**VIII. On-Line Appendices**

**Appendix A**

Table A1: Summary Statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **N** | **Mean** | **S.D.** | **Min** | **Max** |
| Grievance | 1042 | 64.94 | 8.53 | 40.97 | 87.40 |
| Polarization | 1042 | 53.85 | 6.26 | 36.36 | 84.87 |
| Protest | 1226 | 0.42 | 1.26 | 0.00 | 22.00 |
| Gini | 1105 | 35.22 | 9.79 | 18.94 | 67.40 |
| Ln GDP/cap | 1236 | 9.26 | 1.03 | 5.70 | 10.85 |
| Growth | 1272 | 2.80 | 4.79 | -44.90 | 18.29 |
| Ln Inflation | 1272 | 1.71 | 1.31 | 0.00 | 9.64 |
| Legislative Election | 1264 | 0.27 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Executive Election | 1265 | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Polity2 | 1297 | 8.51 | 1.98 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| Regime Durability | 1297 | 30.98 | 34.30 | 0.00 | 202.00 |
| Political Terror | 1241 | 1.97 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 5.00 |
| Urbanicity | 1287 | 65.94 | 16.63 | 7.25 | 97.49 |
| Ln Population | 1287 | 16.35 | 1.31 | 12.80 | 20.81 |
| Presidential System | 1297 | 0.41 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 1297 | 0.33 | 0.22 | 0.00 | 0.93 |
| Time Trend | 1297 | -0.18 | 9.12 | -33.00 | 11.00 |

Table A2: Table of Correlations

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Protest | Polarization | Grievance |
| Protest |  | 0.0906\*\* | 0.0668\* |
| Polarization | 0.0906\*\* |  | 0.182\*\*\* |
| Grievance | 0.0668\* | 0.182\*\*\* |  |
| GINI | 0.0221 | 0.404\*\*\* | 0.286\*\*\* |
| GDP/cap | 0.00676 | -0.506\*\*\* | -0.351\*\*\* |
| Growth | -0.107\*\*\* | -0.0242 | -0.189\*\*\* |
| Ln Inflation | 0.0616\* | 0.233\*\*\* | 0.365\*\*\* |
| Legislative Election | -0.0138 | -0.0853\*\* | -0.138\*\*\* |
| Executive Election | 0.0208 | 0.0579 | 0.0616\* |
| Polity | -0.0375 | -0.329\*\*\* | -0.312\*\*\* |
| Reg. Durability | 0.0316 | -0.192\*\*\* | -0.468\*\*\* |
| Political Terror | 0.0517 | 0.318\*\*\* | 0.346\*\*\* |
| Urbanicity | 0.0678\* | -0.346\*\*\* | -0.160\*\*\* |
| Ln Population | 0.187\*\*\* | -0.0165 | 0.107\*\*\* |
| Presidential | -0.0162 | 0.245\*\*\* | 0.225\*\*\* |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.0386 | 0.253\*\*\* | 0.193\*\*\* |

Table A3: Alternative Representation of the Relationship Between

Grievance and Polarization

**Polarization**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **High** | **Low** |
| **High** | Exclusive Systems | Oligarchic Systems |
| **Low** | Majoritarian Systems | Inclusive Systems |

**Grievance**

**Appendix B**

Table B1: Countries and Years Represented in Data

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Year** |
| Albania  Argentina  Armenia  Australia  Austria  Azerbaijan  Bangladesh  Belarus  Belgium  Benin  Bolivia  Botswana  Brazil  Bulgaria  Burkina Faso  Canada  Cape Verde  Chile  Colombia  Costa Rica  Croatia  Cyprus  Czech Republic  Denmark  Dominican Republic  Ecuador  El Salvador  Estonia  Finland  France  Georgia  Germany  Ghana  Greece  Guatemala  Honduras  Hungary  Indonesia  Iran  Ireland  Israel  Italy  Japan  Kenya  Korea  Latvia  Lesotho  Lithuania  Luxembourg  Macedonia  Madagascar  Mexico  Modova  Mongolia  Mozanbique  Namibia  Netherlands  New Zeland  Nicaragua  Nigeria  Norway  Panama  Paraguay  Peru  Philipines  Poland  Portugal  Romania  Russia  Senegal  Slovakia  Slovenia  South Africa  Spain  Sweden  Switzerland  Taiwan  Tanzania  Thailand  Turkey  Uganda  Ukraine  United Kingdom  United States  Uruguay  Venezuela  Zambia  Zimbabwe | 1192-1996, 2002, 2005, 2008  1995-2012  1992-1997, 2008  1996, 2004, 2007  1995-2012  1997, 2008  2002  1992-1996, 2000, 2004, 2008  1973-2012  2005, 2008  1996-2012  1999, 2003, 2005, 2008  1995-2010, 2012  1992-2012  2008  1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012  2002, 2005, 2008  1995-2012  1996-2012  1996-1998, 2000-2012  1995-1999, 2005-2010  2002-2012  1992-2012  1973-2012  2004-2012  1996-2010, 2012  1996-2010, 2012  1992-1997, 1999, 2001-2012  1993-2012  1973, 1976-2012  1992, 1994-1996, 2008  1973, 1976-2012  1999, 2002, 2005, 2008  1980-2012  1996-2010, 2012  1996-2010, 2012  1992-2012  2001, 2006  2000, 2007  1973, 1976-2012  1996, 2003, 2006  1973, 1976-2012  1996, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2007  2003, 2005, 2008  2000-2008  1992-1999, 2001-2012  2000, 2003, 2005, 2008  1992-2012  1973, 1976-2012  1992-1996, 2001, 2007-2010  2005, 2008  1995-2012  1992, 1996, 2002, 2008  2003, 2006  2002, 2005, 2008  1999, 2003, 2005, 2008  1973, 1976-2012  1996, 2002, 2008  1996-2012  2000, 2003, 2005, 2008  1990-1997, 2001-2005  1996-2010, 2012  1995-1998, 2000-2010, 2012  1995-1998, 2000-2012  2001-2005, 2010  1992-1997, 1999, 2001-2012  1985-2012  1992-1997, 1999, 2001-2012  1992-1996, 1999-2000, 2004, 2008  2002, 2005, 2008  1993-1997, 1999, 2001-2012  1992-1997, 1999, 2001-2012  2000, 2001-2002, 2006, 2008, 2009  1985-2012  1995, 1997-2012  1999, 2003, 2007, 2008  1996, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008  2001, 2003, 2005, 2008  2001, 2002, 2006, 2007  2001-2011  2000-2002, 2005, 2008  1992-1996, 1998-2000, 2004, 2008  1973, 1976-2012  1996, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012  1995-1998, 2000-2010, 2012  1995-1998, 2000-2012  1999, 2003, 2005, 2009  1999, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2009 |

**Appendix C**

Table C1: Count Models of violent and non-violent protest

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model Specification 1** | | **Model Specification 2** | | **Model Specification 3** | |
|  | **Without Country RE** | **With Country RE** | **Without Country RE** | **With Country RE** | **Without Country RE** | **With Country RE** |
| Protest (*t-1*) | 0.236\*\*\* (0.071) | 0.136\*\*\* (0.050) | 0.220\*\*\* (0.068) | 0.141\*\*\* (0.048) | 0.206\*\*\* (0.066) | 0.140\*\*\* (0.048) |
| Polarization (*t-1*) |  |  | 0.056\*\* (0.024) | 0.044\*\* (0.021) | 0.049\*\* (0.021) | 0.043\*\* (0.021) |
| Grievance (*t-1*) |  |  | 0.001 (0.013) | 0.000 (0.016) | 0.007 (0.014) | 0.008 (0.016) |
| Grievance\*Polarization (*t-1*) |  |  |  |  | -0.005\*\* (0.002) | -0.004\* (0.002) |
| GINI (*t-1*) | 0.062\*\*\* (0.023) | 0.044\* (0.024) | 0.049\* (0.025) | 0.037 (0.024) | 0.049\* (0.025) | 0.036 (0.024) |
| GINI^2 (*t-1*) | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.000 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.000 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.001) |
| GDP/cap (*t-1*) | -0.167 (0.313) | -0.108 (0.345) | -0.164 (0.299) | -0.055 (0.336) | -0.249 (0.301) | -0.111 (0.330) |
| Growth (*t-1*) | -0.016 (0.021) | -0.025 (0.025) | -0.011 (0.022) | -0.020 (0.026) | -0.025 (0.021) | -0.027 (0.026) |
| Ln Inflation (*t-1*) | -0.065 (0.114) | -0.080 (0.117) | -0.078 (0.120) | -0.076 (0.117) | -0.092 (0.121) | -0.086 (0.116) |
| Legislative Election (*t-1*) | 0.275 (0.333) | 0.199 (0.231) | 0.206 (0.290) | 0.180 (0.230) | 0.230 (0.288) | 0.199 (0.230) |
| Executive Election (*t-1*) | 0.230 (0.376) | 0.120 (0.337) | 0.147 (0.369) | 0.070 (0.335) | 0.132 (0.360) | 0.048 (0.332) |
| Polity (*t-1*) | -0.228\*\* (0.106) | -0.174\*\* (0.087) | -0.195\*\* (0.099) | -0.163\* (0.086) | -0.141 (0.096) | -0.137 (0.085) |
| Reg. Durability (*t-1*) | 0.002 (0.005) | -0.005 (0.006) | 0.001 (0.005) | -0.006 (0.007) | 0.001 (0.004) | -0.004 (0.006) |
| Political Terror (*t-1*) | -0.065 (0.135) | -0.011 (0.167) | -0.167 (0.133) | -0.061 (0.166) | -0.122 (0.128) | -0.049 (0.164) |
| Urbanicity (*t-1*) | 0.021\* (0.012) | 0.025\* (0.015) | 0.022\* (0.011) | 0.025\* (0.014) | 0.024\*\* (0.011) | 0.026\* (0.014) |
| Ln Population (*t-1*) | 0.348\*\*\* (0.102) | 0.351\*\*\* (0.124) | 0.415\*\*\* (0.102) | 0.395\*\*\* (0.122) | 0.426\*\*\* (0.102) | 0.415\*\*\* (0.120) |
| Presidential | -1.206\*\*\* (0.460) | -0.854\* (0.500) | -1.045\*\* (0.520) | -0.787 (0.486) | -1.052\*\* (0.523) | -0.788\* (0.477) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.210 (0.664) | -0.107 (0.863) | -0.128 (0.703) | -0.125 (0.830) | -0.421 (0.708) | -0.299 (0.816) |
| Time trend | -0.049\*\*\* (0.018) | -0.049\*\*\* (0.016) | -0.032\* (0.019) | -0.038\*\* (0.017) | -0.031\* (0.019) | -0.037\*\* (0.017) |
| Constant | -0.008 (0.373) | -0.673 (0.465) | -0.327 (0.351) | -0.767\* (0.446) | -0.314 (0.360) | -0.724\* (0.436) |
| lnalpha |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 1.511\*\*\* (0.171) | 1.189\*\*\* (0.141) | 1.454\*\*\* (0.169) | 1.178\*\*\* (0.142) | 1.423\*\*\* (0.168) | 1.172\*\*\* (0.143) |
| var(cons[Country]) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant |  | 0.644\*\* (0.272) |  | 0.554\*\* (0.250) |  | 0.499\*\* (0.239) |
| N | 872 | 872 | 872 | 872 | 872 | 872 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Table C2: Count Models with Random Effects and Without Time Trend, Post-1992

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|  |  |  |  |
| Protest(t-1) | 0.393\*\*\* (0.080) | 0.398\*\*\* (0.088) | 0.381\*\*\* (0.088) |
| GINI | 0.060\*\*\* (0.022) |  | -0.016 (0.085) |
| GINI^2 | -0.002 (0.001) |  | 0.001 (0.001) |
| Polarization |  | 0.050\*\*\* (0.019) | 0.052\*\*\* (0.020) |
| Grievance |  | 0.016 (0.015) | 0.015 (0.016) |
| Polarization\*Grievance |  |  | -0.005\*\* (0.002) |
| GDP/cap | -0.077 (0.306) | -0.219 (0.295) | -0.302 (0.306) |
| Growth | -0.029 (0.020) | -0.013 (0.024) | -0.035 (0.025) |
| Logged Inflation | -0.047 (0.089) | -0.141 (0.099) | -0.185\* (0.101) |
| Legislative Elections | 0.080 (0.221) | 0.054 (0.245) | 0.064 (0.249) |
| Executive Elections | 0.203 (0.280) | 0.195 (0.303) | 0.284 (0.310) |
| Polity | -0.166\*\* (0.065) | -0.190\*\*\* (0.071) | -0.170\*\* (0.075) |
| Regime Durability | -0.005 (0.006) | -0.002 (0.006) | -0.000 (0.006) |
| Regime Terror | -0.147 (0.144) | -0.104 (0.146) | -0.043 (0.151) |
| Urbanicity | 0.025\* (0.013) | 0.027\*\* (0.013) | 0.027\*\* (0.013) |
| Ln Population | 0.271\*\* (0.114) | 0.359\*\*\* (0.113) | 0.324\*\*\* (0.113) |
| Presidential Sys. | -0.869\*\* (0.415) | -0.427 (0.371) | -0.738\* (0.436) |
| Ethnic Frac. | 0.012 (0.725) | -0.173 (0.677) | -0.541 (0.730) |
| Constant | -1.163\*\*\* (0.410) | -1.508\*\*\* (0.348) | -1.861 (1.601) |
| Ln Alpha | 0.307 (0.224) | 0.489\*\* (0.233) | 0.440\* (0.252) |
| *Random Effects* |  |  |  |
| Country | 0.634\*\* (0.248) | 0.382\* (0.207) | 0.280 (0.191) |
| N | 913 | 783 | 703 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Table C3: Policy-Oriented Protests in Democracies and Autocracies

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Polity Score | Stated goals of the campaign event | | | | | | | |
| Regime Change | Institutional Reform | Policy Change | Territorial Secession | Greater Autonomy | Anti-Occupation | Unknown | Total |
| -10 | 0.79 | 77.78 | 9.52 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 11.90 | 100.00 |
| -9 | 64.77 | 6.84 | 4.86 | 0.53 | 0.48 | 0.09 | 22.44 | 100.00 |
| -8 | 29.84 | 30.24 | 15.32 | 9.27 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 15.32 | 100.00 |
| -7 | 27.78 | 11.13 | 24.02 | 12.12 | 10.12 | 0.11 | 14.72 | 100.00 |
| -6 | 24.38 | 2.48 | 42.78 | 11.89 | 0.03 | 0.25 | 18.18 | 100.00 |
| -5 | 7.54 | 8.71 | 46.29 | 0.37 | 1.72 | 0.18 | 35.19 | 100.00 |
| -4 | 22.75 | 10.01 | 31.74 | 11.49 | 2.96 | 0.57 | 20.48 | 100.00 |
| -3 | 32.44 | 11.30 | 23.83 | 0.03 | 5.54 | 0.03 | 26.85 | 100.00 |
| -2 | 25.64 | 13.06 | 22.65 | 12.25 | 8.48 | 0.12 | 17.80 | 100.00 |
| -1 | 0.67 | 46.00 | 35.33 | 2.67 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 15.33 | 100.00 |
| 0 | 73.19 | 4.82 | 5.66 | 0.05 | 0.84 | 0.14 | 15.30 | 100.00 |
| 2 | 39.32 | 5.44 | 30.17 | 0.00 | 1.53 | 0.07 | 23.47 | 100.00 |
| 3 | 55.14 | 2.10 | 16.18 | 6.79 | 0.62 | 2.00 | 17.16 | 100.00 |
| 4 | 26.89 | 32.86 | 23.55 | 0.00 | 0.53 | 0.00 | 16.17 | 100.00 |
| 5 | 10.01 | 32.54 | 24.35 | 0.63 | 2.08 | 0.19 | 30.21 | 100.00 |
| 6 | 12.60 | 15.56 | 43.32 | 0.51 | 1.35 | 0.11 | 26.55 | 100.00 |
| 7 | 6.41 | 7.49 | 42.77 | 6.34 | 9.10 | 0.05 | 27.83 | 100.00 |
| 8 | 5.21 | 5.64 | 39.44 | 10.05 | 1.18 | 0.16 | 38.32 | 100.00 |
| 9 | 3.29 | 4.35 | 66.22 | 4.72 | 8.27 | 0.21 | 12.94 | 100.00 |
| 10 | 0.55 | 31.28 | 59.97 | 0.00 | 0.27 | 0.27 | 7.65 | 100.00 |
| Total | 25.72 | 10.16 | 30.91 | 5.90 | 4.07 | 0.26 | 22.97 | 100.00 |
| Cell entries arepercentages. The data show that protests in authoritarian regimes are often centered around regime-change, whereas more stablished democracies (categorized by Polity as those beyond 6in the scale), experience less than 10 percent of protests aimed at regime change. Regarding policy-oriented protest, although protest of this kind happens in both democracies and non-democracies, we suspect this is due to the sample of countries coded in the NAVCO dataset. | | | | | | | | |

Figure C1: Protest Occurrence in democracies and non-democracies

**Note**: Data compiled by authors.