## Online appendices for "Dimensions of Elite Partisan Polarization"

Appendix A1: Review of observational studies	2
Appendix A2: Review of experimental studies	10
Appendix A3: Vignettes	15
Appendix A4: Pretest of statements used in main study	19
Appendix A5: Main results based on samples excluding respondents who failed attentions chec	:ks 20
Appendix A6: Main results based on samples including respondents who failed attentions chec	ks.24
Appendix A7: Effects on in- and out-party affective ratings	28
Appendix A8: Results concerning affective polarization split on variables used to form index	32
Appendix A9: Results concerning trust split on variables used to form index	37
Appendix A10: Description of attention checks	42
Appendix A11: Subsample analyses	43
Appendix A12: Results from factorial experiments compared to benchmark condition	52
Appendix A13: Full models for analysis of follow-up study 2	57
References	62

General notes about the experimental results (A5, A6, A7, A8, A9, A11, and A12) presented in this appendix:

- 1) All results, except those presented in Appendix A6, rely on samples excluding respondents who failed the embedded attention checks. These attention checks are described in Appendix A10.
- 2) If a respondent chose the "don't know" option when answering a question measuring one of the three outcomes, the respondent was excluded when analyzing that outcome. Regarding both trust in politicians and attitude polarization, this is relatively inconsequential; the share of respondents excluded is in both cases only 6 percent. However, the share is 18 percent when analyzing affective polarization. This high share is entirely caused by many respondents choosing "don't know" when answering one of the word rating questions, as it was not possible to choose "don't know" on the thermometer scales. To show the robustness of the results concerning affective polarization, they have been replicated using only the thermometer question as a dependent measure in Appendix A8.
- 3) When examining the effects on trust in politicians, the models include both partisans and independents, but when analyzing attitude and affective polarization, the models only include partisans (leaners included).
- 4) All coefficients in all models remain significant at the same  $\alpha$  levels if heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are employed

## Appendix A1: Review of observational studies

#### Observational studies of issue polarization

#### Criteria for inclusion:

- 1) The study has to be observational, i.e., treatment is not randomized.
- 2) The study must be published in a journal after 2007 and be indexed by Web of Science.
- 3) The study must focus explicitly on elite polarization, i.e., the words "polarization/polarisation" or "polarize/polarise" have to appear in the manuscript when describing the independent variable.
- 5) The dependent variables must be related to the attitudes or behavior of citizens.
- 6) The study must focus on the United States, i.e., at least some of the data must come from the United States.

Title of paper	Author(s)	Year	Journal	Volume(number)	Type of study	Primary outcome variables	Did researchers control for incivility?
Legislative Party Polarization and Trust in State Legislatures	Banda, K.K.; Kirkland, J.H.	2018	American Politics Research	46(4)	Observational	-Trust in legislatures	No
An Empirical Model of Issue Evolution and Partisan Realignment in a Multiparty System	Arndt, C.	2018	Political Research Quarterly	71(1)	Observational	- Effect of cultural conservatism of realignment	No
Political Competition, Partisanship and Interpersonal Trust in Electoral Democracies	Carling, R.E.; Love, G.J.	2018	British Journal of Political Science	48(1)	Observational	- Partisan trust gap	No

Explaining citizen perceptions of party ideological positions: The mediating role of political contexts	Carroll, R; Kubo, H.	2018	Electoral Studies	51	Observational	- Effect of education on perception of ideological positions	No
Elite cues and public polarization on transgender rights	Jones, P.E.; Brewer, P.R.	2018	Politics, Groups, and Identities	-	Observational	- Attitudes on transgender rights	No
Voter Decision- Making with Polarized Choices	Rogowski, J.C.	2018	British Journal of Political Science	48(1)	Observational	- Relationship between ideological proximity and vote choice	No
From on High: The Effect of Elite Polarization on Mass Attitudes and Behaviors, 1972– 2012	Zinger, Joshua N.; Flynn, Michael E.	2018	British Journal of Political Science	48(1)	Observational	- Partisan sorting - Vote choice - Affective polarization	No
A comparative investigation into the effects of party-system variables on party switching using individual-level data	Dejaeghere, Y.; Dassonneville, R.	2017	Party Politics	23(2)	Observational	- Voter volatility	No
Polarization, Number of Parties, and Voter Turnout: Explaining Turnout in 26 OECD Countries	Wilford, A.M.	2017	Social Science Quarterly	98(5)	Observational	- Turnout	No

Partisan Polarization and the Effect of Congressional Performance Evaluations on Party Brands and American Elections	Jones, D.R.	2015	Political Research Quarterly	68(4)	Observational	- Correlation between congressional job performance and party favorability - Vote for president	No
Is there a relationship between party system polarization and voters' proximity to the parties in the left- right dimension?	Papageorgiou, A.; Autto, H.	2015	Acta Politica	50(3)	Observational	- Proximity voting	No
Party Unity, Ideology, and Polarization in Primary Elections for the House of Representatives: 1956–2012	Pyeatt, N.	2015	Legislative Studies Quarterly	40(4)	Observational	- Vote share in primaries	No
Polarization and the Decline of the American Floating Voter	Smidt, C.D.	2015	American Journal of Political Science	61(2)	Observational	- Share of floating voters	No
Political Trust in Polarized Times	Theiss-Morse, E.; Barton, D.; Wagner, M.W.	2015	Motivating Cooperation and Compliance with Authority	-	Observational	- Political trust	No
Political polarization on support for government spending on environmental protection in the USA, 1974-2012	McCright, A.M.; Xiao, C.Y.; Dunlap, R.E.	2014	Social Science Research	48	Observational	- Attitudes on government spending on environmental protection	No

Electoral Choice, Ideological Conflict, and Political Participation	Rogowski, J.C.	2014	American Journal of Political Science	58(2)	Observational	- Turnout	No
Does context matter – The impact of electoral systems, political parties and individual characteristics on voters' perceptions of party positions	Dahlberg, S.	2013	Electoral Studies	32(4)	Observational	- Perceptions of party positions	No
Class voting and Left– Right party positions: A comparative study of 15 Western democracies, 1960– 2005	Jansen, G.; Evans, G.; de Graaf, N.D.	2013	Social Science Research	42(2)	Observational	- Class voting	No
Correct Voting Across Thirty-Three Democracies: A Preliminary Analysis	Lau, R.R.; Patel, P.; Fahmy, D.F.; Kaufman, R.R.	2013	British Journal of Political Science	44(2)	Observational	- "Correct voting"	No
Who Fits the Left- Right Divide? Partisan Polarization in the American Electorate	Carmines, E.G.; Ensley, M.J.; Wagner, M.W.	2012	American Behavioral Scientist	56(12)	Observational	- Party identification	No
Electoral Systems, Party Mobilisation and Political Engagement	Karp, J.A.	2012	Australian Journal of Political Science	47(1)	Observational	- Party contact - Political efficacy	No
Economic Integration, Party Polarisation and Electoral Turnout	Steiner, N.D.; Martin, C.W.	2012	West European Politics	35(2)	Observational	- Voter turnout	No
The Return of the American Voter? Party Polarization	Dodson, K.	2010	Sociological Perspectives	53(3)	Observational	- Turnout	No

and Voting Behavior, 1988 to 2004							
What if Robin Hood is a social conservative? How the political response to increasing inequality depends on party polarization	Finseraas, H.	2010	Socio-Economic Review	8(2)	Observational	- Association income and left-right position	No
Policy Polarization among Party Elites and the Significance of Political Awareness in the Mass Public	Classen, R.L.; Highton, B.	2009	Political Research Quarterly	62(3)	Observational	- Policy attitudes	No
The Dynamics of Partisan Conflict on Congressional Approval	Ramirez, M.D.	2009	American Journal of Political Science	53(3)	Observational	- Approval of Congress	No
The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems Party System Polarization, Its Measurement, and Its Consequences	Dalton, R.J.	2008	Comparative Political Studies	41(7)		- Turnout - Correlation between left- right placement and vote choice	
The Mass Media and the Public's Assessments of Presidential Candidates, 1952– 2000	Gilens, M.; Vavreck, L.; Cohen, M.	2007	Journal of Politics	69(4)	Observational	- Percentage of policy oriented likes and dislikes about parties	No

Partisanship,	Wagner, M.W.	2007	American	35(6)	Observational	- Satisfaction	No
Polarization, and			Politics			with casework	
Citizens' Attitudes			Research			- Perceived	
About Casework						representative	
						helpfulness	
						- Inclination to	
						contact	
						representative	

#### Observational studies of incivility

Criteria for inclusion:

- 1) The study has to be observational, i.e., treatment is not randomized.
- 2) The study must be published in a journal after 2007 and be indexed by Web of Science.
- 3) The study must focus explicitly on incivility, i.e., the words "incivility" or "uncivil" have to appear in the manuscript when describing the independent variable.
- 4) The study must focus on elite incivility, i.e. the incivility must be from politicians.
- 5) The dependent variables must be related to the attitudes or behavior of citizens.
- 6) The study must focus on the United States, i.e., at least some of the data must come from the United States.

Title of paper	Author(s)	Year	Journal	Volume(number)	Type of study	Primary outcome variables	Did researchers control for issue polarization?
The effects of tone, focus, and incivility in election debates	Hopmann, D.N.; Vliegenthart, R.; Maier, J.	2018	Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties	28(3)	Observational	- Spontaneous reactions toward candidates	No
The Mainstreaming of Verbally Aggressive Online Political Behaviors	Cicchirillo, V.; Hmielowski, J.; Hutchens, M.	2015	Cyberpsycholo gy, behavior and social networking	18(5)	Observational	- Flaming acceptability - Intention to engage in flaming	No
Following the News? Reception of Uncivil Partisan Media and the Use of Incivility in Political	Gervais, B.T.	2014	Political Communicatio n	31(4)	Observational	- Propensity to use incivility	No

Variability in	Fridkin, K.L.;	2011	American	55(2)	Observational	- Impressions of	No
Citizens' Reactions	Kenney, P.J.		Journal of			the candidates'	
to Different Types of			Political			personality traits	
Negative Campaigns			Science			- Affective	
						assessments of	
						the candidates	
						- Views	
						regarding the	
						candidates'	
						abilities to deal	
						with several	
						issues	
						- Overall	
						favorability	
						ratings of the	
						candidates	

## Appendix A2: Review of experimental studies

#### **Experimental studies of issue polarization**

#### Criteria for inclusion:

- 1) The study has to be experimental, i.e., treatment has to be randomized.
- 2) The study must be published in a journal after 2007 and be indexed by Web of Science.
- 3) The study must focus explicitly on elite polarization, i.e., the words "polarization/polarisation" or "polarize/polarise" have to appear in the manuscript when describing the independent variable.
- 5) The dependent variables must be related to the attitudes or behavior of citizens.
- 6) The study must focus on the United States, i.e., at least some of the experimental participants have to be American.

Title of paper	Author(s)	Year	Journal	Volume(number)	Type of study	Primary outcome variables	Was perceived incivility measured post-treatment?
Voter Decision- Making with Polarized Choices	Rogowski, J.C.	2018	British Journal of Political Science	48(1)	Survey experiments	Relationship between ideological proximity and vote choice	No
Conflict-Framed News, Self- Categorization, and Partisan Polarization	Han, J.Y.; Federico, C.M.	2017	Mass Communication and Society	20(4)	Lab experiments	Attitude polarization	No
The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the US Electorate	Webster, S.W.; Abramowitz, A.I.	2017	American Politics Research	45(4)	Survey experiments	Affective polarization	No

Bully Partisan or Partisan Bully?: Partisanship, Elite Polarization, and US Presidential Communication	Harrison, B.F.	2016	Social Science Quarterly	97(2)	Lab experiments	Job approval ratings Issue importance ratings Policy opinions	No
Does Media Coverage of Partisan Polarization Affect Political Attitudes?	Levendusky, M.; Malhotra, N.	2016	Political Communication	33(2)	Survey experiments	Policy opinions Affective polarization Perceived polarization	No
Partisanship and Preference Formation: Competing Motivations, Elite Polarization, and Issue Importance	Mullinix, K.J.	2016	Political Behavior	38(2)	Survey experiments	Policy opinions	No
Elite Polarization and Public Opinion: How Polarization Is Communicated and Its Effects	Robison, J.; Mullinix, K.J.	2016	Political Communication	33(2)	Survey experiments	Policy opinions Support for bipartisanship Message evaluations	No
How Ideology Fuels Affective Polarization	Rogowski, J.C.; Sutherland, J.L.	2016	Political Behavior	38(2)	Survey experiments	Affective polarization	No
How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation	Druckman, J.N.; Peterson, E.; Slothuus, R.	2013	American Political Science Review	107(1)	Survey experiments	Effect of frames on policy opinions	No
Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization	Levendusky,M.	2010	Political Behavior	32(1)	Survey experiments	Policy attitudes/ideological consistency	No

### **Experimental studies of incivility**

#### Criteria for inclusion:

- 1) The study has to be experimental, i.e., treatment has to be randomized.
- 2) The study must be published in a journal after 2007 and be indexed by Web of Science.
- 3) The study must focus explicitly on incivility, i.e., the words "incivility" or "uncivil" have to appear in the manuscript when describing the independent variable.
- 4) The study must focus on elite incivility, i.e. the incivility must be from politicians.
- 5) The dependent variables must be related to the attitudes or behavior of citizens.
- 6) The study must focus on the United States, i.e., at least some of the experimental participants have to be American.

Title of paper	Author(s)	Year	Journal	Volume(number)	Type of study	Primary outcome variables	Was perceived issue polarization measured post- treatment?
Rousing the Partisan Combatant: Elite Incivility, Anger, and Antideliberative Attitudes	Gervais, B.T.	2018	Political Psychology	35(1)	Survey experiments	- Feelings of anger, anxiety and enthusiasm - Deliberative attitudes	No
Platforms for Incivility: Examining Perceptions Across Media	Sydnor, E.	2017	Political Communication	29(3)	Survey experiments	Perceptions of incivility	No

More than Mimicry? The Role of Anger in Uncivil Reactions to Elite Political Incivility	Gervais, B.T.	2017	International Journal of Public Opinion Research	29(3)	Survey experiments	- Anger - Use of incivility	No
U Suk! Participatory Media and Youth Experiences With Political Discourse	Middaugh, E.; Bowyer B.; Kahne, J.	2017	Youth and Society	49(7)	Survey experiments	- Normative evaluations of conflict	No
Breaking Down Bipartisanship: When and Why Citizens React to Cooperation across Party Lines	Paris, C.	2017	Public Opinion Quarterly	81(2)	Survey experiments	- Trust in Congress - Candidate evaluations - Motivation of politicians	No
Interview Effects: Theory and Evidence for the Impact of Televised Political Interviews on Viewer Attitudes	Ben-Porath, E.N.	2010	Communication Theory	20(3)	Lab experiments	- Trust in and attitudes towards journalists	No
A Negativity Gap? Voter Gender, Attack Politics, and Participation in American Elections	Brooks, D.J.	2010	Politics & Gender	6(3)	Survey experiments	- Intention to vote in presidential election	No
Bad for Men, Better for Women: The Impact of Stereotypes during Negative Campaigns	Fridkin, K.L.; Kenney, P.J.; Woodall, G.S.	2009	Political Behavior	31(1)	Telephone survey experiments	- Assessments of the candidates (trait and feeling ratings)	No
The Dimensions of Negative Messages	Fridkin, K.L.; Kenney, P.J.	2008	American Politics Research	36(5)	Telephone survey experiments	- Assessments of the candidates (trait and feeling ratings)	No

Beyond negativity: The effects of incivility on the electorate	Brooks, D.J.; Geer, J.G.	2007	American Journal of Political Science	51(1)	Survey experiments	- Political trust - Likelihood to voter - Political interest - Efficacy - Recall	No
Effects of "In-Your-Face" Television Discourse on Perceptions of a Legitimate Opposition	Mutz, D.C.	2007	American Political Science Review	101(4)	Lab experiments	- Perceived legitimacy of the opposition (feeling thermometers and argument ratings) - Awareness of rationales for oppositional positions - Physiological arousal	Partly*

<sup>\*</sup>In Mutz's experiments, participants watched a mock debate between two political candidates and then rated them in terms of perceived incivility and ideology. However, though this is the best attempt to avoid confounding in the literature, the results she presents do not rule out that the level of issue polarization varies across her treatment conditions. The reason is that only averages across the two candidates are reported, meaning that she does not show how big the ideological distance is.

## Appendix A3: Vignettes

## Vignettes concerning drilling for oil and gas used in main study

Low issue polarization + Civility	Low issue polarization +	High issue polarization + Civility	High issue polarization +
	Incivility		Incivility
Drilling off the Atlantic Coast			
and in the Arctic			
Some members of Congress have recently been discussing whether to allow drilling	Some members of Congress have recently been discussing whether to allow drilling	Some members of Congress have recently been discussing whether to allow drilling	Some members of Congress have recently been discussing whether to allow drilling
for oil and gas off the Atlantic Coast and in the Arctic.	for oil and gas off the Atlantic Coast and in the Arctic.	for oil and gas off the Atlantic Coast and in the Arctic.	for oil and gas off the Atlantic Coast and in the Arctic.
Mixed opinions within both parties On average, Democrats in Congress tend to	Mixed opinions within both parties On average, Democrats in Congress tend to	Strong disagreement between the parties	Strong disagreement between the parties
be slightly opposed to drilling, while Republicans tend to be slightly in favor of it,	be slightly opposed to drilling, while Republicans tend to be slightly in favor of it,	On average, Democrats in Congress tend to be strongly opposed to drilling, while	On average, Democrats in Congress tend to be strongly opposed to drilling, while
but the differences of opinion are generally small. Moreover, opinions are mixed within	but the differences of opinion are generally small. Moreover, opinions are mixed within	Republicans tend to be strongly in favor of it, and the differences of opinion are	Republicans tend to be strongly in favor of it, and the differences of opinion are
both parties as members of each party can be found in large numbers on both sides of	both parties as members of each party can be found in large numbers on both sides of	generally large. Opinions are clearly split along partisan lines as most members of	generally large. Opinions are clearly split along partisan lines as most members of
the issue.	the issue.	each party are on the same side as the rest of their party.	each party are on the same side as the rest of their party.
Respectful tone of debate	Harsh tone of debate	Respectful tone of debate	Harsh tone of debate
At the same time, the debate on this issue has been quite respectful. For instance, a leading Republican member of Congress who supports drilling has said that the opponents "are good and honest people." Likewise, a leading Democratic member of Congress who opposes drilling has said that the supporters "have very good intentions."	At the same time, the debate on this issue has been very harsh. For instance, a leading Republican member of Congress who supports drilling has said that the opponents "are bad people who can't stop lying." Likewise, a leading Democratic member of Congress who opposes drilling has said that the supporters "have rotten intentions."	At the same time, the debate on this issue has been quite respectful. For instance, a leading Republican member of Congress who supports drilling has said that the opponents "are good and honest people." Likewise, a leading Democratic member of Congress who opposes drilling has said that the supporters "have very good intentions."	At the same time, the debate on this issue has been very harsh. For instance, a leading Republican member of Congress who supports drilling has said that the opponents "are bad people who can't stop lying." Likewise, a leading Democratic member of Congress who opposes drilling has said that the supporters "have rotten intentions."

## Vignettes concerning air traffic controllers used in main study

Vignettes concerning air traffic o	controllers used in main study		
Low issue polarization + Civility	Low issue polarization +	High issue polarization + Civility	High issue polarization +
	Incivility		Incivility
Air traffic controllers	Air traffic controllers	Air traffic controllers	Air traffic controllers
Air traffic controllers are currently	Air traffic controllers are currently	Air traffic controllers are currently	Air traffic controllers are currently
employees of the U.S. government.	employees of the U.S. government.	employees of the U.S. government.	employees of the U.S. government.
However, some members of Congress	However, some members of Congress	However, some members of Congress	However, some members of Congress
have recently been discussing a proposal	have recently been discussing a proposal	have recently been discussing a proposal	have recently been discussing a proposal
that would allow private firms, rather	that would allow private firms, rather	that would allow private firms, rather	that would allow private firms, rather
than the federal government, to be in	than the federal government, to be in	than the federal government, to be in	than the federal government, to be in
charge of air traffic controllers.	charge of air traffic controllers.	charge of air traffic controllers.	charge of air traffic controllers.
Mixed opinions within both parties	Mixed opinions within both parties	Strong disagreement between the	Strong disagreement between the
On average, Democrats in Congress tend	On average, Democrats in Congress tend	parties	parties
to be slightly opposed to this proposal,	to be slightly opposed to this proposal,	On average, Democrats in Congress tend	On average, Democrats in Congress tend
while Republicans tend to be slightly in	while Republicans tend to be slightly in	to be strongly opposed to this proposal,	to be strongly opposed to this proposal,
favor it, but the differences of opinion are	favor it, but the differences of opinion are	while Republicans tend to be strongly in	while Republicans tend to be strongly in
generally small. Moreover, opinions are	generally small. Moreover, opinions are	favor it, and the differences of opinion	favor it, and the differences of opinion
mixed within both parties as members of	mixed within both parties as members of	are generally large. Opinions are clearly	are generally large. Opinions are clearly
each party can be found in large numbers	each party can be found in large numbers	split along partisan lines as most	split along partisan lines as most
on both sides of the issue.	on both sides of the issue.	members of each party are on the same	members of each party are on the same
		side as the rest of their party.	side as the rest of their party.
Respectful tone of debate	Harsh tone of debate	Respectful tone of debate	Harsh tone of debate
At the same time, the debate on this issue	At the same time, the debate on this issue	At the same time, the debate on this issue	At the same time, the debate on this issue
has been quite respectful. For instance, a	has been very harsh. For instance, a	has been quite respectful. For instance, a	has been very harsh. For instance, a
leading Republican member of Congress	leading Republican member of Congress	leading Republican member of Congress	leading Republican member of Congress
who supports this proposal has said that	who supports this proposal has said that	who supports this proposal has said that	who supports this proposal has said that
the opponents "are good and honest	the opponents "are bad people who can't	the opponents "are good and honest	the opponents "are bad people who can't
people." Likewise, a leading Democratic	stop lying." Likewise, a leading	people." Likewise, a leading Democratic	stop lying." Likewise, a leading
member of Congress who opposes this	Democratic member of Congress who	member of Congress who opposes this	Democratic member of Congress who
proposal has said that the supporters	opposes this proposal has said that the	proposal has said that the supporters	opposes this proposal has said that the
"have very good intentions."	supporters "have rotten intentions."	"have very good intentions."	supporters "have rotten intentions."

In the tables above, the vignettes used in the main study are shown. Three things should be noted about this material:

- 1. In the tables, all direct quotes relate to the intentions of the political opposition. However, as mentioned in the description of the experimental design, it was also possible for participants to receive statements related to the competence/capabilities of the political opposition. These statements were:
  - o "are clueless fools who don't know their stuff" (uncivil)
  - o "are clever guys who know their stuff" (civil)
  - o "are too incompetent to deserve any respect" (uncivil)
  - o "deserve a lot of respect for their competent work" (civil).
- 2. The vignettes used in follow-up study 1 were identical to the ones used in the main study, except that the uncivil quotes were now stronger. The uncivil quotes used in follow-up study 1 were:
  - o "have cruel and rotten intentions." (intentions)
  - o "are evil people who can't stop lying." (intentions)
  - o "are too stupid to deserve any respect." (competence)
  - o "are clueless idiots who don't know their stuff" (competence)
- 3. For purposes of benchmarking, both the main study and follow-up study 1 also included a control group that only read the introductory paragraph on both issues.

#### Vignettes used in second follow-up study

Civility	Incivility
<b>Drilling off the Atlantic Coast and in the Arctic</b> Some members of Congress have recently been discussing whether to allow drilling for oil and gas off the Atlantic Coast and in the Arctic.	Drilling off the Atlantic Coast and in the Arctic Some members of Congress have recently been discussing whether to allow drilling for oil and gas off the Atlantic Coast and in the Arctic.
On average, Democrats in Congress tend to be opposed to drilling, while Republicans tend to be in favor of it. Opinions are split along partisan lines as most members of each party are on the same side as the rest of their party.	On average, Democrats in Congress tend to be opposed to drilling, while Republicans tend to be in favor of it. Opinions are split along partisan lines as most members of each party are on the same side as the rest of their party.
Excerpts from the debate When asked to describe his political opponents, a leading Republican member of Congress said:	Excerpts from the debate When asked to describe his political opponents, a leading Republican member of Congress said:
"During this debate, our political opponents have shown themselves to be good and honest people."	"During this debate, our political opponents have shown themselves to be evil people who can't stop lying."
Likewise, a leading Democratic member of Congress said:	Likewise, a leading Democratic member of Congress said:
"When I look across the aisle, I see very good intentions."	"When I look across the aisle, I see cruel and rotten intentions."

In the table above, the vignettes used in the second follow-up study are shown. Two things should be noted about this material:


- 1. In the tables, all direct quotes relate to the intentions of the political opposition. However, as mentioned in the description of the experimental design, it was also possible for participants to receive statements related to the competence/capabilities of the political opposition. These statements were:
  - o "When I look across the aisle, I see clever guys who know their stuff." (civil)
  - "When I look across the aisle, I see clueless idiots who don't know their stuff." (uncivil)
  - o "During this debate, our political opponents have shown themselves to be competent people who deserve a lot of respect." (civil)
  - o "During this debate, our political opponents have shown themselves to be too incompetent to deserve any respect." (uncivil)
- 2. Unlike the two other experiments, this follow-up study 2 only focused on one issue (drilling) and did not include a benchmarking condition.

## Appendix A4: Pretest of statements used in main study

Question asked to respondents on Amazon's Mechanical Turk:

Below is a list of things that a politician might say about his or her political opponents during a debate or in an interview. How rude or polite would you rate each of the statements?

Average ratings of the eight statements



Respondents who did not rate all statements or used less than 10 seconds to rate the statements were removed from sample.

N = 101.

# Appendix A5: Main results based on samples excluding respondents who failed attentions checks

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (main study and follow-up study 1 pooled)

#### Effects on trust in politicians

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on attitude polarization


High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on affective polarization

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust (both issues)	(2) Policy attitudes (both issues)	(3) Affective polarization (both issues)
High polarization (vs. low)	0.000267	-0.0489***	0.0601***
	(0.0108)	(0.0140)	(0.0165)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0634***	-0.00395	0.0635***
	(0.0108)	(0.0140)	(0.0165)
Republican (vs. Democrat)		0.362***	
		(0.0189)	
High polarization * Republican		0.111***	
		(0.0221)	
Incivility * Republican		-0.0181	
7 1		(0.0221)	
Constant	0.385***	0.268***	0.277***
	(0.00936)	(0.0120)	(0.0143)
Observations	1,958	1,588	1,386
R-squared	0.017	0.467	0.020

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only main study)

#### Effects on trust in politicians

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on attitude polarization


High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on affective polarization

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust (both issues)	(2) Policy attitudes (both issues)	(3) Affective polarization (both issues)
High polarization (vs. low)	-0.00928	-0.0857***	0.0689**
	(0.0163)	(0.0222)	(0.0265)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0478**	0.000541	0.0664*
	(0.0163)	(0.0222)	(0.0265)
Republican (vs. Democrat)		0.409***	
•		(0.0287)	
High polarization * Republican		0.161***	
		(0.0335)	
Incivility * Republican		-0.0126	
, 1		(0.0335)	
Constant	0.386***	0.266***	0.341***
	(0.0142)	(0.0189)	(0.0234)
Observations	916	734	600
R-squared	0.010	0.540	0.022

## Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only follow-up study 1)

#### Effects on trust in politicians

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on attitude polarization


High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on affective polarization

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust (both issues)	(2) Policy attitudes (both issues)	(3) Affective polarization (both issues)
High polarization (vs. low)	0.00800	-0.0211	0.0438*
	(0.0144)	(0.0173)	(0.0201)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0772***	-0.00304	0.0544**
	(0.0144)	(0.0173)	(0.0201)
Republican (vs. Democrat)		0.318***	
•		(0.0244)	
High polarization * Republican		0.0622*	
		(0.0287)	
Incivility * Republican		-0.0243	
•		(0.0286)	
Constant	0.385***	0.267***	0.236***
	(0.0124)	(0.0150)	(0.0172)
Observations	1,042	854	786
R-squared	0.027	0.397	0.015

## Average effects of incivility (only follow-up study 2)




Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on attitude polarization

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on affective polarization

Incivility (vs. civility)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust	(2) Policy attitudes	(3) Affective polarization
Republican (vs. Democrat)		0.431***	
		(0.025)	
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.069***	-0.007	0.090***
• (	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Incivility * Republican		0.033	
•		(0.036)	
Constant	0.394***	0.184***	0.313***
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Observations	1,094	925	844
R-squared	0.021	0.402	0.022

# Appendix A6: Main results based on samples including respondents who failed attentions checks

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (main study and follow-up study 1 pooled)

#### Effects on trust in politicians

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on attitude polarization


High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on affective polarization

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust (both issues)	(2) Policy attitudes (both issues)	(3) Affective polarization (both issues)
High polarization (vs. low)	-0.004	-0.048***	0.056***
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.054***	0.002	0.050**
•	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Republican (vs. Democrat)		0.340***	
•		(0.019)	
High polarization * Republican		0.094***	
		(0.022)	
Incivility * Republican		-0.015	
, 1		(0.022)	
Constant	0.386***	0.290***	0.266***
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Observations	2,261	1,818	1,603
R-squared	0.012	0.403	0.014

## Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only main study)

#### Effects on trust in politicians

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on attitude polarization


High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on affective polarization

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust (both issues)	(2) Policy attitudes (both issues)	(3) Affective polarization (both issues)
High polarization (vs. low)	-0.016	-0.088***	0.068**
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.025)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.032*	0.015	0.039
• •	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.025)
Republican (vs. Democrat)		0.369***	
, ,		(0.030)	
High polarization * Republican		0.139***	
		(0.034)	
Incivility * Republican		-0.020	
J 1		(0.034)	
Constant	0.391***	0.310***	0.318***
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Observations	1,088	864	723
R-squared	0.005	0.433	0.014

#### Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only follow-up study 1)

#### Effects on trust in politicians

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on attitude polarization


High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on affective polarization

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust (both issues)	(2) Policy attitudes (both issues)	(3) Affective polarization (both issues)
High polarization (vs. low)	0.007	-0.016	0.040*
I	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.074*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.017)	0.053** (0.019)
Republican (vs. Democrat)	(0.011)	0.311***	(0.01))
,		(0.023)	
High polarization * Republican		0.050	
T 1 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11		(0.027)	
Incivility * Republican		-0.011 (0.027)	
Constant	0.382***	0.273***	0.230***
Constant	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Observations	1,173	954	880
R-squared	0.025	0.382	0.014

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only follow-up study 2)




Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on attitude polarization

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on affective polarization

Incivility (vs. civility)




Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust	(2) Policy attitudes	(3) Affective
			polarization
Republican (vs. Democrat)		0.421***	
		(0.024)	
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.070***	-0.012	0.093***
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Incivility * Republican		0.048	
•		(0.035)	
Constant	0.393***	0.188***	0.309***
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Observations	1,177	990	899
R-squared	0.022	0.403	0.023

## Appendix A7: Effects on in- and out-party affective ratings

In the article, increasing levels of incivility and increasing levels of issue polarization were found to create affective polarization by increasing the distance between in- and out-party ratings. Below, I show how the two dimensions of conflict affect in- and out-party ratings separately.


Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (main study and follow-up study 1 pooled)



	(1)	(2)
	Affect rating of in-party	Affect rating of out-party
High polarization (vs. low)	0.0146	-0.0463***
	(0.00995)	(0.0115)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0502***	-0.114***
	(0.00995)	(0.0115)
Constant	0.719***	0.439***
	(0.00864)	(0.00996)
Observations	1,437	1,419
R-squared	0.019	0.076

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05


## Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only main study)



	(1) Affect rating of in-party	(2) Affect rating of out-party
	riffeet rating of in party	Timeet racing or out party
High polarization (vs. low)	0.0252	-0.0442*
	(0.0151)	(0.0176)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0343*	-0.102***
•	(0.0151)	(0.0175)
Constant	0.731***	0.385***
	(0.0132)	(0.0155)
Observations	630	619
R-squared	0.012	0.062

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05


## Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only follow-up study 1)



	(1) Affect rating of in-party	(2) Affect rating of out-party
	7 Hier rating of in party	riffeet fatting of out party
High polarization (vs. low)	0.00252	-0.0419**
	(0.0131)	(0.0147)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0649***	-0.121***
•	(0.0131)	(0.0147)
Constant	0.713***	0.476***
	(0.0113)	(0.0126)
Observations	807	800
R-squared	0.030	0.086

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

## Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only follow-up study 1)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

Incivility (vs. civility)

	(1) Affect rating of in-party	(2) Affect rating of out-party
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0293*	-0.121***
3 (	(0.0130)	(0.0143)
Constant	0.708***	0.394***
	(0.00922)	(0.0102)
Observations	864	867
R-squared	0.006	0.077

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

## Appendix A8: Results concerning affective polarization split on variables used to form index

In the article, all results concerning affective polarization rely on an index composed of two different measures, but in this appendix, they are used individually as dependent variables to show the robustness of the results.

The thermometer question was: How warm or cold do you feel about the Democrats in Congress who work on this issue? And what about the Republicans? Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward them. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward them.

- -The Democrats in Congress who work on this issue
- -The Republicans in Congress who work on this issue


Answers on a slider ranging from 0 to 100.

The word question was: *To what extent do you think the following words describe the Democrats [Republicans] in Congress who work on this issue concerning air traffic controllers [drilling]?* 

- -Mean
- -Intelligent
- -Selfish

Possible answers: 1: Describes them extremely well, 2: Describes them very well, 3: Describes them moderately well, 4: Describes them slightly well, 5: Does not describe them, and 6: Don't know.


## Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (main study and follow-up study 1 pooled)



	(1) Affective polarization (thermometer)	(2) Affective polarization (word ratings)
High polarization (vs. low)	0.0764***	0.0440*
riigii polarization (vs. 10w)	(0.0163)	(0.0178)
Incivility (vs. civility)	0.0562***	0.0744***
• ,	(0.0163)	(0.0178)
Constant	0.273***	0.256***
	(0.0139)	(0.0154)
Observations	1,709	1,386
R-squared	0.020	0.017

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05


## Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only main study)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Affective polarization (thermometer)	(2) Affective polarization (word ratings)
High polarization (vs. low)	0.110***	0.0333
riigii polarization (vs. 10w)	(0.0244)	(0.0290)
Incivility (vs. civility)	0.0731**	0.0757**
3 (	(0.0244)	(0.0290)
Constant	0.289***	0.346***
	(0.0207)	(0.0256)
Observations	818	600
R-squared	0.036	0.014

## Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only follow-up study 1)




Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Affective polarization (thermometer)	(2) Affective polarization (word ratings)
High polarization (vs. low)	0.0435*	0.0408
riigh polarization (vs. 10 w)	(0.0215)	(0.0211)
Incivility (vs. civility)	0.0390	0.0659**
	(0.0215)	(0.0211)
Constant	0.261***	0.198***
	(0.0185)	(0.0181)
Observations	891	786
R-squared	0.008	0.017

## Average effects of incivility (only <a href="follow-up study 2">follow-up study 2</a>)

Incivility (vs. civility)



	(1)	(2)
	Affective polarization (thermometer)	Affective polarization (word ratings)
Incivility (vs. civility)	0.0714***	0.0952***
<b>3</b> \ <b>3</b> /	(0.0213)	(0.0225)
Constant	0.348***	0.275***
	(0.0152)	(0.0159)
Observations	939	844
R-squared	0.012	0.021

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses
\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

# Appendix A9: Results concerning trust split on variables used to form index

In the article, all results concerning trust in politicians rely on an index composed of two different measures, but in this appendix, they are used individually as dependent variables to show the robustness of the results.


The first trust question was: *How much trust do you have in the members of Congress who work on this issue?* 

Possible answers: 1: A great deal of trust, 2: Some trust, 3: Little trust, 4: Hardly any trust, and 5: Don't know.

The second trust questions was: *To what extent do you perceive the members of Congress who work on this issue to be trustworthy?* 

Possible answers: 1: To a very high extent, 2: -, 3: -, 4: -, 5: To some extent, 6: -, 7: -, 8: -, 9: To no extent, and 10: Don't know.


# Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (main study and follow-up study 1 pooled)



	(1)	(2)
	Trust (first question)	Trust (second question)
High polarization (vs. low)	-0.00615	0.00465
, ,	(0.0124)	(0.0105)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0725***	-0.0531***
•	(0.0124)	(0.0105)
Constant	0.376***	0.396***
	(0.0107)	(0.00909)
Observations	1,989	1,989
R-squared	0.017	0.013

OLS regressions coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05


# Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only main study)



	(1)	(2)
	Trust (first question)	Trust (second question)
High polarization (vs. low)	-0.0136	-0.00537
riigii polarization (vs. 10w)	(0.0184)	(0.0158)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0520**	-0.0429**
	(0.0184)	(0.0158)
Constant	0.373***	0.399***
	(0.0161)	(0.0137)
Observations	940	942
R-squared	0.009	0.008

OLS regressions coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05


# Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only follow-up study 1)



	(1)	(2)
	Trust (first question)	Trust (second question)
High polarization (vs. low)	-0.000382	0.0131
	(0.0167)	(0.0141)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0909***	-0.0622***
• (	(0.0167)	(0.0141)
Constant	0.378***	0.393***
	(0.0143)	(0.0121)
Observations	1,049	1,047
R-squared	0.028	0.019

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

# Average effects of issue polarization and incivility (only follow-up study 2)



Incivility (vs. civility)

	(1)	(2)
	Trust (first question)	Trust (second question)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0788***	-0.0575***
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	(0.0163)	(0.0135)
Constant	0.376***	0.410***
	(0.0116)	(0.00956)
Observations	1,101	1,097
R-squared	0.021	0.016

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

# Appendix A10: Description of attention checks

In the main study, the respondents were asked the following question on the final page of the survey:

In follow-up studies 1 and 2, this question was replaced with a question that preceded the experiment instead of following it (see Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018). The attention check question used in these was the following (taken from Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances 2014):

When a big news story breaks people often go online to get up-to-the-minute details on what is going on. We want to know which websites people trust to get this information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to the question. To show that you've read this much, please ignore the question and select ABC News and The Drudge Report as your two answers.

When there is a big news story, which is the one news website you would visit first? (Please only choose one)

() New York Post Online
() New York Times website
() Reuters website
() The Drudge Report
() The Associated Press (AP) website
() USA Today website
() Washington Post website
() Yahoo! News
() None of these websites


In order to pass the attention check, respondents had to choose ABC News and The Drudge Report.

# Appendix A11: Subsample analyses

To increase power, all subsample analyses rely on the pooled sample of respondents from the main study and follow-up study 1, which had very similar designs.


#### Does it matter whether the quotes focus on intentions or competence?

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility based only on responses provided after reading issue descriptions containing quotes related to <u>intentions</u>



	(1) Trust (both issues)	(2) Policy attitudes (both issues)	(3) Affective polarization (both issues)
High polarization (vs. low)	-0.00588	-0.0651***	0.0551*
Incivility (vs. civility)	(0.0151) -0.0683***	(0.0171) -0.0176	(0.0229) 0.0655**
Republican (vs. Democrat)	(0.0151)	(0.0171) 0.313***	(0.0229)
High polarization * Republican		(0.0230) 0.141***	
Incivility * Republican		(0.0270) -0.00148	
Constant	0.382***	(0.0270) 0.288***	0.275***
	(0.0129)	(0.0147)	(0.0200)
Observations	950	1,645	715
R-squared	0.021	0.336	0.019

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility based only on responses provided after reading issue descriptions containing quotes related to <u>competence</u>




	(1) Trust (both issues)	(2) Policy attitudes (both issues)	(3) Affective polarization (both issues)
			1550(5)
High polarization (vs. low)	0.0327	-0.0295	0.0655**
	(0.0216)	(0.0166)	(0.0237)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0620**	0.00409	0.0613**
• .	(0.0216)	(0.0166)	(0.0237)
Republican (vs. Democrat)		0.399***	
		(0.0225)	
High polarization * Republican		0.0757**	
		(0.0264)	
Incivility * Republican		-0.0184	
		(0.0264)	
Constant	0.369***	0.249***	0.280***
	(0.0189)	(0.0142)	(0.0204)
Observations	510	1,637	671
R-squared	0.020	0.393	0.021

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

#### Does it matter whether the issue focused on drilling or air traffic controllers?


Average effects of issue polarization and incivility based only on responses that followed the vignette about <u>drilling of the Atlantic Coast and in the Arctic</u>



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust (only air	(2) Policy attitudes	(3) Affective
	traffic control)	(only air traffic control)	polarization (only air traffic control)
			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
High polarization (vs. low)	-0.0207	-0.0507**	0.0498*
	(0.0152)	(0.0164)	(0.0229)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0705***	-0.0109	0.0794***
	(0.0152)	(0.0163)	(0.0229)
Republican (vs. Democrat)		0.438***	
		(0.0221)	
High polarization * Republican		0.0982***	
		(0.0259)	
Incivility * Republican		0.0160	
		(0.0259)	
Constant	0.410***	0.246***	0.254***
	(0.0134)	(0.0140)	(0.0196)
Observations	976	1,653	688
R-squared	0.023	0.472	0.025

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility based only on responses that followed the vignette about <u>air traffic controllers</u>




Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust (only air traffic control)	(2) Policy attitudes (only air traffic control)	(3) Affective polarization (only air traffic control)
High polarization (vs. low)	0.0205	-0.0438**	0.0695**
	(0.0153)	(0.0169)	(0.0235)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0575***	-0.00243	0.0470*
	(0.0153)	(0.0169)	(0.0236)
Republican (vs. Democrat)		0.272***	
•		(0.0228)	
High polarization * Republican		0.120***	
		(0.0267)	
Incivility * Republican		-0.0364	
,		(0.0267)	
Constant	0.362***	0.291***	0.302***
	(0.0131)	(0.0145)	(0.0207)
Observations	982	1,629	698
R-squared	0.016	0.261	0.018

### Are the effects on trust driven by independents or partisans (or both)?

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility on trust among independents and partisans




Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Trust –	Trust –	Trust –	Trust –
	pure	independents	partisans	partisans
	independents	including leaners	including leaners	excluding leaners
	0.000.604	0.0112	0.00200	0.00441
High polarization (vs. low)	0.000684	0.0112	0.00288	-0.00441
	(0.0290)	(0.0163)	(0.0118)	(0.0145)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0443	-0.0726***	-0.0664***	-0.0553***
	(0.0290)	(0.0162)	(0.0118)	(0.0145)
Constant	0.318***	0.351***	0.404***	0.420***
	(0.0243)	(0.0139)	(0.0102)	(0.0126)
Observations	272	785	1,612	1,099
R-squared	0.009	0.025	0.019	0.013

#### Are the results driven by Republicans or Democrats (or both)?

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility among <a href="Democrats">Democrats</a> (including leaners)




#### Effects on pol. attitudes

Incivility (vs. civility)
High polarization (vs. low)

#### Effects on affective polarization

High polarization (vs. low)
Incivility (vs. civility)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust	(2) Policy attitudes	(3) Affective polarization
High polarization (vs. low)	0.00527	-0.0489***	0.0558**
	(0.0150)	(0.0134)	(0.0212)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0505***	-0.00395	0.0530*
	(0.0150)	(0.0134)	(0.0212)
Constant	0.363***	0.268***	0.321***
	(0.0130)	(0.0115)	(0.0185)
Observations	967	954	836
R-squared	0.012	0.014	0.016

OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Policy attitudes range from 0 (most liberal attitudes) to 1 (most conservative attitudes)

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility among Republicans (including leaners)



High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on pol. attitudes


Incivility (vs. civility)

High polarization (vs. low)

#### Effects on affective polarization

High polarization (vs. low)

Incivility (vs. civility)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust	(2) Policy attitudes	(3) Affective polarization
High polarization (vs. low)	-0.00646	0.0618***	0.0677**
	(0.0183)	(0.0181)	(0.0255)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0862***	-0.0221	0.0750**
	(0.0183)	(0.0182)	(0.0255)
Constant	0.466***	0.630***	0.213***
	(0.0159)	(0.0155)	(0.0219)
Observations	645	634	550
R-squared	0.034	0.020	0.028


Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Policy attitudes range from 0 (most liberal attitudes) to 1 (most conservative attitudes)

# Are the effects different depending on whether dependent variables followed first or second issue?

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility among respondents answering DV questions after first issue




Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on attitude polarization

High polarization (vs. low)
Incivility (vs. civility)

#### Effects on affective polarization


High polarization (vs. low)
Incivility (vs. civility)



Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1)	(2) Policy attitudes	(3) Affective polarization
	Trust		
High polarization (vs. low)	0.0124	-0.0459**	0.0750**
	(0.0150)	(0.0164)	(0.0228)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0878***	-0.0131	0.0670**
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(0.0150)	(0.0164)	(0.0229)
Republican (vs. Democrat)	, ,	0.343***	,
•		(0.0220)	
High polarization * Republican		0.112***	
		(0.0260)	
Incivility * Republican		0.0102	
•		(0.0260)	
Constant	0.379***	0.282***	0.272***
	(0.0130)	(0.0140)	(0.0197)
Observations	997	1,655	698
R-squared	0.034	0.373	0.029

Average effects of issue polarization and incivility among respondents answering DV questions after second issue




Error bars are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals.

	(1) Trust	(2) Policy attitudes	(3) Affective
			polarization
High polarization (vs. low)	-0.0139	-0.0483**	0.0450
. , ,	(0.0155)	(0.0173)	(0.0238)
Incivility (vs. civility)	-0.0394*	-0.000200	0.0580*
	(0.0156)	(0.0173)	(0.0238)
Republican (vs. Democrat)	, ,	0.368***	, ,
		(0.0235)	
High polarization * Republican		0.105***	
		(0.0274)	
Incivility * Republican		-0.0297	
		(0.0274)	
Constant	0.392***	0.254***	0.284***
	(0.0135)	(0.0149)	(0.0207)
Observations	961	1,627	688
R-squared	0.008	0.355	0.013

# Appendix A12: Results from factorial experiments compared to benchmark condition


#### Trust in politicians

Trust in politicians across treatments groups (main study and follow-up study 1 pooled)




Only respondents who passed attention checks and answered both trust questions are included in sample. Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. N = 2,431.

#### Trust in politicians across treatments groups (only main study)



Only respondents who passed attention checks and answered both trust questions are included in sample. Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. N = 1,124.


Trust in politicians across treatments groups (only follow-up study 1)



Only respondents who passed attention checks and answered both trust questions are included in sample. Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. N = 2,431.


#### Partisan attitude polarization

Partisan attitude polarization across treatments groups (main study and follow-up study 1 pooled)




Attitude polarization is calculated as the difference in attitudes between Republicans and Democrats. Only respondents who passed attention checks and answered attitude questions on both issues are included. Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. N = 1,964.

#### Partisan attitude polarization across treatments groups (only main study)



Attitude polarization is calculated as the difference in attitudes between Republicans and Democrats. Only respondents who passed attention checks and answered attitude questions on both issues are included. Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. N = 890.


#### Partisan attitude polarization across treatments groups (only follow-up study 1)



Attitude polarization is calculated as the difference in attitudes between Republicans and Democrats. Only respondents who passed attention checks and answered attitude questions on both issues are included. Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. N=1,074.

#### Affective partisan polarization


Affective partisan polarization across treatments groups (main study and follow-up study 1 pooled)



Only respondents who passed attention checks and answered both the thermometer and word-rating questions are included.


Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. N = 1,715.

Affective partisan polarization across treatments groups (only main study)



Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. N = 726.

# Affective partisan polarization across treatments groups (only follow-up study 1)



Only respondents who passed attention checks and answered both the thermometer and word-rating questions are included.

Error bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. N = 989.

# Appendix A13: Full models for analysis of follow-up study 2

Trust in politicians (0 to 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Perceived issue polarization (-1 to 1)		-0.0956**	-0.0297
,		(0.0340)	(0.0320)
Perceived incivility (0 to 1)	-0.480***	, ,	-0.465***
• • •	(0.0598)		(0.0623)
Social trust (0 to 1)	-0.182***	-0.187***	-0.180***
	(0.0341)	(0.0367)	(0.0339)
Political interest (0 to 1)	-0.0716*	-0.0910**	-0.0648*
	(0.0319)	(0.0343)	(0.0323)
Perception of economy (0 to 1)	0.198***	0.229***	0.198***
	(0.0398)	(0.0422)	(0.0397)
Strength of party ID (0 to 1)	0.00917	0.0252	0.0124
	(0.0284)	(0.0302)	(0.0283)
Constant	0.659***	0.358***	0.658***
	(0.0541)	(0.0425)	(0.0540)
Observations	473	473	473
R-squared	0.250	0.143	0.252

OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Political attitudes (-1 to 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Republican * Perceived issue pol.		0.394***	0.398***
		(0.0574)	(0.0598)
Republican * Perceived incivility	0.205	, ,	-0.0209
1	(0.117)		(0.119)
Perceived incivility (0 to 1)	-0.176**		-0.0906
• ` ,	(0.0670)		(0.0635)
Perceived issue polarization (-1 to 1)	,	-0.245***	-0.233***
, ,		(0.0403)	(0.0411)
Republican (dummy)	0.237**	0.158***	0.174*
1	(0.0843)	(0.0366)	(0.0809)
Social trust (0 to 1)	-0.0199	-0.0271	-0.0270
, ,	(0.0337)	(0.0317)	(0.0318)
Political interest (0 to 1)	-0.0329	-0.0411	-0.0331
` '	(0.0365)	(0.0325)	(0.0322)
Perception of economy (0 to 1)	0.0419	0.0498	0.0433
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	(0.0400)	(0.0391)	(0.0390)
Strength of party ID (0 to 1)	-0.0264	0.00581	` '
	(0.0338)	(0.0327)	
Constant	0.395***	0.402***	0.461***
	(0.0621)	(0.0443)	(0.0529)
Observations	401	401	401
R-squared	0.531	0.584	0.587

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Perceived issue polarization (-1 to 1)		0.111**	0.0922*
_		(0.0408)	(0.0394)
Perceived incivility (0 to 1)	0.189*		0.147
	(0.0795)		(0.0775)
Social trust (0 to 1)	0.0553	0.0553	0.0532
	(0.0467)	(0.0459)	(0.0462)
Political interest (0 to 1)	0.0806	0.0694	0.0587
	(0.0422)	(0.0421)	(0.0417)
Perception of economy (0 to 1)	-0.0903	-0.0966	-0.0881
• • • •	(0.0593)	(0.0582)	(0.0587)
Strength of party ID (0 to 1)	0.424***	0.418***	0.420***
8 1 1 1	(0.0481)	(0.0487)	(0.0481)
Constant	-0.0488	0.0375	-0.0538
	(0.0727)	(0.0531)	(0.0718)
Observations	389	389	389
R-squared	0.210	0.212	0.220

OLS regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

#### Survey questions used in non-experimental follow-up study

#### • Trust in politicians

Trust in politicians was measured using an index composed of two questions. The first question was: *How much trust do you have in the politicians in Congress?* 

Possible answers: 1: A great deal of trust, 2: Some trust, 3: Little trust, 4: Hardly any trust, and 5: Don't know.

The second questions was: *To what extent do you perceive the politicians in Congress to be trustworthy?* 

Possible answers: 1: To a very high extent, 2: -, 3: -, 4: -, 5: To some extent, 6: -, 7: -, 8: -, 9: To no extent, and 10: Don't know.

#### Political attitudes

Political attitudes were measured using an index composed of three questions. The first question was: Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.

Where would you place <u>yourself</u> on this scale?

Possible answers: 1: 1 (Government should greatly decrease defense spending), 2: 2, 3: 3, 4: 4, 5: 5, 6:6, and 7: 7 (Government should greatly increase defense spending)

The second question was: Some people think the federal government needs to regulate business to protect the environment. They think that efforts to protect the environment will also create jobs. Let us say this is point 1 on a 1-7 scale. Others think that the federal government should not regulate business to protect the environment. They think this regulation will not do much to help the environment and will cost us jobs. Let us say this is point 7 on a 1-7 scale. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.

Where would you place <u>vourself</u> on this scale?

Possible answers: 1: 1 (Regulate business to protect the environment and create jobs), 2: 2, 3: 3, 4: 4, 5: 5, 6: 6, and 7: 7 (No regulation because it will not work and will cost jobs)

The third question was: Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.

Possible answers: 1: 1 (Government should see to jobs and standard of living), 2: 2, 3: 3, 4: 4, 5: 5, 6: 6, and 7: 7 (Government should let each person get ahead on their own)

#### Affective polarization

Affective polarization was measured using an index composed of both a thermometer question and word rating questions.

The thermometer question was: How warm or cold do you feel about the following groups of people? Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group.

- The Democrats in Congress
- The Republicans in Congress

Answers on a slider ranging from 0 to 100.

The word question was: To what extent do you think the following words describe the Democrats

[Republicans] in Congress?

- -Mean
- -Intelligent
- -Selfish

Possible answers: 1: Describes them extremely well, 2: Describes them very well, 3: Describes them moderately well, 4: Describes them slightly well, 5: Does not describe them, and 6: Don't know.

#### Perceived issue polarization

After respondents had indicated their own attitude on each of the three policy issues (i.e., defense spending, regulation of businesses to protect the environment, and guaranteed jobs and income), they were also asked to place the "Republicans in Congress" and the "Democrats in Congress." These placements were used to calculate perceived issue polarization.

#### Perceived incivility

Perceived incivility was measured using the following question: *Based on what you have seen in debates and in the media, how would you, on average, describe the tone of discussions between politicians? The closer your mark is to one of the two words, the more you feel it describes the tone.* 

Rude-Polite
Agitated-Calm
Emotional- Unemotional
Hostile-Friendly
Quarrelsome-Cooperative

Each pair was arranged on a nine-point scale with a word in each end.

#### Social trust

Social trust was measured using this question: *Generally speaking, would you say that most people* can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

Answers were provided on a 11-point scale, which was labeled with "Most people can be trusted" and "You can't be too careful" at the ends.

#### Political interest

Political interest was measured using this question: Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?

Possible answers: 1: Most of the time, 2: Some of the time, 3: Only now and then, 4: Hardly at all, and 5: Don't know

#### Perceptions of the economy

Perceptions of the economy was measured using this question: *Would you say that over the past year the American economy has gotten better or worse?* 

Possible answers: 1: Much better, 2: Moderately better, 3: Slightly better, 4: About the same, 5: Slightly worse, 6: Moderately worse, 7: Much worse, and 8: Don't know.

#### • Strength of party identification

Strength of party identification was measured by folding answers to the following question: *Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an independent?* 

Possible answers: 1: Strong Republican, 2: Republican, 3: Independent leaning Republican, 4: Independent, 5: Independent leaning Democrat, 6: Democrat, 7: Strong Democrat, and 8: Something else

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