Supplementary Information for "County Over Party: How Governors Prioritized Geography Not Particularism in the Distribution of Opportunity Zones"

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Table SI-1: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables

	mean	sd	min	max	n
Gov County Vote %	0.56	0.16	0.15	0.96	30551.00
LD Party-Match	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00	30373.00
LICs In County (Inv)	0.09	0.15	0.00	1.00	30551.00
Median HH Income	38.36	12.38	3.25	156.90	30439.00
Poverty Rate	0.26	0.12	0.00	1.00	30541.00
UI Investment Score	5.27	2.88	1.00	10.00	30282.00



Figure SI-1: Percent of LICs in Counties won by the Governor. Every governor won counties containing significantly more than 25% of the LICs in their states. This figure shows that governors had the opportunity to favor counties that supported them in their most recent election when making their QOZ designations.

Table SI-2: T-Test Results by State and Variable
Positive result indicates that QOZs have higher level than non-selected LICs; negative result indicates that QOZs have lower level than non-selected LICs.

st	gov_vote_cty	ld_party_match_any	lics_in_county_inv	med_income_hh	poverty_rate	ui_investment_score
AL	0.01	0.09*	-0.01	3**	-0.05**	-0.64*
AR	0	0	-0.04	2.4**	-0.03*	0.11
AZ	0	0.08	-0.01	2.9**	-0.03**	-0.57*
CA	0.01**	-0.03*	-0.01**	10**	-0.1**	0
CO	0.05**	0.14**	-0.14**	4.2**	-0.02	0.17
CT	0	-0.15**	0	9.2**	-0.07**	-0.24
DE	0	-0.06	0	4.5	-0.08*	-1.2
FL	0	0.12**	-0.02**	5.7**	-0.07**	0.6**
GA	0.01	0.08*	0.01	12**	-0.15**	0.8**
HI	-0.01	-0.09	-0.05	3.4	-0.04	-1.7*
IA	-0.03*	-0.22**	-0.21**	4.6**	-0.02	0.88*
ID	0.01	-0.12*	-0.22**	0.45	0.02	-0.1
IL	0	0.01	-0.05**	10**	-0.13**	0.62**
IN	-0.01	-0.04	-0.06**	1.5	-0.02	-0.34
KS	-0.04*	-0.11	-0.08	1.8	-0.02	0.3
KY	0	0	-0.03	4.2**	-0.05**	-0.11
LA	-0.01	-0.15**	0	3.2**	-0.04**	-0.31
MA	-0.02*	-0.11**	-0.01*	7.2**	-0.04**	0.18
MD	-0.04	-0.07	-0.04**	6.7**	-0.06**	-0.09
ME	0	0.15	0	0.56	0.01	-0.78
MI	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05**	1.6*	-0.01	-0.72**
MN	0	0.05	-0.08**	8.2**	-0.07**	0.51
MO	0.07**	0.17**	0.06**	6**	-0.07**	-0.2
MS	-0.03	-0.09	0.05**	-0.19	0.01	-1.3**
MT	0.02	0.07	-0.17*	2.2	-0.02	0.89
NC	0.01	-0.05	-0.03**	4.4**	-0.05**	-0.1
ND	0.03	0.14	-0.08	4.6	-0.06	0.25
NE	0		-0.04	6.7**	-0.08**	-1.3**
NH	0	-0.18	-0.02	5*	-0.03	0.94
NJ	0.04**	0.01	-0.01	3.6**	-0.04**	-0.37
NM	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-1.1	0	-0.66
NV	0	0.06	0.01	8.6**	-0.06**	0
NY	0	-0.04*	-0.01	6.3**	-0.06**	-0.18
OH	0	0.07*	-0.02	4.2**	-0.05**	-0.35
OK	-0.01	-0.05	-0.04	2.5*	-0.04**	-0.45
OR	0.02	0.1	-0.05*	3.3**	-0.03*	-0.98**
PA	-0.04**	-0.15**	0.02*	8.2**	-0.09**	0.26
RI	0		-0.09*	1.6	0	-1.2
SC	0.02	0.16**	-0.03*	4.4**	-0.05**	0.3
SD	-0.01	-0.05	-0.11	2.9	-0.03	-0.46
TN	0	0.06	-0.02	5**	-0.07**	-0.17
TX	-0.08**	-0.15**	-0.07**	1.3**	-0.01	0.35**
UT	-0.01	-0.01	-0.11*	1.2	0	0.21
VA	-0.03	-0.06	-0.02	3.2**	-0.04**	-0.59*
VT	0.04	-0.11	-0.04	4.2	-0.05*	-2.1*
WA	0	-0.05	-0.05**	5.7**	-0.04**	0.46
WI	-0.01	0.03	-0.02	5.5**	-0.05**	-0.52
WY	-0.02	-0.21	-0.15	0.2	-0.04	-2.2*

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table SI-3: OLS Regression Results, All States

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Gov. Vote County	0.061	0.071	0.056	0.038	0.014	0.014	0.018	−0.003
	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.067)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.042)
LD Party Match	0.023	0.020	0.003	0.018	0.016	0.012	−0.003	0.010
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)
LICs in County		−0.0001***				−0.0001		
		(0.00003)				(0.0001)		
LICs in County ln			−0.035***				−0.031***	
			(0.006)				(0.006)	
LICS in County > 3				−0.168***				−0.158***
				(0.028)				(0.029)
Med HH Income	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Poverty Rate	0.465***	0.475***	0.563***	0.523***	0.444***	0.461***	0.537***	0.500***
	(0.110)	(0.106)	(0.098)	(0.109)	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.100)
UI Investment Score	0.007**	0.007***	0.010***	0.009***	0.008**	0.008***	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	30,271	30,271	30,271	30,271	24,305	24,305	24,305	24,305
R^2	0.056	0.058	0.068	0.065	0.053	0.054	0.061	0.062
Adjusted R^2	0.055	0.057	0.066	0.064	0.052	0.052	0.059	0.060

Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Models include state FEs and standard errors clustered by state. Models 5-8 exclude California and Texas

The models in Table SI-3 show that when governors are pooled, there are not significant and robust relationship between either political factor (Gov. Vote County and LD Party Match), and QOZ designation across various specifications of the key "spreading the wealth" measure. Models 1-4 vary the specification regarding the spreading the wealth variable. Model 1 doesn't include it at all. Model 2 uses the 1/LIC measure we report in the body of the paper. Model 3 takes the log of this variable. Model 4 dichtomizes it to distinguishes counties with fewer than four eligible tracts and those with four or more. Models 5-8 are the same specifications but exclude Texas and California – the two states with by far the most tracts.

Table SI-4: OLS Regression Results, Republican Governors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Gov. Vote County	0.238*	0.203*	0.031	0.191	0.136*	0.111	−0.045	0.093
	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.081)	(0.094)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.052)
LD Party Match	0.003	0.001	−0.028	−0.004	0.008	0.007	−0.019	−0.001
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)
LICs in County		−0.0001				−0.0001		
		(0.0001)				(0.0001)		
LICs in County ln			−0.042***				−0.037***	
			(0.007)				(0.006)	
LICS in County > 3				−0.133***				−0.135***
				(0.032)				(0.035)
Med HH Income	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.004***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Poverty Rate	0.440**	0.442**	0.485***	0.475***	0.472**	0.474**	0.515***	0.506**
	(0.129)	(0.127)	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.148)
UI Investment Score	0.006*	0.007*	0.009**	0.008**	0.008*	0.008*	0.010**	0.010**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	18,007	18,007	18,007	18,007	15,525	15,525	15,525	15,525
R^2	0.049	0.050	0.060	0.056	0.057	0.057	0.065	0.064
Adjusted R^2	0.047	0.048	0.058	0.054	0.055	0.055	0.063	0.062

Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Models include state FEs and standard errors clustered by state. Models 5-8 exclude Texas.

The models in Table SI-4 show that there are not significant and robust relationship between either political factor (Gov. Vote County and LD Party Match) for Republican governors. As in Table SI-3, models 1-4 vary the specification regarding the spreading the wealth variable and 5-8 are the same models excluding Texas. While the coefficient on Gov. Vote County is statistically significant in Models 1 and 2, the coefficent is halved when Texas is excluded (Model 5) and there is no statically significant relationship in Model 6. Thus, any ostensible effects in some models for Republican governors are not robust to different measures of the key spreading the wealth variable and they appear to be driven by one state.

Table SI-5: OLS Regression Results, Democratic Governors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Gov. Vote County	−0.138**	−0.101	0.045	−0.114*	−0.122*	−0.139*	0.120	−0.101
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.051)
LD Party Match	0.026*	0.027	0.036**	0.037**	0.023	0.024	0.033*	0.036*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)
LICs in County		−0.0001**				0.00003		
		(0.00001)				(0.0001)		
LICs in County ln			−0.038***				−0.046**	
			(0.007)				(0.014)	
LICS in County > 3				−0.231***				−0.210***
				(0.051)				(0.045)
Med HH Income	−0.004***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.004***	−0.004**	−0.004**	−0.004***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Poverty Rate	0.647***	0.635***	0.652***	0.674***	0.478***	0.479***	0.484***	0.504***
	(0.144)	(0.135)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.043)
UI Investment Score	0.009***	0.009***	0.011***	0.010***	0.009**	0.009**	0.011***	0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Observations	12,264	12,264	12,264	12,264	8,780	8,780	8,780	8,780
R^2	0.075	0.076	0.083	0.085	0.051	0.051	0.059	0.063
Adjusted R^2	0.074	0.075	0.081	0.084	0.049	0.049	0.057	0.060

Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Models include state FEs.
Standard errors clustered by state. Models 5-8 exclude California

The models in Table SI-5 show that there are not significant and robust relationship between either political factor (Gov. Vote County and LD Party Match) for Democratic governors. As in Table SI-3, models 1-4 vary the specification regarding the spreading the wealth variable and 5-8 are the same models excluding Texas. The coefficient on Gov. Vote County is statistically significant in Models 1 and 5, with no controls for LICs in County. When these controls are added, the results are inconsistent. In Models 2 and 6, the results are only significant using the number of LICs in County if California is included. Conversely, in Models 4 and 8, the results are only statistically significant if California is included. In some models there is a statistically significant relationship between legislative district party match and QOZ designation, but this is not robust across the models. The point estimates are also not consistently signed.

Table SI-6: OLS Results by State and Variable
Positive result indicates that QOZs have higher level than non-selected LICs; negative result indicates that QOZs have lower level than non-selected LICs. Note - Same specification as Model 1 in Table **??** but estimate by state.

st	gov_vote_cty	ld_party_match_any	lics_in_county_inv	med_income_hh	poverty_rate	ui_investment_score
AL	0.009	-0.091*	0.601**	-0.003	0.716**	0.031**
AZ	0.150	-0.053	0.848*	-0.004	0.195	0.020**
AR	-0.019	0.016	0.251*	-0.003	0.666	0.010
CA	0.001	0.062**	1.428**	-0.004**	1.266**	0.010**
CO	-0.117	-0.072	0.534**	-0.005	0.334	0.014*
CT	-0.037	0.170*	0.567	-0.006*	0.150	0.010
DE	0.166	0.042	3.237	0.002	1.319	0.031
FL	0.160	-0.083**	0.669**	-0.005**	0.853**	-0.009*
GA	0.222*	-0.017	0.031	-0.008**	1.557**	-0.007
HI	-1.021	-0.049	1.706*	-0.001	0.879	0.037*
ID	-1.088*	0.261	0.501**	-0.005	-0.365	0.005
IL	-0.334**	-0.049	1.075**	-0.002	1.423**	-0.005
IN	-0.055	-0.007	0.394**	-0.003	0.287	0.014*
IA	-0.396	0.114	0.405**	-0.016**	-0.244	-0.002
KS	0.466	0.044	0.171	-0.007	0.234	0.009
KY	-0.030	0.003	0.384**	-0.008*	0.595*	0.015*
LA	-0.083	0.108*	0.246	-0.002	0.493*	0.017*
ME	0.834	-0.131	0.108	-0.008	-0.961	0.025
MD	0.029	-0.004	1.002**	-0.001	0.950**	0.009
MA	0.232	0.241**	0.675	-0.003*	0.280	0.001
MI	-0.128	-0.076*	0.784**	-0.007**	-0.127	0.027**
MN	-0.088	0.005	0.446**	-0.009**	0.641**	-0.005
MS	0.192	0.029	-0.306*	-0.008	-0.321	0.027**
MO	-0.285	0.042	-0.061	-0.010**	0.203	0.007
MT	0.196	-0.057	0.472*	-0.007	0.634	0.011
NV	0.319	-0.006	-0.089	-0.016**	0.198	0.004
NH	-0.766	0.252*	0.612	-0.012	0.513	-0.002
NJ	-0.425**	0.046	0.632	-0.001	0.647**	0.012*
NM	0.126	-0.005	0.410*	0.005	0.528	0.021*
NY	0.024	0.068*	0.795**	-0.003**	0.548**	0.008*
NC	-0.215	0.060	0.536**	-0.006**	0.467*	0.015**
ND	-0.474	-0.216	0.702*	-0.014	0.346	0.041
OH	-0.118	-0.062	0.537**	-0.006**	0.175	0.018**
OK	0.331	0.024	0.261*	-0.002	0.492	0.016*
OR	0.048	-0.040	0.553**	-0.004	0.576	0.033**
PA	0.048	0.037	0.047	-0.010**	0.281	0.007
RI	1.384		1.269**	-0.009	-0.113	0.032
SC	0.114	-0.070	0.769**	-0.002	0.780**	0.002
SD	0.587	0.082	0.403*	-0.004	0.968	0.052*
TN	0.330	-0.079	0.395**	-0.006*	0.756**	0.013*
TX	0.518**	-0.027	0.314**	-0.001	0.272*	-0.001
UT	-0.127	-0.013	0.507**	-0.004	-0.085	0.008
VT	-0.372	0.083	0.544	-0.026*	-0.271	0.066*
VA	-0.033	0.031	0.207*	-0.001	0.653**	0.019**
WA	0.526*	0.055	1.134**	-0.008**	0.155	-0.001
WI	0.222	-0.001	0.293*	-0.011**	0.091	0.020**
WY	-0.141	0.335	0.612	-0.004	0.555	0.078*

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

The state by state OLS models in Table SI-6 bolster the simpler bivariate plots in the body of the paper. When controlling for spreading the wealth and multiple policy need measures, very few states exhibit positive and significant political targeting effects. On the other hand, policy need and spreading the wealth (the LIC in county measure) are significant in many states.

Table SI-7: OLS Regression Results with Swing County Variable. Swing counties defined as those in which the governor got between 44 and 55 percent in the prior election.

	All	Republicans	Democrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Gov. Swing County	−0.008	−0.011	−0.005
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.010)
LD Party Match	0.013	0.00001	0.035**
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.010)
LICS in County Inv.	0.404***	0.382***	0.520***
	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.088)
Med HH Income	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Poverty Rate	0.570***	0.486***	0.680***
	(0.106)	(0.131)	(0.151)
UI Investment Score	0.010***	0.010**	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Observations	30,271	18,007	12,264
R^2	0.072	0.062	0.089
Adjusted R^2	0.070	0.060	0.087
Note:			* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
			Models include state FEs.
			Standard errors clustered by state.

Table SI-8: OLS Regression Results, All States, Including Contiguous Tracts

	All	Republicans	Democrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Gov. Vote County	0.032	0.102	−0.034
	(0.044)	(0.071)	(0.038)
LD Party Match	0.010	−0.006	0.032***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)
LICS in County Inv.	0.139***	0.107**	0.207**
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.053)
Med HH Income	−0.004***	−0.005***	−0.004***
	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Poverty Rate	0.688***	0.613***	0.806***
	(0.098)	(0.120)	(0.132)
UI Investment Score	0.007***	0.007**	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	40,391	24,302	16,089
R^2	0.103	0.094	0.119
Adjusted R^2	0.102	0.093	0.118
Note:	* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001		
	Models include state FEs.		
	Standard errors clustered by state.		

The models in Table SI-8 replicate Table **??**, but include contiguous tracts. We exclude contiguous LICs from our main analysis because governors could only select them if they also selected an LIC that was contiguous with the tract. Overall, there were 10,249 contiguous tracts, only 201 (1.7%) were selected. As these tracts could only be selected if a contiguous LIC were also selected, the decision to select them is not independent of other decisions made by the governor.

Table SI-9: OLS Regression Results, Excluding UI Investment Score

	All	Republicans	Democrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Gov. Vote County	0.035	0.125	−0.037
	(0.056)	(0.092)	(0.041)
LD Party Match	0.011	−0.015	0.046***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.008)
LICS in County Inv.	0.366***	0.326***	0.475***
	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.082)
Med HH Income	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Poverty Rate	0.565***	0.498***	0.671***
	(0.105)	(0.124)	(0.154)
Observations	30,480	18,100	12,380
R^2	0.066	0.058	0.081
Adjusted R^2	0.064	0.056	0.080
Note:	* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001		
	Models include state FEs.		
	Standard errors clustered by state.		

The models in Table SI-9 replicate Table **??**, but exclude the UI Investment Score Variable.

Table SI-10: OLS Regression Results with Urban-Rural Classifications

	All	Republicans	Democrats
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Gov. Vote County	0.041	0.108	−0.024
	(0.059)	(0.077)	(0.039)
LD Party Match	0.005	−0.026	0.045***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.008)
LICS in County Inv.	0.371***	0.335***	0.486***
	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Med HH Income	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Poverty Rate	0.588***	0.506***	0.697***
	(0.105)	(0.128)	(0.150)
UI Investment Score	0.011***	0.010***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
UR Class. Large Fringe Metro	0.040	0.041	0.035
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.028)
UR Class. Medium Metro	0.001	−0.001	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.024)
UR Class. Small Metro	0.003	0.010	−0.002
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.020)
UR Class. Micropolitan	0.055	0.073	0.035
	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.032)
UR Class. Non-core	0.020	0.023	0.030
	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.040)
Observations	30,271	18,007	12,264
R^2	0.073	0.065	0.090
Adjusted R^2	0.072	0.063	0.088
Note:			* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
			Models include state FEs.
			Standard errors clustered by state.

The models in Table SI-10 replicate Table **??**, but includes each county's NCHS Urban-Rural Classification (https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data_access/urban_rural.htm).



Figure SI-2: Proportion of counties with at least one QOZ, by state.

Examples of States Explicitly Incorporating Counties

- Washington: https://www.commerce.wa.gov/growing-the-economy/opportunity-zones/
  - "County ADO Set-Aside: up to 69 tracts total Each county, through the applicable ADO, may nominate a certain number of eligible census tracts within the county for designation. The number of tracts per county is allocated based on the total number of eligible tracts in the county, and is shown in Appendix A. Counties will receive a minimum of one and a maximum of five tracts through this formula."
- North Carolina: https://public.nccommerce.com/oz/
  - "Opportunity for all: Aim for at least one Opportunity Zone in every county"
- Massachusetts: https://www.mass.gov/news/us-treasury-department-approves-baker-polito-administration-opportunity-zone-designations
  - Governor Charlie Baker: "Our administration looks forward to building out the program to advance job creation and economic activity in every county of the Commonwealth"
- New Jersey: https://nj.gov/governor/njopportunityzones/faqs/
  - "75 municipalities, representing every county in New Jersey, received at least one Opportunity Zone"
- Alabama: https://adeca.alabama.gov/Divisions/opportunityzones/Pages/Opportunity-Zones.aspx
  - "The Governor's Office, with the help of ADECA, identified and selected the 158 Opportunity Zones from the qualifying tracts. There is at least one Opportunity Zone in each of the state's 67 counties."