate's victory was fair or not fair?
O Very fair (1)
O Somewhat fair (2)
O Not very fair (3)
O Not at all fair (4)
Q94 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)

End of Block: D-lose5

Start of Block: Explain answer
Q62 We would like to understand your thinking in assessing this outcome. Why did you answer the way you did about whether this outcome is fair and legitimate and whether the victorious candidate is the rightful winner?
Q93 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: Explain answer
Start of Block: EC policy POST
Q65 For future presidential elections, would you support or oppose changing to a system in which the president is elected by direct popular vote, instead of by the Electoral College?
O Support strongly (1)
O Support somewhat (2)
O Neither support nor oppose (3)
Oppose somewhat (4)
Oppose strongly (5)

Q87 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: EC policy POST
Start of Block: Manipulation checks
Q88 In the hypothetical 2020 election scenario that you read about, which party's nominee won he Electoral College and was elected president?
The Democratic candidate (1)
O The Republican candidate (2)
O Not sure (3)
Q67 In the hypothetical 2020 election scenario that you read about, what was the outcome of he popular vote?
O Democrats won the popular vote by 5 percentage points (1)
O Democrats won the popular vote by 3 percentage points (2)
O Democrats won the popular vote by 1 percentage point (3)
Republicans won the popular vote by 1 percentage point (4)
Republicans won the popular vote by 3 percentage points (5)
Republicans won the popular vote by 5 percentage points (6)
O Not sure (7)

Q86 Timing				
First Click (1)				
Last Click (2)				
Page Submit (3)				
Click Count (4)				
Page Break ——				

Q79 To the best of your knowledge, what was the outcome of the 2016 presidential election?
O Donald Trump won the Electoral College and won the popular vote (1)
O Donald Trump won the Electoral College but Hillary Clinton won the popular vote (2)
O Hillary Clinton won the Electoral College but Donald Trump won the popular vote (3)
O Hillary Clinton won the Electoral College and won the popular vote (4)
O Not sure (5)
Q89 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
Click Count (4)
End of Block: Manipulation checks
End of Block: Manipulation checks
End of Block: Manipulation checks Start of Block: Trolling Q58 We sometimes find people don't always take surveys seriously, instead providing
End of Block: Manipulation checks Start of Block: Trolling Q58 We sometimes find people don't always take surveys seriously, instead providing humorous or insincere responses to questions. How often do you do this?
End of Block: Manipulation checks Start of Block: Trolling Q58 We sometimes find people don't always take surveys seriously, instead providing humorous or insincere responses to questions. How often do you do this? Never (1)
End of Block: Manipulation checks Start of Block: Trolling Q58 We sometimes find people don't always take surveys seriously, instead providing humorous or insincere responses to questions. How often do you do this? Never (1) Rarely (2)
End of Block: Manipulation checks Start of Block: Trolling Q58 We sometimes find people don't always take surveys seriously, instead providing humorous or insincere responses to questions. How often do you do this? Never (1) Rarely (2) Some of the time (3)

First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: Trolling
Start of Block: Look up
Q63 It is essential for the validity of this study that we know whether participants looked up any information online during the study. Did you make an effort to look up information during the study? Please be honest; you will still be paid and you will not be penalized in any way if you did.
Yes, I looked up information (1)
○ No, I did not look up information (2)
Q91 Timing First Click (1) Last Click (2) Page Submit (3) Click Count (4)
End of Block: Look up
Start of Block: Comments
Q59 Do you have any comments on the survey? Please let us know about any problems you had or aspects of the survey that were confusing.

Q92 Timing

First Click (1)

Last Click (2)

Page Submit (3)

Click Count (4)

End of Block: Comments

Start of Block: End

Q60

Thank you for answering these questions. This research is not intended to support or oppose any political candidate or office. The research has no affiliation with any political candidate or campaign and has received no financial support from any political candidate or campaign.

End of Block: End