**ONLINE APPENDIX**

**Economic Inequality, Immigrants, and Selective Solidarity:**

**From Perceived Lack of Opportunity to Ingroup Favoritism**

**Observational analysis**

Below I report the full specifications (Table A1) of the models presented in Table 1 in the paper and the robustness checks with country fixed effects (Table A2). Before showing the full models, I offer a more detailed description of the controls.

Compared to Table 1 in the paper, as a further robustness check, I split model 2 and 5 in Table 1 into two separate models (models A2 and A3 and A6 and A7 in the table 1 below, respectively). As I explain below, models A2 and A6 include only socio-demographic controls and feelings of economic security. Models A3 and A7 – which correspond to models 2 and 5 in the main paper – also reports attitudinal controls.

The main variable of interest is the Gini coefficient, which is measured at the regional level. The Gini coefficients range from 0.22 to 0.43. The median and the mean values are 0.33. The standard deviation is 0.033.The region of Cantabria in Spain has the lowest Gini coefficient in the entire sample, while the region of Mid West in Ireland has the highest value.

***Independent variables: Controls***

*Individual level*

Models A1 and A5 include basic socio-demographic controls:

*Income*: The variable contains 10 categories, each of which corresponds to a decile in the income distribution. A measure that relies on deciles, rather than actual values of income, offers two advantages. First, it makes data comparable across countries. Indeed, 10,000 euro have a different value in Switzerland or Portugal. A measure based on deciles overcomes this shortcoming because a category of 1 corresponds to the lowest decile in the country in which the respondent resides, regardless of different costs of living. Second, this measures allows me to consider relative income by providing information to infer the position of the respondent in the income distribution. We know, for instance, that respondents with a value of 4 are always below the median income in their country.

*Gender*: The variable “Female” is equal to 1 for women and 0 for men.

*Age*: Measures the age of respondents in years.

*Education*: The variable, which ranges from 0 to 4, measures the highest level of education attained by the respondent. Compared to variables that simply count the total years of education, the categories of this variable are harmonized and comparable across countries.

*Political ideology*: I control for respondents’ general political preferences, since right-wing individuals are expected to be less supportive of both redistribution and assistance for immigrants. The variable “Right” ranges from 0 (left) to 10 (right).

*Union membership*: I control for whether the respondent is, or has been, a union member, since such a membership is likely positively correlated with support for redistribution.

In model 5 measuring support for immigrants, I also control for c*itizenship*, which is equal to 1 for respondents who are citizens of the country in which they reside. One can expect non-citizens to be more supportive of assistance to immigrants, since they have direct personal material interests at stake.

Models A2 and A6 include additional socio-demographic controls and an indicator of perceived economic security:

*Religiosity*: This 11-category variable is equal to 0 for respondents who are “not at all” religious and 10 for those who are “very” religious.

*Household size*: The variable controls for the number of individuals living in the household and ranges from 1 to 7.

*Unemployment status*: It controls for respondents’ current working situation and is equal to 1 for those who are unemployed. Unemployed individuals likely have a direct material interest in supporting redistribution.

*Economic security:* While one’s income position is directly related to the benefits and costs of redistribution, individuals with similar income may have different evaluations of their economic conditions.[[1]](#footnote-1) Recent work has shown that economic insecurity is related to welfare attitudes (Ford 2015). For this reason, I include a variable that measures a personal assessment of whether one’s own economic means are adequate to live comfortably.

Model A3 and A7 include perceptions of one’ socio-economic surroundings and attitudinal variables:

*Perceived number of poor* and *perceived number of immigrants*: These items, which control for the perceived number of individuals who can potentially benefit from economic support, are at the same time measures of perceived spread of neediness and possible costs of assistance.

Model A3 also includes:

*Attitudes toward inequality*: This variable measures to what extent respondents agree that differences in income should be small for a society to be fair (higher values indicate stronger agreement). This is arguably a strong robustness test, since we expect concerns about distributive justice to be closely correlated with support for redistribution and willingness to help those at the bottom of society.

*Feelings of poor undeservingness*. This item asks respondents whether they agree that low-income individuals get less benefits than what they are entitled to. Higher values indicate more negative feelings.

Model A7 introduces additional controls:

Two controls measure *attitudes toward immigration*, because these attitudinal positions likely affect willingness to help immigrants. These two indicators measure opinions about the impact of immigrants on the economy and the cultural life of the country, respectively.

Perceptions of *immigrant deservingness*: this control is operationalized by an item measuring respondents’ opinion about whether immigrants contribute to society more than what they receive, or vice versa. This item follow Petersen’s (2012) operationalization of deservingness, in which the fundamental distinction is between reciprocators (i.e. individuals who contribute to society) and cheaters (i.e. individuals who free ride). Higher values correspond to the belief that immigrants are underserving.

*Regional level*

In addition to economic inequality, all of the models present four regional controls that are obtained from Eurostat:

*Average GDP per capita*: This item is measured at current prices in US Dollars and controls for average levels of wealth in society.

*Unemployment rate*: The variable measures unemployment rate by all ages. As a measure of economic hardship, unemployment rate can potentially affect support for redistribution and attitudes toward outgroups.

*Share of foreigners*: This variable provides a measure of immigrant and ethnic heterogeneity. Previous studies have shown that ethnic heterogeneity is related to welfare provision and support for redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, Finseraas 2009). Regarding support for immigrants, this variable also controls for a possible exposure effect. Its predicted direction is not clear, since previous work has yielded mixed results (e.g. Luttmer 2001, Fox 2004).

*Population density*: This macro-economic variable controls for the fact that individuals who live in high-density, mostly urban areas may exhibit different preferences (Cho et al. 2006).

*National level*

Finally, model A4 and A8 include four additional contextual indicators at the national level: *average GDP per capita,* *social expenditure, unemployment rate,* and *percentage of foreigners* living in the country. These indicators control for common trends that may affect individuals living in the same country and that may be emphasized by national media. Specifically, controlling for current levels of social expenditure[[2]](#footnote-2) is important because the type of welfare state influences opinions about the role of the state in society (Korpi 1980), which could be correlated with support for redistribution.

**Table A1 – Welfare support for people in need and immigrants: Full specifications**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | |  | |  | | | |
|  | **Welfare support for people in need** | | | | |  | | **Welfare support for immigrants** | | | |
|  | (A1) | (A2) | | (A3) | (A4) |  | | (A5) | (A6) | (A7) | (A8) |
|  | | |  | | | | | | | | |
| Inequality | 1.489\*\* | 1.524\*\* | | 1.205\* | 1.158\* |  | | -1.083\* | -1.088\* | -1.228\* | -1.033\* |
|  | (0.518) | (0.516) | | (0.522) | (0.517) |  | | (0.528) | (0.527) | (0.528) | (0.517) |
| *Individual Controls* |  |  | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| Income | -0.010\*\*\* | 0.010\*\* | | 0.022\*\*\* | 0.011\*\* |  | | -0.002 | -0.005 | -0.011\*\* | -0.008\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) | | (0.004) | (0.004) |  | | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Female | 0.061\*\*\* | 0.065\*\*\* | | 0.063\*\*\* | 0.058\*\*\* |  | | 0.033\* | 0.035\* | 0.055\*\*\* | 0.042\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.013) | | (0.014) | (0.015) |  | | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Education | -0.063\*\*\* | -0.059\*\*\* | | -0.038\*\*\* | -0.032\*\*\* |  | | 0.075\*\*\* | 0.067\*\*\* | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.016\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | | (0.006) | (0.006) |  | | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Right | -0.022\*\*\* | -0.020\*\*\* | | -0.016\*\*\* | -0.015\*\*\* |  | | -0.034\*\*\* | -0.034\*\*\* | -0.026\*\*\* | -0.036\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) | | (0.003) | (0.003) |  | | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| Religiosity | -0.012\*\* | -0.010\* | | -0.010 | -0.017\*\* |  | | -0.007 | -0.006 | -0.005 | 0.009 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | | (0.005) | (0.005) |  | | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| Age | -0.0003 | 0.003 | | 0.0004 | -0.0003 |  | | -0.001\* | -0.001 | 0.001 | -0.0003 |
|  | (0.0004) | (0.002) | | (0.002) | (0.002) |  | | (0.0004) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Age squared |  | -0.00003 | | -0.0000 | 0.00001 |  | |  | -0.00001 | -0.00002 | -0.00002 |
|  |  | (0.00002) | | (0.00002) | (0.00002) |  | |  | (0.00002) | (0.00002) | (0.00002) |
| Union |  | 0.013 | | -0.001 | 0.008 |  | |  | 0.060\*\*\* | 0.054\*\* | 0.051\*\* |
|  |  | (0.016) | | (0.017) | (0.017) |  | |  | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| Household |  | -0.005 | | -0.004 | 0.010 |  | |  | -0.008 | -0.008 | -0.002 |
|  |  | (0.005) | | (0.006) | (0.006) |  | |  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Unemployed |  | 0.10\*\*\* | | 0.067\* | 0.031 |  | |  | 0.041 | 0.0005 | 0.022 |
|  |  | (0.028) | | (0.030) | (0.031) |  | |  | (0.029) | (0.031) | (0.031) |
| Economic security |  | -0.132\*\*\* | | -0.092\*\*\* | -0.093\*\*\* |  | |  | 0.039\*\*\* | 0.009 | 0.022 |
|  |  | (0.010) | | (0.011) | (0.011) |  | |  | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Perceived # Poor |  |  | | 0.026\*\*\* | 0.037\*\*\* |  | |  |  | -0.007\* | -0.006\* |
|  |  |  | | (0.003) | (0.003) |  | |  |  | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Perceived # Immigrants |  |  | | 0.008\* | 0.002 |  | |  |  | -0.002 | -0.006 |
|  |  |  | | (0.003) | (0.004) |  | |  |  | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| Inequality Evaluation |  |  | | 0.071\*\*\* | 0.087\*\*\* |  | |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | | (0.008) | (0.008) |  | |  |  |  |  |
| Poor Undeservingness |  |  | | -0.257\*\*\* | -0.239\*\*\* |  | |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | | (0.008) | (0.008) |  | |  |  |  |  |
| Citizen |  |  | |  |  |  | | -0.567\*\*\* | -0.573\*\*\* | -0.425\*\*\* | -0.446\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | |  |  |  | | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.036) | (0.036) |
| Immigration Attit. (Economy) |  |  | |  |  |  | |  |  | 0.058\*\*\* | 0.056\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | |  |  |  | |  |  | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Immigration Attit. (Culture) |  |  | |  |  |  | |  |  | 0.049\*\*\* | 0.049\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | |  |  |  | |  |  | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Immigrant Undeservingness |  |  | |  |  |  | |  |  | -0.051\*\*\* | -0.040\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | |  |  |  | |  |  | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| *Regional Controls* |  |  | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| GDP | -0.002 | -0.002 | | -0.004 | -0.003 |  | | -0.006 | -0.005 | -0.004 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) | | (0.003) | (0.003) |  | | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.068 | 0.086 | | -0.104 | -0.049 |  | | 0.074 | 0.104 | 0.378 | 0.584 |
|  | (0.482) | (0.480) | | (0.480) | (0.473) |  | | (0.490) | (0.490) | (0.486) | (0.473) |
| % Foreign | -0.386 | -0.258 | | -0.007 | -0.212 |  | | 0.151 | 0.080 | 0.071 | 0.011 |
|  | (0.362) | (0.361) | | (0.369) | (0.366) |  | | (0.370) | (0.370) | (0.375) | (0.368) |
| Pop. Density | -0.0003 | -0.001 | | -0.0002 | -0.001 |  | | 0.004\* | 0.004\* | 0.003 | -0.0001 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | | (0.002) | (0.002) |  | | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *National Controls* |  |  | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| GDP |  |  | |  | -0.003 |  | |  |  |  | 0.005 |
|  |  |  | |  | (0.003) |  | |  |  |  | (0.003) |
| Social Expenditure |  |  | |  | -0.020 |  | |  |  |  | 0.011 |
|  |  |  | |  | (0.011) |  | |  |  |  | (0.011) |
| Unemployment Rate |  |  | |  | 0.005 |  | |  |  |  | 0.041 |
|  |  |  | |  | (0.024) |  | |  |  |  | (0.023) |
| % Foreign |  |  | |  | -0.016 |  | |  |  |  | 0.012 |
|  |  |  | |  | (0.008) |  | |  |  |  | (0.008) |
| Constant | 3.586\*\*\* | 3.634\*\*\* | | 3.964\*\*\* | 4.490\*\*\* |  | | 3.826\*\*\* | 3.802\*\*\* | 3.488\*\*\* | 2.604\*\*\* |
|  | (0.200) | (0.202) | | (0.203) | (0.317) |  | | (0.200) | (0.205) | (0.206) | (0.310) |
|  | | |  | | | | | | | | |
| Observations | 20,487 | 20,377 | | 17,029 | 15,855 |  | | 20,179 | 20,077 | 16,692 | 15,562 |
| Log Likelihood | -28,141.23 | -27,896.14 | | -22,649.03 | -20,889.22 |  | | -28,071.32 | -27,897.11 | -22,406.34 | -20,505.07 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 56,310.46 | 55,830.28 | | 45,344.05 | 41,832.45 |  | | 56,172.65 | 55,834.22 | 44,862.68 | 41,068.13 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 56,421.44 | 55,980.80 | | 45,522.14 | 41,039.57 |  | | 56,291.33 | 55,992.37 | 45,055.75 | 41,290.06 |
|  | | |  | | | | | | | | |
| *Note:* |  | | | | | | \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | | |

**Table A2: Welfare support for people in need and immigrants: Country fixed effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | **Welfare support for people in need** | | | **Welfare support for immigrants** | | |
|  | (A1) | (A2) | (A3) | (A4) | (A5) | (A6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Inequality | 1.535\*\* | 1.584\*\* | 1.287\* | -1.047\* | -1.051\* | -1.222\* |
|  | (0.521) | (0.519) | (0.528) | (0.532) | (0.531) | (0.535) |
| *Individual Controls* | | | | | | |
| Income | -0.010\*\*\* | 0.010\*\* | 0.022\*\*\* | -0.002 | -0.005 | -0.011\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| Citizen |  |  |  | -0.567\*\*\* | -0.573\*\*\* | -0.425\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.036) |
| Female | 0.061\*\*\* | 0.065\*\*\* | 0.063\*\*\* | 0.033\* | 0.035\* | 0.055\*\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.015) |
| Age | -0.0003 | 0.003 | 0.0004 | -0.001\* | -0.001 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.0004) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.0004) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Age squared |  | -0.00003 | -0.00000 |  | -0.00001 | -0.00002 |
|  |  | (0.00002) | (0.00002) |  | (0.00002) | (0.00002) |
| Education | -0.062\*\*\* | -0.058\*\*\* | -0.038\*\*\* | 0.075\*\*\* | 0.068\*\*\* | 0.025\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Right | -0.022\*\*\* | -0.020\*\*\* | -0.016\*\*\* | -0.034\*\*\* | -0.034\*\*\* | -0.026\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Union |  | 0.014 | -0.0005 |  | 0.062\*\*\* | 0.056\*\* |
|  |  | (0.016) | (0.017) |  | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| Religiosity | -0.013\*\* | -0.011\* | -0.011\* | -0.007 | -0.006 | -0.005 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Household |  | -0.005 | -0.004 |  | -0.008 | -0.008 |
|  |  | (0.005) | (0.006) |  | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Unemployed |  | 0.105\*\*\* | 0.066\* |  | 0.041 | 0.001 |
|  |  | (0.028) | (0.030) |  | (0.029) | (0.031) |
| Economic security |  | -0.131\*\*\* | -0.092\*\*\* |  | 0.038\*\*\* | 0.009 |
|  |  | (0.010) | (0.011) |  | (0.010) | (0.011) |
| Inequality Evaluation |  |  | 0.071\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.008) |  |  |  |
| Perceived # Poor |  |  | 0.025\*\*\* |  |  | -0.007\* |
|  |  |  | (0.003) |  |  | (0.003) |
| Perceived # Immigr. |  |  | 0.009\*\* |  |  | -0.002 |
|  |  |  | (0.003) |  |  | (0.003) |
| Poor Undeserving |  |  | -0.256\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.008) |  |  |  |
| Immigr. Attit. (Econ.) |  |  |  |  |  | 0.057\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.004) |
| Immigr. Attit. (Cult.) |  |  |  |  |  | 0.049\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.004) |
| Immigrant Undeserv. |  |  |  |  |  | -0.051\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.004) |
| *Regional Controls* | | | | | | |
| GDP | -0.002 | -0.002 | -0.004 | -0.006\* | -0.005 | -0.004 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.125 | 0.151 | -0.026 | 0.054 | 0.086 | 0.322 |
|  | (0.485) | (0.483) | (0.486) | (0.495) | (0.494) | (0.493) |
| % Foreign | -0.401 | -0.273 | -0.021 | 0.171 | 0.099 | 0.099 |
|  | (0.363) | (0.361) | (0.370) | (0.371) | (0.370) | (0.376) |
| Pop. Density | -0.0005 | -0.001 | -0.0005 | 0.004\* | 0.004\* | 0.003 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *Country  Fixed Effects* | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|  | | | | | | |
| Observations | 20,487 | 20,377 | 17,029 | 20,179 | 20,077 | 16,692 |
| R2 | 0.936 | 0.937 | 0.941 | 0.894 | 0.895 | 0.905 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.936 | 0.937 | 0.941 | 0.894 | 0.894 | 0.905 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.952  df = 20460 | 0.947  df = 20345 | 0.909  df = 16993 | 0.969  df = 20151 | 0.966  df = 20044 | 0.920  df = 16654 |
| F Statistic | 11,167.69\*\*\*  df =27; 20460 | 9,487.26\*\*\*  df =32; 20345 | 7,590.73\*\*\*  df =36; 16993 | 6,074.05\*\*\*  df =28; 20151 | 5,150.62\*\*\*  df =33; 20044 | 4,181.13\*\*\*  df =38; 16654 |
|  | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | | | |

**Observational analysis: Additional robustness checks**

**Table A3: Welfare support for immigrants including additional socio-economic perceptions and attitudinal positions (inequality evaluations and deservingness of the poor)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | |
|  | **Welfare support for immigrants** |
|  | |
| **Inequality** | **-0.948\*** |
|  | **(0.440)** |
| *Individual controls* |  |
| Income | -0.009\* |
|  | (0.004) |
| Citizen | -0.439\*\*\* |
|  | (0.037) |
| Female | 0.041\*\* |
|  | (0.015) |
| Age | -0.00003 |
|  | (0.002) |
| Age squared | -0.00002 |
|  | (0.00002) |
| Education | 0.015\* |
|  | (0.007) |
| Right | -0.036\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) |
| Union | 0.048\*\* |
|  | (0.018) |
| Religiosity | 0.007 |
|  | (0.006) |
| Household | -0.003 |
|  | (0.006) |
| Unemployed | 0.017 |
|  | (0.032) |
| Economic security | 0.024\* |
|  | (0.012) |
| Perceived # Poor | -0.005 |
|  | (0.003) |
| Perceived # Immigrants | -0.005 |
|  | (0.004) |
| Immigr. Att. (Economy) | 0.057\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) |
| Immigr. Att. (Culture) | 0.050\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) |
| Immigrant Undeservingness | -0.040\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) |
| **Poor Undeservingness** | **0.031\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.008)** |
| **Inequality Evaluation** | **0.025\*\*** |
|  | **(0.008)** |
| *Regional controls* |  |
| GDP | -0.001 |
|  | (0.003) |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.538 |
|  | (0.405) |
| % Foreign | -0.038 |
|  | (0.357) |
| Pop. Density | 0.0001 |
|  | (0.001) |
| *National controls* |  |
| GDP | 0.005 |
|  | (0.003) |
| Social Expenditure | 0.009 |
|  | (0.012) |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.042 |
|  | (0.024) |
| % Foreign | 0.011 |
|  | (0.009) |
| Constant | 2.438\*\*\* |
|  | (0.303) |
|  | |
| Observations | 14,945 |
| Log Likelihood | -19,764.190 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 39,590.380 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 39,826.360 |
|  | |
| *Note:* | \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 |

**Table A4: Welfare support for people in need and immigrants controlling for the redistributive effect of the welfare state**

These models include a control for the redistributive effect of the welfare state. The variable – labeled “Redistr.WS” in the table below – is obtained by subtracting the Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers from the Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers for each country in the total population. This variable, therefore, captures the difference in income inequality before and after taxes and transfers. Data come from the OECD Social Expenditure Database.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | | |
|  | **Welfare support for** | |
|  |  | |
|  | **People in need** | **Immigrants** |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | | |
| **Inequality** | **1.178\*** | **-1.227\*** |
|  | **(0.585)** | **(0.590)** |
| *Individual controls* |  |  |
| Income | 0.012\*\* | -0.006 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Citizen | 0.192\*\*\* | -0.496\*\*\* |
|  | (0.040) | (0.040) |
| Female | 0.055\*\*\* | 0.044\*\* |
|  | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Age | 0.002 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Age squared | -0.00002 | -0.00001 |
|  | (0.00002) | (0.00003) |
| Education | -0.030\*\*\* | 0.017\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Right | -0.014\*\*\* | -0.037\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Union | -0.009 | 0.036 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.019) |
| Religiosity | -0.019\*\* | 0.008 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Household | 0.008 | -0.005 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.007) |
| Unemployed | 0.047 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.034) |
| Economic security | -0.098\*\*\* | 0.021 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Inequality evaluation | 0.089\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.008) |  |
| Perceived # Poor | 0.036\*\*\* | -0.005 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Perceived # Immigr. | 0.002 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Poor Undeserving | -0.248\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.008) |  |
| Immigr. Attit. (Econ.) |  | 0.059\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.004) |
| Immigr. Attit. (Cult.) |  | 0.049\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.004) |
| Immigrant Undeserv. |  | -0.039\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.004) |
| *Regional Controls* |  |  |
| GDP | -0.003 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Unemployment Rate | -0.243 | 0.826 |
|  | (0.552) | (0.557) |
| % Foreign | -0.355 | -0.325 |
|  | (0.395) | (0.400) |
| Pop. Density | 0.00004 | 0.00005 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| *National Controls* |  |  |
| GDP | -0.006\* | 0.006\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Unemployment Rate | -0.013 | 0.046 |
|  | (0.027) | (0.024) |
| % Foreign | -0.013 | 0.008 |
|  | (0.010) | (0.009) |
| **Redistr.WS** | **-1.020** | **-0.494** |
|  | **(1.394)** | **(1.247)** |
| Constant | 4.242\*\*\* | 2.927\*\*\* |
|  | (0.404) | (0.370) |
|  | | |
| Observations | 14,502 | 14,219 |
| Log Likelihood | -19,105.320 | -18,865.900 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 38,266.650 | 37,789.810 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 38,478.940 | 38,009.120 |
|  | | |
| *Note:* | \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | |

**Figure A1 – Subnational inequality (measured by Gini coefficients at the regional level)**

**Survey experiment**

The survey is based on a nationally representative sample of the population of Italian residents according to census data for gender, age, and location of residence. The survey value for income also closely resembles the national average value. The average household income in Italy in 2015 was 23,443 € and the average income among survey respondents is 6.89 (where category 6 equals 20,000-25,000 €).

Before running the survey experiment, I conducted two pilot studies. I ran the first pilot study on Amazon MTurk in August 2016 with 200 American respondents. The second pilot study was run in November 2016 with a nationally representative sample of 120 Italian respondents and was administered by the survey company Cint.

**Group covariates**

The table below show the mean values (or proportions) for the main controls across the three groups: control group, inequality treatment, and poverty treatment.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Control**  **Group** | **Inequality Treatment** | **Poverty**  **Treatment** |
| Female | 48.6% | 48.0% | 50.8% |
| Age | 44.6 | 45.5 | 44.2 |
| Education (1-7) | 5.1 | 5.0 | 5.1 |
| Income (1-15) | 6.8 | 6.8 | 7.0 |
| Economic right (1-10) | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.2 |
| Conservative (1-10) | 5.0 | 5.3 | 4.6 |

**Variable operationalization**

Female: 0 = Male; 1 = Female

Age: years of age

Education: 1 = No degree; 2 = Elementary school; 3 = Middle school; 4 = Professional qualification; 5 = High school degree; 6 = College degree; 7 = Post-college degree

Income: 1 = no income; 2 = less than 5,000 €; 3 = 5,000-10,000 €; 4 = 10,000-15,000 €;

5 = 15,000-20,000 €; 6 = 20,000-25,000 €; 7 = 25,000-30,000 €; 8 = 30,000-35,000 €;

9 = 35,000-40,000 €; 10 = 40,000-50,000 €; 11 = 50,000-60,000 €; 12 = 60,000-70,000 €;

13 = 70,000-85,000 €; 14 = 85,000-100,000 €; 15 = more than 100,000 €

Economic right: 1 = left; 10 = right

Conservative: 1 = liberal; 10 = conservative

**Inequality treatment**

The inequality treatment is divided into two pages, which provide bullet-point information about the level (first page) and the recent growth (second page) of economic inequality in Italy. The first page of the treatment also shows a graph depicting income distribution by quintiles. The second page presents a picture depicting the contrast between a wealthy individual, who stands in front of an expensive car and house, and a lower-income individual who looks for food among surplus waste products at a city food market. The two treatment pages are reproduced below.

**Figure B1 – Inequality treatment (original Italian version)**

****



**Inequality treatment: English translation**

Page 1

Censis: the 10 richest Italians own more than 500.000 working families

Today the top 1% owns more wealth than the bottom 70% of the Italian population (about 42.5 million people).

Income differences are very large:

* The top 1% earns on average 102,000 euro per capita per year
* The bottom 10% earns less than 4,500 euro per capita per year

The richest 20% of the population (in red) owns almost 70% of the country’s total wealth.

The poorest 20% (in green) owns only 0.6% of the country’s wealth.

Page 2


**Economic inequality keeps growing, Italy among the worst countries in Europe**


* Since 2000, more than half of the newly created wealth went to the top 10%, a proportion more than 50 times bigger than what the 12 million poorest Italians have received
* The number of the super-rich has increased: today 2,000 people own more than 100 million euro per capita
* The condition of the middle class has worsened: one every four people had to give up private medical treatments and buying new cars, three every five people had to give up vacations and eating at restaurants
* Since 2007 manual workers lost on average 1,700 euro per year and office workers about 1,200 euro, while the income of the executives has increased by 1.5%

**Poverty treatment**

The poverty treatment is also divided into two pages, which provide bullet-point information about the level (first page) and the recent growth (second page) of absolute poverty in Italy. The first page of the treatment also shows a graph depicting the level of poverty in the last ten years. The second page presents a picture depicting a lower-income individual who looks for food among surplus waste products at a city food market. The two treatment pages are reproduced below.

**Figure B2 – Poverty treatment (original Italian version)**





**Poverty treatment: English translation**

Page 1

**Istat, absolute poverty breaks new record: almost 5 million people are poor**

During the crisis, the number of people living in absolute poverty has more than doubled

* Today the bottom 10% of the population earns less than 4.500 euros per year
* Almost 5 million people live in absolute poverty, the highest number in Europe
* These people cannot regularly afford to cover basic expenses and pay for food, housing and clothes

Between 2007 and 2015, the number of absolute poor in Italy has more than doubled.

Today 5 million people cannot afford to pay for food, housing and house bills.

Page 2

**The number of people who lost their house and their job keeps growing**

* During the crisis, unemployment rate has increased by 108% and broke the new record of 13.4%. Among young people, more than two out of five cannot find work
* Food consumption fell to the levels registered more than 30 years ago in 1981, marking the worst fall in Europe
* One every three people had to give up meat, one every five had to save on heating and medical treatments
* Every year almost 300,000 houses are confiscated because people cannot pay back their debts

**Manipulation checks**

As a manipulation check, a question gauged factual knowledge of inequality in the country. The following survey item therefore allows me to evaluate inequality perceptions:

*In your opinion, which one of the following statements about economic inequality in Italy in the last 30 years is correct?*

* *The crisis has decreased most workers’ income, which has produced a decrease in economic inequality*
* *The economic inequality has continued to grow and has reached one of the highest levels in Europe*
* *Economic inequality has become more visible because of the crisis, even if it has remained stable*

The correct answer is the second one.

In the logit models below the binary dependent variables equal 1 for correct answers and 0 otherwise. The first model shows the results for the entire sample of respondents; the second one the results for the subsample of respondents who passed the attention check.

**Table B1 – Manipulation check: Factual knowledge of inequality (entire sample)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | | |
|  | **Manipulation Check 1** | |
|  |  | |
|  | **Inequality Perception** | |
|  | Entire sample | Subset: Passed  Attention Check |
|  | | |
| Inequality Treatment | 0.28\* | 0.34\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.15) |
| Poverty Treatment | 0.20 | 0.24 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.15) |
| Constant | -0.25\* | -0.16 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.11) |
|  | | |
| Observations | 1,270 | 1,016 |
| Log Likelihood | -876.91 | -701.59 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,759.82 | 1,409.17 |
|  | | |
| *Note:* | \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | |

I now show the results of the manipulation check based on perceived inequality measured by the question described above with controls. I also report the results of the manipulation check for the poverty treatment, which measures perceived poverty.[[3]](#footnote-3) I show logit models in which the binary dependent variables equal 1 for correct answers and 0 otherwise.

**Table B2 – Manipulation check: Factual knowledge of inequality (respondents who passed attention check)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | **Manipulation check 1** | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | **Inequality Perception** | | **Poverty Perception** | |
|  | Entire sample | Subset: Passed  Attention Check | Entire sample | Subset: Passed  Attention Check |
|  | | | | |
| Inequality treatment | 0.36\* | 0.48\*\* | -0.08 | 0.06 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.20) |
| Poverty treatment | 0.26 | 0.33 | 0.34\* | 0.48\* |
|  | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.20) |
| Education | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.06 | -0.06 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) |
| Age | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02\*\*\* | 0.01 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Female | -0.07 | -0.15 | -0.10 | -0.32 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.17) |
| Income | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.08\*\* | -0.06 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Economic insecurity | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.09 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) |
| Economic right | -0.08\*\* | -0.09\*\* | -0.05 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) |
| Party ID (Lega Nord) | -0.11 | -0.33 | -0.21 | -0.14 |
|  | (0.34) | (0.37) | (0.40) | (0.45) |
| Location (North-East) | -0.05 | -0.05 | 0.15 | 0.22 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.23) | (0.24) | (0.28) |
| Constant | -0.23 | -0.02 | 0.62 | 1.26 |
|  | (0.64) | (0.77) | (0.73) | (0.92) |
|  | | | | |
| Observations | 1,136 | 910 | 1,137 | 910 |
| Log Likelihood | -767.22 | -605.11 | -641.50 | -466.47 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,574.44 | 1,252.22 | 1,323.00 | 974.94 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | |

As an additional manipulation check, a second survey item asked respondents to evaluate economic inequality. This is a less straightforward and more demanding manipulation check, inasmuch as respondents in the inequality treatment may be more aware of inequality but might not vary their evaluations. The survey question asked:

*Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Economic inequality in Italy is too large.*

* *Strongly disagree*
* *Disagree*
* *Neither agree nor disagree*
* *Agree*
* *Strongly agree*

Below I present ordered logit models, in which the dependent variable is measure on a five-point scale. The first model shows the results for the entire sample of respondents; the second one reports the results for the subsample of respondents who passed the attention check.

**Table B3 – Manipulation check: Inequality Evaluation**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | | |
|  | **Manipulation Check 2** | |
|  |  | |
|  | **Inequality Importance** | |
|  | Entire sample | Subset: Passed  Attention Check |
|  | | |
| Inequality Treatment | 0.27\* | 0.34\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.15) |
| Poverty Treatment | -0.07 | 0.05 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.15) |
|  | | |
| Observations | 1,273 | 1,018 |
| Res. Deviance | 2,717.626 | 2,037.492 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 2,729.626 | 2,049.492 |
|  | | |
| *Note:* | +p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | |

**Table B4 – Support for redistribution: Full specification (logit model)**

*DV: 1 = strongly agree*

*Hence, number of observations: DV= 0 : n=697; DV=1 : n=576*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | |
|  | **Support for Redistribution** |
|  | |
| Inequality | 0.61\*\*\* |
|  | (0.16) |
| Poverty | 0.05 |
|  | (0.16) |
| Education | -0.002 |
|  | (0.07) |
| Age | 0.01\* |
|  | (0.01) |
| Female | -0.25+ |
|  | (0.13) |
| Income (household) | -0.12\* |
|  | (0.05) |
| Economic right | -0.18\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) |
| Conservative | -0.06\* |
|  | (0.03) |
| Party ID (Lega Nord) | 0.70+ |
|  | (0.41) |
| Location (North-East) | 0.26 |
|  | (0.22) |
| Constant | 0.06 |
|  | (0.65) |
|  | |
| Observations | 1,098 |
| Log Likelihood | -689.92 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,419.85 |
|  | |
| *Note:* | +p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 |

**Table B5 – Support for low-income natives vs. low-income immigrants: Full specifications (logit models)**

Support for low-income natives: 1 = strongly in favor (n=570); 0 = all others (n=703)

Support for low-income immigrants: 0 = strongly against (n=439); 1 = all others (n=834)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | **Support for** | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | **Low-Income Natives** | | **Low-Income Immigrants** | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Inequality | 0.39\* | 0.40\* | -0.07 | 0.17 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.18) | (0.17) | (0.20) |
| Inequality\*Conservative | -- | -0.09 | -- | -0.82\* |
|  |  | (0.34) |  | (0.37) |
| Poverty | 0.17 | 0.28 | -0.04 | 0.07 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.18) | (0.17) | (0.19) |
| Poverty\*Conservative | -- | -0.50 | -- | -0.41 |
|  |  | (0.38) |  | (0.40) |
| Education | -0.10 | -0.10 | 0.04 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Female | 0.30\* | 0.31\* | -0.10 | -0.08 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Income (household) | -0.08+ | -0.09+ | 0.06 | 0.06 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Economic right | -0.05+ | -0.05+ | -0.13\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Conservative | 0.06 | 0.24 | -0.13 | 0.32 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.26) | (0.16) | (0.28) |
| Party ID (Lega Nord) | 0.04 | 0.02 | -0.68\* | -0.66+ |
|  | (0.34) | (0.34) | (0.35) | (0.35) |
| Location (North-East) | 0.42\* | 0.41+ | -0.19 | -0.20 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.23) | (0.23) |
| Constant | 0.19 | 0.14 | 1.01 | 0.91 |
|  | (0.58) | (0.59) | (0.62) | (0.62) |
|  | | | | |
| Observations | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 |
| Log Likelihood | -726.28 | -725.29 | -635.82 | -633.34 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,492.57 | 1,494.58 | 1,311.65 | 1,310.68 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | +p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | |

**Table B6 – Support for redistribution, low-income natives, and low-income immigrants: Summary of models without controls (logit and ordered logit models)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | *Support for* | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | **Redistribution** | | **Low-Income Natives** | | **Low-Income Immigrants** | |
|  | *Logistic* | *Ordered* *Logistic* | *Logistic* | *Ordered Logistic* | *Logistic* | *Ordered* *Logistic* |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Inequality | 0.44\*\* | 0.28\* | 0.29\* | 0.23+ | -0.06 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.12) |
| Poverty | 0.12 | -0.04 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.04 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.15) | (0.12) |
| Constant | -0.38\*\*\* | -- | -0.34\*\*\* | -- | 0.63\*\*\* | -- |
|  | (0.10) | -- | (0.10) | -- | (0.10) | -- |
|  | | | | | | |
| Observations | 1,273 | 1,273 | 1,273 | 1,273 | 1,273 | 1,273 |
| Log Likelihood | -871.15 | -- | -873.15 | -- | -819.53 | -- |
| Residual Dev. | -- | 3,368.341 | -- | 3,209.667 | -- | 3,855.724 |
| AIC | 1,748.31 | 3,380.341 | 1,752.30 | 3,221.667 | 1,645.06 | 3,867.724 |
|  | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | +p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | | | |

**Causal Mediation Analysis**

**Table B7 – Inequality, lack of opportunity, and preferences for redistribution: Summary of results**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Support for* | | |
|  | **Redistribution** | **Low-income**  **natives** | **Low-income immigrants** |
| ACME (average) | 0.0106\*  (0.0009, 0.0231) | 0.0062\*  (0.00005, 0.0158) | -0.0103\*  (-0.0214, -0.0011) |
| ADE (average) | 0.1239\*\*\*  (0.0565, 0.1963) | 0.0834\*  (0.0108, 0.1560) | -0.0041  (-0.0694, 0.0603) |
| Total Effect | 0.1345\*\*\*  (0.0652, 0.2049) | 0.0896\*  (0.0153, 0.1630) | -0.0144  (-0.0799, 0.0514) |

Estimates of the effect and 95% C.I. in parenthesis; White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator.

For each of the three mediation analyses: Sample size: 1098; Simulations: 1000

The results show that the causal mediation (ACME) is consistently statistically significant at the .05 level in the three analyses. The average causal mechanism is positive for redistribution and low-income natives and negative for low-income immigrants. This indicates that the treatment (inequality) has a significant impact on the mediator (lack of meritocracy), which in turn has a significant and positive (for redistribution and natives) or negative (for immigrants) impact on support for welfare. The analysis also reveals that the average direct effect (ADE) and the total effect are positive and significant for support for redistribution and low-income natives, which confirms that inequality also produces a direct positive impact on support for these policies. On the other hand, the average direct effect and the total effect are not significant in regard to support for immigrants. This finding suggests that inequality does not have a direct negative impact but negatively affects support for immigrants via its effect on meritocracy (see Tingley et al. [n.d., 7] for interpretation of causal mediation analysis results when ACME is significant but ADE and total effect are not.). The inequality treatment increased perceptions of lack of meritocracy, which in turn made respondents more likely to oppose support for low-income immigrants.

**Table B8 – Inequality, lack of opportunity, and preferences for redistribution: Full results**

For each of the three mediation analyses: Sample size: 1098; Simulations: 1000; White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator.

*Support for redistribution*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Estimate | 95% Lower CI | 95% Upper CI | p-value |
| ACME (control) | 0.0105 | 0.0010 | 0.0229 | 0.03 |
| ACME (treated) | 0.0108 | 0.0009 | 0.0234 | 0.04 |
| ADE (control) | 0.1238 | 0.0566 | 0.1962 | 0.00 |
| ADE (treated) | 0.1241 | 0.0565 | 0.1971 | 0.00 |
| Total Effect | 0.1345 | 0.0652 | 0.2049 | 0.00 |
| ACME (average) | 0.0106 | 0.0009 | 0.0231 | 0.03 |
| ADE (average) | 0.1239 | 0.0565 | 0.1963 | 0.00 |

*Support for low-income natives*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Estimate | 95% Lower CI | 95% Upper CI | p-value |
| ACME (control) | 0.0060 | 0.00005 | 0.0156 | 0.04 |
| ACME (treated) | 0.0063 | 0.00004 | 0.0160 | 0.04 |
| ADE (control) | 0.0833 | 0.0108 | 0.1560 | 0.02 |
| ADE (treated) | 0.0835 | 0.0109 | 0.1560 | 0.02 |
| Total Effect | 0.0896 | 0.0153 | 0.1630 | 0.02 |
| ACME (average) | 0.0062 | 0.00005 | 0.0158 | 0.04 |
| ADE (average) | 0.0834 | 0.0108 | 0.1560 | 0.02 |

*Support for low-income immigrants*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Estimate | 95% Lower CI | 95% Upper CI | p-value |
| ACME (control) | -0.0102 | -0.0216 | -0.0011 | 0.03 |
| ACME (treated) | -0.0103 | -0.0211 | -0.0011 | 0.03 |
| ADE (control) | -0.0041 | -0.0691 | 0.0599 | 0.89 |
| ADE (treated) | -0.0041 | -0.0697 | 0.0606 | 0.89 |
| Total Effect | -0.0144 | -0.0799 | 0.0514 | 0.65 |
| ACME (average) | -0.0103 | -0.0214 | -0.0011 | 0.03 |
| ADE (average) | -0.0041 | -0.0694 | 0.0603 | 0.65 |

**Sensitivity Analysis for Causal Mediation Effects**

As Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010) explain, for mediation effects to be interpreted as causal, the sequential ignorability assumption must be satisfied. The first part of the assumption requires the treatment to be independent of potential outcomes and potential mediators. This part of the assumption is satisfied in my study because survey respondents are randomly assigned to the inequality treatment and the control conditions. The second part of the assumption requires that the mediator is independent of the potential outcomes. This second part is not automatically satisfied, because the level of perceived meritocracy (i.e. the mediator) is not randomly assigned. This part of the assumption requires that the meritocracy mediator can be considered as if it were randomized among the survey respondents who were assigned to the same inequality treatment and who share the same pre-treatment characteristics (Imai, Keele and Tingley 2010, 313).

To address this point, the outcome model in my mediation analysis controls for the treatment status and for a set of covariates (see table 3 in the main paper). However, as in observational studies, even after collecting all the seemingly relevant covariates, one can never be fully certain that unobserved variables are not confounding the relationship between mediator and outcome. This assumption can never be directly tested from the observed data. What I can do is to run sensitivity analysis, which allows me to quantify the degree to which my empirical findings are robust to potential violation of the sequential ignorability assumption.

For each of the three mediations presented, the sensitivity analysis is based on the sensitivity parameter *ρ*, i.e. the correlation between the error terms of the outcome and the mediator models. Under sequential ignorability, *ρ* equals 0. The correlation measured by *ρ* differs from 0 when omitted variables affect both the mediator and the outcome variables. The analysis in my study reveals that when the value of *ρ* equals 0.1 (for redistribution and poor natives) and -0.2 and -0.1 (for low-income immigrants), the confidence interval for ACME contains 0. As an alternative quantification, the ACME estimate would be 0 when the product of the original variance explained by the omitted confounders is 0.0077 in the case of support for redistribution; 0.0088 with regard to support for low-income citizens; and 0.0295 for support for low-income immigrants (see Tingley et al. 2014 for an interpretation of the results).

**Additional test for the mediation effect of perceived lack of meritocratic opportunity**

In the table below, I present models for support for redistribution, low-income natives and low-income immigrants which include perceived lack of opportunity as an independent variable. If lack of opportunity is mediating the impact of inequality on redistribution and welfare support, the coefficients for inequality should be lower in the models including lack of opportunity as an independent variable.

This is indeed the case. As the table shows, lack of opportunity is always a significant predictor. Its inclusion leads to a 10.1% decrease of the inequality effect on support for redistribution, a 9.9% decrease of the inequality effect on support for low-income natives, and a 57% decrease of the inequality effect on support for low-income immigrants (the impact of inequality on support for immigrants remains not significant).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | **Support for** | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | **Redistribution**  **from Rich** | | **Low-Income**  **Natives** | | **Low-Income Immigrants** | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Inequality | 0.109\*\* | 0.098\*\* | 0.071\* | 0.064+ | -0.014 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.033) | (0.033) |
| Poverty | 0.029 | 0.025 | 0.024 | 0.022 | 0.020 | 0.023 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.033) | (0.033) |
| Lack of opportunity |  | 0.066\*\*\* |  | 0.044\*\*\* |  | -0.048\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.013) |  | (0.013) |  | (0.012) |
| Constant | 0.406\*\*\* | 0.246\*\*\* | 0.416\*\*\* | 0.310\*\*\* | 0.653\*\*\* | 0.769\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.039) | (0.024) | (0.039) | (0.023) | (0.037) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Observations | 1,273 | 1,273 | 1,273 | 1,273 | 1,273 | 1,273 |
| R2 | 0.009 | 0.030 | 0.004 | 0.013 | 0.001 | 0.013 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.007 | 0.028 | 0.002 | 0.011 | -0.001 | 0.011 |
|  | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | +p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | | | |

**Additional causal mediation analysis**

**Inequality, lack of opportunity, and welfare deservingness**

I present here two additional causal mediation analyses to test more directly the impact of inequality on relative deservingness of natives vs. immigrants and the resulting impact on welfare chauvinism. This analysis confirms the conditioning role of national identity.

*First additional causal mediation analysis*

First, as already shown in the paper and reported in model A below, inequality strengthens the belief that society is not offering meritocratic opportunities.

This, in turn, variously shapes deservingness beliefs. On the one hand, it *strengthens* the opinion that low-income natives have received less than what they deserve (model B1). On the other, it *weakens* the belief that immigrants have received less than what they deserve (model B2). Consistently, the inequality-induced perceived lack of opportunities promotes the conviction that natives should receive priority over immigrants in welfare access (model B3).

*Second additional causal mediation analysis*

Second, inequality directly *positively* influences perceptions of poor deservingness (model C1) and *negatively* affects perceptions of immigrant deservingness (model C2).

Perceptions of group deservingness are then positively related to welfare support for the group under consideration (model D1 and D2).

Causal mediation analysis confirms that inequality shapes welfare support for natives and immigrants in a diametrically opposing way via these contrasting deservingness perceptions.

**Table B9 – Impact of inequality on perceived lack of opportunity (model A)   
Impact of lack of opportunity on perceptions of welfare deservingness (models B1, B2, B3)**

(A: logit model, B: ordered logit models)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | ***Beliefs that*** | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | **Society Lacks**  **Economic**  **Opportunity** | **Poor**  **are**  **Undeserving** | **Immigrants**  **are**  **Undeserving** | **Natives Deserve**  **Welfare Priority**  **Over Immigrants** |
|  | (A) | (B1) | (B2) | (B3) |
|  | | | | |
| Inequality | 0.37\* | -- | -- | -- |
|  | (0.15) |  |  |  |
| Poverty | 0.07 | -- | -- | -- |
|  | (0.15) |  |  |  |
| Lack of opportunity | -- | -0.83\*\*\* | 0.50\*\*\* | 0.64\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Education | 0.01 | 0.11+ | -0.12+ | -0.13\* |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Age | -0.01 | -0.02\*\*\* | 0.01\*\* | 0.01\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) |
| Female | 0.17 | -0.14 | 0.24\* | 0.02 |
|  | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Economic right | -0.04 | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Conservative | -0.05+ | -0.02 | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Income (household) | -0.001 | 0.07\* | -0.02 | -0.04 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Party ID (Lega Nord) | 0.57+ | -0.29 | 0.65+ | 0.82\* |
|  | (0.34) | (0.34) | (0.33) | (0.34) |
| Location (North-East) | 0.16 | -0.06 | 0.24 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.19) |
|  | | | | |
| Observations | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 |
| Log Likelihood | -739.85 | -- | -- | -- |
| Residual Deviance | -- | 2,232.227 | 2,780.10 | 2,645.191 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,519.71 | 2,276.227 | 2,824.10 | 2,689.191 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | +p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | |

*Causal mediation analysis*

**Table B10 – Further causal mediation analysis**

***Inequality, lack of opportunity, and poor undeservingness***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Estimate | 95% Lower CI | 95% Upper CI | p-value |
| ACME | -0.0292 | -0.0621 | -0.0011 | 0.04 |
| ADE | -0.1044 | -0.2264 | 0.0155 | 0.10 |
| Total Effect | -0.1336 | -0.2590 | -0.0065 | 0.04 |

***Inequality, lack of opportunity, and immigrant undeservingness***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Estimate | 95% Lower CI | 95% Upper CI | p-value |
| ACME | 0.0186 | 0.0012 | 0.0433 | 0.04 |
| ADE | 0.0830 | -0.0888 | 0.2464 | 0.34 |
| Total Effect | 0.1016 | -0.0720 | 0.2631 | 0.25 |

***Inequality, lack of opportunity, and beliefs in welfare priority for low-income natives over low-income immigrants***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Estimate | 95% Lower CI | 95% Upper CI | p-value |
| ACME (control) | 0.0130 | 0.0003 | 0.0270 | 0.04 |
| ACME (treated) | 0.0131 | 0.0005 | 0.0270 | 0.04 |
| ADE (control) | 0.0197 | -0.0495 | 0.0903 | 0.58 |
| ADE (treated) | 0.0198 | -0.0495 | 0.0908 | 0.58 |
| Total Effect | 0.0328 | -0.0390 | 0.1040 | 0.36 |
| ACME (average) | 0.0131 | 0.0004 | 0.0269 | 0.04 |
| ADE (average) | 0.0198 | -0.0495 | 0.0905 | 0.58 |

**Table B11 – Impact of inequality on perceptions of welfare deservingness (models C1, C2) and impact of perceptions of welfare deservingness on welfare support for natives and immigrants (models D1, D2)**

(All models are ordered logit models)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | **Belief that:** | | **Support for:** | |
|  | **Poor are**  **Undeserving** | **Immigrants are**  **Undeserving** | **Low-Income**  **Natives** | **Low-Income**  **Immigrants** |
|  | (C1) | (C2) | (D1) | (D2) |
|  | | | | |
| Inequality | -0.47\*\* | 0.26+ | -- | -- |
|  | (0.15) | (0.14) |  |  |
| Poverty | -0.14 | 0.16 | -- | -- |
|  | (0.14) | (0.14) |  |  |
| Poor undeserving | -- | -- | -0.65\*\*\* | -- |
|  |  |  | (0.07) |  |
| Immigrants undeserving | -- | -- | -- | -0.76\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.06) |
| Education | 0.10 | -0.11+ | -0.08 | 0.07 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Age | -0.02\*\*\* | 0.01\* | 0.005 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| Female | -0.18 | 0.26\* | 0.25\* | 0.13 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Income (household) | 0.07\* | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Economic right | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.15\*\*\* | -0.02 | -0.08\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Conservative | -0.01 | 0.09\*\*\* | -0.01 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Party ID (Lega Nord) | -0.40 | 0.73\* | -0.01 | -0.50 |
|  | (0.33) | (0.33) | (0.33) | (0.32) |
| Location (North-East) | -0.07 | 0.24 | -0.05 | -0.20 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.18) |
|  | | | | |
| Observations | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 |
| Residual Deviance | 2,268.222 | 2,795.566 | 2,629.522 | 2,973.716 |
| AIC | 2,314.222 | 2,841.566 | 2,673.522 | 3,017.716 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | +p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | |

*Causal mediation analysis*

**Table B12 – Further causal mediation analysis**

***Inequality, poor undeservingness, and support for low-income natives***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Estimate | 95% Lower CI | 95% Upper CI | p-value |
| ACME (control) | 0.0377 | 0.0127 | 0.0638 | 0.00 |
| ACME (treated) | 0.0388 | 0.0131 | 0.0648 | 0.00 |
| ADE (control) | 0.0525 | -0.0116 | 0.1215 | 0.10 |
| ADE (treated) | 0.0535 | -0.0121 | 0.1235 | 0.10 |
| Total Effect | 0.0913 | 0.0214 | 0.1627 | 0.01 |
| ACME (average) | 0.0383 | 0.0130 | 0.0642 | 0.00 |
| ADE (average) | 0.0530 | -0.0118 | 0.1225 | 0.10 |

***Inequality, immigrant undeservingness, and support for low-income immigrants***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Estimate | 95% Lower CI | 95% Upper CI | p-value |
| ACME | -0.0297 | -0.0634 | -0.0003 | 0.049 |
| ADE | 0.0154 | -0.0422 | 0.0718 | 0.61 |
| Total Effect | -0.0143 | -0.0805 | 0.0504 | 0.68 |

**Conditional impact of inequality: Robustness checks**

**Table B13 – Support for welfare policies for natives and immigrants conditional on conservatism (OLS, logit and ordered logit models)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | **Support for** | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | **Low-Income**  **Natives** | | | **Low-Income**  **Immigrants** | | |
|  | *OLS* | *Logistic* | *Ordered* | *OLS* | *Logistic* | *Ordered* |
|  |  |  | *logistic* |  |  | *logistic* |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Inequality | 0.09\* | 0.40\* | 0.39\* | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0.11 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.18) | (0.17) | (0.04) | (0.20) | (0.16) |
| Inequality\*Conservative | -0.02 | -0.09 | -0.37 | -0.17\* | -0.82\* | -0.69\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.34) | (0.32) | (0.08) | (0.37) | (0.31) |
| Poverty | 0.07 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.01 | 0.07 | -0.05 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.04) | (0.19) | (0.15) |
| Poverty\*Conservative | -0.11 | -0.50 | -0.89\*\* | -0.09 | -0.41 | -0.35 |
|  | (0.09) | (0.38) | (0.34) | (0.08) | (0.40) | (0.33) |
| Conservative | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0.35 | 0.06 | 0.32 | 0.27 |
|  | (0.06) | (0.26) | (0.23) | (0.06) | (0.28) | (0.23) |
| Covariates | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|  | | | | | | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Control mean | 0.41 | 0.41 | 4.05 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 2.42 |
|  | | | | | | |
| Observations | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 |
| R2 | 0.05 | - | - | 0.12 | - | - |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.03 | - | - | 0.11 | - | - |
| F Statistic | 2.73\*\*\* | - | - | 7.21\*\*\* | - | - |
| AIC | - | 1494.6 | 2751.03 | - | 1310.7 | 3211.59 |
|  | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | | | |

**Table B14 – Support for welfare policies for natives and immigrants conditional on income (OLS, logit and ordered logit models)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | **Support for** | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | **Low-Income**  **Natives** | | | **Low-Income**  **Immigrants** | | |
|  | *OLS* | *Logistic* | *Ordered*  *logistic* | *OLS* | *Logistic* | *Ordered*  *logistic* |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Inequality | 0.02 | 0.03 | -0.03 | 0.01 | 0.06 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.29) | (0.26) | (0.06) | (0.31) | (0.25) |
| Inequality\*Income | 0.03 | 0.15 | 0.13 | -0.01 | -0.06 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.02) | (0.11) | (0.08) |
| Poverty | -0.07 | -0.33 | -0.44 | -0.03 | -0.17 | -0.32 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.30) | (0.27) | (0.06) | (0.33) | (0.27) |
| Poverty\*Income | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0.21\* | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.07 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.02) | (0.12) | (0.09) |
| Income | -0.04\* | -0.21\* | -0.18\*\* | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.09) | (0.06) |
| Covariates | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|  | | | | | | |
| Observations | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 | 1,098 |
| R2 | 0.05 | -- | -- | 0.12 | -- | -- |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.03 | -- | -- | 0.10 | -- | -- |
| F Statistic | 2.81\*\*\* | -- | -- | 7.09\*\*\* | -- | -- |
| AIC | -- | 1492.7 | 2752.6 | -- | 1312.6 | 3210.2 |
|  | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | | | |

**Analysis with subsets of respondents**

**Table B15 – Support for redistribution: Subsets of respondents (ordered logit models)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | | |
|  | **Support for redistribution** | |
|  |  | |
|  | ***Passed***  ***attention check*** | ***Eliminated 5%***  ***slowest and fastest*** |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | | |
| Inequality | 0.44\*\* | 0.60\*\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.17) |
| Poverty | -0.04 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.17) |
| Education | -0.11 | -0.06 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Age | 0.01 | 0.01+ |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Female | -0.29\* | -0.30\* |
|  | (0.13) | (0.14) |
| Income (household) | -0.07\* | -0.08\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Economic right | -0.24\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Conservative | -0.02 | -0.05+ |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Party ID (Lega Nord) | 0.25 | 0.74+ |
|  | (0.34) | (0.43) |
| Location (North-East) | 0.30 | 0.24 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.23) |
|  | | |
| Observations | 878 | 1,032 |
| Residual variance | 2104.718 | 1294.6 |
| AIC | 2150.718 | 1334.6 |
|  | | |
| *Note:* | +p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | |

**Table B16 – Support for low-income natives and low-income immigrants: Subsets of respondents (ordered logit models)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | | | | | |
|  | ***Passed***  ***attention check*** | | | | ***Eliminated 5%***  ***slowest and fastest*** | | | |
|  | **Support for** | | | | | | | |
|  | **Low-Income**  **Natives** | | **Low-Income**  **Immigrants** | | **Low-Income**  **Natives** | | **Low-Income**  **Immigrants** | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Inequality | 0.38\* | 0.42\* | 0.003 | 0.23 | 0.25+ | 0.35\* | -0.08 | 0.33 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.19) | (0.16) | (0.18) | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.14) | (0.17) |
| Inequality\*Conservative | -- | -0.18 | -- | -0.99\*\* | -- | -0.43 | -- | -0.85\*\* |
|  | -- | (0.37) | -- | (0.37) | -- | (0.33) | -- | (0.33) |
| Poverty | 0.14 | 0.27 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.28+ | -0.16 | -0.08 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.18) | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.14) | (0.16) | (0.14) | (0.16) |
| Poverty\*Conservative | -- | -0.66+ | -- | -0.62 | -- | -0.99\*\* | -- | -0.34 |
|  | -- | (0.39) | -- | (0.39) | -- | (0.35) | -- | (0.34) |
| Education | -0.13+ | -0.13+ | 0.12+ | 0.11+ | -0.14\* | -0.14\* | 0.11+ | 0.10+ |
|  | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Age | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.0002 | 0.0001 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Female | 0.24+ | 0.25+ | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.21+ | 0.23+ | 0.10 | 0.1q |
|  | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Income (household) | -0.04 | -0.04 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Economic right | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.19\*\*\* | -0.20\*\*\* | -0.07\* | -0.07\* | -0.16\*\*\* | -0.17\*\*\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Social conservative | 0.06 | 0.32 | -0.30+ | 0.27 | 0.07 | 0.38 | -0.15 | 0.29 |
|  | (0.16) | (0.27) | (0.16) | (0.27) | (0.15) | (0.25) | (0.14) | (0.25) |
| Party ID (Lega Nord) | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.57 | -0.52 | 0.03 | 0.04 | -0.77\* | -0.72\* |
|  | (0.36) | (0.36) | (0.36) | (0.36) | (0.36) | (0.36) | (0.34) | (0.34) |
| Location (North-East) | 0.07 | 0.08 | -0.29 | -0.28 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.22 | -0.22 |
|  | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.19) |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Observations | 878 | 878 | 878 | 878 | 1,032 | 1,032 | 1,032 | 1,032 |
| Residual variance | 2,038 | 2,035 | 2,456 | 2,449 | 2,478 | 2,470 | 2,952 | 2,945 |
| AIC | 2,084 | 2,085 | 2,502 | 2,499 | 2,524 | 2,520 | 2,998 | 2,995 |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | +p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001 | | | | | | | |

1. Consider, for instance, the vast literature on relative deprivation. See e.g. Walker and Smith 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Social expenditure is measured as a percentage of GDP. The variable comes from the OECD Social Expenditure Database and includes the following social policy areas: old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labor market programs, unemployment, housing, and other social policy areas. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. “In your opinion, which one of the following statements about absolute poverty in Italy since the beginning of the crisis is correct?” The three possible answers were: “The condition of the middle class has severely worsened, but the number of absolute poor has decreased;” “Workers’ salaries have collapsed and the number of unemployed has substantially increased, but the number of poor has remained stable,” “The number of absolute poor has almost doubled and the number of unemployed has broken a new record.” The correct answer is the third one. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)