Candidate Filtering:
The Strategic Use of Electoral Manipulations in Russia
Supplementary Appendix

November 23, 2020

Contents

A   Summary Statistics

- Table A1 gives the summary statistics for the analysis sample used in the main regression results in Table 5 of the main text.

TABLE A1: SUMMARY STATISTICS - CANDIDATE LEVEL

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Age (log)	106,236	3.803	0.243	2.944	3.664	3.989	4.644
Female	106,236	0.264	0.441	0	0	1	1
College Education	99,350	0.689	0.463	0	0	1	1
Businessperson	106,236	0.126	0.332	0	0	0	1
Num. Previous Campaigns	106,236	0.590	1.553	0	0	1	142
Num. Previous Wins	106,236	0.177	0.447	0	0	0	6
Num. Previous Rejections	106,236	0.030	0.273	0	0	0	27
Candidate was Incumbent	106,236	0.148	0.355	0	0	0	1
Open Seat	106,236	0.434	0.496	0	0	1	1
Independent	106,236	0.636	0.481	0	0	1	1
Communist Party	106,236	0.032	0.176	0	0	0	1
LDPR	106,236	0.068	0.252	0	0	0	1
Just Russia	106,236	0.028	0.166	0	0	0	1
United Russia	106,236	0.219	0.413	0	0	0	1
Smaller Parties	106,236	0.017	0.128	0	0	0	1
Municipality - Population (log)	104,928	7.739	1.561	2.398	6.635	8.679	13.988
Municipality - Territory (log)	97,234	10.159	1.817	3.178	9.138	11.060	17.275
Municipality - Expenditures (log)	85,778	9.838	2.044	5.908	8.368	10.765	20.816

B Observational Data on Candidate Rejections: Robustness

B.1 Measures of Past Rejections

- The main analysis in Table 5 included a count of previous campaigns each candidate had participated in prior to running for mayor in the each election. Even though that measure helped capture the 'seriousness' of each candidate's application, concerns might still arise that whether due to a lack of resources or simple incompetence, some candidates may systemically submit unreasonable registration applications and thus invite completely justified rejections from electoral commissions. The empirical regularities uncovered in Table 5 of the main text then only reflect differences in party organizational capacity, and not any systemic repression of opposition candidates who pose threats to the regime.

- To account for this possibility, Table B1 includes a count of the number of rejections each candidate experienced *before* they ran for mayor. This measure should be interpreted carefully. On one hand, it may be capturing exactly the deficiencies in registration applications described above (for example, an inability to collect the necessary number of verified signatures because of a lack of infrastructure or societal support). On the other, if we believe the story that some candidates experience persistent political discrimination, then these past rejections could be capturing a kind of 'political gadfly' status. These candidates try time and again to challenge the regime but are consistently thwarted.

- Including this measure of past rejections does not affect the main results. First, the variables capturing electoral vulnerability and candidate viability are all still statistically significant even when past rejections are controlled for. Rejections are more likely to occur when mayoral races do not see incumbents running for office. Moreover, more educated candidates, those working in the private sector, and those without a party affiliation are all more likely to be rejected, with the latter effect magnified by having won office previously.

TABLE B1: CANDIDATE REJECTIONS - INCLUDING PREVIOUS REJECTIONS

	Candidate Had Registration Rejected					
	With UR Cands.			Without UR Cands.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age (log)	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.009*	0.009*	0.009*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	−0.014***	−0.014***	−0.014***	−0.021***	−0.021***	−0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
College Education	0.008***	0.008***	0.007***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Businessperson	0.017***	0.017***	0.017***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Num. Previous Campaigns	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.003***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Num. Previous Wins	0.041***	0.041***	0.041***	0.039***	0.039***	0.039***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Num. Previous Rejections	−0.007***	−0.007***	−0.015***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.036***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Candidate was Incumbent	−0.016***	−0.009***	−0.009***	−0.048***	−0.042***	−0.043***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Open Seat		0.010***	0.010***		0.014***	0.014***
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
LDPR	0.001	0.003	0.004			
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)			
Independent	0.126***	0.128***	0.124***	0.131***	0.131***	0.126***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Communist Party	−0.007*	−0.004	−0.004	−0.008*	−0.008*	−0.008*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Smaller Parties	0.002	0.005	0.008	−0.006	−0.007	−0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Just Russia	−0.003	−0.001	0.001	−0.005	−0.005	−0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
LDPR * Num. Previous Wins			−0.018***			
			(0.005)			
Independent * Num. Previous Wins			0.021***			0.043***
			(0.004)			(0.006)
Communist Party * Num. Previous Wins			−0.003			0.018**
			(0.006)			(0.008)
Smaller Parties * Num. Previous Wins			−0.027**			−0.003
			(0.012)			(0.013)
Just Russia * Num. Previous Wins			−0.014*			0.006
			(0.008)			(0.009)
Region, Year, Municipality Type Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.098	0.098	0.098
Observations	99,350	99,350	99,350	76,713	76,713	76,713

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a candidate was rejected by an election commission. The unit of analysis is the candidate. Columns 1-3 include the entire sample of candidates that attempted to register and run for mayor in their municipality. Columns 4-6 exclude all candidates from the United Russia ruling party. All models include region, year and municipality type fixed effects and cluster standard errors on election. This table differs from Table 5 of the main text by including a measure of past rejections per candidate in all models.

B.2 Dropping Education From the Models

- Data on highest education level achieved is not available for roughly 6% of candidates in the main sample. This missingness is more pronounced for elections happening in either the early years (2005-2007) or the later years (2014-2019) of the sample, largely because of differences in reporting requirements across different subnational commissions. The year fixed effects should absorb much of this missingness, but as an additional robustness check, Table B2 shows the same models as in the main text but dropping education as a predictor. We see that the other point estimates of interest are indeed robust to these reduced specifications (and increased sample size used).

TABLE B2: CANDIDATE REJECTIONS - EXCLUDING EDUCATION

	Candidate Had Registration Rejected					
	With UR Cands.			Without UR Cands.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age (log)	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.009*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	−0.014***	−0.014***	−0.014***	−0.021***	−0.020***	−0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Businessperson	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.010***	0.010***	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Num. Previous Campaigns	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.004***	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Num. Previous Wins	−0.007***	−0.007***	−0.014***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.036***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Candidate was Incumbent	−0.018***	−0.012***	−0.012***	−0.050***	−0.044***	−0.043***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Open Seat		0.010***	0.009***		0.013***	0.014***
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
LDPR	−0.0004	0.002	0.002			
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)			
Independent	0.124***	0.126***	0.122***	0.130***	0.130***	0.126***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Communist Party	−0.006*	−0.004	−0.004	−0.007	−0.007	−0.008*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Smaller Parties	0.008	0.010	0.014	0.001	0.0002	−0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Just Russia	−0.003	−0.001	0.001	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
LDPR * Num. Previous Wins			−0.016***			
			(0.005)			
Independent * Num. Previous Wins			0.020***			0.043***
			(0.004)			(0.006)
Communist Party * Num. Previous Wins			−0.004			0.018**
			(0.006)			(0.008)
Smaller Parties * Num. Previous Wins			−0.032***			−0.003
			(0.012)			(0.013)
Just Russia * Num. Previous Wins			−0.010			0.006
			(0.008)			(0.009)
Region, Year, Municipality Type Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.098	0.098	0.098
Observations	106,236	106,236	106,236	82,991	82,991	76,713

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a candidate was rejected by an election commission. The unit of analysis is the candidate. Columns 1-3 include the entire sample of candidates that attempted to register and run for mayor in their municipality. Columns 4-6 exclude all candidates from the United Russia ruling party. All models include region, year and municipality type fixed effects and cluster standard errors on election. This table differs from Table 5 of the main text by removing education as a control in the models.

B.3   Including Municipality Covariates

- Next, Table B3 shows models with municipality-level covariates that might be correlated with the government's capacity to process registration applications or manage the opposition. Data are available on the population size, territory, and overall government expenditures for 83% of the candidacies (and the equivalent number of elections).

- Overall, the results are robust to both including these measures and the loss of sample size that results. First, we see that candidates running in larger, wealthier jurisdictions (measured by population and expenditures) are more likely to be rejected. This possibly reflects the increased importance of these races, and the value the regime places on ensuring that the correct candidates reach the ballot. The main measures of electoral vulnerability and candidate viability both come through controlling for municipality characteristics, with the exception of the indicator for college education. The results suggest a strong correlation between having a college education and population size, with the latter coefficient potentially dominating in the empirical horse race. However, businesspeople and independents both see higher rejection rates, particularly those that have held office previously.

TABLE B3: CANDIDATE REJECTIONS - MUNICIPAL COVARIATES

| | Candidate Had Registration Rejected | | | | | |
| | With UR Cands. | | | Without UR Cands. | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age (log)	−0.0004	−0.0001	−0.0004	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	−0.007***	−0.007***	−0.008***	−0.014***	−0.013***	−0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
College Education	−0.0004	−0.0005	−0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Businessperson	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.007*	0.007*	0.007*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Num. Previous Campaigns	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Num. Previous Wins	−0.011***	−0.011***		−0.005	−0.005	
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.000)
Candidate was Incumbent	−0.011***	−0.004	−0.004	−0.044***	−0.039***	−0.040***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Open Seat		0.010***	0.009***		0.013***	0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
LDPR	−0.003	−0.001	−0.001			
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)			
Independent	0.122***	0.125***	0.120***	0.132***	0.132***	0.126***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Communist Party	−0.012***	−0.010**	−0.011**	−0.011**	−0.011**	−0.010**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Smaller Parties	−0.028***	−0.026**	−0.025**	−0.038***	−0.039***	−0.038***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Just Russia	−0.006	−0.004	−0.001	−0.004	−0.004	−0.0001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
LDPR * Num. Previous Wins			−0.017***			
			(0.005)			
Independent * Num. Previous Wins			0.026***			0.047***
			(0.005)			(0.007)
Communist Party * Num. Previous Wins			−0.001			0.017*
			(0.007)			(0.009)
Smaller Parties * Num. Previous Wins			−0.018			0.005
			(0.014)			(0.015)
Just Russia * Num. Previous Wins			−0.020***			−0.003
			(0.008)			(0.009)
Municipality - Population (log)	0.020***	0.020***	0.020***	0.027***	0.026***	0.026***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Municipality - Territory (log)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Municipality - Expenditures (log)	0.007**	0.007**	0.007**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Region, Year, Municipality Type Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.098	0.098	0.098
Observations	81,139	81,139	81,139	62,561	62,561	62,561

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a candidate was rejected by an election commission. The unit of analysis is the candidate. Columns 1-3 include the entire sample of candidates that attempted to register and run for mayor in their municipality. Columns 4-6 exclude all candidates from the United Russia ruling party. All models include region, year and municipality type fixed effects and cluster standard errors on election. This table differs from Table 5 of the main text by including three municipality-level covariates: population, territory, and government expenditures.

B.4 Varying Previous Experience in Government

- Not all previous government experience is the same. Table B4 breaks down where candidates served in elected office before running for mayor. Note that these data are only available for elected positions, as complete information on employment on the executive branch is not available down to the municipality, or even regional, level in Russia. Table B4 includes simple interactions between party affiliation and Number of Previous Wins at the municipal level (city council or mayor) in Columns 3-4, city level ('gorodskyi okrug') in Columns 5-6, or regional levels (governor or legislator) in Columns 7-8. The baseline results for the total number of previous wins, regardless of government level, are shown in Columns 1-2. For ease of presentation, the interaction effects shown at the bottom of the table reflect an interaction between party membership and the count of previous wins at the level indicated in the column header.

- Overall, there is not substantial variation between the different levels of government experience. The point estimates on the interactions with regional wins are larger in magnitude, but are more noisily estimated due to the small number of individuals with this background. Therefore, we cannot say with confidence that the differences between the levels are statistically significant.

TABLE B4: CANDIDATE REJECTIONS - PREVIOUS WINS

| | Candidate Had Registration Rejected | | | | | | | |
| | All Previous Wins | | Municipal Wins | | City Wins | | Regional Wins | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age (log)	0.006	0.009*	0.005	0.009*	0.005	0.009*	0.005	0.009*
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Female	−0.014***	−0.021***	−0.014***	−0.021***	−0.014***	−0.020***	−0.014***	−0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
College Education	0.007***	0.012***	0.007***	0.012***	0.008***	0.012***	0.008***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Businessperson	0.017***	0.012***	0.017***	0.012***	0.017***	0.012***	0.016***	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Num. Previous Campaigns	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Num. Previous Wins	−0.033***	−0.036***						
	(0.005)	(0.005)						
Num. Previous Wins - Municipal			−0.028***	−0.029***				
			(0.005)	(0.006)				
Num. Previous Wins - City					−0.041***	−0.035***		
					(0.012)	(0.014)		
Num. Previous Wins - Regional							−0.055***	−0.057***
							(0.010)	(0.011)
Candidate was Incumbent	−0.009***	−0.043***	−0.010***	−0.043***	−0.006**	−0.046***	−0.005	−0.042***
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Open Seat	0.010***	0.014***	0.010***	0.014***	0.010***	0.014***	0.010***	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
LDPR	−0.004		−0.003		−0.003		−0.004	
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Independent	0.121***	0.126***	0.121***	0.127***	0.124***	0.130***	0.124***	0.130***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Communist Party	−0.008*	−0.008*	−0.009*	−0.009*	−0.008*	−0.009**	−0.008*	−0.008*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Smaller Parties	0.004	−0.004	0.004	−0.005	0.0001	−0.008	−0.001	−0.008
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Just Russia	−0.002	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.005	−0.006	−0.004	−0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
LDPR * Num. Previous Wins	0.018***		0.014***		0.023*		0.034***	
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.012)		(0.010)	
Independent * Num. Previous Wins	0.039***	0.043***	0.033***	0.035***	0.031**	0.045***	0.039***	0.058***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Communist Party * Num. Previous Wins	0.016**	0.018**	0.018**	0.019**	0.021	0.039*	0.015	0.028*
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Smaller Parties * Num. Previous Wins	−0.009	−0.003	−0.010	−0.004	0.041	0.049	0.052	0.063*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Just Russia * Num. Previous Wins	0.004	0.006	0.001	0.002	0.036	0.051*	0.013	0.028*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Region, Year, Municipality Type Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.077	0.098	0.077	0.098	0.077	0.098	0.077	0.098
Observations	99,350	76,713	99,350	76,713	99,350	76,713	99,350	76,713

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a candidate was rejected by an election commission. The unit of analysis is the candidate, with odd-numbered columns showing the full sample of all candidates and even-numbered columns subsetting the sample to only those candidates not affiliated with United Russia. Columns 1-2 are the baseline models (Columns 3 and 6 from Table 5 of the main text. The remaining columns show interactions between party and previous wins at the municipal level (Columns 3-4), city level (Columns 5-6), and regional level (7-8).

B.5 Excluding Candidates Who Lost Their Status

- The analysis sample in the main text looks at candidates who either received an explicit rejection at the time of their application or 'lost' their positive registration status later in the campaign. In the latter case, election commissions may have uncovered new information to retroactively rescind registrations. Table B5 restricts the operationalization of the rejection indicator to include only those candidates that were initially rejected by the election commission (and not those who had their registration revoked later but still prior to the election). Running the same models as Table 5 in the main text, Table B5 shows the main effects are robust to this alternate coding approach. Several of the point estimates of interest, such as capturing private sector experience, independent political status, and previous experience, are larger in size.

TABLE B5: INCLUDING CANDIDATES WHO LOST THEIR STATUS

| | Candidate Had Registration Rejected | | | | | |
| | With UR Cands. | | | Without UR Cands. | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age (log)	0.008**	0.009**	0.009**	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	−0.014***	−0.014***	−0.014***	−0.020***	−0.020***	−0.020***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
College Education	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Businessperson	0.018***	0.018***	0.017***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Num. Previous Campaigns	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Num. Previous Wins	−0.008***	−0.008***	−0.016***	−0.004	−0.004	−0.033***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Candidate was Incumbent	−0.013***	−0.007***	−0.007***	−0.041***	−0.036***	−0.037***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Open Seat		0.009***	0.009***		0.012***	0.012***
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
LDPR	−0.00002	0.002	0.002			
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)			
Independent	0.103***	0.106***	0.102***	0.109***	0.109***	0.105***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Communist Party	−0.008**	−0.005*	−0.007*	−0.009**	−0.009**	−0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Smaller Parties	0.012	0.014*	0.017*	0.004	0.004	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Just Russia	−0.007**	−0.005	−0.005	−0.008*	−0.008*	−0.007
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
LDPR * Num. Previous Wins			−0.014***			
			(0.004)			
Independent * Num. Previous Wins			0.020***			0.036***
			(0.004)			(0.006)
Communist Party * Num. Previous Wins			0.002			0.018***
			(0.005)			(0.007)
Smaller Parties * Num. Previous Wins			−0.020*			−0.001
			(0.010)			(0.011)
Just Russia * Num. Previous Wins			−0.005			0.010
			(0.007)			(0.008)
Region, Year, Municipality Type Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.098	0.098	0.098
Observations	99,350	99,350	99,350	76,713	76,713	76,713

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a candidate was only rejected by an election commission. The unit of analysis is the candidate. Columns 1-3 include the entire sample of candidates that attempted to register and run for mayor in their municipality. Columns 4-6 exclude all candidates from the United Russia ruling party. All models include region, year and municipality type fixed effects and cluster standard errors on election.

B.6   Including Incumbent Previous Vote Share

- In the main text, I measure electoral competitiveness using a binary indicator for whether the contested election saw an incumbent running for re-election. In this robustness check, I include a measure of the vote share of incumbent party in the previous full election (regardless of whether the individual representing that party defended his or her position later on).[1] Although this measure of competitiveness is taken from the previous electoral cycle, it sheds light on the strength of ruling machine in the municipality: how able were they to fend off challengers in the past? The theoretical claims suggest municipalities with weaker incumbents should see more rejections.

- The results in Table B6 provide support for this empirical implication. The models are identical to that in Table 5 in the main text, divided into two sections for all candidates and just those outside the ruling party. The first column in each section gives the original model specification excluding the "Incumbent Previous Share" measure. I also exclude the 'Open Seat' variable since it is directly endogenous to the "Incumbent Previous Share" indicator. The results are nearly identical when it is included, though the point estimates on "Incumbent Previous Share" are only significant at the 0.10 level.

- The biggest difference from the main analysis is the significant drop in sample size. This occurs because mayoral terms last from four to six years, while the data are mainly available from 2005 onwards and many municipalities had only appointed mayors between 2005-2014. Thus we lose roughly 65% of the observations.

- Even so, there is a clear, negative, and statistically significant relationship between incumbent previous vote share and the likelihood of a candidate seeing his or her registration rejected. The substantive effects are also meaningful. A one standard deviation increase in incumbent vote share reduces the overall probability of a given candidate being rejected by 6% (a 0.6% change in real percentage points).

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[1] I identify previous elections happening more than 3 years prior using OKTMO codes for each municipality.

TABLE B6: CANDIDATE REJECTIONS - INCUMBENT PREVIOUS SHARE

| | Candidate Had Registration Rejected | | | | | |
| | With UR Cands. | | | Without UR Cands. | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age (log)	0.007	0.013*	0.013*	0.010**	0.017**	0.017**
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Female	−0.014***	−0.025***	−0.025***	−0.021***	−0.036***	−0.036***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
College Education	0.008***	0.005	0.005	0.012***	0.009*	0.009*
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Businessperson	0.017***	0.009	0.009	0.012***	0.003	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Num. Previous Campaigns	−0.002**	−0.002**	−0.001**	−0.002***	−0.002**	−0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Num. Previous Wins	−0.010***	−0.009**	−0.0005	−0.004	−0.009*	−0.038***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Candidate was Incumbent	−0.016***	−0.012***	−0.017***	−0.049***	−0.050***	−0.053***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Incumbent Previous Share		−0.025**	−0.026**		−0.035**	−0.035**
		(0.013)	(0.013)		(0.017)	(0.017)
LDPR	−0.001	0.004	0.012***			
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)			
Independent	0.127***	0.162***	0.166***	0.133***	0.161***	0.155***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Communist Party	−0.006	−0.015***	−0.010	−0.006	−0.022***	−0.026***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Smaller Parties	0.010	0.005	0.013	0.002	−0.008	−0.009
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Just Russia	−0.003	−0.010	−0.002	−0.003	−0.015**	−0.016**
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)
LDPR * Num. Previous Wins			−0.035***			
			(0.006)			
Independent * Num. Previous Wins			−0.007			0.035***
			(0.006)			(0.008)
Communist Party * Num. Previous Wins			−0.011			0.029***
			(0.007)			(0.009)
Smaller Parties * Num. Previous Wins			−0.029**			0.010
			(0.013)			(0.014)
Just Russia * Num. Previous Wins			−0.020**			0.019*
			(0.010)			(0.011)
Region, Year, Municipality Type Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.098	0.098	0.098
Observations	99,350	34,756	34,756	76,713	26,486	26,486

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a candidate was rejected by an election commission. The unit of analysis is the candidate. Columns 1-3 include the entire sample of candidates that attempted to register and run for mayor in their municipality. Columns 4-6 exclude all candidates from the United Russia ruling party. All models include region, year and municipality type fixed effects and cluster standard errors on election.

B.7   Logit Models

- The main analysis uses linear probability models (OLS) to analyze the binary outcome. Several regions see no rejections during the time period; including region fixed effects would be problematic. As a robustness check, Table B7 shows logistic models using the same set of predictors but restricting the sample to only non-UR candidates. The main empirical results are robust to these specifications.

TABLE B7: CANDIDATE REJECTIONS: LOGIT MODELS

	Candidate Had Registration Rejected Without UR Cands.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age (log)	0.010**	0.010**	0.010**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	−0.017***	−0.017***	−0.017***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
College Education	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Businessperson	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Num. Previous Campaigns	−0.003**	−0.003**	−0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Num. Previous Wins	−0.001	−0.001	−0.081***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.021)
Candidate was Incumbent	−0.040***	−0.037***	−0.038***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Open Seat		0.012***	0.012***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Communist Party	0.101***	0.101***	0.097***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Smaller Parties	−0.013	−0.014	−0.017*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Independent	0.048***	0.047***	0.045***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Just Russia	0.001	0.001	0.0001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Independent * Num. Previous Wins			0.084***
			(0.021)
Communist Party * Num. Previous Wins			0.065***
			(0.025)
Smaller Parties * Num. Previous Wins			0.036
			(0.030)
Just Russia * Num. Previous Wins			0.047*
			(0.028)
Region, Year, Municipality Type Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.077	0.077	0.077
Observations	76,713	76,713	76,713

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a candidate was rejected by an election commission. The unit of analysis is the candidate. The sample excludes all candidates from the United Russia ruling party given the lack of variation across regions and years. All models are logistic, include region, year and municipality type fixed effects, and cluster standard errors on election. Marginal effects are shown.

B.8 A Focus on Independents

- Most of the rejections analyzed in the paper are directed towards independent candidates. In the main text, I run analysis comparing across all candidates from outside the ruling party. This section digs in further into the potential differences between independents and party-affiliated candidates.

- First in Table B8, I compare the demographic characteristics between candidates choosing different types of political affiliations. From left to right, the first five columns denote the major groupings participating in mayoral elections in Russia: United Russia, Communists, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Just Russia, and Independents. Independents not only look similar on demographics, they enjoy similar success at the ballot box, winning the same vote share as the two leading systemic opposition parties (KPRF and SR), and achieving victory at a slightly higher clip.

- Several independents can run in a single election, while parties only field one candidate per election. This can make it difficult to summarize across all independents, some of whom are small minnows with no real electoral shot while others are political heavyweights. To investigate further, the column 'Top Ind.' only includes independents which received the top vote share in the contested election. In other words, I restrict the sample to the 'strongest' independent candidate in each election. We see that the strongest independents do much better than candidates from other opposition parties. They win nearly 10% more vote share on average, leading to nearly three times the victory rate in the elections. This suggests that independents post the biggest threat to United Russia candidates.

- The farthest left column 'Ind. Rej' only includes independents who had their registration rejected before the election. Again, the rejected independents look very similar to their counterparts from other parties in terms of their age, education, and campaign experience. Unfortunately because they do not participate in the elections, we cannot observe these outcomes.

- Finally, in Table B9, I restrict the analysis to only independents, necessarily dropping the

party variables (and their interaction with Number of Wins). The aim is to investigate how other measures of candidate viability are correlated with rejection, holding constant the group of independent candidates. The results conclusively show that the main measures (education, business resources, number of previous wins, etc.) are all positively correlated with independents seeing their candidacies being rejected. The point estimates are statistically significant. This suggests that conditional on being an independent, having resources to challenge the regime increases one's chances of registration being rejected. Moreover, the point estimate on 'Open Seat' is positive and statistically significant: independents are more likely to be rejected when an incumbent is not defending his or her seat.

TABLE B8: CANDIDATE DEMOGRAPHICS - ALL PARTIES

	UR	KPRF	LDPR	SR	Ind.	Top Ind.	Ind. Rej.
(1) Total Num.	23,223	3,392	7,219	2,999	67,528	15,942	9,461
(2) Mean Age	48.4	49.5	40.4	46.6	45.8	45.9	46.0
(3) Female (%)	30.5	18.9	22.2	21.3	26.3	30.9	21.7
(4) College Education (%)	76.0	75.7	65.8	75.5	65.8	61.6	72.4
(5) Businessperson (%)	4.7	15.3	20.2	23.5	13.6	9.6	17.9
(6) Num. Previous Campaigns	0.6	1.0	1.9	0.9	0.4	0.4	0.5
(7) Num. Previous Wins	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
(8) Vote Share	56.8	20.4	9.1	17.5	19.2	29.9	
(9) Elections Won (%)	72.7	10.3	2.2	9.0	10.3	28.4	

Each column indicates candidates from the corresponding party: United Russia, Communists, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Just Russia, and Independents. 'Top Ind.' only includes independents which received the top vote share in the contested election. 'Ind. Rej' only includes independents who had their registration rejected before the election. The rows with the percentage sign show the average of the binary indicators for candidates in that group.

TABLE B9: CANDIDATE REJECTIONS - ONLY INDEPENDENTS

	Candidate Had Registration Rejected Only Independents		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age (log)	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Female	−0.021***	−0.020***	−0.020***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
College Education	0.013***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Businessperson	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Num. Previous Campaigns	−0.006**	−0.006**	−0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Num. Previous Wins	0.056***	0.056***	0.056***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Num. Previous Rejections	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Candidate was Incumbent	−0.053***	−0.045***	−0.045***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Open Seat		0.017***	0.017***
		(0.004)	(0.004)
Region, Year, Municipality Type Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome Mean	0.077	0.077	0.077
Observations	62,367	62,367	62,367

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a candidate was rejected by an election commission. The unit of analysis is the candidate. The columns restrict to only Independent Candidates. All models include region, year and municipality type fixed effects and cluster standard errors on election.

C   Candidate Filtering and Electoral Outcomes

- This section investigates whether incumbents who manipulate institutions achieve superior electoral outcomes. The models that follow should be treated with caution. The main text demonstrated that the decision to reject candidates is made based on both personal and contextual characteristics. After controlling for these factors, any unexplained variation may also be driving the electoral outcomes, undermining our ability to show definitively that filtering affects UR's performance in the subsequent elections (and does not just reflect other public opinion dynamics). That said, the exercise is still informative: does UR perform better in elections after its rivals have been prevented from competing?

- Table C1 aggregates data on candidate rejections to the election level and investigates how this strategy affects the ruling party's (UR) ability to hold onto power. The outcomes are an indicator for whether the UR candidate won (Columns 1-2), the vote share of that candidate (Columns 3-4), and overall turnout (Columns 5-6). The main predictor is a count of the number of rejections of independent candidates with previous electoral wins. I focus here on more credible challengers (those who have held office before), though the results are robust to different rejection measures. All models also include the number of candidates with previous wins who submitted applications to serve as a denominator, i.e. control for the pool of potential such candidates that could have been rejected. I show a variety of models that control for municipality characteristics, the number of candidates who were registered, and the set of fixed effects used in the main models.

- The results show clear correlations between the rejection of strong candidates and improved regime performance. For each candidate rejected, the ruling party's vote share increases by 2.8% and win probability increases by roughly 5%. The ruling party is more likely to carry elections where competition has been filtered out beforehand. That success comes at some cost. Columns 5 and 6 show that turnout drops after the slate has been restricted. The effects are not that large (1%), but could reflect less interest among voters in elections where the

outcome has been decided long ahead.

TABLE C1: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AFTER REJECTIONS

	UR Winner		UR Share of Vote		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Independents with Prev. Wins: # Rejected	0.051***	0.048***	0.028***	0.025***	−0.010**	−0.010**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Independents with Prev. Wins: All	−0.050***	−0.047***	−0.039***	−0.038***	0.005**	0.005**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Municipality - Population (log)	0.024***	0.006	0.010***	−0.001	−0.072***	−0.087***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Accepted Candidates (log)	−0.270***	−0.275***	−0.293***	−0.292***	0.015**	0.016**
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Municipality - Territory (log)		−0.005		−0.004**		0.003
		(0.004)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Municipality - Expenditures (log)		0.024***		0.015***		0.013***
		(0.006)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Region, Year, Municipality Type Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21,891	18,221	22,540	18,645	25,560	20,583

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table compares outcomes in elections where the filtering strategy has or has not been used. The outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is a binary indicator for whether the ruling party United Russia candidate won (if such a candidate ran). Columns 3 and 4 look at that candidate's overall vote share. Columns 5 and 6 look at turnout in that election. The sample sizes in Columns 1-2 are slightly smaller because the fixed effects force out groups of observations where only United Russia candidates won. Those in Columns 5 and 6 are slightly larger because elections where no UR candidates ran are included. All models include region, year, and municipality type fixed effects and cluster errors on region and election year.

D Survey Experiment (2019): Anger and Protest Outcomes

- The 2019 framing experiment was placed on an omnibus survey conducted by Levada Market Research between May 24 and 29th, 2019. The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with 1,616 adults aged 18-90. Respondents resided in 140 urban and rural population points across 51 Russian regions. Data on gender, age, education, location, and municipality size were used to create a representative sample of the Russian population with a margin of error of 3.4%. Several hard to reach and underpopulated regions were excluded from the sampling, as well as population points with fewer than 50 residents. The stratified sampling procedure began with population data on all municipalities, and then electoral precincts, to randomly select sampling points. A random walk was used to select households. Follow-up surveys were conducted over the telephone with roughly 35% of all respondents (536 out of 1,616) to confirm the data collected was correct.

- The original Russian wording of the survey experiment is given below. Note that all respondents were given the 'Preamble'.

Framing Experiment (Russian Version):

Preamble: Представьте себе, что в сентябре этого года в вашем населенном пункте пройдут выборы мэра/главы вашего города (муниципального района). Предположим, во время этой кампании становится известно, что

Control: ЦИК (центральная избирательная комиссия) приняла решение увеличить число избирательных участков в вашем населенном пункте.

Treatment 1: Независимый кандидат (беспартийный) не был допущен к выборам.

Treatment 2: Местная администрация организует карусели (т.е. развозят людей автобусами по избирательным участкам, чтобы они могли проголосовать на нескольких участках).

Treatment 3: На бюджетников (школьных учителей, врачей и т.д.) оказывается давление со стороны местной администрации с требованием проголосовать.

Outcome #1: Возмущает ли вас тот факт, что эти выборы не будут полностью честными и свободными?

00. Это будут честные выборы

01. Совсем не возмущает

02. Чуть-чуть возмущает

03. Немного возмущает

04. Достаточно сильно возмущает

05. Очень возмущает

09. Затрудняюсь ответить

Outcome #2: Насколько вероятно, что вы будете участвовать в гражданских акциях, направленных на повышение осведомленности о честности этих выборов (подписание петиций, участие в демонстрациях и т. д.)?

01. Определенно, не стану участвовать

02. Скорее, не стану участвовать

03. Может быть, а может быть и нет

04. Скорее, буду участвовать

05. Определенно, буду участвовать

09. Затрудняюсь ответить

D.1 Summary Statistics

- Table D1 gives summary statistics on the population surveyed in the 2019 survey.

TABLE D1: SUMMARY STATISTICS

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Male	1,616	0.442	0.497	0	0	1	1
Age (log)	1,616	3.752	0.390	2.890	3.466	4.060	4.511
Education	1,616	4.064	1.536	1	3	6	6
Economic Situation	1,613	3.031	0.964	1.000	3.000	4.000	6.000
City Size	1,616	2.708	1.313	1	2	4	5
Employed	1,616	0.577	0.494	0	0	1	1
Voted in 2018 Election	1,603	0.669	0.471	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000

D.2   Balance Checks

- Tables D2 and D3 show balance checks to assess assignment to treatment across the different groups in the population surveys. The covariates used to check balance are the same as those shown in Table 2 of the main text. Table D2 shows the results from two-sample difference-in-means between each of the experimental conditions, while Table D3 shows the results from Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests between each of the experimental conditions. The superscripts denote if the p-value returned by each test was statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The tests show there is broad balance over the covariates across the experimental conditions. In none of the comparisons do the tests return statistically significant differences.

TABLE D2: BALANCE TEST FOR 2019 SURVEY EXPERIMENT: TWO-SAMPLE DIFFERENCE-IN-MEANS TESTS

	Control	Treatment #1 (Filtering)	Treatment #2 (Carousels)	Treatment #3 (Workplace Mob.)
Male	0.44	0.43	0.43	0.47
Age (log)	3.72	3.77	3.76	3.76
Education	4.02	4.06	4.09	4.08
Economic Situation	3.03	3.05	3.04	3.00
Town Size	2.75	2.68	2.67	2.74
Employed	0.57	0.57	0.59	0.57
Voted in 2018 Election	0.64	0.70	0.68	0.65

Cell entries are mean levels of variable by experimental condition. Superscript letters indicate a statistically significant difference from two-sample difference in means tests (p-values less than 0.05) between conditions: a = difference vs. Control, b = difference vs. Treatment #1 (Filtering), c = difference vs. Treatment #2 (Carousels), d = difference vs. Treatment #3 (Workplace).

### TABLE D3: BALANCE TEST FOR 2019 SURVEY EXPERIMENT: KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TESTS

	Control	Treatment #1 (Filtering)	Treatment #2 (Carousels)	Treatment #3 (Workplace Mob.)
Male	0.44	0.43	0.43	0.47
Age (log)	3.72	3.77	3.76	3.76
Education	4.02	4.06	4.09	4.08
Economic Situation	3.03	3.05	3.04	3.00
Town Size	2.75	2.68	2.67	2.74
Employed	0.57	0.57	0.59	0.57
Voted in 2018 Election	0.64	0.70	0.68	0.65

Cell entries are mean levels of variable by experimental condition. Superscript letters indicate a statistically significant difference from Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests (p-values less than 0.05) between conditions: a = difference vs. Control, b = difference vs. Treatment #1 (Filtering), c = difference vs. Treatment #2 (Carousels), d = difference vs. Treatment #3 (Workplace).

## D.3 Regime versus Opposition Supporters

- How respondents view electoral fraud may depend on their political leanings. For example, given that independent and opposition candidates are most likely to be targeted with rejections, their supporters might be more aware of the practice and understand its strategic use by the regime. Oppositions supporters might also be more sensitive to the practice because the media they consume provides more extensive coverage of protests or demonstrations around the issue (for example, Alexey Navalny's 2018 presidential campaign). On the other hand, regime supporters may trust their government to hand down the right decisions and see nothing untoward in the fact that some candidate do not reach the ballot.

- Figures D1 and D2 split the 2019 experimental samples into regime and opposition supporters based on a question using a four-point scale about approval of President Putin. Respondents who answered 'Definitely not' or 'Probably not' were coded as supporters of the opposition, while those who answered 'Definitely yes' or 'Probably yes' were coded as supporters of the regime. The plots shown are identical to those in the main text, subset into these two samples.

- The main takeaway is that for both groups of respondents, candidate filtering still ranks as less problematic and worthy of protests than the other two types of electoral manipulations. Opposition supporters overall are more angered by all types of electoral manipulations and are more likely to protest. But even though candidate rejections are used against opponents of the regime, respondents who similarly oppose the government do not see this tool as uniformly undermining of electoral integrity. These results help back up the claim that a large degree of ambiguity surrounds registration decisions and variation between perceptions of electoral fraud cannot be explained by partisanship.

FIGURE D1: FRAMING EXPERIMENTS (2019): ONLY OPPOSITION SUPPORTERS

Panel A: Respondent Anger over Electoral Integrity

Panel B: Respondent Likelihood of Protesting

Panel A shows the mean level of anger over electoral integrity per control or treatment group, with a value of 1 indicating Not at all Angry and a value of 5 indicating Very Angry. Those who saw the elections as free and fair were coded as 0. Panel B shows the mean likelihood of participating in a collective action in protest over electoral integrity, with 1 indicating Not Likely to Participate and 5 indicating Very Likely to Participate. The sample is subset to only respondents who answered a 1 (Definitely not) or 2 (Probably not) on a four-scale scale whether they approved of President Putin.

FIGURE D2: FRAMING EXPERIMENTS (2019): ONLY REGIME SUPPORTERS

Panel A: Respondent Anger over Electoral Integrity

Panel B: Respondent Likelihood of Protesting

Panel A shows the mean level of anger over electoral integrity per control or treatment group, with a value of 1 indicating Not at all Angry and a value of 5 indicating Very Angry. Those who saw the elections as free and fair were coded as 0. Panel B shows the mean likelihood of participating in a collective action in protest over electoral integrity, with 1 indicating Not Likely to Participate and 5 indicating Very Likely to Participate. The sample is subset to only respondents who answered a 3 (Probably yes) or 4 (Definitely yes) on a four-scale scale whether they approved of President Putin.

D.4 Correlation between Outcomes

- Table D4 shows the correlation between Outcome #1 and Outcome #2, controlling for treatment status and demographics. The results show that respondents who give higher responses on the emotional (anger) five-point scale in Outcome #1 of the 2019 survey experiment, also express a higher willingness to protest, as measured in the five-point scale for Outcome #2.

TABLE D4: SURVEY EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE - CORRELATION BETWEEN OUTCOMES

Outcome:	Likelihood of Protesting	
Comparison Group:	Control	
	(1)	(2)
Outcome #1: Level of Anger	0.182***	0.195***
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Treatment #1: Candidate Filtering	−0.209**	−0.194*
	(0.100)	(0.100)
Treatment #2: Organizing Carousels	−0.205**	−0.193*
	(0.100)	(0.099)
Treatment #3: Workplace Mobilization	−0.145	−0.145
	(0.104)	(0.103)
Covariates	No	Yes
Observations	1,438	1,426

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the five-point scale indicating willingness to protest (the behavioral Outcome #2). The main predictor is the emotional Outcome #1 asked immediately prior. All demographics from Table 2 in the main text are included.

E Survey Experiment (2018): Turnout Outcome

E.1 Question Wordings: English and Russian

- This section gives the exact question wording for the 2018 framing experiment analyzing hypothetical turnout after respondents learn that elections are particularly compromised. Note that all respondents were given the 'Pure Control' preamble. As shown in Table E5, in the 'Pure Control' group, respondents were told of a hypothetical election and then asked immediately about whether they would vote. Respondents assigned to the 'Control' group were immediately asked about their voting propensity. Respondents assigned to any of the four 'Treatment' groups received additional information about how the campaign was conducted before being asked about their voting propensity.

- This framing experiment was placed on an omnibus survey conducted by Levada Market Research between March 23 and 27th, 2018. The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with 1,612 adults aged 18-90. Respondents resided in 97 urban population points and 40 rural municipalities across 51 Russian regions. Data on gender, age, education, location, and municipality size were used to create a representative sample of the Russian population with a margin of error of 3.4%. Several hard to reach and underpopulated regions were excluded from the sampling, as well as population points with fewer than 50 residents. The stratified sampling procedure began with population data on all municipalities, and then electoral precincts, to randomly select sampling points. A random walk was used to select households. Follow-up surveys were conducted over the telephone with roughly 30% of all respondents (495 out of 1612) to confirm the data collected was correct.

TABLE E5: SURVEY EXPERIMENT WORDING: ENGLISH VERSION

|		N	%
Pure Control	Suppose that elections to the State Duma were to be held in September of this year.	325	20.1
Control	The Central Election Commission increase the number of electoral precincts.	321	19.9
Treatment #1	The main opposition candidate is refused registration in the elections.	334	20.7
Treatment #2	Public sectors employees (school teachers, doctors, etc.) face pressure from local administrations to turn out.	296	18.3
Treatment #3	Local governments organize schemes so that multiple people voted ('karousels').	336	20.8
	How likely would you be to vote in this election? (1-5 scale)		
	Total	1,612	

Table E6: Survey Experiment Wording: Russian Version

		N	%
Pure Control	Представьте себе, что выборы в государственную думу были бы в сентябре этого года. Насколько вероятно, что вы примете участие в этом голосовании?	325	20.1
Control	На бюджетников (школьных учителей, врачей и т.д.) оказывается давление со стороны местной администрации с требованием проголосовать.	321	19.9
Treatment #1	Главный кандидат от оппозиции не был допущен к выборам.	334	20.7
Treatment #2	На бюджетников (школьных учителей, врачей и т.д.) оказывается давление со стороны местной администрации с требованием проголосовать.	296	18.3
Treatment #3	Местная администрация организует карусели.	336	20.8
Outcome:	Насколько вероятно, что вы примете участие в этом голосовании?		
Scale:	1 - Определенно, не стану голосовать		
	2 - Скорее, не стану голосовать		
	3 - Может быть, проголосую, а может быть и нет		
	4 - Скорее, проголосую		
	5 - Определенно, проголосую		

E.2 Experimental Analysis

- Table E3 presents the results of the survey experiment that uses turnout as an outcome variable. First, we see that there is no statistically significant difference between the Pure Control and Control groups. Learning that the election commission is changing the number of precincts does little to motivate or deter citizens from expressing an interest in voting. We can also be more confident that including extra information in the vignette about the electoral campaign is not having an independent causal effect on voter likelihood.

- Turning to the treatment arms, we see several patterns emerge. First, all three examples of electoral manipulation drive down citizen enthusiasm to participate in the election. All three treatment arms return means that are substantially smaller than both the Control and the Pure Control groups. Of these treatments, candidate filtering produces the smallest drop in turnout.

- Table E7 puts these results in a regression framework to more precisely estimate the differences between the groups. Column 1 uses the Pure Control group as a reference category, while including demographic characteristics as controls. Standard errors are clustered on region. We see that the three treatments significantly reduce respondent propensity to vote. These results are robust to the Control group used as a reference category (Column 2).

- Next, these negative effects vary across the specific type of electoral manipulation committed. On one hand, two treatments have nearly an identical, negative effect on voting likelihood: opposition candidate filtering and mobilization in the workplace. Russian voters appear to be similarly turned off by these two attempts to shape electoral outcomes, one happening through the co-optation of electoral institutions and the other through the use of clientelism to mobilize voters. But both point estimates are significantly smaller than those from the third treatment: the blatant falsification of the voter by the regime facilitating multiple voting through carousels. Column 3 uses that third treatment as a reference category, and shows that the point estimates both candidate filtering and workplace mobilization are larger and statistically significant.

FIGURE E3: TURNOUT EXPERIMENT

This figure shows the mean likelihood of voting per control, pure control, and treatment group.

TABLE E7: TURNOUT EXPERIMENT: MODELS

			Outcome: Respondent Would Turnout			
Reference Category:	Pure Control		Control		Carousels	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment #1: Candidate Filtering	−0.299***	−0.332***	−0.398***	−0.388***	0.601***	0.546***
	(0.114)	(0.106)	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.118)	(0.112)
Treatment #2: Workplace Mobilization	−0.333***	−0.337***	−0.432***	−0.393***	0.566***	0.535***
	(0.117)	(0.108)	(0.118)	(0.111)	(0.120)	(0.114)
Treatment #3: Organizing Carousels	−0.900***	−0.868***	−0.999***	−0.927***		
	(0.113)	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.108)		
Control: Election Commissions	0.099	0.056				
	(0.114)	(0.106)				
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,466	1,460	1,167	1,162	869	864

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable in this table is a five-point scale of a respondent's likelihood of voting in the next State Duma election. The reference group in the first column is the 'Pure Control' group, which did not receive any information about the electoral campaign. The reference group in the second column is the 'Control' group, which received information about electoral commissions. The reference group in the third column is the 'Treatment #3' group, which received information about election commissions. All models use OLS.

E.3 Balance Checks

- Tables E8 and E9 show balance checks to assess assignment to treatment across the different groups in the population surveys. Table E8 shows the results from two-sample difference-in-means between each of the experimental conditions, while Table E9 shows the results from Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests between each of the experimental conditions. The superscripts denote if the p-value returned by each test was statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The tests show there is broad balance over the covariates across the experimental conditions. The randomization appears to be done correctly.

TABLE E8: BALANCE TEST FOR TURNOUT SURVEY EXPERIMENT: TWO-SAMPLE
DIFFERENCE-IN-MEANS TESTS

	Pure Control	Control	Treatment #1 (Filtering)	Treatment #2 (Workplace Mob.)	Treatment #3 (Ballot Box)
Male	0.46	0.47	0.43	0.42	0.47
Age (log)	3.76	3.81^{ce}	3.74^{b}	3.78	3.74^{b}
Education	3.72	3.81	3.89	3.87	3.78
Family Economic Situation	3.07	3.02	3.13	3.04	3.06
City Size	2.72	2.53^{d}	2.62	2.80^{b}	2.71
Employed	0.56	0.54	0.51	0.58	0.57
Voted in 2018 Election	0.76	0.77	0.75	0.77	0.74

Cell entries are means by experimental condition. Superscript letters indicate a statistically significant difference from two-sample difference in means tests (p-values less than 0.05) between conditions: a = difference vs. Pure Control, b = difference vs. Control, c = difference vs. Treatment #1 (Filtering), d = difference vs. Treatment #2 (Workplace), d = difference vs. Treatment #3 (Carousels).

TABLE E9: BALANCE TEST FOR RUSSIA SURVEY EXPERIMENT: KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TESTS

	Pure Control	Control	Treatment #1 (Filtering)	Treatment #2 (Workplace Mob.)	Treatment #3 (Ballot Box)
Male	0.46	0.47	0.43	0.42	0.47
Age (log)	3.76	3.81^e	3.74	3.78	3.74^b
Education	3.72	3.81	3.89	3.87	3.78
Family Economic Situation	3.07	3.02	3.13	3.04	3.06
City Size	2.72	2.53	2.62	2.80	2.71
Employed	0.56	0.54	0.51	0.58	0.57
Voted in 2018 Election	0.76	0.77	0.75	0.77	0.74

Cell entries are means by experimental condition. Superscript letters indicate a statistically significant difference from Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests (p-values less than 0.05) between conditions: a = difference vs. Pure Control, b = difference vs. Control, c = difference vs. Treatment #1 (Filtering), d = difference vs. Treatment #2 (Workplace), d = difference vs. Treatment #3 (Carousels).