

Online Appendix

Appendix A: Data and Measures

We mainly rely on the data collected by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project for the dependent variables: the two aspects of accountability. The V-Dem data is based on judgements of around 3,000 local and cross-national experts, and covers nearly all polities in the world from 1900-2018. As previous studies have pointed out, there are several potential sources of measurement uncertainty in an expert survey, including that experts may have different levels of reliability (Marquardt et al., 2019) and scale perceptions when rating latent concepts on an ordinal scale (e.g. Bakker et al., 2014; Lindstäadt et al., 2018). To account for these possibilities, the V-Dem project utilizes a Bayesian item response theory (IRT) model to aggregate expert ratings (Pemstein et al., 2018). In addition, bridging-coders, experts who coded multiple countries, are recruited to calibrate the scales of estimates and facilitate cross-country comparison.

There are other limitations of expert surveys that cannot be entirely resolved by an IRT framework. For example, as an anonymous reviewer reminded us, receiving Chinese development projects may further expose the governance quality of recipient countries and affect expert ratings of the accountability indicators (see Stubbs et al., 2014). However, different from some other datasets, which rely on a small group of experts to rate all units, the V-Dem experts are generally scholars who are residents or citizens of the country they are coding. It is expected that they are aware of the quality of institutions even without CRPs. Furthermore, in the main text, we include models using independent variables lagged by more periods and alternative measures of accountability for robustness checks to ensure that this potential bias does not drive the overall results. Another potential uncertainty of the V-Dem data is that experts may have less information about the institutional quality back in time. However, since our analyses are restricted to recent decades, we think this issue is less of a concern.

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Horizontal accountability	0.21	0.84	-1.81	1.91	1709
Checks	2.7	1.63	1	17	1591
Vertical accountability	0.54	0.67	-1.57	1.76	1709
Political competition	6.59	2.82	1	10	1547
China's flows % GNI (resource-related)	0.49	1.83	0	36.88	1709
China's flows per capita (resource-related)	7.82	37.32	0	660.48	1709
China's flows % GNI (other categories)	0.44	1.18	0	12.02	1703
China's flows per capita (other categories)	5.84	29.83	0	687.89	1709
China's SOE flows % GNI (resource-related)	0.47	1.69	0	29.35	1538
China's SOE flows per capita (resource-related)	7.86	39.18	0	660.48	1538
China's SOE flows % GNI (other categories)	0.15	0.66	0	9.89	1537
China's SOE flows per capita (other categories)	2.19	13.01	0	373.36	1538
China's non-SOE flows % GNI (resource-related)	0.06	0.51	0	10.89	1538
China's non-SOE flows per capita (resource-related)	0.75	5.50	0	76.15	1538
China's non-SOE flows % GNI (other categories)	0.05	0.26	0	3.63	1537
China's non-SOE flows per capita (other categories)	0.73	5.18	0	93.15	1538
ODA % GNI	8.51	13.67	0	172.29	1658
ODA per capita	69.46	88.37	0	616.61	1705
ln GDP per capita	8.47	1.01	6.22	10.72	1614
GDP growth	4.82	5.53	-62.08	63.38	1632
Oil export per capita	164.16	865.32	-1838.64	14557.53	1627
Gas export per capita	13.40	209.86	-662.65	3448.00	1627
Regional avg. polity	2.87	2.91	-4.06	7.26	1709
Democracy stock	-37.21	170.82	-448.88	490.01	1594

References

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Appendix B: Additional Tests

This appendix includes additional analyses to explore the robustness of findings reported in the main text. Models included in Tables [B.1](#) and [B.2](#) use ODA net disbursements as the measure of conventional aid. The data of ODA net disbursements per capita and as a share of GNI are taken from the WDI database.

Because the measures of Chinese financial flows are right-skewed, we utilize the log transformed values in the main analyses. To verify whether the results depend on the data transformation, in Table [B.3](#), we include the logged values of funds without divided by population (Models 1 and 2), non-logged % GNI measures (Models 3 and 4), and numbers of Chinese development projects in relevant categories (Models 5 and 6) as the key independent variables. The results of these models are consistent with those reported in the main text. The only exception is that in Model 3, the non-logged measure of CRPs is negatively associated with horizontal accountability, but the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. The coefficient is very close to significance, and it is about 2.5 times greater than the respective coefficient on vertical accountability (Model 4).

Table [B.4](#) includes models with different specifications for the time-series properties of the data. Models 1 and 2 include a year-count variable. The key independent variables in Models 3 and 4 are lagged by three years to partially address the endogeneity issue. Models 5 and 6 are based on the Anderson-Hsiao estimator wherein the equation is first-differenced, and the differenced lagged dependent variable (Δy_{t-1}) is instrumented with the two-year lagged dependent variable (y_{t-2}).

Models in Table [B.5](#) are based on imputed data. In the original sample, the dependent variables are missing for 2 country-years, and the measures of Chinese development projects are missing for about 25 observations. Among the control variables, the measures of net oil and gas exports contain more missing values (206 country-years). We conduct multiple imputations with the Amelia II program ([Honaker, King, & Blackwell, 2011](#)) and generate five imputed datasets based on all dependent and independent variables of Models 3 and 4 in Table [B.5](#). It is assumed that the data are missing at random (MAR), and the missing data can be predicted based on other observed variables. The complete dataset is assumed to be multivariate normal, and each variable is a linear function of all other variables in the imputation model. The coefficients of these models are consistent with those reported in the main text.

The dependent variables in Table [B.6](#) are composing variables of the V-Dem horizontal accountability index, including the capacity and practices of legislative and judicial institutions. The results show that CRPs have adverse effects on most of the indicators, particularly measures of the autonomy and capacity of legislatures and lower courts, whereas only high courts are less influenced. The dependent variables in Table [B.7](#) are components of the vertical accountability index, including the quality and competitiveness of elections. The coefficients for CRPs are negative for the measures of elected officials, quality and competitiveness of elections, and opposition autonomy, but they are statistically insignificant.

In Models 1 and 2 in Table [B.8](#), we aggregate all Chinese projects, and in Models 3 and 4, we only account for projects *not* in the categories of energy generation, mineral mining, and transportation. Consistent with the results reported in the main text, the negative effects of these other-category projects on horizontal accountability are not significant.

Table B.1: Regression estimates of the effect of CRPs (% GNI) on institutional accountability

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Horizontal accountability	Horizontal accountability	Horizontal accountability	Δ Horizontal accountability	Checks	Vertical accountability	Δ Vertical accountability	Political competition
ln China's flows % GNI (resource-related)	-0.0845** [0.0371]	-0.0940** [0.0396]	-0.0762** [0.0314]	-0.0406** [0.0173]	-0.345*** [0.0990]	-0.0595 [0.0422]	-0.0288 [0.0187]	-0.0437 [0.105]
Polity			0.0414*** [0.00851]					
Polity \times ln China's flows % GNI (resource-related)			0.00494 [0.00543]					
ln ODA % GNI (net disbursements)	0.00692 [0.00977]	0.00467 [0.0109]	-0.00509 [0.00987]	0.000131 [0.00425]	0.0966* [0.0511]	0.0224* [0.0120]	0.000784 [0.00540]	0.0487 [0.0410]
ln GDP per capita	0.102 [0.125]	0.0979 [0.133]	0.158 [0.116]	0.00179 [0.0539]	-0.563 [0.405]	0.0333 [0.160]	-0.0326 [0.0886]	-0.0798 [0.398]
GDP growth	-0.00364* [0.00220]	-0.00423* [0.00244]	-0.00524** [0.00201]	-0.00471** [0.00193]	0.0128** [0.00628]	-0.000619 [0.00420]	0.000198 [0.00349]	0.00554 [0.00548]
Oil export per capita		-0.000033* [0.000019]	-0.000041** [0.000019]	-0.000018* [0.000009]	0.000046 [0.000052]	-0.0000029 [0.000024]	-0.00001 [0.000012]	0.000029 [0.00008]
Gas export per capita		-0.000023 [0.000031]	-0.000018 [0.000033]	-0.000027 [0.00002]	-0.00023 [0.00016]	-0.000022 [0.00002]	-0.0000079 [0.000013]	-0.000037 [0.000069]
Regional avg. polity	0.0892*** [0.0242]	0.0735*** [0.0231]	0.0277* [0.0143]	0.00108 [0.00747]	-0.0154 [0.157]	0.125*** [0.0473]	0.0436*** [0.0164]	0.221** [0.110]
Democracy stock		-0.000702 [0.000768]	-0.00133* [0.000716]	-0.00104*** [0.000359]	0.00059 [0.00247]	-0.000593 [0.000816]	-0.000954** [0.000394]	-0.0000442 [0.00229]
LDV				-0.224*** [0.0417]			-0.346*** [0.0512]	
Constant	-0.806 [1.040]	-0.768 [1.105]	-1.276 [0.955]	0.0142 [0.448]	7.246** [3.346]	-0.117 [1.372]	0.299 [0.748]	6.707** [3.297]
Country FE	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Year FE	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
N	1604	1500	1500	1500	1352	1500	1500	1459
Countries	135	127	127	127	125	127	127	127
Log likelihood	280.6	301.1	399.5	848.2	-1813.2	58.82	480.9	-1497.6
adj. R-sq (within)	0.101	0.079	0.191	0.120	0.021	0.132	0.191	0.057

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard error in brackets. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.2: Regression estimates of the effect of CRPs (per capita) on institutional accountability

<i>DV</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Horizontal accountability	Horizontal accountability	Horizontal accountability	Δ Horizontal accountability	Checks	Vertical accountability	Δ Vertical accountability	Political competition
In China's flows per capita (resource-related)	-0.0455*** [0.0162]	-0.0507*** [0.0173]	-0.0497*** [0.0149]	-0.0184** [0.00720]	-0.134*** [0.0496]	-0.0307 [0.0194]	-0.0131 [0.00804]	0.00665 [0.0599]
Polity			0.0412*** [0.00812]					
Polity \times ln China's flows per capita (resource-related)			0.00265 [0.00221]					
ln ODA per capita (net disbursements)	0.00428 [0.00929]	0.00109 [0.0105]	-0.00862 [0.00945]	-0.00137 [0.00421]	0.0801 [0.0503]	0.0185 [0.0120]	-0.000161 [0.00518]	0.0560 [0.0386]
ln GDP per capita	0.108 [0.126]	0.0991 [0.133]	0.167 [0.115]	0.00415 [0.0548]	-0.581 [0.406]	0.0302 [0.158]	-0.0284 [0.0869]	-0.0579 [0.384]
GDP growth	-0.00362* [0.00218]	-0.00412* [0.00243]	-0.00509** [0.00200]	-0.00465** [0.00189]	0.0132** [0.00643]	-0.000687 [0.00433]	0.00000785 [0.00362]	0.00500 [0.00533]
Oil export per capita		-0.000029 [0.000019]	-0.000038** [0.000018]	-0.000015* [0.0000077]	0.000054 [0.000054]	-0.0000042 [0.000025]	-0.000012 [0.000014]	0.000028 [0.000078]
Gas export per capita		-0.000019 [0.000036]	-0.000012 [0.000038]	-0.000026 [0.000021]	-0.00023 [0.00016]	-0.000021 [0.000023]	-0.000012 [0.000018]	-0.000031 [0.000066]
Regional avg. polity	0.0874*** [0.0236]	0.0718*** [0.0222]	0.0253* [0.0137]	0.000750 [0.00752]	-0.0146 [0.158]	0.124*** [0.0469]	0.0432*** [0.0163]	0.221** [0.110]
Democracy stock		-0.000825 [0.000749]	-0.00158** [0.000741]	-0.00107*** [0.000358]	0.000519 [0.00245]	-0.000670 [0.000791]	-0.000963** [0.000385]	0.000129 [0.00228]
LDV				-0.227*** [0.0416]			-0.347*** [0.0508]	
Constant	-0.848 [1.041]	-0.776 [1.100]	-1.353 [0.953]	-0.00436 [0.455]	7.394** [3.355]	-0.0890 [1.361]	0.267 [0.735]	6.509** [3.181]
Country FE	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Year FE	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
N	1607	1501	1501	1501	1355	1501	1501	1461
Countries	135	127	127	127	125	127	127	127
Log likelihood	290.0	310.5	411.3	851.5	-1817.8	59.24	480.3	-1497.1
adj. R-sq (within)	0.109	0.089	0.203	0.122	0.018	0.132	0.191	0.059

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard error in brackets. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table B.3: Regression estimates of the effect of CRPs on institutional accountability

<i>DV</i>	Horizontal	Vertical	Horizontal	Vertical	Horizontal	Vertical
	accountability	accountability	accountability	accountability	competition	accountability
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ln China's flows (resource-related)	-0.00772*** [0.00249]	-0.00288 [0.00261]				
ln China's flows (other categories)	0.000860 [0.00256]	0.00179 [0.00235]				
ln ODA	0.0253* [0.0146]	0.0168 [0.0146]			0.0230* [0.0135]	0.0148 [0.0129]
China's flows % GNI (resource-related)			-0.00712 [0.00439]	-0.00277 [0.00386]		
China's flows % GNI (other categories)			0.00745 [0.00849]	-0.0132 [0.0168]		
ODA per capita			0.00210** [0.000864]	0.00336** [0.00132]		
Number of China's projects (resource-related)					-0.0214** [0.00924]	-0.0183 [0.0129]
Number of China's projects (other categories)					-0.00201 [0.00361]	-0.00495 [0.00478]
Regional avg. polity	0.0983*** [0.0254]	0.119*** [0.0391]	0.0991*** [0.0271]	0.122*** [0.0400]	0.102*** [0.0266]	0.125*** [0.0391]
Constant	-0.488* [0.271]	-0.102 [0.270]	-0.0355 [0.0676]	0.190** [0.0945]	-0.462* [0.256]	-0.0826 [0.245]
Country FE	v	v	v	v	v	v
Year FE	v	v	v	v	v	v
N	1709	1709	1658	1658	1733	1733
Countries	141	141	139	139	141	141
Log likelihood	199.7	54.85	256.0	77.73	169.5	50.37

Note:

All independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard error in brackets.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.4: Regression estimates of the effect of CRPs on institutional accountability

<i>DV</i>	Horizontal	Vertical	Horizontal	Vertical	Δ Horizontal	Δ Vertical
	accountability	accountability	accountability	accountability	accountability	accountability
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS
ln China's flows per capita (resource-related)	-0.0466*** [0.0155]	-0.0253 [0.0167]				
ln China's flows per capita (other categories)	0.00485 [0.0197]	-0.00155 [0.0197]				
ln ODA per capita	0.125*** [0.0359]	0.0990** [0.0425]				
ln China's flows per capita (resource-related) _{t-3}			-0.0324** [0.0163]	-0.0228 [0.0181]		
ln China's flows per capita (other categories) _{t-3}			0.00695 [0.0154]	0.00748 [0.0183]		
ln ODA per capita _{t-3}				0.0220 [0.0291]		
Δ ln China's flows per capita (resource-related)					-0.00701** [0.00339]	-0.000474 [0.00314]
Δ ln China's flows per capita (other categories)					-0.000557 [0.00454]	-0.00797 [0.00696]
Δ ln ODA per capita					-0.0288 [0.0187]	0.00224 [0.0139]
Regional avg. polity	0.0901*** [0.0239]	0.113*** [0.0381]	0.0779*** [0.0232]	0.106** [0.0411]		
Δ Regional avg. polity					0.0301* [0.0180]	0.0360 [0.0282]
Year	0.000623 [0.00404]	0.00143 [0.00371]				
Δ LDV					0.817*** [0.293]	0.630*** [0.220]
Constant	-1.691 [8.077]	-2.968 [7.396]	-0.0512 [0.0721]	0.244* [0.133]		
Country FE	v	v	v	v	v	v
Year FE			v	v	v	v
N	1705	1705	1293	1293	1264	1264
Countries	141	141	139	139	139	139
Log likelihood	228.1	71.56	347.3	189.5	323.3	32.45

Note:

All independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard error in brackets.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.5: Regression estimates of the effect of CRPs on institutional accountability with imputed data

<i>DV</i>	Horizontal	Vertical	Horizontal	Vertical
	accountability	accountability	accountability	accountability
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln China's flows per capita (resource-related)	-0.0447*** [0.0160]	-0.0237 [0.0170]	-0.0455*** [0.0158]	-0.0260 [0.0168]
ln China's flows per capita (other categories)	0.00588 [0.0218]	-0.000259 [0.0207]	0.00736 [0.0208]	0.0000602 [0.0209]
ln ODA per capita	0.125*** [0.0373]	0.0960** [0.0393]	0.133*** [0.0391]	0.0988** [0.0394]
ln GDP per capita			0.112 [0.0765]	0.0837 [0.0565]
GDP growth			-0.00415** [0.00177]	0.000943 [0.00364]
Oil export per capita			-0.0000066 [0.000019]	0.000031 [0.000028]
Gas export per capita			-0.000046 [0.000047]	-0.000023 [0.000045]
Regional avg. polity	0.0526* [0.0270]	0.0759** [0.0318]	0.0542** [0.0255]	0.0765** [0.0316]
Democracy stock			0.0000121 [0.000547]	-0.0000157 [0.000292]
Constant	-0.363** [0.144]	-0.0339 [0.145]	-1.301* [0.673]	-0.745 [0.520]
Country FE	v	v	v	v
Year FE	v	v	v	v
N	1727	1727	1727	1727
Countries	141	141	141	141

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard error in brackets. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.6: Regression estimates of the effect of CRPs on indicators of horizontal accountability

<i>DV</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	High court independence <i>v2juhcmd</i>	Lower court independence <i>v2jumcmd</i>	Compliance with high court <i>v2juhccomp</i>	Compliance with judiciary <i>v2jucomp</i>	Executive oversight <i>v2gotovst</i>	Legislature investigates <i>v2lqmvstp</i>	Legislature questions officials <i>2lqgstexp</i>
ln China's flows per capita (resource-related)	-0.0407 [0.0260]	-0.0369* [0.0206]	-0.0295 [0.0225]	-0.0542** [0.0267]	-0.0455*** [0.0172]	-0.0464** [0.0186]	-0.0447* [0.0234]
ln ODA per capita (net disbursements)	-0.0166 [0.0201]	-0.00495 [0.0167]	0.00467 [0.0142]	0.00812 [0.0160]	-0.00360 [0.0176]	0.00947 [0.0173]	-0.0161 [0.0178]
ln GDP per capita	-0.0276 [0.160]	0.0110 [0.157]	0.155 [0.165]	0.0565 [0.188]	0.0840 [0.195]	0.0194 [0.176]	0.0264 [0.152]
GDP growth	-0.00402 [0.00295]	-0.00672* [0.00360]	-0.00590* [0.00317]	-0.00503 [0.00344]	-0.00591* [0.00352]	-0.00635** [0.00316]	-0.00311 [0.00361]
Oil export per capita	-0.000051 [0.000032]	-0.000058* [0.00003]	-0.000012 [0.000033]	-0.000033 [0.000023]	-0.000056** [0.000028]	-0.000038 [0.000025]	-0.000019 [0.000026]
Gas export per capita	-0.000086 [0.000059]	0.000015 [0.000039]	-0.000016 [0.000026]	-0.000012 [0.000033]	-0.000065 [0.000053]	0.000021 [0.000081]	-0.000017 [0.000035]
Regional avg. polity	0.0675 [0.0638]	0.0369 [0.0265]	0.0284 [0.0242]	0.0389 [0.0350]	0.0723* [0.0388]	0.0536** [0.0247]	0.0977*** [0.0363]
Democracy stock	-0.000887 [0.000963]	-0.000296 [0.000973]	-0.00158* [0.000882]	0.0000173 [0.00102]	-0.000764 [0.000906]	-0.00171* [0.00103]	-0.0000693 [0.000927]
Constant	0.191 [1.295]	0.0658 [1.287]	-1.217 [1.365]	-0.460 [1.538]	-0.644 [1.629]	-0.0789 [1.455]	0.205 [1.256]
Country FE	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Year FE	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
N	1501	1501	1501	1501	1441	1442	1442
Countries	127	127	127	127	127	127	127
Log likelihood	-502.9	-176.4	-73.42	-213.6	-197.6	-278.7	-383.4
adj. R-sq (within)	0.023	0.027	0.023	0.022	0.081	0.033	0.032

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard error in brackets. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table B.7: Regression estimates of the effect of CRPs on indicators of vertical accountability

<i>DV</i>	Electoral regime <i>v2x_electreg</i>	EMB autonomy <i>v2elembaut</i>	EMB capacity <i>v2elembcap</i>	Election voting irregularities <i>v2eltrreg</i>	Election gov. intimidation <i>v2elintim</i>	Election multiparty <i>v2elmlpar</i>	Election free fair <i>v2elfrfair</i>	Suffrage <i>v2elsuffrage</i>	Opposition autonomy <i>v2psoppaut</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
In China's flows per capita (resource-related)	-0.0160 [0.0118]	-0.0339 [0.0281]	-0.00733 [0.0211]	-0.0113 [0.00770]	-0.0174 [0.0106]	-0.0131 [0.00996]	-0.0126 [0.0102]	-0.273 [0.257]	-0.0218 [0.0190]
In ODA per capita (net disbursements)	0.00656 [0.00646]	0.0249 [0.0164]	0.0248* [0.0126]	0.0104 [0.00664]	0.00946 [0.00668]	0.00684 [0.00591]	0.0111* [0.00607]	0.499 [0.466]	0.0182 [0.0198]
In GDP per capita	0.117 [0.104]	-0.209 [0.200]	0.0839 [0.206]	-0.0150 [0.0721]	-0.00307 [0.0714]	-0.00721 [0.0902]	0.0274 [0.0751]	4.122 [4.185]	0.0373 [0.223]
GDP growth	0.00000561 [0.00262]	-0.00170 [0.00413]	-0.0000850 [0.00290]	-0.00179 [0.00164]	-0.000947 [0.00178]	0.00155 [0.00209]	-0.000655 [0.00174]	-0.0140 [0.0135]	-0.00678 [0.00490]
Oil export per capita	0.000003 [0.000021]	-0.000034 [0.000029]	0.000014 [0.000024]	-0.000007 [0.0000081]	-0.0000043 [0.00001]	0.0000096 [0.000017]	-0.00000047 [0.00001]	-0.0004 [0.00032]	-0.000035 [0.000024]
Gas export per capita	-0.00002 [0.000017]	-0.000078 [0.00005]	0.000025 [0.00004]	-0.0000056 [0.000012]	-0.00000092 [0.000017]	-0.000021 [0.000017]	-0.00000048 [0.000014]	0.0025 [0.0028]	-0.00019* [0.000098]
Regional avg. polity	0.0607** [0.0244]	0.139*** [0.0353]	0.0742*** [0.0257]	0.0459** [0.0193]	0.0509** [0.0252]	0.0466** [0.0191]	0.0594*** [0.0215]	1.912 [1.790]	0.131** [0.0610]
Democracy stock	-0.000104 [0.000513]	-0.00206** [0.00104]	0.000681 [0.00105]	-0.000195 [0.000443]	-0.000517 [0.000431]	0.000223 [0.000477]	-0.000374 [0.000456]	-0.00551 [0.00738]	-0.000861 [0.00115]
Constant	-0.225 [0.883]	1.837 [1.652]	-0.406 [1.681]	0.384 [0.614]	0.339 [0.613]	0.556 [0.749]	0.0804 [0.634]	58.93 [39.35]	0.217 [1.917]
Country FE	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Year FE	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
N	1501	1501	1501	1395	1395	1395	1395	1501	1488
Countries	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	125
Log likelihood	706.3	-422.3	-89.98	1097.5	1000.6	811.6	893.7	-4472.3	-237.7
adj. R-sq (within)	0.074	0.146	0.062	0.113	0.079	0.056	0.087	0.071	0.105

Note: Election-related indicators are coded only for election years. Values of the previous election-year were imputed for the non-election years. All independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard error in brackets. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.8: Regression estimates of the effect of China's development flows on institutional accountability

<i>DV</i>	Horizontal	Vertical	Horizontal	Vertical
	accountability	accountability	accountability	accountability
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln China's flows per capita (all categories)	-0.0373** [0.0164]	-0.0183 [0.0212]		
ln China's flows per capita (other categories)			-0.0205 [0.0183]	-0.00908 [0.0267]
ln ODA per capita (net disbursements)	0.000488 [0.0106]	0.0182 [0.0120]	0.00103 [0.0107]	0.0185 [0.0120]
ln GDP per capita	0.0852 [0.134]	0.0240 [0.157]	0.0962 [0.139]	0.0298 [0.159]
GDP growth	-0.00417* [0.00247]	-0.000736 [0.00440]	-0.00426* [0.00249]	-0.000788 [0.00440]
Oil export per capita	-0.000024 [0.00002]	-0.0000023 [0.000025]	-0.000027 [0.00002]	-0.0000039 [0.000025]
Gas export per capita	-0.000022 [0.000037]	-0.000022 [0.000022]	-0.000019 [0.000038]	-0.00002 [0.000022]
Regional avg. polity	0.0720*** [0.0224]	0.125*** [0.0471]	0.0739*** [0.0237]	0.126*** [0.0479]
Democracy stock	-0.000748 [0.000746]	-0.000591 [0.000775]	-0.000499 [0.000773]	-0.000468 [0.000808]
Constant	-0.648 [1.106]	-0.0312 [1.347]	-0.742 [1.151]	-0.0804 [1.367]
Country FE	v	v	v	v
Year FE	v	v	v	v
N	1501	1501	1501	1501
Countries	127	127	127	127
Log likelihood	304.1	56.28	292.5	54.20
adj. R-sq (within)	0.081	0.128	0.067	0.126

Note: All independent variables are lagged one year. Robust standard error in brackets. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01